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Land Warfare in Ukraine Modern Battlefield of Europe

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Land Warfare in Ukraine Modern Battlefield of Europe Food for thought 05-2019 Land warfare in Ukraine Modern Battlefield of Europe AN EXPERTISE FORUM CONTRIBUTING TO EUROPEAN CONTRIBUTING TO FORUM AN EXPERTISE SINCE 1953 ARMIES INTEROPERABILITY European Army Interoperability Center INTRODUCTION This paper was drawn up by Martin Šuba under the supervision and guidance of the Director of the The war in Ukraine began in 2014 and there Permanent Secretariat. are no signs of it ending in the near future. It is the longest conflict on the European con- This Food for Thought paper is a docu- tinent since the Second World War, and the ment that gives an initial reflection on only ongoing military conflict on the Euro- the theme. The content is not reflecting the positions of the member states, but pean continent. The war in Ukraine is usually consists of elements that can initiate linked to other conflicts in the post-Soviet re- and feed the discussions and analyses gion, stemming from the continuation of the in the domain of the theme. It was Russian ‘near abroad’ policy, which seeks to drafted by the Permanent Secretariat of Finabel. maintain influence in countries of the former USSR1 and the Eastern Bloc countries. We can also view this policy in the context of the renewed West-Russia rivalry, which includes broader geopolitical themes, such as NATO enlargement or energy security. The events di- rectly leading to the Ukrainian crisis in 2013 TABLE OF CONTENT and following the annexation of Crimea are shortly discussed in first subhead of chapter; Introduction 2 “Timeline of the war”. Timeline of the war 3 This study overall focuses on the military - Political background and features of the Ukrainian conflict, beginning annexation of Crimea 3 with a timeline of the most important events - War in Donbas – main developments 4 that took place. There is a prominent focus on land warfare, opposing actors in the con- War in Donbas 6 flict, support from abroad, and the military - Specifics of modern warfare strength and capabilities of Ukraine. The war in Ukraine 6 in Ukraine is interesting from a land war- - Actors of the conflict and fare perspective due to the fact that modern their military strength 7 technology and strategies are being used in - Military exercises and weapons combination with old Soviet weapons and provided to Ukraine 12 vehicles. - The Gerasimov model of Hybrid Warfare 14 The separate subhead of the study focuses on - Human Rights violations the humanitarian situation in Donbas in or- in Donbas 17 der to present the war’s impact on the soldiers and citizens of the Donbas region. Conclusion 19 Bibliography 20 Chapter 2.3 focuses on military exercises con- ducted during the war by different actors. A specific chapter is dedicated to the exam- ination of a new Russian way of warfare, 1 USSR – The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics which is being used in the war in Ukraine. Land warfare in Ukraine 2 TIMELINE OF THE WAR the 25th of May 2014, and Petro Poroshenko become the new president of Ukraine. Two Political background and days later he signed an association agreement annexation of Crimea with the EU („Little Green Men“: a primer on Modern Russian Unconventional Warfare, Ukraine has been balancing its foreign policy Ukraine 2013-2014, pdf.). between the West and Russian since gaining independence in 1991. Ukrainian independ- Beginning on the 26th of February 2014, ence resulted in problems with Russia, because, pro-Russian protests appeared in Simferopol, among many other issues, a large amount of the capital of Crimea. At the same time, un- Russian military personnel and huge amounts identified soldiers began to seize military fa- of material, were suddenly in a foreign coun- cilities, airfields, and governmental and me- try. Most important were the Soviet nuclear dia buildings. On the 27th of February 2014, weapons and Russian Black Sea fleet stationed these armed and unidentified groups sur- in Sevastopol on the Crimean Peninsula. The rounded and occupied the Crimean regional question of nuclear weapons was resolved in parliament and raised the Russian flag on top 1994 by the signing of the Budapest Memo- of the building („Little Green Men“: a primer randum. Ukraine agreed to hand all of its nu- on Modern Russian Unconventional Warfare, clear weapons to Russia in exchange for secu- Ukraine 2013-2014, pdf.). rity assurances from Russia, the United States, Great Britain and France. After this, Russia In order to avoid more bloodshed, the Ukraini- and Ukraine signed many more treaties regard- an government ordered its soldiers in Crimea to ing their mutual partnership, cooperation, and not resist. The invaders were later identified as the Black sea fleet (Bilinsky, 1999). The treaties members of the Russian army, although it was were revoked by both sides after the annexation repeatedly denied by Russian President Putin at of Crimea in 2014. Since the 1990’s there were the time. These soldiers blocked all of the roads discussions in Ukraine about joining NATO and other transport links connecting Crimea and the EU, and both were declared as a prior- with Ukraine. After annexation of the whole ity for Ukraine (Roudik, 2014). peninsula, the Crimean parliament decided to hold a referendum on its status. On the 16th of This schism in Ukrainian geopolitics escalated March 2014, the people voted for Crimea to in 2013 when President Viktor Yanukovych join the Russian Federation as an integral part. refused to sign an association agreement with This referendum was not recognised as credible, the EU which resulted in massive protests in or in line with international law by the majority the Ukrainian capital – Kyiv, and in other of countries, because it was in contradiction to Ukrainian cities. The biggest protests took the Ukrainian constitution (article 73, in regard place in Kyiv’s main square, Maidan Nezalezh- to border changes). The referendum took place nosti (literally: square of independence), after the annexation, when the media were al- which is why the protests became known as ready controlled by pro-Russian forces, and Euromaidan. Protests continued during 2014 international observers were not present during and escalated to violent clashes between pro- the referendum (Matzek, 2016). testers and police, which resulted in hundreds of wounded and many dead. President Ya- The annexation prompted the levying of nukovych was forced to flee the capital city, economic sanctions on Russia by the United first to Eastern Ukraine, and later to exile in States, Canada, Australia, the EU, and many Russia (DPR, online). Elections were held on others (Wang, 2015). Land warfare in Ukraine 3 War in Donbas – main developments as a direct invasion. The Russian claims were obviously false because the trucks were ac- On the 6th of April 2014, armed separatist companied by rebel soldiers, and not the Red groups stormed police stations in Donetsk Cross, which usually accompanies similar hu- and seized arms located there. They called manitarian help. for secession from Ukraine and the creation of the Donetsk Republic, and these rebels In February 2015, rebels began bombard- wanted to hold a referendum on independ- ment of Ukrainian positions and then encir- ence. Separatist militants launched offensives cled and attacked the city of Debaltseve. Dis- in Kramatorsk and Slavyansk on the 12th of cussions on resolving the conflict continued April 2014 and took over military and po- under the leadership of the OSCE and also lice headquarters in the region. The next day, by the Normandy-format, which includes the Ukrainian government initiated an Anti- France, Germany, Ukraine and Russia. These terrorist Operation (ATO) and sent troops negotiations eventually resulted in the Minsk against rebels in Slavyansk. They were howev- II agreement. A ceasefire was planned to er pushed back, and separatists seized all their come into force on the 15th of February 2015, military equipment. Separatists also tried to while heavy fighting still continued around seize a military base in Mariupol, which is Debaltseve and the village of Loginovo (Birn- an important Ukrainian harbour city, how- baum, Demirjian, 2015). However, follow- ever they were defeated and repulsed by the ing the 15th of February, fighting continued Ukrainian army. and rebels and Ukrainian forces blamed each other for violating the Minsk agreement. The On the 17th of April 2014, the Ministers of battle of Debaltseve continued until the 18th Foreign Affairs of Russia, Ukraine, USA and of February, when Ukrainian forces started the EU met in Switzerland for the Geneva Ac- to withdraw from the city under heavy fire. cords, where they decided to task the OSCE2 President Poroshenko called for a UN peace monitoring mission with overseeing the con- keeping mission in Debaltseve, and for an flict’s de-escalation. EU mission to Eastern Ukraine. The OSCE was let into Debaltseve and described the sit- Referendums for the independence of DPR uation in the city as a humanitarian catastro- (Donetsk Peoples Republic) and LPR (Lu- phe (Flikke, 2015). gansk Peoples Republic) were held on the 11th of May 2014 without any international The villages of Maryinka and Krasnohorivka observers, and resulted in the creation of these become places of conflict between Ukrainian republics, recognised only by Russia. Separa- and separatist forces at the beginning of June tists conducted offensives against Ukrainian 2015. The Ukrainian government accused positions in Luhansk district and on the 26th separatists of conducting a full-scale offen- of May, and again on the 11th of July 2014 sive in this region, with more than 10 tanks against rebel forces attacking Donetsk airport. and 1,000 fighters. The battle of the village On the 23rd of August, 260 Russian trucks Shyrokyne ended with the withdrawal of sep- crossed the border with Ukraine. Russians aratist forces, but their tanks and heavy artil- claimed that trucks carried only humanitarian lery stayed close.
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