Markovićeva Kritika Hegelove Logike1
Total Page：16
File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb
Load more
Recommended publications
-
Immanuel Kant and the Development of Modern Psychology David E
University of Richmond UR Scholarship Repository Psychology Faculty Publications Psychology 1982 Immanuel Kant and the Development of Modern Psychology David E. Leary University of Richmond, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/psychology-faculty- publications Part of the Theory and Philosophy Commons Recommended Citation Leary, David E. "Immanuel Kant and the Development of Modern Psychology." In The Problematic Science: Psychology in Nineteenth- Century Thought, edited by William Ray Woodward and Mitchell G. Ash, 17-42. New York, NY: Praeger, 1982. This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Psychology at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Psychology Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. 1 Immanuel Kant and the Development of Modern Psychology David E. Leary Few thinkers in the history of Western civilization have had as broad and lasting an impact as Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). This "Sage of Konigsberg" spent his entire life within the confines of East Prussia, but his thoughts traveled freely across Europe and, in time, to America, where their effects are still apparent. An untold number of analyses and commentaries have established Kant as a preeminent epistemologist, philosopher of science, moral philosopher, aestheti cian, and metaphysician. He is even recognized as a natural historian and cosmologist: the author of the so-called Kant-Laplace hypothesis regarding the origin of the universe. He is less often credited as a "psychologist," "anthropologist," or "philosopher of mind," to Work on this essay was supported by the National Science Foundation (Grant No. -
Émilie Du Châtelets Institutions Physiques Über Die Grundlagen Der Physik
Émilie du Châtelets Institutions physiques Über die Grundlagen der Physik Dissertation zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades eines Doktors der Philosophie (Dr. phil.) im Fach Philosophie an der Fakultät für Kulturwissenschaften der Universität Paderborn vorgelegt von: Andrea Reichenberger Erstgutachter: Prof. Dr. Volker Peckhaus Zweitgutachter: Prof. Dr. Ruth Hagengruber Disputation: 14. Juli 2014 Note: summa cum laude 2 Inhaltsverzeichnis Vorwort 4 1 Einleitung 5 1.1 Thema und Forschungsstand . .5 1.2 Problemstellung und Ziel . 12 1.2.1 Zwischen Newton und Leibniz . 12 1.2.2 Zur Newton-Rezeption im 18. Jahrhundert . 16 1.2.3 Zur Leibniz-Rezeption im 18. Jahrhundert . 17 1.2.4 Leibniz contra Newton? . 21 1.2.5 Du Châtelets Rezeption . 25 2 Du Châtelet: Vita und Œuvre 31 2.1 Biographischer Abriss . 31 2.2 Werke und Editionsgeschichte . 33 2.2.1 Principes mathématiques . 33 2.2.2 Éléments de la philosophie de Newton . 37 2.2.3 Dissertation sur la nature et la propagation du feu . 38 2.2.4 Institutions physiques . 39 2.2.5 Essai sur l’optique . 40 2.2.6 Grammaire raisonnée . 40 2.2.7 De la liberté . 41 2.2.8 Discours sur les miracles & Examens de la Bible . 41 2.2.9 Discours sur le bonheur . 42 2.2.10 La Fable des abeilles de Mandeville . 44 2.2.11 Lettres . 45 3 Du Châtelets Institutions physiques im historischen Kontext 47 3.1 Die Editionsgeschichte . 47 3.2 Der Disput mit Jean-Jaques Dortous de Mairan . 48 3.3 Newton in Frankreich . 50 3.4 Der Vorwurf Johann Samuel Königs . -
PHILOSOPHICAL (PRE)OCCUPATIONS and the PROBLEM of IDEALISM: from Ideology to Marx’S Critique of Mental Labor
PHILOSOPHICAL (PRE)OCCUPATIONS AND THE PROBLEM OF IDEALISM: From Ideology to Marx’s Critique of Mental Labor by Ariane Fischer Magister, 1999, Freie Universität Berlin M.A., 2001, The Ohio State University M.Phil., 2005, The George Washington University A Dissertation submitted to The Faculty of Columbian College of Arts and Sciences of The George Washington University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy January 31, 2010 Dissertation directed by Andrew Zimmerman Associate Professor of History The Columbian College of The George Washington University certifies that Ariane Fischer has passed the Final Examination for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy as of August 25, 2009. This is the final and approved form of the dissertation. PHILOSOPHICAL (PRE)OCCUPATIONS AND THE PROBLEM OF IDEALISM: From Ideology to Marx’s Critique of Mental Labor Ariane Fischer Dissertation Research Committee: Andrew Zimmerman, Associate Professor of History, Dissertation Director Peter Caws, University Professor of Philosophy, Committee Member Gail Weiss, Professor of Philosophy, Committee Member ii © Copyright 2010 by Ariane Fischer All rights reserved iii Acknowledgments The author wishes to thank her dissertation advisor Andrew Zimmerman, who has been a continuous source of support and encouragement. His enthusiastic yet demanding guidance has been invaluable. Both his superior knowledge of history and theory as well as his diligence in reviewing drafts have been crucial in the successful completion of the research and writing process. Further, many thanks are extended to Gail Weiss and Peter Caws for joining the dissertation committee, and to Dan Moschenberg and Paul Smith for agreeing to be readers. -
Download (1155Kb)
Original citation: Vanzo, Alberto. (2016) Empiricism and rationalism in nineteenth-century histories of philosophy. Journal of the History of Ideas, 77 (2). pp. 253-282. Permanent WRAP URL: http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/78420 Copyright and reuse: The Warwick Research Archive Portal (WRAP) makes this work by researchers of the University of Warwick available open access under the following conditions. Copyright © and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to the individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners. To the extent reasonable and practicable the material made available in WRAP has been checked for eligibility before being made available. Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without prior permission or charge. Provided that the authors, title and full bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata page and the content is not changed in any way. Publisher’s statement: All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations used for purposes of scholarly citation, none of this work may be reproduced in any form by any means without written permission from the publisher. For information address the University of Pennsylvania Press, 3905 Spruce Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104-4112. A note on versions: The version presented in WRAP is the published version or, version of record, and may be cited as it appears here. For more information, please contact the WRAP Team at: [email protected] warwick.ac.uk/lib-publications -
Alberto Vanzo
Empiricism and Rationalism in Nineteenth-Century Histories of Philosophy Alberto Vanzo This paper traces the ancestry of a familiar narrative of early modern phi- losophy, one that dominated the English-speaking world throughout the twentieth century.1 According to this narrative, which I will call the stan- dard narrative, the early modern period was marked by the development of two rival schools: the rationalism of Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz (DSL) and the empiricism of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume (LBH). Rationalists are said to claim that we have substantive a priori knowledge of the world and, typically, that we have non-empirical concepts. Empiricists claim that all our substantive knowledge of the world and all our concepts are grounded on experience.2 The early modern period came to a close once Immanuel I would like to thank Peter Anstey, Timmy de Goeij, Tom Sorell, and audiences at the University of Otago for valuable comments on earlier versions of this article. This research was supported by a Marie Curie International Incoming Fellowship within the 7th European Community Framework Programme. 1 See, e.g., Robert Adamson, The Development of Modern Philosophy, ed. W. R. Sorley (Edinburgh: Blackwood, 1903); Bertrand Russell, A History of Western Philosophy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945); Frederick C. Copleston, A History of Philosophy (Lon- don: Burns, Oates and Washbourne, 1946–75), vols. 4–6; the thematic organization of the Routledge History of Philosophy, general eds. G. H. R. Parkinson and S. G. Shanker (London: Routledge, 1993–99), vols. 4–6; Roger Scruton, A Short History of Modern Philosophy, 2nd ed. -
Hegel's Conception of the History of Philosophy by Zeyad El Nabolsy, B.Eng
HEGEL'S CONCEPTION OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY i M.A. Thesis - Z. El Nabolsy; McMaster University - Department of Philosophy HEGEL'S CONCEPTION OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY BY ZEYAD EL NABOLSY, B.ENG A Thesis Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Master of Arts McMaster University © Copyright by Zeyad el Nabolsy, September 2017 ii M.A. Thesis - Z. El Nabolsy; McMaster University - Department of Philosophy McMaster University MASTER OF ARTS (2017) Hamilton, Ontario (Philosophy) TITLE: Hegel's Conception of the History of Philosophy AUTHOR: Zeyad El Nabolsy, B.Eng (McMaster University) SUPERVISOR: Professor Sandra Lapointe NUMBER OF PAGES: viii, 160 iii M.A. Thesis - Z. El Nabolsy; McMaster University - Department of Philosophy Lay Abstract: In this thesis I attempt to fill in a gap in Anglophone scholarship on Hegel by presenting an account of a much neglected aspect of Hegel's system, namely, Hegel's account and conception of the history of philosophy. I begin by attempting to dispel some misunderstandings that have distorted the Anglophone reception of this aspect of Hegel's thought, and by emphasizing the importance of understanding Hegel's views on the history of philosophy if one wishes to understand later developments in the historiography of philosophy. I then present the principles by which Hegel evaluates development in the history of philosophy, and I attempt to attenuate some of the tension which seems to exist between Hegel's methodological prescriptions and his actual practice as a historian of philosophy. I conclude with an account of Hegel's views on continuity in the history of philosophy, and their relation to contemporary views on continuity in the history of philosophy. -
Johann Eduard Erdmann Frommanns Klassiker Der Philosophie Begründet Von F Richard Falckenberg* Weil
Johann Eduard Erdmann Frommanns Klassiker der Philosophie Begründet von f Richard Falckenberg* Weil. Dr. n. o. Professor an der Universität Erlangen XXX. Johann Eduard Erdniann Von Hermann Glockner Johann Eduard Erdmann Ton Hermann Glöckner Mit einem Bildnis Ttcr Stuttgart 1932 Fr. Frommanns Verlag (H. Kurtz) Copyright by Fr. Prominanns Verlag (H. Knrtz) Stattgart J. FINK, HOFBUCHDRUCKEREI / STUTTGART Dem Andenken meines unvergeßlichen Lehrers Paul Hensel gewidmet. „Wer nicht von dreitausend Jahren Sich weiß Rechenschaft zn geben, Bleib' im Dunkeln unerfahren, Mag von Tag zn Tage leben." Goethe. Vorwort Die neuere Philosophiegeschichtschreibung wurde aus dem Geiste des Hegeischen Systems geboren. In seinen epochemachenden „Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie", die 1833/36 zum ersten Male im Druck er schienen, hatte Hegel die Philosophiegeschichte als einen sinnvollen Zusammenhang von geistigen Taten vorgetra gen, deren geschlossene Reihe den notwendig-freien Gang der universalen Selbstbesinnung verewigt. Aber diese Vor lesungen bedeuten nur einen Anfang. Man darf behaup ten, daß sie vor allem eine philosophisch-systematische Leistung darstellen und erst in zweiter Linie als histori sches Werk zu betrachten sind. In doppelter Richtung ging der Anstoß zu weiterer Arbeit von ihnen aus. Einmal galt es im Sinne Hegels fortzufahren; es galt den großen Ge dankenzug festzuhalten und nach Möglichkeit zu vertiefen; die Philosophiegeschichte durfte nicht wieder zu Stoff sammlung, Räsonnement und Kompendiengelehrsamkeit herabsinken. -
Hegel and Stirner: Thesis and Antithesis
HEGEL AND STIRNER: THESIS AND ANTITHESIS LAWRENCE S. STEPELEVICH The recent profusion of studies directed to uncovering the "Young . Marx" has also provoked so me renewed interest in his contempo rary, Johann Caspar Schmidt (1806-1856), better known as Max Stirner. With a few exceptions, the most important being William Brazill's The Yo ung Hegelians, Stirner has been retained in his traditional role as Marx's first critic, the harried "Sankt Max" of The German Ide ology. This perspective, established firmly by Sid ney Hook and continued by David McLellen, does cast light upon Marx's development, but it cannot be expected to do justice to Stirner, who is more than a mere anti-Marxist. Since the recovery and popularization of his work just before the turn of the century, a small but undaunted group calling them selves "individualistic anarchists" have c1aimed Stirner as their mentor. However, they have largely ignored the philosophical as pects of his thought in favor of its possible political consequences. This expected ignorance is the cause of those one-dimensional anarchist sketches of Stirner, such as drawn by John Henry Mackayl or Benjamin R. Tucker,2 which are usually more inventive than representational. Nevertheless, it was mainly through their singular devotion to the anarchistic implications of Stirner's major work, Der Einzige und sein Eigentum, which has accounted for its ap pearance in eight languages and oyer fifty complete editions.3 Still, the continued interest evoked by Stirner's teachings, even when limited to defending anarchism or providing fodder for Marxian scholars, suggests that these teachings have a firm metaphysical grounding.