~ FLIGHT COMMENT I MAY " JUNE " 1969
_J
Introducing , our new "INf0" series of bulletins - another way of keeping you in the picture. db r CANADIAN FORCES DIRECTORATE OF i HEADQUARTERS FLIGHT SAFETY (
The Flight Safety Committee minutes for the cold COL R. D. SCHUITZ weather period last winter testified to an epidemic of DIRECTQR OF FLIGHT SAFETY flying clothing delays and shortages . This perenniol W. . GARNER LCOI H. E. BJORNESTAD pipe- MAJ W The final review of the 1968 accident'incident analysis has just nuisance seems to stem from either end of the FLIGHT SAFETY INVESTIGATION A line . Your job is to give the system time enough to been completed and we are ogain forcibly reminded that people are respond to requests ; the "other end" might well look SHIFT still the main area of concern . We have continued to make headway into a condition which has apparently confounded IN in reducin 9 the number of accident causes attributed to materiel and military supply experts since at least, the Crimean environmental deficiencies but we have made no headway whatsoever War . EMPHASIS in reducing the number of instances where personnel error results in (Spectrometric Oil Analysi s Program) paid off SOAP resource losses . This Is most Important slnce In 1968 human failing recently when a CH112 engine was removed as 2 NDT at the crossroads directed by the SOAP officer . After iron and alumi- is present in 66 0 of the air accidents, and in 65°i; of the ground num traces in the oi I were detected, the engine was accidents and incidents . The fact that this situation has remained examined and found to have a cracked crankcase at 4 PEOPLE '69 relatively constant for several years demands that we do something the centre main bearing . The oil pump housing was about it now . Some of the obvious questions we must ask ourselves : gouged and the scavenge gears were deeply nicked . b Good Show The upper end of several outer valve spnngs were " In what areas do we err most often, and why? heavily worn, and six piston pin plugs were worn " Do we onalyze our errors carefully enough, and is coordinated tapered . In its low-level role this is one aircraft 8 the right (wrong) runway.. . action taken to correct or compensate for known weaknesses? where an engine failure could have disastrous con- " Do we re 9 ularl Y review the action taken to ensure that it is sequences . (NDT is examined elsewhere in this issue in "NDT at the Crossroads" .) 10 gettingthemostfromaWEATHERBRIEFING still applicable? " Do we hesitate to tackle the human error aspect because it is At 120`'F a jet engine produces only four fifths as 12 MARSHALLING SIGNALS too com P lex - or worse, do we accept the old clich~ "to err is much power as at 60` . Here's a few rounded-off human"? figures for safe summer flying: altitude I am sure that man Y of us will have difficulty in answering these Compressor I~let Temp(F) °o Thrust Available at 100°o RPM 14 Dental problems at q uestions to our own satisfaction since the record clearly Indicates 120 81 .6°~a loo ss.9~% 16 a pilot's signature ... that we continue to make the some or similar mistakes over and 80 92.9~0 over again . T0 96 .3°0 We are examining the broad aspects on patterns of human be- 59 100 .0°0 17 On the Dials haviour in an attempt to establish more clearly why people make mistakes in and around aircraft . This is a long-term study involving The statistics section came up with a very thought- 18 fire and fuel many agencles and cannot, in the foreseeable future, be expected provoking item the other day . In the periods ending 15 Jan we lost 17 CF104 aircraft every two years 21 Gen from 210 to provide answers to our everyday problems. for 1963-64, 19b5-66, and 1967-68 . This figure came The annual review enables us to assess general problem areas; to light during the preparation of a progress report! similarly, everyone associated with aircraft operations should 24 Comments to the Editor continually assess his job . After all, it's you the individual - as Exposure to excessive doses of sunlight during the well as the Canadian Forces' operational capability - that suffers day means less-than-good night vision that night. If you're scheduled to night-fly wear protective when an aircraft accident occurs. glosses and preserve that extra margin of acuity which may come in handy . It's a good thing to keep in mind thi s summer . Editor Capt J. T. Richards Art and Layout CFHQ Graphic Arts 425 AW(F) Alouette Squodron, CFB 8agotville, pfans a combined reunion and sap-sucking spree for the weekend of 20-22 June . AIf former squadron members Flight Comment is produced by the CFHQ Dir~ ectorate of flight Safety . The contents do not are invited md urged to attend. In order to aid the necessarily reflect official policy and unless planning committee in the preparation of invitation otherwise staled should not be construed as lists, etc, all interested former members are asked to regulalions, orders or directives. Contributions, contact Cc~t Keith Bottoms, 8ox 406, CFB Bagot- comments and criticisms are welcome ; the pro~ ville, Que, statinq period attached io 425 Squodron motion of flight sofety is best served by disse- and present address. Please pass this information fv minating ideas and on-the-job experience . Send submissions to : Editor, Flight Comment, CFH~ ;' ony former members. Personal invitotions and schedule COL R. D. SCHULTZ DFS, Ottawa 4, Ontario . S~bscriplions available of events wifl be mailed to all known 425 Alumni . from Queen's Printer, Hull, P .Q, Annual sub- DIRECTOR OF FLIGHT SAFETY scription rate is ~1 .50 for Conada and USA. :a110 00-1(1-l~l, ;lircraft $pectrometric C)il :lnalvsis measurement of the element5 prcsent in the oil . Pro ram (S0 :'1Pl t~~as Frublished i n .auK ] 9 6h~ to desrribc Thc bcncGts to he derivcd from this techniquc : the p ro Kram and re c,>ulate its i mE~l emcntdti~ - 'r ~n . b) cctro- ~ :1 useful diaKrtostir aid for t:arl~~ dctcction nf metric oil anal~~sis mcans the determination of aircraft inci p ient fail,;rc - ~c :,i=>ir~f'c~. , i . n i. t~~> ntrih >.~~ion r' tu com p onent wear condition h~~, accuratel~~, meas u r'tng t h e ' i ~ht safet~ . mctallic elements contained in used-oil samples . :a ~ Reduction of o~~er!~,~u' and rc~air1" cost~ . NDT definite corrclation exi ;ts bet«~een the metallic ron- ~ I alid maintenanre yualitc control data . taminants in alubricatin~ oil and thc mcchanical condition ~ ~'alid informatic~n to de~id~ extension or redu~tion of thc mechanism w~hich this oil serl~es . SOA is ba5ed ~~f oti~erhaul life. , at c)n t}~ese tivell- p roven fact 5 .~ ~ llata on ne~,~ scstem, unctcr dc~~clo;~ment, test sn~l o :111 elements have a characteristic spectrum which r~aluation . allrn~ti their unmistakable identifiration . ~ ( ;uide to maintenance trouhleshootin~. the 0 The composition of the ntatc~rials used for en~ine, llere's ho~c tl-ie p ro x ram has p ro ~ rcssc-d . ..1 .ti 0 ..1 transmission ~om P onent~ are kno«~n and indi~~idual laboratorv ~~'as added last C)ctoher to the aircraft 11ain- metallic elements cxpected in ~aear fiv-products can tenance I)evelo p ment ~ 'nit's \1)' I Centre, to complemer,t crossroads hc cstablished . existinK ~DT resourres . This laboraror~~ ran anal~~ze up 0 11~~~~inK rontact produces wear particles and their to ?00 sam p les p er dav; , and is the forerunncr o f s', imilar' rate of P roduction ran he classified as normal or installations at other hases as thc pro~ram expand~ . abnorn~al . This c-quipment is alread~~ or i~ill soon be rnonitorcd h~ o Technolo~,ry ltas ilevcloped instroments whirh are ~0:1 : ;9 ~~ C :I~I ;, I ~~~ (~ :1\~0 , CTh ~ -~~0-.. l, C 11,~ . Maj. M. Chamberland 5imple to opcrate and capable of yuick accurate mc~in transn~ission, [ l'll-1N en ;rinc and transn;i :, ;i~~n . CFNQ Directorate of Aerospace Engineering 'I'he impact of 50~11' on fli~ht safetv and maintenance p ractices r~~ill bc in dirc ct p ro~or1 tt'o n ~to, thc suppurt- it recci~cs from the field. To quotc from a previous artirlc on S() IP, "the attitude of persons at the unit to~~ards the proKram is thc decisive factor detf rrninin~ its surcess Tv~o 1'eature articles ~lithin the realm of Nc~n-Dcs- hecausc thc unit is re, p onsihlc~ for , and Ita ; control o~~er, kev factors in the prn~ tructive Testing aprearcd in Flight Comment during ;rarn" . In rlosin~ this re~~ietiti~ c~f tlcc p,t~t, I m~, :~t ~tre :;s thc~ 1967 : effectivc contribution made hv other titicll-kno~a~n methodti ~ Speetrom~tric Oil Analysis Nrogram in Air Div such as radio>ra p,,hv ultrasonir , eddv-current. and dve-. ~ Nt~n Destructive Testing for ,qircraft !19ainten- Pcnetrant in providin,t; solutinns to scriotis in-ser~~ice anc:~ }~roblems : craekin ~> of the J,"~ IG1' , rra~ kin ~~ of thc "tIt tor spar attachment point ancl corrosion in t}7e rudder hin~e :'11rnn-st t~~o vears ha~'e ela, sed sinre thcsc articles hrarket of thc ('aribou . Past arhirvcmcnts mav be a sourre of ~atisfaction a lE> >cared . I .ct's I K lancc bark aion thc road travelled in thc last t~~~o ~~cars as ~cell as comment on curre~nt devclc~p- but certainl~~. nut Eor let-u PI . '~C)T terhnolo ~.v i5 dc~clo } ~- ing at a phcnomc:nal pace, raisinK the rhallcnt;c of ments . ,?11sn~, there are q ucstions ,,~~our ans~n~ers to w}uch First shipment of oil samples arrives at CFB Trenton's ma~ havc a marked influence on future ,~rowtlr of 1U'C for Air Maintenance Development Unit . These samples are evaluatin,~ nc~c mcthods for fttture use . 'V'I)T is at thc~ . aircraft maintenanrc~ . from the J79 engines at Cold Lake . ~rossroads
Sentimental Journcv Pcek into the Future tioni~ analyzcr :, and vihration lt is rewardin,l tc~ real :ze that four NUT J1rc~a llctach- mcanitor~ 1-cavc~ :carhcd tlre field operational staKc ; commercial and militar` ments ha~e been cstablished since ;1u-~t, l~~fr"r and are a,~,~cncics u5e them to detert providcrik~ continuous '~D'1' support fnr aircraft rnainten- malfunctions of turho>roI f.~ and turfx_rjet ent,~ines . anre. Sorne of thc detarhments are still handi~appc~d hv 'I'he merlranir of tomorro~~~ rna~~ wc:ll lack of eyuipmcnt ; cfforts are beint~ rnade to resol~~e find out that a microphone is his bcst friend in cietcctin~~ en~inc malfunctions these difficulties . Tlicsc detachmcnts offcr tc~ bases . l,iquid rrystals (suh- and c_r~rit:; a yuick ar,d, flcxihlc answcr to '~DT necdti stances sharin~ properties of hoth liquids and crvstalsj can arisin,t; in connertion with aircraft maintc~nance . be applied to a suspect surface to detect the extent 'l'hr task of cducation I~as hccr, p~,trsucd `~ith ~~it ;our . The Canodian Forces starts its full-time spectrometric of cxfoliation c~orrosion or cracks undcr rivet heads . 111(1 00-]Il-3 ~on-))cstrurtive Testin,t,~ of ~'lirrraft, Kas oil analysis program . Seen here is Cpl J .F . Mattie, i~iii9i~i~_i~~~~~~~i~ Thesc liyuid rrystal5 arc extrcmelv sensiti~e to tempc~r- taking aturc ; h~ihlishtd in tic~ptemher last ~~ear. `This ~'111CI full`~ dcs- CFB Cold Lake, first somple in Canada . c~han~cs thc ~~ariati~~n of colour pattems is thc hasis of dcfect detertion crihes thc existin~~ ~UT resourrcs antL outlines the . Infrared (Ik? thermoKraph~ ;1 most important '~I)'1' milestone is the incroduction ~roccdurc to hc folloticed bv ~~rc~s~cctivc users . Thc 11)'I' (measurin,~ tempt:raturc distribution on a s,rrfacc hcatcd ,r E of Spcctrometric Oil Anal~~sis (ti0 :1) as a monitorin ;,7 familiarizaticrn coursc fr.~r ufficcrs, ~ivcn at thc \U'C bv 1R sourcel has been used ~eith surcess to detect tcchniquc of the condition c~f cn~ines and transmissions Technician at the AMDU spectrometric oil analysis Centre in 'I'renton, has pla~~ed a si~nilicant rolc in heatint; flaw~s in de-icin>; sy~stems . 11uloPraphic Non for aircraft and heliro,tersp . This monitorin~> tec_hni y ue laboratory runs all samples through an atomic absorption generatin~ a«~areness to \D'I' potential amon~ mainten- Destr!cctive Testin,~ (visual ima ;e is obtained from a hadstrikin ;; success d~rou~;hout the pilot scale evaluatic~n spectrometer . This machine can measure traces of metal ance manat,lers . This course «~ill be continued throu~h sound ima K el ~an detert se P arations and ovcrla t~ in tircs. sta,~7e for 1 .air Dlvlslorl (Flit;ht ('ommcnt, 11a`~, Jun lc~f~i ~ . in the oil down to parts per million ; abnormal rates of 1Q6c~ as "~D'h for 1laintenanre 11ana ers" . tiiY ~ourscs The list could he mucl : lon~er but is sufficientl~~ indic- Consequentlti~, the decision on a Forres-w~ide i :t~plrr~,c~n- increase in metal contamination of an engine's lubricants are scheduled ~i~tth an intake of 10 per course . aei~°e of the challen,r.~e p osed for 1 ~lannin ~ luturc nec~ds . tatiorr was rcachcd in '~ov 1Q(;; . alerts technicians to possible trouble . cont'd on poge 24
F~ight CommeM, May Jun 1969 3 Fa i I- unsafe f i re wa r 0 Neu~ nrod actlr~ll l~ u~or~s! The CH113 :1 ~'ova~eur helicopter inrnrporatcs a fire detection s~~stem. of a tv.P e ne~c~ tc~ t}rc ('F : infra-red sensors installed around the cn~ine compartment are In 1968 : of the l46 air accident causes 96 were Personnel supposed to '`see" flartte or an~ hot spot and li~ht up the , panel . Il'e were pleased with this svstem for a while S43 human errors resulted in air accidents because it seemed to be frce of the old false warnin~s of the total aircraft accident causes - air and 9 round - nonsense but our deli ht turned to de p re ;sion averni r,Tht whcn the svstem failed to detect a fire . It turned out that le accounted for 64% the total. pPeo of there were, no sen~ors "lrrokinT" at thc bottom of the enk~ine - wherr thc firc had becn . ~o w~e installed addi- `'{'eople '69" is the name of a series of conlerence~ nov~ taking place tional sensors to ive the en>;ine all-round a.>vera e . :a~ luck ~a~ould have it, the prototype was put tc~ the tcst in at CFHQ under the auspices of the Directorate ot Fli~ht S3f~cty . These flik~ht when a number onc cnt;ine dcveloped a hot spot cunferences ~~ill bring together men erpert in th~ fi~ld of~ hull~an factors Fire sensor "saw" fire at crack in casing - or did it? rn the combustor casrn~ . 'I'hc liqht dulti~ came on, the v~ill develop a and behaviour . From these modest beginnings hopefully englnc was securcd and the trrp aborted . 7he onlv odd fire warnin~ stayed on because the heat had melted program enahling us to hetter understand the resoune callea "Pzrsc~nnel'' . thin~ was that even after the en,~ine was well and tnrly solder in the sensor causin it to stav, excited even The ur~enc`~ of this challenge is apparent in the statistics abov~e - clearly . cooled the fire warnin 7 li 7ht was hurnin~~ bri->htlv!. 14'as it when the fire was c_~ut . '1'his seems to bc a failure which a "sign of the times'" . rnere coincidence that t}~e warnin~ svstem apparentlv noerates on the safe side ; however, operators should bc ave a false indication ~.vhen there was a real fire~? aware that this can happen . The fire may be out eti~cn ~arlier . in the .lan'Feh issue of this rnagazine, the editorial carrled >; Doubt hea p ed u P on confusion'. tl7oukic the lir,~ht is sti11 on ; thev 5hould takc action to this statement : (~F(IQ called in ~he ~cientists w~ho reported that the determine thc: actual situation . Advances in equipment design, reliobility and technical know-how have significantly reduced the number of accidents caused by Materiel fallure, but at the same time the human involvement in accidents has rernoined relatively constant . This now means that people occount for 50-70 0 of the total accident cause factors - about five times that of Materiel failure, ~I'his bcing the case our attention must logically tum to elusive ~1an . At the openin~ conference lhere ~~as little difficulty in achieving un- animous ackna~~ledgtment lhat at some time in the recent past ~~e acyuired UASS - yov did a wheels-up: the knowled~e and resources tc~ effectiv~el}c combat !1lateriel problerrts hut that no similar progress hat~ been accomplished for the human resource . That's the appropriate acronym for Undercarriage common factor in mind he attacked the problem . He feels that thc pilot would quickly recoRnize thc unusual be- f'ut another t{ay, the hattle against the man-machine comhination is only ;'1utc~matic Safeguard System anc~ it's presently being half vSc~n . haviotrr of an aircraft on a fla P les~ a PP roach ; that's whv, considered . . . the flap, are rarelv for~otten . ~~hv not provide for the llere's some points that wcre made : 'I'hc assault on bcllv landings has mct with varvin~ autornatic cvclin,t,~ of the underrarria,f;e with the landin~ aircraft uccurrences in lhe Ganad%an Fc~rces . The human prc5encc in dcr:,"rccs of surrcss ovcr thc ycars . F~~erythin,i;~ Irc.~m flaps rf the undercarrca~e has not been prevrously selec- is ~~orth_v c~f urgent tr(tcnlion . discipline to disparaKemcnt has hcen tried - and we 5till tcd? B etter communication techni y urs'' hetween' a ~encies mu st Ilre'lll~ c havc tivhccls-ups . lt's not surp risin ;:; thcrcforc that fix- 'fhc invcntor claims that his is a simple positive further flighl ~afety accorT~hlishments . For ~xample . too often, a oricnted p ersons have a>>liedE1 thcir inventivc talents to systcm that will move thc underrarria,~c sclcctor to its the iwerlooked "do~a~n" seiection . down osition after all w~arnin devices have failcd to knowledgc uf hazarcls ~~hich is a pre-requisite of a~~iation planning P ,>; The latest of these devices - and onc we're verv alert the pilot . Ilis UndercarrlaQe ;'lutomatic tiafct,'vard ts rncort~plete . interested in - is the hraincllild of a retired l;Cr'IF nfficer System (UA~S) is simplicity itself. for analvring specific " There are fevv, if any, scientific t~Chrllqllz5 w~ho obscr~~rd . . . althc_ru~h rt rs true that even very~ ahle A w~orkable system of thrs sort w~ould havc sc~cral aircraft c~ccurrence . human limitations or failures in the context of an and com ~ctcnt E ~ilots can for K ct to lowcr thr whecls and major advanta~es : 1~or e~am p le, does '`inattention" bv- a p_ilot re~resent[ what the word have done so, there is litcle real purpose to be scrved in ~ aircraft damaKe costs eliminated ~uggests or might it really be on occasion "saturation"`' seekin a reason for their a~tion . 5~ueh seekin q tcnds ~ investi~ation costs climinatcd onl`~ to confirrn a ain and a ain the one and onlv si ~ni- ~ fcwcr prcvcnUve re~ulations and policin,t; of them " There is no one agency or individual employ~etl directly in analti~zin~ . ~ '; . c, ficant fact : even a hi~hly cxperienced pilot can for~c~t ~ eliminate repecitive KT phraseoloky the Personnel input intc~ tiircraft occurrences . This is in stark contratit or he distracted so as co forket the wheel lowerin,~ action ~ eliminatcs hack-up eyuipment such as warninK to the resource5 the Canadian Forces apply to `~latericl Ite~datil . a re q uired of him" . ~lcvices, etc . minority categoryl . Frum an investi~ation of 1Ki4? pilots who forKot to 1>,c have seen the device it~elf and are impressr'd There s some tough prc~hlems and dect51~n5 ah ca a . C a n w~e afford not to lower the wheels }re drscovercd that not one of them w~ith its mechanical simplici'ti- . It mav be just w~hat we press on? Jusi r~aa the statistics above - there's y~~ur ans~cer . for~ot to lower the flaps for landin~ . And with this have been lookin ~ fc~r - for deradcs .
Flighr Comment, May Jun 1969 5 I
to an extent that it could have caused failure of the S~v~ bellcrank itself . Good Show Cpl Bruce displayed alertness and good judgement ; in following through with his original observation, he brou g fit to li g ht a seriaus corrosion hazard .
CPL R.J.. MAINS
1y'hile checking a transient T33 for a reported fuel seepage, Cpl iV1ains decided to extend his check beyond ins ectin the connections and have a look at the MWO F,G .D . Nash J~ust P g fuel lines. This thorough search uncovered a chafed Capt J.P, McGrath tiptank fuel transfer line where it passed by a bracket . It Cpl R .J. Mains waswomtoap oint where a dan g erous fuel leak was imminent . Cpl Mains checked the other transient T33s and found another aircraft in the same condition . Since then, Cpl Mains has found still another transient T33 with a chafed line. his Sgt G .C . Mitchell Cpl Mains' commendable diligence in pressing Lt B,G . Alston inspection as well as the follow-up, meant that a serious and hazard was eliminated . Cpl W .G . McAskill CAPT J .P. Mcf,,RATH F~ SGT G.C. MITCHELL and CPL W.G. McASKILL Capt 11cGrath was at 10,000 fcet and 3 miles from \ , ~ base when he intentionally flamed-out the engine for As crewchief during towing operations, Sgt Mitchell Cpl R,S . Bruce the student to P ractise the reli g ht se q uence . After the to maintain the hover, then with the aid of another was informed of an unusual noise in a Tutor while it was student had made several unsuccessful attempts to crewman, lifted the man vertically to the safety of the being towed . Some object or component sounded loose as Cpl D, A . Janes relight, Capt McGrath took control, declared an emer- ramp . the aircraft passed over the hangar door sill . Sgt ;ylitchell gency, and set up the aircraft for a forced landing . On ~tll'0 Nash's fast response and cool judgement decided to ground the aircraft until the source of this the descent, Capt McGrath continued to attempt a relight enabled him to perform a feat reqttiring considerable sound was investigated . Cpl McAskill and crew then but landed the aircraft with the en g ine still flamed out . strength under difficult conditions . In saving a man carried out a thorou g h search of the tail section of the pre-solo student and carried out a slow-speed descent A broken wire in the electrical system had made a from serious injury 14W0 Nash exemplifies the devotiun aircraft . After much patient effort in a very cramped using all speed bral{ing techniques . The emergency relight impossible. of those whose ~ob it is to ensure the safet of others . area, a three-pound bucking bar was discovered . This oxygen bottles were activated makin s eech J Y In handling the emergency with precision and good g P diftiicult tool, used in assembling aircraft, was not of mtlitary with the pressure breathing . To avoid expasing himself judgement, Capt McGrath demonstrated a high standard origin. to the windhlast in the outside air, uf flying skill - convincing proof to his student of the -63'~1~' Lt Alston CPL D.A. JANES A potentially serious hazard was eliminated by a leaned forward and hunched dowm, relying mainly on dili- stxndards to be attained by professtonal arrcrew . P rofessional follow-up of a minor clue. It took the instnments for his return to the circuit. 1~'hile fixing a minor malfunction on an Albatross, to g ence and initiative of Cpl VIcAskill ttnd Sgt ;Vtitchell 4t'ith a heavy fuel load and an ice-covered Cpl Janes became suspicious of the unusual appearance runway, bring this hazard to light. wingbox extension area . Although this CAPT F. WAGNER Lt Alston had an additional complication - the necessity in the starboard to look out into the 150 mph slipstrearn which was 21' region was outside his trade responsibility he investi- Capt Wagner, while hovering at 50 feet during a below at the time . gated further and determined that there was corrosion - a rappelling exercise (unloading of troops by rope descent ) , Had he lost control of the difficult situation the condition which had not previously been reported . From had a flameout in thc number 2 engine. At almost all-up student might not have been able to complete a success- th~'s. di~s co ver y,~ olher aircraft were g iven similar in- weight, the CH113's rotor speed fell off rapidly . Quickly - ful landin . Lt Alston demonstrated a hi g h de g ree of s p ections in order to P revent the condition growing to for s P eed was of the essence here - Ca P t 64'a g ner ex p ertl - skill in recovering his damaged aircraft under very serious proportions. controlled the aircraft to a zero speed single`engine adverse conditions . Cpl Janes' alertness and good sense of responsi- landing under marginal conditions . bility made possible the timely preventive measures to In a situation where the slightest miscalculation this hazard . Sound observation could have caused serious injury for passengers and MWO F.G.D. NASH crew, Capt Wagner skillfully maneuvered his helicopter The BOpsO mentioned that on several occasions he had The helicopter in which MWO Nash was crewchieF to a landing with no damage . His cool judgement and noticed servicing personnel working near operating during a rapelling exercise, was hovering 50 feet above CPL R .S. BRUCE flving skill enabled him to make a noteworthy contri- turbine aircraft who were not wearing protective ear an opening in the trees too small to accept the aircraft . While checking a hydraulic leak inside the tail bution to aircraft safety . coverings . A question was asked, whether all servicing As safety man, Mlt'0 Nash was monitoring the secaion of an Albatross, Cpl Bruce noticed signs of troops ersonnel have been issued the equipment and had they descending by rope to the ground . As the first man left corrosion in the vicinity of the rudder boost mechanism . P been P ro P erl Y fitted to eoch individual . It is essential the ramp, MN'0 Nash looked outboard and found him response to this, he extended his check to other areas LT B.G. ALSTON In that proper fitting be exercised to adequately protect suspended by his arms several the rudder boost bellcrank and feet below the aircraft, and found corrosion on personnel from the noise factor . . . Ai 32,000 feet and 42 miles from base, the rear half unable to move. The man's al P ine hook had J'arnmed the around the control cable attachment points . Iti'hen the - Flight Safety Committee of the T33 canopy suddenly disintegrated with a resultant lifeline . Realizing that the man tvould soon tire and cables were disconnected corrosion and deep pitting explosive decompression . Lt Alston took control from his possibly fall to the ground, he quickly wamed the pilot were discovered in the vicinity of the attachment points
flight Comment, Moy Jun 1969 light at runwav's end, but it's real soupy outside and take control ar~d maintain minimum altitude . 11oments thcrc's rain on the windscreen . { .A t t hr's ver~ ~ m oment later you see the runwav threshold going hy . Having the a ltet technician is observin K a runwav, visual ran e of run~eav. centreline in si ~'. t .vou 9uickl }1 descend ~ P o P the less than 1000 feet.) speedbrakes, retard the throttle to idle, and prepare for About the time the aircraft reaches 200 feet vou the landin~. the right ~wrong~ hear the controller sa y ~ "Observe vou in } ~our overshoot" Thi~ time, ,vou have the ri ~ht run~~av which is onlv. and .vou notice the aircraft startin g to level off and yuo 6~00 fcct lon K - and wet. l!naware that this is the c ase, ,vou attem P t a landin ~ from where vou. first ~ lim P sed the Kr ound . ~'ou arc P articularlv. distressed at the lack of br a ki n~,~ ~a ctio n . ~'o u r ap i ~i 1 ~~ r cach thc po' tnt where vou realize that tivith a harelv-noticeablc, deccleration rate , runway... vou're no lonr~er in command of things. i 1+1~,~~s . The aircraft continues into the mud and after a few f mild Kyrations cvmes to a stop 300 feet into thc rain- soddcn field be1 ~ond the overrun . ~'ou still can't make out where you are . tiothing looks familiar, evcn the route followed b}~ the truck taking you back bewilders vou . ~1nd if ,vour landin had been on the IonTer main runway? l~ou would have almc~st certainly run off that one too - and into a row of formidahlv. constructed a PP roach- li~ht pylons . Things would have been diffrrent then . . . ~'ou kee P askin vourself: could this have been avoided? ~'ou still have confidence in Y our abilitv, to fly to minitnums but with the wisdom of hindsight you admit it mi ht have been better to havc donc a missed a PP roach . At least that would have ~ iven .vou time for a sli~htly morc critical assessment . 1'ou now~ know that whcnever .vou let y ourself K et hoxed in - there's no wav. You're intently peering into the cloud and drizzle . . . out.
C's for GURRENCY, not quite up to scratch. It was pointed out that the CFB clothing stores are R's for RUNWAY, soaking and short. now open, on a permanent basis, at all times during A fitting example . . . normal working hours including lunch hour. A's for APPROACH in a~-limifs weather. Flight Safety Committee S is for SOUP that's near to ~he ground. H is for HIGH, HOT, AND HYDROPLANING.
Sgt Murray Pallttel of CFB Cold Lake, set aside ~o,ooo his microphone recently aflel talking down the f .et's suppose you'rc: an cxpcrienced T-bird drivcr . 'fhis last point is important . ~'ou ha~i been clearecl to basecommander,Col W .H . You plan an IFR round-robin with a chap in the rcar takcoff on the ri~h1 runway - a runwav y~ou knew (?) to t~i~~- Vincent . It was Sgt Pal- seat ; he nee~is sonie practice for his up-comin~,- tickee be inactive c-~nd nurmall ~ used as a taxi~ti~av . I~hat vou y . rner's 20,OOOth radar ap- ride . '~o complications - just a strai~htforward flip ~~~ith ~lidn't know was that the left ru nw~v~i ~a as, tem orari lv , P proach - a mi lestone two ~ood alternates anci lots of fucl - like vou've done closed and unli-~ht ed . (~ 'o u hadn ' tnoticed as vuu c,o5sed accomplishmenf for a manv time~ before . flowever , therc's a coir p le o f un- thc riRht nm~tiay on vour wav to the lonr_;er left one, that radar controller . settlin K as p ects to beirr ~ the ca f~tain for this fli =ht the ri~ht_ nrnwav. li i,Thts wcre on . ) In the RCN from 1943 todav : Thc takeof f is normal and you proceed on an une~~ent- to 1951, Sgl Palmer lomed ~ tour last '['i3 trip was 3 months a~o ful trip-une~~entf,rl, except that the weather at homc is the RCAF in 1953, serv- Sgt Palmer looks on as Col Vincent, . the weather's at minirnums, or nearabouts and not deteriorating . ,~pproachin~ hasc, yuu're given ?00 and ing at Halifax, Summer- CFB Cold Lake Base Commander, makes likelv to ~~et bettcr, 1 ; ~ in li~;ht rain and fo,~ . side, 4 Wing, and Trenton a congratulatory endorsement in Sgt ~'ou S et tasi and ATC clearance . The w°eather's not '~'ow, on final approach at destination ~,~~th thr lad before transferring ta Cold Palmer's logbook . Major J . Carpenter, ~uod ; in fact the tou~er operator later admits he couldn't in the back seat at the controls, ~~ou're monitorin ~ what . Cake in 1961. BATCO, accompanied Col Vincent on even see vour aircraft - but clcared vou for takeoff looi;s like a reasonablv k~ood G(' ;1 run . The currections the flight in a two-seat CF104. anvwa~~. . . Thc o~eratort stated later " . . .the tivcather was are small and he seems to be co p in 6> ~seil . 1'ou're intentlv auite bad" and wasn't sure which runwati~ ~ou had used . pecring into the cloud and drizzle, luokin 7 for the strohe-
Fli 9 ht Cornment ~ Ma Y Jun 1969 ured, their accuracy dependin ;; largely on the talents of they ponder pressure patterns in advance oE a moisture- the weather observer . Othcr wcathcr parametcrs that laden warm front) into three distinct personality types : concern the pilot are turbulence, icing and vertical cloud structure. Tbese phenomena are suhjectivelyand randomly Pessimistic Pete ohserved bv, aircrew ~" their accuracv, de P ends on the who will predict "Zero-Zero" in rain, weather-obsc~.r v'tng talents of the arr' c re.w . C'o ns e qu e n tl y,~ drizzle and fog. for a pilot to minimize the complications that may arisc from the errors inherent in the "raw" data, he must know what the weather is and, of course, some of the reasons for its behaviour . Since weather for the most part follows a wcll-ordered pattera, various three-dimensional models have been de5igrred to help explain the whvs and wherefores of weathcr occurences . The sim P lest of these atmos P heric models is the iVorn~egian air mass and frontal model ; this one used all pilot iraining sch001s its is in . Due to Optimistic Orville simplicity a pilot can attain a firm and basic understand- always hopefully looks on the ing of the weather. And it's with this model as a back- who side things, comes out with ground Sfy Sr~othsayer Sam states hrs case . 6etter of Startrng wrth a srmple synopsrs he ~:reates a mental 3 ® 3/4R-F . P icturc of what the wcathcr is and was ~ and P arlavs, tltis into a progrtostic . 11ost !11et-men will present a stereotype s y ~no p sis which makes for a monotonous monolo gu c', however it need not be , as lon g as it is brief and to thc Point . The meat of anv aviation weather bi"iefin K is takcoff landin K and in-tli g ht conditions . The weather bricfcr must he emphatic, choosin~; his words carctully in ordcr to instill confidence in the forecast . At times, this is exceedingly hard to do, because official aero- drome and si g nificant weather forecasts are basicallv. the opinion of thc issuing forecaster. And human nature Hedger Harry being what it is, personality conflicts are bound to arise . a realist who will not 6e tied down, (,enerally sp~ e a kin g, in-fli g ht conditions that the issues 1® 3/4R-F varra6le b 1X forecaster ex Pects the P ilot to encounter are thc result %aR-L-F. of years of expericnce in studying weather sv5tems affectrng ~trtatn geographrc area.ti . A s a result , ~ these h! forecasts have a statistical base which can be im P roved upon by augmcnting the statistical data with pilot and rada r re ports . "he1 im p ortance oi p ilot re p orts as an adjunct to the basic raw data neressary to produce a forccast, cannot be overstressed . Admittcdly, there is a limited use of the pilot-to-forecaster frequency in ~anada, and pilot rcport,5 pas s throu g h several sta g cs of communrcatron . AS a result , re p orts are sub'ect to services am P lification or editing rendering their valuc sometimes }ror optimum efficiency in weather briefing than weather and the weathcrman . q uestionablc . llowever, any pil~t report is better the pilot should know The author, briefing an aircraft crew . nonc at all . Similarlv, the h1et-man should knnw the pilot and his 1?adar reports, ,graphically displaycd, arc an exccllent aircraft~ ca P abilities . 'fhat wav,~ the two P artici P ants A pilot may reyuest anything from thc bchaviour of . possiblc deviations (or cornplications) that may aid in an Y weather briefin g . On occasion it mav, be will get the most from a weather hriefing . a sin g le weather P arameter ~ge , tem P erature ) to an arisc from the unkno~un~~ that exi5t in the weather possible to arrange for thc pilot to observe the radar inte g ration of scveral p arameters from the surface into situation at hand . screen so he can g et the "fccl" o( thc weathcr . the stratos p here, and from coast to coast or continent The knowledgcablc reader will see there's a "lot Basically, aviation weather forecasting is probability to contincnt. It's readily seen that N'eathe~r-N~i~ard ll'illie between the lincs" in the above paragraph. Mcteor- p red'ct'onr i in the sub'ective sense. As a result a second has quite a problem; however, to minimizc the com- ology - may be assi,grted to the various even in the s Pace a ge - still has manv, inaccu~- set of predicted valurs Vem Dingle is a forecoster vt CF8 Uplonds Mereor` plexities, standard ~eather briefing formats have been acier both from the point of view of observation and weather elements . Thcse possible deviations ~hould be ological Section. After graduating from the University evolved. Briefin g s as Kiven bv, the !~1ct-wan generallv . prediction . To illustrate, ronsider the hourly aviation discussed wit}t the pilot in the event that the official of Monitoba with rn honours degree in Science, consist of three distinct parts : weather report ; the weather parameters of temperature, forecasts break down so that he can take cvasive or Mr Dingle served from 1951 to 1955 ot Rockcliffe. He was ot Goose Bay from to 1958 " Since 1958 he . a short statement on tempcrature, moisture and dewpoint, wind and altimcter setting are objectively abortive action if necessary . 1955 has been at Uplands in Ottawa . pressurc ae}vection fields (gencral symopsis), measured by means of accurate instruments . In some $ince weather forecasting is both an art and a science, . a professiona 1 'rn ter p retation of takcoff , in-fli g ht instances, however, the ceiling and ti~isibility which are personalitics are part-and-parcel of prediction . Thc and landing wcather, of utmost irn P ortance to the P ilot are sub'ectivel1 y meas- experienced pilot has probably typed w~eathermen (as
10 Flight Comment, May Jun 1969 ~1 4LS - rotpry wing a;rcraft
- p~~ aircraft IVIARSHALLING SIGNALS
~~~ CIEAR , 4ilhea~i~e ,
r
GIGNT
Cf 118
. J Toothache at altitude, known medically as aerodon- ~ ~'ariations in barometric pressure can bring about by the saliva. One dental authority has stated that acid talgia,usually represents an acute flare-up of subcGnical secondarv hemorrhage . This can also occur after P roduction in thc dental P la q ue is intermittent rather than sY m.P toms . Reduced barometric P,ressure is the p reci P i- gum treatment rf there is stlll some actrve rnfectron continuous lastrng 30 to 4S mrnutes after meals or snacks tatrng factor,either in flight or dunng a pressure chambcr pre sent. containing fermentable carbohydrate . run. Some. Y ears aK o, the cause was thou ght to be simT~l.Y ~ Some patients experience dry socket or loss of Qactena rn the mouth burld acid up raprdly after . recent expansron of gas trapped underneath fillings More blood clot after extraction . Y ou've eaten carbohvdrates, . Stick Y solid carbohv~rates, dental thinking is that changes in atmospheric pressure aggra- r The maxillary sinus is sometimes affected. such as candy bars are said to lead to more cavities vate the impaired circulation in irritated or diseased r Pain and other symptoms occur as late as the fourth than those consumed as liyuids such as soft drinks . !19ost tooth pulp. Reduced barometric pressure usually does post-operative day in some patients . dentists will advise you to cut out those sweet between- not affect normal teeth or teeth with open cavities . ~ '~tedication given dental patients can compromise meal snacks altogether or replace them with raw fruits problems Generallti~ speaking, toothache at altitude occurs aircrew efficiency and safcty . or vegetables, cheese, eggs, unsweetened milk, nuts or durin g ascent and be ~'ns at 5000 fcet. Some P ersons Some experts are of the opinion that clinical experience lean luncheon meat. Even if vou can't brush after even~ episode of pain with no rccurrence . In have only one indicates that flying should be routinely restricted for 4R meal or snack ~Y ~ou can g et rid of some of the food debris other cases, the toothache shows a consistent pattern hours followin g tooth extraction and that the Patient by rinsing your mcxrth out with water or swishing it altitude and disappearing at the occurring at a specific should be re-examined before rcturn to dut} ~ . It is for around in vour mouth before vou swallow it. Dental at same altitudc when direction is reversed. these rcasons that dcntisls and oral surgeons will recom- floss or a tnoth p ick wil) dsi lod ge bit s~ of food be t w e e n IE pain occurs during descent, the tooth is probably mend grounding of a pilot or aircrewman far 4R hours vour tceth . non-vital, perhaps onc in which the nerve has been following a surgical procedure . C~ranted the irre gu lar schedule inherent in aircrew tooth is removed. If pain occurs during ascent, the Now for a few words on how .vou get dental cavities jobs often makes conventional "proper oral hygiene" altitude usually vital . in the first P lace . Research on the cause of tooth deca Y next to impossible . However, trv to brush after meals ~ less frequent source of toothache during ascent is is a continuing process . Fiowever, there secms to be an d s n a cks or a t le a st ri n se o ~rt your mouth . 5'chedule A toothache ar1 ~u~here an abscess at the root of the tooth . Such an abscess can ~eneral agreement that the chief factors are mouth your dental appointments regularly and once you've generate a small amount of trapped gas which causes bacteria, food, dental playue and susccptible tooth all possible, keep them. And, is bad news schcduled them, if at severe pain on expansion . In other cases a chronic surface . Bacteria break down food debris in thc mouth finally, as in all aeromedical rnatters, good general but a toothache abscess can cause dull pain on dcscent which can and produce acid . The dental plaque on the surface of physical condition and sensible eating and drinking several days . while ou're in persist on the ground for the teeth collects the acid and holds it . (Oddly enouRh, habits are K ood P reventive medicine . Your g ood health y yg When toothache strikes at, say 14,000 feet, the only in some ersons dental la ue neutralizes the acid . is trouble y ou can do without . . . P P q ) and good oral hygiene, plus the ministrations of a skilful the time is descend but thing you can do about it at Then depending on the tooth's susceptibility to decay, dentist when re quired ~ should kee P dental trouble at this is not alwavs, immediately possiblc . On completion thc acidworks on the tooth until the acids are neutralized altitude to a rninimum . ® of the flight or chamber run, get in touch with your fli g ht sur Kcon or dental officer. 'I'he offending tooth may turn out to be one which was rccently filled . (t usually requires 48 to 7Z hours for the dental pulp to quiet down after dental treatment . In some cases, a new filling causes syrnptoms for several weeks and then as tissue changes stabilize, symptoms no longer occur. Deep- seated sl~'lvcr fillin_sg without underlvin g base matcrials or insulators, mechanica' 1 ly ~ i mp rrfe~ct fillin g s and in- Crises create crunches adcquately filled root cana ls , can be troublemakers whcn barometric pressure is reduced. Accidentti oftzn arise when somcthing abnormal mediate refuelling ; this necessitated using In some cases when a tooth hurts at altitude the fuelling units which had been in dead trouhle rs not ~n the tooth itself; rt hurts because of occur5 . Ifere's how things can snc~wball, . . storage for a long time. pain referred from some other source . Pressure in the ~ Refuelled, the captain taxied out and ap- maxrllary srnus durtng descent can cause pressure on a Landing during very heavy rain a transport plied 100°~ for his takeoff - a takeoff which the tooth nerves of the upper ~aw wh~ch, rn turn, causes ran off the side of the runway - the field's he had to abort when he noticed power the teeth to ache. If dental eramination fails to reveal only runway . reduction on the roll . The fuel contained abnormalities, the possibility of aerosinusitis should be ~ A ground recovery snafu caused the aircraft water beyond the level permissible for use. checked nut, to block the runway for several hours forcing Another source of referred pain is inflammation of several aircraft to divert. the g
Fli 9 h1 Comment , Ma y 1un 1 969 17 car~o c.arr~er .
~elll° in the ~'kr>i ,~rt~ , -~ r ~1 m ~~.itnE ~ - n` ,>u GF I c,nt trot . w ~1Ct' LjIC~ t~r~t~t ~rro ~tl ltttt t he ~n . ~~~h. ~cl ' ~ lt t ,c l~ i`1 ~ ~r` t'ldt, tttel to f n9 ,ti~_ , ca11~ tltrl , ~ lf 1~ `~~ . > T ~lln~ ~ 't1f ~ , ~~Ut~ ~ ~~~~E vf Pof°do \ ~ _rd 1 in th-c~ F t~- ttan ~ ~nt, tl~j 1 fP f ~r ~ t ~tt It . ic.l~. , , c .ra`t 1111~ ~ ~ l,i~~~ ;;n- , ~, e11 ~t r r; ~ ° ozr llu,,~e 11 . ' ~~n ~~n tle ~` '''~n~C~l~, ~t~!' nt tl't -`~U~1l~~r c re 9'~1 °S ,, . l,tl tlt~~jt ~ ~' CI't' N . P 90 ;~~. f,`ccit, ~ , {ft 1~~~~~c~Ei~ . ,~~ ~ thF > ~e e. ~~ P So/ . ; lr'~tUtF ,~ h9 4 . r n1PIZt
eris
That ominous fictitious net~s report coul~l happen : in fact, V . cau sed , board atrcraft su,»e recent uccurrenc~s should have e ;ervone ver~ vehicle on hicle oke from ires in ve Fv cctnc~rneJ . Sm o{ electr i ca~ "' ,l P/ ,,ck sForting { {o give you an idea ~~hat ;ac're up against, this pagc b Y rn. a~P L'td To t;i,ton tr ~ n to bu de s . n Z tha used insulatto So e~ti contains some uf the reecnl occurrences having high-hazard ans ~ ree ca Ares co . e~,y c to a ae9 to ar S~ri nCe 9fr0 potential . We're not saying specifically hut; tu reverse the am failed 4 t44 2Pd ntrp l 1 ~ ne ouse : d load in 9 te k . te ~e . trertd - lhat's up to the uperatur5 - btlt tlte lact remains thttl sor an ed as requ~ red , ov er, . S~ Sp d t/~ S eve o sol' , ed . ervi connect ; Co~ {~/ c% in9 g ,ve~ oth suP er d~s se. /e ec t { a1 c° . orders and procedures ignoretl or feebl~ applizd can tipell eok d hicle batt y - B , d ~e air 1 ralt wo5 tea m en sure ve o~h / ton cr °fj g e,~ s~, Jisaster. 0~ tc odin9 os CFP111~ i n sure yo '°e~~ ~sor. Se 4n) / ~4S issued in ;tructions on clangeruus cargu handltng ; n d lo ity F11C hr+5 e~ ~ or o integ r~ity ervrs o°d Pak there's alsu dcfinitive coverage in CFP111 . fiut publications th s~P ns''r e 1 C Q ° ot t ~o to e i 1~ . ~,o H can unly go so far ; wc all know Ihal nu puhlication can he so . ~ ed ~F P ~arg© as to preclude rrccidents, neither can the fa~ d bY o~s comprehensive an9er While t ' r eq~rre °xYrng for tak eoff prot~isions ot such puhlications legislate for evetv pussiblz the ram a 1'e eP ~oade , ~'o to ~ P positi on was d rn circurnslance . This means thai thuse handling dangerous notice d leaki 0 bt °' amounts o{ {ue nglare cargu must be pessimists at h~~trt . I~rcmt this attituJe will I . g comc tigilance and cautiun - lacking on oc;cayion, iis the Cause; accounts on this pag~ shuw . L.oodin 9 creW supervisor 1~e're convinced that rnuch of the prublem Stems f~rum vehicle didn't moke Was positio~ed sure thot pro perly lack uf fantrliartly wtth regulattons . Dunng an exercrsc in oircraff, 0~ in Ncrv Dcc 1968 N~hcn land lorces tt~ere deployed in .1TC \e inci~ent~ in which t~ e\ e a. aircraft there ~tere nu fewer than five a opQ . Sfro er st h~s either vzhicles ur runtainers leaked sufficirnt quantitics a9 0 e o{ flights . Une aircraft ~~as furced apd' , r po ot .or . .~,b of 1-~asoline tu hazard the c eok~n 9oso~ . 0 r c °n 9 m ~\ e '~ ~t to lanel at ihe ncar~st suitablc strip and thc uther~ «~r~ vQS, fro iro h co at ra nk \ o co ver m I' err F,, el ,11 in9 ht oa°~ ~k att \ ~e ohligca to proceed al lu ;{zr altitutles in utder to mrrke their ed tr . r co ~ ed sp 1 1 uel t r ta a eQ E ae Coos e, . Qtler. ns ~A not t c e1 0 ',~9 , o~ to ot ~c e J~stination, On the same ~~~rcise, there t~as an anxtuus w Qa lev . ta o \~. ~b .~, ,a,t 1\ ~o tehicle un B os w e ck G o ~t ~ \o ~9 \a momenl ~~hen smuke ;;ns seen cuming from a SuAerv~ cl,m. bou t 9 . '~ ank sh° 1,.Iler n tt o~; iet et~ ~r c to tobl;S So~ o n ~ le ol . t v o d board an airrraft . Imagine ti4hat ;tuulJ hati~e huhpenecl if i h lo nd c ve C t a P \~9h oa .,t e~ ~e CFp od ,n rew f . . on low ~ h o t therc had been fuel lcuks as ;tell . tc'9ri ~yQ o~ ~edro 2,2 t 5 be ck S ' nche tc° e \o`~~ c` pri~hlem plaguing nperakrrs is the limited life r ~ re f uel ,~ro a ve tE ,n9 Another ~e9ui re lou nsu tt o handling antl interior d ,~ e ;ts . o h lo ~ri thc a;zrage jtrry can. Rough 1 . a, I ed to 1 e Irm to09 o~ a ., ~, f s~b th o~ rusting ~tieaken these cans making them unable to nith- d cre ermr 5 ~ Sot cor9 , . rvr of assoctated t~tth altttude . use~ or or' in P ,.y~- . Qu se~ e , .on stand the differential in pr~ssure Ca rv~s ,~a5 v~r1h G SuP ctr needed, ul cuurse, ts a can desrgned fur atr oth nten ts ~`- ot h co t+a 11h~tt is co ~ re transportattun . , tonk c'~ e 16h~te dn thc prublems exist'' Th~ IIAL .>1RD examples shnu ~;here the problems lic . . . \
18 Fiight Commen, May Jun 1969 19 determine local traffic and to notify them of these in- tentians . ~ Gen from Two-Ten As the run-up was completed and the aircraft pro- lEARN FROM O1HER5' MISIAKES--you'll no1 live tong enough 1o moke Ihem oll yoursell~ ceeded onto the runway, a faintly discernible movement \ was observed at the far end of the runway and the airevac taxi strip, Moments aircraft beat a hasty retreat onto the chan Ke on final, puttin~ the two thc tank tivas holcd having been later a light aircraft was observed flying overhead . At aircraft out nf P osition . .'vumber ' dra~Ked along the runw'av and 'rvith was heard that t~oth the same time a voice transmission si~hted the ficld first and called it, both fins. would clear the area to let the Albatross the light aircraft CF1L~~, ~CR :1Ph:~ 'f1F'f :1~h The that he would complete his landin~, Lead's determination to stav in depart! tti~~o-h ;ane formation, hat'inr; r~~,crshnt ti~'hereupon lcad said he titi'oulil o~'er- the lcad with a P oor T :IC :a`t . (he Due to the layout of the field there are two accesses airports thc fir ;t a RP roach in helo~l~-1 I'~ h, shcl,~r . wanted the practice ; enmpromiseci Uncontrolled without any parallel taxistrips, Also, the to the runway `~'eather, was hack on final . Thcn Then lca~ announced that he too good jud~cment and airmanship . Thc end it is ru nwa ti ~ has a sli g ht centre rise~, from either things seemed tn have come un- haci thc rUnn'av in si~ht; he fell in last-minute mancuvcrin ; plu~ the are hazardous almost impossible to see any light aircraft parked or stit,-hed . hekrind ~2 for,a stream landinl. I t un 1~lanned formation chan K es could "During an airevac flight into an uncontrolled airf~ort taking-off from the opposite end . Thc lead'~ earlier T:'1C :1\ un- turneii out to be a ~lir"~?r~°am landin~: have had more ~erious conse uenccs . almost identical situation that q at Kelowna, E3C, the local unicom frequency 122 .8 was This is the second reliabilitti r~'as hclicved rcctifiec~, " . . .the result of turbulence did not :a revietiv of the various formation involved in in the past few months cont ac t ed to determine an y traffic in the local area . The the writer has been thereforc, radar ! its 1ucrision ~rn- seem suf6cier~t to cause t}~e tank eo stream-lanciins; techniques has been airport ." reply was that two light aircraft were doing touch-and-go at the same ser~~iccablcl passed onlr one headink strike the runtia~av" . tievertheless, initia t ed. landings o n runwa y 1~" . The airevac aircraft made an on runway and proceeded to the L'ntiom ir':~at~ncier ar° oh~~inu .cll~ r~' ,~alue bu~ uneventful landing 15 , new terminal off the button of runway 33 to pick up the rr nlti ~ ,-ior l Nf' ~-c= quir ~p ed aircra't., Thfre ~ little , ~- r . . patient. Pue to very low wind co ndition , we decided to thal u~e can do aoou~ tltir kin~I ~, 1~a uru -~.ecept C1I113, RI':SCI'h: H117,~1RD~ During too 5mall to eause damage . ,qfter the jud,t;ement of the tree hazard becn in the > ,, . use runway 33 for takeoff to expedite getting the patient Go continue tu caution pilot .r ahot~t thc~ greut cari' reco~cr~ of a lost bov :;nfferin{r fli,~ht, the bladetip cover caps and t,reatc_r error, thc: damat,c ~ould have severelv to hospital . The local unicom frequency was used to ncc~ded at thc°sc° unconirolfc'd airports . from csposure, it was ncr- metal cover.~ for the de-icer blanket~ p re:vented the com-letie->n. P nf the essarv to land thc heliropter . 'hhc were found Jama,t;ed, as well as ciis- rescue . Re~cue mrssions require the fli~}tt~ en K inecr directcd the p ilot in tortion in thc tip cr,~,~ers of thc three weighin,g and accc~ptance of certain settin~ thc aircraft down in a verv blaiie~ . risks - more than in most nther c:onf incd brush area. 'fhe Fh: had Despite t}le urg_enc~' nf the situ- peacetime operation~ . llc~wever, thosc: noticed a small willow tree les ; tharr ation the Fh, should not ha~e acrc P ted hazards which can rca~il~ be elim- onc inch in diameter in front c>f the x hazar~ «~hirh hc could havc casilv inatcd 5hould not bc Jisrc ~ardccl in helicopter ~,~~luch mi ;;ht he hit l-rti' the and c~cicklv} eliminated . Ha~ his thc ur~cncv c~f thc n~c~mcnt . frcmt rotor hladeti p s hut lle thou,~ht it cont'd on nexf page Mule/ Tutor/ UCR melange
After dropl~in ; off a ~ilot at his airc :raft, thc_ driver rey~.rest to install part~ Erom another manufacturer to ~~'ith an .1Pt in tow starccd off a~ain, whercupc~n thc rectifv thc prahlerrl was approved on an interim hasis . pilot " . . .heard a noise and lc~okc:d aror,nd and ~a'S1' !he~ Fi~~e more tv cck,~ ~5 - a~ nd the rr~~~ci kits arc ctill not availa`~',e ~~pe ~~t rik~ht side of thc mule had struck t}~e pitot head" . Irom the ~ontractor . Of all the u~ers of tlriti Investigators' quiz The driver stated, on proccedin~; to move off he tractcrr, onlti' this unit has reported anti' instances of nits are delivered, all nc_rticed t}~at the ,t;as pedal s~~as stuck to the floor ; hc t5r~llc 1 c ~ 'inniin-~j .r . Rut ~chcn t}~c You are asked to investigate an extreme hazard on the runwa Y . You're told that no aircraft or f , Canadian Forces will be Inodificd . braked but wati- unablc to ~~op before hittink thr pitot Dbs in the vehicle was involved . What would ou re ort? the dan~aRe was minor and Y P hrn.~m . ll~~~~cver, had the thmttle been stuck to the floor I~c ~{'cre fortunate that a does takc hefore motiinK off, the en .gine noise at full throttle ccr- that t}rere were no injuric> . Actionin~ l~(R - csperiallti- whcn paysec} to sumc manufacturers . tatnlv `could ha- v c~ heen a 1 r Frarent to the 1 ~ilot ~tihc~ heard time onlv I the noise of the rnule strikin~ the airrraft . Thc clrlver n as attempttnK to f~asst between the ~a~in K ti 1 ~~ of noticec} ttivc> 1 >arkcd Tutors ; it would aplrear that tivhen he he didn't I.ave enorc~h clcarancc and attcmpted to brake, thc throttlc mav then have stuck . e Problems on the I)b throttle 1'amminK prompted a l'CR ahc~ut fi c m onths earlicr . In addition, all D6 drivers were CH113 menace ~,~, - ~ . hriefed on this hazard . ~uch accidents iwithout the assistance of a stickin,K A crewchief moving about inside the cabin during a throttlel continuc to he a problem . flc~wever, a~ this one landing, lost his balance and fell into the apen area miqht have been a~'oided, the slow response to thc l~'CR containing the external cargo hook . Ne di slocated a sent to the is 1 ~crtincr,t . Five ~cceks after the 1'CR ~ti'crs shoulder and suffeted cuts - the punishment af the ,+ ~ : ~ manufacturer, }re advised us that the mod kits requirecl unwary . ~s . certain en~inecrin~; dra`~in~s . Ten weeks later, the trial . mou p rot'ed '~rnsatisfactor~- nn test~ . :lftcr annther four their 1 `t'ecks tl,e unit re P orted another throttle jammint; ;
20 .y V
to i;rab the tow~bar and atten.pt to w~f~~en thev fail under normal stress . affccted the formers, stringers, and ural failure of the upper sw'ay brace 5teer the nosewheel . fle v°as par- `even of the nrne towbars at the forward spar cap flant,-e . ln addition, caused the ncar disaster . elon- tiallti~ sucressful ; his intervention unit hau shcarpins with si,~ns of An the left aileron wa~ h;;~kled an~ thc gatc :d gouge in the win~tip fairint,~ convertcd a thrce-~ lanc rollisian stress and wear . 'I't~~o of the seti-en left flap was bindin~ . supports both theories . into a t~ac~-plane affair . Both air- were on tf ;e ver~e of failing . The The failure or lu~s ~~ ; thc tiptank Thc hazards of incorrect instal- craft hac} rc~nsiderablc damaKc ; thc record of failed shearpins ~oes back ~. swa~~ hraces accounts for its oscil- lation of tiptanks have been adver- win~ of thc runawa~~ passed under to 196~ in w~hich ~amaee to aircraft, lation - severe enough to smash the tised maybe the ,~i~ .~ :rc~ ~.c ;l~ the other's tail before cominQ to a te}ricleti, and near-injuries ~~cere the wing . Improper installation or stnrct- drive the mcssagc hon-~c . CF10~, ~111~:AKI'l~ lG .alV Thc 5top . outcnme . ciriver haci slo~,ved aimc~t to a stop 1)~rc'~ i wheel hrakin~ in the d~~ral Thc shcarpin cannot, c~f c~ur~e, as the aircraft reached its parkin,r; CI''10~ is aviilable, onl ~ ~ fro n ~ the he dispen~ed with a~ it protects the ~osition on the slo in~~ ram~~ ~~~hen frc~nt ~cat - a rita~ detail that ~cas nosetivheel c;ear frorn overstressing 1 P 5 Bl_'FFAI .O, CR .a'~rE II :~7. :1RD 1 crcw llespite its inadeyuate dcsign the tow~bar shearpin broke . 'l~hr missin~ in the F:Os and conseyuentl~~, durink tow~in~. ~iet~ertheless, a timcd of 3 were installin~ an c~n{inc with a (no level-windink ~uide) this type brakeman in thc rear cockpit w~as in other towin~ orciers . (.llthou,~h, if replacement pr~~~;ram is the ob~iou5 manual Kooscneck crane . Ilhile the has been used for manv vears w~ithout unahle to stop thc: aircraft despitc ro~erl`~ serviced, full brakin~ i5 ine~pensive altemative to e~pensive P 1 . tiC0 i c o P erated the crane the tw~o a problem, sugKestin~ that opcrators his all-out trompint:,~ an the binder~ . also a~~ailablc from the rear cc~ckpit .) accidcnts such as tai~, particularlv mcn guided the en~ine into place on and supervisors have been more 111-(, rou ~h and Ilastilv dodgin~ thc runawav 11'orn and fati~ued shearpins con- as bases are faced ~~ith the en~;ine mounts - until tl:erc was a vikilant in the past . drirer velled ihe win~man aceidents . the totiv at tinue to rause ~;round undulatinK surfaces sudden snap . 'fhe cnXine dropped ['CK - at first, not imple- ontu the maintcnance stand on which mented - su,t;gested lo,t;ically cnouKh, the men wcrc standin~ . The men were enlar in >; the side flan K es of the unin'ured but the en Tine wasn't . cable drun~. llowever, an opcrator CF1I)d, l~ C COI,1, :'~PtiI~:~ :~ftcr J Thc cahle had piled up and must still use the utmost ~arc and receivin~ takeoff clc~arancr :,rrd oper- jun~ped the drum flanXe - the second vi~~ilance to prevent unevcn winding . inr; ui? to 1(_)0 ~, the pilc>t t'elt an such case . E[owever, thc previous Thus, sti~ithout t}re more cxpensil'c unusual vib;~atic~n . ~~s he retardec't ',hc / oce:urrences haii heen blamed on the lee~el-wind devire, the hazard of tl~mitle, suspicic~n turncc} to amazc- electrical operation of the crane and injur~' and damake exist~ . Onlv timc ncent a~ the left win~ lell, tiplittin~; not it~ design . ThiS provcd to be a in no prccautionarv instructions bein,t; will establish if the clieaper mudel the tiptank and ~pillin,~ fuel on tl~c red herrin~;andytutepossibly rcsultcd i5sued . was really a "best buv" . runwav . Thc .~clc~ tor ane thc indi- cators ~how ed u; c down and locked . '1'l~c fa ;lure of ihe S~a~ ~trut lI-link allc~wcd thc ~ort main undcr- 1 C1 :~~1, 'I'FC}1 INJliRFI) ;lfter button- was cventua[lv freed hva comhination rarria ;;e lc~ to collatisc rearward all }I-link~ on thc: basc wcre exam- in~ up inspection panels on thc of car>o,t, ram p ~lnwer'rn,k, I~ d c f l atrn~' the bac}1`~ dan;a,t tl~e pc.rrt wheelwc:ll lnc~d ; ll ~~cre found suspect . 'Co ;in,t,~ rudder, the technician lowered liinr nose olecr aud a crowb a r hctw een the deterrnine if it was pru,Kre~~ivc arra/ t}ic ~raclicc hor,cb dis P c:nser self in the personnel bucket uf a vehicle and aircraft . c:~rackin~,~ ur mercl~~ tool rnarks, thcsc and porl tiptank . telesropin~ lift tnick . Once below Fortunatelv there were onlti~ minor links were latcr \-ravcd . "hhis was the third such failurc the tail tipthe bucket was maneuvered injurics . 'Che man had maneuvercd '1'o dctcct anvfurther such fati ;,rue in tw~o ~cceks ; onc ha~ occurrcd to one side to clear the nearbv the bucket incorrectlv . However, thr durin~,r a hi(;h-speed taxi te;t and failurcs : han ~ar doors ; then , instead of oin .T dcsi>_;ncr is reallv. at fault bv, ne-~li-k one ciurint; towin~ . The prokres~ive all installed links «~ill he dnwn thc bucket went u p . Thc con- Kently desigrrin,~ the lever movement havc ori- ?~-raved not later thau thc_ next fatig~ue crack appcared to trol, and the man'S hand ticcrc rn thc wrong plane . ,a control lever kinated at a mark lcft hv a tool airframe periodic inspection . found will be dressed out. jatnmcd into the fuselage lowcr which is moved forward to raise and impact on thc Il-link . Thcre wcre a links in stock will be ~i5uallv ~'~I)T of all II-links will be ~urfacc . ;lsthe controlswcre jammed, back toloaver cnunters the in-;tinctive This accident poliltS to aneed for number of s~,rch marks in this area . inspected for surface irre~;ular- addcd t+~ thr (' F l0~ r~ 1 Pcriudir the bucket could nnt be lowered ; he impulse5 of an operator . formal safety criteria in such deviccs . t'~in~ ultra-violet \1)T cxamination, ities or tool marks and any Inspection .
U,~kOT :1, l~'v'FOKh :(' :IS'1' IlI'\Uti ln throughout the nic;ht the forcc in- c~ntinues to be an "inexact sciencc" . T33, 10'I'VG TOh~ Thc: aircraft was dition~ . . ." 'hlie copilot mcntioned off a ~traiKht-in approach . tlie earlv mornin,~ at an itiolatcd creased ta nearly ~U mph in r;ust~ - The least imponderahle aspect cf at ~}U00 ah,~ti~e r;rc~~,cnd c~n a spc~tter bein ~ tlrn~wn ahc~ut the cock it . The outcr w'in~ skin and tip p northern air P ort the crew were ast+~n- enou~h to blow the aircraft backwar~i~ weather, then, is the certaintti~ of [roto fli ~ht with a lurmation . Flvin The pilot thcn noti~cd t}re pc>rt fairin~,> : buckled and torn . For P k . K wert ished tc_~ lrnd the airtraft thev lrad SO feet and sw'in~ it throu~h iU`'. The uncertaintv - act accnrdin ~1~ . . at ~00}; in a ~}~-t~0`' port bank thc~ tiptank comrnencc a rapid vcrtical ~~ irrches alon~r, the u~~r Pe r s P a~ ca P~ parked the prevrous nrkht, in a starboard elevator ~eas extensi~~elv aircraft crossed in front of, and oscillation . Despite reducin^ pota~er rivets had heen ~ullecl aw'av like } . differcnt spot .'f'he starl>nardcle~ator damaKed necessitatin K a flv-in, re- ; (1() fect above, the fcumation . " :~ and casin~ uff the slight G torn stitches . Internal w~in~ dama~e f 1-1!?1, was overlappin,~ the w~in~tip of a 1 ~laccmcnt . ~evere vibratic~n or huffet ~uddenlv thc oscillations incrcased and civilian tu'in-en~ine 1'ob . llinds continued to climb during o~curred not unlike turhulcnce at structural failurc sccmcd imrninent . I 'nable to obtain chocks from the the dav. to ~~ m 1 ~h ~ sts movin K thc verv low lcvel in ~usty° wind c'on- 1~hcn thc winKs started to ripple and civilian a,~enc~~ the ni~~ht before Dak backwards - even J~um 1 ~in~_ a the tiptank seemed ahout to tear ( everti'thine. w~as closed u P~~ thev. chock on one occasion . Good fortune awati', tlie empty tanks ~t~erc j ettis- Answer ; neverthelc~ss dccidc~d that with the alone prevented the aircraft from declaring emerKenc~, oned . ;'~fter an parking brakc sct it was safe to hc_in~; exposed to these w~inds during A lighln~ng stnke last summer al CFB Toronto. thc pilot c:arried out a cc~ntroll- leave th : air~raft unchocked . Iiut t}le nl~}lt . before safe[~~ abil itv check landin~,T the winds did not follow the foreca~t ; Forecastrn~, ~a~' the experts,
22 Flight Comment, May Jun 1969 to the editor BIRD WATCHERS' CORNER
ICe }tere at tit 11ar~arets ~()R :111 (ontrol ('entre are ticr`~.P rouu of our cquipment but ~~~ere astounded to find ~ie could control aircraft ~~a~~ out in Corn~~x. I refcr to ~our item in , the 1 an Fcr issuc° "~i~ Como~ ai rcre~~~ -- ; OD(i 1~oodocr hc,ctr~" . Tl~i~ 9 w ~ .9 ~a~! . . . phvto ~ho~~~s 6 aircre«' from ~lf~ tiyn . :1s wc have hc:en reco~~erin~ ~lr~ ~yn cii rcraft at C F R ( hatham, i t i s hn~cci t}rat ~~7e arc~ not comlrromisinK fli~ht safctti~ bv recoverint; thcsc aircraft sc> far Irom their base at ('c~n;o~, ('ol ,~ .J . Collins CFti tit 1far~arets
Fra.nfi ; attrnpts to huc~c these ~ +- ii c~~Tl tr
cont'd from page 3 ,1dcq~.tatc plannin,t; m~~ist he prcccded hv a thorous;h to flir;ht saEetl ;. In this r~'ay, you prvvidc ti;e effort in sur~~evto dctcrmine tu w~hatextent cxist ;nk~ ~UT resrncces ~.i nearthin? the facts so that .tl~e tool,ti which ~cience and ar r irtilized . 'flic confirmation of aircr~cfr structural applied en~incering have crea'~cl, can ~ontri6~.ttc tn lh~ inte~;ritv no~1 hcin .t; ac,hie~~cd b~~ the cxtensive ~~ise of aincorthincss of c~ur air~raft . ® rac3ro~raihi~ 'c ( --ravl exarnination shoulc! result in re~~is- ions to dch~ot-le~~el maintenanic proredures . Fliminatin~ !19ui Pti~ Chamberl~:zr.d ~bt~~inNd n C'A in l~`~~~ ana cc~stl~~duplication of inspcctions is possihle . :1n`' e~~alua- , B~c I1~F~t,illurr a,,~~'~ in 1958 fr~~:r~ Lav~nl ilniversitv. . tr'o rt. r~l ne~ti~ methods must hc made a r,~ainst tl-ie hack >round 1'~c- an ` f~~' >.. Ti- ~~ rc7 .~u~7te , his fir ::t ~r . ::ic nrn~=r,t ~,^~a ~ r,f ~urrent maintt:nance problems tcr det_errnine those to tn 1~ T.~11, titi~~~st~r~, ;Jntar :-_, vvhich 1-~r:~ icft in -,~ ~t~hich our actcntiorr rn~i~t Eirst bc ccv~rted . Pro~~en methods l~tJl! ` f__,r,r At1rrF" P,~~t_r~r P ._1;F L ~uk ~c~ r c7tC,r Y, F~_~~.~'6 :_^llffv . T T'7 rnutit he farthcr investi ;iated to espand thcir usehrlness In A~~~~~u : t 196', re ~won n C`nt r,~icn~ 'dJr l~in~; un~ ~ttendF~c C'r~n~if :Gld in ~c~l~~~int ; cxistin,~~ prnblc:ms . 1~~,~reau : ch~-,lar~,l~ip .! GULLI ^~~11Pq~ ~ .` A~rc~nautic :, 1~~, :cr pc~~'~>'a~l~sut~ t~rc rnnncJiate lu~ t~,~ re , c~ur efforts shall bc directcd ,. ln vfrrh in welctinrj rr~etailur;ay . In ~;~ct~b~r 1Q6~;, itp n From casual observations of this bird, some bird watchers are ton arif plannin~ the futurc gro~cth of '~U'l- for aircraft vvcas po :;tc-~d to 6RC! ;ne~~,~ AP~DLI) ~;til-tF~re f,,c ~;,-..~ misled into supposmg that Gulhbles are nest-bound sanctu- mai~~tenance. Surve`~s ~ti~ill be rarried crut to cstahlish thG p~.~r:i!icn ~f ND'l' 7lfic~lr rm!i1 1ulti~ 196i . HF it must that occasionally this c~ur needs and Jeterminc our 1~robl~m~ . Thc attcntion and i~ __:rr~_nth;, , - : ~-~n :irl~~ ,fcr the ~_~~~ v ~,.1~pm ~> cr' c i s arY seekers. And be admitted survcys ' ~ i f,:~r ~} i r -11 rr.rt- tf~~~roukluress ,~Ti~cn bv all forrnatic~n~ te~ thcse iJF~T r ~_~r;r~~~ ., ~~ _~u~~ing .~_A[', C _ sP ecies does display an mstinchve inchnatton to rest in the ~,~:~1', influence thc extent of the maintenance contrihution ~;ratE: , f A~°r~ , -~~ ?~°,,~intvna~~ce . nest. Take the Gull's less-than-com P lete scrutin y of his flock's work, for example . Real or imagined pressure of work seems to intervene - particularly when the inspection involves another experienced and trusted bird. Thus, from the good The servicing officer reported that the lighting on the ramp area was inadequate. Recently, a crew were doing intentions of both parties, old Gullible gets gulled and a Poor lighfing penalty a run-up on a visiting aircraft and a fuel tank leak was mis-mated part is missed. Confident in the competence of a not detected because of poor lighting . feathered fellow he casually gestures his acceptance while - Flight Safety Comrnittee a characteristic song escapes his gullet: I 24 WHENEVER-I'M-RUSHED I-DISPENSE-LOTS-OF-TRUST ...a useless dim glow!
Most aircrew make certain that workable flashlights are part of their flight deck equipment-but not all . On one very black night, seconds after takeoff, a fully loaded mu Iti-engine transport experienced a loss of primary electrical power. To compound the problem, essential instrument lights were not automatically restored . In an effort to provide the captain with instrument lighting during this critical phase of flight, the first officer grabbed his readily available flashlight, to use while making the necessary electrical panel switch configurations . To his consternation, the flashlight gave out only a useless dim glow! Meanwhile, a quick-thinking flight engineer filled the gap by illuminating the captain's flight instruments with his own flashlight until the first officer, fumbling in the dark, managed to restore aircraft electrical power. Flashlights of dubious quality as well as worn-out batteries continually find their way into the system -and stay there unchecked - unless there's a program for: * getting rid of damaged flashlights . a ready access at the flightline to fresh batteries and bulbs - and even flashlights (at CFB Uplands!). @ a routine check program. Convinced? OK, just answer this question : How keen is the above- mentioned crew now for maintaining their flashlights?