Strategic Competence Lessons from 13 Years of War
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Cohen ARROYO CENTER Improving Strategic Competence Lessons from 13 Years of War Linda Robinson, Paul D. Miller, John Gordon IV, Jeffrey Decker, Michael Schwille, Raphael S. Cohen Prepared for the United States Army Approved for public release; distribution unlimited For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/rr816 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication. ISBN 978-0-8330-8775-1 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © Copyright 2014 RAND Corporation R® is a registered trademark. Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. 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Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org Preface The purpose of this report is to contribute to the ongoing efforts to distill lessons from the U.S. experience in 13 years of war (2001–2014), apply the lessons to the future operating environment, and identify crit- ical requirements for land forces to operate successfully in conjunction with joint, interagency, and multinational partners to address hybrid and irregular threats. This study seeks to address a particular gap in the current debate on the future of national security strategy and the role of landpower caused by an inadequate examination of the national level of strategy made by the interagency level of government. The gap exists because there has been no systematic effort to collect and analyze insights from those who have been actively engaged in making policy and strategy from 2001 to 2014. A RAND Arroyo Center workshop provided a mechanism for eliciting insights from policymakers and academic experts involved in the formation of national-level strategy and its implementation over the past 13 years. This study analyzes and develops those insights in the context of the overall debate on future national security strategy. The purpose of this document is to assist military and civilian leaders in assessing capabilities needed in the U.S. government, and in land and special operations forces in particular, in future irregular and hybrid conflicts. This research was sponsored by U.S. Army Special Operations Command and conducted within the RAND Arroyo Center’s Strat- egy, Doctrine, and Resources Program. RAND Arroyo Center, part of the RAND Corporation, is a federally funded research and develop- ment center sponsored by the United States Army. iii iv Improving Strategic Competence: Lessons from 13 Years of War The Project Unique Identification Code (PUIC) for the project that produced this document is HQD146692. Contents Preface ............................................................................. iii Tables ..............................................................................vii Summary .......................................................................... ix Acknowledgments .............................................................. xxi Abbreviations .................................................................. xxiii CHaptER ONE Introduction ....................................................................... 1 Methodology ....................................................................... 4 CHaptER TWO The U.S. Experience in Land Warfare, 1939–2014 ......................... 7 The Formative Years: World War II Through Korea ........................... 8 The Model Breaks Down: The Vietnam War Through the 1980s ..........13 The 1990s and the Search for a New Paradigm ...............................18 From NCW to Counterinsurgency: Afghanistan and Iraq, 2001–2014 ................................................................... 24 Learning the Big Lessons .........................................................29 CHaptER THREE Lessons from 13 Years of War .................................................31 Findings ............................................................................32 1. The Making of National Security Strategy Has Suffered from a Lack of Understanding and Application of Strategic Art .............32 v vi Improving Strategic Competence: Lessons from 13 Years of War 2. An Integrated Civilian-Military Process Is a Necessary, But Not Sufficient, Condition of Effective National Security Policy and Strategy ..................................................................... 44 3. Military Campaigns Must Be Based on a Political Strategy, Because Military Operations Take Place in the Political Environment of the State in Which the Intervention Takes Place ......................52 4. Technology Cannot Substitute for Expertise in History, Culture, and Languages Because of the Inherently Human and Uncertain Nature of War ..............................................................59 5. Interventions Should Not Be Conducted Without a Plan to Conduct Stability Operations, Capacity Building, Transition, and, If Necessary, Counterinsurgency ...........................................63 6. Shaping, Influence, and Unconventional Operations May Be Cost- Effective Ways of Addressing Conflict That Obviate the Need for Larger, Costlier Interventions ............................................71 7. The Joint Force Requires Nonmilitary and Multinational Partners, as Well as Structures for Coordinated Implementation .............. 77 CHaptER FOUR Future Conflict and Implications for the JIIM ............................85 Future Conflict Trends .......................................................... 87 The Need for a Theory of Success ...............................................93 Proposals for Institutional Reform ............................................ 101 Enhancing Strategic Competence ........................................... 104 Organizational Adaptation .................................................. 105 SOF-Conventional Force Interdependence ................................ 110 Innovative and Multifunctional Personnel ................................ 114 Joint Capabilities for Irregular Warfare .................................... 116 Interagency and Intergovernmental Coordination ........................ 117 Improving Coalitions and Leveraging Multinational Expertise......... 119 Conclusion ....................................................................... 123 References ....................................................................... 125 Tables 4.1. Diffusion of MANPADS, ATGMs, and UAVs ................. 94 4.2. Selected Joint and Interagency Capabilities .................... 118 vii Summary The United States and many of its closest allies have been engaged in a long period of continuous military operations with mixed success in confronting a range of complex and dynamic threats. The U.S. mili- tary recognizes that a great deal of intellectual work remains to be done to learn from these experiences. This