World Bank Document

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

World Bank Document 46719 Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Middle East Centralization, and Decentralization North Africa and Confl ict in the Middle East Working Paper and North Africa Series Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized No. 51 October 2008 Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized by The World Bank Mehmet Serkan Tosun Produced by the Serdar Yilmaz Offi ce of the Chief Economist Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Summaries in Arabic and French Middle East and North Africa Working Paper Series No. 51 Centralization, Decentralization and Conflict in the Middle East and North Africa By Mehmet Serkan Tosun∗ University of Nevada, Reno and Serdar Yilmaz• World Bank October 2008 Discussion papers are not formal publications of the World Bank. They represent preliminary and often unpolished results of country analysis and research. Circulation is intended to encourage discussion and comments; citation and the use of the paper should take account of its provisional character. The findings and conclusions of the paper are entirely those of the authors and should not be attributed to the World Bank, its affiliated organizations, or to members of its Board of Executive Directors or the countries they represent. The authors thank Lyn Squire, Blanca Moreno-Dodson Jennifer Keller and Robert Beschel for helpful comments and suggestions, Dilek Uz and Omid Harraf for excellent research assistance. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions are entirely those of authors, and do not represent the views of the World Bank, its executive directors, or the countries they represent. Corresponding author: Serdar Yilmaz. * Department of Economics, College of Business Administration, University of Nevada-Reno, Reno, Mail Stop 0030. Nevada 89557; [email protected]; phone: +1-775-7846678. • Social Development Department, World Bank, 1818 H Street, NW, Washington D.C. 20433; [email protected]; phone: +1-202-473-9350. TABLE OF CONTENTS ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS.........................................................................................I ABSTRACT..............................................................................................................................II 1. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................................1 2. CENTRALIZATION IN THE MENA COUNTRIES: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ........2 Ottoman Taxation System..........................................................................................2 3. COMPARISON OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE IN SELECTED MENA COUNTRIES ................................................................................................................6 Deconcentration and Decentralization in MENA......................................................6 Expenditure Assignment............................................................................................7 Revenue Assignment .................................................................................................9 Intergovernmental Transfer Characteristics...............................................................9 Discussion..................................................................................................................10 4. DETERMINANTS OF CENTRALIZATION AND DECENTRALIZATION...........................11 Measurement Issues and Review of the Literature....................................................11 Empirical Analysis.....................................................................................................13 Empirical Results.......................................................................................................16 5. INTERGOVERNMENTAL REFORM OPTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS ..............................19 REFERENCES..........................................................................................................................23 APPENDICES Appendix A: Government Structure in Egypt....................................................................34 Appendix B: Government Structure in Iran.......................................................................36 Appendix C: Government Structure in Tunisia .................................................................39 Appendix D: Government Structure in West Bank/Gaza ..................................................40 Appendix E: Government Structure in Yemen..................................................................42 TABLES Table 1. Share of Local Government in GDP and in Total Government Expenditures ..................................................................................................26 Table 2. Deconcentration and Decentralization Systems in MENA Countries ...........27 Table 3. Expenditure Assignment in MENA Countries ..............................................28 Table 4. Expenditure Assignment Scores ....................................................................29 Table 5. Revenue Assignment in MENA Countries....................................................30 Table 6. Transfer Characteristics and Allocation Rules in MENA Countries.............30 Table 7. Summary Statistics for the Regression Analysis on the Determinants of Centralization in MENA Countries ...............................................................31 Table 8. Determinants of Central Government Expenditure in MENA Countries......32 Table 9. Determinants of Decentralization in MENA Countries.................................33 APPENDIX FIGURE Figure A1. Egyptian Local Government System .............................................................35 APPENDIX TABLES Table B1. The System of Subnational Administration in Iran .......................................37 Table D1. Categorization of Local Government Units in West Bank & Gaza...............41 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS DPI Database of Political Institutions EPCs Elected People's Council GCC Gulf Cooperation Council GDP Gross Domestic Product GFS Government Finance Statistics ICRG International Country Risk Guide LLA Law on Local Authorities MENA Middle East and North Africa Region MoH Ministry of Health MoI Ministry of Interior MoLA Ministry of Local Administration MoLD Ministry of Local Development MoLG Ministry of Local Government MPO Management and Planning Organization WBG West Bank and Gaza i ABSTRACT In this paper, we examine broadly the intergovernmental structure in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, which has one of the most centralized government structures in the world. We are addressing the reasons behind this centralized structure by looking first at the history behind the tax systems of the region. For this, we review the Ottoman taxation system that has been predominantly influential as a model and discuss its impact on current government structure. Next, we discuss the current intergovernmental structure by examining the type and degree of decentralization in five countries representative of the region: Egypt, Iran, West Bank/Gaza, Tunisia and Yemen. We then conduct a cross-country regression analysis using panel data for a broader set of MENA countries to understand the factors behind heavy centralization in the region. Our findings show that external conflicts constitute a major roadblock to decentralization in the region. JEL classification: H77, H87, N45, O53 Key words: Fiscal decentralization, intergovernmental relations, Middle East and North Africa ii Centralisation, Décentralisation et Conflit au Moyen-Orient et en Afrique du Nord Avant-propos Ce document examine, sous un angle général, la structure intergouvernementale de la région du Moyen-Orient et de l’Afrique du Nord (MENA), l’une des structures publiques parmi les plus centralisées au monde. Nous abordons les raisons sous-jacentes à cette structure centralisée en se penchant tout d’abord sur l’historique des systèmes fiscaux de la région. Pour ce faire nous examinons le système fiscal ottoman qui a été un modèle d’une influence prédominante et nous discutons son impact sur la structure gouvernementale actuelle. Ensuite, nous discutons de la structure intergouvernementale actuelle en examinant le type et le degré de décentralisation dans cinq pays représentatifs de la région : l’Egypte, l’Iran, la Cisjordanie/Gaza, la Tunisie et le Yémen. Nous réalisons ensuite une analyse de régression transfrontalière en se servant de données de panel pour un plus grand nombre de pays de la région MENA afin d’appréhender les facteurs qui expliquent la forte centralisation dans la région. Nos conclusions montrent que les conflits extérieurs constituent un obstacle majeur à la décentralisation. iii ﺍﻟﻤﺭﻜﺯﻴﺔ ﻭﺍﻟﻼﻤﺭﻜﺯﻴﺔ ﻭﺍﻟﺼﺭﺍﻉ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺸﺭﻕ ﺍﻷﻭﺴﻁ ﻭﺸﻤﺎل ﺃﻓﺭﻴﻘﻴﺎ ﺍﻟﺨﻼﺼﺔ ﻨﺘﻨﺎﻭل ﻓﻲ ﻫﺫﻩ ﺍﻟﻭﺭﻗﺔ ﺒﺎﻟﺒﺤﺙ ﻫﻴﻜل ﺍﻟﺘﻨﻅﻴﻡ ﺍﻟﺤﻜﻭﻤﻲ ﻓﻲ ﻤﻨﻁﻘﺔ ﺍﻟﺸﺭﻕ ﺍﻷﻭﺴﻁ ﻭﺸﻤﺎل ﺃﻓﺭﻴﻘﻴﺎ ﺍﻟﺘﻲ ﺘﺘﺴﻡ ﺒﻬﻴﺎﻜل ﺤﻜﻭﻤﻴﺔ ﻫﻲ ﻤﻥ ﺃﻜﺜﺭ ﺍﻟﻬﻴﺎﻜل ﻤ ﺭ ﻜ ﺯ ﻴ ﺔﹰ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻟﻡ. ﻭﻨﺴﺘﻜﺸﻑ ﺍﻷﺴﺒﺎﺏ ﺍﻟﺘﻲ ﺘﻘﻑ ﻭﺭﺍﺀ ﻫﺫﺍ ﺍﻟﻬﻴﻜل ﺍﻟﺸﺩﻴﺩ ﺍﻟﻤﺭﻜﺯﻴﺔ ﺒﺎﻟﻨﻅﺭ ﺃﻭﻻ ﻓﻲ ﺘﺎﺭﻴﺦ ﺍﻟﻨﻅﻡ ﺍﻟﻀﺭﻴﺒﻴﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻤﻨﻁﻘﺔ. ﻭﻟﻬﺫﺍ ﺍﻟﻐﺭﺽ، ﻨﻘﻭﻡ ﺒﺎﺴﺘﻌﺭﺍﺽ ﺍﻟﻨﻅﺎﻡ ﺍﻟﻀﺭﻴﺒﻲ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻌﻬﺩ ﺍﻟﻌﺜﻤﺎﻨﻲ ﻭﺍﻟﺫﻱ ﻜﺎﻥ ﻤﻬﻴﻤﻨﺎ ﻜﻨﻤﻭﺫﺝ ﻭﺒﺤﺙ ﺁﺜﺎﺭﻩ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﻬﻴﻜل ﺍﻟﺤﻜﻭﻤﻲ ﺍﻟﺤﺎﻟﻲ. ﺜ ﻡّ ﻨﺘﻨﺎﻭل ﺒﺎﻟﻤﻨﺎﻗﺸﺔ ﺍﻟﻬﻴﻜل ﺍﻟﺤﺎﻟﻲ ﻟﻠﻬﻴﺌﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﺤﻜﻭﻤﻴﺔ ﻋﻥ ﻁﺭﻴﻕ ﺩﺭﺍﺴﺔ ﻨﻭﻉ ﺍﻟﻼﻤﺭﻜﺯﻴﺔ ﻭﻤﺩﺍﻫﺎ ﻓﻲ ﺨﻤﺴﺔ ﺒﻠﺩﺍﻥ ﺘﺸﻜل ﺘﻤﺜﻴﻼ ﻟﻠﻤﻨﻁﻘﺔ، ﻭﻫﻲ ﻤﺼﺭ ﻭﺇﻴﺭﺍﻥ ﻭﺍﻟﻀﻔﺔ ﺍﻟﻐﺭﺒﻴﺔ ﻭﻗﻁﺎﻉ ﻏﺯﺓ ﻭﺘﻭﻨﺱ ﻭﺍﻟﻴﻤﻥ. ﻭﻨﺠﺭﻱ ﺒﻌﺩ ﺫﻟﻙ ﺘﺤﻠﻴﻼ ﺍﻨﺤﺩﺍﺭﻴﺎ ﻓﻴﻤﺎ ﺒﻴﻥ ﺍﻟﺒﻠﺩﺍﻥ ﺒﺎﺴﺘﺨﺩﺍﻡ ﺒﻴﺎﻨﺎﺕ ﻤﺘﺴﻠﺴﻠﺔ ﺯﻤﻨﻴﺎ ﻟﻤﺠﻤﻭﻋﺔ ﺃﻭﺴﻊ ﻤﻥ ﺒﻠﺩﺍﻥ ﺍﻟﻤﻨﻁﻘﺔ ﻟﻔﻬﻡ ﺍﻟﻌﻭﺍﻤل ﺍﻟﻤﺅﺜﺭﺓ ﻓﻲ ﻫﺫﻩ ﺍﻟﻤﺭﻜﺯﻴﺔ ﺍﻟﺸﺩﻴﺩﺓ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺸﺭﻕ ﺍﻷﻭﺴﻁ ﻭﺸﻤﺎل ﺃﻓﺭﻴﻘﻴﺎ. ﻭﻴﻅﻬﺭ ﻤﺎ ﺘﻭﺼﻠﻨﺎ ﺇﻟﻴﻪ ﻤﻥ ﻨﺘﺎﺌﺞ ﺃﻥ ﺍﻟﺼﺭﺍﻋﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﺨﺎﺭﺠﻴﺔ ﺘﺸﻜل ﻋﻘﺒﺔ ﺭﺌﻴﺴﻴﺔ
Recommended publications
  • Arrested Development: the Long Term Impact of Israel's Separation Barrier in the West Bank
    B’TSELEM - The Israeli Information Center for ARRESTED DEVELOPMENT Human Rights in the Occupied Territories 8 Hata’asiya St., Talpiot P.O. Box 53132 Jerusalem 91531 The Long Term Impact of Israel's Separation Tel. (972) 2-6735599 | Fax (972) 2-6749111 Barrier in the West Bank www.btselem.org | [email protected] October 2012 Arrested Development: The Long Term Impact of Israel's Separation Barrier in the West Bank October 2012 Research and writing Eyal Hareuveni Editing Yael Stein Data coordination 'Abd al-Karim Sa'adi, Iyad Hadad, Atef Abu a-Rub, Salma a-Deb’i, ‘Amer ‘Aruri & Kareem Jubran Translation Deb Reich Processing geographical data Shai Efrati Cover Abandoned buildings near the barrier in the town of Bir Nabala, 24 September 2012. Photo Anne Paq, activestills.org B’Tselem would like to thank Jann Böddeling for his help in gathering material and analyzing the economic impact of the Separation Barrier; Nir Shalev and Alon Cohen- Lifshitz from Bimkom; Stefan Ziegler and Nicole Harari from UNRWA; and B’Tselem Reports Committee member Prof. Oren Yiftachel. ISBN 978-965-7613-00-9 Table of Contents Introduction ................................................................................ 5 Part I The Barrier – A Temporary Security Measure? ................. 7 Part II Data ....................................................................... 13 Maps and Photographs ............................................................... 17 Part III The “Seam Zone” and the Permit Regime ..................... 25 Part IV Case Studies ............................................................ 43 Part V Violations of Palestinians’ Human Rights due to the Separation Barrier ..................................................... 63 Conclusions................................................................................ 69 Appendix A List of settlements, unauthorized outposts and industrial parks on the “Israeli” side of the Separation Barrier .................. 71 Appendix B Response from Israel's Ministry of Justice .......................
    [Show full text]
  • Israeli Settlement in the Occupied Territories
    REPORT ON ISRAELI SETTLEMENT IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES A Bimonthly Publication of the Foundation for Middle East Peace Volume 20 Number 4 July-August 2010 MOVING BEYOND A SETTLEMENT FREEZE — THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION LOOKS FOR A NEW COURSE By Geoffrey Aronson the settlement of Amona, for example, The wave of building in Judea the state prosecutor’s office offered an In their meeting on July 6, President and Samaria has never been explanation for its inaction that was Barack Obama and Israeli prime minis- higher. Thousands of units are described by Ha’aretz correspondent ter Benjamin Netanyahu presented a being built in every location. I Akiva Eldar as “the line that will go well-choreographed bit of political the- was never a fan of the freeze. No down in the ‘chutzpah’ record books: atre aimed at highlighting the “excel- one in the cabinet was. [The The prosecution asks to reject the lent” personal and political relations be- freeze] was a mistake. It is impos- demand to evacuate the illegal settle- tween the two leaders and the countries sible to take people and freeze ment since diverting the limited means they represent. Obama explained after them. This is not a solution. The of enforcement to old illegal construc- their meeting that, “As Prime Minister government remains committed tion ‘is not high on the respondents’ Netanyahu indicated in his speech, the to renew a wave of construction agenda.’ And why not? ‘Means of bond between the United States and this coming September. In any enforcement’ are needed to implement Israel is unbreakable.
    [Show full text]
  • ISRAEL.Qxp Mise En Page 1 11/07/2019 14:40 Page1 Middle East & West Asia ISRAEL UNITARY COUNTRY
    Fiche ISRAEL.qxp_Mise en page 1 11/07/2019 14:40 Page1 Middle East & West Asia ISRAEL UNITARY COUNTRY BASIC SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS INCOME GROUP: HIGH INCOME LOCAL CURRENCY: NEW ISRAELI SHEKEL (ILS) POPULATION AND GEOGRAPHY ECONOMIC DATA Area: 21 643 km 2 GDP: 333.4 billion (current PPP international dollars), i.e. 38 276 dollars per inhabitant Population: 8.709 million inhabitants (2017), an increase of 1.7% (2017) per year (2010-2015) Real GDP growth: 3.3% (2017 vs 2016) Density: 402 inhabitants / km 2 Unemployment rate: 4.2% (2017) Urban population: 92.3% of national population Foreign direct investment, net inflows (FDI): 18 169 (BoP, current USD millions, 2017) Urban population growth: 2.0% (2017) Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF): 20.3% of GDP (2016) Capital city: Jerusalem (10.4% of national population) HDI: 0.903 (very high), rank 22 (2017) MAIN FEATURES OF THE MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK Israel is a unitary parliamentary democracy established in 1948 by the Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel. Israel has no formal written constitution but thirteen “Basic Laws” (and a temporary one) that were passed in 1957 to set up a legal framework. The first basic law established the parliament in 1958. It is a unicameral parliament ( Knesset ) composed of 120 members elected every four years by direct universal suffrage. The Knesset elects the President of the State in a secret vote for a single, seven-year term. The country’s prime minister is the head of government and chief executive, entrusted with the task of forming the cabinet, which is the government’s main policy-making and executive body.
    [Show full text]
  • 22 March 2004 ICG Asia Report N°77 Islamabad/Brussels
    DEVOLUTION IN PAKISTAN: REFORM OR REGRESSION? 22 March 2004 ICG Asia Report N°77 Islamabad/Brussels TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS ....................................................... i I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1 II. BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................. 3 A. GENERAL AYUB KHAN'S BASIC DEMOCRACY.......................................................................3 B. GENERAL ZIA-UL-HAQ'S LOCAL GOVERNMENT SYSTEM ......................................................4 III. THE MUSHARRAF DEVOLUTION........................................................................... 5 A. DOMESTIC AND EXTERNAL IMPERATIVES .............................................................................5 B. THE BLUEPRINT ....................................................................................................................7 1. Administrative Decentralisation ................................................................................7 2. Fiscal Decentralisation...............................................................................................8 3. Law Enforcement.......................................................................................................8 C. MILITARY EXCEPTIONS.........................................................................................................8 D. DOMESTIC REACTION ...........................................................................................................9
    [Show full text]
  • The Relationship Between Inflation Rate, Oil Revenue and Taxation In
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by International Institute for Science, Technology and Education (IISTE): E-Journals Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development www.iiste.org ISSN 2222-1700 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2855 (Online) Vol.4, No.19, 2013 The Relationship between Inflation Rate, Oil Revenue and Taxation in IRAN: Based OLS Methodology Kamyar Radnia Economics Department, School of Social Science, Universiti Sains Malaysia (U.S.M), Paulu Pinang 11800, Malaysia *Email: [email protected] Abstract In this paper we investigate the relationship between inflation behaviors relying to using oil revenue and taxation revenue as two distinguish original sources in Iranian economy. We employ the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) as methods for analysis data in short and long run periods. In this study, we found that the oil revenue and corporate tax are significant variables to measurement of consumer price index. Taxation has both positive and negative impact in economic growth and consumer price index due to increasing and decreasing inflation rate. Since increase export oil cause to increasing in price level in Iran, government ought to try to allocate the earning from selling of oil. On the other side, increasing in corporate tax cause to price level rises. So, policy makers and economics should reduces taxation on corporate to make incentive in investors to more investment. Key Words: Microeconomic variables, Inflation rate, Taxation, OLS Methodology, Iranian economy 1. Introduction The history of oil exploration and extraction dates back a long time ago, especially for Iran. The base of the Iranian economy has been placed on the extraction of natural resources.
    [Show full text]
  • Health Sector Evolution Plan in Iran; Equity and Sustainability Concerns
    http://ijhpm.com Int J Health Policy Manag 2015, 4(10), 637–640 doi 10.15171/ijhpm.2015.160 Editorial Health Sector Evolution Plan in Iran; Equity and Sustainability Concerns Maziar Moradi-Lakeh1,2*, Abbas Vosoogh-Moghaddam3,4 Abstract Article History: In 2014, a series of reforms, called as the Health Sector Evolution Plan (HSEP), was launched in the health system of Received: 22 May 2015 Iran in a stepwise process. HSEP was mainly based on the fifth 5-year health development national strategies (2011- Accepted: 27 August 2015 2016). It included different interventions to: increase population coverage of basic health insurance, increase quality ePublished: 31 August 2015 of care in the Ministry of Health and Medical Education (MoHME) affiliated hospitals, reduce out-of-pocket (OOP) payments for inpatient services, increase quality of primary healthcare, launch updated relative value units (RVUs) of clinical services, and update tariffs to more realistic values. The reforms resulted in extensive social reaction and different professional feedback. The official monitoring program shows general public satisfaction. However, there are some concerns for sustainability of the programs and equity of financing. Securing financial sources and fairness of the financial contribution to the new programs are the main concerns of policy-makers. Healthcare providers’ concerns (as powerful and influential stakeholders) potentially threat the sustainability and efficiency of HSEP. Previous experiences on extending health insurance coverage show that they can lead to a regressive healthcare financing and threat financial equity. To secure financial sources and to increase fairness, the contributions of people to new interventions should be progressive by their income and wealth.
    [Show full text]
  • Report of the 4Th Uclg World Congress
    RABAT 2013 1-4 OCTOBER 2ND WORLD SUMMIT OF LOCAL AND REGIONAL LEADERS Report OF THE 4thUCLG WORLD CONGRESS 1 SUMMARY 04 09 10 14 FOREWORD AT THE HEART OPENING CEREMONY THEMATIC ROUND OF THE WORLD AND INTRODUCTORY TABLES AND SUMMIT PLENARY PARALLEL SESSIONS rabat 2013 - the world summit in numbers | www.uclg.org 48 53 54 62 STRATEGIC CLOSING PLENARY SIDE EVENTS FINAL PLENARIES DECLARATION Foreword UCLG offered attendees a unique opportunity to debate and exchange their views on the most vital issues for the agenda of sub-national authorities and their partners for the 21st century. 4 rabat 2013 - the world summit in numbers | www.uclg.org REPORT OF THE 4TH UCLG WORLD CONGRESS , the centenary year of the international municipal movement, 2013 saw the celebration of 2nd World Summit of UCLG from 1-4 October 2013 in Rabat, Morocco. The Moroccan capital “supports all initiatives that aim to promote the principles of decentralization and local democratic development” (extract from the The Moroccan capital speech by the King of Morocco, read at the Summit “supports all opening by Mr Fathallah Oualalou, Mayor of Rabat). initiatives that Over 3,000 participants from 125 countries from all aim to promote regions of the world took part in the four day event. the principles Representatives of local and regional authorities, national governments, multi-lateral agencies, the of decentra- private sector, development partners and civil society lization and came together to connect, debate and exchange local democratic experiences. The four days offered a unique opportunity development.” for them to debate and exchange their views on the most vital issues for the agenda of sub-national authorities Mr Fathallah Oualalou, and their partners for the 21st century.
    [Show full text]
  • PUNONG BARANGAY TASKS and RESPONSIBILITIES Checklist
    PUNONG BARANGAY TASKS AND RESPONSIBILITIES Checklist NOT FOR SALE a PUNONG BARANGAY TASKS AND RESPONSIBILITIES Checklist NOT FOR SALE Punong Barangay Tasks and Responsibilities Checklist Copyright@2018 Local Government Academy (LGA) Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) All rights reserved. All rights reserved. No portions of this book may be copied or reproduced in books, pamphlets, typewritten, xeroxed, or in any other form for distribution or sale, without permission from the Academy. ISBN: 978-971-0576-81-4 Printed and bounded in Manila, Philippines. Published by: Local Government Academy Department of the Interior and Local Government 8/F Agustin I Bldg., F. Ortigas, Jr. Road, (formerly Emerald Ave.) Ortigas Center, Pasig City 1605 Philippines Tel Nos. (632) 634-8430 / 634-8436 www.lga.gov.ph Technical Working Group: Alfonso A. Maralli, Jr. Sally S. Jumalon Maria Louisa B. Bite Cover and Layout: Iris A. Igrobay PUNONG BARANGAY TASKS AND RESPONSIBILITIES Checklist TABLE OF CONTENTS I Messages iii - vi II List of Acronyms vii III Tasks and Responsibilities as Mandated by the Local Government Code 1 IV Tasks and Responsibilities Pursuant to Presidential Directives 5 V List of Presidential Directives and DILG Memorandum Circulars 31 i PUNONG BARANGAY TASKS AND RESPONSIBILITIES Checklist MESSAGE The public offices are public trusts. They are a manifestation of the will of the people. This is at the very core of democracy that we enjoy today. Both local and national officials are in the same situation, they are accountable to the people, the constituents that voted for them. The funds that are utilized are from the people and the natural resources that belong to the nation and its future generations.
    [Show full text]
  • Worldwide Estate and Inheritance Tax Guide
    Worldwide Estate and Inheritance Tax Guide 2021 Preface he Worldwide Estate and Inheritance trusts and foundations, settlements, Tax Guide 2021 (WEITG) is succession, statutory and forced heirship, published by the EY Private Client matrimonial regimes, testamentary Services network, which comprises documents and intestacy rules, and estate Tprofessionals from EY member tax treaty partners. The “Inheritance and firms. gift taxes at a glance” table on page 490 The 2021 edition summarizes the gift, highlights inheritance and gift taxes in all estate and inheritance tax systems 44 jurisdictions and territories. and describes wealth transfer planning For the reader’s reference, the names and considerations in 44 jurisdictions and symbols of the foreign currencies that are territories. It is relevant to the owners of mentioned in the guide are listed at the end family businesses and private companies, of the publication. managers of private capital enterprises, This publication should not be regarded executives of multinational companies and as offering a complete explanation of the other entrepreneurial and internationally tax matters referred to and is subject to mobile high-net-worth individuals. changes in the law and other applicable The content is based on information current rules. Local publications of a more detailed as of February 2021, unless otherwise nature are frequently available. Readers indicated in the text of the chapter. are advised to consult their local EY professionals for further information. Tax information The WEITG is published alongside three The chapters in the WEITG provide companion guides on broad-based taxes: information on the taxation of the the Worldwide Corporate Tax Guide, the accumulation and transfer of wealth (e.g., Worldwide Personal Tax and Immigration by gift, trust, bequest or inheritance) in Guide and the Worldwide VAT, GST and each jurisdiction, including sections on Sales Tax Guide.
    [Show full text]
  • A Threshold Crossed Israeli Authorities and the Crimes of Apartheid and Persecution WATCH
    HUMAN RIGHTS A Threshold Crossed Israeli Authorities and the Crimes of Apartheid and Persecution WATCH A Threshold Crossed Israeli Authorities and the Crimes of Apartheid and Persecution Copyright © 2021 Human Rights Watch All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America ISBN: 978-1-62313-900-1 Cover design by Rafael Jimenez Human Rights Watch defends the rights of people worldwide. We scrupulously investigate abuses, expose the facts widely, and pressure those with power to respect rights and secure justice. Human Rights Watch is an independent, international organization that works as part of a vibrant movement to uphold human dignity and advance the cause of human rights for all. Human Rights Watch is an international organization with staff in more than 40 countries, and offices in Amsterdam, Beirut, Berlin, Brussels, Chicago, Geneva, Goma, Johannesburg, London, Los Angeles, Moscow, Nairobi, New York, Paris, San Francisco, Sydney, Tokyo, Toronto, Tunis, Washington DC, and Zurich. For more information, please visit our website: http://www.hrw.org APRIL 2021 ISBN: 978-1-62313-900-1 A Threshold Crossed Israeli Authorities and the Crimes of Apartheid and Persecution Map .................................................................................................................................. i Summary ......................................................................................................................... 2 Definitions of Apartheid and Persecution .................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • B'tselem Report: Dispossession & Exploitation: Israel's Policy in the Jordan Valley & Northern Dead Sea, May
    Dispossession & Exploitation Israel's policy in the Jordan Valley & northern Dead Sea May 2011 Researched and written by Eyal Hareuveni Edited by Yael Stein Data coordination by Atef Abu a-Rub, Wassim Ghantous, Tamar Gonen, Iyad Hadad, Kareem Jubran, Noam Raz Geographic data processing by Shai Efrati B'Tselem thanks Salwa Alinat, Kav LaOved’s former coordinator of Palestinian fieldworkers in the settlements, Daphna Banai, of Machsom Watch, Hagit Ofran, Peace Now’s Settlements Watch coordinator, Dror Etkes, and Alon Cohen-Lifshitz and Nir Shalev, of Bimkom. 2 Table of contents Introduction......................................................................................................................... 5 Chapter One: Statistics........................................................................................................ 8 Land area and borders of the Jordan Valley and northern Dead Sea area....................... 8 Palestinian population in the Jordan Valley .................................................................... 9 Settlements and the settler population........................................................................... 10 Land area of the settlements .......................................................................................... 13 Chapter Two: Taking control of land................................................................................ 15 Theft of private Palestinian land and transfer to settlements......................................... 15 Seizure of land for “military needs”.............................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Imagereal Capture
    BROADENING THE SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN ISRAEL: BElWEEN ACTIVISM AND RESTRAINT Daphne Barak-Erez* I. Introduction: Judicial Review in Israel: a Case-Study The debate around the scope and function of judicial review is a classical one. The present article will address it by focusing on the case study ofjudiCial review in the Israeli Supreme Court. The focus on this example is of speCial interest because the Israeli approach has transformed Significantly since the 1980s and currently presents an espeCially broad version of robust judiCial review. Additionally, taking into consideration the intensity of public life in Israel and the challenges that the country faces (including security threats), the case law of the Israeli Supreme Court touches on diverse and controversial public matters. In order to fully assess these developments, it is worthwhile to review the doctrinal changes, which have enabled the broadening of the scope of judiCial review. Against this background, the article will assess the defacto impact of these developments and will depart from the more traditional debates around the jurisprudence of the court, which focused on the normative deSirability of the doctrinal changes. 1 ll. Doctrinal Changes and the Growing Scope of Judicial Review in Israel The developments in the law of judiCial review since the 1980s have been dramatic, and include the follOwing: Stewart and Judy Colton Professor of Law, Chair of Law and Security, Faculty of Law, Tel-Aviv University. An earlier version of this article was presented at a joint conference of the Israeli Supreme Court and the Indian Supreme Court, December 200B. 1.
    [Show full text]