Refugee Camps and Informal Settlements in Lebanon and Turkey During the Syrian Refugee Crisis?”

Master in Crisis and Security Management

Master’s Thesis

“To what extent have integration and facilitation policies developed inside refugee camps and informal settlements in Lebanon and Turkey during the Syrian refugee crisis?”

Chris Spence - S1948547 Master Thesis – Final version Crisis & Security Management Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs – Leiden University Supervised by: Daan Weggemans Second reader: Bart Schuurman

Word count: 24,425 [excl. bibliography and annexes] Date: 9, January 2018

Acknowledgments

This thesis on the refugee crisis is my final paper of my Master’s programme “Crisis & Security Management” at Leiden University.

Writing this thesis took a huge effort and I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor, Daan Weggemans, for the continuous support of my thesis, his patience, feedback and knowledge. The topic of refugees is not his area expertise, but his guidance and encouragement helped me during the process of writing this thesis.

I would also like to thank The Hague Peace Projects in The Hague, which through them I was able to be introduced to Osama Mousa, Hiba Hussein and their two colleagues Ali and Aida who work for Syrian Eyes in Lebanon. This organization is a group of Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese who conduct many activities within the Syrian refugee camps in East Lebanon.

Finally, I would like to thank my friends, family and in particular my sister Cara for their support and positive energy throughout this past year, which kept me going to the end of my studies.

Leiden, January 2018

Chris Spence

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements ...... 2 List of Figures and Tables ...... 4 List of Abbreviations ...... 5

1.0 Introduction...... 6 1.1 Scientific Relevance...... 7 1.2 Research Question ……………...... 9 1.3 Outline of Thesis ………………...... 10

2.0 Syrian Civil War and the Refugee crisis ...... 11 2.1 Syrian Conflict ...... 11 2.2 Numbers Displaced...... 12 2.3 Humanitarian Costs...... 14 2.4 Lebanon ………………...... 15 2.5 Turkey ………………...... 16 2.5.1 European Union (EU) – Turkey Deal...... 17

3.0 The Study of Refugees ...... 19 3.0.1 Refugee vs. Migrant? ...... 19 3.0.2 1951 UN Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol...... 20 3.0.2 Integration and Facilitation Studies...... 21

4.0 Methodology Framework...... 24 4.1 Data Collection Methods (Triangulation of Methods)...... 24 4.2 Content and Discourse Analysis ………...... 25 4.3 Data Exploitation and Assessment...... 26 4.4 Internal / External Validity...... 26 4.5 Limitations and Pitfalls...... 26

5.0 Analysis of the Integration / Facilitation of Refugees...... 28 5.1 Lebanon...... 29 5.1.1 Housing - 2011 - Present...... 31 5.1.2 Education - 2011 - Present...... 34 5.1.3 Employment - 2011 - Present...... 36 5.1.4 Health - 2011 - Present...... 37 5.2 Turkey...... 39 5.2.1 Housing - 2011 - Present...... 41 5.2.2 Education - 2011 - Present...... 43 5.2.3 Employment - 2011 - Present...... 45 5.2.4 Health - 2011 - Present...... 47

6.0 General Conclusion...... 50

List of Figures and Tables

Figure 1.0: Syrian Refugee Crisis–Massive Displacement (Source: Mercy Corps, 2017.13

Figure 2.0: Syrian refugees in Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon (Source: UNHCR as quoted in Newss, 2017 ...... 13

Figure 3.0: Financial Investment for Syrian refugees (Source: UNHCR as quoted in Newss, 2017...... 14

Figure 4.0: Conceptual Framework and Domains (Ager & Strang, 2008)...... 23

Figure 5.0: Data on primary education of Syrian refugees (Source: Newss, 2017)...... 29

Figure 6.0: Conditions at the Salaam wa Makhaba informal settlement in Lebanon (Limoges, 2017)...... 32

Figure 7.0: Ten Provinces with Highest Number of Registered Syrian refugees (International Crisis Group, 2016b) …………………………………...…....40

Figure 8.0: Map of Ten Provinces with Highest Number of Registered Syrian refugees (International Crisis Group, 2016b) ………………………………………...40

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AFAD Turkish Disaster & Emergency Management Authority AI Amnesty International CI Care International EU European Union IDPs Internally Displaced Persons ILO International Labour Organisation IOM International Organisation for Migration IS Islamic State LWPF Law on Work Permits for Foreigners MEHE Ministry of Education and Higher Education MoPH Ministry of Public Health NGOs Non-Governmental Organizations PKK Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) RACE Reaching All Children with Education RRP The Syria Regional Response Plan TECs Temporary Education Centres TL Turkish lira TP Temporary Protection TPID Temporary Protection Identity Card UN United Nations UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNICEF United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund WFP United Nations World Food Programme WHO World Health Organization YPG Kurdish People’s Protection Units

1.0 Introduction

The Syrian Civil War, which began in 2011, has resulted in over 5.2 million people fleeing the country (UNHCR, 2017). The war has created the worst refugee crisis of the 21st century, and according to United Nations reports, the number of refugees displaced has surpassed the amount of refugees displaced during World War II (McKirdy, 2016; Mercy Corps, 2017; Charles & Denman, 2013: 96; Yenilmez, 2016: 2; Amnesty International, 2015; Yazgan et el., 2015: 185; Chaar & Medjad, 2017). In December 2015, the United Nations refugee agency estimated that for the first time the number of refugees worldwide has passed 20 million, and the number of forced displacement of persons has passed 60 million, breaking all previous records (UNHCR, 2015).

With an enormous death toll and the displacement of millions refugess, there seems to be no end in sight as the fighting continues in Syria. With 987,571 Syrian asylum applications made in Europe between April 2001 and September 2017, this crisis has become a dominant topic of debate in most European countries, and news outlets headlines have focused their attention on migration and refugee movements to Europe (Crowe, 2016; UNHCR, 2017). However, there has been less attention put on the massive humanitarian crisis and strain on resources it has created inside Turkey and Lebanon (Warda & Bhabha, 2013:1464). When we look at these numbers seeking asylum in Europe, the numbers are low compared to the millions of refugees seeking safety in Syria’s neighbouring countries (Crowe, 2016). According to UNHCR (2017), as of 28 December 2017, there were 4,421, 789 million Syrian refugees currently seeking safety in Lebanon and Turkey (UNHCR, 2017). Turkey now has the world’s largest population of refugees in the world, hosting 3,424,237 million Syrians (UNHCR, 2017). In Lebanon, there are just under a million Syrian refugees within a total population of 4.5 million people in the country (Ahmad, 2017). Lebanon also currently hosts the largest number of refugees per capita in the world (Inter-Agency Coordination, 2016). What is most disturbing is, according to the U.N., more than half of all Syrian refugees — roughly 50 percent — are children under the age of 18 (Mercy Corps, 2017; Crowe, 2016). This crisis has now resulted in Syrian refugees becoming the world’s largest refugee population under the United Nations’ mandate (Tecs International, 2016).

The vast majority of the Syrian refugees who have fled their country have entered the neighbouring countries of Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan (Figures 1.0 and 2.0). With no return date determined, these host countries have found it difficult to cope with the massive number of refugees crossing borders (BBC News, 2016; Akgündüz et al., 2015:1; Samari, 2014). Accommodating the Syrian refugees in Turkey and Lebanon has put enormous strain on the government’s finances and they are finding it difficult to meet the needs of the increasing number of people entering their country every day. Most Gulf States and European countries have either introduced strict immigration laws or closed their borders, which has left Syrian refugees with diminishing options for countries like Turkey and Lebanon to deal with the crisis and the flow of refugees (Editorial Board, 2017). Millions of the refugees in Turkey and Lebanon live in refugee camps that are overcrowded and have poor access to services (Sazak, 2015: 305). According to the UNHCR, “half of all

Syrian refugees in Lebanon live in insecure dwellings” (UNHCR 2015, Mar 12). The massive number of refugees, who have fled their homes and country in fear of their lives has threatened the territorial integrity, social cohesion, and the way of life for both the Syrians and the host populations in Turkey and Lebanon. Both the Turkish and Lebanese governments have developed policy measures to try to facilitate these refugees in the refugee camps and informal settlements in their countries. However, with the overwhelming number of refugees, new cultural tensions and problems have been increasing with the facilitation of the refugees (Mercy Corps, 2017). The refugees have been in residing in camps since 2011, when the Syrian crisis first began and the flow of displaced refugees was increasing every day as a result of the violence in Syria. Facilitating the millions of Syrian refugees in these refugee camps and informal settlements is an immediate priority of both Lebanon and Turkey. There is a lack of funds currently available to successfully support the massive number of people, and there is a growing pressure on the global community to do more and to financially help both Turkey and Lebanon. The important benefits of facilitating and integrating Syrian refugees is that it will provide them with the means and purpose to support their lives. Moreover, both Lebanon and Turkey can gain economically, socially and culturally in the long-term with the contribution of the refugees in their country (Mercy Corps, 2017). Failure to properly facilitate refugees into host societies could create a permanent underclass and future security problems with a generation of uneducated children and thousands unemployed people who are scrambling to make a living and support themselves and their families by any means possible. This fragility could result in regional and global security issues for the future in the region. The aim of this research paper is how Turkey and Lebanon have tried to deal with the social, economic, and health crisis of the Syrian refugees within the refugee camps and informal settlements in the host countries during the Syrian refugee crisis. The aim of this research paper will be to explore and discuss to what extent the facilitation and integration policies have developed in the refugee camps and informal settlements in Lebanon and Turkey during the Syrian refugee crisis in the effort to cope with the millions of refugees inside their countries borders. Ager and Strang’s (2008) conceptual framework for refugee integration will be used to identify to what extent these development polices have been successful. In section four of this paper, I will explore and discuss in my methods section how I collected and coded my data. 1.1 Scientific Relevance

Academics have researched the topic of refugee facilitation and integration policies and it has become a key policy objective relating to how to settle refugees and migrants during the Syrian refugee crisis and led to significant public discussion (Ager & Strang, 2008: 166). For example, Ager and Strang (2008) have a made a conceptual framework for refugee integration and facilitation policies that presents a list of indicators that are required to constitute successful integration and facilitation between refugees and host communities (Figure 4.0). Ager & Strang and Cheung & Phillimore (2013) have both indicated that the markers and means and the four sub topics or sectors: employment, housing, education and health are critical as indicative of successful integration of refugees (Ager & Strang, 2008: 166, 169). However, this conceptual framework has only been studied for refugees settling in

7 the UK and other Western European countries for successful integration and the facilitation of refugees and has not been used for refugees in informal settlements or refugee camps in the Middle East. As such, there is limited attention to how these markers and means work for Syrian refugees in refugee camps and informal settlements in both Turkey and Lebanon and we will use the four sub topics in this paper to see if the framework can be used for the integration of refugees in refugee camps and informal settlements. By using Ager and Stang’s (2008) conceptual framework when trying to answer my research question on how integration and facilitation policies have developed during the refugee crisis in the refugee camps and informal settlements in Turkey and Lebanon will add to the scientific relevance of the topic within academia. The focus of this analysis was on the four sub-topics: 1) housing; 2) education; 3) health; and 4) employment and by analyzing the extent in which integration policies in Lebanon and Turkey have developed within their refugee camps during the Syrian refugee crisis we can see how they developed and if they were successful in Lebanon and Turkey compared to when they were used in the UK and other Western countries.

The integration and legal and human rights debate for dealing with refugees has become an important topic in the media since the beginning of the Syrian refugee crisis. Turkey has signed the 1951 Refugee Convention but not the 1967 Protocol, which means that Turkey maintains the geographical limitation clause to only have the legal responsibility for those refugees from Europe (Rygiel, Baban & IIcan, 2016: 317). The 1951 Refugee Convention related to the status of refugees provides a comprehensive codification of refugee rights within the international community and endorses the term “refugee” in Article 1 (UNHCR, n.d: 2,3).

With over 3 million Syrian refugees in Turkey, there is a legal debate to what Turkey’s obligations are in terms of handling the refugees in their country. Turkey has kept an open door policy to the Syrian refugees with temporary protection status and the treatment of the refuges as ‘guests’ and not refugees (Ozden, 2013:5; Rygiel et al., 2016:317; Içduygu, 2016:6). The 2014 Law of Foreigners and International Protection prevent Syrian refugees from resettling in Turkey permanently, and therefore must engaged in the UNHCR resettlement process (Stavropoulos, 2017). After receiving international pressure and signing the European Union (EU) – Turkey deal on 18 March 2016, the Turkish government instituted new facilitation and integration policies to deal with the Syrian refugees in their country. Under the deal, the EU would provide €3 billion to the Facility for Refugees in Turkey and this would be used to support the aid efforts including education, health housing and welfare of refugees in Turkey (Newss, 2017; Içduygu & Toktas 2016).

With millions of Syrians arriving in Turkey since the crisis began, there have been security fears within Turkey. These fears are under the guise of refugees as criminals and terrorist organizations that will infiltrate Turkey, resulting in terrorist attacks inside the country, leading to security concerns in the future (Yenilmez, 2016: 9). Jihadists connected to radical networks have already taken advantage of the open-door policy the Turkey has instituted, with the IS-linked suicide bomb attack in 2016 that killed ten German tourists in Istanbul (International Crisis Group, 2016b). In 2014, a study conducted by the Turkish government found that 62% of respondents believed that Syrians in Turkey distort social order and moral

8 values within the country as a result of criminal activity (International Crisis Group, 2016b). There have been complaints to the Turkish authorities with frequent claims stating that: “we used to sleep with our doors open but we can’t do so any longer” … “our children used to play on the streets until the morning but now they are afraid of Syrian gangs” (Erdogan, 2014: 71). However, further research was conducted to argue these claims, finding that only 0.33% of Syrians (33 in 10,000) have been involved in criminal activity between 2011 and June 2014 (International Crisis Group, 2016b). Over 80% of Turkish citizens in the south of the country are located near the refugee camps are opposed to citizenship for Syrians, with 70% wanting the refugees to be sent home and 81% believed the refuges have not been facilitated or integrated well into Turkey (International Crisis Group, 2016b). This study will show why integration and facilitation policies are important with the risk for ghettoization, criminality, radicalization, and the creation of a permanent under-classed population if implemented facilitation and integration policies fall short for the millions of Syrian refugees in the country (Saferworld, 2016:3).

In Lebanon, the Syrian refugees have put substantial stress on the already fragile economy and have led to a debt-to-GDP ratio of 135% - one of the highest in the world (Laarhoven, 2016). The situation in Lebanon is different from Turkey as the Lebanon government does not have official government refugee camps, and instead have informal settlements supported by the government but run by UNHCR and it has supported the majority of the Syrian refugees during the crisis. As mentioned earlier, according to the UNHCR, “half of all Syrian refugees in Lebanon live in insecure dwellings” (UNHCR. 2015, Mar 12). Due to the living conditions in Lebanon for these Syrian refugees, small crimes have increased by more than 60% since 2011 because the lack of assistance given to refugees in these informal settlements (Salloukh, 2017:62). In Lebanon, Syrians now make up over 26% of the Lebanese prison population, and in recent years, human trafficking of Syrian refugees in these informal settlements have become commonplace (Salloukh, 2017:62). The research of facilitation and integration of refugees in Turkey and Lebanon is important within academia because knowing how policies are working is important to identify if refugees are feeling secure and are able to prosper in their new environment. If Turkey is unable to handle these millions of refugees, or if the Lebanese economy collapses from the pressure, the crisis concerns wider world politics as a new wave of refugees will be heading into Europe and beyond will result, and may result in increased xenophobia and a rise in right wing parties in western countries (Chaar & Medjad, 2017). 1.2 Research question

The aim of this research is to add knowledge to the subject of integration among refugees who are in the refugee camps and informal settlements in Turkey and Lebanon, and specifically, how millions of Syrian refugees are adjusting and integrating into life in refugee camps and informal settlements in these host countries. This research thesis will discuss the challenges of settlement, and how integration and facilitation policies have developed during the Syrian refugee crisis within refugee camps and informal settlements in Lebanon and Turkey. The exploration of evolving integration policies by the Lebanese and Turkish

9 governments during the Syrian refugee crisis in the refugee camps and informal settlements will be discussed. Strong facilitation and integration frameworks are important to help support both the migrant people and citizens of receiving countries. By examining how these integrating policies have developed, we can identify if they have been successful in order to meet the needs of both the refugees in the camps in Lebanon and Turkey, and for the host communities. To test and answer this question on how these policies have developed and been successful, Ager and Strang’s (2008) integration framework will be used to investigate and to evaluate the research question. Again, as mentioned previously this framework has only been used in the UK and other Western countries, but not in refugee camps and informal settlements in Turkey and Lebanon. The following research question will guide the analysis:

RQ: “To what extent have integration and facilitation policies developed inside refugee camps and informal settlements in Lebanon and Turkey during the Syrian refugee crisis?” 1.3 Outline of Thesis

In the following section 2.0, a brief introduction on the background to the Syrian Civil War will be presented, and discussion of how the Syrian crisis began. This discussion is followed by information on the political and cultural dynamics in Lebanon and Turkey and how this crisis has currently affected and changing dynamics in the countries and how the Syrian refugees have impacted the host societies. Finally, this section will explain the EU-Turkey deal and how this deal has changed the way Turkey has dealt with the refugees in their country in the attempt to try to fully integrate the refuges by changing and developing new policies. Finally, in section 2.0, I will present the numbers of refugees that have been displaced and what the humanitarian costs have been. In section 3.0, as the terms ‘refugee’ and ‘migrant’ are often misrepresented when it comes to humanitarian crisis, this section will define these two concepts and lay out the 1951 UN Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol. This discussion will be followed by an explanation of Lebanon and Turkey signing these agreements and how they have reacted in the current crisis when dealing with the Syrian refugees. Section 4.0, the methodology section, will present the data sources and specific methods of analysis central to answering the research question, along with the internal / external reliability of the data, and the limitations and pitfalls of the research. Section 5.0 is the analysis section where housing, education, employment, and health indicators in both the refugee camps and informal settlements in Lebanon and Turkey to indicate to what extent integration and facilitation policies in the refugee camps have developed from 2011, when the first Syrian refugees arrived in Turkey, to the present day. These results are summarized in section 6.0 and present the response to the research questions. Finally, a short discussion highlights the possible limitations of the study and provides further recommendations for future research.

2.0 The Syrian Civil War and the Refugee Crisis

In this section, the origin of the Syrian conflict will be explained and the reasons the war has lasted for more than seven years will be presented. This discussion will be followed up by explaining how many people the conflict has displaced into neighbouring countries, and what the humanitarian costs of this conflict has been for Lebanon and Turkey. Syria has a troubled history with both Lebanon and Turkey, and in this section, I will explain what these troubles have been and identify because of this troubled past, there has been some resentment towards facilitating and integrating the Syrian refugees into both Lebanon and Turkey. Finally, I will explain the EU–Turkey deal that saw an agreement that would allow the EU to send back any irregular migrants to Turkey, and in exchange, the EU would give €3 billion to the Facility for Refugees in Turkey. This deal is relevant because it was the first step the EU did in order to stop the flow of migrants arriving on European shores, and the first major steps that the Turkish government took in order to institute new policies of trying to integrate and facilitate the 3 million Syrian refugees in their country. 2.1 The Syrian Conflict

In the spring of 2011, following popular uprisings against dictatorships in other Arab countries, thousands of anti-government Syrian demonstrators poured into the streets to protest against Bashar al-Assad’s government (Yazgan, et ell. 2015:185). However, these peaceful demonstrations soon escalated after the government started a violent crackdown, and resulted in opposition groups beginning to fight back in response (Mercy Corps, 2017; Crowe, 2016). This resistance soon resulted in a civil war, as army defectors and many civilian Syrians took up arms and joined the newly created Free Syrian Army, who were actively fighting against government forces (Mercy Corps, 2017). The following seven years has resulted in a number of jihadi extremists’ organizations linked groups, such as Jabnat al- Nusra and Islamic State, in turn gaining a foothold in Syria. The conflict has also led to a proxy war in Syria that has Iran and Russia helping fund and supply Assad and his government forces. While Saudi Arabia and the United States have been funding and help train the Free Syrian Army and the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG), who joined the fight in the north of the country (Beauchamp, 2017). Iran has also asked Hezbollah from Lebanon to cross the border and bring thousands of troops to help fight alongside Assad’s government forces, making alliance a bigger regional issue and putting additional strain on Saudi Arabia and Iran who have been regional rivals for decades (Beauchamp, 2017).

There are many different groups fighting in Syria, but recently Russian President Vladimir Putin and Turkish President Recap Tayyip Erdogan agreed on some de facto conditions to try and end the war, as both countries have been supporting opposing factions (O’Connor, 2017). Both Putin and Erdogan have been trying to put together a de-escalation zone across the country, but these attempts have been rejected by the United States who are backing the Syrian Democratic Forces and the Kurdish alliance in the country (O’Connor, 2017). All sides are now talking in the efforts to try and end the fighting, but there are still jihadi

11 extremist groups in the country. As such, the fighting continues, and could continue for many more months or years to come.

The seven years of fighting it has forced and displaced millions of people from their homes, resulting in the biggest refugee crisis since World War II with millions of Syrians seeking shelter in neighbouring countries, like Lebanon and Turkey (Grisgraber, 2012: 1; Yazgan, et ell. 2015: 185). The media attention continues to focus on the ongoing battles within the country and between the different groups fighting. However, there has been less attention put on the grave humanitarian crisis the conflicts have created, and the subsequent refugee crisis occurring inside Turkey and Lebanon (Warda & Bhabha, 2013:1464). The civil war has impacted Syria politically, socially, and economically as divisions between ethnic groups and secular and religious fighters continues to complicate politics of the conflict, and settling the conflict that much more difficult (Mercy Corps, 2017; Yazgan, et ell. 2015: 185). 2.2 Numbers Displaced

More than 11 million people have died or have fled Syria, which represents over half of the country’s population prior to the start of the Syrian civil war in 2011 (Mercy Corps, 2017). These refugees have fled their homes and country in fear of their lives. This massive movement of people has threatened the stability of the surrounding regions of Lebanon and Turkey.

When the Syrian civil conflict broke out, the first refugees to cross the Turkey–Syria border was a group of 252 Syrians in April 2011 (Kadkoy, 2017:1). Over the next three years, this number would reach into the millions, and changed the development policies to try and deal with the situation in both Turkey and Lebanon (Şimşek, D. & Çorabatır, 2017:17). As mentioned earlier, as of 28 December 2017, there were 3,424,237 million Syrian refugees currently seeking safety in Turkey, making it the world’s largest population of refugees in the world (UNHCR, 2017). In Lebanon, there is just under a million Syrian refugees within a total population of 4.5 million people in the country (Ahmad, n.d.). Lebanon also currently hosts the largest number of refugees per capita in the world (Inter-Agency Coordination, 2016: 7). This refugee crisis has resulted in Syrian refugees becoming the world’s largest refugee population under the UN mandate (Tecs International, 2016).

What is most disturbing, according to the UN, is that more than half of all Syrian refugees — roughly 50% — are children under the age of 18 (Mercy Corps, 2017; Crowe, 2016). The UN estimates that only 1 in 10 Syrian refugees are living in refugee camps, while the rest are living in unfamiliar urban areas in efforts to survive (Mercy Corps, 2017). Figure 1.0 shows how quickly the Syrian refugees fled their country, and how these numbers increased, creating a crisis of epic scale for the region surrounding Syria in terms of the massive numbers of people fleeing to neighbouring countries.

The Syrian crisis, and sheer numbers of refugees in neighbouring countries, threatens the territorial integrity, social cohesion, and the way of life for both the Syrians and the host county populations (Mercy Corps, 2017). By overwhelming the neighbouring hosts communities, while creating new cultural tensions and problems of integration for refugees (Mercy Corps, 2017). As such, this humanitarian crisis is no longer a regional issue, but a global problem with the flow of displaced refugees increasing every day from the Syrian Civil War.

Amnesty International Secretary General, Salil Shetty, argues that wealthy western countries have shown a complete absence of leadership and responsibility with the crisis, when 10 countries that account for less than 2.5% of the world GDP have taken more than 56% of the world’s refugees (Amnesty International, 2016a). Shetty further adds:

“The world cannot go on leaving host countries overwhelmed because they are next to a crisis country with no support from the rest of the world. While a small number of countries host millions of refugees, many countries provide nothing at all” (Amnesty International, 2016, October 4).

Amnesty International offers key facts and figures that indicate gulf countries, including Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Bahrain have offered zero resettlement places to Syrian refugees, along with countries with high income including Russia, South Korea, and Japan (Amnesty International, 2016a).

As the number of refugees worldwide reaches 60 million, and conflicts are becoming more protracted with displacements and refugee’s average length lasting more than 17 years, the world needs to act together in this specific crisis by offering resettlement and humanitarian assistance instead of closing their borders, or expecting developing countries like Lebanon and Turkey to solely and inadequately deal with the crisis (Şimşek & Çorabatır, 2017:13).

2.3 Humanitarian Costs

With the civil war in Syria now in its seventh year, and the millions of Syrian refugees escaping into neighbouring countries like Turkey and Lebanon, the war has created enormous strain on the countries and without additional help and international aid, Lebanon in particular, has grown weary of taking more refugees as the country is at a breaking point. The economic growth in the country has decreased and soon will not be able to provide any further supports for the Syrian refugees (Editorial Board, 2017).

Ongoing international financial support to Lebanon will allow the country to host large number of refugees and provide health care, schooling, and other essential services (Elsayed, 2013). Amnesty International states that with funding shortages from the international community, the most vulnerable Syrian refugees in Lebanon only receive just $21.60 per month, around US$0.70 cents a day, for food assistance - well short of the UN recommended poverty line of US$1.90 per day (Amnesty International, 2016). With 1 in every 5 people in Lebanon now Syrian, the magnitude of the task at hand trying to deal with this crisis is evident (Amnesty International, 2016, February 5).

According to the UN, $4.5 billion was required to provide emergency support and meet the urgent needs of the most vulnerable Syrians in 2016, but only $2.9 billion was received as of March 2017 (Mercy Corps, 2017). Figure 3.0 below gives a closer look at where the funding is coming from to cover the financial cost of the Syrian refugee crisis, showing Turkey generating most of the funding from its own government coffers (Newss, 2017).

Figure 3.0 (Source: UNHCR as quoted in Newss, 2017)

Initially at the beginning of the refugee crisis, Turkey rejected any humanitarian aid or international assistance because it wanted to show it was a strong growing economic power in the Middle East able to deal with these types of issues (Aras & Sahin, 2015: 202). However, as the situation grew in intensity and Turkey became the world’s biggest refugee-hosting country, while the financial and social burden started to cause growing resentment among the population, international donors started to contribute aid to the crisis (Sazak, 2015: 305; Press TV News Videos, 2014).

By February 2015, the Turkish government provided extensive humanitarian aid to the refugees, and according to their figures, had spent $6 billion overall on the Syrian refugee crisis, while the total contributions it received from international donors stood at only $300

14 million (Hurriyet Daily News, 2015). The majority of this money was spent on clothing, shelter, housing-related goods, and food and non-food items such as medicines (Del Carpio & Wagner, 2015:8).

With over 3 million refugees now in need of assistance in Turkey, in 2016 the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, accused the international community of not contributing enough to improve conditions for refugees and he stated that Turkey had spent over 10 billion dollars, while the international community was not contributing enough to improve the conditions for the refugees in his country (Öztığ, 2016:146).

Since the beginning of the crisis, Turkey has spent over 20 billion dollars on Syrian refugees and managing the spill-over of the crisis (Şimşek, D. & Çorabatır, 2017:139). The efforts have focused on camps, health care systems for both refugee camp and non-camp populations, education and other integration system schemes in the effort to help support the Syrians integrate better within the country (Şimşek, D. & Çorabatır, 2017:139). The World Health Organization (WHO) has praised Turkey for its charitable efforts last year when it spent over $6 billion on humanitarian relief and currently hosting millions of refugees (Daily Sabah, 2017). Although the international community has contributed some aid to the crisis, other countries like Russia, China, India and other G20 countries who have the economic means have not contributed comparably to the extent of the crisis, and the humanitarian appeals that continue (Elsayed, 2013). 2.4 Lebanon

The crisis in Syria has been going on for over seven years, putting Lebanon at the forefront of one of the worst humanitarian crises ever witnessed (Government of Lebanon, 2017: 5). The UN Refugee Agency has over one million Syrians registered in Lebanon, adding to the roughly 450,000 Palestinian refugees already in the country (Berti, 2017). These numbers indicate that Lebanon has the highest per capita concentration of refugees in the world, representing nearly one-quarter of the combined Lebanese population (Berti, 2017). Moreover, Lebanon still suffers from the historical wounds of the Lebanese civil war that lasted from 1975 to 1990 (Fiedler, 2017). The 1989 Taif Agreement put an end to the war with a Syrian withdrawal of Lebanese territory within two years and a sect-based governance system based on sectarian division between the Christians and the Shia and Sunni-Muslims (Bahout, 2016). This shows the deep historical relation that adds to the complexity in the region. The people living along the Syrian – Lebanese border have historically had “close familial, cultural, and commercial ties, resulting in some fleeing refugees welcomed into homes of family and friends from neighbouring communities” (Grisgraber, 2012). However, a majority of the Syrian refugees have increasingly been blamed for many of the economic and structural problems in Lebanon. The Syrian civil war has resulted in more political and sectarian divisions in the country, including the prospect of a shift in the domestic sectarian balance from the refugees, which could complicate and create future friction in Lebanon due to this sectarian balance shift (Berti, 2017; Fiedler, 2017). In Lebanon, Shia or Sunni Muslim

15 peoples make up just over half the population, with Christians making up about 40% (Chaar & Medjad, 2017). With the majority of Syrian refugees being largely Sunni Muslim, this further influences changes in the sectarian balance and impact politically (Chaar & Medjad, 2017). While the Lebanese people were generous in welcoming the fleeing Syrians, the vast number of refugees threatens the territorial integrity and social cohesion, creating new cultural tensions due to the sheer numbers into the country (Mercy Corps, 2017). These new social tensions have given rise to some clashes between the local and the Syrian refugee population (Berti, 2017). Unlike Turkey, the Syrian government has not established official refugee camps in the country because there was a fear of refugee camps becoming permanent settlements and where militants could emerge (Fiedler, 2017). There are several camps setup, but the official ‘no refugee camp’ policy has made it more difficult to distribute humanitarian aid, while the living conditions are dire in many of the camps (Fiedler, 2017). The Lebanese economy is not strong enough to support the Syrian refugees without the help from international assistance. The World Bank has estimated that Lebanon has incurred losses of US$13.1 billion since 2012 (Government of Lebanon, 2017:8). With the economic and social issues of having Syrian refugees in the country, there was reluctance for long-term socio-political and economic integration. However, as the situation is getting worse, stronger policies will need to be put in place to integrate refugees in the country (Berti, 2017). 2.5 Turkey

Since the start of the Syrian conflict in 2011, Turkey has followed with an open-door policy towards the Syrian refugees and today there are over 3 million Syrian refugees in the country that makes up 3.5 per cent of Turkey’s population (Asik, 2017; UNHCR, 2017). Turkey has twenty-five refugee camps and the majority is located along the Syrian-Turkish border in the south of the country (Kirisci, 2016:81). The refugee camps in Turkey is considered some of the best in the world in terms of services, education, physical facilities, and the provision of vocational training for refugees (Kirisci, 2016:81). The Turkish government has stated that it has spent over $25 billion managing the refugee camps, putting a strain on the public services in the country with all Syrians in Turkey entitled to free health care (The Economist, 2017). According to Samari (2014), Turkey has refused help from UNHCR, and has been handling the crisis solely on their own - resulting in further strain on the health care system because of the amount of resources directed toward the Syrian Refugee Response (Samari, 2014). Leading up to the Syrian civil war, Turkey was one of the most vocal critics of the regime in Syria, as Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu said, “negotiating with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad would be like shaking hands with Adolf Hitler” (Reuters, 2015). Also, both countries have been dominant countries in the Middle East, which has led to a long and turbulent history of distrust and fiction between each other (Reuters, 2015). There have also been sectarian tensions and mob violence reported between locals the refugee population around the refugee camps (The Economist, 2017). This tension is due to mainly that Turkey’s biggest religious minority are the Alevis, which is a distant cousin to the Alawites, the sect

16 that forms the backbone of the Syrian regime (The Economist, 2017). As the majority of the refugees in the camp are Sunnis, tensions are ebbing as these groups have a historical hated to each other (The Economist, 2017). That said, although there have been some tensions, generally solidarity with the refugees has remained strong (The Economist, 2017). However, when President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan announced that Turkish nationality would be granted to Syrians living in Turkey, there was a backlash, and opinion polls show attitudes are slowly changing towards supporting the Syrian refugees in the country (Özerim, 2016). Although Syria and Turkey share religious similarities, one of the biggest obstacles is the culture, language, and communication between both the Syrian and Turkish population is the primary stumbling block preventing Syrians from gaining social mobility (Nelson, 2016: 102). To tackle this problem, the Ministry of National Education and local authorities have been teaching Syrians the Turkish language, culture, and daily life practices to better integrate the refugees into Turkish society (Oguz, 2017). These efforts have helped to bring both communities together. However, for many Turkish, it has been hard to distinguish between the terms “guest”, “asylum seeker”, “refugee” and “temporary protection” (Özerim, 2016). 2.5.1 European Union (EU) - Turkey Deal

On 18 March 2016, the EU and Turkey signed a historic landmark agreement whereby under the deal, the EU would provide €3 billion to the Facility for Refugees in Turkey in order to help the support and the aid efforts, including education, health housing, and general welfare of refugees in Turkey (Newss, 2017; Içduygu & Toktas 2016). This agreement was also meant to prevent growing tensions towards refugees and to formulate long-term integration policies for Syrians in Turkey, helping to integrate into Turkish society and help reduce xenophobic behaviours in refugee communities (Içduygu, 2016: 7). The deal also outlined several initiatives to deal with the Syrian refugee crisis by managing refugee migration into Europe (Rygiel et al., 2016: 315). Part of the agreement, the Turkish government has promised to increase security efforts along its borders “to prevent new sea or land routes for illegal migration opening from Turkey to the EU” (European Council, 2016). The EU also offered Turkey liberalized visa restrictions for Turkish citizens when travelling to the EU, and future talks of possible Turkish membership into the EU (Rygiel et al., 2016: 316). By closing the EU’s borders to refugees, it has given Turkey the task of dealing with the millions of displaced Syrian refugees on its own (Asik, 2017).

The EU-Turkey deal was the result of “the crisis of summer 2015”where tens of thousands of refugees arrived daily on European shores (Içduygu & Toktas, 2016). In order to limit the number of refugees arriving in Europe, the EU and Turkey agreed to this “one in, one out” deal that meant all irregular migrants who arrived in Greece would be returned to Turkey, and for every Syrian sent back there would be one registered Syrian in Turkey sent to the EU (Içduygu & Toktas, 2016). As of 27 February 2017, there were only 3,565 Syrian refugees transferred from Turkey to the EU under this agreement, indicating that this agreement has been of the benefit to the EU, but not the 3 million Syrians currently in Turkey and the Turkish government’s efforts to try to integrate them into Turkish society (Gogou, 2017).

Arguably, this agreement is what changed Turkey’s view on integrating these Syrian refugees in the country and had led to several integration policies that have been developed, which will be discussed later.

The EU has come under criticism for this agreement, shown to hamper international commitments signed for refugee protection in the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, and the 1967 Protocol in giving refugees temporary protection (Rygiel et al., 2016). Since the signing of this EU-Turkey deal, the Turkish government now approaches the refugee crisis from a “crisis management” to “sustainable integration” approach, with new integration policies put forward in attempt to integrate 3 million Syrian refugees into Turkish society (Kadkoy, 2017).

This section has highlighted the challenges in dealing with the refugees that have been displaced due to the Syrian civil conflict. The Syrian conflict is into its seventh year, with no end in sight. Due to the continued fighting in the country, millions of displaced Syrians in Turkey and Lebanon have resulted. The cost of dealing with these refugees has been hard on both the Lebanese and Turkish economies, coupled with historical wounds suffered from the Syrians in Lebanon, and historical regional conflicts between Turkey and Syria. These historical and current tensions, a number of continued challenges are expected. The EU– Turkey deal has slowed down the number of refugees reaching the shores of Europe. However, new challenges are facing the Turkish government to attempt to facilitate and integrate the Syrian refugees within their country borders through new the adoption and development of new, responsive policies.

3.0 The Study of Refugees

The following section will distinguish the important difference and terminology between ‘refugees’ and ‘migrants’ and will discuss the legal ramifications for both Lebanon and Turkey, as we try to fully understand the Syrian refugee crisis. These differences will be explored by explaining the UN 1951 Refugee Convention, and the 1967 Protocol international comprehensive agreements, and the rights refugees have, along with legal requirements placed on Turkey and Lebanon as signatories. Finally, Ager and Strang’s (2008) conceptual framework for refugee integration is an important contribution to understanding of refugee integration into host communities. Health, education, housing, and employment spheres are included in the framework as key indicators for refugees to be fully facilitated and integrated into their new host country. 3.1 ‘Refugee’ vs ‘Migrant’

As mentioned, the fighting in Syria has led to millions of people fleeing the country in search of safety and security. When we talk about the migrant crisis, we need to understand the terminology and narrative between ‘refugee’ and ‘migrant’ when discussing this crisis, as the distinction between the two definitions is important. According to Nyers (2013:4) the “phenomenon of refugee has a long history of being subsumed in discourses of crisis and danger”. Sunde (2015) and Ahmad (n.d.) argue that a ‘migrant’ is someone who chooses to move to a different country in search of better education or job prospects. ‘Refugees’, according to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, are “persons fleeing armed conflict or persecution. These are people for whom the denial of asylum has potentially deadly consequences” (Ahmad, n.d.). Bos (2003) has defined a ‘refugee crisis’ as it involves a sudden transition and massive movement of people into a neighbouring or third country.

With these distinctions, it is clear that this is not a ‘migrant crisis’, but instead is a ‘refugee crisis’ because the Syrian refugees whom have fled Syria to their neighbouring countries have done so because of war and persecution, and not in search of better jobs or education. Historically, refugees have been considered to be temporary visitors to the host country and because this crisis has been going on for so many years, the terminology has been changed among the media and with governments dealing with the crisis (Yenilmez, 2016). When changing the terminology between ‘refugee’ and ‘migrant’, it allows for less responsibility for countries when dealing with a crisis of this magnitude. We have seen how political the distinct terminology has become, and how the international attitude has changed overtime - from the end of the World War I to the conclusion of the Cold War (Sazak, 2015). Specifically, between World War I and the end of the Cold War “refugees seeking protection were from European stock, their cultural assimilation was perceived as relatively straightforward and it helped to meet the post-war labour shortages” (Hathaway & Neve, 1997: 119). However, since end of the Cold War, industrialized nations have become protective against refugees, migrants, and asylum-seekers by changing the terminology we now see today as cultural, political and economic incentives have disappeared (Feller, 2001:129). Once the terminology has changed, countries are no longer obligated by law to

19 manage and support their refugees when entering host countries if the refugees are managed as migrants. 3.2 1951 UN Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol

The UN 1951 Refugee Convention relates to the status of refugees, consolidating previous international agreements and instruments in regard to refugees, and provides a comprehensive codification of refugee rights within the international community (UNHCR, n.d: 2,3). The 1951 Convention emphasized and endorsed the term “refugee” in Article 1 (UNHCR, n.d: 3). A refugee, according to this convention, is defined as:

“A refugee … is someone who is unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country” (OHCHR, 1951:2).

This Convention was ratified by 145 countries, but one thing the 1951 Refugee Convention did not offer all refugees was enforceable rights. The 1967 Protocol later defined the term ‘refugee’ and granted significant protection and legal obligations of states to protect them, deeming that host countries could not deport refugees to the country from where they fled from (UNHCR, 1989; Holzer, 2013:845). The 1967 Protocol also removed the geographic limits and time limits of the 1951 Convention, where originally it was limited to those persons fleeing events occurring in Europe before 1 January 1951 (UNHCR, n.d: 2).

The 1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol grants refugees equal access to important state institutions, including courts (article 16), labour markets (article 23), elementary schools (article 22), and public relief (article 23) (Holzer, 2013:842). Also, in Articles 12 and 30 of the Refugee Convention, refugees must receive favourable treatment and are entitled to such things as: access to housing, higher education, right to own property, employment, public health, and the right to move around the freely within the country (Şimşek, D. & Çorabatır, 2017:25). Finally, the convention also prohibits host states from deporting refugees to the country from which they fled (Holzer, 2013: 842). In short, defining a ‘refugee’ is important because refugees cannot be returned to their home country if their safety is not assured, but if they are defined as a ‘migrant’ then they can be sent back and do not have the same rights and obligations as refugees. Ahmad argues “how is it – that people fleeing war in Syria – have suddenly been labelled as economic migrants instead of refugees?” (Ahmad, n.d.).

In the case of Lebanon, with more than 50% of Syria’s population currently displaced, many of these refugees have escaped across the border. Lebanon has not signed the 1951 Refugee Convention nor the 1967 Protocol, but despite this, Lebanon has maintained an open-border policy and has accommodated Syrians who are fleeing their country, in turn, draining their own government resources (Grisgraber, 2012; Samari, 2014). This support has resulted in Lebanon at a breaking point in terms of supporting the Syrian refugees, and the Lebanese

20 government has been adamant that Lebanon cannot be a permanent country of asylum or supporting the Syrian refugees long-term (Samari, 2014).

Since 2011, Turkey has seen millions of refugees enter their country and, as mentioned, Turkey now houses the most refugees in the world. This influx has made the situation more complicated in Turkey as a signatory of the 1951 Convention, but not the 1967 Protocol. As such, Turkey maintains the geographical limitation clause, only taking the legal responsibility for those refugees from Europe (Rygiel, Baban & IIcan, 2016: 317). However, Turkey has kept an open-door policy to the Syrian refugees with temporary protection status, treating them as ‘guests’ and not ‘refugees’ (Ozden , 2013:5; Rygiel et al., 2016:317; Içduygu, 2016:6). These ‘guests’ are given Temporary Protection (TP) and they are not forced back to Syria, but there is also no limit on the duration they can stay in Turkey (Nielsen, 2016). The 2014 Law of Foreigners and International Protection prevents refugees from resettling in Turkey permanently, or engaging in the UNHCR resettlement process (Stavropoulos, 2017). This ‘guest’ status also means that these Syrian refugees can be relocated by the Turkish government without any legal process (Ozden, 2013). By being temporarily protected, Syrians stay in Turkey until a third country can take them on (Şimşek & Çorabatır, 2017).

The Turkish asylum system does not officially use the term ‘integration’ and The Law of Foreigners and International Protection in Article 96 uses “harmonization” as a term to replace “integration” (Şimşek & Çorabatır, 2017: 18, 144). However, now that there are over 3 million Syrian refugees in Turkey, the government has started working on the integration of refugees, albeit sticking to the Law where it states foreigners must attend courses on language, culture, legal system, political structure, and history of Turkey, as well as recognizing their obligations and rights in the country (Şimşek & Çorabatır, 2017: 18, 144).

Although there are hundreds of thousands in refugee camps, the UN estimates that only 1 in 10 Syrian refugees live within camps, and the rest are in urban or rural areas away from the refugee camps throughout Turkey (Mercy Corps, 2017). Another UNCHR report argues that this figure is wrong, and splits half of the people living in refugee camps and the other half in urban areas living close to the camps (Akgündüz et al., 2015). Regardless of the actual figures, Turkey has tried to change some of their policies in efforts to integrate the Syrian refugees by pursuing resettlement options. 3.3 Integration and Facilitation Studies

Evidence suggests that the facilitation and integration of refugees into host communities can be a complex challenge. The topic of integration has become significant in public discussion and a key policy objective when talking about resettlement of refugees and other migrants into host communities (Ager & Strang, 2008). Ager and Strang’s (2008) integration framework is an important contribution to understand the integration process, and the concept of ‘integration’ itself, as used by a range of stakeholders and widely differing meanings (Ager & Strang, 2008: 166, 168). Castles et al. (2002) further explains that integration can mean different things to different actors depending on their interests, assumptions, perspective, and values. ‘Integration’ is defined by the Council of Europe as:

“a common framework of legal rights; active participation in society, on the basis of minimum standards of income, education and accommodation; freedom of choice of religious and political beliefs, cultural and sexual affiliation, within the framework of basic democratic rights and liberties” (Council of Europe, 1995:15).

Sales & Angelo (2008) argues that integration has two major elements that include both structural and cultural dimensions. The structural dimension involves participation in society, such as education, the labour market, and the health care system. The cultural dimension is described as changes in the immigrant’s identification and cultural orientation (Sales & Angelo, 2008: 21). Whatever definition, integrating migrants into host communities, at least three basic dimensions concerning the cultural, economic, and social role migrant’s play in their new host environment are critical (Council of Europe, 1995:9). Sales & D Angelo (2008) indicates that in order for the process of integration to happen, one needs to feel like a full and active member of society, with the means and opportunities to participate in the wider social and cultural context (Sales & D Angelo, 2008:66). In order for the facilitation of this process to occur, there are necessary conditions such as: “rights - both formal; access to social, civil and political rights; and substantive access to rights (e.g. non- discrimination, freedom from harassment); the ability to act independently – based on the knowledge of language/structures of society (e.g. how to access services); the material resources to participate in all aspects of life within the community (e.g. adequate housing, employment appropriate to skills/qualifications, access to education and health); extensive local networks (social/emotional and instrumental); a sense of belonging and trust (with the ability to choose to maintain, adapt and reject aspects of cultural traditions from country of origin/host country, and with the presence of national/ethnic groups ‘taken for granted’ and visible within the mainstream)” (Sales & D Angelo, 2008:66).

Ager & Strang (2008) have argued that barriers, such as language and cultural knowledge and safety and security, could constrain the facilitation of local integration of refugees if not obtained (Ager & Strang, 2008: 182). Policymakers and academics believe that in order to facilitate refugees into their host communities, there is agreement that there must be social interaction in order to integrate properly (Cheung & Phillimore, 2013). In order to facilitate integration, all parties must understand their rights and responsibilities with the utilization of the four domains in Ager & Strang’s framework, from the perspective of refugees and host communities (Cheung & Phillimore, 2013: 3). The Council of Europe defines assimilation as “a one side process of adaption, in which migrants have to give up their distinctive linguistic, cultural or social characteristics and become indistinguishable from the major population” (Council of Europe, 1995:33). Thus, “all forms of cultural or social behaviour ranging from completely giving up one's background to preserving unaltered patterns of behaviour are covered by the term of integration” (Council of Europe, 1995:9).

Some of the challenging situations involved with integrating Syrian refugees into Turkey and Lebanon society are providing equal access to the labour market, health, housing, education, other public services (Council of Europe, 1995). The strategy in Europe to facilitate the integration of refugees has been to fill the labour supply gaps in most European countries that

22 are experiencing an ageing population (Kondle-Seidl, 2016:13). However, the Syrian refugee crisis saw a surge in refugees to Europe and resulted in a backlash with EU countries closing their borders to stem the surge of refugees entering the EU (Şimşek & Çorabatır, 2017: 14).

With the EU closing their borders, Syrian refugees are stuck and will remain in refugee camps in Lebanon and Turkey, stretching the already limited resources in these host countries to a breaking point, while changing the countries social fabric (Şimşek & Çorabatır, 2017). In order for facilitation and integration to succeed, there must be a long-term framework that deals with both the concerns of the refugees and host communities to allow for the opportunity for refugees to attain rights and integrate fully in host countries (Şimşek & Çorabatır, 2017: 14, 15). Many critics have argued that refugee camps have become a visible symbol of failed human rights and those living in camps are in a state of legal limbo, relying on the host countries and the international community for constant help (Holzer, 2013).

The conceptual framework for refugee integration policy comes from Ager and Strang (2008) as a list of key components and indicators required in order constituting successful integration between refugees and the host countries. The four core domains of integration identified by Ager and Strang are: 1) Markers and Means; 2) Social Connection; 3) Facilitators; and 4) Foundations (Figure 4.0). The Markers and Means are based upon indicators that include health, education, housing, and employment. According to Ager and Strang (2008) to achieve and measure integration, Employment, Housing, Education, and Health spheres are key issues in determining local achievement of integration for refugees (Ager and Strang, 2008: 169 – 170, 185). Cheung & Phillimore (2013) have also indicated that the markers and means are critical for integration, and are critical to move to the next domains of integration (Cheung & Phillimore, 2013). As such, this Markers and Means domain of the framework determines the degree of integration, and is applied to this research on the integration of Syrian refugees within the refugee camps in Lebanon and Turkey.

Figure 4.0: Conceptual Framework and Domains (Ager & Strang, 2008)

4.0 Methodology Framework

For this research question, a qualitative research design is most appropriate because it allows for the analysis of textual and contextual data. Qualitative research typically includes research designs that collects evidence within natural settings and uses multiple methods that are interactive, humanistic, and fundamentally interpretive (Campbell, 2014). Moreover, qualitative data provides also provides a depth of understanding for data collected through methods such as random sampling, observations, case studies, questionnaires, policy reports / statements, video transcripts and open-ended questions (Campbell, 2014). This is fundamentally different from research questions that require measurement and involve research methods that collect numbers for analysis.

The research question guiding this work requires a qualitative research approach in order to analyse the data required. Data sources includes policy statements, position papers, academic discussions, newsletters, publications, video transcripts and reports, and a secondary analysis of cross-sectional survey data material related to refugee integration. These documents and videos were selected as key sources about the development of integration and facilitation policies in the informal settlements and refugee camps in both Lebanon and Turkey. These data sources and were used as sources to respond to the guiding research question. The information and data collected from these sources were colour coded through a thematic analysis of four factors of integration: 1) housing; 2) education; 3) health; and 4) employment.

A media discourse analysis was conducted by extracting videos and news sources through a media snowballing sampling method. Video and news release transcripts were coded by hand, and examined to identify evidence to support the research question. A second analysis of these coded transcripts were reviewed again, seeking phrases, quotes, and evidences relating to the four sub-topics variables of integration and facilitation development policies within the informal settlements and refugee camps in Lebanon and Turkey. The coded information obtained and used from these videos was examined, and key codes and phrases written onto word documents with a reference to the speaker and organization. These excerpts were organized by theme and connections between excerpts were made.

The secondary analysis of information conducted from original research by Amnesty International, UNHCR, Inter-Agency Coordination and Mercy Corps, as well as academic research applied to this specific context. The NGOs and international organizations that were used in my secondary analysis had access to the informal settlements and refugee camps in Lebanon and Turkey. The original research included multiple data sources in order to ensure that the findings of the research maintained a high internal validity. 4.1 Data Collection Methods (Triangulation of Methods)

A triangulation of methods through various theories and data sources were used in order to find multiple sources of evidence to support the findings. Textual data sources were retrieved from various key policy documents, reports and data sources that were found from Amnesty International, Inter-Agency Coordination and UNHCR’s data section on their website, as well as academic research related to the integration and facilitation of refugees in Turkey and Lebanon. Video data sources were retrieved from YouTube for analysis of interviews and

24 reports conducted by Vice News, Vox, International Crisis Group, EU Civil Protection & Humanitarian Aid Operations and Emirates 24/7 On Dubai One. As discussed in section 4.0, data collection and analysis focused on evidence of Syrian refugee integration and facilitation in Lebanon and Turkey via four sub-topics: 1) housing; 2) education; 3) health; and 4) employment. When putting the key phrases into YouTube as discussed in section 4.0, the above data sources and information from these organizations were found. I also did Google searches using these key phrases to find analysis from interviews and reports conducted by these organizations. The Snowball sampling method was used for videos as a non-probability technique to identify further video links, related to the four sub-topics in refugee camps and informal settlements in both Lebanon and Turkey. Again, as discussed in section 4.0, the further video links and the snowball sampling that was used was videos that were related to the same terms that were found while doing this media discourse analysis in order to help us answer the research question. 4.2 Content and Discourse Analysis

Content and discourse analysis are forms of textual analysis where you can either analyse your data for its latent or manifest content, which is important when doing research for conducting systematic, quantitative, objective, and contrasting data used to help answer the research question or test a hypothesis when deciding how to structure the analyses (Jackson et al., 2007). In this work, a content analysis was conducted using both a manifest where I predominantly manifested the concrete surface of the content or data used from key documents from UNHCR's website and other international organizations including Amnesty International, Mercy Corps and academics who have conducted their own research. I used latent content where I drew my own conclusions by analysing several documents that I found when I manifested the concrete information from these documents, reports and assessments. The information was collected using secondary data sources from academic writings, reports, policy documents, fact-sheets, and assessments from government and international organizations, including Amnesty International, Mercy Corps, and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Documents were coded by concepts relating to the four sub-themes: 1) housing, 2) education, 3) health, and 4) employment). Coded data was then analysed in terms of facilitation and integration efficiency of refugees in refugee camps in Turkey and Lebanon. Searching software was not used to do the coding, but was done by hand, while referring to and examining the secondary data sources also listed above. Each document, report or fact-sheet were colour coded it with four different colours related to each sub-theme (housing, education, health and employment) and copy and pasted findings into separate Word documents for individual analysis. Data from multiple sources were collected into one document, triangulated findings determined consistencies in the data across data sources.

A discourse analysis of videos and YouTube selections was conducted, including interviews from several NGOs and international organizations working with refugees, professionals, news pieces and documentaries with a focus on the last three years of documentation of the integration of Syrian refugees inside of refugee camps and informal settlements in Lebanon and Turkey. Snowball sampling method for videos was used as a non-probability technique to identify further video links. Videos were reviewed and cross compared to ensure reliability of findings and interpretation of the data. Personal notes and exceptional quotes were recorded from the independent and YouTube video sources, and also used for analysis.

4.3 Data Exploitation and Assessment

Data was analysed with a triangulation of research methods, along with multiple data sources, in order to help ensure the accuracy of findings and the interpretation of results. Triangulation supports a fundamental basis for the conceptual validity of the four sub-themes within Ager and Strang's integration framework for the understandings of refugee integration (Ager & Strang, 2008: 169). Retrieved data was colour coded by topic (housing, education, health and employment), in turn allowing for the conceptualization and interpretation of each of the four identified indicators of integration from multiple and diverse data sources. The coded data was further analysed to determine evidence to support an answer the research question. The retrieved data also worked anonymously to provide quotes from documents and interviews conducted by NGOs and international organizations to support these study findings. 4.4 Internal / External Validity

The internal validity of this research was assured through a triangulation of methods and the gathering and analysis of multiple data sources. Analysis included interviews by international organizations such as Mercy Corps, UNHCR, World Vision International and Inter-Agency Coordination just to name a few. There is also an analysis of existing literature from academics and governmental reports from both Lebanon and Turkey, as well as desktop research of previous work on the topic. In the data analysis, a clear association between the data of multiple sources ensured that the study findings maintained a high internal validity, that the research methods were appropriate for the data sources, and that the indicators for integration were theoretically correct. This study supports a medium level of external validity due to the vast amount of data available for two countries, with level of integration as a single unit of analysis. However, findings can be generalizable to other conflict zone countries in the region as the internal validity of the findings remains strong. 4.5 Limitations and Pitfalls

Although looking for indicators of integration may sound simple, getting up-to-date and reliable data to answer this research question proved to be challenging, partly due to the lack of relevant and accurate real data coming out of refugee camps with constantly changing policies from the governments in these countries (Council of Europe, 1995). There are a number of pitfalls that can be expected to interfere with receiving the correct and most reliable and current information. One of the barriers and pitfalls for this work is the lack of primary data collection and independent research of data found from first-hand witnessing in refugee camps and informal settlements in both countries. There may also be a lack of access to information regarding the discussions and decisions of governmental integration policies in both of the host countries and this may include personal or politically biased analysis reports, as these governments may only want to release the documents they want the public to see in regards to new governmental integration policies in these countries. Another barrier is the bias or reliability of the interviewer or interviewee during data gathering and how accurate the interpretations of the findings are to answer the research question. Does the interviewer have their own agenda in asking certain questions? Does the interviewer work for

26 the government or an independent organization? Are they asking a wide variety of people with different backgrounds in the refugee camps and informal settlements or only those who are receiving the most aid or help? One other pitfall when using Ager and Strang’s integration framework is that they used their framework for refugees in the UK and it has further been used with other refugees in other Western countries. This framework was used on a variety of refugees from a number of backgrounds and in this paper I used it only for Syrian refugees in refugee camps and informal settlements, which both are different than what had been used for this framework previously, so further research would be needed on other nationalities in other refugee camps to see if it is relevant to this framework.

Finally, conducting primary research to respond to this specific research questions rather than relying on other independent sources to answer my research question could have mitigated the pitfalls and limitations of this study. However, primary data collection and analysis was not possible within the time-frame and resources supporting this study. I relied on the policy documents and reports, fact-sheets and assessments from the NGOs and international organizations that were listed above who conducted their own research and had access to the refugee camps and informal settlements in these countries to explain how these integration and facilitation policies have developed during the Syrian refugee crisis.

5.0 Analysis of the Integration & Facilitation of Refugees

This section will present the analysis of the integration and facilitation development policies of refugees within Lebanon and Turkey. This analysis will be presented by first, explaining the effect the refugee crisis has had on both Turkey and Lebanon, and secondly, the Lebanese and Turkish governments development policies relating to the refugees and refugee camps in Turkey and the informal settlements in Lebanon. This discussion be followed by using Ager and Strang’s (2008) four key indicators theorized to be required for full integration within their conceptual framework for refugee integration. These indicators include: health, education, housing, and employment. These four indicators will be used as the framework for analysis and frame the response to the research question guiding this work. The findings will discuss to what extent the integration and facilitation development policies for these two governments have changed during the Syrian refugee crisis, and will present further challenges that may arise in order to facilitate and integrate Syrian refugees into their host societies by using Ager and Strang’s framework.

The current refugee crisis has put an enormous strain on the local economies of both Lebanon and Turkey. With the number of refugees increasing every day, these countries are required to look at ways in which they can facilitate and integrate the vast number of Syrian refugees into their host societies. The following analysis will look at how these two governments are dealing with this crisis through the adoption of new development polices in terms of employment, housing, education, and health of the Syrian refugees within refugee camps and informal settlements.

Arguably, the most researched area of facilitation and integration of refugees is employment because refugees are believed to need work to support a livelihood before they are considered fully integrated into the local society (Castles et al. 2001). When refugees are able to find employment and meaningful work, then individuals and families are able to plan and promote their own economic independence, in turn allowing an independence from the confines and security of the refugee camps (Ager and Strang, 2008). Language skills are considered an important factor for refugees to find a job and a place within society. As such, vocational training and education are considered key aspects of facilitation and full integration of refugees (Ager and Strang, 2008).

Through education, refugees become active and constructive members of society. This participation is seen an important part of integrating refugees into their new surroundings (Ager and Strang, 2008). Turkey and Lebanon provide free education for refugee children; however, overcrowding in the schools, language, and logistics are believed to be some of the issues depriving Syrian children of receiving quality education (Newss, 2017). School is understood as an avenue where refugee children are able to have regular contact with children of the local host communities, playing an important role in building friendships and helping with the language or cultural barriers (Ager and Strang, 2008: 172). Figure 5.0 shows the number of children enrolled in school and that not in school in both Lebanon and Turkey. There is an obvious challenge facing these countries trying to close the gap of refugee children receiving a quality education.

Figure 5.0: Data on primary education of Syrian refugees (Newss, 2017)

Housing is an important factor in facilitating and integrating refugees into host communities. The quality, physical size, types of housing, and access to services are a determinant of feelings of connection and emotional wellbeing in new surroundings (Ager and Strang, 2008: 171). Housing is basic to human rights and needs, and are the basis for safety and security within the region and communities.

In both Lebanon and Turkey, healthcare is provided to Syrian refugees in refugee camps and informal settlements. However, although healthcare is free of charge for citizens in Turkey. In Lebanon, refugees are required to pay for part of their health coverage. Access to health coverage is considered an important part of integration because it allows refugees an active engagement with the host community and access to basic health services (Ager and Strang, 2008). Speaking the local language is considered as central when receiving health coverage because it reduces barriers when one is able to communicate properly their health issues and concerns (Ager and Strang, 2008). 5.1 Lebanon

As discussed in section 2.0, for over the past seven years, Lebanon has been dealing with one of the worst humanitarian crises in recent memory (Government of Lebanon, 2017). Lebanon today has the highest number of refugees per capita in the world, and refugees make up almost one-quarter of the population in Lebanon (Berti, 2017; Rainey, 2015). The government in Lebanon estimates that there are over 1.5 million Syrian refugees and just over 1 million registered refugees with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR, 2017). Figures show that more than half of the refugees displaced are women and children, and 60% of the Syrians that are over 15 years old are without legal residency and 70% are living below the poverty line (Government of Lebanon, 2017:11, 12).

Unlike in Turkey where there are official government-run refugee camps, in Lebanon there are no formal refugee camps (Limoges, 2017). Some of the reasons of this approach are: the fear of refugee camps becoming permanent settlements; security reasons and fear of radicalization; and worries that the long-term presence of Syrians in Lebanon could tip the

29 sensitive balance in the country (Fiedler, 2017; Limoges, 2017). With Lebanon having a unique sectarian, power-sharing system made up of 18 recognized religious sects, there needs to be agreement from all major political parties (Shen, 2017). At the moment, two of the main political blocks hold opposite views of whether to establish official refugee camps (Shen, 2017).

This ‘no refugee camp’ policy has meant that Syrian refugees live in over 1700 informal refugee camps or settlements throughout the country, but with the majority along the border in the Bekaa-valley, Akkar, and Balbeek-Hermel rural area, representing some of the poorest regions of the country (Fiedler, 2017). Public services are overstretched and this has meant that the distribution of humanitarian aid has been hampered, and resulted in vital aid not reaching the refugees in these settlements (Government of Lebanon, 2017). The pressure also has resulted in a strain on the capacities of schools, facilities, health care, and infrastructure (Fiedler, 2017). Ninette Kelley, UNHCR representative in Lebanon said, “We are limited to what we can do, especially in the informal settlements, the circumstances in these settlements are very dire” (Rainey, 2015).

With these informal settlements not officially run by the government, the largest-ever eviction of Syrian refugees in Lebanon resulted last year when more than 11,000 refugees across at least 92 settlements were uprooted in the Bekaa Valley due to security concerns issued by the Lebanese government (Limoges, 2017).

With the political debate about how to deal with the future of Syrian refugees in the country, the decision of short and long-term solutions, as well as sensitive topics and policies around permanent integration of Syrians in the country, have altered the sectarian dynamics in Lebanon (Berti, 2017). For the first three years of the crisis, UNHCR and human rights groups applauded Lebanon for its open borders and non-encampment and approach in dealing with the influx of Syrian refugees (Shen, 2017). However, in order to limit the impact of refugees, the country shifted policies from an open-door policy to introducing significant restrictions in obtaining temporary residency and work permits (Berti, 2017). Many politicians have said the best solution would be for the Syrian refugees to return to their homeland, but as the Syrian civil war continues to be fought and there is a required need for more efforts and development policies in place for long-term socio-political and economic integration (Berti, 2017).

If Lebanon is going to implement long-term integration policies, the Lebanese government will need money and support from the international community. According to the World Bank, since 2012, Lebanon has incurred losses of $13.1 billion USD, with $5.6 billion from 2015 alone (Inter-Agency Coordination, 2016: 7). On 6 June 2017, UNHCR spokesman Andrej Mahecic claimed that the current funding gap for the Syrian crisis in Lebanon is more than US $1 billion, adding that the “funding gap spells uncertainty for desperate Syrian refugees” (Seeberg, 2017:1).

5.1.1 Housing - 2011 – Present

In Ager and Strang’s conceptual framework on refugee integration, housing is one of the key components and indicators required to constitute successful integration between refugees and the host countries. There are a number of indicators and measures that has an effect on the overall physical and emotional wellbeing for refugees to feel at home and integrated into their new host environment (Ager & Strang, 2008: 171). Some of the indicators include: housing conditions, physical size, facilities, and the financial security all have a cultural and social impact when it comes to how the refugees are feeling comfortable and integrated in their new surroundings (Ager & Strang, 2008:171). The following section will explain how these indicators and measures have had an impact on refugees in Lebanon and if the housing development policies in the informal settlements that have been instituted by the Lebanese government are helping with the Syrian refugees feeling integrated into Lebanese society according to Ager and Strang’s integration framework.

With the Lebanese government’s policy stance that there will be no official refugee camps for Syrian refugees in Lebanon, many refuges have been forced to seek refuge in temporary shelters, abandoned buildings, and informal settlements (World Vision, 2012). The refugees are dispersed in over 1700 localities throughout the country (Figure 2.0), with the majority along the border with Syria and in the Bekaa, Akkar, Baalbek-Hermel, and northern regions of the country - which are considered to be the most underprivileged and has the highest unemployment rates of any regions in the country (Kazour, et al., 2017). With no official refugee camps, these refugees are forced to rent private land in the informal settlements, with some living in rented properties, but the majority of the refugees are living in tents, while landlords are engaged in practices where they are taking advantage of the situation of these refugees with extremely high rents because the refugees are stuck with limited places to go and having to pay it (Limoges, 2017). There are over 1 million Syrian refugees in Lebanon and 17 percent live in informal settlements and pay on average $189 per month for rent, which in most cases, is just for a plot of land (Inter-Agency Coordination, 2017: 2). Out of those 17 percent, 38 percent of displaced Syrians live in substandard shelter condition (Inter- Agency Coordination, 2017: 2). For many of these refugees who are not working and are struggling to get by, they are finding it extremely difficult to pay the monthly rent without any assistance from the government or international organizations (Inter-Agency Coordination, 2016). These informal settlements are owned by private landowners and refugees typically make verbal agreements that are considered ‘informal’ rather than ‘illegal’, as ‘formal’ would therefore be classed legal for settlement by the government (Inter-Agency Coordination, 2016). A Syrian refugee in one of the informal settlements in Bekaa region named Mohammad Salloum claims: “We feel cut off and abandoned. We would certainly rather be in an official camp ... we'd be receiving aid more regularly [and] at least we wouldn't have to pay for our tents. The landlord requests 150,000 Lebanese Lira [$100] for each tent, and we have seven tents” (Rainey, V, 2015).

Some refugees have said that overcrowding is an issue in the camps, with some living in overcrowded dwellings with 45 people in a five-room house, and some up to 11 people in a room (World Vision, 2012: 1; Shelter Sector, 2016: 115). According to the UNHCR, “Half of all Syrian refugees in Lebanon live in insecure dwellings” (UNHCR. 2015, Mar 12). These informal settlements have been characterized with having extremely poor living conditions that lack clean water and sanitation, are overcrowded, and disease has become a problem with polio and cholera being spread (Inter-Agency Coordination, 2016: 3, 5; Mercy Corps, 2017). In the larger informal settlements, water shortages are at emergency levels with some people only getting 30 litres per day, which is one-tenth of what the average American uses every day (Mercy Corps, 2017). In some of the settlements, there is basic conditions with poor sanitation and solid waste collection (Government of Lebanon, 2017). Figure 6 illustrates the conditions that some of the refugees have become accustomed to living in these informal settlements in Lebanon.

Figure 6.0: Conditions at the Salaam wa Makhaba informal settlement in Lebanon (Limoges, 2017)

The overcrowding conditions are significantly worse at Bekaa, where the majority of people living in these informal settlements live in tents (UNHCR, 2016). The refugees that live in homes measuring less than 35 square meters and are mostly two-bedroom places that do not include bathrooms or toilets, and the majority of the homes are structurally dangerous and need of repairs (UNHCR, 2016).

For those refugees that are living in tents, most are not prepared for the long cold winters in the Lebanese mountains, where temperatures have a tendency to drop below zero and most walls are made of sugar sacks and the roof made of plastic sheeting, making it hard to keep the tents warm (World Vision International, 2012: 1; Government of Lebanon, 2017; Vice News, 2015). A refugee at the Bekaa settlement says: “Our tents are in a dire state and our children are suffering because of that, we need insulation material such as nylon covering and wood, if we have those, we will be able to fix the tents ourselves” (UNHCR, 2016: 21). Many children are without adequate winter clothing. 12-year-old Hala says, “I just want clothes. All mine were burned. I just have the ones I have on” (World Vision International, 2012: 1). Many of the refugees do not have savings and the job prospects in the camp are limited, leading to the inability to secure many of the basic needs such as food, clothing and home

32 supplies (Government of Lebanon, 2017). The majority of the displaced Syrians will live in the same tent or home and will deal with the overcrowding and lack of facilities because they have no other option and cannot afford to move elsewhere (Government of Lebanon, 2017). More than 90 percent of the refugees need to borrow money in order to pay their rent and purchase food (Government of Lebanon, 2017).

Those refugees that have managed to register in the county are able to receive assistance from the Lebanese government, NGOs, and UNHCR. However, the Lebanese government has not had the money to fully deal with this crisis (Samari, 2014). In 2016, these organizations and the Lebanese government appealed for $2.48 billion to deal with the refugee crisis and only received $1.12 billion (Inter-Agency Coordination, 2016). Out of this amount, $474 million was received for food security – representing only 47 percent of the amount ask for, and $139 million was asked for to support shelter and accommodation, and only 38 percent of that amount was received (Inter-Agency Coordination, 2016). Later in 2016, at a two-day international conference in Brussels that brought together 70 donor countries and international aid groups from around the world, these countries and donors agreed to commit $6 billion USD to go to Lebanon to help with the refugee crisis (Limoges, 2017).

With the additional funds to help support and deal with the refugee crisis, the Lebanon Crisis Response has developed new policies in trying to ensure that vulnerable refugees have access to affordable shelter, at a minimum, and working to ensure that there is proper coordination among all authorities and NGOs help in making these development policy changes and delivering on the services (Inter-Agency Coordination, 2017). In the last quarter of 2016, there were 11,281 shelters that have been rehabilitated up to a minimal standard (Inter- Agency Coordination, 2017). In the first quarter of 2017, there were 5,907 refugees living in substandard shelters that received weatherproofing, doors, roofs, and better sealed windows (Inter-Agency Coordination, 2017). Also, 13,361 individual refugees living in subpar shelters in informal settlements received shelter kits and protection against fighting the winter storms (Inter-Agency Coordination, 2017). In the first three months of 2017, more than 75,000 vulnerable refugee households received a monthly cash assistance stream that would help towards purchasing food, paying rent, and servicing any other outstanding debts (Inter- Agency Coordination, 2017).

Although the Lebanese government has developed new integration and facilitation policies from the money given to them to help the refugees in these informal settlements, 71 percent of the refugees still live in poverty in 2016, compared to 69 percent in 2015, and 49 percent in 2014 (Government of Lebanon, 2017). In 2017, the shelter sector focused on new development policies by improving the physical conditions of the shelters, but these development policies have still not addressed the fact that people are living in overcrowded shelters with a lack of water in the tents and buildings (Government of Lebanon, 2017). We can see that, although conditions are slightly improving with their new integration and facilitation development policies, there still needs to be stronger policies in place by the Lebanese government to successfully integrate the Syrian refugees into Lebanon. When looking at some of the indicators Ager and Strang pointed out as successfully integrating refugees into their new surroundings, the Lebanese government has not dealt with

33 development policies enough when it comes to housing conditions and facilities to help make these Syrian refugees more comfortable and fully integrated. 5.1.2 Education - 2011 – Present

Ager and Strang’s conceptual framework indicates that education and vocational training are also one of the key aspects of full integration of refugees in their new host country because it helps making them more active and constructive members of society (Ager & Strang, 2008: 172). Education provides the skills and competences needed to enable people to become constructive members of society (Ager & Strang, 2008: 171). Syrian refugee children need to be educated, as to ensure that there is not a lost generation. In order for this to happen, children will need to have the opportunity to go to school and learn the local language, helping children overcome feels of isolation or exclusion within host communities and the ability of children to make friends and establishing relationships is important and central to integration into the local community (Ager & Strang, 2008: 172). In Lebanon, the education of Syrian refugees is crucial for the prospect of their social, economic, and cultural integration into society (Öztürkler & Göksel, 2015). Educating the Syrian children will equip them with the skills required and protect them from the prospects of recruitment into radicalized or armed groups, child labour, or early marriage as some may see these as an only option for their future (Peters & Besley, 2015). Prior to the Syrian uprisings, Syria boasted the highest enrolment and literacy rates for males and females in the region, with 92 percent of female primary school enrolment, and 97 percent for males (Charles & Denman, 2013). However, when the conflict began, these rates drastically changed. In 2013, only 12 percent among 6 to 14 years old refugee children and 5 percent of secondary aged children were attending school and this indicates the bleak situation facing Syrian refugee children (Watkins, 2013). The longer these children are out of school, the greater the gap and need to catch up to their peers, causing refugee children to struggle socially and to flourish in society (World Vision International, 2012). The main obstacles in educating Syrian refugee children are that Lebanese schools do not have the capacity to accommodate all the children. Moreover, in Syria classes are taught in Arabic, but in Lebanon, classes are taught in English, French, and Arabic, creating a language barrier for many children (Charles & Denman, 2013). A Syrian refugee child aged 9 named Yazan, said “I prefer school in Syria because it’s easier for me to learn. I only know how to speak Arabic” (World Vision International, 2012:8). Another child 11 years old Abdallah said, “I don’t go to school here anymore because I don’t understand the languages” (World Vision International, 2012: 6).

Another major obstacle in preventing children from going to school is that, in Syria most schools are same-sexed and in Lebanon most are mixed schools, which results in many parents not wanting their daughters attending classes with boys (Charles & Denman, 2013). Other barriers include transportation costs in getting kids to school, costs of school fees and books, and some kids feel they are discriminated against at school and these reasons result in kids refusing to go to school or dropping out altogether (Charles & Denman, 2013; World

Vision International, 2012). A 7-year old Syrian refugee named Zahra claims: “I don’t go to school now because my dad told me the bus does not come by our house anymore” (World Vision International, 2012: 6). Another 12-year old boy named Omar says: “I heard children saying I should be hated because I am Syrian” (World Vision International, 2012:6).

The Lebanese Ministry of Education has tried to fix the problem by waiving school and book fees, and trying to open more schools to help with the space constraints (Charles & Denman, 2013). Despite the Lebanese government’s efforts, the huge influx of Syrian refugees into Lebanon has destabilized the education system and the government is having problems in dealing with the costs involved of educating the sheer number of children (Inter-Agency Coordination, 2016). In 2016, the Ministry of Education and Higher Education (MEHE) worked alongside a new foundation called Reaching All Children with Education (RACE) to put together a new strategy and framework to the year 2021 that would try and have Syrian refugee children aged 5-17 enrolled in school (Inter-Agency Coordination, 2016). Overall, $253 million was mobilized to help cover enrolment fees for the children, strengthen education institutions, and help to integrate children to the school system as key components of the RACE interventions (Inter-Agency Coordination, 2016). In the first year, the agency provided 197,825 Syrian refugee children a formal education (Inter-Agency Coordination, 2016).

In 2017, at the Brussels Conference, NGOs, governments, donors, and UN bodies pledged $6 billion USD for the Syrian response in 2017, and $3.7 billion USD for 2018 (OCHA, 2017). Some of this money has been given to Lebanon and to the Lebanese Ministry of Education and Higher Education (MEHE). It has shown that just over 250,000 Syrian children between 3 and 17 years old remain out of school, with 42 percent of eligible Syrian children enrolled in public education, while the highest is still in the Bekaa region where 78 percent of Syrian children are out of school, indicating the monumental task of the government trying to integrate the children and provide the education they require (Government of Lebanon, 2017).

This section has highlighted the new integration and facilitation development policies the Lebanese government has taken in their efforts to integrate the Syrian refugees during this crisis. Despite the Lebanese government taking significant strides in attempting to integrate and educate the Syrian refugee children, one of the key challenges that remains is classes being taught in French and English, where the majority of these children only speak Arabic, which results in many children drop out or do not attend school (Government of Lebanon, 2017). This indicates that the Lebanese government will need to implement some new development policy frameworks in order to properly address this issue of trying to integrate these children by giving them vocational training in a familiar language so that they are able to attend school and not result in a lost generation of uneducated children (Government of Lebanon, 2017). In Ager and Stang’s framework, education and vocational training provides the skills needed to enable refugees to be constructive members of society and feel integrated into Lebanese society. As mentioned, Lebanon has the memories of the Lebanese civil war, and the thought of uneducated children being radicalized or joining armed groups plays a

35 crucial role in policies instituted by the Lebanese government to try and prevent this resulting from a lost generation of children. 5.1.3 Employment - 2011 – Present

In Ager and Strang’s conceptual framework, employment constitutes arguably the most researched area of integration and the full integration of refugees into host countries and above all you need to work before you are integrated into the local society (Ager & Strang, 2008: 170). Ager and Strang have identified that “promoting economic independence, encouraging self-reliance, restoring self-esteem, and facilitating employment opportunities are crucial for the long-term and successful social integration of the refugee” (Ager & Strang, 2008:171).

The crisis in Syria has cost the Lebanese economy an estimated $13.1 billion USD since 2012, and $5.6 billion USD pertains to 2015 alone. This expenditure has put enormous strain on public services and employment opportunities (Government of Lebanon, 2017). Unemployment levels and informal labour are increasing, particularly in the poorest areas of the country, while unemployment among the youth is 3 to 4 times higher than the overall unemployment rate of the general population in the country (Government of Lebanon, 2017). The country is facing stagnation and the overall GDP rate is below 2 percent, which is making it hard for job creation and putting additional strain on the refugee community who are trying to find jobs in a competitive market, especially in the low skilled categories (Government of Lebanon, 2017).

Recent figures show that the Syrian labour work force in Lebanon is estimated at around 384,000 people, and the unemployment rate among the Syrian refuges to be about 36 percent (Government of Lebanon, 2017: 103). The majority of those who are employed work in construction and agricultural sectors, because language continues as a barrier for most Syrians looking to find a good job (Government of Lebanon, 2017). Many refugees work less than 15 days a month and earn less than the survival minimum rate posted by the Lebanese government (Government of Lebanon, 2017). Those refugees who are in informal settlements are usually located next to agricultural land and many of these refugees who are working are hired as fruit or vegetable pickers and are paid directly cash or through ‘work for rent agreements’ with landlords (Inter-Agency Coordination, 2016).

Up until 2015, the Lebanese government showed leniency towards Syrian refugees who had not regulated their stay and were working without work permits, resulting in an estimated 47 percent of Syrian refugees working within the country (ILO, 2014). However, the Lebanese government changed their stance, and in 2015 introduced new policies that regulated and prohibited UNHCR registered Syrian refugees from working if they did not have the correct residency papers or permits to work (Laarhoven, 2016). Syrian refugees are now required to renew their residency in the country every six months, which costs $200, and they must have proof of sponsorship or letter from an employer, or evidence of financial ability to support themselves in Lebanon (Laarhoven, 2016). The issue of being reliant on employer sponsorship has made Syrians vulnerable to exploitation, and five out of forty refugees who

36 were interviewed said their employers have sexually harassed or tried to sexually exploit them (Laarhoven, 2016). This means that the Syrians lack both job security and a stable income, and 70 percent of households are living below the poverty line with 90 percent in debt (Berti, 2017). It is clear that in the long run, these new measures may harm the Lebanese economy and society with millions of Syrian refugees hosted within the country.

This section has highlighted what the Lebanese government has done in regards to development policies during the refuge crisis in terms of employment. Since 2015, the new development policy residency rules set out by the Lebanese government has pushed refugees towards accepting even more exploitive labour sources. Alternative avenues, such as prostitution and child labour, are increasing and becoming a new problem for the government to deal with in their country (Fiedler, 2017; Shen, 2017). In Ager and Strang’s integration framework, employment is arguably one of the most important indicators needed for fully integrating Syrian refugees into host communities. With the current development policies instituted by the Lebanese government, opportunities for local integration remain restricted and the government has not done enough according to Ager and Strang’s framework to integrate these refugees in the country. The government is increasingly forced to look at how to fully integrate the Syrians into their countries workforce, or it could result in a new group of people struggling in the country and looking to any means to survive, which could result in further exploitation, criminality, and much longer periods before full integration within the host country. 5.1.4 Health - 2011 – Present

Health is one of the core factors of refugee integration according to Ager and Strang’s conceptual framework, as health is considered critically important for the active engagement within society and of key government state services (Ager & Strang, 2008; 172). Ager and Strang have indicated that language barriers and the lack of information and communication are one of the biggest obstacles for refugees when trying to explain what it wrong with them and get the proper information needed from health professionals (Ager & Strang, 2008; 173). This language gap leads to delays or refusals to seek medical care, or in the inappropriate use of services (Ager & Strang, 2008). In Lebanon, the country currently hosts over 1 million Syrian refugees and has the highest number of refugees per capita in the world. This situation has created a new challenge and burden for the already weak Lebanese health system in trying to provide medical assistance to the Syrian refugees (Lyles et al., 2016; Blanchet et al., 2016). The government in Lebanon covers 47 percent of primary healthcare for Syrian refugees, and leaves the rest of the medical support to be covered by UNHCR, foreign aid organizations, and other NGOs (Newss, 2017). When the crisis first began, the health and protection of Syrian refugees was led by UNHCR. But due to the high costs in providing support to over a million refugees, and a lack of funding coming from international donors, the UNHCR increased out of pocket payments for refugees from 15 percent to 25 percent (Blanchet et al., 2016). For those refugees registered with UNHCR and are between the ages of 5 to 60 years of age receive

37 health care in the centres managed by NGOs for a fee of approximately $2 to $3 USD (Blanchet et al., 2016).

Ninette Kelley who works for UNHCR, and a representative in Lebanon, states:

“Lebanon is a highly privatized health system, so it is extremely expensive to treat refugees and it has been impossible to meet all health needs and what they have done is prioritize primary over secondary health care. Because primary you can have the greatest impact for comparable cost that means for secondary health care hospitalization we can only treat those with emergency live saving needs. For example treating some with cancer could cost over $100,000, but in the primary that money could treat over 10,000 children, so those are the tough choices that are needed to make on a daily basis” (Emirates 24/7 On Dubai One, 2014).

What this translates to is that UNHCR would like to provide health coverage for all refugees, but do not have the money or resources to do it.

In areas like Akkar and Bekaa, where most of the informal settlements are located, around 10 percent to 25 percent of the Syrian refugees are in need of more health coverage and support (Relief Web, 2017). In these refugee camps and informal settlements, clean water and sanitation and the spread of diseases like polio and cholera has become a big concern (Mercy Corps, 2017). Polio was eradicated in the Middle East over 15 years, but with its re- emergence since this crisis began, every child that now passes through the UN registration in informal settlements are now receiving immunization to help fight a possible epidemic from emerging in the region (Emirates 24/7 On Dubai One, 2014). With new policies and measures that allow for thousands of refugees to receive free or subsidized health coverage at the primary level, fewer cases of diarrhoea and other issues have been reported (Emirates 24/7 On Dubai One, 2014). These Syrian refugees can access a network of 220 Primary Healthcare Centres (PHCCs) and an estimated 700 dispensaries/health outlets, which most are NGO clinics and a number of informal practices run by Syrian doctors in the informal settlements for free or a subsidized fee (Relief Web, 2017).

While subsidized fees and out-of-pocket payments are lower for refugees than other Lebanese, in 2016, 16 percent of Syrians who required primary health services were not able to access care because fees and costs were too high and they were unable to pay the bill (Lyles et al., 2016; Government of Lebanon, 2017). Most secondary and tertiary health care institutions are mainly private, and the costs to access these services are even more expensive and inaccessible for refugees with the money (Inter-Agency Coordination, 2017, June).

In 2016, the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) received $14.4 million USD and new integration development policies put this money towards healthcare centres and hospitals, which this led to 151 additional staff and 26 government hospitals given medical equipment and supplies to help provide healthcare to Syrian refugees (Inter-Agency Coordination, 2016). In the first quarter of 2017, LCRP Health partners in Lebanon received $18.8 million, which only represented 6 percent of the 2017 appeal for $308 million (Inter-Agency Coordination, 2017, April). However, the funds helped in continuing to provide Syrians with

38 subsidies and free medication, when in the first 6 months of 2017, there were 16 percent of Syrians that still did not have access to primary healthcare (Inter-Agency Coordination, 2017, April). This money has also provided hospital care through UNHCR services, with 20,309 displaced Syrians with secondary emergency healthcare, representing 17.6 percent of the annual target (Inter-Agency Coordination, 2017, April).

In this section, I have indicated what integration and facilitation developments have been instituted in terms of healthcare by the Lebanese government during the Syrian refugee crisis. The Syrian crisis is going into the seven year, and although there have been minimal policy development advancements and gains in providing Syrians with health care coverage in Lebanon, according to Ager and Strang’s integration framework there are still many challenges ahead for new policies and financing to provide care for the refugees (Blanchet et al., 2016). The MoPH Response Strategy (HRS) that was drafted in 2015, and updated in 2016, as a new integration development policy strategy had an aim for the LCP Health sector in Lebanon to have full integration within the existing national health care system services for refugee communities by 2020 (Relief Web, 2017). The new policy development strategy objectives are to increase access to healthcare services to refugees by reaching displaced persons, and prioritizing the most vulnerable refugees while strengthening the health care system as a whole to help with the demand and the pressure placed on it from the crisis (Relief Web, 2017). Currently, the Lebanese health system is overstretched and has not provided all the services needed to the refugee community. Moreover, according to Ager and Strang’s framework for full integration of refugees, language barriers and costs are still factors that have not been achieved by these new integration development policies by the Lebanese government. These new development policies and strategies that are set out by MoPH are needed in order for refugees to receive the health care needed and to allow for full integrate into Lebanese society. Ager and Strang have pointed out that health is one of the core factors when it comes to fully integrating refugees into host communities. There are still challenges and new development policy measures required for the Lebanese government. 5.2 Turkey

In April 2011, Turkey first saw only 263 Syrian refugees crossing the border into the country and that figure has now increased to over three million refugees (Öztığ, 2016: 140; UNHCR, 2017). Soon after the first Syrian refugees arrived in the country, Turkey declared it would adapt an open-door policy and established refugee camps in the south - eastern provinces of the country (Öztığ, 2016). There are twenty-five refugee camps located across Turkey and it is estimated that the camps costs over 450 million euros per month, covering the basic needs, including medical services, health centres, and education facilities (Kirisci, 2016; Stavropoulos, 2017). Originally, Turkey refused additional help from international donors and from UNHCR when the crisis first began. However, as the figure spent went well over $3.5 billion in 2014 on the Syrian Refugee Response, and an increased burden on the health care system, the Turkish government has since asked for outside help (Samari, 2014). As of 19 October 2017, the funding requirements to deal with the refugees was $890,172,034 USD and only $331,233,531 USD was received from UNHCR and international donors - leaving a

37 percent gap needed to cover these required costs (UNHCR, 2017). Figures 6.0 and 7.0 shows the areas in Turkey where the most registered Syrian refugees are located. These figures represent actual numbers of refugees in each province, as of 10 November 2016.

Figure 7.0: Ten Provinces with Highest Number of Registered Syrian refugees (International Crisis Group, 2016b)

Figure 8.0: Map of Ten Provinces with Highest Number of Registered Syrian refugees (International Crisis Group, 2016b)

The refugee camps in Turkey are considered to be well above the average that is associated when you compare them to other refugee camps worldwide in terms of the housing, health services, education and physical facilities (Kirisci, 2016: 81). A refugee camp in Kahramanmaras, located in the south of Turkey has air-conditioned container-unit houses that houses over 25,000 refugees and each unit contains a bedroom, kitchen, a television and a laundry machine (The Economist, 2017). This refugee camps also has a supermarket, school and a hospital and since 2011, over 240,000 refugee children have been in Turkey (The Economist, 2017).

In legal terms, the Syrian refugees in Turkey are currently under “temporary protection status”, which means they have access to education by enrolling in one of the 400 Temporary Education Centres (TECs), unlimited free health care, and social and legal assistance through

40 a provisional identity card, but this does not grant them internationally recognized refugee status in the country and that means they are not entitled to permanent settlement and citizenship rights, which means it makes their status in Turkey unsettled because they have limited legal rights in the country (Içduygu, 2016: 28; Saferworld, 2016: 2; International Crisis Group, 2016). Over 80 percent of the Syrian refugees in Turkey find themselves living under ‘temporary protection’ (Rygiel, Baban & IIcan, 2016:317).

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan made an announcement on 2 July 2016 that the Turkish government could eventually recognize the settlement of the Syrians in the county can this could lead to the Syrian refugees being granted Turkish citizenship (İçduygu & Şimşek, 2016: 62). In President Erdogan’s opinion, the integration policies of the Syrian refugees are in Turkey’s best interest because if nothing is done then they will be a destined to stay and the longer the country does not integrate them into Turkish society the higher the risk they will become a stateless underclass and susceptible to radicalization and joining terrorist groups (The Economist, 2017). The long-term solution is integration development policies that will provide the refugees with immediate housing, health, education and employment for all refugees (İçduygu & Şimşek, 2016: 59).

With millions of refugees in the country it has now forced the Turkish government to think urgently about integration development policies and how to deal with the Syrian refugees, but integration has remained an empty concept in Turkey when talking about asylum, migrants and refugees (Şimşek & Çorabatır, 2017: 15-16). Integration and granting Syrian refugees access to the same rights and entitlements as other Turkish citizens must be a priority to give them full participation in Turkish society, so they feel like valued and integrated citizens (Içduygu, 2016: 28). Turkey has adopted and developed the first-ever asylum legislation law that guarantees Syrian refugees basic humanitarian services, health services, special training language courses, access to right to education and work permits to be established (Şimşek & Çorabatır, 2017: 18). The Turkish government tried to fast-track naturalization for Syrian refugees, but it resulted in problems because it had planned to grant Syrians citizenship without targeted integration policies, which created a backlash from the Turkish community (International Crisis Group, 2016b). President Erdoğan acknowledged these mistakes at the 2016 UN General Assembly were he said, “We initiated the process of citizenship for the refugees …. This brings about social risk problems. We took this risk and do not regret it”. He said it is “is essential to give Syrians a long-term perspective in some form, with clearly-defined steps and conditions for meaningful integration in education, the labour market and social life” (International Crisis Group, 2016b). 5.2.1 Housing - 2011 – Present

In this section I will look at Ager and Strang’s conceptual framework on refugee integration where housing is one of the key components and indicators that are required to constitute successful integration between refugees and the host countries. According to Ager and Strang (2008), there are a number of indicators and measures that has an effect on the overall physical and emotional wellbeing for refugees to feel at home and integrated into their new host environment (Ager & Strang, 2008:171). Some of the indicators would include the

41 housing conditions, the physical size, facilities and the financial security will all have a cultural and social impact when it comes to how the refugees are feeling comfortable and integrated in their new surroundings (Ager & Strang, 2008:171). The following section will explain how these indicators and measures have had an impact on refugees in Turkey and what housing development integration policies the Turkish government has instituted during the Syrian refugee crisis and if it is helping with the Syrian refugees feeling integrated into Turkish society according to Ager and Strang’s framework.

Unlike in Lebanon where there are not official refugee camps, in Turkey the government has made efforts to house the Syrian refugees in the country. When the crisis first began, the Syrian refugees were hosted in refugee camps in containers and tents mainly located in south- eastern Turkey close to the Syrian border and today there are now twenty-six refugee camps that have been set up in 10 provinces throughout the country (Öztığ, 2016: 141; Kirisci, 2016: 80; Içduygu, 2016: 14). Turkey has over 3 million refugees in the country and these refugee camps house approximately 30 percent and the remainder are scattered across Turkey’s 81 provinces (Lhroob, 2016; UNHCR, 2017).

The state-of-the-art refugee camps in Turkey are much better than those in Lebanon and are considered to be some of the best when you compare them to other refugee camps in other countries in terms of education, health services, physical facilities and vocational training for adults (Kirisci, 2016: 80; Lhroob, 2016). The air-conditioned container units at the refugee camps in Kahramanmaras, in Turkey’s south are home to 24,000 Syrian refugees and each unit contains a television, laundry machine, kitchen and bedroom (The Economist, 2017).

The average tent size in the refugee camps is 15.8 square meters and each tent averages about 6 people living in each, so there is about 2.8 square meters per individual (Development Workshop, 2016: 17). Each tent contains a small kitchen, refrigerator and 35 percent have TVs, 30 percent have satellite dishes and the findings found that 60 percent of households have mobile phones (WFP, 2016: 9; Development Workshop, 2016: 18).

Refugees living in the tents and container units have problems with clean water, electricity and adequate arrangements for disposal of the waste (Development Workshop, 2016: 147). In the border province of Hatay, the refugees here pay between TL 500 ($140) and 900 ($250) per month for rent, while many Syrian refugees make less than TL 900 (Al-Omar, 2017).

Just like in Lebanon, the refugees in Turkey have issues with their accommodation during the winter season with tents being flooded each time it rains (Özden, 2013: 11). One of the refugees at the Islahiye camp stated: “The only reasons why we endure these awful conditions in the camp is that there are no planes bombing us from above” (Özden, 2013: 11). Another refugee criticized the camp conditions by saying that “The camp conditions are great if you don’t mind living like animals, but if you want to live like a human, the conditions are unacceptable” (Özden, 2013: 11). In 2017, fourteen organizations have provided more than 140,000 Syrian refugees in the camps with e-vouchers in 52 of Turkey’s 81 provinces, which can be used to purchase electric heaters, clothing, coal and other winter related items (Inter- Agency Coordination, 2017, May: 3). Refugees were interviewed at the camps and 81 percent

42 said they were unable to purchase winter items without some assistance and 74 percent said they were not consulted before receiving assistance (Inter-Agency Coordination, 2017, May: 7).

Turkey hosts the most refugees in the world and the country has spent billions on housing them. The refugee camps are getting overpopulated and the Turkish government is trying to come up with new development policies to integrate these refugees and finding long-term solutions in dealing with the Syrian refugees in the country (İçduygu & Şimşek, 2016: 68- 69). Although integration is the new policy of the Turkish government, refugee camps are a short-term solution and as these refugees are integrated in the camps they will eventually have to move towards integration outside the camps (Içduygu, 2016: 15).

The Turkish asylum system by Law does not contain any wording regarding housing, but in Article 3 of the Temporary Protection Regulation of 2014 describes Temporary Accommodation Centres as “the centres to be built to meet collectively the shelter and nutrition needs of the foreigners under the coverage of this regulation” (Şimşek & Çorabatır, 2017: 146). In 2016, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan suggested that the giant housing and construction company called TOKI in Turkey, could provide housing for Syrians in the country part of a new development integration strategy, but this led to widespread criticism and discontent among opposition parties in the country and the local population because the majority of Turkish citizens would not benefit from these public housing programs (Şimşek & Çorabatır, 2017).

This section highlighted some of the integration policies developed during the Syrian refugee crisis by the Turkish government in terms of housing. Unlike in Lebanon where there is not official refugee camps and there is a problem with facilities and the conditions in the camps. In Turkey, the refugee camps are considered some of the best in the world with state-of-the- art facilities and it shows that the Turkish government has been successful in their facilitation and integration development policies in dealing with this crisis. These general conditions of housing in Turkey has allowed for the Syrian refugees to feel more comfortable in their new surroundings and allow for easier integration into Turkish society. As mentioned earlier, Ager and Strang has indicated the physical and emotional wellbeing were important measures for refugees to feel at home and integrated into their new environment and the Turkish government’s development policies are helping towards the integration of the Syrian refugees in the country. 5.2.2 Education - 2011 – Present

In Ager and Strang’s conceptual framework, education and vocational training is one of the key aspects of full integration of refugees in their new host country (Ager & Strang, 2008:171). Education provides the skills and competences needed enabling people to become constructive members of society (Ager & Strang, 2008:172). Syrian refugee children need to be educated, so there is not a lost generation and for this to happen these children will need to have the opportunities to go to school and learn the local language, so this will stop kids feeling isolated or excluded from the host community children and are able to make friends

43 and feel integrated into the local community (Ager & Strang, 2008:172). This chapter will explain what integration development policies the Turkish has instituted to help educate the Syrian refugee children during the Syrian refugee crisis. Prior to the Syrian crisis starting, the lower secondary school enrolment was 89 percent and the primary school enrolment in Syria was 99 percent (Human Rights Watch, 2015: 5). Today, Turkey has over 3 million Syrian refugees and currently out of the 835,000 school- age Syrian children in Turkey, only 463,000 attend Temporary Education Centres or public schools according to the Ministry of National Education (MoNE) in the country (Şimşek & Çorabatır, 2017: 149). Trying to accommodate this many Syrian children and making sure the government meets their education needs has been a difficult challenge for educators and integration policy makers in the country (Dallal, 2016: 107). Policy makers realize that integrating these children into the Turkish education system is the best way from preventing a ‘lost generation’ of Syrian youth and that could prevent them from being easy targets for radicalized groups, criminal organizations and terrorist groups or help leading them to early marriage or child begging (Dallal, 2016: 108; Saferworld, 2016; International Crisis Group, 2016). The Turkish government realizes that education and access to education is very significant because it allows both the Turkish youth and Syrian children to mix and it exacerbates the integration process by bringing both communities closer together (Çelik & Erdogan, 2017: 1; Development Workshop, 2016). According to Turkish national laws and legislation, all children in Turkey including foreigners have the right to free education at primary and secondary levels including Syrian children in refugee camps who have access to preschool, elementary and high school education and it is the Ministry of National Education (MoNE) who is responsible for ensuing refugee children enjoy this privilege and removing any barriers to enrolment (Içduygu, 2016; Bircan & Sunata, 2015; Gurel, 2017).

According to refugee children and parents who were interviewed the most common reasons why Syrian refugee children do not attend school is financial difficulties, discrimination from other children, distance to schools, lack of space in classrooms, legal obstacles and unlike Lebanon where some classes are taught in Arabic, the main reason for children in Turkey not attending school was because of language barriers where classes are taught in Turkish and many of the children do not speak the language (Rygiel, Baban & IIcan, 2016; Development Workshop, 2016; İçduygu & Şimşek, 2016).

Due to this language barrier, another preferred option for Syrian refugee children has been enrolling into Temporary Education Centres (TECs), which are classes that are available in refugee camps and are taught in Arabic and staffed by Syrian volunteer teachers and use a modified form of the Syrian curriculum (Içduygu, 2016: 21; Gurel, 2017: 1). All these TECs are under the supervision of the Ministry of Education in Turkey and at the moment there are not enough TECs to satisfy the demand of the all the Syrian refugee children wanting to take classes at them (Saferworld, 2016: 4). In 2016, the European Union pledged up to 6 billion Euros to help take care of the millions of Syrian refugees in Turkey and this included helping in whatever way possible to get and keep Syrian children in school (Kayali & Asquith, 2016).

Part of this money that was pledged by the EU was used by the Ministry of Education in Turkey as a development policy and used as a “education cash grant” to encourage families to send their children to school by giving them around US$30 each semester to help towards transport, books or any other financial difficulties Syrian refugee families may be having (International Crisis Group, 2016). Other areas where this money is being used is by building more Temporary Education Centres (TECs) and Turkish language and skills-training courses offered by the Ministry of National Education (MoNE) where Syrian children are able to learn Turkish, which is important elements of the integration process for these children to adopt to Turkish society (Gurel, 2017: 1; Çelik & Erdogan, 2017: 3).

The access to education and Syrian children learning the local language is important for easing social tensions like bullying and racism and will help with the process of social integration among both communities (Saferworld, 2016: 5). If these children know Turkish and are able to go to Turkish schools then this will help in building relationships and mixing with local kids and will be supportive of the integration process (Ager and Strang, 2008: 172).

In conclusion, this section has highlighted some of the facilitation and integration development policies instituted by the Turkish government during the Syrian refugee crisis in terms of education. Through new integration policy measures, Syrian refugees have the right to free education at primary and secondary levels through the Ministry of National Education (MoNE) who it is their mission to get these refugee children in school and being educated. Turkish facilitation and integration policy makers have realized that educating these refugee children is required, so it prevents a ‘lost generation’ from being disillusioned and not educated in the country. The biggest obstacles has been the language barrier where classes are taught in Arabic, financial difficulties and lack of space in the classrooms. As mentioned previously, Ager and Stang’s integration framework, education and vocational training provides the skills needed to enable refugees to be constructive and active members of society and the language barrier and vocational training need to be addressed in order integrate the Syrian refugees. The Turkish Ministry of Education and the policy makers have developed new policies by instituting Temporary Education Centres (TECs), putting Syrian children in Turkish classes and hiring volunteer Syrian teachers to help elevate this problem and hoping that this will help integrate these children by building more bonds with the local community and becoming constructive members of society today and in the future. 5.2.3 Employment - 2011 - Present

Ager and Strang’s conceptual framework has indicated that employment constitutes arguably on the most researched areas of integration when it comes to fully integrating refugees into the host country (Ager & Strang, 2008:171). Ager and Strang have identified that promoting economic independence, encouraging self-reliance, restoring self-esteem and facilitating employment opportunities are crucial for the long-term and successful social integration of the refugee (Ager & Strang, 2008:171). This section will explain what integration development policies the Turkish government has put forward when it comes to employment of Syrian refugees in the country during the refugee crisis.

While Turkey has been generous in providing Syrian refugees with basic needs and emergency care since 2011, the country has made few development policies to facilitate their integration of employment into Turkish society (Içduygu, 2016: 6). Instead of offering Syrian refugees with full refugee status, the countries integration policies have been granting them as ‘guests’ or giving them ‘temporary protection’, which has given them fewer rights in Turkey and has not helped with the integration of them into Turkish society (The Economist, 2017).

Many of the Syrian refugees in Turkey work illegally in mainly construction, heavy industry, manufacturing and agriculture sectors (Kirişçi, 2014: 21). Because they have no legal rights to work it makes them vulnerable to exploitation and abuse and Turkish employers do not offer them contracts or medical insurance (Rygiel, Baban & IIcan, 2016: 318; Al-Omar, 2017). These Syrian refugees also work for less money; earning less than 1,500 Turkish lira (TL) a month compared to the average salary of 1,800 TL the average Turkish employee would earn (Al-Omar, 2017).

Another huge problem is the increase in child labour in Turkey. A study conducted by the Development Workshop found that as many as 53 percent of those under the age of 17 years of age that live in a refugee camps were working as agricultural labourers (Development Workshop, 2016: 15). This is due to the fact that most families are struggling financially and adults are having a hard time finding work, so the perception among many Syrian refugee families is that agricultural labour is now a job done by the younger family members to bring in income for the family to survive during this difficult time in their life (Development Workshop, 2016: 15; UNHCR, 2015: 7). Another study conducted by the Turkish government found that most of the Syrian children who worked are working for more than 8 hours a day and for less than $12 (Asik, 2017). With this increase of Syrian workers and willing to work for less money it has caused resentment among Turkish workers where Syrians are now often confronted with ethnic discrimination, racism and xenophobia is increasing in Turkey (Development Workshop, 2016: 47).

The Turkish government acknowledged that steps were needed to be taken to try and integrate Syrians into Turkish society and the work force and in 2016 the government introduced new development integration policies and important regulations (Içduygu, 2016: 6). Turkey did not grant Syrians official refugee status in the country, but the new Regulation on the Work Permit of Foreigners under Temporary Protection took effect that would allow those Syrian refugees who have been registered with the Turkish authorities for more than 6 months to be able to apply to the Labour Ministry for work permits to work legally in the country (Içduygu, 2016: 6). However, this development policy has been a slow process and to date there have been less than 20,000 work permits given to Syrian refugees, which is extremely low considering there are approximately 1.8 million Syrians who are of working age in the country (Asik, 2017; Maras, 2017).

Even if work permits are granted to Syrian refugees, the language barrier is one of the biggest problems to employment for many of the refugees (Şimşek & Çorabatır, 2017: 174). Ager and Strang has indicated that language is vitally important and around 70 percent of the Syrian refugees who were interviewed by the Development Workshop stated they do not

46 speak Turkish at all or have not been given the opportunity to learn the language. (Development Workshop, 2016: 82). To address this issue, Turkish language courses and vocational training are now being offered to Syrian refugees in more places by UNHCR and the Turkish government (UNHCR, 2017, May: 2).

The integration of the Syrian refugees into the local labour market in the country is vital to improve their own social and economic status and it is in Turkey’s own interest as well (Içduygu, 2016: 29). A United Nations report, states that Syrian refugees have contributed over $8 million to the Egyptian economy since 2011 and the numbers in Egypt do not exceed 120,000, so with over 1 million Syrian refugees who are able to work in Turkey the Turkish government could be missing out on hundreds of millions of dollars to their economy annually (Al-Omar, 2017).

Turkish President Erdogan also stated the longer the country takes to open up the job market and integrate Syrians into Turkish society “the risk that the refugees will become a permanent, stateless underclass, susceptible to radicalization” (Maras, 2017). Syrians do not want to be considered guests and want their rights as refugees, so they have legal access to the Turkish labour market and stop the risk of being exploited and this will be crucial if Turkey wants to fully integrate the Syrians into Turkish society (Gümüş & Eroğlu, 2015: 479).

This section has highlighted some of the integration development policies the Turkish government has instituted in terms of employment of the Syrian refugees in the country. Although the Turkish government has developed new integration policies and tried to take some steps to integrate the Syrian refugees into the local work force, there needs to be more urgency placed on getting work permits for these refugees so that they can legally work in the country. Ager and Stang have pointed out in the integration framework that promoting economic independence and facilitating employment opportunities are crucial for the long- term and successful social integration of the refugee and there needs to be more emphasis placed on vocational training for refugees to learn the Turkish language and make it easier for them to integrate (Ager & Strang, 2008). 5.2.4 Health - 2011 – Present

According to Ager and Strang’s conceptual framework, health is one of the core factors of refugee integration, as health is considered important for active engagement with key government state services (Ager & Strang, 2008:172). Ager and Strang have indicated that language barriers and the lack of information and communication are one of the biggest obstacles for refugees when trying to explain what is wrong and get the proper information needed from health professionals in the host community, leading to some refugees refusing to go to the doctor or leading to inappropriate use of services (Ager & Strang, 2008). This section will explain what integration development policies the Turkish government has instituted to help with Syrian refugees in the country in terms of health care provision within the country during the Syrian refugee crisis.

With over 3 million Syrian refugees, Turkey hosts the highest number of refugees in the world and it has led to additional challenges and pressures on the Turkish health services (EU Civil Protection & Humanitarian Aid Operations, 2017). Originally, Turkey refused help from international donors and UNHCR and wanted to deal with the crisis on its own, but today, due to the burden on its health care system, the country now receives minimal foreign aid and has spent over $6 billion on humanitarian relief last year alone (Daily Sabah, 2017). In doing, so has been praised by the World Health Organization (WHO) for its efforts in the field of health (Daily Sabah, 2017). However, due to Turkey’s refusal of international assistance, Turkey has been strict on allowing NGOs, international humanitarian relief organizations, and observers into the refugee camps and this has resulted in information on health in the refugee camps has been screened by Turkish authorities (Samari, 2014).

The majority of the over 3 million Syrian refugees in Turkey have a Temporary Protection Card (TPID) which allows access to hospitals and free medical treatment in the country (Al- Omar, 2017). Although Syrian refugees receive free health coverage and can use all Turkish hospitals, two of the biggest obstacles that make refugees reluctant in use these facilities are the cultural and language barriers experienced when Turkish-speaking doctors try explaining and communicate about health needs to Arabic-speaking Syrian refugee patients (European Commission, 2017; Lhroob, 2016).

In order to combat and alleviate this problem, in 2016 the Turkish government enacted a new integration development policy that allowed Syrian health professionals to enter the Turkish health system, with the aim of trying to integrate Syrian health professionals into the Turkish system (World Health Organization, 2017). With a grant of €2 million from the EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey, the WHO and other international donors worked with the Ministry of Health in Turkey with nee development integration policies that would provide and train Syrian nurses, doctors and translators (European Commission, 2017; Içduygu, 2016). Since November 2016, this approach has resulted in the training with over 360 Syrian nurses and 380 doctors being trained and allowed for work in refugee camp health centres and hospitals as translators and professionals (European Commission, 2017; Içduygu, 2016). Syrian refugees are more comfortable being treated by a Syrian doctor or nurse who can also speak Arabic (World Health Organization, 2017; European Commission, 2017). A Syrian refugee patient named Aruba Naemi says: “The Syrian doctors are better because we understand them and they understand us and what is wrong with us. They understand us. The Turkish doctors do not understand us” (EU Civil Protection & Humanitarian Aid Operations, 2017). Another Syrian patient named Fatima Hamid says: “it is better for us that there are Syrian doctors we can see. It is reassuring. When we go to a Turkish hospital, we do not understand most of what the doctors say because of the language” (EU Civil Protection & Humanitarian Aid Operations, 2017).

This section has explained what integration development policies the Turkish government has instituted to help with Syrian refugees in the country in terms of health care provision within the country during the Syrian refugee crisis. Having the Syrian refugees in Turkey will continue to have a cost and strain on the health services in the country. The refugee population growing faster than Turkey’s general population, and with the Kahramanmaras

48 refugee camp expected to double in under 10 years, there will arguably still be issues moving forward (The Economist, 2017). However, as the Turkish authorities continue to develop and integrate their policies and train Syrian doctors, nurses, and interpreters into Turkish society, Syrian refugees and population will feel more supported and able to integrate easier into their new country.

6.0 General Conclusion

Concluding, this research paper has tried to offer a contribution to some of the facilitation and integration development policy changes the Lebanese and Turkish government is doing towards integrating the Syrian refugees into their country. This final section will present the main results and provide an answer on the following research question: “To what extent have integration and facilitation policies developed inside refugee camps and informal settlements in Lebanon and Turkey during the Syrian refugee crisis?” First, the research question will be answered by summarizing what facilitation and integration development policies both the Lebanese and Turkish governments have done during the Syrian refugee crisis inside refugee camps and informal settlements. These are based on housing, education, employment, and health that were drawn from Ager and Strang (2008) conceptual framework for refugee integration and facilitation policies required to constitute successful integration and facilitation between refugees and host communities (Figure 4.0). Second, working with Ager and Strang’s integration framework I will investigate how successful these governments have been with their facilitation and integration development policies according to the integration framework. Third, some of the pitfalls and limitations of the study will be discussed, including the strengths and shortcomings. Finally, further avenues for future research and critical reflection on the topic of integration and facilitation of the Syrian refugees will be discussed.

Housing

Both the Lebanese and Turkish governments have instituted integration and facilitation development policies inside refugee camps and informal settlements during the Syrian refugee crisis. This paper explained how during the refugee crisis, the Lebanese government used money given to them from international governments and donors towards new development policies that included giving refugees monthly cash assistance that could be used towards purchasing food, paying rent, and servicing any other outstanding debts. Also, these integration development polices focused on improving the physical conditions of the shelters the refugees were living in like fixing the roofs, weatherproofing, doors and better sealing the windows to help in the winter months.

The Lebanese government has developed new integration and facilitation policies to help integrate these refugees in the informal settlements by improving the physical conditions of the shelters. However, these development policies have still not addressed the fact that people are living in overcrowded shelters with a lack of water and other vital facilities in these tents and buildings. According to Ager and Strang’s integration framework, in order for refugees to feel integrated housing conditions, overcrowding and facilities need to be addressed in order for refugees to feel comfortable and fully and successfully integrated.

Unlike in Lebanon where there are no official refugee camps and problems with facilities and the conditions in the camps. In Turkey, the refugee camps are considered some of the best in the world with state-of-the-art facilities and it shows that the Turkish government has been more successful in their facilitation and integration development policies in dealing with this

50 refugee crisis. The general conditions of housing in Turkey has allowed for the Syrian refugees to feel more comfortable in their new surroundings and allow for easier integration into Turkish society. As mentioned previously, Ager and Strang integration framework has supported that the physical and emotional wellbeing are critically important for refugees to feel at home and integrated into their new environment. The Turkish government’s development policies in terms of housing are helping towards the integration of the Syrian refugees in the country.

Education

During this Syrian refugee crisis, the Lebanese government has taken significant strides to try and integrate and educate the Syrian refugee children with new development policies during the refugee crisis. Some of these integration development policies instituted by the Lebanese Ministry of Education was to waive school and book fees, and trying to open more schools to help with the space constraints most refugee children were experiencing. Despite the Lebanese government taking significant strides in attempting to integrate and educate the Syrian refugee children, one of the key challenges that remains is classes being taught in French and English, where the majority of these children only speak Arabic, which results in many children dropping out or not attending school (Government of Lebanon, 2017). In Ager and Stang’s integration framework, education and vocational training provides the skills needed to enable refugees to be constructive and active members of society and the Lebanese government will need to implement new policy frameworks in order to properly address this issue before refugees are fully integrated into Lebanese society.

In Turkey, the Turkish government has developed integration policies where the Syrian refugees have the right to free education at primary and secondary levels through the Ministry of National Education (MoNE). Turkish facilitation and integration development policy makers have realized that educating these refugee children is required, so it prevents a ‘lost generation’ from being disillusioned and not educated in the country. The Turkish Ministry of Education has also instituted development policies by opening Temporary Education Centres (TECs), putting Syrian children in Turkish classes and hiring volunteer Syrian teachers to help elevate this problem. The intension of these integration policies is to help integrate the children by building more bonds with the local community and becoming constructive members of society today, and for the future. As mentioned previously, in Ager and Stang’s conceptual framework, education and vocational training provides the skills needed to enable refugees to be constructive members of society and to fully integrate into their new host country, so having the classes taught in Arabic helps, but for these children to be integrated vocational training and learning Turkish will be needed. We see that in both Lebanon and Turkey have the same problem with language and vocational training.

Employment

Since the start of the Syrian refugee crisis, employment in Lebanon has been restricted for refugees. As such, this lack of opportunity has made it difficult for them to integrate in the country. Since 2015, the Lebanese government has set out new development policy residency

51 rules, making it tougher to work in the country. This policy approach has resulted in pushing refugees towards accepting even more exploitive labour, such as prostitution and child labour which are increasing and becoming a new problem for the government to deal with in the country (Fiedler, 2017; Shen, 2017).

In Ager and Strang’s integration framework, employment is arguably one of the most important indicators needed for fully integrating Syrian refugees into host communities. With the current development policies instituted by the Lebanese government, opportunities for local integration remain restricted and the government has not done enough according to Ager and Strang’s framework to integrate these refugees in the country. The government is increasingly forced to look at how to fully integrate the Syrians into their countries workforce. Lack of meaningful economic participation could result in further exploitation of the refugees and a longer process of integration in the country.

Unlike in Lebanon, the Turkish government has tried to develop some steps to integrate the Syrian refugees into the local work force. In 2016, the Turkish government introduced new development policies and important regulations for Syrian refugees to receive work permits so they can work legally in the country. However, as indicated earlier, these new development policies have been slow to be implemented and millions of Syrians are still waiting for work permits, so they can work in the country without worrying about being exploited and with the hope of becoming fully integrated into Turkish society. Ager and Strang have pointed out in the integration framework that promoting economic independence and facilitating employment opportunities are crucial for the long-term and successful social integration of the refugee and if you work legally then you are integrated in the local host community (Ager & Strang, 2008).

Health

In this section, I will summarize what integration and facilitation developments policies have been instituted in terms of healthcare by the Lebanese and Turkish governments during the Syrian refugee crisis. In Lebanon, the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) has instituted new development policies that has put money towards healthcare centres and hospitals, which this has led to 151 additional staff and 26 government hospitals given medical equipment and supplies to help provide healthcare to Syrian refugees (Inter-Agency Coordination, 2016).

The MoPH Response Strategy (HRS) has developed a strategy for full integration of the existing national health care system services within the refugee community by 2020 (Relief Web, 2017). These new strategy objectives are meant to increase access to healthcare services by reaching displaced refugees and prioritizing the most vulnerable, while strengthening the health care system to help with the demand and the pressure put on it (Relief Web, 2017). Currently, the Lebanese health system is overstretched and has not provided all the services needed to the refugee community. Language barriers and costs are also still factors. New policies and strategies that are set out by MoPH are needed in order for refugees to receive the health care they need will allow for full integration into Lebanese society. Ager and Strang have pointed out that health is one of the core factors when it comes

52 to fully integrating refugees into host communities, so dealing with the costs, language barrier and providing health care are challenges the Lebanese government still needs to deal with according to Ager and Strang’s framework.

In Turkey, the Turkish government has developed several facilitation and integration policies in the refugee camps during the Syrian refugee crisis in terms of healthcare. The majority of the 3 million Syrian refugees in Turkey have a Temporary Protection Card (TPID), which gives Syrian refugees free health coverage and access to hospitals and medical treatment (Al- Omar, 2017). Other integration development policies instituted by the Turkish government have been training Syrian doctors, nurses, and interpreters, which has allowed for faster integration of Syrian refugees in the country by making them feel more comfortable and able to integrate easier into their new host country.

According to Ager and Strang’s conceptual framework, health is one of the core factors of refugee integration, as health is considered important for active engagement with key government state services (Ager & Strang, 2008:172). Ager and Strang have indicated that language barriers and the lack of information and communication are one of the biggest obstacles for refugees when trying to explain what is wrong and get the proper information needed from health professionals in the host community, leading to some refugees refusing to go to the doctor or leading to inappropriate use of services (Ager & Strang, 2008). We see that the Turkish government has done a better job in addressing these issues with their integration development policies during the Syrian refugee crisis.

Limitations and Future Research

In conclusion, this work has offered a contribution to what extent facilitation or integration policies have developed inside refugee camps and informal settlements in Lebanon and Turkey during the Syrian refugee crisis. For this paper, Ager and Strang’s (2008) conceptual framework for refugee integration was used. This framework lists indicators that are required to constitute successful integration and facilitation between refugees and host communities (Figure 4.0). Ager and Strang have indicated that the markers and means and the four sub topics: employment, housing, education and healthcare are required and must be met for successful integration of refugees.

Although looking for indicators of integration may sound simple, getting up-to-date and reliable data to answer this research question proved to be challenging, partly due to the lack of relevant and accurate real data coming out of refugee camps with constantly developing integration policies from the governments in these countries (Council of Europe, 1995). There are a number of pitfalls that can be expected to interfere with receiving the correct and most reliable and current information. One of the barriers and pitfalls for this work is the lack of primary data collection and independent research of data found from first-hand witnessing in refugee camps and informal settlements in both countries. The majority of this research relied on policy reports, documents and data from governments, other academics who conducted their own research in refugee camps and informal settlements and international organizations that included Amnesty International Mercy Corps, Inter-Agency Coordination

53 and UNHCR’s website that had several up-to-date documents, reports and policy papers on integration development policies in the refugee camps and informal settlements. Although this was a strength in having access to this information, this was also one of the pitfalls because I was not conducting my own research in the refugee camps and informal settlements. Due to this pitfall, some of the information I obtained for this paper may include personal or politically biased analysis reports, as some of these governments may only want to release the documents they want the public to see in regards to new governmental integration policies in these countries. Furthermore, the reliability or bias of the interviewer or interviewee during data gathering and how accurate are the interpretations of the findings to answering the research question. Does the interviewer have their own agenda in asking certain questions? Does the interviewer work for the government or an independent organization? Are they asking a wide variety of people with different backgrounds in the refugee camps and informal settlements or only those who are receiving the most aid or help? Conducting primary research to respond to this specific research question rather than relying on other independent sources to answer my research question could have mitigated the pitfalls and limitations of this study. However, primary data collection and analysis was not possible within the timeframe and resources supporting this study, so I relied on the above sources to obtain my data.

Finally, one other pitfall when using Ager and Strang’s integration framework is that their primary fieldwork and findings was for refugees in the UK and refugees in other Western countries. This framework was used on a variety of refugees from a number of backgrounds and in this paper I used it only for Syrian refugees in refugee camps and informal settlements in both Lebanon and Turkey. Both of these have never been used to test this integration framework previously, so further research would be needed by other academics on other nationalities in other refugee camps and informal settlements to see if this integration framework can be used outside of Western countries when explaining refugee integration in host countries. I would suggest for future research that academics conduct primary research and go to the refugee camps and informal settlements themselves to interview the refugees. Also, by conducting this research on several nationalities and not just Syrian refugees in refugee camps and informal settlements you can see if this framework works on all nationalities and does not matter on the setting and if you are in a Western country or a refugee camp when it comes to these indicators for successful integration. What we do know is that the topic and concept of integration of refugees will remain controversial and a debated topic, so further research is needed in order for us to see what integration development policies should be instituted to effectively deal with the integration of refugees.

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