The West New Guinea Debacle: Dutch Decolonisation and Indonesia, 1945-1962 To my daughter Stephanie Stewart and her husband Anthony in appreciation of your caring support of Christine and Daniel. Cover photo: Sukarno, holding a hoe (pacol), poses as the ‘first farmer’ of the nation. Photo courtesy of Greg Poulgrain. The West New Guinea Debacle: Dutch Decolonisation and Indonesia, 1945-1962 C.L.M. Penders Crawford House Publishing ADELAIDE A CHP Production Produced and published in Australia by Crawford House Publishing Pty Ltd P.O. Box 181 Hindmarsh SA 5007 Tel: +61 8 8340 1411 Fax: +61 8 8340 1811 Email: [email protected] Web: http://www. chp.com.au Published in North America by University of Hawai’i Press 2840 Kolowalu Street Honolulu, Hawai’i 96822 Published in Europe by KITLV Press Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde (Royal Institute of Linguistics and Anthropology) P.O. Box 9515, 2300 RA Leiden, The Netherlands © 2002 C.L.M. Penders National Library of Australia Cataloguing-in-Publication entry Penders, C.L.M. (Christiaan Lambert Maria), 1928–. The West New Guinea Debacle: Dutch decolonisation and Indonesia, 1945-1962. Bibliography. Includes index. ISBN 1 86333 205 7. 995.1035 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publishers. Printed in India by Thomson Press 00 01 02 03 04 5 4 3 2 1 CONTENTS Acknowledgements viii Map x I Prologue The basis of Dutch colonial power 1 Dutch policy of non-alignment 4 Dutch-Indies defence policy 5 In the grip of Japan 13 The Indonesian revolution 24 The Round Table Conference 39 II The West New Guinea Question – Genesis West New Guinea as a new Eurasian fatherland 55 The future political status of West New Guinea in the balance: 1945-1949 61 The West New Guinea question deferred during the Round Table negotiations 83 The van Eechoud factor 87 Papuan anti-foreign and nationalist trends 104 The Mimika region 106 The Muju region 110 The Koreri movement 115 The Simson movement 131 Anti-Dutch colonial movements 134 The Raja Hamadi movement 138 Pro-Indonesian agitation 140 Papuan nationalism 146 Modern education 148 The West New Guinea Debacle Papuan reaction 154 Australian involvement 160 III Decolonisation and Nationalisation, 1950-1958 Indonesian Reactions 178 The armed forces and politics 182 The Westerling affair 185 The demise of federalism 191 The Macassar revolt 194 The Republic of the South Moluccas 196 The security question 200 Social revolution 205 Squatting 207 Darul Islam 210 Pillage of cargoes in ports 213 Demands for nationalisation 215 The Dutch government freezes discussions on West New Guinea 216 The Dutch military mission 219 The rule of Indonesian ‘law’ 226 Moves toward nationalisation 236 Indonesian government measures to reduce Dutch economic prominence 239 The abrogation of the Round Table Agreement 244 Moves of the Burhanuddin Harahap government 251 The final curtain: 1956-1958 259 Dutch profit and loss account – 1950-1958 265 IV West New Guinea – An International Dispute The Netherlands and West New Guinea 279 Failure of Dutch-Indonesian negotiations on West New Guinea 283 Indonesia and West New Guinea 286 Growing criticism in The Netherlands about official West New Guinea policy 288 The USA and West New Guinea 290 Washington and Sukarno 293 vi USA support for anti-Jakarta rebellions in Sumatra and Sulawesi 295 Dutch demands for American military support in West New Guinea 296 Australia between Scylla and Charybdis 301 The policies of R.G. Casey 311 The position of the Australian defence establishment 319 Australia in retreat 325 The demise – 1960-1962 329 The Kennedy intervention 332 Luns fights on 335 The Brazzaville proposal 339 The Netherlands abandoned 340 The Vlakke Hoek incident 344 Unofficial Dutch-Indonesian contacts 347 The involvement of Robert Kennedy 351 The Bunker Plan 357 Luns’s last stand 363 On the brink of war 368 V The Papuans Betrayed Papua under traditional colonial rule 384 Social and economic development 391 Papuan nationalist reaction 400 The Democratische Volkspartij 408 Partai Nasional 415 Other political organisations 421 The Papuan rights for independence nullified 428 VI Epilogue 435 Glossary 443 Abbreviations 449 Bibliography 454 Index 467 vii The West New Guinea Debacle ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS his book is largely based on data drawn from the Nether- T lands Archives (Rijksarchief), the archives of the Department of Foreign Affairs (Buitenlandse Zaken), and the National Ar- chives in Canberra. I should like to thank all personnel involved, although I am particularly grateful for the help extended by Mr Van Velsen, Dr Van Zeeland and the library staff of Buitenlandse Zaken. In the National Archives I am especially indebted to John Pepper. In addition, a large number of other people volunteered in- formation and encouragement. Among these are the hundreds of Indonesians interviewed over the years, the vast number of whom want to remain nameless out of fear of possible political repercussions. I want here to show my appreciation for your great hospitality, your friendship and the valuable contribution made to this book. Special thanks are also due to Professor P. Drooglever, Pro- fessor A. Reid, Professor M.R. Fernando, Dr P. van der Eng and Dr R. Stevens for their support; to Gordon Kidd of the Queens- land University history department, an ex-colleague and friend; and to my wife Theresia and my daughter Stephanie Stewart, for their heroic efforts in changing a chaotic manuscript into a more readable story. Finally, I am greatly beholden to Mrs A. Steenbergen-Kijlstra for her valuable help and logistic support during my sojourns in the Netherlands, and to Phillip Kirk who was so often called upon to rescue me when stuck in a computer morass. viii ix Prologue I PROLOGUE his study is concerned with the final and traumatic years T of the Dutch colonial presence in Indonesia. After the official transfer of sovereignty by the Netherlands to the federal states of Indonesia in December 1949, Dutch policies and ac- tions were still able to exert a significant impact on its former colony both politically and economically. The modern economic sector in Indonesia in particular remained Dutch dominated. The Indonesian nationalist dream of establishing a free nation from Sabang to Merauke also had not yet been fully achieved owing to the Dutch refusal to hand over West New Guinea. The story focuses on the Dutch decolonisation process from 1950 onwards, including the West New Guinea debacle. The Indonesian Revolution period of 1945 to 1949 is treated only summarily, concentrating chiefly on Dutch policies and perspec- tives, which so far have been scantily treated in the existing Eng- lish language literature on the subject. The history, however, of the genesis of the West New Guinea question, beginning in the 1920s, is looked at in more detail. Secondly, an attempt is made to describe and analyse the emergence of a Papuan national con- sciousness and the fight for Papuan freedom. In this context also the policies of the United States and Australia are examined. The basis of Dutch colonial power Dutch power in the Indonesian archipelago dated backed to the arrival of the Dutch East India Company (VOC), at the begin- 1 The West New Guinea Debacle ning of the 17th century. Superior Dutch naval power, and com- mercial wealth in Europe, was also quickly felt by other Euro- pean contenders in Asia. In the Indonesian area the existing Portuguese prominence was annihilated and other competitors, namely the Spanish, British, and the Danes, were pushed out by force of arms. But also in other parts of Asia, the Dutch, as worthy disciples of Calvin, manifested an inordinate zeal in their quest to add to the glory of God and their own pockets, taking control of the Cape of Good Hope and Ceylon, and establishing fortified trading posts in Japan, China, Formosa, Thailand, In- dia and the Persian Gulf. In the East Indies the company’s fortified headquarters were located at Jacatra at the mouth of the Ciliwung River in west Java. Renamed Batavia it grew into a large trade emporium and government administrative centre. The other centre of the VOC power was in the Moluccas – the Spice Islands – in eastern Indo- nesia. It was their precious spices like nutmeg and cloves that had been the main attraction luring the Dutch to the Indies in the first place. Essentially a trading body, the company showed little inclination to establish itself as a land-based power and its servants were instructed to avoid, as much as possible, involve- ment in indigenous affairs. The maximising of profits was the motto. Unlike the Portuguese, who were fired with a burning zeal for saving souls and waging a holy war against Islam, as well as amassing filthy lucre, the company forbade its religious minis- ters to proselytise in Muslim areas out of fear of causing politi- cal repercussions, which in turn were bound to lower profitabil- ity. In the rest of the archipelago the company tried to enforce a monopoly by tapping the trade from the interior at the mouth of major rivers. Local princes were cajoled into signing contracts, granting the Dutch overlordship, sole trading rights, regular delivery of produce like timber, rice or forest produce at fixed prices. The company’s power normally extended no further than the reach of the guns of their fortified trading posts and the lo- cal rulers were left to their own devices in internal matters. 2 Prologue Continued political unrest in Java adversely affected profits, causing the company to meddle ever deeper into Javanese affairs and eventually to become a territorial power itself.