The Cold War and the Spanish Concordat of 1953

Home , Concordat of 1953, Federico Tedeschini, Integrism (Spain), Pact of Madrid, Pope Pius XI and Spain, Supreme Order of Christ

Zachary Charles Wareham

Bachelor of Arts (Honours), St. Stephen's University, 2003

A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

Master of Arts

in the Graduate Academic Unit of History

Supervisor: Peter C. Kent, Ph.D. History

Examining Board: Steve Turner, Ph.D. History, Chair Sean Kennedy, Ph.D. History Nancy Nason-Clark, Ph.D. Sociology

This thesis is accepted by the Dean of Graduate Studies

The University of New Brunswick

September 2007

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I+I Canada Dedication

To the memory of my friend Nathan James Alberts (1981-2007)

ii Abstract The Spanish Concordat of 1953 strengthened the power of the established church, reasserted an anti-modern theology, brought prestige to Spain, showered Franco with

ecclesiastical privileges, and marked the end of hopes that Pius XII might support the

anti-Franco resistance. The most important element for Franco was maintaining his key role in the appointment of bishops, the reaffirmation of a 1941 concession.

Although the 1953 Concordat was primarily a domestic agreement, it was also

internationally significant. Franco's Spain was isolated as a fascist state by the great powers after the Second World War. Pius XII was reluctant to pursue a concordat under these circumstances, for fear of impeding a peaceful transition to monarchy. Nonetheless,

Franco redoubled his efforts to win the support of the Holy See and the Catholic world.

Despite attempts, Spain was excluded from the UN, the Marshall Plan and NATO.

Although restrictions on the freedoms of Protestants in Spain were denounced by

President Truman and a cause of Spain's continued isolation, the outbreak of the Korean

War in 1950 led the United States to support Spain at the UN, send an ambassador to

Madrid and begin bi-lateral discussions for a military and economic agreement. In line with internal developments in the Curia, the Holy See sought from 1952 onward to

improve Spain's international standing and reduce Spain's religious critics by silencing the church's campaign against Protestantism. With renewed opportunities, Pius XII

strengthened the church vis-a-vis the Falange. In return for what was intended as a precedent-setting concordat, Pius XII embraced Franco as a noble Christian leader. Then, one month after the Concordat, the United States and Spain concluded the Pact of Madrid

and accepted Franco as an ally in the Cold War. The two agreements marked the end of

Spain's postwar isolation and ensured the survival of Franco's dictatorship.

iii Acknowledgements

I have received tremendous support, encouragement and help throughout the process of writing this thesis, of which I am honoured to acknowledge here. The faculty and staff in the history department, my peers and many other friends have helped me in ways they may never know. I regard them all in high esteem and wish to extend my sincerest gratitude. Thank you all.

First and foremost, I am privileged to acknowledge the person that made this all possible, my thesis supervisor, Dr. Peter C. Kent. It was at his suggestion that I chose this thesis topic and from his collection of primary documents that I was able to undertake it. I thank him for this, as well as for translation help, unwavering support, insightful revisions and kind generosity. I also want to acknowledge his wife, Wendy

Kent, who I thank you for her hospitality and encouragement throughout my time at the

University of New Brunswick.

A number of specific professors and friends I wish to mention by name. Sister

Therese assisted me with translations of French documents and was eager to have discussions and debates about Pope Pius XII and Spanish Catholicism, all of which I valued very much. As my neighbour of eight months while living in Harvey Station, Dr.

Robert Larmer was a source of encouragement and was always prepared to listen and ask questions pertaining to my thesis. I thank the retired Rev. Dr. Charlie Preston for his interest and enthusiasm in my thesis. I thank Dr. Gregg Finley, who was always happy to provide a helping hand. Indeed, my interests in the history of Spanish Catholicism derived from the undergraduate coursework and travel-study that I did under his supervision. I also wish to acknowledge and thank him and Dr. Cheryl Fury for

encouraging me to pursue my education at the University of New Brunswick.

I also acknowledge and thank my professors of the graduate seminars that helped

prepare me along this path. I very much enjoyed and benefited from the course-work in

U.S. Foreign Relations, Post-1945 European History and the Philosophy of History. I also

want to acknowledge my thesis committee for their efforts in the midst of busy schedules

in hurrying my defense date along, Dr. Sean Kennedy, Dr. Steve Turner and Dr. Nancy

Nason-Clark.

My parents Steve and Holly have provided me with the opportunity to pursue my

education in New Brunswick. I thank them along with my sisters, Shannon, Jenessa and

Allie, for their optimism, encouragement and generosity.

I also want to thank my friends and former roommates that have provided me with

outlets to discuss my research and vent both frustration and enthusiasm. Foremost of

these, I acknowledge Nathan James Alberts, to whom the memory of this thesis is dedicated. Not only did he happily listen to anecdotes, dreams and stories about

concordats, popes, kings, queens, Franco and various Spanish churchmen, but he also provided valuable insights, research leads, translation help, encouragement and enthusiasm for my topic.

v Table of Contents

Dedication ii

Abstract iii

Acknowledgement iv

Table of Contents vi

Chapter I: Historiography 1

Chapter II: The historical background of the 12 relationship between church and state in Spain

Chapter III: From ostracism to Cold War ally: 44 preconditions for a new concordat

Chapter IV: Internal factors leading to the 68 Concordat of 1953

Chapter V: The United States, Spain and the 90 Roman Catholic Church

Chapter VI: The Cold War and the 111 Spanish Concordat of 1953

Bibliography 134

Curriculum Vitae

vi CHAPTER I: Historiography

The Spanish Concordat of 1953 was an important element in the rehabilitation of

Franco's Spain after its isolation following the Second World War. Concluded on 27

August, 1953, it had been an objective of Franco for well over a decade. A month after the Concordat was concluded the United States embraced Spain as an ally in the Cold

War, and signed a series of executive agreements, known as the Pact of Madrid, that sent

economic and military aid to Spain in exchange for the United States' construction and use of air and naval bases on Spanish territory. The two agreements have been linked by historians, but had little in common, and no study has undertaken an attempt to evaluate the coincidence. Had Pius XII not been reluctant to endorse Franco's Spain with his blessing in the Concordat, perhaps the American reevaluation of its Spanish policy may have occurred earlier. It was President Truman's resistance that stalled exchanging ambassadors and kept the Pact of Madrid from being concluded during his administration. This was due largely to his aversion to the suppression of Protestant rights in Spain. The Concordat was hailed at the time as evidence that the Vatican did not support the intransigent anti-Protestant campaigns of Cardinal Segura and helped rehabilitate Spain's image. Pius XII worked cautiously in Spain to get the best terms for the Church. Rather

than push for Franco's quick rehabilitation, Pius XII sought to wait for it, and in the

meantime get what he wanted in the first concordat of the Cold War. Following the

International Eucharistic Congress in Barcelona in June of 1952, the Holy See was

prepared to conclude a concordat. It waited, however, until after a controversial education

law was passed in March 1953. A number of the articles in the Concordat had their origin

in the distant past. That the Holy See revived anachronistic traditions for Franco's Spain

was testament to the appreciation it had of the Spanish Church. Perhaps nowhere else was

the Church more triumphant, militant and conservative. The Church in Spain secured its

power through the Concordat at levels unmatched since King Ferdinand VII (1814-1833).

This study of the origins of the Spanish Concordat, although informed by French,

British, American and Italian diplomatic archives, also draws from a wealth of secondary literature on Spanish Catholicism, the Franco regime, Pope Pius XII and the Truman and

Eisenhower administrations. Although there is a vast body of work that speaks briefly of the 1953 Concordat, to date there has been no study that specifically treats it. The 1999 compilation, Controversial Concordats: The Vatican's Relations with Napoleon,

Mussolini and Hitler, provides a wonderful introduction to the topic of concordats. The

"Introduction" by John K. Zeender mentions in passing that after the death of Pius XII the

Spanish Concordat became a source of controversy, just like the agreements with Hitler and Mussolini.1 Of the three concordats concluded under Pius XII with Portugal in 1940,

Spain in 1953 and the Dominican Republic in 1954, the Spanish Concordat remains the

' John K Zeender, "Introduction," Frank J. Coppa, Ed., Controversial Concordats: The Vatican's Relations with Napoleon, Mussolini, and Hitler (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1999), 1-33,31. 2 most controversial. Although a multi-faceted study of the origins of each, complete with comparisons and contrasts, would be a welcome contribution to the historiography, the present thesis will concern itself only with Spain. 1953 was an important year in the history of the papacy's concordats. It was the year that Pius XII chose to "renovate the tradition."2

To date, general studies of Spanish Catholicism have provided the best coverage of the origins and effects of the Concordat. The most useful general study remains

Stanley Payne's Spanish Catholicism: An Historical Overview, published in 1984.3 It is helpful in that it provides the origins of the traditions that were regulated in 1953.

Unsurpassed in either English or Spanish is William Callahan's two volume study,

Church, Politics and Society in Spain, 1750-1874 and The Catholic Church in Spain,

1875-1998.4 These monographs provide the necessary background to demonstrate how the ancien regime Church was destroyed then refashioned in the modern era. Chapter XV of the second volume, "The Church and Franco's 'New Spain,' 1940-1953," deals with negotiations for the concordat and argues that National Catholicism was not so much an ideology as it was a veneer, and that the Concordat itself "applied a final coat of veneer...

. but failed to strengthen it from within."5 It provides little explanation of the Concordat itself, and does not demonstrate its wider significance to the Vatican or the Pact of

Madrid. In his numerous footnotes, Callahan cites a chapter of Javier Tusell's Franco y

2 Brouillet (Holy See) to Bidault, 28 August, 1953, Q d'O, z Europe 1949-55/Espagne 37, PP 43-49. 3 Stanley Payne, Spanish Catholicism: An Historical Overview (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1984). 4 William Callahan, Church, Politics and Society in Spain, 1750-1874 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1984); Callahan, The Catholic Church in Spain, 1875-1998 (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2000). 5Callahan, The Catholic Church in Spain, 1875-1998,411. 3 los catolicos as the unsurpassed study of the negotiations.6 Tusell provides the details of

the negotiations and contents of the Concordat, but he does not tie them into their larger

Cold War significance, nor does he narrate the origins of the traditions regulated. It is

certainly not a comprehensive study of a Spanish Concordat like Brigitte Journeau's 2002

Eglise et etat en Espagne au XlXsiecle: Les enjeux du concordat de 1851, which ties the

n 1851 Concordat to the international considerations following the 1848 revolutions. To

date, no counterpart study that demonstrates the international and domestic

considerations of the 1953 Concordat exists. What has emerged about the 1953

Concordat is a recent study by Pablo Martin de Santa Olalla Saludes about negotiations

for its revisions in the 1970s, La iglesia que se enfrento a Franco: Pablo VI, la

Conferencia Episcopaly el Concordato de 1953?

Another pertinent monograph was published in 1987 by Frances Lannon,

Privilege, Persecution, and Prophecy: The Catholic Church in Spain, 1875-1975. This account of the Spanish Church assesses its impact on society, politics, and culture from the restoration of the Bourbon Monarchy under Alfonso XIII (1875) to the monarchy's restoration one hundred years later under King Juan Carlos. Lannon argues that the

Church and its values were synonymous with ultra-conservative; periods of privilege coincided with conservative regimes; persecution coincided with the Second Republic

6 Javier Tusell, Franco y los Catolicos: la politico interior Espanola entre 1945 y 1957 (Madrid: Alianza, 1984). 7 Refer to Callahan, "Book Review," Eglise et etat en Espagne au XlXsiecle: Les enjeux du concordat de 1851, by Brigitte Journeau, American Historical Review, 108.3 (June 2003), 919-920; Ucelay-Da Cal, Enric. "Book Review." Eglise et etat en Espagne au XlXsiecle: Les enjeux du concordat de 1851, by Brigitte Journeau. Mediterranean Historical Review. 20.1 (June 2005), 127-133. 8 Pablo Martin de Santa Olalla Saludes, La iglesia que se enfrento a Franco: Pablo VI, la Conferencia Episcopaly el Concordato de 1953 (Madrid: Dilex, 2005). 'Frances Lannon, Privilege, Persecution and Prophesy: The Catholic Church in Spain, 1875-1975. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987).

4 (1931 -36) and Civil War (1936-39), and a period of prophecy followed the Second

Vatican Council (1962-1965), during which the Church called for democratization.

Lannon contends that the changes that occurred in theology due to the Council,

undermined the Church's relations with the state and upper echelons of society, thus

causing crisis of legitimacy for the Franco regime. The Church fared well during the transition to democracy because it had prophesied this change. The Concordat of 1953 receives little attention.

A number of articles and books have been written on the Church's role during the

Spanish Civil War. These include Peter C. Kent's "The Vatican and the Spanish Civil

War" (1986), Jose M Sanchez's The Spanish Civil War as a Religious Tragedy (1987), and more recently Mary Vincent's "'The keys of the kingdom': religious violence in the

Spanish Civil War, July-August, 1936."10 Studies concentrating on the Church in the period of early Francoism are less prominent. The first volume in a projected study of civil-ecclesiastical relations under Franco was published in 1999, Gonzalo Redondo's

Politica, cultura y sociedad en la Espana de Franco, 1939-1975, Tomo I: La configuracion del Estado espanol, nacionaly catolico (1939-1947). Redondo has received harsh criticism for appearing too pro-Franco.11 Nonetheless, his projected second volume will help fill the void in the historiography of the 1953 Concordat.

l0Peter C. Kent,"The Vatican and the Spanish Civil War.," European History Quarterly, 16 (1986) PP. 441- 64; Jose M. Sanchez, The Spanish Civil War as a Religious Tragedy (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987.) Mary Vincent, '"The keys of the kingdom': religious violence in the Spanish Civil War, July-August, 1936," The Splintering of Spain: Cultural History and the Spanish Civil War, 1936- 1939, Chris Ealham and Michael Richards, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 68-92. 11 Aurora G. Morcillo, Book Review of Politica, cultura y sociedad en la Espana de Franco, 1939-1975, Tomo I: La configuracion del Estado espanol, nacional y catolico (1939-1947) The Journal of Modern Histoiy 74.2 (2002), 433-435. 5 The historiography of Franco's Spain is extensive. 12 Much debate has been generated over whether Franco's dictatorship was fascist or authoritarian.13 Some later studies have tended to downplay these characterizations to stress Franco's personal role in sustaining his dictatorship through balancing the interest groups and elites.14 Such books as Stanley Payne's The Franco Regime, 1936-1939, Paul Preston's Franco: A Biography, and Juan Pablo Fusi Aizpurua, Franco: A Biography are the standard accounts.15 This thesis ties into and draws from these books' sections on ostracism and realignment. These studies steer away from older interpretations that accredited little to Franco in overcoming the period of ostracism.16 Each addresses the Concordat and the Pact of

Madrid as important aspects of Franco's rehabilitation.

Payne suggests that Franco stalled negotiations for the Pact while trying first to conclude the Concordat.17 Unfortunately he provides no evidence for his assertion.

Furthermore, he identified the Concordat as little more than a ratification of an "existing status quo."18 Juan Pablo Fusi credits more to the Concordat. On the one hand he portrays

Franco as a politically astute, patient and realistic diplomat. On the other hand, Franco appears to be a delusional maniac obsessed with Freemasonry and Communism. These

12 See Miguel A. Cabrera's Review Article, "Developments in Contemporary Spanish Historiography: From Social History to the New Cultural History," Journal of Modern History 77 (Dec. 2005), 988-1023. Translated by Edwin Tudsbery. 13 Ismael Saz Campos, "Fascism, fascistization and developmentalism in Franco's dictatorship," Social History 29.3 (August 2004), 342-357. 14 Antonio Cazorla. "Early Francoism, 1939-1957." In Alvares Junco, Jose and Adrian Shubert. Spanish History since 1808. London: Arnold, 2000, 259-276. 15 Stanley G. Payne, The Franco Regime, 1936-1975 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987); Paul Preston, Franco: A Biography (London: Harper Collins, 1993); Juan Pablo Fusi Aizpurua, Franco: A Biography, Translated by Felip Fernandez-Armesto, Preface by Sir Raymond Carr (New York: Harper & Row, 1987). 16 See for instance Alan Lloyd, "The Caudillo Knows How to Wait." Franco (London: Longman, 1970 [1969]), 202-215. 17 Payne, The Franco Regime, 418. 18 Payne, The Franco Regime, 420. 6 two images are reconciled well in Fusi's narrative. The two 1953 agreements represent a

manifestation of Franco's complex character. The relationship with America was an

archetypal example of realist politics in the early Cold War. It was for the benefit of both

parties, but lacked any sort of moral recognition of Francoism. The relationship with the

Vatican was the opposite. National Catholicism was the guardian of Franco's Spain, to

save it from the evil dangers of freemasons, communists and Americans. The Concordat

was an attempt at a restoration. It aimed to restore a political-theological system which

predated the 1851 Concordat. It looked to restore the Spanish golden age of the sixteenth

century. In this sense, it marked Franco's delusional agenda. However, the two pillars

worked side by side to give Franco the moral and temporal support necessary for his

government's success. However, in regard to details, Fusi provides little on the

Concordat itself.

Paul Preston notes how international ostracism boosted Franco's ego and never

seriously threatened his dictatorship. Ostracism was identified as the latest example of a long history of European resentment towards Spain. Overcoming ostracism, Franco felt, demonstrated the strength of the Spanish character and leadership. Franco waited patiently, unwilling to seriously liberalize or step down, and launched his own ideological war against Communism and Freemasonry. Preston demonstrates Franco's ability to manipulate Cold War fears and capitalize upon American domestic paranoia and international pragmatism. After the outbreak of the Korean War, Franco was able to carry out his plan to incorporate conservative Catholicism in support of his rule as the only moral and stable "Sentinel of the West." Preston notes that the Concordat was of less

7 significance than the Spanish press stressed and that Franco was far more concerned on

finishing negotiations with the United States.19

There was a lot of resistance amongst nationalists, Catholics, Falangists and

monarchists to the future agreement with the United States. They feared the loss of

sovereignty and were concerned that the Pact undermined Spain's neutrality and might

entangle it in a potential war with the Soviet Union. Furthermore, they feared the influx

of American Protestants and the cultural effects that a Spanish-American alignment

might have. There would have been plenty of reasons for Franco to first seek the

Concordat, as Payne suggested. However, there seems to be little evidence to support

this.

Monographs and essays on Spain's international relations have increased over the past decade.20 The ones dealing with Franco's Cold War rehabilitation have been particularly interesting. Some stress the role Britain played in the United States' Spanish policy up to 1950.21 Others examine the role Franco played in Washington through the

Spanish lobby.22 Still others look to the role played by France in Spain's ostracism and rehabilitation.23 What is conspicuously absent from these is a study of the role played by the Vatican. Britain and France certainly influenced Washington's decisions about

Madrid, but did the Holy See? One essay by Boris Liedtke, "Spain and the United States,

1945-1975," makes a bold claim, stating the Pact of Madrid "could be seen as the first in

19 Preston, Franco, 621-622. 20 For a great collection of essays see, Balfour, Sebastian and Paul Preston, Spain and the Great Powers in the Twentieth Century (New York: Routledge, 1999). 21 David J. Dunthorn, Britain and the Anti-Franco Opposition, 1940-1950 (New York: Palgrave, 2000). 22 Mark S. Byrnes, '"Overruled and Worn Down': Truman Sends an Ambassador to Spain," Presidential Studies Quarterly, 29.2 (1999), 263-279. 23 David Andrew Messenger, "France, the Allies and Franco's Spain, 1943-1948" (PhD Dissertation, University of Toronto, 2000). 8 a series of Realpolitical decisions that led the United States to the brink of nuclear war in

Cuba, defeat in Vietnam and ultimately victory against the Soviet Union."24 Leidtke

asserts that this change happened under the Eisenhower administration. The Pacts were

on their way to conclusion under the Truman administration. The shift occurred as a

result of the Korean War. Truman would always remain hostile to Franco, but succumbed

to American pressures to co-opt the Iberian Peninsula into western defense.

Within the historiography of the origins of the Cold War, Pius XII is "the most

contentious religious figure."25 Surprisingly, no study of his concordat diplomacy has been undertaken. Pius XII's policy of neutrality during the Second World War has produced far more historiographical controversy than his anti-communist intransigence.

This study does not tie directly into that debate, but demonstrates how Franco's pro-Nazi dictatorship led Pius XII to avoid concluding a new Concordat in 1941. In the collection of essays, Religion and The Cold War a debate emerged over whether or not Pius XII was an architect of the Cold War, and whether his visions and policies were in accord with

President Truman's. In some areas, as in the case of the 1948 Italian elections, the

Vatican and the United States worked side by side. Frank Coppa has argued that Pius XII shared responsibility in the origins of the Cold War. Peter Kent, on the other hand, demonstrated how the hopes and aims of Pius XII were often at odds with Truman, and that the Vatican played little influence in policy-making decisions in Washington. Kent's

The Lonely Cold War of Pope Pius XII ends in the Holy Year of 1950.26 The question for

24 Liedtke, Boris N. "Spain and the United States, 1945-1975,"Spam and the Great Powers in the Twentieth Century, 229-244. 25 Diane Kirby, ed. Religion and The Cold War (New York: Palgrave Macmillian, 2003), 11. 26 Peter C. Kent, The Lonely Cold War of Pope Pius XII (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2002). 9 1953 was, to what degree did Rome and Washington work together in Franco's

rehabilitation? As will be shown, Pius XII's Concordat was no pawn of "Yankee

imperialism," as an Italian communist Senator suggested.27 The Pope's religious

considerations in Spain were sometimes in opposition to the political and military agenda

of the United States.

The Concordat was of world-wide significance in so far as it was a reassertion of

a nineteenth-century, anti-modern social and political theology of church and state. As

such, it was troublesome for American Catholics, who had increasingly in the late 1940s

and early 1950s come under attack for this retrograde ideal. From 1945 onward it seemed

that Pius XII would make overtures in regard to ecumenism, democracy and separation of

church and state. In the early 1950s the influence of Monsignor Montini and the Christian

Democrats on Pius XII's decisions lost sway to the influence of Alfredo Ottaviani and the

ultra-conservative curial group called the "Roman Party."28 Nowhere was this more

evident than in the Spanish Concordat of 1953. In regard to some of these theological

questions a number of sources have provided information: dissertations on Pius XII,

studies of the American Catholic Church, recently published documents, and a biography

of Pope Paul VI.29

27 Telegram from d'Ormesson (Holy See), 5 November, 1953, Q d'O, z Europe 1949-55/Espagne 37, pp. 98-99. 28 Andrea Riccardi, II "Partito Romano" nel secondo dopoguerra (1945-1954) (Brescia: Morcelliana, 1983). 29 Carol Vanderburg, "The Christmas Messages: the Contribution of Pius XII to the Catholic Church's Endorsement of Human Rights and Democracy" (PhD Dissertation, Duquense University, 2002); Peter Hebbelthwaite, Paul VI: The First Modern Pope (New York: Paulist Press, 1993); Gerald Fogarty, The Vatican and the American Hierarchy from 1860 to 1965 (Stuttgart: Anton, 1982); Carlo Falconi, "Pius XII: Eugenio Pacelli," Popes in the Twentieth Century: From Pius X to John XXIII, translated by Muriel Grindrod (London: Weidenfeld andNicolson, 1967), 234-301; Francis P. Kilcoyne, "American Catholics and Franco's Spain, 1935-1975: A Study of Evolving Perceptions" (PhD Dissertation, Boston College, 1996); Joseph A. Komonchak, John Courtney Murray; Samuel Cardinal Stritch; Francis J. Connell, "The 10 The historiographical gap exists on the international dimension and domestic

significance of the origins of the 1953 Concordat. This thesis will aim to fill that gap by

drawing from relevant diplomatic archives. In particular, reports drawn from the Papers

of the British Foreign Office, the Ministere des Affaires etrangeres, and Ministero degli

Affari Esteri, along with the Myron Taylor Papers and published volumes of the Foreign

Relations of the United States, will serve to inform this thesis.

Crisis in Church-State Relationships in the U.S.A." A Recently Discovered Text by John Courtney Murray," The Review of Politics, 61.4 (Autumn 1999), 675-714. 11 Chapter II: Historical background of the relationship between church and state in Spain

Juan Carlos I renounced his rights to appoint prelates to the Catholic Church upon

ascending the throne in 1975. This tradition of the Patronado Real began during the

Reconquista, evolved during the eighteenth and nineteenth century, was rejected by the

Second Republic, and reinstated, albeit in a modified form, under Francisco Franco. The

1953 Concordat confirmed these traditional privileges of the Head of State. After the

Second Vatican Council, such a system was illegitimate but Franco refused to renounce

his rights. Thus in 1975, the restored Bourbon King felt it was necessary to negotiate a

different Concordat. Although the Church in Spain today and its relations with the monarch are no longer regulated by the 1953 Concordat, some of its terms continue. King

Juan Carlos I, in the tradition of Spain's monarchs, thanks to Franco's persistence, remains the proto-Canon of the Papal Basilica Santa Maria Maggiore in Rome. There are many ways in which the 1953 Concordat remains significant. Indeed, it was a remarkable

feat. Franco succeeded in incorporating anachronistic traditions of church and state as a

fundamental aspect of his dictatorship.

Ferdinand and Isabella united the crowns of Castile and Aragon as the Kingdom of Spain in 1479, and used the Catholic Church as a unifying force in the process. The collaboration of Church and Crown put a significant stamp on Spanish history. The two earliest and most infamous examples of collaboration were the Holy Office of the Spanish Inquisition and the Patronado Real. The spirit and history of both underpinned

the articles of the Spanish Concordat of 1953.

The Spanish Inquisition suppressed heresy and was an instrumental tool of social

control. It was created in 1478 as a unique institution to deal with a specifically Iberian

form of heresy. Over the course of the fifteenth century roughly half of the approximately

200,000 Sephardic Jews in Castile had converted to Catholicism, but many did so for

political and economic benefits; these converts were known in Spain as conversos. When

contention for the Castilian throne led to war in 1474, many of the conversos and Jews

fought against Queen Isabella I (1474-1504), and suffered because of it. The young

Queen and her consort Ferdinand V felt that apostate conversos who sought to win back

converts for Judaism were a political threat, and would challenge the reestablishment of a

strong monarchy. Castile had once been known as the land of three religions, and the medieval papal inquisition had never extended its jurisdiction in its domains. Rather than

seeking its extension, Ferdinand and Isabella pressed the papacy for their own Holy

Office. The astute monarchs understood that Church reform would be an essential

component of their royal pursuits, and that Castile's corrupt Church hierarchy could not be trusted to stamp out heresy.30 The necessary papal bull was promulgated and provided that Ferdinand and Isabella would nominate and present inquisitors to the Spanish Holy

Office as well as lay claim to confiscations made by the institution.

30 For a brief description of the corruption of the clergy and reforms of Isabella, see Jean Hippolyte Mariejol, "The Clergy," The Spain of Ferdinand and Isabella, Translated and Edited by Benjamin Keen (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1961), 249-261. 31For a brief introduction to the Inquisition, see Payne, Spanish Catholicism, 32-38. On Isabella I see Peggy K. Liss, Isabel the Queen: Life and Times, Rev. Ed. Middle Ages Series (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004). 13 The first two decades of this Spanish Inquisition were the most ruthless. Under

the reign of the first Grand Inquisitor, Tomas de Torquemada (1483-1498), who was

himself a converso, some 2000 victims were burned at the stake. Approximately 15,000

others suffered lesser penalties. The Spanish Inquisition developed as one of the first

centralized institutions of the new Kingdom of Spain. As a political tool with jurisdiction

over all baptized Christians, it had tremendous power and was an ideological tool of the

crown. Not even the Primate Archbishops of Toledo were freed of its watchful eye.

Allegedly to make work easier for the Holy Office, practicing Jews were expelled from

Spain in 1492 while practicing Muslims were expelled a decade or so later; both

expulsions proved detrimental to Spain's economy. Henceforth all Spaniards were

subjected to the Inquisition's repressive authority as Spain ceased to be the land of three religions. Led by Ferdinand and Isabella, Church reform swept the land before the

Protestant Reformation and Spain was to produce some of the most influential figures of the Counter-Reformation. Foremost among them was St. Ignatius Loyola (1491-1556), the founder of the Society of Jesus. In the words of Spain's principal late nineteenth century historian, Menendez y Pelayo, Spain was "the hammer of heretics, torchbearer of

Trent, sword of Rome, cradle of St. Ignatius."

Just as the Spanish Inquisition grew well beyond its original intent of suppressing apostasy among the conversos, so too did the Patronado Real grow. The former was conceived of in response to Judaism and the latter in response to Islam. Since the fall of

Constantinople to the Seljuk Turks in 1453, the papacy appealed for the help of Christian monarchs in combating the spread of Islam. In 1481 the last Muslim Kingdom of

32 Payne, Spanish Catholicism, 35-37; Liss, 177. 33Lannon, Privilege, Persecution and Prophesy, 9. 14 Granada went to war with Ferdinand and Isabella.34 A bull of crusade was thus

promulgated for Ferdinand and Isabella. They were encouraged to bring completion to

centuries of the Christian re-conquest of Spain from Islamic control, the Reconquista,

which was completed by 1492.

During the Reconquista, wealthy nobles, ecclesiastics and monarchs built

numerous churches, converted mosques and established monasteries. Papal law at the

time rewarded generous benefactors with rights of patronage in return for building

churches and endowing them with estates which supported the work of the clergy.

Foremost among these rights of patronage was the charge of looking after the work of the

Church, which boiled down to the "right of presentation." The patron could choose the

candidate for appointment to a vacant benefice or office. During the fifteenth century the

Castilian crown had become the most powerful of these private patrons in lands

conquered from the Moorish Kingdom of Granada. Ferdinand and Isabella thus inherited

rights of appointment which they used to reform the corrupt and wealthy hierarchy.

Ferdinand and Isabella were not content, and with the eyes of skilled canonists,

persuaded the papacy to grant a complete or "royal patronage," to all lands conquered

from Granada. The financial responsibilities would be significant. The entire parish

structure of an ecclesiastical province, Granada, would need to be established. Converting

Muslims, preaching to these converts, and upholding and strengthening the faith of a new

34 For a concise overview of the final war against Granada see John Edwards, Ferdinand and Isabella, Profiles in Power (New York: Pearson/Longman, 2004). For an introduction to Al-Andalas, as Islamic Spain was known, see Richard Fletcher, "The Early Middle Ages, 700-1250," in Spain: A History, Edited by Raymond Carr (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 63-89. 35 Eugene W. Shiels, "Patrons and Patronage," King and Church: the Rise and Fall of the Patronado Real, Jesuit Studies; Contributions to the Arts and Sciences by Members of the Society of Jesus (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1961), 21-43. 15 Castilian immigrant community, all necessitated a strong, loyal, educated and devoted

clergy. The necessary bull was issued in 1486, six years prior to the fall of Granada.36

Known as the Patronado Real or "royal patronage," its powers were immense. Isabella

presented her royal confessor as the first candidate for the vacant Archbishopric. Not

only did this give Ferdinand and Isabella the right to present candidates for appointment

to vacant archbishoprics, bishoprics and abbacies, but also the capitular clergy, parish priests and non-consistorial benefices, which were by law usually appointed by the local bishops. The Catholic Monarchs were empowered to build their vision of a Church hierarchy in Granada. The papacy voluntarily reduced its authority, trusting that

Ferdinand and Isabella would meet the challenges.

The experiment of "royal patronage" proved a success, and reforms made under the watch of Ferdinand and Isabella would influence decisions at the Council of Trent.37

More importantly, this system of patronage was eventually extended to the New World.

Just as it was an important aspect of the colonization of Granada, so too would it become a key element of the colonization of New Spain.

Beginning with the first papal grants to Spain over the "Indies" in 1493, the

Patronado Real de las Indies was finally completed in 1508 and was intended as a perpetual institution. The infamous Borgia Pope, Alexander VI (1492-1503), who was himself a Spaniard, started the process and endowed Ferdinand and Isabella with the title los reyes Catolicos (the Catholic Monarchs). Julius II (1503-1513) finalized the

i6Orthodoxe fideiproagationem, of 13 December, 1486. An English translation of this and later Papal Bulls, as well as the 1753 Concordat may be found in Shiels. 37 David W. Coleman, "Creating Christian Granada: Religion and Community on the Old World Frontier, 1492-1570" (PhD Dissertation, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1996). 16 •JO

institution. The Spanish Crown had developed unprecedented ecclesiastical power. The

Patronado Real severely limited Rome's role in controlling and developing the Latin

American Church. This concession was made prior to the Protestant Reformation which

produced the centralizing Counter-Reformation Church. The repercussions of the

Patronado Real in Latin America were felt until the last vestiges of Spain's empire fell in

1898. By then, however, the Patronado had grown in significance for mainland Spain.

Problems arose over the Patronado under Ferdinand and Isabella's Habsburg

successors. The Patronado was more than an ecclesiastical and political tool; it also

entailed financial obligations. The revenues of vacant benefices went to the patron. Since

the Church in Castile, Aragon, Sicily and Naples fell outside the royal patronage,

revenues from vacancies there were sent to the papacy and formed an essential feature of

papal finance, especially after the 1516 Concordat between the Papacy and France had

blocked wealthy French benefices from going to Rome. Both the Pope and Catholic

Monarchs shared a dependency on Castilian Church wealth. In fact, after the Castilian

Cortes, which was the permanent representative institution of nobles, the Assembly of the

Clergy provided the second major source of revenue for the Spanish crown.39 All

financial concessions and taxes due the crown required Papal approval. The Habsburgs

wanted to extend their patronage to include Castile and Aragon, but the Papacy would not

allow it. There were no special circumstances to justify such action and the Papacy could

not afford to lose this valuable source of wealth. Spain had become the dominant power

on the Italian Peninsula during the sixteenth century, and too much conflict over the issue

38 The Bull to finalize the institution was issued on 28 July, 1508, Universalis ecclesiae regimini. 39 On the wealth of the Church refer to Thomas J. Dandelet, Spanish Rome, 1500-1700 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001); and Sean T. Perrone, "The Procurator General and the Castilian Assembly of the Clergy, 1592-1741," The Catholic Historical Review, 91.1 (January 2005), 26-59. 17 would be mutually detrimental. Uneasy financial compromises proved enough to stabilize

royal and papal relations.

Charles II was the last Habsburg King of Spain. Producing no heir to the throne,

Charles extended succession to the Bourbon Duke of Anjou, the grandson of the Sun

King Louis XIV and great-grandson of Spain's King Philip IV. Thus the death of Charles

II in 1700 inaugurated the Spanish Bourbon dynasty in the person of King Philip V

(1700-1746).40

Fears of Bourbon dominance, however, prompted Britain to ally with the Austrian

Habsburgs in putting up a rival claimant to the throne which led to the outbreak of the

War of the Spanish Succession. For the first time since Ferdinand and Isabella, the

political unity of Spain was challenged and the traditional close relations of Church and

state fell by the wayside. The old kingdoms of Aragon had hitherto retained autonomy

based on their permanent representative institutions (cortes) and respective charters of

rights (fueros). Catalonia, Aragon and Valencia, fearing that Bourbon-style absolutism

would mark the end of their cortes and fueros, supported the Habsburg pretender, and

sought Austrian and British reinforcement. Austrian victories over Bourbons on the

Italian Peninsula ensued, and the papacy was pressed into supporting the Habsburgs.

There were two Spains, and the results were disastrous. Philip V broke off relations with

Rome, closed the nunciature in Madrid, suspended taxes due to the papacy, and sought to

freely appoint candidates to the Spanish episcopacy. The desire to complete the

Patronado Real had never been greater. Spanish Bourbons resented papal power and

40 John Lynch, Bourbon Spain, 1700-1808, A History of Spain (Oxford, Blackwell, 1989). 18 opposed sending Spanish money to Rome. Philip V wanted total control over the Church,

as already existed in France.

Peace was reached amongst European powers by the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713,

although not without Spain's complete humiliation. The important Mediterranean outpost

of Gibraltar was ceded to Britain, and the Italian and Lowland possessions were ceded to

the Austrian Habsburgs. Philip V had to renounce inheritance rights to the French Crown

but Spain and its empire in Latin America and the Philippines were secured under the

Spanish Bourbon dynasty. In retaliation against the kingdoms of Aragon, their cortes and fueros were eliminated. Centralization had begun in earnest. The Spanish Church would

soon follow as a victim of Bourbon regalism.

Concordats were not needed in Spain before the arrival of the Bourbon dynasty,

because the Inquisition, the Patronado and complex financial relations with Rome had

proved sufficient. In other countries concordats arose out of conflicts and acted as peace

treaties between pope and king. Following the War of the Spanish Succession, relations

between Rome and Madrid were at an all time low. For the first time since Ferdinand and

Isabella, a concordat was needed to settle royal-ecclesiastical conflict. In all, it took three

separate concordats to produce a stable system of relations. The first in 1717 never came

into force, while the second in 1737 never satisfied the Spanish crown.41

In 1753 the final Spanish Concordat of the eighteenth century was concluded. Its

foremost accomplishment was in ending the dispute over the Patronado Real. In the

Concordat the Holy See conceded approximately 12,000 residential benefices to the royal

41 On these concordats see Freiherr von Pastor Ludwig, The History of the Popes, from the Close of the Middle Ages. Drawn from the Secret Archives of the Vatican and Other Original Sources, Translated by E.F. Peeler (London: Routledge, 1961 [1891]). Refer to volume XXXIII on the 1717 Concordat, volume XXXIV on the 1737 Concordat, and volume XXXV on the 1753 Concordat. 19 patronage. Thenceforth only fifty-two Spanish benefices remained directly under papal

provision. Since this brought an extensive loss of revenue in Rome, Spain paid 1,300,000

Roman scudi in compensation.42 Pope Benedict XIV was harshly criticized for the

agreement, but papal power was waning. Spanish and other European monarchs had been

modeling their governance on Louis XIV, and identified church-state relations according

to the Gallican tradition of limiting Papal influence over Church administration. The risk

of dividing the Spanish Catholic world was too great and Benedict XIV salvaged as much

as he thought possible in this "era of papal weakness."43

After the limitation of papal power in Spain, the clerical elite changed. The Jesuits

were expelled from Spain's dominions and their properties were redistributed to other

segments of the Church. Charles III further collaborated with France and Portugal in the

abolition of the Jesuit Order. He elevated Jansenists and other reform-minded clerics who

were educated at the universities and were acquainted with the ideas of the

Enlightenment. They aimed to curb the popular extravagances of Spanish Catholicism, modernize the ecclesiastical map, limit the roles of the monastic orders and encourage mendicant orders such as the Franciscans.

The Church in Spain, although changed, retained its power over society and remained the wealthiest institution. It ran orphanages, foundling homes and schools.

Bishops funded social projects, built bridges and provided relief to the underprivileged.

42 According to Pastor, the arrival of this sum in Rome (February 1753) provided the first public knowledge of the Concordat. The money arrived according to articles XVII, XIX, and XXI. Respectively 310,000 scudi was "in compensation for the rights of collation"; 600,000 scudi was the "substitute for the abolished pensions and bank-bills"; and 233,333 scudi was in "substitute for abolished spoils." Added in that article, Spain further conceded 5000 scudi annually from the cruzada revenue "for the maintenance and subsistence of the apostolic nuncios." Pastor, XXXV, 71. 43 Payne, Spanish Catholicism, 61. For the best detailed study of the Spanish Church from the mid- eighteenth century to 1874, see Callahan, Church, Politics, and Society in Spain, 1750-1874. 20 The Spanish Inquisition's victims became far fewer, with the last death in the 1780s. But

although Church wealth was extensive, it was unevenly distributed. Elites lived in well-

educated, urban splendour, but parish clergy in the countryside were impoverished and

under-educated. Unemployed secular clergy flocked to the cities where there were

opportunities of numerous well-paying benefices. According to the 1768 census, roughly

2500 rural parishes lacked priests, while approximately 20,000 secular priests roamed the

cities without work.44 The diocesan and parish structure in Spain needed to be redrawn to better accommodate population change. Serious weaknesses plagued the archaic Church.

The advent of Spanish liberalism in the nineteenth century highlighted these. The

Inquisition and the Patronado Real were soon challenged.

The nineteenth century liberal revolution destroyed the church of the old regime,

although not without difficulty and bloodshed.45 The Peninsular War (1808-1814) introduced the revolution and inaugurated the Latin American independence wars. The conflict emerged when Napoleon imprisoned King Ferdinand VII and secured the throne of Spain for Napoleon's brother Joseph. In reaction, popular rebellion erupted in Madrid on 2 May, 1808. The violent repression that followed spurred fierce resistance throughout the rest of Spain. Cities formed juntas in the name of Ferdinand VII, which in itself was a revolutionary act since it denied the legitimacy of Ferdinand's abdication, and, therefore, opposed the absolute sovereignty of the monarch. Regional juntas were soon centralized from Cadiz. In 1809 the Junta Central declared the convocation of a General Cortes. The conflict was viewed almost uniformly by the Spanish hierarchy as a Holy War against

44 Payne, Spanish Catholicism, 67. 45 On Spanish liberalism see, Isabel Burdiel, "The liberal revolution, 1808-1843," Spanish History Since 1808, Jose Alvarez Junco and Adrian Shubert, eds. (New York: Arnold, 2000), 17-32. 21 Napoleon. Clergy played a prominent part in the resistance.46 Some bishops emerged as

presidents of their local anti-Napoleonic juntas.

The Cortes of Cadiz produced Spain's first liberal constitution in 18 1 2 47 Freedom

of the individual was embraced. Powers of the monarch, Church and nobility were

subordinated to representational government. The disruption of the Inquisition caused by the French invasion brought unprecedented freedom of the press. In regard to religion,

48 Spain remained Catholic, and no effort was made to introduce religious freedom.

Liberal clergy made up nearly one-third of the popularly-elected deputies. Resistance of

ecclesiastics to the revolution grew stronger when the Cortes debated the future of the

Spanish Inquisition. Clerics serving the Cortes of Cadiz were divided.49 The majority of the hierarchy felt attacked. They hoped that Ferdinand's restoration would dissolve the

Cortes, abandon the constitution, and unleash the Spanish Inquisition to punish the opponents of absolute monarchy.

The roots of Spain's nineteenth century crises lay in the failure of the post-

Napoleonic Order to reconcile the forces of liberalism with those of monarchy and religion. King Ferdinand VII was restored after Napoleon's downfall in 1814. Although welcomed by all, he followed a neo-absolutist agenda, abolished the Constitution of

Cadiz and re-established the Inquisition. The Papacy restored the Society of Jesus, and

46 Callahan, Church, Politics, and Society in Spain, 86; Stanley Payne wrote, "There was apparently not a single province in all of Spain that did not produce at least one guerilla band led by a priest or monk." Spanish Catholicism, 72. 47 Excerpts of the Constitution may be found in W. N. Hargreaves-Mawdsley, Spain under the Bourbons: a Collection of Documents (London: Macmillian, 1973), 238-241. 48 Article XII read "The religion of the Spanish people is, and ever shall be, the only true faith of the Roman Catholic Church. The Nation offers it protection with wise and just laws and outlaws the practice of any other." Spain under the Bourbons, 240. 49 The vote was held on 22 January, 1813. Eleven of the 90 votes in favour of its abolition were ecclesiastics. 32 of the 60 votes against the measure were as well. See Callahan, Church, Politics, and Society in Spain, 70. 22 Ferdinand welcomed them back to Spain. Ferdinand employed the Patronado Real based

on the terms of the 1753 Concordat. He thereby subordinated the hierarchy and

eliminated reformers from its ranks. Although Ferdinand attempted to restore the

beleaguered Church, the regular clergy had already shown significant rates of decline. By

1820 the population of friars and monks had dropped from prewar levels of 46,500, to

33,500.so A militarypronunciamiento brought liberals back to power in an interregnum

of three years, 1820-1823. The Spanish Inquisition was again dissolved and the Jesuits

expelled. Strictly monastic orders were closed and their properties were seized. Ferdinand

was restored to absolute power but, near the end of his life, showed a more compromising

approach toward the liberals. The hierarchy's dissatisfaction with the crown was leading

it away from support of regalism.

Ferdinand VII had produced no heir to the throne until his fourth wife, Maria

Christina, gave birth to the first of two daughters in 1830. Until that point Ferdinand's brother, Don Carlos, had been in line for succession. Ferdinand abandoned the principle of male succession and declared his daughter Isabella to be his successor. When Don

Carlos protested, Ferdinand sent him into exile.51 Ferdinand VII died in September 1833 and Maria Christina was made regent for Queen Isabella II (1833-1868), who was just three years old when the succession war broke out.

The First Carlist War (1833-1840) was fought under a religious banner. Most of the Spanish hierarchy supported Isabella, but Pope Gregory XVI refused to recognize

50 Payne, Spanish Catholicism, 76. 51 These three documents are found in Spain under the Bourbons, 278-281. 23 either side.52 Don Carlos, the pretender, an ultra-traditionalist and pious Catholic, was

opposed to secular currents of liberalism, and committed to decentralization and the

restoration of the Spanish Inquisition. Unable to put down the Carlist uprising, Maria

Christina dismissed her first government, and appointed a liberal from the Cortes of

Cadiz to form a new cabinet. Martinez de la Rosa's new government aimed to reduce the

numbers of the regular clergy, but was unable to control anti-clerical mobs. His successor

abolished the male religious orders and sold their properties at auction.

The 1753 Concordat had been invalidated by the Carlist War and thus no norm

existed for filling vacancies within the Church hierarchy. Pope Gregory XVI refused to recognize the state's nominations, as he had not recognized Isabella II as the rightful heir of Spain. The depleted hierarchy made this a problem. All eight metropolitan sees were vacant. Out of the total of Spain's 60 dioceses, only 11 had bishops in 1840.53 Cathedral chapters were forced by the state to elect their candidates as diocesan governors.54 The

Espartero government took radical measures at top-down reform, announcing a complete restructuring of the ecclesiastical map. Seventeen dioceses were to be suppressed, and thirteen new ones created. Of the 19,000 parishes throughout Spain, 4000 were to be closed and a limit of 22,000 was set upon the priesthood.55 The tithe was abolished, and on 2 September, 1841 the government ordered the sale of properties owned by the secular clergy. Within two years sixty percent of its property had been sold for over three billion

52 Two notable exceptions were the primate, Pedro de Inguanzo, and bishop of Leon, Joaquin de Abarca. Both refused to attend the recognition ceremony held in June 1833 for the Princess of Asturias. The primate later succumbed to an oath of loyalty, whereas the bishop of Leon fled to Galacia where he tried to win clerical support for Carlos V. Callahan, Church, Politics, and Society in Spain, 147. 53 Between 1834 and 1840, 25 bishops had died and 11 were exiled. Callahan, Church, Politics, and Society in Spain, 163. 54 Callahan, Church, Politics, and Society in Spain, 164. 55 Callahan, Church, Politics, and Society in Spain, 167. 24 reales.56 The financial base of the Church had been completely undercut. The social

implications were far-reaching.

Outspoken allegiance to Rome had not existed in the Spanish Church for

centuries, but Pope Gregory XVI had won the esteem of the Spanish episcopate. He made

frequent denunciations of Spain's ecclesiastical policies. Priests caught supporting the

Pope's pronouncements were hauled before Spain's courts. The Catholic press was quick to publicize these conflicts. State-led reform had failed to subordinate the Church to liberalism. Instead it had strengthened the reactionary quality of Spanish Catholicism, and brought the Church firmly under Papal guidance.

The difficult task of reconciliation fell upon General Ramon Narvaez, who came to power as Prime Minister in May of 1844. His objectives were clear: get papal recognition of Queen Isabella II, confirmation of the 1753 Concordat's principles of patronage, and forfeit Church claims to confiscated properties already sold. The government in return would suspend the sales and agree to pay for the maintenance of the clergy. During the negotiations Gregory XVI aimed for the restoration of the male religious orders and recognition of the Church's right to property. Ultimately these negotiations failed.

The election of Pope Pius IX in 1846 was viewed positively in Spain and helped bring about a settlement of the Church-state conflict.57 Pius IX helped the Spanish government to fill Episcopal vacancies, and in 1848 cleared another obstacle by recognizing Queen Isabella II. Although the revolutions that swept throughout Europe

56 Callahan, Church, Politics, and Society in Spain, 168. 57 Nancy Rosenblatt "Church and State in Spain: A Study of Moderate Liberal Politics in 1845" Catholic Historical Review 62.4 (1976), 589-603. 25 that year were quickly put down in Spain, Pius IX was forced to flee Rome. In 1849

French and Spanish troops defeated Mazzini's republic and restored Pius IX to the Papal

States. With the renewed fear of revolution, concluding a new concordat became a vital

goal for the Spanish government. Aiding Pius IX's restoration only improved Spain's

prospects.

Just like the 1753 Concordat, the new Concordat was negotiated between the

Spanish government and the Holy See in strict secrecy, excluding the Spanish hierarchy

from the process.58 Considering the breadth of civil-ecclesiastical discord, the

negotiations were difficult and its terms were comprehensive. It was finally concluded on

16 March, 1851 and was a significant achievement that changed the face of Spanish

Catholicism by completing the socio-economic effects of liberalism's attack on Church wealth and power. For the first time since the outbreak of the First Carlist War, the

Church had a legal framework in which to operate. The opening four articles were

especially important in this regard. Spain was declared Catholic, "to the exclusion of any other cult." Education was mandated to conform to Church doctrine in public and private spheres. The clergy were given the express protection of the state and guaranteed their freedom to operate according to the sacred canons. Liberals who had worked hard to reform education were sidelined. Freedom of religion was a distant prospect for liberal

Spain.

Pius IX achieved a number of things in negotiating the Concordat. On a general level, he guaranteed that Spain would not seek to reform the Church on its own.

58 An English translation is provided in appendix one of Charles Patrick Foley "The Catholic-Liberal Struggle and the Church in Spain, 1834-1876" (PhD Dissertation, The University of New Mexico, 1983). Ecclesiastical matters needing resolution were to be referred to the Holy See. In regard to

the contested reforms of the ecclesiastical map, the Concordat hammered out details. A

few changes were agreed upon, but could only go forth in collaboration with the bishops.

The most contested concession on the part of the Spanish state was the restoration of the

male religious orders. Compromise was reached on that article through employing vague

language. Two were specifically recognized as legal and a third was to be named at a

later date. The sales of Church property were recognized as final. Unsold plots of land were to be returned, and the right of the Church to own property was guaranteed. Pius also demanded in compensation detailed provisions for the state's funding of the clergy.

Of key importance to Spain in the settlement was recognition of the validity of the 1753

Concordat. Thus the liberal state inherited the rights of the Patronado Real. Most important of these patronage rights were in regard to filling vacant Episcopal or

Archiepiscopal Sees. From a list of three candidates drawn up in collaboration with

Church authority, the state would present its choice for appointment.

The Spanish state got the better end of the deal. Through subordinating the

Spanish Church to the Papacy and the Concordat, the government undercut clerical support of Carlism and made the Church one of Spain's elite interest groups. The hierarchy was forced to resort to lobbying within the Spanish government to protect the

Church's interests. From the Primate Archbishop of Toledo to the lowly parish priests, each member of the clergy became dependent upon the state for its income. The old

Spanish Catholic Church had the wealth and initiative to offer at least some relief to the underprivileged. Cut short of this financial independence, it was unable to provide significant help to the lower classes. Homilies ordering Catholics to respect authority and serve their masters were ill-placed with the beginnings of industrialization. Regional and

class divides were beginning to characterize religious practice in Spain.

The Concordat helped slow the institutional decline of the Spanish Catholic

Church, and nowhere was this more evident than in the reintroduction of the male

religious orders. The number of monks and friars had climbed from insignificance in

1851 to a population of 10,630 in 1902.59 Nuns numbered nearly four times as many.

Sixty-three new female religious orders were introduced to Spain in the latter half of the

century. The Concordat's provisions on the regular clergy facilitated this growth and in

turn encouraged a Catholic revival in Spain.

The Catholic revival was largely a middle and upper-class phenomenon deeply

linked to education and propagation of popular religiosity. Many of the new female

orders were solely dedicated to educating and training girls. The same was true of male

orders for boys. Shortcomings of state education made this expansion possible. Wealthy

Spaniards were eager to support the reestablishment of Catholic secondary schools. The

Jesuits also founded institutes of higher learning. The religious orders organized popular missions and encouraged pilgrimages. Catholic publications and confraternities

expanded. Associations devoted to the Sacred Heart of Jesus grew rapidly. Missionaries were sent to Latin America and China. Marian devotion increased and Eucharistic

Congresses were held.

The problem remained that this Catholic revival failed to provide answers for the social and economic distress of the lower classes. The secular clergy was undergoing a decline in numbers despite Spain's dramatic increase in population. The state could not

59 Payne, Spanish Catholicism, 107. 28 fund the creation of new parishes to meet challenges in urban areas. As the revolutionary left grew, so too did the perception that the Church had become the domain of the bourgeoisie and capitalist order.

Spanish Catholicism during the first quarter of the twentieth century was distant from politics. No Catholic party emerged due to internal divisions within both the hierarchy and the laity. The Church held a privileged position in Spanish society, but its enemies were becoming stronger. Spain emerged with the largest radical left in Western

Europe.

The 1898 debacle in the Spanish-American War with the United States brought the end of four centuries of Spanish empire. Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines were lost and Spanish society felt itself to be in profound crisis. The once glorious empire was destroyed. The monarchy was losing popularity, and the Church had refused all aspects of modernization. Spanish Catholicism had become the most ultramontane in Europe. At a time when the Papacy was thoroughly anti-modern under Pius X, Spanish Catholicism was considered "more papist than the pope." Spain's Catholic revival was entirely traditional and failed to quell de-Christianization. The reinvigoration of the regular clergy helped to strengthen anti-clericalism.

The two dynastic parties, Conservatives and Liberals, proved unable to work together. Politics remained volatile, exclusive, corrupt and fast-paced. Out of this instability were formed other parties from the various spectrums of the right and left.

Catholics also made nominal headway. Spanish Catholic Action was formed by modernizers within the Church and attempts were made at some adaptation to modern politics and current issues. The hierarchy's divisions hindered this development however. Regional Catholic movements were formed in the Basque region and in Catalonia. The government tried to reduce regional nationalisms there, refusing to allow the appointments of local prelates.

Colonial wars in Morocco provided yet another cause for instability. Calls for more troops in North Africa in July of 1909 culminated in a leftist uprising in Barcelona.

Known as the "tragic week," churches and convents were set ablaze in the midst of riot and urban warfare. Violent repression put down the unrest, but brought with it serious repercussions. The working classes grew further disenchanted with parliamentary monarchy and with the Church. They sought to develop their organizations and became even further radicalized.

Spain declared neutrality in the First World War and reaped benefits through massive exports. Rampant inflation, however, highlighted Spain's internal social divisions. The decline in exports following the Great War's end only worsened the situation. Parliamentary instability remained endemic. Between 1917 and 1923 Spain cycled through 15 governments. Coupled with difficulties in Morocco, the stage was set for military dictatorship. General Miguel Primo de Rivera launched a bloodless coup in mid-September of 1923. King Alfonso XIII's support sealed his victory. Although not opposed to authoritarian rule, the Church was uneasy because Primo de Rivera had collaborated with socialists and their trade unions at the expense of Catholic organizations. The dictator propped up the monarchy and Church as the symbols of

30 Spain's unity; some in the clergy were reluctant to go along, but others collaborated

openly.60

Primo de Rivera resigned in January of 1930. Widespread resentment over the

monarchy's support for dictatorship strengthened the appeal of republicanism. With the

old dynastic parties destroyed under the dictatorship, the revival of parliamentary

monarchy stood little chance for success. The monarchy stood for a Catholic tradition

that was doomed. The future for both the Church and crown looked bleak.

The victory of republicans in the national municipal elections held on 12 April

1931 brought the abdication of King Alfonso XIII and the defeat of Catholic power in

Spain. The new government proclaimed religious liberty in Spain, and thus necessitated

change in civil-ecclesiastical relations. Attacking the Spanish Church's privileged position had always provoked controversy and strengthened reactionary currents within

Catholicism.61 On the other hand, the creation of the Second Republic encouraged moderates within the Spanish Church and led to the creation of Spain's first Catholic political party.

Cardinal Segura y Saenz was the first of the Spanish episcopate to speak up. He had been appointed Archbishop of Toledo in 1927 and made a cardinal that same year. 47 years old at the time, his quick rise to the primacy had been due to the patronage of Primo de Rivera and Alfonso XIII. In a pastoral published on 2 May 1931, Cardinal Segura praised the departed king, and urged Catholics to remember that the King had

60 On Primo de Rivera and the Church Refer to Callahan, "The Dictatorship, 1923-1930," The Catholic Church in Spain, 149-168. 61 Spain's Jesuit journal, Messenger of the Sacred Heart, typified this reactionary current. In 1931 one article declared in uncompromising terms: "the time is approaching when all ideologies and all social systems will be resolved into two-either Communism or Catholicism, either Rome or Moscow." Quotation found in Lannon, Privilege, Power and Persecution, 44. 31 consecrated Spain to the Sacred Heart, and always protected the Church. Segura's pro-

monarchical pastoral encountered a fierce and quick reaction. The government lobbied

the papal nuncio, and had Segura removed to Rome. On 11 May, mobs in Madrid, Seville

and five other cities responded by setting ablaze churches and convents. Segura

continued to criticize the Republic from abroad until he was forced to resign as

Archbishop of Toledo.

Elections were held on 28 June, 1931. With no organized monarchist or rightwing parties, republicans of centrist and leftist persuasion joined Socialists in forming the

Republic's first Parliament. Its primary goal was to write a new constitution. The most divisive aspect of this challenge proved to be the church-state dimension. Article 26 of the new Constitution dealt with the Spanish Church and marked the demise of state

Catholicism. Church and state were officially separated for the first time in Spanish history. The state's financial support for the clergy was to be completely cut over the next two years. Religious orders were prohibited from teaching and banned from commercial or industrial activities. Their properties could be subjected to nationalization. Anti- clerical legislation proceeded further in 1932. The Jesuits, the richest and most influential order of Spain's Catholic revival, were dissolved and their educational institutes and properties were seized. Divorce was legalized and cemeteries were secularized. No reference was made to the 1851 Concordat. Separation of church and state deemed it to be null and void.62

62For the Church and the Second Republic refer to Jose M. Sanchez, Reform and Reaction: The Politico- Religious Background of the Spanish Civil War (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1964). Sanchez argues that he Second Republic failed to identify its real threat as the extremists of the left and right. Rather, it saw the Church as the major challenge to its stability. In seeing the Church as an 32 Such political anti-clericalism spurred Catholic reaction. Social Catholicism had

made little headway in Spain prior to the Second Republic. Inspired by the encyclicals of

Pope Leo XIII and encouraged by Pope Pius XI, the papal nuncio Federico Tedeschini

and his close friend Angel Herrera Oria led the way. It was time for Catholics to

overcome their differences and join together in political alliance. Herrera was chief editor

of El Debate, and leader of Asociacion Catolica Nacional de Propagandistas (ACNP)

and soon to be president of Spanish Catholic Action. Herrera was able to use his position

to form a political party, Action Popular. In 1933 Herrera joined with other Catholic and monarchist groups to form the Republic's only mass right-wing party: Confederation

Espanola de Derechas Autonomas (CEDA). Jose Maria Gil Robles became its president.

CEDA's major shortcoming was that it had no positive political agenda. Herrera and Gil

Robles were of the accidentalist persuasion, meaning, they would accept any form of government, provided that they could work within a legal framework to achieve their

Catholic goals. CEDA was significant because it demonstrated Catholic willingness to accept the Republic. United to protect Church interests and repeal anti-clerical legislation, but not promote any radical social program, CEDA carried out its work with the clear approval of Tedeschini and Pope Pius XI. In the 1933 elections CEDA won 115 seats in parliament and helped to form a new government. When three CEDA members entered the cabinet in 1934, fierce resistance from the left sparked an uprising in Asturias, and a separatist revolution in Catalonia. Before the Asturias uprising was put down, 34 clergy had been brutally slain. Spain was polarized.

enemy, the Republic failed to monopolize off the inner Church division between moderates and conservatives. 33 In the February 1936 elections, the right-wing coalition was narrowly defeated by

the left-wing Popular Front, and Spain devolved into violence and social unrest. Again,

the churches were targeted. By June 160 had been destroyed and another 251 suffered /•i

damages. Basque nationalists and Catalan separatists, although Catholic, looked to the

Popular Front with hopes of autonomy. For much of the rest of Catholic Spain, the

situation provoked fear.

The dissident military uprising on 17 July 1936 instigated the Spanish Civil War.

The rebel group was a conglomerate of disparate forces of the right, and went forth without a clear plan for governance. Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany provided them with military and economic aid. The Republic had the aid of the Soviet Union, and sympathy of much of the world. The Spanish Catholic Church provided the rebels with myth, rhetoric and justification. The loyalists lacked this sense of purpose. In the turmoil of the uprising, the Popular Front lost control over its revolutionary and regional forces. The results were disastrous for the Spanish clergy, and served to strengthen the Church's

support for Franco. Since liberalism's first attacks in the 1820s, persecution of the Church had become a venerable left-wing tradition. But the sheer scale of atrocities during the

Civil War had no precedent. The clerical death-toll in Republican zones was greatest during the first months of the Spanish Civil War. By the end of the conflict, 6,832 priests, monks, friars and nuns had been slain.

Against this backdrop of violent social anti-clericalism, the new primate, Cardinal

Isidro Goma y Tomas, issued the Collective Letter of the Spanish bishops to the Catholic world. The letter warned Catholics not to be swayed by leftist propaganda, arguing this

63 Payne, Spanish Catholicism, 166. 34 was no war between democratic and fascist forces, but a religious crusade against atheistic communism. In the United States the Collective Letter caused dissension between Protestants and Catholics. To Francisco Franco's mind, the Spanish episcopate had shown valuable aid to the Nationalists by winning over international Catholic opinion. From the perspective of Pope Pius XI, the conflict was a tragedy that pit

Catholics against each other.64 The international dimension made the conflict even more appalling. Pius did not want Spain to emulate Hitler's Germany or Mussolini's Italy.

There were ample reasons to fear it would. An anti-Nazi encyclical in 1937 was suppressed in Spain with the agreement of Cardinal Goma. Pius XI's sympathy for the plight of Basques and Catalan Catholic loyalists, risked angering the Spanish Episcopate.

Many Basque and Catalan Catholics, although horrified by the persecution, were opposed to the Nationalists. Catholics were being pitted against each other, and the Vatican wanted to avoid all escalation.

Once the Basque region succumbed to Nationalist forces, it was inevitable that the

Holy See would open full diplomatic relations with Franco's government in Burgos.

Franco repealed much of the Republic's anti-clerical legislation and invited the Jesuits back to Spain. Then, on 4 May 1938, almost a year before the end of the war, the Vatican opened full diplomatic relations.

During the war Franco grew to covet the Patronado Real, and wanted to claim the right for himself by reinstating the 1851 Concordat. As Generalissimo and Caudillo,

Franco held appointment powers over the entire military, government and party,

"Kent, "The Vatican and the Spanish Civil War," 441-64.

35 possessing a central authority that far outweighed any of Spain's past monarchs. There

was, however, one exception. Franco had no control over the administration of the

Church.

By 1939 Franco was experiencing trouble in civil-ecclesiastical relations. Despite

the hierarchy's support for the Nationalists, it feared the rising influence of Nazi Germany

over Spain's fascist party, the Falange. Church publications critical of Spain or the Axis

powers were being censored and Catholic worker's associations were being closed. When

Germany and Spain signed a cultural agreement in January 1939, the Episcopate took a

stand. Protests of the Spanish Primate, Cardinal Goma, and Papal Nuncio, Gaetano

Cicognani, convinced Franco to abandon the agreement. Hitherto, all attempts made by

Franco to reinstate the 1851 Concordat had been denied. Pope Pius XI passed away on 10

February, 1939. On 2 March the Conclave elected Secretary of State Eugenio Pacelli as

Pope, and he adopted the name Pius XII. He, like his predecessor, hoped to be a pope of peace. Would he prove more willing than Pius XI to reinstate the Patronado? Franco could only hope.

Cardinal Goma celebrated a Te Deum service in honour of Franco's Nationalist victory on 20 May in Madrid's royal church of Santa Barbara. Well choreographed,

Franco presented the Primate with the "sword of victory." The icon had belonged to Don

Juan de Austria and had been worn in his Holy League victory over the Turks at the

Battle of Lepanto. In Cardinal Goma's mind, a new crusade had just been won and the

36 sword was a potent symbol of a unified agenda of church and state. Goma had it placed in

honour at his magnificent Toledo Cathedral.65

Despite such displays of unity, there soon emerged tension between Cardinal

Goma and the Spanish government. On 8 August, 1939 Goma issued a pastoral, "Lessons

of War, and Duties of Peace." Calling for national reconciliation, he urged the

government to embrace forgiveness and grant amnesty to republican prisoners. The

Primate was taking a forthright stance not seen during the war. He lost no time in

denouncing the rising influence of Nazi ideology in Spain.66 His pastoral was chopped up

by Falangist censors and was only circulated in diocesan publications. Although

disappointed, Goma took pleasure that his pastoral caused the Falange considerable

embarrassment.67

Cardinal Goma's pastoral was praised publicly by Cardinal Segura, the former

Primate of Spain. Segura returned from exile in 1937 and was appointed Archbishop of

Seville. He was soon to become one of Franco's most vocal critics and staunchest

advocates for the restoration of the monarchy. In 1940 Segura got into an argument with

the civil governor of Seville, who Segura felt was infringing on the Church's autonomy.

The intransigent Archbishop threatened him with ex-communication and Franco was

forced to remove the discredited Falangist.68 In a sermon delivered in 1940, Segura drew

attention to the word caudillo. He stated that in past times the word was reserved for the

65 Callahan, "The Evangelization of Franco's 'New Spain,'" Church History 56.4 (December 1987), 491- 503,491; Malley (Madrid), "Survey of the Church in Spain and of its Attitude towards the Regime," 12 Dec 1951, FO, WS1781/1. 66 Malley (Madrid), "Survey of the Church in Spain and of its Attitude towards the Regime," 12 Dec 1951, FO, WS1781/1. 67 Malley (Madrid), "Survey of the Church in Spain and of its Attitude towards the Regime," 12 Dec 1951, FO, WS1781/1. 68 Malley (Madrid), "Survey of the Church in Spain and of its Attitude towards the Regime," 12 Dec 1951, FO, WS1781/1. 37 "leader of a band of thieves," and that St. Ignatius denounced such figures as demons.

Segura's disrespect provoked the Caudillo's outrage, and Franco wanted to urge the

Vatican to call for Segura's resignation. However, the Caudillo's advisors warned that

doing so would discredit the official image of Spain's harmonious civil-ecclesiastical

relations.

More and more, Franco became determined: appointing bishops was as important

as appointing civil-governors. He needed to secure the appointment of bishops loyal to

Nationalist Spain. Therefore, he needed some sort of a modified Patronado Real. Franco

was prepared to pay whatever costs were necessary in seeking the outdated tradition.

The material and clerical damage to the Spanish Church during the Civil War was

immense.69 In the end around twenty percent of the clergy had been killed, but in some dioceses, death tolls were much higher. The clergy of Barbastro, which was hit worse, was decimated by 87.8 percent. In Barcelona more than 300 parish churches were burnt

If) to the ground. Despite Spain's war-torn economy and vast shortage of resources, the state paid the bill for the church's reconstruction. By 1940 seventy churches had been rebuilt.71 Missions were being organized throughout Spain on scales never before seen.

Church holidays and parades were restored. Religious revival was being officially proclaimed.

Cardinal Vidal y Barraquer, Archbishop of Tarragona, was one of the three bishops that refused to sign Cardinal Goma's 1937 Collective Letter. Barraquer was

69 For the fullest account of the persecution of the Church during the Civil War see, Sanchez, The Spanish Civil War as a Religious Tragedy. For the most recent account see, Vincent, '"the keys of the kingdom': religious violence in the Spanish civil war, July-August 1936." 70 Callahan, "The Evangelization of Franco's 'New Spain,'" 495. 71 Three years later the figure reached more than 3000, and by 1947, more than 800 new churches had been built. Callahan, "The Evangelization of Franco's "New Spain,'" 497. 38 highly regarded by Pius XI, and continued to direct his Archdiocese from exile after the

Civil War. While most of the Spanish Church hailed a religious revival in Nationalist

Spain, Barraquer was skeptical about the "external manifestations of the cult," and

maintained that it was more of a reactionary political expression than a true religious

revival. Barraquer was atypical of the Spanish Church and was an impediment to

Franco's agenda.72 Pope Pius XII was troubled by rumours that Franco wanted to force

this cardinal's resignation.73

Ensuring that the two archdioceses and nineteen dioceses vacant in Spain were

filled with pro-Franco bishops was thus a priority for the state. Cardinal Segura could

hope in vain to be restored as the Primate. At the time Spain was closely allied with Nazi

Germany, and the Spanish Church was becoming an embarrassment to the Franco

regime. The Bishop of Callahora, for example, in 1941 published a pastoral against Nazi

Germany titled "Modern Errors." Although its circulation was forbidden in Spain, 50,000

copies were printed in London and secretly distributed in Madrid.74

The 1851 Concordat could not be reinstated, because in the mind of Pope Pius

XII, such a move was impossible. The patronage traditions defined in 1851 were

concessions to Spain's monarchy, and thus Franco had no right to inherit them.

Furthermore, Canon Law challenged the current legitimacy of such an antiquated system.

Since it had been codified in 1917, no concordat had conceded investiture privileges to a head of state. Neither Mussolini nor Hitler could have hoped to control the appointment

72 Callahan, "The Evangelization of Franco's 'New Spain,'" 501. 73 John Carrol, bishop of Baltimore, "Proud Vaunt," US TIME, 20 Nov., 1939. Available Online: http://www.time.c0m/time/magazine/article/0,9171,762834,00.html 74 Malley (Madrid), "Survey of the Church in Spain and of its Attitude towards the Regime," 12 Dec 1951, FO, WS1781/1. 39 of bishops in their countries, as codification had made that practice obsolete.75 While the

future of the Church in war-torn Europe looked bleak, it at least looked secure on the

Iberian Peninsula. Pope Pius XII had just signed a concordat and missionary agreement

with Salazar's Portugal in 1940, which granted no privileges of presentation to the

Portuguese dictator. Pius XII would not, however, agree to negotiate a concordat with

Franco, believing the stakes were too high. Franco was demanding concessions that other

European dictators had not dared. Furthermore, Pius XII abhorred Spain's close

relationship with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. The majority of the Spanish

churchmen favoured the Franco regime, felt indebted for the protection it received during

the Civil War, and were pleased to see Spain return as an officially Catholic state.

Despite his reservations, Pius XII could not discount the opinions of the Spanish

episcopate. Avoiding negotiations with Spain over civil-ecclesiastical legislation would

have risked angering the Church. As the Second World War waged on, some sort of modus vivendi with the Franco regime became necessary.

The pro-Axis brother-in-law of Franco, Serrano Suner, was a key architect of a

fascist Spain. Suner had been Franco's first Minister of the Interior and was the

administrative head of the Falange.76 Suner was also used by Franco as an emissary to

Hitler, and soon after the outbreak of the Second World War, Suner became Foreign

Minister. In that role, Suner was entrusted with the task of negotiating church-state relations with the Papal Nuncio, Gaetano Cicognani.

75 1917 Code of Canon Law, Canon 1450: "No right of patronage can in the future be validly acquired under any title." Canon 1471: "If the Apostolic See has conceded either in concordats or aside from them the indult of presenting to a vacant church or even to a benefice, there is not in this a source of the right of patronage, and the privilege of presenting must be given strict interpretation by the tenor of the indult." Shiels, 261. 76 Cunado is Spanish for brother-in-law. Eric Niderost, "The Secret Conference between Hitler and Franco at Hendaye could have changed the course of the War," World War II, Vol 15 (2), July 2000. 40 Fruit of their efforts emerged in the "Agreement between the Spanish Government

and the Holy See, of June 7, 1941, on the Way in which the Privilege of Presentation is to

Be Exercised."77 Spain's primary objective in the negotiations was to secure for Franco

presentation rights for Episcopal appointments. For the Holy See and Pope Pius XII, the

negotiations aimed to safeguard Catholic education, and define Catholicism as the

religion of state. The Agreement, which has been also called the Convenio, proved

significant in many respects. It reached an agreement on the Spanish Patronado Real, and

modified the system into a suitable compromise, but at the same time left unresolved a

number of important and related issues. In appointing bishops and archbishops, it was

agreed that, in consultation between the government and the nuncio, a list of six

candidates would be drawn up, from which the Pope would nominate three, from which

Franco would make the final selection. This concession, unparalleled in concordat

diplomacy after the Code of Canon Law, was monumental. In return the Spanish Catholic

Church gained much.

The first half of the Convenio spelled out the specifics of Franco's "privilege of presentation." The second half dealt with future Spanish-Vatican negotiations and devised a suitable status quo of confessional church-state relations. Article six envisioned a new concordat to incorporate the rules of the Convenio. Article seven formally announced the opening of negotiations over the "provision of non-consistorial benefices," such as parish priests and the capitular clergy. Article eight declared that, in the

77 The text for the agreement may be found in "Addendum I" of the Catholic Church and Spain, The Concordat between Spain and the Holy See (27 August 1953), Facts About Spain, 50 (Madrid: Diplomatic Information Office, 1953), 23-25. 41 meantime, the bishops and archbishops would make appointments to parishes and distribute benefices according to rules laid down in the Code of Canon Law.

Article nine was important, as it declared that the first four articles of the 1851

Concordat were restored until a new concordat would come into force. These outlawed the public practice of other religions, guaranteed that public education of all levels would abide by Catholic dogma, made the state the protector of the Church and granted the clergy "all the liberty established by the sacred Canons." Article ten provided that in civil legislation, "as may concern the Church in any way," the state must reach previous agreement with the Holy See. These last two articles marked real victories for the Holy

See and the Spanish Church. If Franco ever wanted to conclude a concordat, he would need to abide by the strict rules of the 1851 Concordat and not legislate on "mixed matters" without first approaching the Holy See.

A new Primate Archbishop of Toledo, Pla y Deniel, was appointed soon thereafter, on 3 October, 1941. He had won Franco's favor in 1936, when as bishop of

Salamanca, Pla y Deniel had issued the first pastoral to define the Spanish Civil War in terms of a religious crusade. He was not Franco's first choice. Originally he wanted the

"Blue Bishop" of Madrid, Leopoldo Eijo y Garay. Pius XII adamantly refused. Such a staunch Falangist bishop could not expect the Vatican's patronage.78 Negotiations for appointing bishops to the rest of Spain's vacant dioceses took more than a year, largely because Serrano Suner sought to advance only pro-Falangist priests. Out of thanks for the quick appointment of a new primate, and in hope that Pius XII would soon make Pla y

Deniel a cardinal, Franco allowed Cardinal Vidal y Barraquer to return from exile in

78 Callahan, The Catholic Church in Spain, 389-391. 42 December of 1941. Pius XII delayed holding his first consistory until after the Second

World War. By that time, Pla y Deniel was issuing pastorals reminiscent of Goma's

"Lessons of War and Duties of Peace."

The 1941 Convenio restored the traditional rights of the Catholic Monarchs to

Franco. Those rights, first gained to Ferdinand and Isabella, extended by the 1753

Concordat, and modified by the 1851 Concordat, were contentious and marked a victory of Franco's regalist vision of Church and State. The Convenio, however, differed from the former concordats insofar as it marked, in the long run, more of a triumph for the Spanish

Church than it did for Franco's dictatorship. 12 years would pass before the new concordat would be signed. Why the delay? Because Franco's grip on power would be challenged by the victors of the Second World War and Pope Pius XII cautiously awaited its outcome.

43 Chapter III: From ostracism to Cold War ally: preconditions for a new concordat

During the highpoint of Spain's post Second World War isolation, between 1945

and 1950, church and state relations in Spain developed increased significance, not only

for Franco's government and the Spanish Church, but also for the Vatican and the United

States. Two fundamental laws, a primary education law, and three agreements with the

Holy See were concluded to consolidate Franco's dictatorship as an "ideal" Catholic state.

These years provided the preliminary steps towards concordat negotiations. The onset of

the Cold War led influential American Catholics, anti-communists, businessmen, and

military leaders to Franco's aid. President Truman remained adamantly opposed to

allying with Franco, but was reluctantly pressured after the outbreak of the Korean War to open full diplomatic relations and approve a congressional loan to Spain of

$62,500,000. During Pope Pius XII's triumphant Jubilee in 1950, there was evidence of reserve towards Franco's dictatorship. The anti-Franco opposition, now further united, was convinced that Pius XII's support would help their cause. After the UN abandoned

diplomatic sanctions against Spain in November 1950, however, Pius XII finally agreed to open concordat negotiations. Franco's dual Catholic and anti-communist agenda served him well on the world stage.

Francisco Franco reveled in the Falangist press comparisons of their Caudillo to los reyes Catolicos. Even more so, he enjoyed concrete materializations of their patrimony. Conceptualized from the perpetual institution of the Patronado Real, first

developed by Ferdinand and Isabella and last regulated in 1851, Franco sought the restoration of traditions of Church patronage to consolidate the Church's support for his dictatorship. Remarkably, he succeeded in this regard and gained the right of patronage over the appointment of bishops in 1941. This concession from Pope Pius XII came at a cost. Spain was bound by the first four articles of the 1851 Concordat and was under agreement not to pass laws involving the Church's interests without the prior mediation of the Holy See.

However, there were difficulties in what Franco had bought. Finding prospective bishops sympathetic to the Falange proved more difficult than imagined. Although a stable relations were established between the Vatican and Spain in 1941, the Church was not free from battles with the Falange. Some of these factors would change when the defeat of Nazi Germany destabilized Franco's international standing, but, in so doing, cleared the way for the Church in Spain to assert its interests over the Falange.

In a number of ways, the civil-ecclesiastical relationship developed after the Civil

War served the traditional Church well, particularly in matters of education, marriage laws, finances, and the suppression of other religions. But in other ways, the liberty of the

Church was threatened. Franco's Civil War victory and attempted implementation of a fascist-style government caused the Catholic Church to lose its labour unions, youth groups, free Catholic press and lay political action. The Primate Pla y Deniel, although appointed for his pro-Franco sympathies during the Civil War, emerged as an influential player fighting to increase the liberty of the Church.

45 The background to Spain's postwar isolation was the "original sin," that Nazi

Germany and Fascist Italy had been Franco's allies during the Spanish Civil War. The

establishment of a brutal dictatorship was projected as a middle road between liberalism

and communism. Spain promulgated its first Fundamental Law in March of 1938, the

Fuero del Trabajo, somewhat of a Falangist constitution. During the Second World War,

Franco opportunistically remained neutral, although his regime provided Nazi Germany

with tungsten and other mining rights to pay off some of its debts.79 On 12 June, 1940

Spain changed its status to "nonbelligerent," and two days later captured the international

city of Tangiers.

Hitler and Franco met at Hendaye on 23 October, 1940 to discuss the terms of

Spain's entry into the war. Franco revealed his opportunism and enraged the Fuhrer.80

Spain would declare war on Britain and attack Gibraltar only if Germany would

guarantee economic aid and cede to Spain territory in French Morocco.81 When it came

to fighting Soviet Russia and not Britain, however, Franco had less reserve. The Caudillo

sent a volunteer group of Falangists in June of 1941, the Blue Division, to assist in

Germany's Operation Barbarossa. Many Spanish Catholics heeded the call. But when the

United States entered the war later that year and, with Britain, launched attacks in the

Mediterranean, Franco's optimism for a quick German victory dwindled.

In an effort to improve his standing among the allies in 1942, Franco dismissed

Serrano Suner as his Foreign Minister and declared Spain's second Fundamental Law,

79 Leonard Caruana and Hugh Rockoff, "A Wolfram in Sheep's Clothing: Economic Warfare in Spain, 1940-1944," The Journal of Economic History, 63.1 (March 2003), 100-126. 80 On Hendaye, see Eric Niderost, "The Secret Conference between Hitler and Franco at Hendaye could have changed the course of the War," World War II, 15.2 (July 2000), 66-72. 81 Franco also enraged the Fuhrer, by arguing that, even if Hitler took Britain, the government could continue their fight from Canada. Hitler explained his displeasure to Mussolini: to have "three or four teeth pulled out" would have been more pleasant than another meeting with Franco. Cited from Niderorst. 46 which re-established Spain's Cortes. Franco aimed to give his government some

semblance of democracy. He then ordered the withdrawal of his troops from Tangier and

offered the Allies guarantees that he would discontinue shipments of tungsten to

Germany. One of Franco's major miscalculations was waiting to re-declare neutrality

until 1944.82 Perhaps having helped the Allies more would have saved Spain from the

desperate years of isolation.

As the tide turned against Hitler, Franco sought to re-write Spain's role in the

Second World War. The Civil War was again stressed as a Catholic crusade against

communism. Aspirations for a new African empire were abandoned. Based on the ideals

of Hispanidad, which stressed a shared spiritual physiognomy born from the Castilian

language and Roman Catholic religion, Franco aspired to cultivate bonds with Latin

America. The Falange was being discredited as a political force.

Don Juan de Bourbon, the son of King Alfonso XIII, issued his Lausanne

Manifesto on 19 March 1945. It denounced Franco's dictatorship as a fascist government

and called for the transition to a constitutional monarchy. Don Juan urged the immediate resignation of prominent monarchists and encouraged the military to defect to his cause.

When need be, Franco could react decisively, which he did in this case. He opened a

session of the Consejo Superior del Ejercito (the Superior Council of the Army) on 20

March and tirelessly defended his position, arguing that Spain was so secure against the communist threat that the United States would soon adopt a similar form of government.

Catholic leaders Martin Artajo and Joaquin Ruiz Gimenez were then sent as Franco's personal envoys to Don Juan to convey the message that Catholics and Monarchists, for

82 Payne, The Franco Regime, 341. 47 the moment, could not support a transition. The pretender's Manifesto proved a disaster

for his cause.

Formed in reaction to the horrors of the Second World War, the United Nations was founded in 1945 in an attempt to ensure and foster peace, justice and democracy.

Franco was on the agenda. At the founding San Francisco conference a motion on membership requirements was passed. It was the initiative of the Mexican delegation and was inspired by exiled leaders of the Second Republic. It banned any country from joining that had been formed with the armed help of Nazi Germany or Fascist Italy. In an effort to promote a change in government, Franco's Spain was banned from the United

Nations.

At the Potsdam Conference, the Big Three met to discuss their cooperation in rebuilding Germany and postwar Europe.83 The Spanish situation was raised and Stalin supported breaking all diplomatic relations with Franco and offering support to the exiled government. Churchill (and later Attlee) and Truman were unwilling to intervene directly, potentially risking further unrest in Europe when rebuilding was the main concern. Potsdam's final communique made a specific reference to Franco's Spain, and denied it the possibility of membership in the United Nations. This was a "ratification" of the United Nations' declaration of 19 June. Communists and Democrats could work side by side in regard to Spain. Franco had good reason to fear.

On the international stage some hoped that Franco would restore the monarchy, while others looked to the exiled republican government, led by former Prime Minister

83 It lasted from 17 July to 2 August. For a study of the Spanish Question at Potsdam see Enrique Moradiellos, "The Potsdam Conference and the Spanish Problem,"Contemporary European History 10.1 (2001), 73-90. 48 Jose Giral y Pereira. Inside Spain another opposition group of non-communist socialists,

republicans and liberals emerged, the Alianza Nacional de Fuerzaz Democraticas

(ANFD). None of these bids for power worked in unison. Further to the left, Spanish

Communists and Anarchists took their own route, crossed the Pyrenees and unleashed a

guerilla war. The disparate forces of opposition suffered in their inability to collaborate,

attract Allied aid or secure internal support of Spain's main pillars, the military, party or

Church.

The Movement, which the Falange had been renamed as Spain's sole party, was

discredited on the international stage. Franco sought to redirect his government's image,

not by eliminating the Falange, but by taming it. Unwilling to make concessions to Don

Juan, Franco looked to Spanish Catholics and the Vatican for support. Thus Spain

promulgated as its third fundamental law, the Fuero de los Espanoles, on 17 July, 1945.

On the same day Spain enacted its Primary Education Law. The following day Franco

reshuffled his cabinet. All three marked significant concessions to the Church.

Franco honoured the terms of the Convenio that committed Spain to consult the

Vatican prior to legislating on "mixed matters." Thus the Spanish Church and the papal

nuncio lobbied in the development of both the Spanish Fuero and the Primary Education

law. The Fuero offered Spaniards civil liberties common to Western European nations, but did so insofar as these liberties did not challenge state authority. "Spaniards owe

faithful service to their country, loyalty to the Head of State, and obedience to the laws"

read article two. In tune with Canon Law, the family was declared the "natural and

fundamental institution of society," and marriage was declared "indissoluble." Article six

constitutionally defined Spain as a Catholic nation: "The profession and practice of the Roman Catholic religion, which is that of the Spanish State, will enjoy official

protection." In the eyes of the conservative Cardinal Segura, article 6 of the Fuero

contained elements that threatened Spain's Catholic unity. It continued: "The State will

assume the protection of religious freedom, which will be guaranteed by effective judicial

protection and which, in turn, will safeguard morals and public order." Both parts of

article six won approval with the Vatican. However the more conservative elements of

the Spanish hierarchy opposed any grounds of religious freedom.

The Primary Education Law was an even greater victory for the Spanish Church.

Since the Civil War the Falange and the Church had fought over control of education.

The 1945 law adopted a Thomist philosophy of Catholic education from Pius XI's

encyclical, Divini illius Magistri (1929).84 According to it, the foundation of Church

schools was embraced as an inherent right of the Church, which as a "perfect society,"

would be funded in their pedagogical efforts by the state. The Church would have the power to confer its own degrees and establish its own curriculum and faculty requirements. In state-run schools the hierarchy controlled religious education. In the words of the Education Minister, Ibanez Martin, the goal was to eliminate the "perverted rationalism characteristic of the teaching reforms of the ancient political utilitarianism."

Thus, the Spanish Church would teach Pius IX's Syllabus of Errors as standard

84 Rafael Calvo Serer, "The Church in Spanish Public Life Since 1936," The Catholic Church in World Affairs, Edited by Waldemar Gurian and M.A. Fitzsimons, Translation by Walter Langford and William Grupp's (Notre Dame: Notre Dame Press, 1954), 305-338, 322. 50 curriculum.85 The Primate of Spain tirelessly lobbied for this vision of the education

law.86

One day after promulgating the Fuero and education law, Franco reshuffled his

cabinet to reflect the changing international considerations. Ibanez Martin stayed on in

education. Jose Felix Lequerica, "the unabashed fascist," was removed as Foreign

Minister and replaced by Alberto Martin Artajo.87 This was Franco's most important

appointment and was intended to appease Pope Pius XII and win Spain allies amongst the

Catholic, anti-communist Hispanic world. Artajo was a social Catholic, had been

President of Spanish Catholic Action and had close ties to Angel Herrera Oria and other

Republican era progressive Catholics. Hesitant at first to accept the appointment, Artajo

was encouraged by Pla y Deniel and Angel Herrera to use the appointment to strengthen

the Catholic family's influence on Franco. Within Spain he could lobby for an end to

censorship, the republication of El Debate, and the creation of a social democratic

DO party. Artajo accepted the position under the condition that Franco replace his Axis- OQ tainted ministers in the cabinet. Franco rarely accepted ultimatums. That he did so was a testament to the importance that Franco put in Artajo's appointment. Franco's Catholic turn predated increased efforts to force Franco from power.

Spain's relations with France were an especially contentious issue. Being anti-

Franco had come to be identified as a badge of the anti-fascist resistance coalition. Any

85 Paul Blanshard, Freedom and Catholic Power in Spain and Portugal: An American Interpretation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1962), 115. 86 Callahan, 401. 87 Lequerica was also rejected as ambassador to the United States because of his record as a pro-Axis foreign minister. See Mark S. Byrnes, '"Overruled and Word Down': Truman Sends an Ambassador to Spain," Presidential Studies Quarterly, 29.2 (1999), 263-279, 264. 88 Preston, Franco, 539. 89 Preston, Franco, 538. 51 rapprochement between the Allied victors and Franco's Spain, Americans feared, would

have produced a propaganda victory for the French Communist Party. Spain's exiled

Republican government moved to France from Mexico soon after the Second World War.

Spanish communists stationed themselves along the Pyrenean border and unleashed a

guerilla war, in hope that an internal conflict could spark the Big Three into supporting

Franco's demise. When Franco's military captured and ordered the execution of a

communist chief in the campaign, Cristino Garcia, France responded by closing its borders to Spain. Garcia was a proclaimed hero of the French resistance. France wanted to sanction Spain economically, but also, along with the USSR, wanted the Spanish question to go before the newly-established United Nations Security Council. Britain had business interests in the peninsula and agreed with the United States in wanting to avoid bringing the "Spanish Question" to the Security Council, because of the risk of Soviet interference in Spanish domestic affairs. In an effort to placate French domestic opinion, and spark internal resistance in Spain, the United States, Britain and France issued their

Tripartite Declaration on 4 March 1946 that called for internal forces in Spain to bring about the peaceful removal of Franco. Any effect this might have had on Franco was tempered the following day when Winston Churchill issued his 'Iron Curtain' speech.

Peaceful relations between East and West were breaking down and Franco clearly recognized his opportunity to exploit anti-communism to his advantage.90

British and American initiatives were unable to keep the Spanish question away from the UN Security Council. On 11 April, 1946, the Polish delegation raised the

Spanish question and an investigative sub-committee was formed. This committee did not

90 Preston, Franco, 555. 52 find that the Franco regime posed a threat to European peace and security and thus

indicated the United Nations had no jurisdiction to forcibly intervene to remove Franco.

A committee was then formed in the General Assembly to draft a resolution. On 12

December 1946, the proposal of Tom Connally, Chair of the US Senate Committee on

Foreign Relations, was adopted. Franco's dictatorship, the resolution reaffirmed, "was

imposed by force upon the Spanish people with the aid of Axis powers".91 It declared that

Spain, a fascist state, should be isolated from all UN-related agencies and conferences.

Member states were recommended to "immediately recall" their ambassadors accredited

to Spain. The Franco regime was formally ostracized from the international community.

Only Portugal, Switzerland and the Vatican retained full diplomatic relations with Spain.

What were seen as cosmetic changes could not prevent the hostility of the United Nations

in 1946.

There were dangers of being isolated from the postwar community of nations, but there were also opportunities. In rebuilding his war-torn country, it was recognized that

Spain would need the United States as an ally. During the Civil War, the Spanish Church successfully lobbied for the support of the American episcopate. Franco hoped that by fashioning Spain as Catholic instead of fascist that American Catholics and anti- communists would again fight for him. In the meantime, Franco would use the UN ostracism to his advantage and play up xenophobic fears in an attempt to consolidate his domestic base of support. Four days after the Spanish Resolution was passed, he attended a celebration commemorating the Spanish resistance to the Napoleonic invasion. Franco identified the current international hostility against Spain as Masonic and Communist

91 "UN General Assembly Resolution 39(1) on the Spanish Question," 12 Dec 1946, Available Online at: http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/espana/doc/spal2dec46.html 53 inspired. He declared he would resist this foreign interference as fiercely as Spaniards

resisted Napoleon. Although it had disastrous economic effects on Spain, the UN-led

ostracism strengthened Spanish nationalism, and in the long run, helped consolidate

Franco's and the Catholic Church's grip on power.92

Pius XII was convinced after the Second World War that the best way to avoid

communist victory at the polls, particularly in Italy, was through supporting Christian

Democratic parties. In the Curia this was controversial, as conservative elements wanted

to avoid the creation of a single Catholic party, and aspired to an authoritarian, clerical

93 state. Instrumental in the Vatican's democratic direction was Monsignor Giovanni

Battista Montini, the future Pope Paul VI. Montini and Pius XII wanted to avoid Europe's polarization into pro-American and pro-Soviet camps, and wanted to see Latin Europe develop in unison to establish foundations of true peace. They feared Soviet Russia's interference in Eastern Europe. Montini and Pius XII hoped for a Christian Democratic transition in Spain, most likely in the form of a constitutional monarchy.94

Such aspirations for Spain were far from reality because the Spanish Episcopate appreciated its gains since the Civil War. To them, as the Second Republic had taught, democratic government was endemically anti-clerical. Despite hope for evolution, the

Vatican believed that Spain's ostracism from the international community was a mistake.

Pius XII would not sever diplomatic relations with Franco, which had little if any ability to force Franco from power. Even if such action were successful, it might have revitalized Spanish anarchists, socialists and communists.

92 Preston, Franco, 562. 93 Kent, The Lonely Cold War of Pope Pius XII, 28-29. 94 Anthony Rhodes, The Vatican in the age of the Cold War (Norwich: Michael Russell, 1992), 147, 170. 54 That Spain remained a contentious issue in Rome was demonstrated at Pius XII's

first consistory of 18 February, 1946. In general Pius XII used the consistory to

internationalize the curia, make clear his endorsement of Christian democracy and spread

awareness about the treatment of Catholics in communist controlled countries. In total he

created thirty-two new cardinals. Of the seventeen new European cardinals, three were

from Spain: Pla y Deniel, the Primate Archbishop of Toledo, Parrado y Garcia, the

Archbishop of Granada, and Arce y Ochotorena, Cardinal Vidal y Barraquer's successor

as Archbishop of Tarragona.95

One of the new cardinals was the Archbishop of New York, Francis Joseph

Spellman. He was a close friend of Pope Pius XII, and during the Spanish Civil War, had defended Franco's Nationalists as valiant crusaders against atheistic communism. After the death in 1944 of Pius XII's Secretary of State, Cardinal Maglione, the Pope offered

Spellman this top curial position. Convinced that he could be of better service from his

Archdiocese in New York, Spellman declined.96 Pius XII decided against appointing a

Cardinal Secretary of State and chose henceforth to personally run Vatican foreign affairs through two loyal under-secretaries: Montini of Ordinary Affairs and Domenico Tardini of Extraordinary Affairs. During the 1946 Consistory the Sacred College discussed

Franco's Spain and disagreement arose. Cardinal Spellman and the Americans favoured accepting Franco as an anti-communist ally, whereas the European cardinals by and large wanted to see Franco removed from power.

95 Five cardinals were created from North America, six from Latin America, and one each from Australia, Mozambique, China and Lebanon. 96 Fogarty, 307-308,310-311. 55 Franco hoped to use the consistory to his advantage and sent a delegation of

ministers to Rome charged with an important task. Franco was confident after his

renewed Catholic turn that he could complete his Patronado and conclude an agreement

on presentation privileges over appointments to non-consistorial benefices. He wanted to

ensure that appointees as parish priest and capitular clergy would help consolidate

support for his dictatorship. On top of that, the delegation raised further requests, aiming

to modernize Spain's ecclesiastical map and get Spain's uniquely privileged juridical

status in the Church restored by lobbying for the reinstatement of Spain's ecclesiastical

court of appeals.

Despite his reservations, Pius XII allowed negotiations to proceed from Madrid.

On 16 July, 1946, Spain and the Holy See signed an agreement on the "Provision of Non-

Consistorial Benefices."97 It allowed Franco to choose his candidate for numerous types of benefices from a list of three that was drawn up by a bishop. In regard to appointing parish priests, however, Franco was removed from the process and bishops retained their rights in accordance with Canon Law, although Franco did gain a veto over nominations if he objected to their political character. The agreement further reiterated a key article of the 1941 Convenio. Until a new concordat could come into being, Spain would abide by the first four articles of the 1851 Concordat.

Five months later Spain and the Holy See signed another agreement in Madrid, QO this time on "Seminaries and Universities of Ecclesiastical Studies." The date of 8

December was chosen on purpose, as it was the "Feast of the Immaculate Conception of

Our Lady, Patroness of Spain." Foreign Minister Artajo and Apostolic Nuncio Gaetano 97 "Addendum II," Facts About Spain, 50,27-31. 98 "Addendum V," Facts About Spain, 50,43-51. 56 Cicognani signed the agreement in the presence of the Ministers of Justice and National

Education, the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Director-General of Foreign Policy,

Director-General of Ecclesiastical Affairs, Director of relations with the Holy See, and

Chairman of the Concordat Committee. The agreement provided that the state would support major and minor seminaries in all the dioceses throughout Spain. The presence of numerous government officials underscored the importance Franco attributed to his diplomatic relations with the Holy See, especially in light of the 1946 UN Spanish resolution.

Negotiations over ecclesiastical boundaries floundered, but Franco's other goal, seeing the restoration of Spain's ecclesiastical court of appeals, materialized four months later. On 7 April 1947, Pius XII promulgated a Motu Proprio "on Restoration of the

Tribunal of the Rota of the Apostolic Nunciature."99 As a prelude to the rules laid down for the court, Pius XII briefly mentioned how "the lamentable upheavals" of the Second

Republic that denounced the 1851 Concordat, "denied the sacramental character of marriage, and perturbed the whole of the sacred domain" which had led Pius XI to abolish Spain's Rota on 21 June 1932. Now that Spain had rectified the Republic's

"vexations" and restored the "sacramental character of marriage," Pius XII saw fitting the restoration of the Rota according to the wishes of the Spanish episcopate and government.100

Some diplomatic observers identified the 1946 agreements and the 1947 Motu

Proprio as Pius XII's support for Franco's continued dictatorship, but the realities were far more complex. Pius XII feared alienating the Spanish Church hierarchy by publicly

99 "Addendum VI," Facts About Spain, 50, 53-61. 100 "Addendum VI," 53. 57 denouncing Franco. In the agreement on non-consistorial benefices Pius XII secured more for the Church than Franco desired. The agreement on seminaries was a resounding victory for the Church which Pius XII could hardly refuse, considering the recent plight of seminaries under communist persecution. The restoration of the Rota was a form of appeasement of Spain. However, behind the scenes it was a compromise deal in return for

Franco's presentation of Angel Herrera y Oria to the diocese of Malaga. Herrera, who had been an active supporter of Christian democracy during the Second Republic, studied in

Switzerland during the Civil War and took Holy Orders in 1940, had good relations with

European Catholics, and was far more progressive than any of the other Spanish bishops.

In the eyes of Foreign Minister Artajo, he would be persona grata in Rome.101

Pius XII wanted to see political evolution in Spain and an improvement of its international standing and felt that Spain's current isolation from the UN was counter- productive. The Vatican could lobby for Spain's evolution through loyal bishops such as

Herrera. But it understood that these efforts were unlikely to produce results, especially while the western democracies continued in their hostility to Franco and in favour of the

Republican and Monarchist opposition. The foremost example of which was Spain's exclusion from the Marshall Plan.

There were elements in the United States that did not agree with the Truman administration's aversion to Franco's Spain. The Catholic Republican Representative

Alvin O'Konski, for instance, passed a resolution through the House of Representatives designed to include Spain in the Marshall Plan but was defeated in consideration with the

Senate. It was evidence to Franco that the United States was ready to recognize Spain's

101Peter C. Kent, "The Dilemma over Franco Spain," (Unpublished manuscript, 2002), 19, 20. 58 anti-communist assets.102 If accepted into the ERP, persuaded the second in command of the Spanish Embassy at the Vatican to William Dunham, then Franco would agree to a bi-lateral treaty with the United States that would force Spain to make the liberalizing changes desired by western democracies. For this reason, Franco decided upon sending

Lequerica to Washington as his "foreign service inspector." Lequerica had Franco's

"complete confidence," even more so than Artajo, since he had no agenda other than to please Franco.103 From Washington Lequerica organized an influential Catholic lobby.

Soon demands were being heard from Catholics, anti-communists, and the military leaders of the desire to normalize relations with Spain, and thus seek the abandonment of the 1946 diplomatic sanctions. Truman refused all pressure to send an ambassador to

Spain and remarked he "did not care if Cardinal Spellman and the Pope" called for it.104

Lequerica failed to gain Spain's acceptance into the Marshall Plan, but his pro-

Spanish lobby eventually achieved other results. In 1949 a number of US senators visited

Madrid and the US Navy "demonstrated its interest in Spain by calling on Spanish ports."105 Military planners looked for prospects on the Iberian peninsula and in its

Atlantic and Mediterranean harbours. Western European hostility towards Franco ensured the impossibility of incorporating Spain into the newly formed North Atlantic Treaty

Organization (NATO). Thus, military planners wanted "unilateral action" to integrate

Spain into plans for Western defense. Such a policy, some diplomats feared, would

102 Byrnes, 265, 266. 103 Memorandum of Conversation, 11 May 1948, TP 26/800. 104 Byrnes, 266. 105 Byrnes, 269. 59 hinder American commitments to NATO.106 Truman's Secretary of State, Dean Acheson,

urged the President to reconsider current policy of isolating Spain in hopes of political

evolution. Truman reaffirmed his position; unless Franco provided "fundamental

freedoms, particularly freedom of worship", there could be no policy change.107 In 1947

and 1949 Cardinal Segura spoke of Protestant threats to Spain's Catholic unity.

Truman was increasingly criticized in this regard. Democratic Senator Pat

McCarran accused Truman of being anti-Catholic; Republican Senator Harry Cain

suggested the current policy was evidence of Communist influence in the Truman

1 fiR administration. In fact, there was inconsistency. Tito's persecution of Catholics in

Yugoslavia did not prevent American collaboration there. However in Spain, where less than one percent of the population was Protestant, Truman remained firm in his demand for religious liberty before any improvements could be made.109

The American charge d'affaires in Madrid, Paul Culbertson, also desired change.

He was critical of Spain but pressed the State Department to fight for the abolition of the

1946 Spanish resolution. He stated: "There are two major tragedies in Spain. One is the backward, bigoted Church... The other tragedy is the utter failure of the Franco regime to evolve." Despite this analysis, Culbertson tried to allay Truman's fears. Although

"religious intolerance" is "repugnant to our democratic concepts," he argued, it should not be blamed on Franco but on the Spanish Church and people that "support the old

106Memorandum by the Country Specialist in the Office of Western European Affairs Dunham (Washington) 15 April 1950, FRUS, Vol. Ill, 1558-59. 107 Byrnes, 270. 108 Byrnes, 267, 269. 109 Malley (Madrid), "Survey of the Church in Spain and of its Attitude towards the Regime," 12 Dec 1951, FO, WS1781/1. 60 inquisition spirit...and are bigoted and backward."110 He saw no options, the exiled leaders had no internal support, and hopes for an abrupt liberalization might incite revolution. Culbertson urged the United States to negotiate with Franco.111

Some American and Italian diplomats recognized that perhaps a role might be played by Pius XII. They urged the Holy See to use their influence. By putting pressure on Franco towards democratization, they hoped that Franco's government might evolve into an acceptable ally of the Western European democracies.112 Pius XII "was infinitely prudent" in this regard. Rather than use direct pressure on Franco through the nunciature, he preferred to use the Spanish episcopate to call for change.113

Pius XII had entertained preliminary thoughts of convening a Church council and set preparatory stages in motion in 1948. The Congregation of the Holy Office took up the task under the direction of Monsignor Alfredo Ottaviani, since 1935 its Assessor.114

Pius XII abandoned the initiative for a council, but not the aspirations of Ottaviani and the Roman Party. Foremost amongst them was the idea of proclaiming the dogma of the bodily assumption of Mary, which had been the topic of a 1946 encyclical of Pius XII.

Ottaviani also wanted to continue along the line of Pius IX and develop a present day

Syllabus of Errors. Pius XII decided upon using the opportunities presented in the upcoming year of Jubilee to put forth some of Ottaviani's agendas. The papal bull to

"°Culbertson (Madrid) to Acheson, 22 June 1949, FRUS, Vol. IV, 750-753. 1 "He wrote: "So long as we spit in the eye of the guy who has it in his power to bring about evolution, we can expect little progress." Culbertson (Madrid) to Secretary of State, 20 June 1950, FRUS, Vol. Ill, 1563- 1567. u2Foreign Ministry to Washington, 9 Aug 1950, ASMAE, B19/555/Espagne; Foreign Ministry to Washington, 3 Aug 1950, ASMAE, B19/555/Espagne. 113Madrid to Foreign Ministry, 15 July 1950, ASMAE, B19/555/Espagne. 114 Ottaviani worked closely with Pius XII, as the Assessor had the role of reporting findings of the Cardinals within the Holy Office to the Pope, as well as presenting the cases of consulters to the Holy Office. announce 1950 as a Holy Year emerged on 26 May, 1949. Not two months later the

Vatican moved to the offensive. On 1 July the Holy Office promulgated an

excommunication decree for Catholics who collaborated with, belonged to, or voted for

communist parties. If there had ever been any doubt, communism and Catholicism were

deemed mutually exclusive.

On 20 December, 1949 the Madrid press recorded progress for negotiations

between the Holy See and Foreign Minister Martin Artajo aimed at the creation of six

new dioceses in Spain. Franco aspired to travel to Rome to finish these negotiations and be present for the beginning of the Holy Year, but reservations on the part of the Italian

government prevented his trip."5 Thus, Foreign Minister Martin Artajo departed Madrid

for Rome, and was accompanied by representatives of a charitable organization, I'Oeuvre

Pie. Apart from successful negotiations for new dioceses, Artajo raised the prospect of negotiating an accord to stipulate the terms of a military chaplaincy. The Vatican initially

showed reluctance. A provisional agreement on the military chaplaincy had been signed in 1937, which put the authority of chaplains directly under the Primate Archbishop of

Toledo.116 Bernard Hardion, the French charge d'affaires in Madrid, interpreted the

Vatican's reluctance to negotiate a new agreement as representative of the Holy See's wish to keep the Spanish Church free from the further confines of State control.117

Following Artajo's trip to Rome, there was press speculation that the Holy See had again refused attempts to accept Spain's offer to open concordat negotiations.118 In Madrid, this

115 Hardion (Madrid) to MAE, 20 December 1949, Q d'O, z Europe 1949-55/Espagne 35/ PP. 210-213. 116Madrid to Washington, 10 Aug 1950 ASMAE, B19/555/Espagne. 117Hardion (Madrid) to MAE, 20 December 1949, Q d'O, z Europe 1949-55/Espagne 35/ PP. 210-213. 118Hardion (Madrid) to MAE, 28 February 1950, Q d'O, z Europe 1949-55/Espagne 35, PP. 37-48. 62 spurred a fierce denunciation, including a denial in Ecclesia by Pla y Deniel.119 The

implication that the Vatican did not support Spanish efforts was injurious to the proud

Spanish Catholic Church, as well as to Spain's international image. Pius XII was reluctant

to flatter Franco with more agreements, but was also hesitant to directly pressure Spain in

the directions hoped by the Truman administration. He had to walk a fine line, as he was

always at risk of frustrating the Spanish Episcopate.

Don Juan the Pretender attempted in 1950 to get Pius XII to shore up international

support against Franco, and support his ascendance to the Spanish throne. Perhaps what

was surprising was that the Pretender and his monarchist contingent were received at the

10C\ Vatican with all the traditional pomp deserved for the Spanish Monarch. On the other hand, when Francisco Franco's wife made the pilgrimage to Rome, accompanied by her

daughter, son-in-law, and a contingent of government officials, they were received in what they considered a less than dignified manner.121

Pius XII aimed to avoid political discussions with Don Juan, but eventually stated reservations towards the leadership of Franco, and stated that he was opposed to all forms of dictatorship. Nonetheless, he explained that it was not the Vatican's role to interfere in domestic politics, particularly in Spain, where the Church had great protection. When pushed further, Pius XII made the comment that if Don Juan had the clear economic and political backing of the United States, Britain and France, as well as that of the working people in Spain, then the Holy See would be willing to support Don Juan's ascendancy.

119Hardion (Madrid) to MAE, 28 February 1950, Q d'O, z Europe 1949-55/Espagne 35, PP. 37-48. 120 In contrast, King Leopold of Belgium, who wanted to be restored to power but did not have the Pope's blessing, was received during the Holy Year as a mere pilgrim. Roberts (Holy See) to Morrison, "Holy See: Annual Review for 1950," 25 July 1951, FO, WV 1011\3. 121Hardion (Madrid) to MAE, 14 June 1950, Q d'O, z Europe 1949-55/Espagne 35, PP. 71-78. 63 Don Juan naively boasted that he had secured Pius XII's support and he discussed this

with Theodore Xanthakey, the US Special Assistant to the Ambassador in Portugal.

Xanthakey properly interpreted the Pope's statements as "highly diplomatic."

Franco had a heart attack in the summer of 1950, which, although it was kept a

tight secret, was not hidden from diplomatic circles. Pius XII wondered what would happen if Franco were to die and reportedly broached the subject with Franco's wife.123

Protection of the Church against encroachments of secular or atheist states was a main theme of Holy Year. Pius XII could not ignore that Franco treated the Church well. Pius

XII might have still hoped that Franco would restore the monarchy on his own terms, but it was likely that Don Juan's breach of protocol and repeatedly demonstrated ambition was disapproved of by the Pope. Franco was too cautious to hand over power; Don Juan was too anxious to seize it.

Regardless, Don Juan felt he had the Pope on his side, and he hoped to encourage another tripartite statement of support, along the lines of the 1946 French, British and US denunciation. The other exiled leaders felt similarly, with both the representative of the

Spanish Socialist Workers Party, Senor Gomez and the representative of the Spanish

Confederation of Monarchist Forces, Senor Vejerano, having told the British Foreign

Office that they believed Pius XII would support Don Juan in the event of another tripartite declaration against Spain.124 The President of the Basque Republic in Exile, Jose

Antonio Aguirre, followed a similar line, and argued that the original declaration failed because the Spanish opposition had lacked their present unity. Now that non-communist

122Memorandum of Conversation by Special Assistant (Xanthaky) to the Ambassador in Portugal (MacVeagh), 20 June 1950, FRUS, Vol. 111,1567-1569. 123Madrid to Foreign Ministry, 15 July 1950, ASMAE, B19/555/Espagne. 124Roberts (Holy See) to Morrison, "Holy See: Annual Review for 1950," 25 July 1951, FO, WV 1011\3. 64 exiled leaders were in unison, a similar declaration could spur a coup within Spain and

replace Franco with a democratic institution. The entire opposition was aware of the

importance of Pius XII's support. The proposals came too late; there would be no new

tripartite declaration. The State Department had already begun to fight for better relations

with Spain, even if Truman had still to be convinced.125

On 25 June 1950, North Korean troops invaded South Korea, crossing the boundary of the 38th parallel drawn up after the Second World War. Truman and

Acheson felt it was inspired by Moscow, acted decisively and sent troops on 28 June. Air

strikes were ordered the following day. The United Nations passed a resolution in

support. At first, this intensification of the Cold War did nothing to alter Truman's policy towards Spain. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), however, found in the new situation an urgent need to incorporate Spain into NATO, which they presented as National Security

Council (NSC) resolution 72 on 3 July 1950. NSC 72 argued that in the event of a war in

Europe, NATO could not currently defend itself and Spain was a necessary ally. The

State Department disagreed and worried that "participation of Spain would cause dissension and controversy" amongst Western democracies and thus hinder the efficacy of NATO.126 Truman called NSC 72 "decidedly militaristic."127

In the fall of 1950, Acheson adapted his position. First, in September the British and French Foreign Ministers clarified that Spain's eventual integration into Western defense was in some degrees desirable.128 Second, the intervention of Chinese forces in

125Acheson to Connally (Washington), 18 January 1950, FRUS, Vol. Ill, 1549-1555. 126 "A Report to the National Security Council by the Secretary of State," 3 July 1950, FRUS, Vol. Ill, 1570-1572. 127 Byrnes, 274. 128 Byrnes, 274. 65 Korea on 26 October solidified American fears of the escalation of a global conflict. The

United States did not feel that it could currently protect Western Europe in the event of a

war with the Soviet Union. Leaving Franco out of plans for defense was identified for its

dangers.

Meanwhile, relations between Spain and the Vatican had improved. On 5 August,

1950 the Spanish Ambassador to the Vatican, Joaquin Ruiz-Gimenez, concluded

negotiations with Monsignor Tardini for an "Agreement between the Holy See and the

Spanish Government on Military Jurisdiction and Religious Assistance to the Armed 1 ^Q

Forces." The terms of the agreement were quite favourable to the Church. Tardini

succeeded in reducing what were considered "regalistic servitudes" that the Military

Vicar General in Spain had historically represented.130 In particular, what was new was

that seminarians and priests were excluded from the possibility of conscription.

According to one diplomat, in prolonging the negotiations for this agreement, the Vatican

further evaded Spain's prospects for a concordat.131

The first step towards Spain's international rehabilitation was the withdrawal of the diplomatic sanctions of 1946. Spain's Latin American Allies had called for a vote unsuccessfully in 1949, but now, in the atmosphere of the Korean War, had the

Americans on board. Peru and the Dominican Republic brought the issue to the General

Assembly. A resolution was drafted that repealed the diplomatic sanctions and formally allowed Spain membership in UN related organizations. President Truman reluctantly allowed his delegation to vote in its favour. On 4 November, 1950, the vote passed 38

129 Addendum IV, Facts About Spain, 50, 37-42. 130Cocks (Holy See) to Bevin, 11 Aug 1950, FO, WV 1783X7. 13'Cocks (Holy See) to Bevin, 11 Aug 1950, FO, WV 1783Y7. 66 votes to 10, with 12 abstentions. Pope Pius XII was pleased. With Franco's UN diplomatic isolation at an end, the Pope finally agreed to requests to open concordat negotiations.

67 Chapter IV: Internal factors leading to the Concordat of 1953

After the 1941 Convenio Francisco Franco acquired privileges of patronage for

the appointment of bishops. After the 1946 agreement, Franco acquired these privileges

on a much broader level, over the appointment of non-consistorial benefices. As Head of

State and, since 1947, self-appointed regent of the crown, Franco had successfully

acquired a modified Patronado Real from the traditions of los reyes Catolicos. In his

revisionist conception of Spanish national history, Franco would not model his system on that of Isabella II or Ferdinand VI.132 He regarded the nineteenth and eighteenth centuries

as disastrous years that saw foreign ideas enter Spain, destroy its greatness and undermine the collaboration of church and king that emerged during the Reconquista. As defined by the thirteenth century Castilian Monarch Alfonso X, the origin of the right of patronage was in donating land, building Churches and establishing them with the economic means necessary for the cure of souls.133 This threefold contribution gained the patron three rights of patronage in return. Foremost was honour. Second was the Church's support of their patron if ever needed in times of trouble. The third was the right to watch over the spiritual work, or basically, appoint prelates. Franco possessed the last privilege, but what of the first two? The national Catholic rhetoric "one Caudillo, one faith, and the

132 Isabella II concluded the 1851 Concordat. Ferdinand VI concluded the 1753 Concordat. 133 Shiels, 22. 68 advance in the name of God and eternal Spain" undermined the reality.134 Not only was

Franco's honour in question, but the Church seemed reticent to help him in time of need.

Criticisms of the dictatorship by the Spanish episcopate demonstrated that Franco needed

to consolidate his Patronado. In opening negotiations for a concordat, Franco demanded

both honour and the expressed support of the Church.

There were a number of issues that increased the necessity of a concordat. The

Church in Spain had been increasingly vocal. In regards to education, the treatment of

Protestants, censorship, warming relations with the United States and the deplorable

situation of workers under the Falangist system, the Spanish episcopate criticized Franco.

These issues that were primarily domestic frustrated Spain's foreign relations. Since 1945

Spain was projected to the world as a great Catholic nation, one that had defeated the

communist menace in a twentieth century Reconquista. Franco wanted a concordat to

secure this powerful myth.

There were also practical concerns leading to a new concordat. Franco's main pillars of support were losing their confidence. In 1951 as western ambassadors returned to Madrid, the internal balance of power in Spain spiraled out of control. The military,

Franco's ultimate guarantor for power, was under-funded and poorly resourced. It was beginning to lose faith in its Generalissimo.135 When Franco needed it in Barcelona to put down strikes that implicated the Falange, the monarchist Captain General refused. The

Falange was also resentful of Franco for downplaying its influence in favour of social

134 Callahan, "The Evangelization of Franco's 'New Spain,'" 499. 135 For a general discussion of military discontent prior to the Pact of Madrid, refer to Paul Preston, "Decay, Division, and the Defense of Dictatorship: The Military and Politics, 1939-1975," Elites and Power in Twentieth-Century Spain: Essays in Honour of Sir Raymond Carr, Fraces Lannon and Paul Preston, eds. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 203-228. 69 Catholics after the Second World War. The Church continued to be frustrated by state

censorship, infringements on its apostolate and by problems in Spain's system of

education. The UN-sponsored ostracism had bolstered the disparate Nationalist camp

behind its Caudillo. Now that it had dissipated, questions concerning Spain's future were

paramount for all. Attaining a concordat had taken on increased importance. Negotiations

would be carried out in Rome by Spain's ambassador, Ruiz Gimenez and Pius XII's

undersecretary of Extraordinary Affairs, Monsignor Tardini. Before they could begin,

Spain's inter-ministerial concordat committee needed to compose a draft. The Ministers

of Foreign Affairs, Education, Justice and the Secretary of the Movement went to work in

earnest. There were a number of issues that were on the agenda. Foremost, Franco wanted his Patronado enshrined indefinitely. He wanted the political and religious capital of a concordat, and due honour for his contribution in restoring the Church. Franco wanted to eliminate Spain's adherence to the first four article of the 1851 Concordat, which in theory gave the Church immense power, and rewrite his own version. He wanted priests to offer prayers for the Head of State and to regulate church and state according to Canon Law to such a degree as to undermine criticisms of the immorality of his dictatorship. Furthermore, there were education issues, financial details and cultural considerations.

Spain's economy was in dire straits and the country was desperately in need of aid. The social distress caused by autarky had been apparent at the Vatican for years. In

1951 crises erupted and repression proved unable to prevent unrest. This was first apparent in Barcelona, Spain's industrial center. On 1 March 1951, coincidentally the same day that Stanton Griffis presented his credentials as the new American Ambassador to Spain, protests materialized in the form of a boycott of the tram service due to fare

increases. After the Civil Guard contained the disorder, the authorities made efforts at

appeasement, acquiesced to the boycotters' demands and reinstated the old tram fares.

The unrest, however, could not be so easily dismissed and it soon spread as a general boycott in reaction to high prices and low wages. It escalated into a general strike that

1"XI consisted of nearly all the factories, shops and offices in Barcelona.

The dissidents had good reason to protest. The cost of living was sevenfold what

it had been before the war, and the meager prewar wages had increased only three 1 times. Poverty and inflation were so dire that many factory and store owners actually

collaborated with their workers against the government.139 "[T]hese events," wrote

British Ambassador John Balfour to the Foreign Office, "had been planned in the first instance by a section of the Falange who saw an opportunity for making political capital out of the prevailing social distress."140 Barcelona's civil governor, Eduardo Baeza

Alegria, could not control his subordinates, and the armed police refused orders to put down the strikers. Baeza then called on the monarchist captain general, Juan Bautista

Sanchez, for help. Sanchez refused all assistance for what he saw as caused by an inept civil governor.

Politically, there was a crisis within the Movement between old-guard, civil war

Falangists, and the younger, opportunist generation. Some of the leaflets propagated to encourage the general strike were distributed by this younger generation. These dissidents

136 Balfour (Madrid) to Eden, "Spain Annual Review, 1951," 21 Jan 1952, FO WS 1011/1. 137 Balfour (Madrid) to Eden, "Spain Annual Review, 1951," 21 Jan 1952, FO WS 1011/1. 138 Telogram from d'Ormesson, 16 March 1951, Q d'O, z Europe 1949-55/Espagne 35 pp. 130 + 139 Telogram from d'Ormesson, 16 March 1951, Q d'O, z Europe 1949-55/Espagne 35 pp. 130 + 140 Balfour (Madrid) to Eden, "Spain Annual Review, 1951," 21 Jan 1952, FO WS 1011/1. 71 opposed the directives of Baeza, and the tram company, as well as Spain's economic

leadership, notably, Juan Antonio Suanzez, Minister of Trade and Industry and head of

the INI, which was the state controlled industry investment holding firm modeled on

Mussolini's IRI. With Bautista Sanchez unwilling to save Baeza with his forces, Franco

was forced to act and he sent in "three destroyers and a minesweeper" to put down the

strike.141 Marines and the armed police restored order and workers returned to their jobs.

Baeza, unwilling to blame the Falange, declared that the strikes were of communist

inspiration. Just as the left had "provoked the diplomatic and economic blockade of our

Patria, they try it now when the blockade has been dissipated, when it can be expected

that its economic consequences will also be dissipated."142 The Catalan Communist Party,

PSUC, was involved, and its former leader, Gregorio Lopez Raimundo, was promptly

arrested, imprisoned and tortured.143 The protests, strikes and loss of authority were not just a communist event, but demonstrated widespread discontent at all levels of society.

They created a significant turning point for the Franco regime, demonstrating that

repression could no longer hide Spain's dire situation.144

Franco promptly sacked Baeza and replaced him with the hard-line, old-guard

Falangist, General Felipe Acedo, and young dissidents within the Movement were removed. When smaller disturbances broke out in Spain that spring, authorities "reacted vigorously," employing their "propaganda machine" in full force.145 The protest planned

141 Richards, 566. 142 Richards, 566. 143 Although he eventually was released into exile as the result of an "international outcry." Richards, 568. 144 Richards, 573. 145 Balfour (Madrid) to Eden, "Spain Annual Review, 1951," 21 Jan 1952, FO WS 1011/1. 72 for 22 May in Madrid against high prices was prevented.146 Although the government

showed its strength, it did not resort to the extreme repression that had characterized the

civil war, and had appalled even Nazi onlookers. The repercussions of autarky, the

corruption of industrialists and pitfalls of the syndicate system were only partially

realized in 1951. The system which had developed was coined a "rational-bureaucratic

authoritarian rule," and the announcement of Franco's fifth government signified this

slightly modified direction. Foreign Minister Martin Artajo was one of only three cabinet members to retain their positions in the 19 July cabinet shuffle. By and large, the new

cabinet lacked the Catholic veneer demonstrated in 1945. Although he remained the head of the INI, the "architect of autarky," the Minister of Industry and Commerce, Senor

Suanzes, was removed and the Ministry was divided into two separate entities. The necessity of trade was partially recognized in a "liberalizing turn."147 The ideological constraints of autarky were slightly modified.

Franco made a surprising ministerial change and removed his long-standing

Minister of Education, Jose Ibanez Martin, who had recently come under criticism.

Franco wanted a young Catholic in good standing with the Vatican to take over the portfolio. At first he appointed Fernando Maria Castiella but, to Franco's surprise, the up and coming diplomat refused the position. Having developed a committed and tenacious

148 reputation as a diplomat, Castiella wanted to continue in that line of work. Franco thought over the possibilities, and decided that Ruiz Gimenez, Spain's Ambassador to the

Holy See, would be well suited to be Minister of Education and that Castiella might 146 A small boycott of the public transport system occurred, but in general, the government had restored order in the country by May. 147 Richards, 572-573. 148 Tusell, Franco y Los Catolicos, 250. 73 prove a better plenipotentiary in concordat negotiations. Thus, the well regarded

Ambassador in Rome, much to his surprise, was recalled and appointed Minister of

Education.

Gimenez had nominally made headway towards a concordat and had also raised

the possibility of restoring to Spain's Head of State honourary privileges over Mary's

Roman Patriarchal Basilica, Santa Maria Maggiore. On 6 April 1951, Ruiz Gimenez

submitted the Concordat committee's initial draft. He had been confident in his ability to

conclude the agreement. He hoped that 1951, the centenary of the 1851 Concordat and tenth anniversary of the 1941 Convenio, might just be the year. Although he was removed

from Rome, Gimenez would still be involved in negotiations as a member of the

Concordat Committee. He was ready for changes in the Education Ministry and Franco understood that this was important for concluding a concordat.

The Education Ministry had developed increased significance in Franco's Spain.

Ibanez Martin had held the education portfolio since 1939, but new controversies provided reasons for his removal. Ibanez Martin had been a Catholic in good standing with Pius XII, particularly for his Elementary Education Law of 17 July 1945. There were problems in what had become a two-tiered education system. With no standardization between the state and Catholic schools, the examinations required for students to proceed to state-run secondary or post-secondary institutions hindered the graduates of Church-run schools. Education was considered a "mixed matter," thus according to the 1941 convenio, any new legislation must first be negotiated with the

Holy See. In the early 1950s Spain was undertaking a reform of secondary education in order to minimize some of the current difficulties of their education system. The Holy See was favourable to the Spanish government's concerns, and wanted to see some sort of

standardization, but ran into difficulties in dealing with the Spanish hierarchy, which

fiercely refused any state interference in the area of examinations. According to

Monsignor Tardini, the Spanish Church had embarrassed the Vatican in the matter.149

There was yet another matter in education that needed to be addressed, and it related to the power of Opus Dei over Spanish universities. Opus Dei had been founded

in 1928 by Father Josemaria Escriva. It received its first diocesan approval from the pro-

Falangist Bishop of Madrid, Leopoldo Eijo y Garay in 1941, and temporary recognition by Pius XII in 1947 as a secular institute. It had three basic divisions. The elite of Opus

Dei were called numeraries. To become one of these required taking the three oaths of poverty, chastity and obedience, as well as having received a doctorate and pursued advanced theological and philosophical studies. Oblates were second in the order, and also took the three oaths. Supernumeries were at the bottom of the Opus hierarchy and did not require the oath of celibacy.150 On 16 June 1950, the Holy See approved Opus Dei and agreed to let married couples join. The Clergy were also free to join Opus Dei's

Priestly Society of the Holy Cross. In general, Opus Dei was a Catholic group that encouraged men and women from all backgrounds, careers or classes, to seek sanctity through their daily, ordinary work. It especially attracted and encouraged intellectuals to make a difference in society. It was a secretive organization and drew much of its theology from the conservative Spanish Church. Father Escriva's book, The Way,

149 d'Ormesson (Holy See) to Schuman, 5 March 1952, Q d'O, z Europe 1949-55, Espagne 35, 210-213. 150 Richard Herr, An Historical Essay on Modern Spain (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), 226-227. On Opus Dei, see two new books: John L. Allen Jr., Opus Dei: An Objective Look behind the Myths and Reality of the Most Controversial Force in the Catholic Church (London: Doubleday, 2005); Robert Hutchison, Their Kingdom Come: Inside the Secret World of Opus Dei (London: Doubleday, 1997). 75 outlined the basics of Opus Dei. Cardinal Tedeschini, formerly nuncio to Spain, was

appointed by Pius XII as "Guard" of Opus Dei.

The Minister of Education Ibanez Martin was fond of Opus Dei and appointed

Escriva's right hand man, Jose Maria Albareda, to an influential position, as head of the

institution that awarded university fellowships and grants, the Consejo Superior de

Investigaciones Cientificas. Albareda rewarded Opus Dei members over all others.

Ibanez Martin also appointed Opus members to the juries that elected university

departmental chairs. The result was that by 1950 Opus Dei had a stranglehold on Spain's

universities, particularly in departments of philosophy and history. Rafael Calvo Serer,

Opus Dei's main theorist, acquired the chair of philosophy at the University of Madrid.

A number of elements of Spanish society distrusted the secretive Opus Dei and

resented the Minister of Education for giving them control of the universities. The

Falange was at the top of this list, but the other religious orders and Catholic Actionists

were also frustrated and feared its rising influence. Ruiz Gimenez distrusted Opus Dei

and did not approve of Ibanez Martin's overt favoritism of the group. Professor Gimenez had studied during less repressive times. Despite his own orthodoxy, he was a supporter

of Spain's progressive luminaries, such as Ortega y Gasset. One of Gimenez's first tasks

as Minister of Education was to pass a law that made competitions for professorships more open, thereby slowing the rise of Opus Dei in the universities. Gimenez soon oversaw the appointment of two Falangists of social Catholic persuasion as rectors to the universities of Salamanca and Madrid.151

151 Herr, 238. 76 Although friends, Maria Castiella was quite different in background and

personality from Ruiz Gimenez. To the outside world, Castiella's reputation was more

Falangist than Catholic. Formerly of Catholic Action, Castiella had published in the

Catholic review, Signo, but not prominently as had Artajo and Gimenez in Ecclesia and

Boletin de la Asociacion Catolica Nacional de Propagandistas.152 Notably, Castiella had

coauthored the prototypical expression of Spain's imperialist objectives during the

Second World War, Reivindicaciones de Espana (1941), for which he was awarded the

National Prize of Literature. Following that accomplishment, he enrolled in the volunteer

Blue Division and fought against Soviet Russia alongside Nazi Germany. For this

service, he was awarded an Iron Cross by Hitler. After the Second World War, Castiella

assisted the commission which produced the Spanish Fuero. In 1948, when Peru and

Spain exchanged ambassadors, Franco sent Castiella to serve in Lima. With the opening of full diplomatic relations with Britain in 1951, Franco recalled Castiella from Peru and appointed him to London, only to be refused by the British due to his fascist credentials.

Castiella would encounter difficulties in Rome that Gimenez had not. Why had Franco appointed an ambassador of questionable background?

The former ambassador had been well regarded at the Vatican, and got along well with Curia moderates like Montini. Franco was suspicious that Gimenez did not share his ideal system of Church-State relations, which favoured the traditional regalism of the monarch over the autonomy of the church. Javier Tusell, the principal historian of concordat negotiations, concluded that Franco did not consider Gimenez "so much

152 Tusell, Franco y los Catolicos, 251. 77 Spain's ambassador to the Vatican as the Vatican's ambassador to Spain."153 After the

initial draft had been received, Pope Pius XII made clear that he wanted to take back the

1941 and 1946 concessions to Franco that allowed him to hand-pick Spain's bishops and

lesser clergy. In Franco's mind, no such concordat would ever be concluded. The

Caudillo was confident that Castiella would negotiate a tougher line in Rome. The

Patronado Real was the sine qua non of Franco's concordat.

Castiella's background set him apart from his predecessor and he was particularly concerned about specifics of Spanish Catholicism. He was a proponent of integrism, the anti-modern movement born out of the First Vatican Council (1870) and the particulars of nineteenth century Spanish Catholicism. Historian Javier Tussel explained that

Castiella's shock upon his arrival in Rome must have been more than Gimenez's shock upon his removal. "Less clerical," but more intransigent, Castiella found himself an outsider in Rome, complained about his cool reception from Montini, and was frustrated by a general protest against Spain sparked by his arrival. He thoroughly believed that a confessional Catholic state was the ultimate form of government and was, therefore, highly critical of the Italian Christian Democrats. Like the majority of Spanish Catholics, he saw liberal democracy as inherently anti-Catholic. Nonetheless, he was surrounded in

Rome by the view that Spain was a stain on the map of Christian Europe. At the presentation of his credentials, Pius XII made an obscure reference to Spain's international image. "We have requested in heaven that it will not be long until the dissonances and distances of today are lost in a fruitful harmony of intentions and of

153 Javier Tusell, Spain: From Dictatorship to Democracy: 1939 to the Present, Translated by Rosemary Clark (Blackwell Publishing, 2007), 110. 78 activity."154 The Pope's words were widely commented upon. Castiella believed the Pope

meant that the return of Spain into a concert of nations was a prerequisite for improved

relations. The leftist press interpreted it as the Pope's blessing on Spain. However, the

Italian Catholic press saw it more as a diplomatic way to bring to Castiella's attention that

without evolution, Spain's authoritarian regime could not promote Christian peace.

Castiella was understandably angered by this.155

There were ample reasons for Pius XII not to desire a concordat. On a general

level, the interwar era of concordats had come to an end. Pius XII embraced democracy

and denounced dictatorships. At the 1946 consistory there were European cardinals that

raised criticisms of Pius XI's policy of concluding concordats with dictators. The German

Concordat of 1933 was the foremost object of this debate. Nonetheless, Franco had

proved to be a different sort of dictator, one that followed the terms of preliminary

agreements. Tardini could have stepped up negotiations in April by promptly preparing a

counter-draft. Under the guidance of Pius XII and with the support of Montini, such a

move was prolonged. The labour unrest and tightening of repression in Spain worried the

Holy See. Montini argued now that since Franco had finally weathered the years of UN

ostracism, he was much more prone to flex his authoritarian muscles against the wishes

of the Church.156 Tardini's general reflection was that "the attachment to a specifically

Spanish design of Catholicism" raises concerns, that perhaps it is not truly ultramontane, but proud of its legacy and sees Roman Catholicism as cosa nostra. Furthermore, Pius

154 "Nos pedimos al cielo que no tarde la hora en que las disonancias y distancias de hoy se pierdan en una fructuosa armonia de propositos y de activida." Tusell, Franco y los Catolicos, 252. 155 Tusell, Franco y los Catolicos, 252. 156 Telogram from d'Ormesson, 16 March 1951, Q d'O, z Europe 1949-55/Espagne 35, 130 + 79 XII was bothered by bombastic, neo-Golden Age rhetoric, claims that Franco Spain

marked a Christian identification unmatched since the times of King Phillip II.

On the other hand, the persecution of the Church in the eastern bloc made the

privileged situation in Spain seem ideal, especially to the curial elements that opposed the

postwar democratic turn. In Western Europe the Roman Catholic Church was

experiencing problems in regard to ecclesiastical discipline and theological orthodoxy.

Thus, Pius XII issued the encyclical Humani Generis during the Holy Year, and

promulgated the infallible dogma of the Assumption of the Virgin Mary into Heaven.

Such conservative measures were well received by Spanish Churchmen like Cardinal

Segura. Ecclesiastical discipline in democratic Europe was raising concerns. A worker

priest experiment in France, for instance, had led some to denounce their vows of

celibacy and marry. Pius XII also feared the rising influences of secularism, capitalism,

socialism and unorthodox theology in Latin America. The Pope's encyclical of 20 June

1951, Evangelli Praecones, addressed the danger and called for increased missionary

activity in Latin America, where "dangerous pitfalls" of "open and covert attacks of heretical teaching" endanger Catholicism.158 The Spanish Church had stepped up its missionary activity in Latin America and was praised for this by the Vatican as a weapon

against these recent trends.159 Despite Castiella's cool reception in Rome, there was

evidence that Pius XII was growing in his appreciation of the Spanish Church.

In December of 1951 Castiella suggested to Martin Artajo that Spanish Catholic

Action should get its representatives to respond to its critics in the "pagan" publications

157 d' Ormesson (Holy See) to Schuman, 5 March 1952, Q d'o, z Europe 1949-55, Espagne 35, 210-213. 158 Evangelli Praecones, 20 June 1951. 159 d' Ormesson (Holy See) to Schuman, 5 March 1952, Q d'o, z Europe 1949-55, Espagne 35, 210-213. 80 of Italian Catholic Action, and "rectify the grave errors" it propagated.160 Artajo

responded by sending two prominent pro-Franco men from Spanish Catholic Action:

Fernando Martin-Sanchez Julia and Bishop Angel Herrera Oria. Castiella arranged with

Montini for their private audiences with the Pope. Martin-Sanchez, having been Herrera's

successor as the head of the Association of National Catholic Propagandists (ACNP), was

best equipped, in Artajo's mind, to inform Pius XII of the real condition of the Church in

Spain. On top of that, he had good contacts with international Catholic organs and while

in Rome organized a conference titled, "How a Catholic with Open Eyes Sees Spain

Today." Bishop Herrera met with the Pope and became concerned about Pius XII's

demeanor, which he described as an uncharacteristic "restlessness." After his return to

Malaga, Herrera wrote a homily about his trip in which he speculated about the Pope's

condition, and confirmed, that in a world struggling against the evils of communism, it was right for Spaniards to side with authority, instead of the weak forces of liberalism.161

Castiella and the Spanish embassy pushed the concordat negotiations along, and the trip of Bishop Herrera and Martin-Sanchez could be read as a success. In January of

1952 Tardini submitted the Vatican's counter draft of a concordat. The Holy See abandoned its intentions to take back Franco's Patronado. Until that moment, negotiations had been preliminary. As of 1952, they were fully underway. If Pius XII was going to conclude a concordat that enshrined the 1941 and 1946 agreements, he was going to make sure that the Church received as much freedom possible. In contrast with the negotiations of Spain's concordats in the past, Pius XII included Spain's metropolitans in the process. According to Tardini, the issues that needed to be resolved in the

160 Tusell, Franco y los Catolicos, 253. 161 Tusell, Franco y los Catolicos, 253. 81 Concordat were not that significant and the slow pace of negotiations hitherto was due to

Pius XII's reluctance to flatter Franco with the prestige that it would offer.162 The Holy

See wanted to see Franco and the Spanish Church humbled in order to improve their standing in western Europe and around the globe. As somewhat of a litmus test, the first postwar International Eucharistic Congress was to be held in Barcelona in the spring of

1952. Progress was underway.

Nonetheless, elements of the Spanish episcopate continued to embarrass Franco.

Not surprisingly, Cardinal Segura was at the forefront of this campaign. He took advantage of Franco's sensitivity to the issue of Protestantism and "accusations of illiberalism [sic] and intolerance" from abroad. It was an opportunity for Segura and other elements of the Spanish Church and anti-American Falangists to vent their frustrations about Spain's negotiations with the United State.163 The foreign uproar about

Protestants re-emerged in January of 1952 over the government's refusal to allow a

Canadian-owned, Protestant chapel in Madrid to permit worship. If this were not bad enough, on 3 March, a group of Catholic Action radicals burned down a British owned chapel in Seville. After some of the culprits were arrested, rumours emerged that the attack was a deliberate action to embarrass the regime in the wake of recent criticisms.164

It was significant that the attack on the Protestant Chapel happened in Seville, as it was instigated by the Archbishop. On 20 February Segura issued his Lenten pastoral:

"The obligation of resisting the advance of Protestantism in Spain." It was first published on 15 February in the Seville archdiocesan publication, Official Ecclesiastical Bulletin

162 d' Ormesson (Holy See) to Schuman, 5 March 1952, Q d'o, z Europe 1949-55, Espagne 35, 210-213. 163 Balfour (Madrid) to Eden, 13 March 1952, FO, WS 1782/8. 164 Payne, The Franco Regime, 421; Balfour (Madrid) to Eden, 13 March 1952, FO, WS 1782/8. 82 and then, on 10 March, a week after the chapel-burning incident, was made available to the official Spanish press. Concerned with the preservation of faith in Spain against what

Segura called, "attacks of the devil," the pastoral was devoted to fears that "the protestant campaign is increasing in an extraordinarily grave manner."165 Segura cited as proof the document prepared by the American embassy in 1950 titled, "The Protestant Church in

Spain," and also claimed that the recent death of King George VI of England facilitated this growth, in "a campaign of benevolence towards Protestantism." To this particular criticism, the British embassy responded that "the Cardinal's anxieties, wherever they may spring from, must be upsetting the balance of his judgment."166 The Lenten Pastoral sparked worldwide reaction and further propagated the intolerant reputation of the

Spanish Church.167 According to some diplomatic observers, this was Segura's attempt to hinder economic and military negotiations with the United States.168 The Vatican was not impressed. It hoped that the International Eucharistic Congress scheduled for Barcelona in May might improve Spain's international Catholic reputation.

Despite the potential damage, the pastoral received comment in a major article in the Madrid publication, Ya. Considered the "organ of militant Catholicism," the journal put a Falangist twist on the Cardinal's concerns and argued that the aims of the Church and state were united in the treatment of Protestantism. Protestants were encouraged in their missionary efforts abroad, but discouraged by Spaniards "at a moment so grave for

165 Balfour (Madrid) to Eden, 13 March 1952, FO, WS 1782/8. 166 Balfour (Madrid) to Eden, 13 March 1952, FO, WS 1782/8. 167 Calvo Serer claimed that the world misunderstood the pastoral, 329. 168 Foreign Ministry to London, Paris, Holy See, Washington and Lisbon, 26 March 1952, ASMAE, B 1667/555 Sp. Balfour (Madrid) to Eden, 13 March 1952, FO, WS 1782/8. 83 the existence of Christian civilization," from missions in Spain.169 The article sought to

demonstrate that Segura's pastoral, and the Spanish Church in general, were in line with

Falangist doctrine, and represented the foremost cooperation between Church and state

since the Spanish Golden Age. The British embassy considered it an "ironical reflection."

Segura's many criticisms of the Falange always received state censorship, but his latest

tirade avoided the censors and found Falangist sympathy. Anti-American sentiment

linked the Falange to some of Segura's fears. The resolute cardinal worried that a military

and economic agreement with the United States would bring the influx of US Protestant

business and military men, which it might interfere with the Catholic unity and

traditionalism of Spain.170 Rafael Calvo Serer explained in defense of Segura that

"religious tolerance is easily used for subversive political activities, prohibited in any

civilized state."171

With such negative attention drawn to Spanish Catholicism, Ambassador Castiella

could only hope that the upcoming International Eucharistic Congress could help undo the effects of Segura's pastoral. An influx of foreign Catholics and diplomats was recognized as an opportunity to improve relations with the Catholic world, and to demonstrate Spain's commitment to and identification with the Catholic Church, serving thereby to reestablish Franco's "cherished image" as "defender of the faith."172 Barcelona, the focus of crisis and repression in 1951 could be the focus of peace and world Catholic praise in 1952. The Eucharistic Congress might also serve to cover up the tightening of

169 Balfour (Madrid) to Eden, 13 March 1952, FO, WS 1782/8. 170 Foreign Ministry to London, Paris, Holy See, Washington and Lisbon, 26 March 1952, ASMAE, B 1667/555 Sp. 171 Serer, 329. 172 Preston, Franco, 619. Javier Tusell, Franco y los catolicos, 254. 84 repression that emerged after the strikes of 1951.173 On the occasion of the International

Eucharistic Congress, an estimated one-third of the prisoners in Spanish jails received

amnesty.174 Perhaps surprisingly, the Barcelona International Eucharistic Congress was

the first of its kind to specifically address social issues. Cardinal Tedeschini was the

Papal legate. Now staunch supporter of the Spanish confessional system and the Guard of

Opus Dei, Tedeschini had come a long way.175 As nuncio to Spain during the Second

Republic, Tedeschini's efforts to include Catholics in liberal politics had been resented

by the Spanish hierarchy. He had developed close relations with Herrera Oria and the

176 "accidentalists." In the early 1930s this collaborationist approach was dismissed by

Republicans as an insincere embrace of Catholic politics and despised by conservatives

for its abandonment of the cause of the monarchy. The "accidentalist" approach was later

developed by Herrera to pertain to the Franco regime. It served Herrera well despite his

criticisms that Franco had not allowed the formation of a Catholic party to counter the

Movement. Nor did Franco allow, as Artajo hoped in 1945, the republication of the

Spanish Catholics' most liberal organ, El Debate. Tedeschini's role in Opus Dei singled the Cardinal out from Herrera, Artajo and Gimenez. The "accidentalist" approach adopted by Tedeschini during the Second Republic devolved into a more conservative vision.

Tedeschini had become the "everlasting defender" of Franco's Spain in Rome. Speaking highly of the Congress, the Cardinal noted its effects "would be indelible." On 1 June, the

173 "There could be no more effective mask for his savagely repressive rule." Preston, Franco, 619. 174 (Madrid) to Eden, "Spain: Annual Review for 1952," 26 January 1953, FO, WS 1011/1. 175 Tusell, Franco y los Catolicos, 255. 176Callahan, The Catholic Church in Spain, 310. 85 last day of the Congress, Franco consecrated Spain to the Eucharist. Pope Pius XII indeed thanked Franco for this identification.177

Cardinal Segura continued his criticism of Franco's government in two more pastorals in 1952. One of them, "The Catholic Unity of Spain: Pastoral Admonitions

concerning the religious controversy," discussed the illegality of Protestantism in Spain.

It argued that article six of the Fuero, which officially tolerated the private practice of non-Catholic religions, was a violation of article one of the 1851 Concordat. Comment in

Italian journals charged that the Catholic Church was united against Protestantism in

Spain and challenged the Vatican to respond. Tardini expressed deep concern with

Segura's increased resistance. He admitted that, legally speaking, there were inconsistencies, but the Vatican did not support Segura's line of argument. Tardini believed that Protestants in Spain did not complain about their treatment in private, and that Segura's campaign was inopportune, but not surprising, considering his zealous and intemperate character. Tardini and Castiella fully expected that in concordat negotiations they would moderate the 1851 language in an effort to both appease the Spanish Church and make legal inconsistencies over the treatment of Protestants disappear. The

Cardinal's tone in the pastoral, according to the British Ambassador Sir John Balfour was in "marked contrast" to that taken during Lent. He speculated "it is not improbable that a timely word from the Vatican may have halted the course of his intemperate denunciations."179

177 Tusell, Franco ylos Catolicos, 255. 178 De Margerie to Schuman, 22 August 1952, Q d'O, z Europe 1949-55, Espagne 36, PP. 92-93. 179 Margerie to Schuman, 22 August 1952, Q d'O, z Europe 1949-55, Espagne 36, PP. 92-93. 86 A homily delivered in September by Bishop Angel Herrera further troubled

Franco's identification with the Church. Composed after a trip to Ireland and England,

Herrera directed his message to the social problems facing the modern world. Unlike

Cardinal Segura, Bishop Herrera enjoyed "without question the regard and confidence of

1 80 the Holy See." His criticisms carried weight.

The Bishop of Malaga developed his homily in two parts: family morals and

socia• l morals. On the former, Herrera was highly critical of the west and praised Spain. 181

Herrera identified the British press as particularly decadent, citing high divorce and juvenile crime rates as proof. According to Herrera, family morals in Spain appeared, perhaps, the most developed in the world, and was a model to be emulated.

With regard to social morals, Herrera criticized Spain and praised the western democracies for their efforts in combating social inequalities. He identified Britain's efforts as unequalled in history and made the point that the mission to combat social inequality was not only socialist, but also Christian. Christian Democratic efforts towards the redistribution of land in Italy, and labour reforms in Germany were also identified and praised in this light. Furthermore, Herrera paid tribute to the work of French Catholics.

Their interest in the fair distribution of wealth, studied for the Social Week of Dijon, was noted by Herrera, and approved by Pope Pius XII. In comparison with the highly developed Christian "social morals" of democratic Europe, Herrera launched his attack on Spain. It "is no question of charity but simply of justice." The trade union system was illegitimate and failed to represent the plight of workers. Herrera deemed immediate

180 Meyrier (Madrid) to FO, 13 September 1952, Q d'O, z Europe 1949-55, Espagne 36, PP. 98-103. 18'ironically, he even paid tribute to the Soviet Union's efforts to control and "defend morality in the press." Meyrier (Madrid) to FO, 13 September 1952, Q d'O, z Europe 1949-55, Espagne 36, PP. 98-103. 87 action necessary, and claimed that this was the "major spiritual problem of eastern

Spain." His criticisms were reminiscent of Montini's following the strikes of 1951.

Despite Franco's carefully projected Catholic image, Herrera rebuked the basic tenets of

the regime. The Bishop of Malaga held influence over Martin Artajo. His homily

troubled Franco and demonstrated the essence of the Vatican's reluctance towards Spain.

Despite these criticisms, the climate in Rome had already begun to evolve in

favour of Spain, in large part due to the positive effect of the Eucharistic Congress. On a

personal note, Castiella was pleased to be accepted as a nobleman in the honourary

Pontifical Court. In July Osservatore Romano approached Castiella, for the first time,

with the opportunity to refute leftist criticisms of the Spanish Church. He wrote Artajo it

was "impossible to find out the mysterious force" that caused the change in direction.184

The same day Castiella met Tardini and discussed the opening of negotiations over Santa

Maria Maggiore.

On 17 November, 1952 Spain was admitted to the United Nations Educational,

Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Pius XII was a strong advocate of the

United Nations and was in full support of this development, identifying it as the beginning of Spain's incorporation into the community of nations.185 Criticisms of

Franco's economic and social policies were based on seeing Spain benefit from the economic reconstruction of Europe and rejection of nationalist policies. Without abandoning the principle of non-political involvement, Pius XII supported the project

182 Meyrier (Madrid) to FO, 13 September 1952, Q d'O, z Europe 1949-55, Espagne 36, PP. 98-103. 183 Telogram from d' Ormesson (Holy See) 16 March 1951, Q d'O, z Europe 1949-55, Espagne 35, 13+ 184 Tusell, Franco y los Catolicos 255. 185 Tusell, Franco y los Catolicos, 256. 88 towards European unification.186 He did this not through direct pressure but through loyal

members of the episcopate like Bishop Herrera. Late in 1952 Pius XII announced his next

consistory would be held the following year. Two more Spaniards were made cardinals as

well as Spain's nuncio.187 The internal shift in the Curia resulting from the 1953

consistory was to Spain's advantage.

186 Roberts (Holy See) to Eden (London) "Holy See: Annual Review for 1952," 23 March 1953, FO, WS 1011/1. 187 In past centuries it had been a matter of honour that Spain's nuncios would become cardinals. 89 Chapter V: The United States, Spain and the Roman Catholic Church

During the period that negotiations proceeded for a concordat, negotiations also

proceeded for a bi-lateral military and economic agreement with the United States. The

events that led the United States and the Holy See into fully accepting Franco Spain were

not intimately related, but religious issues were significant in the view from Washington.

Both in Truman's relations with Spain and the Holy See, an antiquated theology of

church-state relations frustrated progress. This narrative begins at the end of 1950, when the Truman administration first decided to send an ambassador to Madrid.

Confident that he had acted correctly, Franco criticized the "ill-calculated

ostracism" of the great powers in his 1950 New Year's Eve broadcast and claimed that the western world owed Spain reparations for the hardships the UN resolution had incurred.188 The strikes of 1951 demonstrated to Franco an urgent need to consolidate his dictatorship. As in 1945, Franco reacted to changing circumstances by appointing a new cabinet. It was time for him to overcome the anti-Franco opposition and seek out renewed economic and military prospects with the United States.

Since the 1946 UN Resolution, the US State Department had developed a number of objectives in regards to Spain. It wanted Franco to make overtures to democratization

188 Balfour (Madrid) to Eden, "Spain Annual Review, 1951," 21 Jan 1952, FO WS 1011/1. 90 before seeking improved relations. In the early postwar years, the Department and the

National Security Council differed in their appraisal of Spanish-American relations.

Military planners wanted to incorporate the Iberian Peninsula into western defense. It was

important for its strategic geographical position. In the event of a European war, its deep harbours on the Atlantic and the Mediterranean would be valuable assets. Air force bases

were also coveted in Spain from which the United States could launch long-range bombers. With the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, the State Department came

around to appreciating the military opportunities presented by the Iberian peninsula. It, therefore, wanted to see Spain become a NATO member state. The first step towards this

lay in rescinding the UN diplomatic sanctions. The next step was sending an ambassador to Madrid, who could work to improve Spain's relations with France and Britain.

President Truman tried to distance himself from these developments. He was opposed to any form of relationship with Franco, not only because he considered him a fascist, but also because of the religious situation in Spain. Truman only reluctantly agreed to allow his delegation to vote in favour of abandoning the UN diplomatic sanctions. When a reporter asked on 2 November, 1950 if this meant Truman would now send an ambassador to Madrid, he announced it would be "a long, long time" before such action would be taken. Such comments frustrated Secretary of State Dean Acheson, who was beginning to anticipate new opportunities following the establishment of full diplomatic relations.

Just two weeks after Truman's unguarded comment, Congress approved a

$62,500,000 loan for Spain. Truman would have preferred to avoid such a loan, but congressional forces required mutual assistance aid for Spain if it were to also go to Yugoslavia. The following day, on 17 November, Truman named Stanton Griffis as his

ambassador to Spain. Griffis was a sixty-four year old investment banker, not a career

diplomat. He had just resigned as ambassador to Argentina. While there he had suffered

criticism in the American press for praising Peron. For years Griffis had wanted to be

sent to Spain. First, however, he wanted a brief vacation. This delighted President

Truman, because sending an ambassador so soon after his November comment would

have caused considerable embarrassment. The President told Griffis he was not fond of 1 RQ

Spain and had been "a little overruled and worn down by the Department."

Griffis' appointment was not announced until 27 December. When Truman was

asked at a press conference the following day what caused him to change his mind about

appointing an ambassador, he responded "my attitude towards Spain hasn't changed a bit."190 Truman tried to cover up the importance of his November press statement, and

stated that since January of 1950 the State Department had been considering opening full

diplomatic relations. In Truman's mind, the religious situation in Spain was of utmost importance. Unless Protestants were provided with religious freedom, there could be no improvement of relations.

According to the State Department, the religious question was of secondary importance. Griffis was directed to strive for Spain's integration into western defense.

This meant that Franco would need to make overtures to Britain and France, making his rearmament and economic rehabilitation acceptable to the western democracies. Franco had been attempting to act as a "wedge" between the United States and the western

189 Brynes, 275. 190 "318. The President's News Conference," 28 December 1953. Available online at: http: //www. trumanlibrary. org/publicpapers/index. php 92 allies.191 Griffis was warned to avoid flattering Franco. The United States was not

seeking a "sentinel of the west," but the defense of Western Europe from Soviet

aggression.

Franco appointed Lequerica as his ambassador to Washington, which did nothing

to improve Truman's feelings towards Spain. Lequerica had been refused by the Truman

administration for the same appointment back in 1945. By appointing Lequerica again,

Franco was making a point. Spain had not changed its position as a result of the Cold

War, but the Truman administration had. Lequerica presented his credentials on 17

January, 1951. President Truman was quick to end their meeting; he hardly even shook

Lequerica's hand.192

The United States Senate confirmed Stanton Griffis as ambassador to Spain on 1

February 1951. He presented his credentials one month later and his reception was in stark contrast to Lequerica's in Washington. Hundreds of Franco's Moorish Guards accompanied the new ambassador en route to the Palacio de Oriente, as Griffis rode along in an eighteenth century coach. He was greeted by a military band and crowds of cheering Spaniards.193 In his meeting with Franco and Martin Artajo, the first topic raised was the treatment of Protestants. After Stanton Griffis pointed out specific examples of persecution, Franco agreed to direct his cabinet and civil governors to broaden their

191 The Secretary of State to the Ambassador-Designate to Spain (Griffis), at Washington. 6 February, 1951. FRUS Vol IV, 791-795 192 Preston, Franco, 603. 193 Preston, Franco, 606. 93 interpretation of the law regarding non-Catholics: to allow "services which did not

disturb the peace."194

To Ambassador Griffis's delight, the United States National Security Council

adopted a resolution in June that stated bi-lateral negotiations were the necessary step to

incorporate Spain into western defense. The United States could no longer wait for

Britain and France to come on board. Truman reluctantly approved and on 8 July named

Admiral Forrest Sherman as the high ranking official to accompany Ambassador Griffis in the exploratory discussions.195 Truman told Sherman that he would not let his personal

dislike of Franco "override the convictions of you military men."196 The United States was steering away from its former concerns of European resistance. A strong warning from London followed on 10 July:

What is wanted at this stage of the cold war is strong build-up of material and moral forces of Atlantic powers. If US Govt [sic] by unilateral action attempts to associate Franco-Spain with West it wld [sic] give severe shock to Scandinavians, Belgians, Dutch, possibly Italians, besides British and French. Western morale wld [sic] be gravely disturbed by implication Europe is to be defended at 197 Pyrenees.

On the same day as this strong warning, Dean Acheson, George Marshall, General Omar

Bradley and Admiral Sherman discussed the NATO opposition to rearming Spain. They concluded that political concerns of the western allies were less important than military necessity.198 The United States was pursuing a militaristic Cold War policy against the

194 The Ambassador in Spain (Griffis) to the Secretary of State, Madrid, 15 March 1951, FRUS, Vol. IV, 807-809. 195Memorandum regarding the Conduct of Base Negotiations With Spain (Washington), 25 June 1951, FRUS, Vol. IV, 826-827. 196 Preston, Franco, 612. 197 The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Secretary of State, London, 8 July, 1951, FRUS, Vol. IV, 827-828. 198 Preston, Franco, 612. 94 counsel of its NATO allies. Western Europeans viewed the implications of the Korean

War differently from the United States.

A group of American senators visited Franco on 13 July to discuss western

defense and left Madrid with a good impression of Franco. Admiral Sherman visited

Franco on 16 July, and delved straight into discussions about air force and naval bases.

When asked when the military planners could begin their studies in Spain, Franco

responded "Immediately ... on the 19th I am changing my cabinet but from the 20th

onwards they can come anytime." Unfortunately for Franco, Admiral Sherman died in

Naples on 22 July, before returning to Washington. Even after these initial discussions,

the Protestant question continued to be on Ambassador Griffis's agenda. In reminding the

ambassador of the importance of the issue, Dean Acheson praised Griffis for "telling

Franco that if there were only five Protestants in Spain, they should have the same rights of religious freedom as any other Spanish citizen."199

Foreign Minister Martin Artajo struggled to speed up negotiations with the

American military and economic planners in Madrid. The disinclination of the Truman administration in these regards caused setbacks, and the first months of 1952 proved disappointing. Martin Artajo faced domestic critics of what he called his "American card."200 Segura's pastoral and the positive Falangist reception demonstrated this.

In Madrid, Martin Artajo decried delays as intolerable because Spain badly needed economic assistance. The resignation of Ambassador Griffis on 28 January, 1952, was another reason negotiations suffered. Spain's Foreign Minister would not negotiate

199 Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Griffis), 10 August 1951, FRUS, Vol. IV, PP. 860-861. 200 The First Secretary of Embassy in Spain (Anderson) to the Department of State, 12 March 1952, FRUS 1952-1954, Vol. VI. Part II, 1819-1821. 95 with a charge d'affaires in the interim between the resignation of Griffis and the arrival of

Ambassador Lindon MacVeagh, who presented his credentials on 27 March, 1952.

Truman had not been impressed with Stanton Griffis, nor had he with the State

Department or military planners. However, Franco and Ambassador Lequerica thought

Griffis had been "the best ambassador imaginable" and were disappointed at his

OCi 1 resignation. The new Ambassador, Lindon MacVeagh, had last served in Peru and was

less inclined to lobby on Spain's behalf, proving more in line with President Truman's

views. This was important because it was an election year in the United States. Truman

announced in March that he would not run for reelection, but his administration was

cautious in its relations with both the Vatican and Spain. Unpopular decisions amongst

the Democratic Party's Protestant constituents like allying with Franco or appointing an

ambassador to the Vatican, were resisted in order not to benefit the Republican campaign.

Truman was happy to continue his anti Franco stance. On 7 February, the

President was asked if he agreed with the recent statement, made by General Eisenhower, that Spain should not join NATO.202 Eisenhower had just resigned as NATO Supreme

Allied Commander and returned to Washington, inaugurating his leadership campaign for the Republican Party. In early 1951 the State Department had aimed for Spain's incorporation into NATO, but the resistance of western Europeans and Spain's desire for a bi-lateral military-economic pact blocked this initiative with the result that the State

Department no longer desired NATO membership for Spain 203 Truman's reply to the

201 Paul Preston, Franco, 617. 202 "Editorial Note," No. 839, FRUS 1952-1954, Vol. VI. Part II, 1799-1800. 203 On the State Department's original intent, see: The Secretary of State to the Ambassador-Designate to Spain (Griffis), at Washington. 6 February 1951. FRUS 1951, Vol IV, 791-795. On Spain's desire to not 96 question was that he had "never been fond of Spain." When asked to clarify if this meant

that Truman agreed with General Eisenhower, the president barked "that is my answer. I

gave it to you."204 By that, Truman later admitted, he meant he disliked Franco's Spain.

Former Ambassador Griffis explained on 8 February that Truman's dislike was due to the

"intolerable delays" in reforms towards religious liberty in Spain.205

Hoping to achieve legitimacy through negotiations with the United States, the

Franco government was particularly sensitive to criticisms of intolerance and

90 (\

persecution. Hoping to ease Truman's fears, Franco wrote a response to Truman, and

stated that "natural difference in feelings and traditions" between the United States and

Spain was evident: Spain was overwhelmingly Catholic, but the United States and other

countries "due to their diverse and numerically important confessions" were "compelled"

to live under a system of religious liberty. Franco reiterated that Spain guaranteed the

"private practice of other cults."207 The Caudillo, however, was communicating in unfamiliar terms. Protestant religions being described as "cults," and the lack of any public freedom for Protestants in Spain, by Truman's terms, reeked of religious persecution.

Opposition to the poor treatment of Protestants in Spain and to Segura's Lenten pastoral in particular was expressed in the United States by Protestants and Catholics alike. Ambassador Lequerica was troubled, but was glad to find the broad opposition of

Spanish Catholic Action to Segura's pastoral. Two somewhat moderate American join NATO, see: Memorandum of Conversation, 29 February 1952, FRUS 1952-1954, Vol. VI. Part II, 1821-1823. 204 "Editorial Note," No. 839, FRUS 1952-1954, Vol. VI. Part II, 1799-1800. 205 "Editorial Note," No. 839, FRUS 1952-1954, Vol. VI. Part II, 1799-1800. 206 Balfour (Madrid) to Eden, 13 March 1952, FO, WS 1782/8. 207 "Editorial Note," No. 839, FRUS 1952-1954, Vol. VI. Part II, 1799-1800. 97 Catholic journals, Indiana Catholic and Record, and the Jesuit organ, America, attacked

Spanish intolerance. The American journals were concerned with the damaging effects of

Segura's campaign in the United States, especially considering the current politicization of American Catholicism.208 A rebuttal emerged in the Spanish periodical, Ecclesia.

Americans were accused of being out of line with Papal teaching. In fact, the Papacy was undergoing its own internal power struggle. On one side were those who supported

Spanish Catholicism and the confessional ideal. On the other were the Christian

Democrats that wanted to see an evolution of church and state theology, a clear endorsement of the separation of church and state.

During the late 1940s and early 1950s American Protestant and leftist criticism of the Roman Catholic Church was growing. At the forefront was Paul Blanshard, whose publications in the Nation were compiled into two books, American Freedom and

Catholic Power in 1949 and Communism, Democracy and Catholic Power in 1951. The first argued that if American Catholics ever represented the majority of the population, they would seek to abandon the Bill of Rights and establish a confessional state. The latter argued that the "clerico-fascist international" currently represented a greater threat to democracy than did communism. Blanshard cited Peron's Argentina, Salazar's Portugal and Franco's Spain as examples.

Montini, in opposition to the Roman Party, believed there was a need to revise the

Church's theology on relations with the state. In this matter the United States was important, especially considering the criticisms coming from Paul Blanshard. An

208 Washington to Foreign Ministry, 23 May 1952, ASMAE, B 1667/555-Sp; Foreign Ministry to Holy See, 3 July 1952, ASMAE, B 1667/555-Sp. 98 American Jesuit, John Courtney Murray, had received Montini's blessing to study the matter.

Behind the scenes of the triumphal Church during the Holy Year, Murray sent a memorandum to Montini that presented a less than triumphant situation. It was titled:

"The Crisis in Church-State Relationships in the U.S.A." In it Murray encouraged a response from the Vatican, a clear endorsement of democracy and separation of church

and state. Murray boldly stated in confidence to his friend: "It is certain that the

American difficulty cannot be adequately met as long as Catholic doctrine in Church-

State relationships remains in its present stage of development."209 Murray was referring to the "two theses" theology, that in countries where Catholics were a minority the

Church supported religious freedom, but in countries composed of a majority of

Catholics, the Church desired a privileged status. Unless the Vatican abandoned this nineteenth century theology, Murray felt that the anti-Catholic campaign of Paul

Blanshard would continue unchecked. He was encouraged by Montini in his attempt, through the exegesis of Leo XIII's encyclicals, to prove that Roman Catholicism favoured democracy. This would be a difficult task. Blanshard cited Leo XIII as proof of the ideal of a confessional state. Murray felt that these were not immutable theological principles, but specific reactions to what was occurring at the time.

Murray had enemies in the American Catholic Church, which, in many ways, was more ultramontane than European episcopates. Father Francis J. Connell, for instance, sent a warning to Cardinal Pizzardo in 1950 of the unorthodox views winning popularity in the United States. The American Cardinal Francis Stritch received a copy of Murray's

209 Komonchak, John Courtnery Murray; Samuel Cardinal Stritch; Francis J. Connell, "The Crisis in Church-State Relationships in the U.S.A.," 19. 99 memo from Montini in 1951. In response he dismissed Murray's arguments as unsound.

The memo was also referred to the Holy Office for study. In 1951 Cardinal Pizzardo was

appointed as Secretary of the Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office. He too was an

adherent of the Roman Party, further evidence of the right's rising influence in the Curia.

Montini and John Courtney Murray would make little headway when the most influential

curial elements of the Holy Office wished to see the Catholic bloc of the western hemisphere embrace confessional systems, similar to that seen in Franco's Spain.

Nonetheless, in 1951 John Courtney Murray published a short essay in the Month by way of response: "Paul Blanshard and the New Nativism."210

Meanwhile, President Truman was hoping to reestablish diplomatic relations with the Vatican. Myron C. Taylor's ten year service as Roosevelt's and then Truman's personal representative to the pope had ended in January 1950 due to protests of

American Protestants who argued that Taylor's unofficial ambassadorial role to the

Vatican was a violation of the separation of church and state. The closing of Taylor's office "without the slightest notification," was identified by Pius XII as being caused by a

"campaign of injurious attacks against this Apostolic See." Pius XII later explained:

We would have expected, on that occasion, that qualified persons would have recalled certain elements of public opinion to a due respect by noting the absolute correctness of the Holy See, from whom there was not the slightest suggestion of interference in the matter.

210 Essay maybe found online at, http://woodstock.georgetown.edu/library/Murray/1951a.htm 211 Pius XII (Holy See) to Eisenhower, 19 June 1954, FRUS 1952-1954, Vol. VI, Part II, 2013-2014. 100 In a letter to Pius XII Truman described the closing of the office as "unfair to me, to Your

Holiness and Mr. Taylor's mission."212

Despite a potential public-relations fiasco, Truman aimed to establish a formal legation at the Vatican, although he had been advised against doing so in 1950 because

Protestant churches were opposing specific Catholic legislation in the Senate and appointing an ambassador could only embolden this resistance. Truman prolonged the issue for a year and the effects were negative for American Catholics. The pilgrims from the United States that made their journey to Rome during the Holy Year found themselves isolated with no diplomatic representative to arrange for papal audiences.

Spain also suffered from Taylor's resignation. Its embassy had formerly used the

American contacts at the Vatican to seek improved relations with the United States. Any efforts that might have been made in Rome were lost due to the closing of Taylor's office.

On 20 October 1951, Truman appointed General Mark Clark as his ambassador to the Holy See. Not necessarily to Truman's surprise, "A perfect furore [sic] of opposition arose" and the Senate Foreign Relation's Committee Chairman "was violently opposed."213 The announcement even prompted Eleanor Roosevelt to write Truman for her first time, urging him to oppose the Vatican appointment.214 The widespread criticisms resulted in Clark's resignation. The events leading to this troubled Pius XII.

212 President Truman (Washington) to Pope Pius XII, 14 May 1952, FRUS 1952-1954, Vol. VI, Part II, 2003-2006. 213 President Truman (Washington) to Pope Pius XII, 14 May 1952, FRUS 1952-1954, Vol. VI, Part II. PP. 2003-2006. 214"Dear Mr. President: I have not written you before but I am afraid I must now break my silence about the appointment of an ambassador to the Vatican. I am getting letters on every side as I am sure you are too and I feel that perhaps I should tell you it seems to me since we are a Protestant country, we should heed the very evident feeling so many Protestants have against having an ambassador at the Vatican." Eleanor Roosevelt to Harry S. Truman, 29 January 1952, Available Online at: http://www.trumanlibrary.org/eleanor/1952.html 101 The failure to appoint an ambassador was evidence of a worsening relationship between

the United States and the Vatican in the early 1950s. Truman's explanations to Pius XII

were not well received. To the Vatican, such "furore[sz'c]" was deplorable, and likely was

not the majority belief of Americans.215

Near the end of 1952 renewed opportunities developed for Franco with both the

Vatican and the United States. In Rome the effects of the results of the Barcelona

Eucharistic Congress have already been noted. In Washington, improved prospects were

due to the Presidential elections. In the 1952 elections, the Democratic presidential

candidate was Illinois Senator Adlai Stevenson, running against the famous General

Eisenhower. The Republican Party's campaign was "K1,C2," (Korea, communism, and

corruption). Eisenhower judged Spain more realistically than Truman but disdained military Keynesianism and NSC-68. America, he felt, could not sustain the role of world policeman. So Eisenhower campaigned for the need to "strengthen the economic and

social dykes against Soviet communism rather than ... preparing for a possibly eventual, but not yet inevitable war."216 In 1950 military spending in the United States reached 14 billion dollars. In 1952 the annual military spending reached 53 billion dollars.217 Despite

Truman's militarization, Spain had continued to be a contentious issue on religious grounds. Truman viewed Spain solely through an ideological lens and blocked Franco's prospects for benefiting from the Cold War. Truman wanted to keep the military pacts

215 Pius XII (Holy See) to Truman, 10 July 1952, FRUS 1952-1954, Vol. VI, Part II, 2010- 2012. 216 Michael S. Sherry, In the Shadow of War: The United States since the 1930s (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), 190. Sherry makes the argument that militarization in the United States was not caused by the Cold War but accelerated by it. Eisenhower is identified by Sherry as the one president to make a sincere attempt to limit militarization. 217 Thomas J McCormick, America's Half-Century: United States Foreign Policy in the Cold War and After, 2nd Ed. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 94. 102 with Spain off his watch.218 After Eisenhower's victory, military pact negotiations were

again delayed due to personnel changes in the State Department and Madrid embassy.

They were also delayed because Franco held out for the best possible terms. Nonetheless,

Franco could be sure that Eisenhower would prove a better and more consistent ally.

On 27 December, 1952, the Spanish Ambassador to the Vatican had a private

meeting with Pius XII in which he tried to convince the Pope that the time was right to

conclude negotiations, because the "international wall against Spain had been broken and

practically eliminated." Castiella understood that Pius XII had been reluctant to speed

negotiations along, in part because Spain was still considered a pariah nation. Spain's

improved international standing since 1950 and negotiations for a mutual assistance

economic and military pact with the United States, Castiella hoped, might convince Pius

XII that Franco Spain had developed stability and respectability, and that it was finally

time to conclude concordat negotiations. Spain had not and would not, Castiella insisted,

bend to international pressures, but to the "directions of the Holy Father," As "the

absolute owners of its destiny ... [Spain] can now readjust its policy following faithfully

the Pontifical directives."219

Pius XII revealed there were issues left unresolved. In particular, the Concordat

drafts had not made any references to Catholic Action. Pius XII explained it was necessary to guarantee the autonomy of Catholic Action from state interference. Castiella

disagreed. Catholic Action, a group of Catholic lay associations, originated in the nineteenth century and developed during the early twentieth century as an apolitical

218 "It was no doubt of some comfort to Truman (and not a coincidence) that at least the actual agreement with Franco was not signed on his watch, although most of the important negotiations were conducted before he left office." Byrnes, 276. 219 Tusell, Franco y los Catolicos, 258-259. 103 Catholic lobby, with its primary aim the re-Christianization of society through social and

educational efforts. The protection of Italian Catholic Action in the 1929 Concordat was

an important objective of Pius XI to safeguard the association as apolitical, a means of preventing its dissolution by the totalitarian society of Fascism. However, Italian Catholic

Action groups, such as the university section, FUCI, developed as an alternative political force to fascism, from which the postwar ranks of Italian Christian Democratic leadership were primarily drawn. Prior to the Concordat with Mussolini's Italy, Catholic Action had been openly suppressed and harassed. Thus its inclusion in the 1929 Concordat was hailed as a victory for Pius XI.

Castiella felt that for two reasons Catholic Action could not be mentioned. First, because the Concordat intended to represent a new model, such a direct reference from

Mussolini's Concordat could not be allowed. Second, because even during the anti- clerical legislation of the Second Republic, Spanish Catholic Action had not been suppressed, but actually expanded its cultural and social influence. The implication was that Franco might prove more hostile to the association than the Second Republic. In

Castiella's line of thinking, the general article on associations of the Church would be sufficient. A specific article on Catholic Action would undermine the Spanish government's general intentions in the Concordat.

There was another issue that would prolong the Concordat negotiations. The Holy

See wanted to wait until Ruiz Gimenez had passed the new law on secondary education, so that Pius XII could communicate with Spain's Committee of Metropolitans to discover what else needed to be addressed.

104 On 12 January, 1953 Pius XII held what became his last consistory in which he

made twenty-four new cardinals. For Francisco Franco, the news was great. Pius XII

elevated two Spanish Metropolitans, the Archbishop Emeritus of Tarragona, Benjamin de

Arriba y Castro, and the Archbishop of Santiago de Compostela, Fernando Quiroga y

Palacios, both staunch supporters of Franco.220 Pius XII also elevated the Nuncio to

Spain, Gaetano Cicognani.221 Franco held a ceremony for the occasion, and according to the centuries old tradition of the Catholic Monarchs, he "conferred the biretta" on the new

Spanish cardinals, following which the out-going Nuncio eulogized Spain as the

"standard-bearer of the Church."222 Franco was delighted. Such a cherished image had been strengthened in 1952 by the Barcelona Eucharistic Congress. Cicognani, who had not been a great advocate of a concordat, paid lip service to Nationalist Spain's restoration of the Church. It looked to Franco that his years of effort in cultivating Spain's

Catholic image on the international stage was about to pay off. In Sir John Balfour's coverage of the ceremony, he cautioned the British Foreign Office from assuming that the

'yyi

Cardinal's eulogy meant Cicognani now advocated a concordat.

The consistory demonstrated the continued resistance of Pius XII to communist persecution. In defiance of the Polish and Yugoslav authorities, Pius XII designated

Wyszynski and Stepinac cardinals in their absence. Neither Archbishop was able to

220 Tussel, Franco y los Catolicos, 258. 221 Cardinal Cicognani is not to be confused with his brother, the Apostolic Delegate to the United States, Amleto Cicognani. The latter was named a cardinal by Pope John XXIII and served Paul VI as Secretary of State. 222 Balfour (Madrid) to Eden, 21 March, 1953, FO, WS 1782/2. 223Balfour (Madrid) to Eden, 21 March, 1953, FO, WS 1782/2. There is an inconsistency over Cicognani's objectives. William Callahan asserts that he "promoted the concordat project." Archival evidence suggests otherwise, and the Concordat evolved without the nunciature's influence. Rather it involved the Spanish hierarchy directly and the Spanish Embassy at the Vatican. Madrid to MAE, 15 July, 1950, B19/555-Sp. Callahan's assertion that the Nuncio favoured a Concordat is found in, The Catholic Church in Spain, 409. 105 attend as they had both been recently imprisoned. Domenico Tardini and Giovanni

Battista Montini were allegedly offered the red hat by Pius XII in 1952, but both refrained from becoming cardinals in order to retain their dual direction of the Secretariat of State directly subordinate to the Pope.224 As such, they held incredible influence for not being cardinals. Montini's title was raised to Secretary of Ordinary Affairs and

Tardini's to Pro-Secretary of State. Monsignor Samore returned from being nuncio to

Columbia in 1953 to assist Tardini in the Congregation of Extra Ordinary Affairs. As such, Samore and Tardini were in control of the remaining concordat negotiations with

Spain.

One of the most important new cardinals and curial appointments was Alfredo

Ottaviani, who, two days after the consistory, was appointed Pro-Secretary of the Holy

Office. Although the prefecture of this particular Congregation belonged to the Pope, the importance within the curia of the Secretary of the Holy Office was second only to the

Secretary of State, which had been vacant since 1944. Pro-Secretary was an experimental title. Cardinal Pizzardo had been appointed Secretary in 1951, but since Pizzardo was 73 and an acting prefect of another congregation, Ottaviani's appointment made him the supreme aid to the aging Cardinal. Ottaviani's long tenure in both the Secretariat of State and the Holy Office ensured that the recent directions of the Holy Office, and its tendencies towards a theologically centralizing orthodoxy, would be strengthened.

Liberal theologians, French intellectuals, left-leaning Catholics, and even anti-fascist

Christian Democrats, were soon to be ostracized by the Holy Office. It seemed that the theological agenda of the Roman Party was second in importance to resisting

224 Hebblethwaite, 250. 106 communism. Ottaviani could quip: "you can say anything you like about the divinity of

Christ but if, in the remotest village in Sicily, you vote Communist, your

excommunication will arrive the next day."225 After 1953, "the Roman joke said Pius reigned and Ottaviani ruled."226

On 2 March, 1953, Cardinal Ottaviani delivered a controversial speech on church and state relations to the Lateran Seminary. As the theological guard against heresy,

Ottaviani spoke of the double-standard embraced by the Church. Freedom of religion was to be entertained only in nations not composed of a majority of Catholics. Where

Catholics were the majority, the traditional thesis of relations remained. Truth, Ottaviani argued, made no compromise with religious freedom; clerical states were ideal. The speech praised Franco's regime and paid tribute to Article Six of the Fuero de los

Espanoles, which constitutionally declared Spain to be a Catholic nation. The speech also attacked theological developments coming from the United States. Without using John

Courtney Murray's name, Ottaviani denounced the theologian's liberal suppositions of religious freedom.227 For Murray this was bad timing. He had just published the first of his studies on Leo XIII's encyclicals in the journal Theological Studies.

Montini, again acting to calm progressive Catholics and offended theologians,

228 insisted that the speech was not authoritative, but a "purely private utterance."

Osservatore Romano, realizing the potential harm, tempered reports of the speech and suppressed specific mention of the United States. In contrast, Castiella hailed the speech 225 Although originally from Andrea Riccardi, Pio XII, the translated quotation was taken from Hebbelthwaite, 245. 226 Hebblethwaite, 216. In his biography Ottaviani is titled "pro-prefect," but technically the title was not used until John XXIII's pontificate. After reorganization of the Curia, Ottaviani became pro-prefect in 1966. 227Fogarty, 371. 228 Fogarty, 376. 107 as a victory and immediately sent the text to the ACNP President, Fernando Martin

Sanchez Julia, for full translation and propagation.229

Pius XII's papacy was moving in a more conservative direction. The internal

struggle of his pontificate between moderates and conservatives was nearing conclusion.

In 1953 the turn to the right had become more evident. It was an important election year

in Italy and Pius XII wanted the Christian Democrats to ally at the polls with neo-fascists

to ensure the exclusion of the left. The directive did not go over well. Disagreement

between Montini and the Christian Democrats on the one hand, and Pius XII and the

Roman Party on the other, eventually led to further discredit Montini. Cardinal Pizzardo

warned in 1953, that "Montini was the most dangerous man in Rome."

1953 was the year that Spain completed its dual foreign policy objectives,

completing the Concordat with the Holy See on 27 August and the Pact of Madrid with

the United States on 26 September. The first was a long term objective of Franco's that

would enshrine Spanish tradition. The latter was a military and economic tie with the

United States that would rupture Spanish isolation. That the two agreements coincided

was in the interests of Franco, but was not due to Washington and Vatican collaboration.

On the contrary, the anachronistic church and state theology, as it existed in practice in

Spain, was a key issue that slowed Spain's rehabilitation. President Truman remained

firm with Franco but was unable to stop the military and economic interests in Spain

following the outbreak of the Korean War. When he wanted to send an ambassador to the

Holy See, widespread opposition blocked it. When he wanted to avoid sending an

229 ACNP is the abbreviation for Asociacion Catolica Nacional de Propagandists. Commentary of ACNP may be found in Frances Lannon, Privilege, Persecution and Prophesy and William Callahan, The Catholic Church in Spain, 1875-1998. On Ottaviani's speech see Fogarty, 370-376, and Tusell, 261. 230 Hebblethwaite, 255. 108 ambassador to Madrid, Military, Congressional, Catholic and economic interests forced

it.

Pius XII waited until Franco's regime had weathered the worst stages of

ostracism. From the first agreement in 1941 to the last in 1950, the Church had gained a

lot, but much was still left pending. In 1951 the demonstration of Franco's security

apparatus in suppressing strikes was a turning point. The anti-Franco opposition was

powerless to take over and neither the strikes nor the repression fazed the American military interests in Spain. Rather it demonstrated the need to act quickly. On the

contrary, the strikes raised concerns at the Vatican and demonstrated the need to push for

change. Bishop Herrera became the spokesman against Spain's autarkic and authoritarian government. Perhaps with the right terms in a concordat, the Church could provide the pressure necessary to lead to change.

The Spanish government demonstrated its keen desire for a solemn concordat to enshrine Franco's privileges as Head of State and was very insistent on its terms. Tardini and Pius XII were hesitant to offer Franco the gratification he desired from a concordat.

The Holy See waited for the Eucharistic Congress and the enactment of a new law of secondary education before pursuing negotiations in full force. If the Spanish Foreign

Office had doubted whether or not the Vatican would conclude the agreement, the 1953 consistory signaled what was to come.

Segura's pastoral crusade against Protestantism in Spain strengthened Truman's anti-Franco sentiments. But it also demonstrated the international importance of properly regulating the church with the state. Cardinal Ottaviani, considered one of the most conservative and powerful forces in the Curia, praised the very article that Cardinal

109 Segura attacked. The resolute Archbishop of Seville befitted the Spanish Church's

reputation, "more papist than the pope." The Holy See was ultimately concerned to get its

best interests not only because it would have significance in Spain for the Church, but

also because it was the first one of a new era. Spain stressed a Hispanidad connection in

the negotiations and the Vatican appeased these wishes. The shift towards concluding a

model concordat of a confessional state would be a setback. Catholic moderates and

reformers like John Courtney Murray understood that it would provide further arsenal for

critics of Catholic power like Paul Blanshard.

Truman was particularly hostile towards Franco for not allowing Protestants

complete freedom of worship. To what degree did Truman view Cold War objectives in

religious terms? When it came to Yugoslavia, the persecution of the Catholic Church

played no part in the Truman administration's policy. Ironically, it was Truman's desire to

send aid to Tito that forced him to send $62,500,000 to Franco in November 1950. In

Pius XII's mind, Tito was a rising threat to freedom of religion. Upon elevating the

imprisoned Archbishop Stepinac as a Cardinal in 1953, Pius XII was raising awareness of

the persecuted Church. Although Truman has been credited with conceiving and fighting the Cold War on religious terms, his vision differed much from Pope Pius XII's. The

Protestant issue in Spain did not affect Eisenhower to the degree it affected Truman. The

Pact of Madrid was not so much a shift of policy in administrations, as has been

suggested. The policy was well in motion when Truman left office.

110 Chapter VI: The Cold War and Spanish Concordat of 1953

Ruiz Gimenez enacted the new law on secondary education on 25 February 1953.

The law had been long delayed. When the Committee of Archbishops declared its

objectives in 1952, the Falange had put up fierce resistance, hoping to see Church schools

continue to be disadvantaged by taxes, exams and degree recognition. Although the law was a compromise between the two groups, the hierarchy was not satisfied. The law reserved the State's right to impose taxes on school buildings, as well as require university degrees for priests engaged in teaching. Nonetheless, the Church praised

Franco for the law because he faithfully followed the procedures on legislating "mixed matters." An article in Ecclesia of 7 March that publicized the hierarchy's complaints, significantly broke the secret to the Spanish public that concordat negotiations were currently in progress. The article suggested that rectifying the remaining education issues that leave "Church schools ... at an economic and pedagogic disadvantage" would be the sine qua non of the concordat.

The Spanish Foreign Office had a number of issues with the negotiations that it still needed to resolve. The most important objectives, the reiteration of agreements of

231 Balfour (Madrid) to Eden, 21 March, 1953, FO, WS 1782/2. Ill 1941, 1946 and 1950, had already been achieved, but came at a cost. To a large degree

Franco's remaining objectives were matters of honour, Spanish nationalism and the

avoidance of appearing subservient to the Church. But there were other specific points

that ran into difficulty with the Holy See. The Foreign Office hoped to avoid an article on

Catholic Action, for instance. It also wanted to eliminate all debate on the legal

inconsistencies between article one of the 1851 Concordat, currently in force, and article

6 of the Spanish Fuero. Issues of ecclesiastical liberty proved most significant.

As matters of honour and nationalism, Franco wanted Pius XII to restore Spain's

traditional relationship with Santa Maria Maggiore, which sent revenues for mass

celebrated in honour of the Spanish Head of State. He wanted an article that ordered

Spanish priests to daily offer up prayers according to the tradition proscribed during the

Counter-Reformation and wanted the Spanish language to be officially recognized by the

Congregation of Rites in hearing causes of beatification. Spain also demanded rules for

future changes to the ecclesiastical map. In general, The Foreign Office wanted to

propagate the Concordat as a perfect agreement that regulated an ideal Catholic state.

Wherever possible, the Spanish government wanted to enshrine the Code of Canon Law

without reservation. Some issues demanded by the Church raised no difficulty because

they demonstrated the cultural significance of Catholicism to Spain. This included state

observance of Church holidays and feasts.

As concerned the Holy See, there were a number of specific requests other than

Catholic Action. It wanted recognition of the Catholic Church as a "perfect society" and

free communication between the Church and the Holy See. It wanted recognition of the

Vatican City as the independent state of the Holy See. It wanted detailed stipulations on

112 state funding of the clergy and exemptions from tax. It wanted the inviolability of religious places guaranteed as stipulated by Canon Law. It shared the desire with the

government and Church to fully accept civil effects of marriage celebrated by the Church.

Pius XII aimed for the fullest state recognition of Canon Law. In short, he wanted a model concordat that could set the bar for other nations and increase the liberty of the

Spanish Church.

Castiella had been frustrated by the difficult negotiations. He fought for the government in trying to limit concessions that would increase the political power of the

Church. He was troubled by the lack of compromise, particularly in regard to gaining further economic "subventions and exemptions." By 1953 Castiella could count at least forty such concessions. 232 According to Castiella, this demonstrated a "stingy" Church.

Apparently it was more concerned about finances than a consolidation of legal norms.233

The Vatican viewed these concessions as the necessary exchange for allowing the reproduction of the Patronado.

Spain's Metropolitans studied the Concordat draft and delivered their criticisms in

June. They insisted on dealing with the conception of the Spanish nation as integrally

Catholic, and other religions as inferior and foreign. Cardinal Segura was alone in advising the Holy See to not sign any agreements with what he saw as a fascist, regalist, and illegitimate regime seeking to sell Spain's soul to American imperialists. Apart from the Concordat, Segura also advised the Vatican not to conclude the negotiation over

Spanish patronage of Santa Maria Maggiore.

232Tusell, Franco y los Catolicos 256. 233 Tusell, Franco y los Catolicos, 256. This opinion was supported by one of the first English language books on Franco's Spain, Herbert Lionel Matthews, The Yoke and the Arrows, Revised Ed. (New York: G. Braziller,1961), which identified the Concordat as primarily an economic agreement. 113 At the height of Segura's critiques against Franco in 1952, Tardini had stated that

he wanted to temper the anti-Protestant constitutional criticisms by addressing a revision

of the first article of the 1851 Concordat.234 At this stage, Pius XII took interest in the

negotiations. Since he did not want to write a precedent-setting article that outright

denied freedom of religion, but wished to appease the Spanish Church, Pius XII

suggested the simple reproduction of the controversial 1851 article. He also expressed a

desire to include article three of 1851, an article which had been originally composed as a

way for the Church to continue its hold over society without the restoration of the

Spanish Inquisition. It bound the state to assist the episcopate in suppressing "malicious

attempts to pervert and corrupt the souls of the faithful" as well as prohibiting "the publication, introduction or circulation of harmful books" in Spain. The Pope explained to Castiella that he felt the Concordat was ready to conclude and any further prolonging

235 of negotiations was the result of reservations on the part of Spain and not the Holy See.

Pius XII had secured all the terms most important to the Holy See except the article on

Catholic Action that he still demanded. Either he was un-concerned with Spain's interests in avoiding reference to 1851 and wished to appease the Spanish episcopate, or he used the hierarchy's insistence against religious freedom as a negotiating tool to gain the concession on Catholic Action.

Castiella was frustrated. Aiming to present the 1953 Concordat as different from its predecessor, as well as to overcome Spain's Protestant critics, the old articles of 1851 had to be revised. In the perception of the Spanish Foreign Office, any inclusion of the old Concordat, violated by the Second Republic, implied that it was superior to the new. 234 De Margerie to Schuman, 22 August, 1952, Q d'O, z Europe 1949-55/Espagne 36/ pp 92-93. 235 Tusell, Franco y los Catolicos, 267. 114 If that was the case, it underhandedly brought up the issue that Franco was denied the

reinstatement of the 1851 Concordat. Spain had to seek consultation with Rome and the

disagreement was mediated by the Convenio of 7 June 1941. It reinstated the first four

articles of the 1851 Concordat as a status quo agreement until a new concordat could be

concluded. However it also revised the 1851 Patronado into a more acceptable form. In

the end, Castiella gave into an article on Catholic Action as a concession for a new first

article. To the frustration, especially of Segura, the compromise also agreed that a final

protocol would be added to the Concordat. In relation to article one, the Protocol

confirmed the rules of Article VI of the Fuero. Pius XII received another concession in the compromise. In relation to the new article two, the Protocol accepted in force the

stipulations of article 3 from the 1851 Concordat.236

In the remaining negotiations for the Papal Bull to reestablish Spain's relationship with Santa Maria Maggiore, Castiella brought before Tardini the rumour that its conclusion was dependent upon Spain's economic agreement with the United States.

Tardini adamantly denied there was such an association. Nonetheless, Castiella was given permission to relay to Tardini the details of progress with the United States. Historian

236 Article VI of the Fuero : " The profession and practice of the Roman Catholic religion, which is that of the Spanish State, will enjoy official protection.The State will assume the protection of religious freedom, which will be guaranteed by effective judicial protection and which, in turn, will safeguard morals and public order."; Article III of the 1851 Concordat: " The clergy will not be impeded in any way as they carry out their functions, nor will any individual or pretext be allowed to disrupt the performance of their duties and responsibilities; on the contrary, the State will protect them and give them due respect and regard according to divine precepts and nothing will be allowed that might cause disrespect or contempt; His Majesty and the government will give its powerful patronage and support to the bishops whenever it is requested, principally when they oppose malicious attempts to pervert and corrupt the souls of the faithful or when they wish to prevent the publication, introduction or circulation of harmful books." 115 Javier Tussell argued that the conversation was significant by virtue of being

mentioned.237 The Vatican had proof of Franco's Cold War rehabilitation.

It is hard to downplay the importance of Santa Maria Maggiore to the Holy See,

and more specifically, to Pius XII, who as Euguenio Pacelli had celebrated his first Easter

Sunday Mass in this basilica. St. Peter's Basilica was the center of the Vatican, and St.

John Lateran was the Cathedral Church of the Roman Pontiff, which historically had been associated with the French Church. Santa Maria Maggiore was the third most

important of the Roman patriarchal basilicas. It had always been and would remain the

figurehead church of Mariology.

Its connections with Spain dated back to the fifteenth century. Pope Innocent X concluded with King Philip IV an annual foundation to the Liberian Chapter in Sacri

Apostolatus, dated 7 October, 1647. The Apostolic Constitution stipulated that the King of Spain granted money from his Sicilian dioceses of Catania and Mazara, for the

Basilica, in exchange for three yearly masses celebrated in honour of Spain: one on the

Nativity of the Virgin Mary, one on All Souls, and one on the Feast of St. Ildefonso, "to

238 intercede for the spiritual and temporal prosperity of the King and the Spanish Nation."

In perpetual memory of Spain's patronage stands a seventeenth century bronze sculpture of Phillip IV in prominence at the entry of the Basilica.239 The foreign patronage of

Spain's monarchy was abandoned under Mussolini. Spain's annual tributes to the Basilica wound up in the Sacred Roman Rota in 1933. A Pontificial Commision had been formed to examine the case. The privileges sought for Spain at Santa Maria Maggiore were

237 Tussell, Franco y los Catolicos, 262. 238 "Addendum III," Facts about Spain, 50, 33-36. 239 Steven F. Ostrow, "Gianlorenzo Bernini and Girolamo Lucenti, and the Statue of Philip IV in S. Maria Maggiore: Patronage and Politics in Seicento Rome," The Art Bulletin, 73.1(Mar., 1991), 89-118. 116 particularly important for cultivating Franco's Catholic persona as defender of the faith.

Negotiations began in 1952 and were concluded on the occasion of the Feast of the

Dedication of St. Mary of the Snows, on 5 August, 1953.240 The newly created

constitution reinstated the Spanish Canon, which administered the celebration of three

yearly Masses in honour of Spain.241 If Franco (as Head of State) could not attend,

ceremonial honours would be conferred upon his Ambassador to the Holy See. The Papal

Bull, Hispaniarum fidelitas, established the Canon and honoured Franco for the

restoration of "[t]he fidelity of Spain to the Catholic religion and the Apostolic See, and

her devotion to the Blessed Virgin Mary.. ."242

The Spanish Concordat followed less than one month after Hispaniarum fidelitas,

and was signed on 27 August, 1953. It consisted of 36 articles and a Final Protocol.

Monsignor Tardini joked that it was the longest ever concluded; he was amused by what he saw as a childish insistence on grandiose language and particulars of Spanish

Catholicism. He stated a month prior to its conclusion, "the Concordat would be poorly understood by strangers. There is only one country like Spain, admitted, but this document will be of immense importance for us, especially in the South American countries."243 Martin Artajo explained why that was. "The most important innovation is

240 The legend had it that Mary appeared to a devout man during a snowstorm in June, requesting for herself a Church. It was built on the spot by Pope Liberius (352-366). Hence it is also known as the Liberian Basilica. 241 They were "on the Feast of the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary, one on the Feast of the Immaculate Conception, and one on the Feast of St. Ferdinand, King of Spain, for propagation of the Faith, for the intentions of the Head of the Spanish State, and in intercession for the prosperity of the Head of the State and of the Spanish Nation." on 15 August: 8 December: and 30 May; respectively. See "Addendum III," 33-36. 242 "Addendum III," 33. 243 Telegram from d' Ormesson (Holy See) 24 July 1953 Q d'O, z Europe 1949-55/Espagne 37/pp. 37-38. 117 the decided and open manner in which the classic questions are regulated, and, more

particularly, those of marriage and education."244

Castiella had been insistent that the signature ceremony should be a solemn

celebration. Although it lacked publicity, it fulfilled the desires of the Spanish

negotiators.245 The day began at 9:30 in the morning at the Papal palace, Castel Gandolfo.

Castiella and Artajo were received by Pius XII as the Swiss Guards and Pontifical Armed

Forces extended their honours. At 12:30 the Concordat was signed back at the Vatican in

the Hall of Congregations of the Apostolic Palace. The entire contingent of the Spanish

embassy was present.246

Although the technicalities of the concordat would require a trained specialist in

canon and concordat law, an analysis of the text can serve to demonstrate how the

objectives of Spain and the Holy See played out. Traditionally, the first articles of a

concordat were the most important. Such was the case in 1953. Article 1 read "The

Catholic, Apostolic, and Roman religion continues to be the only religion of the Spanish

nation, and shall enjoy the rights and prerogatives that correspond to it in keeping with

Divine law and Canon Law."247 The 1851 Concordat had stated that Catholicism was the

only religion of Spain, "to the exclusion of any other." The article was a satisfactory

compromise for the Holy See if not for the Spanish Church. In relation to this article the

Final Protocol approved article VI of the Fuero. World press coverage hailed the

significance. The London Times' coverage was titled "Non-Catholics Sects in Spain:

244 "Addendum XI," Facts about Spain, 50, 83-87, 87. 245 Brouillet (Holy See) to Bidault, 28 August 1953, Q d'O, z Europe 1949-55/Espagne 37/ pp 43-49. 246 Brouillet (Holy See) to Bidault, 28 August 1953, Q d'O, z Europe 1949-55/Espagne 37, PP 43-49. 247 The compromise on this article involved the omission of the 1851 clause, "to the exclusion of any other;" This eliminated what Cardinal Segura claimed a contradiction contained in Article VI of the Fuero: "No one shall be molested for his religious beliefs or in the private practice of his worship." 118 Freedom Protected."248 The New York Times' coverage was more in depth, and cited the inclusion of article 6 of the Fuero as evidence of the Vatican's repudiation of Segura. It further praised the confirmation of the status quo in Morocco, which allowed for "public worship" for Jews and Muslims in Spanish controlled Africa.249 That this was such a controversial point of the negotiations demonstrated how difficult Tardini's and

Castiella's roles were.

Article 2 stipulated that the Catholic Church was a "perfect society" and thus guaranteed it freedom and powers both publicly and spiritually and also recognized for the Holy See jurisdiction, communication and free publication in Spain. In relation to this article the final protocol approved article III of the 1851 Concordat.

Article III of the 1953 Concordat was one of Spain's specific concessions to the

Holy See. "The Spanish State recognizes the international legal personality of the Holy

See and the State of the Vatican City." The recognition was desirable due to potential threats to Vatican sovereignty in the event of an outbreak of war or a Communist electoral victory in Italy. The article would soon become the subject of attack in the leftist press.250

Article IV was in regard to the liberty of the Church. It recognized all religious associations already in existence or that in the future would come into being. Castiella originally hoped that this article would be a sufficient enough reference to Catholic

Action. That it was not was determined in article XXXIV. Catholic Action was "allowed freely to carry out their apostolate." Article V ensured that Catholic holidays and feasts

248 The London Times, 29 August, 1953. 249 The New York Times, 28 August, 1953. 250 Telegram from d' Ormesson (Holy See), 5 November 1953, Q d'O, z Europe 1949-55/Espagne 37, PP. 98-99. 119 were officially proclaimed and observed by the State, and Article VI guaranteed prayers

for the Head of the Spanish State, in accordance with the precedent granted by St. Pius V

and Gregory XIII.

The major achievement of Franco in the Concordat was the reassertion of the

appointment procedures of 7 June, 1941, in article VII. By those terms the government

and Spanish nuncio together composed a list of six candidates for appointment as bishop.

The Holy See would "present" three from the list, and Franco would pick his choice. The

Agreement of 1950 on religious care of the armed forces was confirmed in Article VIII.

The 16 July, 1946 Agreement on non-consistorial benefices was secured in Article X.

Franco was the last secular leader to enjoy such privileges. King Juan Carlos I voluntarily

renounced these privilege when he succeeded Franco in 1975.

Article XIII, which recognized the 5 August, 1953 Bull on the Patriarchal Basilica

of Santa Maria Maggiore, made another significant concession to Spain: Spanish was

recognized as an admitted language by the Congregation of Rites. This article which

related to St. Mary's Basilica honoured the whole Catholic, Spanish-speaking world. By

the end of the year, 186 "martyrs" of the Civil War had already been submitted for

0 < 1 beatification. Castiella further gained for the Spanish Head of State, by future

agreement, the title of Chancellor over the basilica.

Article XXIII simply stated: "The Spanish State recognizes the full civil effects of marriages celebrated according to the rules of Canon Law." However a list of procedures to follow marriages was appended to the article in the Final Protocol. The Concordat guaranteed the State's subsidy of the Spanish Church and schools, as well as fully 251 Tusell, Franco y los Catolicos, 275. 252 Brouillet (Holy See) to Bidault, 28 August, 1953, QO/EU/EUR 49-55/Espagne 37, PP 43-49. 120 exempted them from the remaining leviable taxes (XIX, XX). Religious, secular and

regular, as well as seminarians training for the priesthood, were exempted from military

service. The "Motu Proprio" that reestablished the Rota Tribunal of the Apostolic

Nunciature on April 7, 1947 was confirmed (XXV) and its ecclesiastical trials were

declared "exclusively competent" in cases relating to the nullity of a marriage (XXIV).

Only Spain had possessed its own ecclesiastical court of appeals. This was one of those

specific privileges of the Spanish Church, which had its origins in the sixteenth century.

In addition to the confirmation of the Spanish Rota, another traditional honour of Spain

was restored, it was conceded two seats on the Tribunal of the Sacred Roman Rota, one

for Aragon and one for Castile. Only the Spanish episcopate possessed that honour.

Non-Catholics were exempted from Catholic education. But in all levels of

school, from primary to post-secondary, both state-run and church-run, religious

education was deemed mandatory; teachers, curriculum and certification were deemed

fully accountable to the Spanish hierarchy. Article XXVI stated further that in all

educational institutions "teaching shall conform to the principles of Dogma and Morals of the Catholic Church."

One article was unique in the history of concordats and dealt with Catholic properties and their historical significance. Article XXI stipulated that a Committee on cultural, artistic and architectural heritage be formed in every diocese to "supervise the preservation of, and repairs and eventual alterations to" the architectural sites and artistic works owned by the Church considered nationally and historically significant. It further stated: "The Holy See consents to the State's being given the option to purchase such objects, on equal terms, when they are put up for sale by public auction ..." Article XXII

121 declared "[t]he inviolability of churches, chapels, cemeteries, and other sacred places. .."

It also stipulated that "[i]n cases of expropriation ... the competent ecclesiastical

authority shall always first be heard, even as regards the amount of the compensation."

Article XXXV declared that difficulties in interpreting the Concordat would proceed in accordance with the interpretation of the Holy See. Ecclesiastical matters not

covered, would follow the existing Code of Canon Law.

The Catholic sector of Franco's government, those influential Cabinet Ministers

and ambassadors that emerged from Catholic Action, such as Artajo, Gimenez and

Castiella, could proclaim they concluded an ideal system of civil-ecclesiastical relations and now had a model concordat. The reality was quite different for the Falange. Some dissenters refused to attend the ratification session in the Cortes. Castiella had conceded more than intended in Rome, and the Spanish Church had acquired a most privileged situation. Franco intended a more regalist Concordat, but the Holy See had negotiated a tough line. The freedom of the Church in Spain had political implications that challenged

Franco's balance of power. Franco even acknowledged that "questions relating to ecclesiastical rights were certainly delicate and difficult to handle."253 Some Spanish observers doubted that Spain would sign the Concordat because of its unprecedented establishment of Church hegemony.254 Falangists wanted a Concordat to secure Spanish

Catholic identity before allying with the United States, but they feared the hierarchy's political ambition, and resented Franco's limited control over them.

253 "Addendum IX: Message of H.E. the Head of State to the Spanish Corte, October 26, 1953," Facts about Spain, 50, 65-78, 72. 254 Meyrier (Madrid) to MAE, 8 September 1953, Q d'O, z Europe 1949-55/Espagne 37, PP 50-58. 122 The Concordat exceeded a simple recognition of the Church's sovereignty and

went far beyond defining Catholicism as the national religion; it gave true "preeminence

to Canon Law."255 Ecclesiastical courts were given complete jurisdiction over marriage,

and the state would now have to write specific legislation on the marriage of Catholics

and non-Catholics in accordance with Canon Law. One of its effects was that divorce would not be legalized until the Concordat's abrogation after Franco's death. The clergy were exempted from military service and could not accept public posts without the local

Ordinary's approval. State-run religious education had to conform to the dogma of the

Church. Instructors and curriculum needed approval from the hierarchy. Church property was exempted from taxation. Although the state financed temporal needs, inviolability of the Churches and ecclesiastical property was guaranteed. The Holy See was guaranteed free communication with the Episcopate and unfettered rights of publication in Spain.

Clergy were exempted from state courts, unless approved by the Vatican. Catholic Action was free in its apostolate. Radio and television were forced to respect and propagate

Catholic morality. Non-Catholics were ensured only private rights. Mixed matters would continue to have to seek consultation with the Holy See. Legislation already existing in contradiction to the Concordat "shall be taken as repealed." In short, the Spanish Church was the ultimate benefactor of the Concordat. The Holy See had negotiated it to ensure freedom from state interference, as well as to guarantee dependency upon the Holy See. It belonged to the project of Roman Catholic centralization. Tardini admitted that the concessions offered in the Concordat far exceeded anyone's expectations of what a state

255Meyrier (Madrid) to MAE, 8 September, 1953, Q d'O, z Europe 1949-55/Espagne 37, PP 50-58. 123 could offer a church. The precedent it set, he considered was of "immense

importance."256

The Spanish Concordat was the first since the end of the Second World War, and

the second of Pius XII's pontificate. It was identified as a new model for anti-communist

Catholic nations and was intended to be particularly relevant in Latin America.257 It was projected as a different model than previous concordats: rather than resembling a treaty between antagonistic forces, it was the consummation of relations with an existing

co Catholic State. Franco, Artajo, and Castiella all emphasized that it was negotiated in an atmosphere of peaceful collaboration. The strict confidentiality of negotiations helped support this claim; rumours that the Vatican had shown reserve were vehemently denied.259

The actual negotiations, however, had been fraught with difficult concessions and compromises. Despite all the rhetoric of a new model, the Spanish Concordat compared in many points to other controversial concordats. Like those of the past, it granted legitimacy and prestige to a leader of questionable authority.260 In comparison to Spain's past Concordats, the Holy See again conceded patronage rights contrary to its own desire.

In three Spanish cases this concession was the primary goal of the Spanish government, and was conceded by the Papacy as a necessity due to fears of international instability. In

1753 it was fear of losing control in Latin America due to a rift with Ferdinand VI. In

256 Telegram from d'Ormesson (Holy See), 24 July 1953, Q d'O, z Europe 1949-55/Espagne 37, PP 37-38. 257 Telegram from d' Ormesson (Holy See), 24 July, 1953, Q d'O, z Europe 1949-55/Espagne 37, PP 37-38. 258 The Concordat with Portugal was more of a consummation than a peace treaty, but it lacked the holistic confessionality of the Spanish Concordat. Further, the Holy See did not make generous concessions to the State. Because of its general nature, it proved one of the longest lasting Concordats of the twentieth century. 259 "Addendum IX," 69; "Addendum XI," 83. 260 For an analysis of how Napoleon, Mussolini and Hitler all used concordat to this end, see Frank J. Coppa, Ed., Controversial Concordats. 124 1851 it was a fear of liberal revolution. In 1953 it was a fear of communism. In each case,

the Patronado was conceded in exchange for financial concessions. In 1753 money was

sent to Rome in compensation for the loss of more than 10,000 benefices. In 1851 the

state agreed to financially support the clergy in compensation for the dissolution of

Church wealth. In 1953 the financial concessions were considered due compensation for

Franco's privileges. The 1851 Concordat was concluded in order to fill the numerous vacancies in the Church. Part of the reason that Franco was able to state that the new

Concordat had different inspirations was that the real peace treaty agreement between opposing factions occurred in the 1941 Convenio. Each of the three most significant concordats in Spain's history originated out of a church and state conflict that followed some sort of civil war. After 1941 peace was still far off in civil-ecclesiastical relations.

During the pro-Axis stage of Franco's dictatorship, Cardinal Goma feared that the state might still devolve into open persecution of the Church. From 1945 onwards, as Spain's ostracism emerged, Franco aimed to satisfy the Church, as it became both internally and internationally beneficial to appease the Holy See and project his country as a model

Catholic nation. Franco did not want Spain identified as a fascist country, but as a nation revived in Catholicism following the victorious crusade against atheistic communism.

Despite this rhetoric, the Church had no shortage of criticism of how it was treated in

Spain. Nonetheless, it was sensitive to claims that the Vatican did not appreciate Franco's restoration.

Ofs 1

The conclusion of negotiations took the Spanish public by surprise. As was expected, the official press lost no time in presenting the Concordat as "a political event

26'Brouillet (Holy See) to Bidault, 28 August, 1953, Q d'O, z Europe 1949-55/Espagne 37, PP 43-49. 125 of exceptional importance."262 Emphasizing that the Concordat raised the international

prestige of Franco's Spain to new heights, it also proudly portrayed the unique privileges

it enshrined (i.e. Santa Maria Maggiore, Spanish Rota, and two seats on the Roman Rota)

as a source of jealousy for the French Church.263 The Vatican knew all along that the pro-

Francoist press would boast about its Concordat. In abandoning his reservations near the

end of 1952, Pius XII had to accept this fact.

The question remains, did Franco get what he wanted? In terms of paying for the

Patronado, Franco proved generous towards the Church. In return he gained honour and

increased respectability, but did not gain one coveted privilege of the patron. Elements of

the hierarchy, rather than offering their moral support, continued to criticize the Caudillo.

When doing so, it demonstrated that civil and ecclesiastical relations were not

harmonious, and that the Church would not abandon its right to speak to political,

economic and social topics. During the week preceding the Concordat's conclusion,

Archbishop Olaechea and Bishop Herrera unleashed a renewed offensive against the

government. Bishop Herrera, in a sermon published in Ya, and Bishop Olaechea, in a pastoral on the "just wage," denounced Franco's social and agricultural policies and

defended their rights to speak on political matters. Herrera's sermon was on the parable of the Good Samaritan. Criticizing the agricultural law of "the exemplary exploitations of 15

July, 1952" for creating "a new rural aristocracy," Herrera denounced the Andalusian land owners as being only "seemingly Christian" which "Jesus-Christ abhors."264 Herrera recognized positive directions coming out of the Social Institute of Leo XIII, which

262Meyrier (Madrid) to MAE, 8 September, 1953, Q d'O, z Europe 1949-55/Espagne 37, PP 50-58. 263Meyrier (Madrid) to MAE, 8 September 1953, Q d'O, z Europe 1949-55/Espagne 37, PP 50-58. 264 Meyrier (Madrid) to MAE, 8 September 1953, Q d'O, z Europe 1949-55/Espagne 37, PP 62-68. 126 declared the need for the redistribution of wealth and land. He also recognized that the

Minister of Agriculture was charged with the responsibility of increasing crop production, but denounced him for doing so at the expense of human dignity. Herrera stated that first and foremost, "transportation routes, electric lights, houses, schools, churches, sports, radio, controlled cinematography, professional culture, Sunday rest, joy and well being and above all social justice, authenticates participation of the workman in the products of the ground!"265 These were not features present in the majority of

Spaniards' lives.

The French Ambassador in Madrid, Meyrier, acknowledged the timing of these overtly political messages. He noted that the fundamental contradiction in the Concordat was the assumption that the Church supported the policies of the Falange. He speculated that the privileges granted to the Church in the Concordat "could carry the germs of change," or at least have demonstrated a shift in Franco's base of power.266 The Holy See could only hope. Despite Franco's Patronado, the ecclesiastical hierarchy continued to fight for the Pope's vision of social justice. It would do this without risking ecclesiastical discipline. The Spanish Church, sometimes considered more papist than the pope, would clearly support the more conservative and anti-communist directions of Pius XII and the

Holy Office in the early 1950s.

After the conclusion of the Pact of Madrid, the Holy See was criticized in the

Italian and French communist press for signing the Concordat. In an article of Unita entitled, "Franco and the Christian Democrats," the Italian Communist Senator, Ottavio

Pestore, criticized the Concordat as Vatican "subservience to Yankee imperialism."

265 Meyrier (Madrid) to MAE, 8 September 1953, Q d'O, z Europe 1949-55/Espagne 37, PP 62-68. 266 Meyrier (Madrid) to MAE, 8 September 1953, Q d'O, z Europe 1949-55/Espagne 37, PP 62-68. 127 Insisting that with Spanish military buildup resulting from the Pacts of Madrid, the Holy

See guaranteed its sovereignty in a secret article where Franco agreed to send troops in the event of war.267 This was vigorously denied by the Osservatore Romano. There was no secret article. To demonstrate that international politics differed from religious considerations of the Holy See, the article pointed to Tito's Yugoslavia. The United States allied with Tito even before allying with Spain. The Holy See's relations with

Yugoslavia, however, had reached an all time low.

On 8 September, the Feast of the Nativity of the Blessed Virgin Mary, Pius XII published the Encyclical Fulgens Corona declaring 1954 a Marian Year to celebrate the centenary of Pope Pius IX's infallible proclamation of the Immaculate Conception of

Mary. In it Pius XII made a special reference to the Patriarchal Basilica of Santa Maria

Maggiore. He did not mention Franco's new role as Chancellor of the Basilica, but the encyclical helps explain why Franco was honoured with such privileges.

The encyclical announced a Marian year, not only as a centenary, but also as a response to communist atheism and materialist secularism. Pius XII stated that governments rejecting Christian principles err and their "laws and public authority have little or no value."268 Leaders of nations, he continued, can remedy this evil. Perhaps the primary example of such a leader was Francisco Franco.

For the Marian Year, Catholics were instructed to pray for Mary's intercession.

Persecuted Catholics throughout the world were the primary targets of this exhortation.

Everybody knows what difficulties the Church is experiencing in many parts of the world; with what lies, detraction and spoliation she has to contend. All know

267 Telegram from d'Ormesson (Holy See), 5 November 1953, Q d'O, z Europe 1949-55/Espagne 37, PP. 98-99. 268 Fulgens Corona, 8 September, 1953. 128 that in many places pastors of souls are either unhappily banished or thrown into prison without just cause, or else are so harassed that they are unable to carry out their duties properly. Finally, all are well aware that in those same places they are not allowed to have their own schools and training colleges, that they cannot publicly teach, defend or propagate Christian doctrine in periodicals or commentaries, and cannot properly train the youth in accordance with the same doctrine.269

Although solemnly and sincerely promulgated, Mariology under Pope Pius XII

developed a political character just as it had under Pope Pius IX. It was the legacy of the

First Vatican Council applied to the Cold War. The proclamation of the Dogma of the

Bodily Assumption during the Holy Year of 1950 was the only other "infallible"

statement of a pope since Pius IX. Pius XII has since been criticized for his dogmatic proclamation. Rather than support new methods of theology and biblical studies, as

seemed would be the case from earlier encyclicals in the 1940s, Pius XII curbed new developments in the name of ecclesiastical discipline. Instead he chose to promote popular Mariology. Embracing Catholic traditionalism and dogma was part of Pius XII's religious cold war. As the Church's most powerful intercessory figure, Mary was embraced to protect Catholics from the onslaught of atheist totalitarianism.

The clearest indication that Pius XII finally approved of Franco emerged on 22

December, 1953, when Ildebrando Antoniutti was presented his credential as Apostolic

Nuncio in Spain. Monsignor Antoniutti had been appointed charge d'affaires at Burgos late in 1937 during the Spanish Civil War. In 1953, he had just concluded 15 years of service as Apostolic Delegate in Canada. After the elaborate credential presentation ceremony for Antoniutti, "doyen of the diplomatic body," Franco was informed that Pius

269 Fulgens Corona, 8 September, 1953. 129 970 XII had made him a knight in the highest Vatican Order: the Supreme Order of Christ.

The honour had not been bestowed for fourteen years.271 At first reluctant to confer papal

knighthood on Franco, fearing that it would impede monarchial restoration, Pius XII now

fully embraced Franco and helped seal the Caudillo's Cold War legitimacy.272 Antoniutti praised the Catholicism of the Spanish people by radio message after the ceremony. The

OTX Spanish press was quick to cite "new bonds between Spain and the Holy See."

Despite the acceptance and appreciation of Francisco Franco in 1953, it is

doubtful that Pius XII ever abandoned reservations towards Franco's labour and

economic policies. As a largely unexplored aspect of his pontificate, Pius XII had an ardent commitment to social problems and human rights. Although he did not write great

social encyclicals, his commitment to the legacy of Leo XIII's Rerum Novarum was propagated through the medium of Christmas Messages. As Carol Jane Vanderburg has argued in her doctoral dissertation, these messages formed a valuable aspect of his pontificate's theological development and foreshadowed developments of the Second

Vatican Council. In Spain, embracing Franco did not mean embracing Falangism. As

Meyrier pointed out there was a fundamental contradiction in the text with regard to political philosophy. The French ambassador pondered what changes the Concordat implied for Francoism. The Spanish Church's commitment to the proletariat and human rights did not cease because of the "union without confusion." Pius XII could embrace

270 Madrid to MAE, 24 December 1953, Q d'O, z Europe 1949-55/Espagne 37. The Supreme Order of Christ became the highest of the Papal Orders of Knighthood in 1905 after reorganization by Pius X. Also reorganized by Paul VI in 1966. Its origins relate to the creation of a Portuguese Order which incorporated the Knights Templar. Connected to the Crusades and Age of Exploration, the Order had also been conferred upon Phillip II. 271 Tusell, Franco y los Catolicos, 277. 272 Madrid to MAE, 24 December 1953, Q d'O, z Europe 1949-55/Espagne 37. 273 Madrid to Foreign Ministry, 24 December, 1953 ASMAE, B19/555/Espagne. 130 Franco as a "beloved son," an ardent champion of "Christian public law," and a noble

governmental leader committed to Marian devotion; but he could also trust the

empowered Spanish Church to pressure the Franco government in regard to the Church's vision of human rights and economic liberalization. The Papacy could continue to act above national politics and meanwhile influence them. As the Cold War brought Franco

Spain respectability and rehabilitation, it also directed Pope Pius XII in his theological development. These two developments converged in the Spanish Concordat.

Francisco Franco achieved his major international objectives in 1953. Consistent with his opportunistic, "realist" approach to foreign relations, Franco secured legitimacy with the United States through the Pacts of Madrid (September 26). Under President

Truman, these agreements evolved slowly, and largely outside Franco's control. An active Spanish lobby in the United States was successful in pressuring Truman to reevaluate relations with Franco in the context of potential war with the Soviet Union.

Only in the Red Scare witch-hunt of Senator Joseph McCarthy could the Republican electoral campaign accusation, that Truman was soft on communism, be understood. The

Truman Doctrine, the creation of NATO, and the massive military expenditures of NSC-

68, indicate American complicity in the origin of the Cold War. But despite General

Franco's clear anti-communist identity, President Truman resisted pressures to ally with

Spain. Anti-fascism on both sides of the Iron Curtain ostracized Franco. Its legacy, much stronger in Europe than in the United States, prevented Franco from joining the western

Cold War camp. But anti-communism eventually eclipsed Franco's ostracism in the

United States and the Vatican. The process to incorporate Spain through a bi-lateral pact had begun despite Truman's distaste and the victory of Eisenhower ensured its conclusion. Truman aimed to keep the pacts "off his watch." He did so successfully, but

inconsistently. Franco was a general and a Cold Warrior. President Eisenhower was as

well, and Franco was pleased with his victory.

During the Second World War, when the Axis Powers wanted Franco to restore

the favour, Franco demanded French colonial possessions in exchange. Franco also

sought the idea of Hispanidad, and dreamed of a neo-imperialist connection with the

Spanish-speaking world to counter Anglo-American hegemony. Franco's Ambassador to

the Holy See and future Foreign Minister, Fernando Castiella y Maiz, was a proponent of

this Spanish ideology. The victory of the Allies in 1945 created a new era of international

relations and dashed any neo-imperialist goals of Franco Spain. The Hispanidad vision

was turned into a cultural vision rooted in Catholicism and Castilian (the Spanish

language). It offered inspiration for Blanshard's thesis that apart from communism,

Catholicism (and its clerico-fascist international project) threatened American

democracy. Franco also sought connections to the Arab world and helped cultivate a bond with theocratic, anticommunist and nationalist regimes. The anti-communist legacy

of the Spanish Civil War and the Blue Division's fight against Soviet Russia made clear

Franco's allegiance in the emerging Cold War. Western Europe was being rebuilt and rearmed with American assistance, and Franco waited for his anticommunist credentials to win Spain recognition in the Cold War. The agreement with the United States in 1953 had not the pride and nationalist significance of the Spanish Concordat. The relations with the Vatican were a unifying factor of Franco's foreign policy and provided a post- fascist crusade myth for his regime. The Concordat was connected to Nationalist Spain's identity and the Hispanidad vision. The Pacts of Madrid marked the economic and

132 military restoration of Spain. But the Concordat restored Spain's pride in the Communion of the Church. Spain became a model Catholic nation whose concordatory could be emulated in Latin America as a block against communist and Protestant infiltration.

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Zachary Charles Wareham

St. Stephen's University, St. Stephen, New Brunswick, Bachelor of Arts (Honours) in Interdisciplinary Studies, 2003