Volume 46, Number 2, Spring 2014, pp. 159-178 Davis & Glantz 159 Resurrecting the Also-Rans: Image Repair Debate Strategies of Democrats Who Voted to Authorize the War in Iraq

Corey B. Davis & Mark J. Glantz

Joseph Biden, Chris Dodd, John Edwards, and Hillary Clinton were unique among 2007-2008 Democratic presidential candidates. They voted October 11, 2002 to authorize U.S. military use in Iraq and, with the exception of Edwards, voted on October 17, 2003 to authorize supplemental appropriations for the war. These votes presented an image problem for the candidates with Democratic primary voters who strongly opposed the war and favored its prompt end. Aside from Clinton, these candidates faded early in the contest. The current study analyzed attempts by Biden, Dodd and Edwards to repair, with voters, their respective images. Edwards’ use of mortification and Biden’s convincing use of transcendence are evaluated as the most effective image repair strategies. Implications for politicians, voters, and political communication scholars also are considered. Principal among these implications is the finding that political debates are an ideal context for the study of apologia.

n 2007, Democratic contenders for the 2008 presidential I nomination, four of whom had been in the Senate for the controversial 2002 and 2003 war authorization votes, found themselves responding to accusations of reversing positions or flip- flopping. Senator Joseph Biden of Delaware, Senator Hillary Clinton of New York, Senator Christopher Dodd of Connecticut, and former Senator John Edwards of North Carolina had voted on October 11, 2002 to authorize the use of the U.S. Armed Forces against Iraq (U.S. Senate, 2002). On October 17, 2003, Biden, Clinton, and Dodd voted for the supplemental appropriations bill for operations in Afghanistan and Iraq (U.S. Senate, 2003). Edwards voted against the October 17 appropriation (U.S. Senate, 2003). A Fox News/Opinion Dynamics poll taken in September, 2003 found 46% of polled Americans and 27% of polled Democrats supported the $87 billion appropriation (PollingReport.com, 2003). Later, on May 24, 2007, Dodd joined Clinton and Obama (Edwards resigned prior to the 2004 election to focus on his presidential run) voting against U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans' Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act. Biden was alone among Democratic presidential contenders in his support of the bill, which eventually passed the Senate (GovTrack.US, 2007).

Corey B. Davis (Ph.D. University of Missouri) is an Assistant Professor of Communication at University of Wisconsin-Whitewater. Mark J. Glantz (Ph.D. University of Missouri) is an Assistant Professor of Communication & Media Studies at St. Norbert College. Correspondence should be addressed to [email protected] or [email protected].

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In 2007, the four presidential hopefuls had to answer to a Democratic primary electorate who strongly opposed the war. An ABC News/Washington Post tracking poll taken during the period of April 12-15, 2007 showed 70% of surveyed Americans disapproved of the war (PollingReport.com, 2007a). A Quinnipiac University poll during the period of April 25-May 1, 2007 indicated 74% of Democrats supported a timetable for withdrawing troops from Iraq (PollingReport.com, 2007c), and 93% of Democrats in an April 20- 24 CBS News/New York Times poll expressed disapproval of President Bush’s handling of the war (PollingReport.com, 2007b). The importance of the Iraq War as a campaign issue was reflected in the Democratic presidential primary debates. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were the most deliberated issue during the early primary debates, trumping other issues of foreign policy, terrorism, and stalwart Democratic issues like healthcare and poverty (McKinney, Davis, & Delbert, 2009). Candidates who had opposed the war from the beginning, such as former U.S. Senator Mike Gravel from Alaska, U.S. Representative Dennis Kucinich of Ohio, U.S. Senator Barack Obama of Illinois, and New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson, leveled heavy criticism on these candidates for their support of the war (Healy, 2007; Holland, 2007). For Biden, Clinton, Dodd and Edwards, their votes on Iraq created serious threats to their images with voters. Their images were in even more jeopardy among Democratic voters who opposed the war in higher percentages than the general public. The CBS News/New York Times poll, which showed 93% of Democrats disapproved of Bush’s handling of the war (PollingReport.com, 2007b), also found 43% of Democrats disapproved of the way Democrats in Congress were handling the war in Iraq (PollingReport.com, 2007b). Despite the uphill public opinion battle, Hillary Clinton managed to advance deep into the primary season, ultimately losing the nomination to Barack Obama. Biden, Dodd and Edwards were not as successful as Clinton in the 2008 primary election. However, we argue all three senators had to provide excuses for their votes to repair their images in the eyes of Democratic primary voters. We examine the candidates’ image repair strategies using Benoit’s Image Repair Theory (initially named Image Restoration Theory), arguing that political communication scholars and public relations specialists may gain from a careful analysis of “failed” image repair strategies. After all, case studies can be valuable in providing not only best practices, but also examples of what not to do. In addition, the eventual influence Biden earned via his ascent to the vice presidency renders an analysis of his rhetoric on military action valuable. After providing a brief review of work in image repair and a review of Benoit’s Theory of Image Repair, we analyze candidates’

Volume 46, Number 2, Spring 2014, pp. 159-178 Davis & Glantz 161 image repair statements regarding their records on the war in Iraq made during the first (April 27, 2007), second (June 3, 2007), and fourth (July 24, 2007) Democratic presidential primary debates. The third debate (June 28, 2007) was excluded from analysis because it did not feature any direct questions on the topic of the war in Iraq. We then compare and evaluate the strategies used by Biden, Dodd, and Edwards. Finally, we offer implications of our work and future directions for political image repair research.

Image Repair Theory One could speculate speeches of apologia or self-defense have existed since humans first realized reputations were subject to shine and tarnish. In fact, examples of early apologetic discourse can be seen in Gorgias’ (1990) Encomium of Helen and versions of Apology by Plato and Xenophon (Kennedy, 1963). Ryan (1982) also traced the scholarly study of apologia back to Plato, as well as Isocrates. However, only in the last century have scholars sought to develop typologies and classifications to better understand the different ways in which humans seek to repair, enhance, or maintain their images. Fisher (1970) identified apologia as a primary motive for human communication, defining the genre as “purification, concerned with correcting an image” (p. 132). Scott and Lyman (1968), and Burke (1970) among others, presented detailed typologies of apologia. Ware and Linkugel’s (1973) typology particularly is useful for understanding how apologia strategies can be combined in meaningful ways. Their theory begins with the assertion apologists typically rely on some combination of four strategies: denial, differentiation, transcendence, and bolstering. The theory then contends those four strategies can be combined to form identifiable postures. A rhetor who seeks absolution will use denial and differentiation. One who seeks vindication will use denial and transcendence. The combination of bolstering and differentiation represent an explanative posture; the pairing of bolstering and transcendence result in a justificative stance. Some combinations of strategies—transcendence and differentiation, for instance—are less commonly used in tandem and may not actually make much sense when used together. Thus, even a relatively straightforward typology of strategies, such as the one constructed by Benoit (1995), can result in extraordinarily complex rhetorical constructions. Benoit’s (1995) Theory of Image Repair begins with two assumptions: (1) communication is motivated by the drive to make and attain goals, and (2) one of the central goals of human communication is to maintain a positive reputation. Benoit identified two elements necessary for an attack to pose a threat to one’s image. First, there must be an undesirable act. Second, the individual whose

162 Davis & Glantz Iowa Journal of Communication reputation is at stake must be responsible for the undesirable act (Benoit, 1995). Given these assumptions and elements of image repair discourse, and building upon the classifications of previous work (e.g., Burke, 1970; Scott & Lyman, 1968; Ware & Linkugel, 1973), Benoit (1995) identified five main strategies for image repair: denial, evading of responsibility, reducing the offensiveness of the event, corrective action, and mortification. Rhetors may employ just one of these strategies but are more likely to employ multiple strategies combining, for example, elements of reducing the offensiveness and corrective action. The following brief review of these five strategies, as outlined by Benoit (1995), inform the subsequent analysis. Denial can take two forms, simple denial of involvement in or responsibility for an event and shifting the blame to others. Evading responsibility can take one of four forms. Provocation is the act of suggesting the wrongful act was in response to another wrongful act; as in, the person was provoked into acting as s/he did. In applying a strategy of defeasibility, the rhetor claims a “lack of information about or control over important factors in the situation” (Benoit, 1995, p. 76). Claiming the act was an accident or unexpected mishap is a third way of evading responsibility. A fourth way to evade responsibility for an action is to claim s/he acted in earnest or had good intentions. Rhetors can attempt to reduce the offensiveness of actions through six sub-strategies. Bolstering involves attempts to lessen the negative perceptions of rhetors by highlighting their positive traits. Second, rhetors minimize or downplay the negatives associated with the event. Third, differentiation separates a negative action from a closely-linked but more offensive action. Fourth, transcendence attempts to reduce the offensiveness of actions “by placing the act in a different context” (Benoit, 1995, p. 77). A fifth method is to attack the accuser to erode the credibility of the attackers and thus lessen the negative claims against the defender. Finally, compensation, essentially bribery, provides victims with items of value (money, services, etc.) to soften the negative impact of the offensive act. Corrective action is different than compensation. Whereas compensation only provides concessions which do not amend the situation, corrective action attempts to restore an image by returning the situation to the way it was before the undesirable event occurred. Because complete restoration is often impossible, corrective action also involves efforts to change negative policies or practices to “make changes to prevent the recurrence of the undesirable act” (Benoit, 1995, p. 79). Corrective action does not necessarily involve assuming responsibility or blame for a negative action.

Volume 46, Number 2, Spring 2014, pp. 159-178 Davis & Glantz 163 Mortification requires the acceptance of guilt or responsibility and the admission of wrong-doing. It is often accompanied by an apology and a request for forgiveness.

Image Repair in Political Debates Image repair has been effectively applied to interpret numerous examples of political apologia (e.g., Benoit, 1995; Benoit & Henson, 2009; Blaney & Benoit, 2001; Len-Rios & Benoit, 2004; Liu, 2007). Benoit’s (2006a, 2006b) studies, particularly relevant to the current essay, concluded George W. Bush’s use of image repair strategies to justify the Iraq War was largely unsuccessful. Bush repeatedly denied making any mistakes related to the Iraq War, invoked transcendence to suggest his wartime decisions had served a greater purpose, and used defeasibility to argue he may not have had the best possible intelligence regarding Saddam Hussein’s alleged stock of weapons of mass destruction. Benoit concluded the strategies were poorly chosen and failed to repair Bush’s image with Americans. Importantly, Bush used press conferences and a Sunday morning talk show to employ his image repair strategies, not a political campaign debate. Communication researchers frequently have studied the role of image and character discourse in political debates (Benoit & Brazeal, 2002; Benoit & Harthcock, 1999; Katz & Feldman, 1962; McKinney & Carlin, 2004; McKinney, Dudash, & Hodgkinson, 2003), yet this research does not provide sufficient analysis of how candidates shape perceptions of image in political debates. Benoit and Brazeal (2002) provided evidence that defenses are substantially more common in debates than in other political message forms (e.g., television ads, convention speeches). They offer two potential reasons: First, candidates have more control over content in non-debate messages, and are therefore more easily able to “resist” responding to attacks leveled by opponents than in the heat of a debate (Benoit & Brazeal, p. 228). Second, in a debate, the audience already has heard the attack, so candidates do not risk making voters aware of negatives they did not already know. Further, Benoit and Brazeal listed the frequency with which image repair strategies were employed. However, they stopped short of providing rhetorical interpretation of specific image repair strategies and how they functioned to repair images during a debate. Davis (2013) examined Clinton’s image repair on the topic of her Iraq war authorization votes, but the apologia of Biden, Dodd and Edwards remain unexplored. The current study fills these gaps.

Accusations Against War Authorizers Over the course of the 2008 Democratic presidential primary debates, fellow candidates, moderators and, in the case of the fourth debate (the YouTube debate), prospective voters raised questions

164 Davis & Glantz Iowa Journal of Communication about the actions of Biden, Dodd and Edwards which damaged their respective images. Although each candidate faced uniquely nuanced situations influenced by factors such as varying name recognition, number of years in the Senate, consistency of voting record, and policies advocated, all three senators faced attacks for essentially two acts. First, each of the candidates voted to authorize the war in Iraq. Second, the candidates voted for subsequent appropriations to fund the war. In responding to the attacks, candidates faced four main accusations about the war votes: (1) Biden, Dodd and Edwards exercised poor judgment in their decisions to authorize the war; (2) the candidates were dishonest about their reasons for voting for the war and about their intentions to stop the war; (3) the candidates failed to show leadership in their votes on the war and subsequent appropriations; and (4) since the candidates voted for the war, they bore responsibility for the failure of the war.

Analysis of Candidates’ Image Repair Strategies All three candidates—Biden, Dodd and Edwards—used the 2007 Democratic primary debates to address their decisions on the Iraq war. In subsequent sections, we detail the strategies employed by each candidate, using quotations from the debate discourse to illustrate and interpret how strategies were articulated. Although a typical analytical practice for image repair studies (e.g., Benoit, 2006a; Benoit, 2006b; Liu, 2007; and Benoit, 2009), this study marks the first time scholars have sought to identify strategies used by multiple candidates in the context of a presidential primary debate.

Biden In the 2007 debates, a popular policy proposal among Democratic candidates was to begin immediate withdrawal of troops from Iraq. Some candidates, such as Kucinich, Gravel, and Richardson, advocated the immediate and total withdrawal of troops. Biden distinguished himself as the only candidate who did not advocate immediate troop withdrawal. Biden was repeatedly attacked by both his fellow Democratic candidates and by citizens who asked questions during the CNN YouTube debate. Specifically, accusers used Biden’s consistent votes in favor of continued funding of the war to question his commitment to ending the war. Biden had voted (on May 24, 2007, between the first and second debates) for a continuing appropriation the other Democratic presidential candidates in Congress (including Clinton, Dodd, Obama, and Kucinich) had voted against (GovTrack.US, 2007).

Attacking the accuser. One strategy Biden employed was to attack his accusers. In the second debate, Congressman Kucinich

Volume 46, Number 2, Spring 2014, pp. 159-178 Davis & Glantz 165 suggested Democrats could end the war by refusing to approve additional funds for the war. Democrats were put in charge by the people in the last election with the thought that they were going to end the war. Well, they haven't. They have to stop the funding. And I certainly am urging all of my colleagues here, don't give them any more money.” (The Democrats’ second, 2007, n.p.) The attack framed Biden (and other war authorizers) as having failed the American people. Biden responded directly to Kucinich’s accusations by attacking the Congressman for being dishonest, “look, the Republicans and this president have not told us the truth about this war from the beginning. The last thing we Democrats should do is not be telling the truth” (The Democrats’ second, 2007, n.p.). In essence, Biden attacked his accuser, Kucinich, by placing him in the company of the Bush Administration and other pro-war Republicans. In the fourth debate, then Senator Obama declared, we have to send a clear message to the Iraqi government as well as to the surrounding neighbors that there is no military solution to the problems that we face in Iraq…. So we have to begin a phased withdrawal; have our combat troops out by March 31st of next year [2008]. (Fourth Democratic debate, 2007, n.p.) Following Obama’s proposal to immediately begin to withdraw troops, Biden defended his perceived failure to bring the troops home: You know we can’t just pull out now. Let’s get something straight. It’s time to tell the truth. The truth of the matter is: If we started today, it would take one year, one year to get 160,000 troops physically out of Iraq, logistically… There’s not one person in here that can say we’re going to eliminate all troops… unless you’re going to eliminate every physical person who’s an American in Iraq…. Tell the truth for a change. (Fourth Democratic debate, 2007, n.p.) According to Biden, those who would question his policy positions on Iraq were simply being dishonest. Later in the same debate, New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson noted, “Well, I'm trying to provoke a debate here, because there's a difference between the senators and me on when we get our troops out. I've been very clear: Six month[s], but no residual forces” (Fourth Democratic debate, 2007, n.p.). Biden defended his position by attacking Richardson’s suggestions as dishonest and impractical: Number one, there is not a single military man in this audience who will tell this senator he can get those troops out in six months if the order goes today. Let's start telling the truth. Number one, you take all the troops out. You better have helicopters ready to take those 3,000 civilians inside the Green

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Zone where I have been seven times and shot at. You better make sure you have protection for them, or let them die, number one. So we can't leave them there. And it's going to take a minimum 5,000 troops to 10,000 just to protect our civilians. So while you're taking them out, Governor, take everybody out. (Fourth Democratic debate, 2007, n.p.) Biden’s strategy was to defend his consistent war funding votes by attacking his accusers and making their alternative proposals appear insincere and unrealistic.

Transcendence. Finally, even though Biden attacked his fellow Democrats as dishonest in their criticisms of his proposals, Biden argued his votes, particularly his votes providing appropriations to troops, were justified. Employing transcendence, Biden explained why he supported continual funding of the troops in the field: We know that if we put in these mine-resistant vehicles, these V-shaped hull vehicles, put them in now -- we could save two- thirds of the lives and two-thirds of the injuries. My colleagues joined me when I proposed fast-forwarding the funding for that so we could get 2,500 of them into the field by August. If we had voted no and stopped this, it would have delayed that. Lives are at stake. I—and I knew the right political vote, but I tell you what, some things are worth losing elections over… We hear people telling everybody, “Just stop the war, Congress.” We have 50 votes. We're busting our neck every single day. So I respect them. But look, I cannot, as long as there is a single troop in Iraq that I know if I take action by funding them, I increase the prospect they'll live or not be injured, I cannot and will not vote no to fund them. (The Democrats’ second, 2007, n.p.) Biden’s defense presented his motivations in stark contrast to his Democratic opponents who criticized him for continuing to fund the war. Biden argued his votes were justified—morally-imperative actions—that funded life-saving technology for American troops. Biden’s purported noble interest in keeping the troops safe transcended the attacks he sustained for not voting to end the war as others in his party might have preferred.

Dodd Chris Dodd faced a slightly different rhetorical situation than Biden. He had voted consistently for war authorization and funding until the May 24, 2007 appropriation bill when he voted nay (the bill that Biden still voted to approve). Logically speaking, he could not deny or shift the blame for these votes, as he was not denying their existence or his responsibility for his voting record. In an effort to

Volume 46, Number 2, Spring 2014, pp. 159-178 Davis & Glantz 167 defend his own inconsistent votes on war authorization and funding, Dodd employed differentiation and corrective action.

Differentiation. Dodd attempted to differentiate his original votes to authorize and fund the war from his “no” vote on the later supplemental appropriation. Dodd argued if the supplemental appropriation had been defeated, funding for the war would have been cut off: “There were eleven of us back when the supplemental bill came up a few weeks ago that voted to cut off that funding here. There's no other way I know to bring this to a head than through that mechanism” (Fourth Democratic debate, 2007, n.p.). Dodd was referencing the fact that he and 10 other senators (excluding Biden but including Obama and Clinton) had voted to end funding of the war in Iraq. He was one of the senators who had previously voted to authorize the war and was now voting to withhold continued funding of the war. Therefore, Dodd wished to demonstrate how his most recent vote reduced the offensiveness of his earlier votes.

Corrective action. Dodd could not undo his previous votes on the war. He could not return the U. S. or Iraq to their respective statuses prior to Dodd’s vote to authorize the war. However, he could attempt corrective action by taking steps to stop funding the war effort. Dodd’s solution was to vote against additional Iraq war funding requests and to end U.S. involvement in Iraq by speedily withdrawing from Iraq. This is a failed policy. Our troops have been heroic, and certainly we'd all make sure that whatever they needed, they would get. But we need to understand that we've got to move beyond this policy. We need bolder, experienced leadership that will take us in a different direction than where we're clearly-- clearly headed. (The Democrats’ first, 2007, n.p.) Dodd points out the failed Iraq war policy of the Bush administration; he pledges that a Dodd administration would correct the failed policy. Dodd wanted to withdraw the troops from Iraq he originally authorized President Bush to send: I have advocated, again, that we have our troops out by April of next year. I believe that the timeframe is appropriate to do that. I would urge simultaneously that we do the things we've talked about here, and that is pursue the diplomatic efforts in the region to at least provide Iraq the opportunity to get on its feet. But I believe our military ought to be out before that. If I'm president in January, I'd be advocating a responsible withdrawal that's safe for our troops who are there, to provide the resources for them to do it. (Fourth Democratic debate, 2007, n.p.)

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Dodd’s previous votes allowed the war to happen and also allowed diplomacy to stop. Dodd, in this excerpt, called for correction of course. He wanted to withdraw the troops he authorized sending to Iraq and reengage the diplomatic efforts his vote allowed to cease. Thus, Dodd’s proposals represent corrective action for his votes to authorize and fund military action in Iraq.

Edwards Since he had resigned from the Senate to focus on his 2004 presidential run, Edwards was unique from the sitting senators. Unlike Biden and Dodd, Edwards had the luxury of being immune from attacks against potentially controversial votes held after he left the Senate. However, he still faced scrutiny for his official vote of support for the Iraq war in 2002 and accusations of inconsistency regarding his subsequent nay vote in 2003. In an effort to repair his image in the wake of war votes, Edwards relied heavily upon mortification and bolstering.

Mortification. Early in the first debate, Edwards was credited with accepting responsibility for and apologizing for his vote on the Iraq war. However, it was Brian Williams, the first debate’s moderator, who delivered the apology: Senator Edwards, you made a high-profile apology for your vote in favor of the Iraq war resolution. You have said, quote, ‘We need a leader who will be open and honest, who will tell the truth when they made a mistake.’ Was that not a direct shot at your opponent, Senator Clinton?” (The Democrats’ first, 2007, n.p.) Thanks to the phrasing of Williams’ question, Edwards was able to avoid making the actual apology and move to attacking those who had not apologized: No, I think that's a question for the conscience of anybody who voted for this war. I mean, Senator Clinton and anyone else who voted for this war has to search themselves and decide whether they believe they've voted the right way; if so, they can support their vote. If they believe they didn't, I think it's important to be straightforward and honest. Because I think one of the things we desperately need in our next president is someone who can restore the trust bond between the American people and the President of the United States because I think that trust has been devastated over the last six years. (The Democrats’ first, 2007, n.p.) In this exchange, Edwards is mortified and yet is able to point out that his opponents, who voted for the war, especially Clinton, yet had to apologize.

Volume 46, Number 2, Spring 2014, pp. 159-178 Davis & Glantz 169 In the second debate, voters heard Edwards speak for himself in admitting he bore guilt for the Iraq war authorization vote. Edwards rejected a strategy of defeasibility employed by Clinton (Davis, 2013). He did not suggest he had inadequate information. Instead, he admitted he was wrong with his votes to authorize the war: I think I had the information I needed. I don't think that was the question. I think one difference we [Clinton and I] do have is I think I was wrong. I should never have voted for this war. And this goes to the issue Senator Obama raised a few minutes ago. He deserves credit for being against this war from the beginning. He was right. I was wrong. (The Democrats’ second, 2007, n.p.) Edwards took responsibility for his vote and declared he believed the vote was wrong. Further, he praised Obama for being right on the issue by opposing the war from the beginning, thus identifying the course of action he (Edwards) should have taken. Unlike in the first debate when the moderator acknowledged Edwards had previously apologized, in the second debate, voters heard Edwards, himself, provide a clear admission of wrongdoing.

Bolstering. When Edwards praised Obama for being right about Iraq, Edwards mortified himself by telling voters he saw the error of his ways. He also bolstered himself by stressing his humility, his ability to admit he was wrong. “I should never have voted for this war…. He was right. I was wrong” (The Democrats’ second, 2007, n.p.). By humbling himself, Edwards bolstered his image and sought to reduce the significance of his offending vote when contrasted with his favorable qualities. Edwards bolstered his image as an honest person: And I think it is important for anybody who seeks to be the next President of the United States, given the dishonesty that we've been faced with over the last several years, to be honest to the country. We have to reestablish trust between the American people and the President –and that's going to require any of us who want to be president to be open and honest with the American people. (The Democrats’ second, 2007, n.p.) Edwards is attempting to persuade the audience his honesty and trustworthiness outweigh his error in voting to authorize the war. By bolstering his honest and trustworthy character, he attempted to reduce the offensiveness of his votes. In the second debate, Edwards explained how he had demonstrated leadership and steadfastness in his positions on the subsequent Iraq appropriation votes: The President vetoed it [the bill that included a timetable for withdrawal], then it came back, and then there was a moment of truth. And I said throughout the lead-up to the vote that I was

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against a funding bill that did not have a timetable for withdrawal, that it was critical for the Congress to stand firm; they were given a mandate by the American people… I want to finish this—others did not; others were quiet. They went quietly to the floor of the Senate, cast the right vote. But there is a difference between leadership and legislating. (The Democrats’ second, 2007, n.p.) Edwards highlighted his leadership and commitment in opposing the most recent Iraq war appropriations. He attempted to argue that since he supported stopping the war by cutting off funding, his leadership and steadfastness outweighed his error in originally authorizing the war in Iraq.

Evaluation of Candidates’ Image Repair Strategies During the 2007 primary debates, Democrats Biden, Dodd, and Edwards were forced to address their previous votes on the topic of the war in Iraq. Due to idiosyncrasies in their individual images and situations, or perhaps because they differed in their perception of what strategies would be most effective with Democratic voters, the three candidates differed in their use of image repair discourse. Consequently, each candidate’s rhetoric can be evaluated differently.

Reducing Offensiveness of Event Given that denial was not an option since every candidate clearly voted to authorize the war, it makes sense each candidate would use some form of reducing the offensiveness. Biden attacked his accusers and attempted to demonstrate transcendence. Dodd used differentiation, and Edwards attempted bolstering. Of these, the most convincing strategy was Biden’s transcendence. Biden was in the difficult situation of defending his continued financial support of a war he believed had failed. Biden frequently attacked his fellow Democrats for being dishonest about the practicality of withdrawing the troops. Although this strategy was not ultimately the most effective, April 2007 polls (such as an ABC News/Washington Post poll finding 70% of Americans disapproved of the war (PollingReport.com, 2007a) and a Quinnipiac University poll finding 74% of Democrats wanted a troop withdrawal schedule (PollingReport.com, 2007c)) suggested voters, especially Democratic voters, wanted the war to end. They wanted the troops to leave Iraq. Other candidates, such as Obama and Richardson, who had carried the antiwar banner all along, and even Dodd and Edwards who had just recently picked up the antiwar mantle, were telling voters what they wanted to hear, and Biden was telling them the opposite. However, Biden effectively used transcendence to argue the popular choice was not necessarily the morally right choice or even the most pragmatic, particularly so, with a declaration in the second debate:

Volume 46, Number 2, Spring 2014, pp. 159-178 Davis & Glantz 171 “and I knew the right political vote, but I tell you what, some things are worth losing elections over” (The Democrats’ second, 2007, n.p.). Biden argued ultimately, nothing else matters in the context of the lives of American troops. His position won accolades from analysts such as those on CNN, who argued after the second debate that “Biden was on fire” and “was especially forceful in his answers on troop funding” (CNN.com, 2007, n.p.). Washington Post columnist E.J. Dionne also lauded Biden’s consistency on the issue of Iraq, arguing, “Biden's clarity stands as a challenge not only to Bush, but also to Clinton, Obama and Edwards” (Dionne, 2007, n.p.). Edwards attempted to bolster his reputation by acclaiming his leadership ability and honesty. However, Edwards provided questionable evidence of such ability to lead: “But I have made very clear from the outset that the way to end the war is for the Congress to use its constitutional authority to fund” (The Democrats’ second, 2007, n.p.). Edwards criticized Clinton and Obama for waiting to vote until they had seen how others would vote, implying that he led, and Clinton and Obama followed. Or in Edwards’ words, “there is a difference between leadership and legislating” (The Democrats’ second, 2007, n.p.). However, Edwards failed to mention he was no longer in the U.S. Senate at the time of the vote. How could he have led on an issue he never voted on? The omission of this detail conflicted with Edwards’ other bolstering appeal to his honesty, making the apologia logically inconsistent. Obama immediately scored points in that debate by directly challenging the legitimacy of Edwards’ leadership and honesty bolstering: “You're about four and a half years late on leadership on this issue” (The Democrats’ second, 2007, n.p.). Dodd tried to repair his image by using differentiation to suggest his later votes against funding were different and somehow superseded his original vote to authorize the war. However, the fact remained he voted for the original resolutions. Although Dodd may have regretted the earlier votes, it is a logically inconsistent and thus ineffective to argue they were substantively different.

Corrective Action Benoit (1995) noted one can take corrective action without admitting guilt. Dodd attempted this strategy by trying to make amends without ever actually declaring he was wrong for voting to authorize military action in Iraq. Dodd’s corrective action is to make up for past yes votes by voting no on the more recent appropriations. However, these actions do not undo the war, and Dodd’s claims that he has taken the corrective action are still absent of admission of his initial mistake in voting to allow military action against Iraq. Although corrective action may theoretically be divorced from mortification, corrective action is practically effective as an

172 Davis & Glantz Iowa Journal of Communication independent strategy only when the rhetor is not guilty and thus not expected to admit guilt (Benoit and Lindsey, 1987). In Dodd’s case, he did vote to authorize the war, and if he believed that decision was wrong and he needed to make amends for it, why also not acknowledge through mortification? The logical inconsistency of this rhetorical blunder made corrective action without mortification an ill-conceived strategy for Dodd.

Mortification Of the three speech sets analyzed here, only Edwards attempted to repair his image through the strategy of mortification. Recall mortification involves accepting responsibility for one’s actions and asking for forgiveness. Although Edwards did not ask explicitly for forgiveness during the debates, he claimed he accepted responsibility for his actions. Edwards openly and frequently admitted and regretted his vote on Iraq. Further, he explicitly apologized for his vote. Thus, Edwards employed a strategy of mortification, which may have resonated with a Democratic primary electorate eager to vilify any candidates who still defended the merits of invading Iraq. A Washington Post article argued as much, noting Edwards’ apologies earned him respect in the antiwar movement among such groups as the Progressive Democrats of America and the antiwar True Majority Action PAC (Mosk, 2007).

Discussion Although it would be inappropriate to claim these debate performances led directly to voters’ rejection of the candidates, certainly, voters had this information at their disposal, and likely weighed the candidates’ defenses among other factors when making their choices election day. Before making a summary judgment about the overall effectiveness of any strategy, we considered the outcome of the primary elections. By February 2008, all three candidates analyzed here had dropped out of the race. Biden and Dodd failed to advance past the Iowa caucuses; their candidacies never really demonstrated widespread support in polls (PollingReport.com, 2008). Edwards dropped out in January, partly because Obama had secured the role of the antiwar candidate. After Obama eventually emerged as the victor of the 2008 Democratic primary, attention turned to selection of a vice presidential running mate. Many pundits speculated Clinton was the natural choice, but Obama’s ultimate pick of Biden serves as evidence Biden’s image repair efforts, while not immediately effective in securing the presidential nomination, may have been well conceived. Although Biden’s attacks on his accusers (including Obama) presented obvious rhetorical hurdles to be cleared in the general election, the eventual vice president’s use of transcendence

Volume 46, Number 2, Spring 2014, pp. 159-178 Davis & Glantz 173 was without contradiction (no flip-flopping), and his impassioned pleas that the safety of the troops should transcend all other concerns may well have complemented Obama’s anti-war (and perhaps perceived anti-military) image. An Op-Ed in the Huffington Post offers evidence for this conclusion: Barack Obama has just hired the guy who can not only continue to help Obama look fresh by helping to get the inside game into the right supportive patterns, he has hired someone who is not a knee-jerk, young study on national security issues [, someone] who knows what poor shape America's global position is today. (Clemons, 2008, n.p.) Further, Biden’s pragmatic approach to a gradual withdrawal of troops may have served as a credible alternative to the “pull them all out now” approach that may have been viewed skeptically by conservative Democrats or independent voters. Ultimately, when the Obama administration employed this approach, Obama was able to stand beside his vice president who had consistently championed the gradual withdrawal. Thus, not only were Biden’s image repair strategies logically consistent, but they allowed the Obama administration (including the consultation of Vice President Biden) to appear more consistent than if Obama had chosen another “withdraw now” candidate. Ultimately, Biden’s leadership was important to successfully removing American troops from Iraq (Hanis & Hazlett, 2009; Wilson, 2009), and his stance on the war was successfully merged with Obama’s position. A July 2009 New York Times piece simply noted, “Mr. Biden, along with President Obama, campaigned on a platform of ending the Iraq War” (Stolberg, 2009, n.p.). We provided a unique comparative analysis of the application of image repair strategies of multiple candidates in the unique context of a series of political debates. In this speech set, Biden’s portrayal of transcendent concern for the well being of Americans in Iraq seems to be the most consistent and logical of the strategies applied. Benoit concluded “those guilty of wrong doing probably should accept the responsibility immediately and apologize,” reasoning, “to do otherwise risks exacerbating the damage to one’s reputation” (1995, p. 161). Edwards heeded this advice, and, at first glance, Edwards’ use of mortification in admitting the wrongness of his vote may be judged as effective in repairing his image with Democratic primary voters in the short term. However, Edwards’ subsequent personal scandals and insincerity (see Friedman, Morison & Griffin (2011) for a detailed timeline) likely eroded any image restoration his mortification may have achieved (PollingReport.com, 2012; Wiid, Pitt, & Engstrom, 2011). Our analysis demonstrated how poor execution and situational factors can undermine the effectiveness of rhetorical devices. In Edwards’ case, although his image repair strategies may have been

174 Davis & Glantz Iowa Journal of Communication well conceived, he ultimately failed to remain above the fray or, as Trent and Friendenberg (2008) put it, to manufacture “an image of being above the political trenches … aloof from the hurly-burly of political battle” (p. 100). In contrast, in addition to Dodd’s failure to combine mortification with his otherwise adequate use of corrective action, the Connecticut senator’s candidacy very likely would have failed regardless of his image repair effectiveness. The exemplar of an “also-ran,” many voters may have been unaware that Dodd was anywhere near the political trenches, in or above them. As a New York Times feature quipped, “He earned some solid reviews but failed to draw much notice. He is polling in Kucinich-land” (Leibovich, 2007, ¶2). The 2008 Democratic presidential primary saw voters hold political leaders accountable for their perceived support of an unpopular war. The 2008 primary debates were a prominent feature in the campaigns for these elections and speak to some of the democratic value of public deliberation in general and political campaign debates in particular. Moreover, our analysis suggests implications for three groups: politicians, voters, and scholars of political communication. The very fact Biden, Dodd, and Edwards felt obliged to address their respective records on the war in Iraq during live debates suggests politicians face an exigency to maintain and repair their images in situations more difficult to control than press conferences, television commercials, press releases, and stump speeches. In the process, their discourse on the Iraq War may have shaped the attitudes and opinions of citizens and perhaps other candidates. Voters, on the other hand, should not be content to simply require their political candidates to speak about difficult or unflattering topics. Voters also must have the skills to competently evaluate the strategies candidates use to maintain and repair their images in debates and other political message contexts. Arguably, such a skill is as valuable to an informed citizenry as any other political media literacy endeavor. Finally, political scholars will be rewarded by efforts to examine political image repair discourse in varied contexts. This study showcased the prominence of political campaign debates as a venue for defenses of policy and character. As such, this research should serve as an impetus for further comparative studies of image restoration discourse in political debates. Future research should examine the use of image repair strategies in other phases and settings of political campaigns. Specifically, scholars should examine apologia in both primary and general election debates as well as policy and character defenses in campaigns for other offices, such as congressional and gubernatorial elections.

Volume 46, Number 2, Spring 2014, pp. 159-178 Davis & Glantz 175 Conclusion “Elections have consequences” is a familiar refrain in politics. Certainly, votes to authorize and fund a controversial war also have consequences. In 2007-2008, Democratic candidates of various prospects took to the debate stage in an effort to mitigate the consequences of their votes. Analysis of their image repair rhetoric in those debates shines light on divergent paths to political resurrection and political wilderness.

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