Volume 46, Number 2, Spring 2014, pp. 159-178 Davis & Glantz 159 Resurrecting the Also-Rans: Image Repair Debate Strategies of Democrats Who Voted to Authorize the War in Iraq Corey B. Davis & Mark J. Glantz Joseph Biden, Chris Dodd, John Edwards, and Hillary Clinton were unique among 2007-2008 Democratic presidential candidates. They voted October 11, 2002 to authorize U.S. military use in Iraq and, with the exception of Edwards, voted on October 17, 2003 to authorize supplemental appropriations for the war. These votes presented an image problem for the candidates with Democratic primary voters who strongly opposed the war and favored its prompt end. Aside from Clinton, these candidates faded early in the contest. The current study analyzed attempts by Biden, Dodd and Edwards to repair, with voters, their respective images. Edwards’ use of mortification and Biden’s convincing use of transcendence are evaluated as the most effective image repair strategies. Implications for politicians, voters, and political communication scholars also are considered. Principal among these implications is the finding that political debates are an ideal context for the study of apologia. n 2007, Democratic contenders for the 2008 presidential I nomination, four of whom had been in the Senate for the controversial 2002 and 2003 war authorization votes, found themselves responding to accusations of reversing positions or flip- flopping. Senator Joseph Biden of Delaware, Senator Hillary Clinton of New York, Senator Christopher Dodd of Connecticut, and former Senator John Edwards of North Carolina had voted on October 11, 2002 to authorize the use of the U.S. Armed Forces against Iraq (U.S. Senate, 2002). On October 17, 2003, Biden, Clinton, and Dodd voted for the supplemental appropriations bill for operations in Afghanistan and Iraq (U.S. Senate, 2003). Edwards voted against the October 17 appropriation (U.S. Senate, 2003). A Fox News/Opinion Dynamics poll taken in September, 2003 found 46% of polled Americans and 27% of polled Democrats supported the $87 billion appropriation (PollingReport.com, 2003). Later, on May 24, 2007, Dodd joined Clinton and Obama (Edwards resigned prior to the 2004 election to focus on his presidential run) voting against U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans' Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act. Biden was alone among Democratic presidential contenders in his support of the bill, which eventually passed the Senate (GovTrack.US, 2007). Corey B. Davis (Ph.D. University of Missouri) is an Assistant Professor of Communication at University of Wisconsin-Whitewater. Mark J. Glantz (Ph.D. University of Missouri) is an Assistant Professor of Communication & Media Studies at St. Norbert College. Correspondence should be addressed to [email protected] or [email protected]. 160 Davis & Glantz Iowa Journal of Communication In 2007, the four presidential hopefuls had to answer to a Democratic primary electorate who strongly opposed the war. An ABC News/Washington Post tracking poll taken during the period of April 12-15, 2007 showed 70% of surveyed Americans disapproved of the war (PollingReport.com, 2007a). A Quinnipiac University poll during the period of April 25-May 1, 2007 indicated 74% of Democrats supported a timetable for withdrawing troops from Iraq (PollingReport.com, 2007c), and 93% of Democrats in an April 20- 24 CBS News/New York Times poll expressed disapproval of President Bush’s handling of the war (PollingReport.com, 2007b). The importance of the Iraq War as a campaign issue was reflected in the Democratic presidential primary debates. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were the most deliberated issue during the early primary debates, trumping other issues of foreign policy, terrorism, and stalwart Democratic issues like healthcare and poverty (McKinney, Davis, & Delbert, 2009). Candidates who had opposed the war from the beginning, such as former U.S. Senator Mike Gravel from Alaska, U.S. Representative Dennis Kucinich of Ohio, U.S. Senator Barack Obama of Illinois, and New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson, leveled heavy criticism on these candidates for their support of the war (Healy, 2007; Holland, 2007). For Biden, Clinton, Dodd and Edwards, their votes on Iraq created serious threats to their images with voters. Their images were in even more jeopardy among Democratic voters who opposed the war in higher percentages than the general public. The CBS News/New York Times poll, which showed 93% of Democrats disapproved of Bush’s handling of the war (PollingReport.com, 2007b), also found 43% of Democrats disapproved of the way Democrats in Congress were handling the war in Iraq (PollingReport.com, 2007b). Despite the uphill public opinion battle, Hillary Clinton managed to advance deep into the primary season, ultimately losing the nomination to Barack Obama. Biden, Dodd and Edwards were not as successful as Clinton in the 2008 primary election. However, we argue all three senators had to provide excuses for their votes to repair their images in the eyes of Democratic primary voters. We examine the candidates’ image repair strategies using Benoit’s Image Repair Theory (initially named Image Restoration Theory), arguing that political communication scholars and public relations specialists may gain from a careful analysis of “failed” image repair strategies. After all, case studies can be valuable in providing not only best practices, but also examples of what not to do. In addition, the eventual influence Biden earned via his ascent to the vice presidency renders an analysis of his rhetoric on military action valuable. After providing a brief review of work in image repair and a review of Benoit’s Theory of Image Repair, we analyze candidates’ Volume 46, Number 2, Spring 2014, pp. 159-178 Davis & Glantz 161 image repair statements regarding their records on the war in Iraq made during the first (April 27, 2007), second (June 3, 2007), and fourth (July 24, 2007) Democratic presidential primary debates. The third debate (June 28, 2007) was excluded from analysis because it did not feature any direct questions on the topic of the war in Iraq. We then compare and evaluate the strategies used by Biden, Dodd, and Edwards. Finally, we offer implications of our work and future directions for political image repair research. Image Repair Theory One could speculate speeches of apologia or self-defense have existed since humans first realized reputations were subject to shine and tarnish. In fact, examples of early apologetic discourse can be seen in Gorgias’ (1990) Encomium of Helen and versions of Apology by Plato and Xenophon (Kennedy, 1963). Ryan (1982) also traced the scholarly study of apologia back to Plato, as well as Isocrates. However, only in the last century have scholars sought to develop typologies and classifications to better understand the different ways in which humans seek to repair, enhance, or maintain their images. Fisher (1970) identified apologia as a primary motive for human communication, defining the genre as “purification, concerned with correcting an image” (p. 132). Scott and Lyman (1968), and Burke (1970) among others, presented detailed typologies of apologia. Ware and Linkugel’s (1973) typology particularly is useful for understanding how apologia strategies can be combined in meaningful ways. Their theory begins with the assertion apologists typically rely on some combination of four strategies: denial, differentiation, transcendence, and bolstering. The theory then contends those four strategies can be combined to form identifiable postures. A rhetor who seeks absolution will use denial and differentiation. One who seeks vindication will use denial and transcendence. The combination of bolstering and differentiation represent an explanative posture; the pairing of bolstering and transcendence result in a justificative stance. Some combinations of strategies—transcendence and differentiation, for instance—are less commonly used in tandem and may not actually make much sense when used together. Thus, even a relatively straightforward typology of strategies, such as the one constructed by Benoit (1995), can result in extraordinarily complex rhetorical constructions. Benoit’s (1995) Theory of Image Repair begins with two assumptions: (1) communication is motivated by the drive to make and attain goals, and (2) one of the central goals of human communication is to maintain a positive reputation. Benoit identified two elements necessary for an attack to pose a threat to one’s image. First, there must be an undesirable act. Second, the individual whose 162 Davis & Glantz Iowa Journal of Communication reputation is at stake must be responsible for the undesirable act (Benoit, 1995). Given these assumptions and elements of image repair discourse, and building upon the classifications of previous work (e.g., Burke, 1970; Scott & Lyman, 1968; Ware & Linkugel, 1973), Benoit (1995) identified five main strategies for image repair: denial, evading of responsibility, reducing the offensiveness of the event, corrective action, and mortification. Rhetors may employ just one of these strategies but are more likely to employ multiple strategies combining, for example, elements of reducing the offensiveness and corrective action. The following brief review of these five strategies, as outlined by Benoit (1995), inform the subsequent analysis. Denial can take two forms, simple denial of involvement in or responsibility for an event and shifting the blame to others. Evading responsibility