Politics, Prohibition, and the Mullan-Gage Law
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
“It’s Not Even About the Booze!” Politics, Prohibition, and the Mullan-Gage Law Elizabeth J. Beutel Alcohol consumption defined American culture in the 1920s. Hyped up in popular media, the iconic image of the era involves drinking and dancing in a smoky speakeasy well past midnight. This image becomes ironic, of course, given that the sale, manufacture, distribution, and transportation of alcohol were illegal.1 Many people felt the federal government needed to put an end to the rampant drunkenness of the 19th century, as many Americans did not have the ‘willpower’ to stop drinking on their own. The 18th Amendment to the United States, as well its corresponding enforcement law known as the Volstead Act, tried to limit access to alcohol, and thereby reduce alcohol consumption. In addition to the federal law, the New York State legislature passed a law known as the Mullan-Gage Act in an attempt to provide a means to enforce the new Prohibition laws. However, the new enforcement law fixed none of the problems in the Volstead Act, rather, it restated the federal law almost word for word, and made a violation both a state and federal crime. Technically the combination of three different bills, the Mullan-Gage law came to be known by the state of New York as “little Volstead.”2 It completely failed, and was repealed in 1923, just two years after it was passed. Mullan-Gage was attributed to the “Dry” forces, the side of the argument in favor of prohibition, and further alienated moderates to create a partisan issue, where a person was either Dry or “Wet,” against the prohibition of alcohol. The Mullan-Gage law was not a practical law, but 1. United States. The U.S. Constitution, Amendment XVIII (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress Archives, 1919). 2. Daniel Okrent, Last Call: The Rise and Fall of Prohibition (New York: Schribner, 2010), 242. 60 Elizabeth J. Beutel rather an exercise of the political power of the Dry forces. The illegal liquor trade in New York City was infamous for its disregard of the 18th Amendment, and speakeasies flourished in this era. The exact number of speakeasies is not known, but the police commissioner estimated the city had “thirty-two thousand illegal drinking spots,” all of which sold alcohol.3 The Mullan-Gage law was passed after the enactment of the Volstead act, as a way to aid in the enforcement to the national law. However, in reality, it just doubled the punishment, as the New York Times pointed out. The Mullan-Gage law was not needed to make unlawful the manufacture, transportation, or sale of intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes. The Volstead law already had made that a criminal offense against the United States. The Mullan- Gage law merely made the same act a separate offense against the State of New York and thus enabled the Federal Government to secure a double punishment “for the same acts.”4 The only additional provision the Mullan-Gage law included that was not part of the Volstead Act was that carrying a hip flask in New York was the “equivalent of carrying an unlicensed handgun”5. It is unusual, then, that the State of New York would pass this law after the passage of the national law. William Anderson, leader of the Anti-Saloon League, praised the law for allowing the local police forces to assist the severely understaffed and heavily corrupt Prohibition Agency.6 Trying to enforce Prohibition in New York had been considered a “colossal failure”7. An effective enforcement law would have done more than double the punishment and make another less significant activity illegal. Mullan-Gage was widely regarded as a 3. Okrent, Last Call, 242. 4. Austen G Fox, “PROHIBITION STILL THE LAW: Federal Statute Is In Effect Even If Mullan-Gage Law Is Repealed” (New York Times, May 8, 1923). 5. Michael A Lerner, Dry Manhattan: Prohibition in New York City (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 77. 6. “ANDERSON PREDICTS NEW TURN TO CASE: Anti-Saloon League Superintendent Says “Developments” Will Come Today. SEES END OF QUESTIONING Prefaces Church Address With Statement That Charges Are Aimed at the Dry Cause” (New York Times, January 29, 1923). 7. “THE GOVERNMENT FAILS” (The Chicago Defender: Aug 06, 1927). “IT’S NOT EVEN ABOUT THE BOOZE!” 61 disaster, being called impossible to enforce and an affront to American liberty.8 It is only right to assume then, that there were other motivations to pass the Mullan-Gage law besides modifications and improvements of the Volstead Act. The Mullan-Gage law increased the workload of the New York Police Department and other law enforcement officials in a few ways. The most significant aspect of the Mullan-Gage Law was it required NYPD and other law enforcement offices to participate in the enforcement of Prohibition. However, another important aspect of the law would prove to be a nuisance for both police and the justice system. Due to a section that made carrying alcohol on one’s person illegal, even holding legally obtained alcohol was prosecuted. It was later considered unconstitutional, but for a while, it made arrests more common than ever. Women were now being arrested more frequently, as they would blatantly disobey the law with the rising flapper culture.9 Little sympathy was offered to those who were found in violation of the law. Whereas the Volstead Act permitted the brewing of beers, wines, and spirits for home consumption, under Mullan- Gage, possessing alcohol without a permit could land a person in jail, as was the case of a druggist who could not prove he obtained the alcohol legally by home brewing, overlooking the fact that he was arrested in the hospital with severe burns after his still exploded, injuring him and killing one of his sons.10 The New York courts became so overwhelmed with violations of the 18th Amendment, that the judges in the Southern District were expected to see an annual amount of 50,000 cases, even though they could realistically only see 4000 a year.11 The absurdity of the Mullan-Gage Act adding this provision made enforcement much more difficult, and arrests much more common. The law was badly constructed, and, in the end, did nothing. Out of the thousands and thousands of arrests, “not even one jail sentence” 8. Fox, “PROHIBITION STILL THE LAW. 9. Lerner, Dry Manhattan, 76, 173. 10. “JERSEY TRAINS GUNS ON PROHIBITION LAW: A Democrat and a Republican Present Anti-Dry Bills at Opening of Senate. EDWARDS NON-COMMITTAL Retiring Governor, In Farewell Mes- Sage, Says His Successor Has Definite Views on the Issue” (New York Times, January 25, 1926). 11. Okrent, Last Call, 254. 62 Elizabeth J. Beutel was issued, only further highlighting the problems with enforcement of prohibition.12 There was not a large public outcry for further legal action for the Dry cause. In fact, the law was predominately despised by the public, and many attacked the police in response to the law, including an incident of a woman “[swinging] a bottle of liquor precariously near [a] patrolman’s head.”13 The main driving forces pushing for a state level enforcement law were Dry lobbying groups. New York had not been kind to the lobbying groups, such as the Anti Saloon League. The league had tried to set up a division earlier in the century, with little success.14 The State was notoriously Wet and corrupt, with Tammany Hall controlling the politics of the state. The partisan politics that influenced the passage of the law shall be reviewed in greater depth later, but in New York City itself, Tammany Hall was able to prevent the funding of prohibition enforcement, with little complaint. A large part of the NYPD was Irish Catholic, an ethnic and religious group that very often voted Wet. They did not want to follow the law, and most often ignored any violation of the Volstead Act.15 Tammany Hall had a large grip on the politics of New York, and when it came to the Prohibition debate, citizens did not complain. The Anti-Saloon League faced an uphill battle, without public support, to push Mullan-Gage through. The Anti-Saloon League had defined itself as a single-issue organization, “intimidating” politicians into voting for Prohibition. It had used this tactic at its inception, and proved very effective.16 By focusing on being a single issue-lobbying agency, it shaped the prohibition debate, swaying voters to the Dry cause on a platform of moral reform, and ousting Wet politicians for lawmakers more sympathetic to the Dry cause. One of 12. Okrent, Last Call, 254. 13. “DRY CHIEF FEARS STATE LAW REPEAL: Yellowley Says Such Action Would Be Serious Blow at Enforcement. CANCEL 8 LIQUOR PERMITS Six Retail Druggists, One Wholesale Firm and a Truckman Are Punished. WOMAN DECORATOR HELD Patrolman Says She Waved Bottleat His Head in Cabaret--Case Goes to Grand Jury.” New York Times, November 15, 1922. 14. K. Austin Kerr, Organized for Prohibition: A New History of the Anti-saloon League, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), 147. 15. Lerner, Dry Manhattan, 74. 16. Okrent, Last Call, 36. “IT’S NOT EVEN ABOUT THE BOOZE!” 63 their tactics in their efforts to gain political power was the usage of rhetoric in political cartoons, telling voters to vote Dry, and thereby threaten the position of an incumbent Wet. Ohio was one of their first battlegrounds, and the fight for Dry politicians in the state made the League grow to national prominence. The Anti-Saloon League proved this method, among others, worked extremely well, turning all but one state politician to the dry cause.17 This campaigning and lobbying effort was employed with the push for the Mullan-Gage law as well.