CONSEIL DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL NATO UNCLASSIFIED and 568" PUBLIC DISCLOSED EXEMPLAIRE N0 COPY OR ICIHAL : ENGLISH ' % 4T ' 16th April, 1957 • DOCUMENT
—— , • ^ ^ ( ^ JEmmi \ i- . . . : ' ' - ' THE MIDDLE EAST ' •
Report by the .Committee of Political Advisers -
The Soviet Union and the Middle East
The USSR seeks everywhere to hring about the ultimate . Communist objective of world domination. It pursues this object- ive by flexible and opportunist methods. Communist ideology in certain respects handicaps them in pursuing their imperialist aims in the Middle East and they make .only limited use Of it. They present themselves in this area primarily as the champion of nationalism, particularly Arab nationalism. The fact that in so doing they are supporting nationalist feelings which are predomin- antly anti-Western makes these Soviet tactics especially effect- ive and dangerous. From the point of view of NATO, the main Soviet threat is not at present an attempt to take over territories but rather: . (a) to.destroy the strategic positions of the Western Powers in the Middle East, to disrupt defensive arrangements such as the Baghdad Pact and to secure the removal of Western bases;
(b) to establish a stranglehold on Western oil supplies and thus to be in a position'to weaken both the Middle East and the West. / 2. The Soviet- Union seeks to obtain a voice in all important decisions affecting the Middle East. It has already obtained this voice to the extent that certain countries of the area r- particularly Egypt, and Syria - have helped this Soviet ambition by 'themselves making use of Soviet influence and drawing on Soviet support as a counterpoise to the West.
3. .In pursuit of its. objectives, Soviet policy seeks to discredit and undermine the position of governments and groups in the Middle East which are-willing to co-operate with the-West. This serves to increase instability -in the area and encourages the rise of elements embittered against the west, sometimes inexperienced and perhaps-irresponsible and reckless. The USSR, seeks to'create and aggravate difficulties for the West by bring- ing these elements into control especially in the oil-transit DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED states but also in the oil-producing countries.
k.. Western ideas and technology have had an unsettling effect .in. this area and their impact has been intensified by, and has in turn accelerated, the disintegration of the traditional religious and social structure. The Arab states are now sovereign but are painfully aware that they remain'dependent on the great powers for capital, arms and technical skills: for this they are
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inclined to "blame the West. United hy common history, culture, language and'religion, they are nevertheless-:, rent hy so many rivalries and. conflicts that they aée^miabIeJto reach unity of action "in^'the face of the great powers *or to" develop" effective political- and economic measures^in common.^ ,y»Even within each country there are such sharp di'vïSidhîs' t'ha-t^there is no concensus on the methods and ultimate purpose of the government. Conser- vative businessmen, landovmers, traditional rulers and chiefs, minority groups in the area, are still' trying to develop a mutual- ly advantageous relationship with the "West. Of the Arah pop- ulation, however, two-thirds are under 30 years, almost all poor, and even those who have power or jobs are unsure of themselves and of the security of their position. In these circumstances- Arab nationalism" presents itself as a vague concept characterised by strongly- negative tendencies, anti-Western, anti-colonial, and on- the widest basis, anti-Israeli. Mingled with these impulses there are v:\r-icd personal and dynastic ambitions.
5. To exploit Arab nationalism, the USSR by 1-955 proclaimed its readiness to establish mutually profitable relations with any régime Intent on following "independent" foreign and domestic policies, i.e. any. regime which might be prepared to' move away from the West. By- this initiative, Russia reasserted her tradit- ional ambition to-, play a major rôle in the Middle East. In Europe the development of NATO strength blocked Soviet expansion.. Under these circumstances the USSR took a serious viev/ of the signature of the. Baghdad Pact. It may have feared this develop- ment and in any event it reacted sharply-to it as possibly prov- iding the groundwork for an extension of Western military bases in the area. ' 1
6. At -this time the USSR responded favourably to the overtures from the leading Arab opponents .of the Baghdad Pact - Egypt and Syria - for the supply of arms. It became increasing- ly clear that the USSR was prepared to supply weapons'", diplomatic support, markets, technical assistance, and, in1some instances, credits to states which .rejected alignment with the West.
7. The effect of the new Soviet policy on the Middle East was drastic. For. the first time, non-Communist, anti-Western nationalists were able to look to the Soviet Union for help that promised to offset Western influence in the Arab world. Above all, they saw the possibility of settling scores with'Israel (which they view as a creation of imperialist Western powers), thus redeeming Arab honour with Soviet help and. re-uniting the "Arab' homeland"', which Israel'geographically cuts asunder. More than any, other consideration this weighed in determining the attitude of most Arabs and in giving the USSR an entrée into the Middle East. .
DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED 8. There are further reasons why the Arabs are inclined to look favourably toward the USSR, and to blame the West for many things it has not done or could not have prevented. While many Arabs recall the history of Western efforts from the"crusades onward to establish control in the Middle East,, they know ' little of Turkish, Iranian and Afghan encounters with Russia-, '
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and give no credit to those who prevented Russian armies from reaching the Arah world. . The West has substantial political influence in several Middle Eastern states and plays a major role in the most important enterprises in the economies of these states. It remains the major purchaser and supplier of commercial goods in all.Middle Eastern states, the sole purchasers of their oil, and until recently, the sole source•for capital, technicians and arms. Knowing this, certain Arab governments are . inclined to see closer relations with the USSR as providing a countervailing balance against Western influence in the area. Thus Soviet influence has been advanced in the area . on the invitation of nationalist independent governments without the use of Soviet armed forces and with only limited • recourse to the apparatus of international Communism.
Soviet Methods
9. To take advantage of Middle Eastern receptivity, the Soviet Union has made skilful use of a wide variety of weapons. These include economic relations, propaganda, diplomatic manoeuvres, the furnishing of arms to certain states and, though in a limited way, the activities of local Communist movements.
10. The large expansion in Soviet bloc trade with the Middle East is marked by the Increase in trade agree- ments from 7 in 1953 to 31 in 1955. The greatest measure Of-Isuccess appears to have been achieved in those countries which had no oil resources, were not committed to Western• defence alliances and, with the exception of Syria were experiencing balance of payment difficulties. Egypt, Afghanistan and Syria were the most prominent among the Middle Eastern countries where Soviet influence grew, and this was partly related to arms deals made with the Soviet bloc. Since the last half of 1955 the pace of trade has. quickened and trade now involves mostly Soviet bloc capital goods and arms in barter exchanges for agricultural products. Large-scale credits were given to some countries, and the entire battery of trade agreements, technical assistance and trade fairs was used. - Although the initiative in the Soviet economic offensive has come from the Soviet Union, the satellites have played a very important p^rt in it.
11. Reduction in the. rate of increase of Russia's economic expansion for 1957 should not have much effect on its economic offensive in this area. Economic and military assjistance- has become an integral part of SovTet~dïplrom:a~cy and is likely to endure as long as the "competitive co- existence" policy continues. DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED 12. Military, even more than economic aid has been the most spectacular demonstration of Soviet support for the Arabs. Egypt and Syria have received Soviet arms on favourable terms in quantities which are very substantial in proportion to their capacity to absorb them. Afghanistan and the Yemen have also received large arms supplies on favourable terms. The arms furnished are largely from stocks which are obsolescent•in the Soviet bloc and which they can easily spare'at little cost. In this way important Middle East states are being- brought into
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re.liance -upon' the Soviet bloc for military supplies. Similarly, these states are being brought to rely on Soviet bloc markets, for their „exports ; . ..
: 13. . Such, states are bound to think twice before taking actions which might, antagonise the USSR,. They could only be rescued from their eventual economic and. military dependency ' at substantial cost'to the rescuer. Moreover, by acting as. supplier to these states the USSR, wins friends in army circles and gains -the' advantages arising from the presence of Soviet technicians and the influence they may ticve on military'and economic policy. The USSR also secures an'opportunity to influence even indoctrinate, the nationals of these states who are.given training in the bloc.
14, - In pursuance, of its aims and in support of its new Arab clients the USSR has markedly increased both its printed and , broadcast propaganda to the area. Despite "peaceful co-existe.nce" the tone of this Soviet propaganda is virulently anti-Western, This propaganda is aided by other means:' the enlargement and elevation in status of Soviet diplomatic missions, numerous tours by high-ranking Communist bloc officials, ministers and parlia- mentary delegations, assorted visits by dancers, athletes and others, and.popular exhibitions and trade fairs. Free visits to the Soviet bloc are.also used to gain supporters in government, cultural and religious' circles.
,;'. 15. In the United .'Nations, the USSR and other Communist rh'embers have taken every opportunity to curry favour with the Arabs and to agitate for action on issues which contribute to extremism on' the part of anti-Western elements. The high-water mark of;Soviet political intervention was the despatch during . t'iie Suez crisi's o'f a series of noteswhich could be interpreted as involving a threat of direct military•action. The timing of these notes, which were accompanied- by t.alk and rumours of sending Soviet "volunteers"', led the Arab.press and populace . to attribute the stopping , of hostilities, at least, in part., to Soviet action. Soviet prestige gained in consequence.
16. By its support of local nationalist aspirations, the USSR has lent greater respectability to local Communists..and has in some countries given them opportunities to participate in elections andto gain entrée into the circle of highly opportunistic and changeable Arab.politicians. Because of the Soviet emphasis, on government-to-government relationships, the Communist Partiés are less free to advocate revolutionary violence or even to indulge in sharp criticism of any régime, "however reactionary, which has entered into closer relations with the USSR. The USSR even tolerates, as in the .case of. Egypt, .counter-measures directed against local Communists as being'largely irrelevant to Soviet policies in the . Middle East. DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED In spite of the measures directed against .them, as parties, in all Arab countries, the Communists in Middle Eastern countries are active in trying to profit from inflaming anti-Western discontents, in disseminating Marxist ideas in a .form acceptable to the.Arab •religious and cultural outlook and'in holding up to Arab eyes, the image of'a USSR.which succeeded by its own efforts in transforming itself from a peasant economy to a powerful, modern, industrial "welfare" state.. ' ; '
-, 17. . . The membership-of the. Communist Parties is .small. ":; .Only In Syria (which has.the largest, as many as 10,000) arid in Jordan- does • the Party have any effect on government, policy. . Marxist doctrines have, however, made very real NATO SECRET . -L- -5- NATO SECRET C-M(57)65
progress among educated circles in the Arah world, especially teachersj students/ and to some extent, labour leaders.
18. Much more important than the direct r$le of the Communist Parties in the Middle East is the part' played by the • Egyptian propaganda resources and prestige. The parallelism of Soviet and Egyptian aims, particularly the Soviet espousal of Anti-Western Arab nationalism of which Egypt is"the principal exponent,, has enabled the Soviet Union to reap the benefit of •this very considerable influence of Egypt in" the Arab world.
-19. The effect of Cairo Radio on all classes of people..: particularly the masses, in nearly all Middle East countries', even those whose governments are friendly to the West, cannot be. ^overestimated. It is through this medium that the Egyptians maintain .their constant propaganda pressure against the,West, agai'nst pro-Western Arab countries and in particular against Arab alliances with the West such as the Baghdad Pact. Pro- grammes^ directed to specific areas such as the Persian Gulf5 the Aden- Protectorates and Algeria are deliberately subversive in intention and employ every technique to influence and exploit Arab nationalist feeling to the maximum. Cairo Radio is pro- bably the most'powerful single anti-Western medium in the Middle East.
20. This propaganda is reinforced by the activities of the Egyptian press, the Egyptian diplomatic missions (particularly' their military. attaches - who have engaged in subversion) by the'' rôle of Egyptian advise-rs, teachers and technicians throughout the area, and the important part played by Egypt's schools and universities^ in the education of students from other Middle Eastern countries.
Conclusions
21. The NATO Directive to the MilitaryAuthorities (C-M(56)138(Einal)) in speaking of the possibilities of action which are open to the Soviet loaders through the use of con- ventional arms, but which would entail the risk of deteriorating into a major war. stated:
"(c) Attacks against peripheral non-NATO countries
If tho West is. deemed to be deterred from employing nuclear weapons and if for this or other reasons the Soviet leaders thought that a non-NATO country on the periphery of the Soviet Bloc would not or could not receive effective support of the Western powersj the Soviets might be tempted to use their preponderance in conventional forces either for armed : DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED intervention • in the country in question or to exert pressure on it in order to influence it towards .alignment with the Soviet camp."
'Turkey is within the NATO area" which -has effective deterrent Forces, but otherwise the Middle East is an area in which, despite the Baghdad Pactf there are relatively insufficient effective forces and no area-wide fully-integrated defence organization. The importance of the Baghdad Padt is that it helps to discourage the Soviet Union from feeling that it could use its vastly pre- ponderant conventional forces to thrust with impunity into the Middle East . In this context. the Eisenhower Doctrine and the decision; of the US Government to .join the Baghdad Pact Military Committee assume particular importance . '
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22. Nevertheless , there is no way in: which', the West can entirely, exclude the USSR politically or economically. from the area, at least as long as the states in the area believe it to be profitable to maintain such relations with the USSR. The Soviet Union is at present exerting influence in the Middle East less through local Communist Parties than by harnessing and ex- ploiting anti-Western nationalism, in particular Arab . nationalism, and by waging an unremitting compaign against pro-Western forces in the Middle East. The West faces a very real and perplexing problem in trying to deal with this extremely effective Soviet technique. En particular; the Arab-Israeli dispute provides the USSR with a ready-made lever to turn Arab opinion against the West.
23. The main targets of present Soviet policy are' the oil- transit states, Egypt and Syria, which are becoming increasingly dependent on the Soviet Bloc economically, chiefly because of commitments incurred by the supply of Soviet Bloc arms. The fernen is an interesting example of how a country, whose foreign policy is dominated by a single consideration: a claim against the.Westr can thereby become responsive to Soviet influence. Similarly-, for its own purposes the USSR supports Afghanistan's . Irredentist claims against Pakistan5 a member of the Baghdad Pact and of SEATO. The future of Jordan is problematical and will . probably be determined by a struggle for power between the King and the anti-Western, pro-Egyptian elements. Should the present unstable Dquilibrium be upset, partition, which would likely be Jordan's fate, could hardly be managed without previous repercussions.
21+. Elsewhere in the area and on its flanks (Pakistan, Iran, Lraqs the sheikhdoms and principalities of the Arabian peninsula.. Saudi-Arabia, Lebanon, the Sudan, Ethiopia, Libya, Tunisia and Morocco) the independent states co-operate in varying degrees'With the West (in some instances providing strategic bases) despite the Dxistence of certain anti-Western elements. The Baghdad Pact is a grouping of 1 Arab and b non-Arab countries v/hich are strongly anti- communist. It constitutes the only concerted regional pro-Western and anti-Soviet force whose influence can be matched against that of Cgypt and Syria.
25.. A shift of Soviet policy to direct aggression cannot be jxcIudcd. cut the USSR will' almost certainly wish to avoid steps in bhis region which substantially increase the risk of general war in the thermonuclear age. If war broke out among Middle Eastern states the. USSR,, having suppIiedLarms to its clients^ might face a Korean type of situation. It might have the painful choice of allowing- Lts own protégés to be defeated at heavy cost to its prestige or of intervening with Soviet Bloc,-troops and risking general war-.
26. The Soviet Union may ultimately hope to establish Moscow- lominatod regimes in the Middle East; and may be encouraged to DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED telieve that the situation in Syria can be exploited over the long ?un in this direction. But at present the USSR does not appear to te pressing for the establishment of Soviet-dominated .regimes in the area, and if:such a régime were set up in a Middle Eastern country, Lt would tend' to drive most other Middle Eastern governments closer bo the West and excite widespread fear of Soviet intentions in much Df Asia and Europe. However, even the limited risks which the USSR appears wil.ling to accept may involve miscalculation. In particular the USSR incurs, special risks in operating in an area where regimes are unstable and emotions are violent and at times explosive.
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27. Even among the Arab clients of the USSR5 the Soviet entry into the area do'es not mean that they wish the West to play no rôle there. They may he unwilling to enter into contractual ties with the West because of suspicions that these might impair their independence or subject thorn to undue influence from a stronger alien power. They are persuaded, however, that the best chance of realising their goals of independence and material progress will arise if both the West and the USSR are on hand to compete for advantages, each ensuring that tho other shall not gain predomin- ance. In this respect the Wost acting in defence of its own interests, should in the longer run have a distinct advantage for, unlike the USSR^f one of its basic principles is the right of all nations .to pursue independent foreign and domestic policies. ;
28. Major dangers for the Wostern strategic position in the Middle East nonetheless pjrsist and, unless met, may well grow. Nasser has already shown how Soviet support can be enlisted in the effort to expel 'Western influences from the Arab countrios and even from Moslem Africa and to subvert Arab governments that refuse to team.up with Egypt. Moreover„ Syria and Egypt would probably be prepared to enter into unprecedented commitments to the USSR for Soviet protection if that were the only alternative, to defeat by Israel or by any Western-supported Arab regime. Yet the danger of renewed Arab-Israeli warfare has by no moans been eliminated and intra-Arab rivalries remain intense.
29. Western actions in the area designed to create or build up defensive strength against Soviet aggression, however necessary, tend to be misinterpreted or translated in terms of local issues and rivalries because it is with these that the Middle Eastern states' are preoccupied. It is largely for this reason that Afghanistan, Syria, Egypt and Yemen pay little heed to the dangers involved in becoming dop endent on the USSR for arms and for economic and political support. Under these circumstances the division among Middle Eastern states could in turn produce, whether the Wost wills it or not^ a division of this region into Soviet and Western spheres of influence.
30. The fundamental instability that accompanies the trans- formation of the traditional society of the Middle East and the insistent nationalist aspirations there will continue for a long time to come to provide-major opportunities for Soviet exploita- tion. The USSR will not neglect these opportunities, whether it be to aggravate troubles in this region, advance its own influence, or put pressure on the West to negotiate Middle Eastern or wider settlements on terms the USSR feels to be advantageous. As against this there are still strong mutual ties between the West and the region (far stronger than for the Soviet Union). The West will have those opportunities which accrue to the side which
DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED is more powerful in international affairs, which is alone capable of transporting and utilising the oil which is the main revenue- producing asset of the area and "which possesses a culture« technology, and wealth that have long appealed to the people of the Middle East. The pursuit by the West of sound and consistent policies in the Middle East is an essential element for success in reducing or eliminating Soviet influence there.
(Signed) A. CASARDI Palais de Chaillot, Chairman Paris, XVIe.
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COUNTRY STUDIES
INTRODUCTORY NOTE
31.. The following examinations of individual-Middle, Eastern states are presented in rough geographical order;from east to west. The countries which are of greatest immediate concern are Egypt» Syria, Jordan and Yemen. Pakistan, although counted "by : some governments as part of1 the Middle East (where it is certainly important as. a Moslem country and a member of. the Baghdad Pact) has/generally been considered as outside the scope of this study.' Hence no study of its political stability has'been undertaken. However, it can be said that Communist influence on its policies. or; the chances of a Communist take-over are negligible..
AFGHANISTAN
'32. Political power in Afghanistan is vested today, as in* the past, in a ruling dynasty and its close associates. The government is autocratic' and depends for support on the Army and the police. Conditions for the formation of a Communist Party do not ; exist at present because of the feudal and tribal structure of society. s ' , " - 33. • .The traditional policy of Afghanistan., a gateway between the. ..USSR and the Middle East and. South Asia5 has been to maintain-'independence by avoiding too close association with - great power blocs. In this endeavour, there .seldom has been an even balance- from l'ate 1953 to mid-1956, events favoured clçse relations with the Soviet Union. Since, mid-1956, the Afghan - Government has endeavoured to. .redress that situation and during recent months has made a riumber of overtures seeking to realign.. its; ties with the free world and especially with the United States and Pakistan. : Thei perennial problem of Pushtunistan, involving Afghan claims 'to peoples and' territories south of its borders with Pakistan has been studiously, muted during, the past,,., nine months by Afghan leaders and the controlled Afgharipress, and radio.' There are reasons for hoping that Afghanistan might adopt even more conciliatory policies toward the Government of Pakistan if the latter found it possible to relax certain of its adamant- positions and afford a face-saving device for formerly vociferous Afghan proponents of Pushtunistan'.' ..
3k. It is estimated variously that between .one-third and, one-half of foreign trade is with the Soviet Bloc. ,.For reasons probably more strategic than economic, credits amounting to about. $122 million have been granted to Afghanistan by the USSR and Czechoslovakia, for economic projects as well as for arms -,- purchases. --These credits are being used...in part on long-term
DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED development projects, in part on items of an,eye-catching- nature. Many of these projects may be planned to serve,, ultimateIy> a- . . strategic purpose, especially in the northern regions.. Many • • Soviet technicians are employed on these' operations, 300-400. being present in the country at the end of"1956. Sizeable
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iantities of arms have hoen delivered, under "both Soviet and ;ech credits, including jet training planes, small arms, munition, mortars, military trucks, anti-aircraft guns and 'ohahIy jet fighters, helicopters and tanks. The Soviet Union. i.s also granted transit rights for Afghan goods to "bypass ikistan.
35. Por the immediate future,.the present Afghan Government i ems firmly seated in power. However, Afghanistan has become Lcreasingly dependent economically on the Soviet Union and 'viet influence is undoubtedly, greater than at any time during Le past two decades. There are opportunities'for infiltration Ld subversion by means, of the Soviet' expert's" in. Afghanistan, ie Russians are exploiting'exchanges of visits and cultural and iligious contacts and are now broadcasting in Pushtu. The iall but growing intelligentsia may in the future offer fertile •ound for Communist propaganda. There' are, therefore, in'the . >nger run, disquieting possibilities.
.AN •'• • -
36.' Iran, which has a long tradition of separate existence Ld a rich indigenous civilisation, has passed through a crisis )llowing the nationalisation of oil but now seems to have icovered its equilibrium. The maintenance of this equilibrium ipends in great measure on the continuance in power of the Shah, lo is popular, has:'the support of the army and has political >ntrol in his hands.
37* The Communist Party of Iran, the Tudeh, along with \ .her opposition parties.., is outlawed and the period fallowing Le overthrow of Mossadegh has seen its lines of communication .srupted, the morale .of its rank and file broken and its leaders .spersed,. The Tudeh party has declined to about one-tenth, of • s former strength, possessing now from 1+,000 to- 8,000 members Ld its present efforts are concentrated almost exclusively on Lrvival. The other leading opposition party, the National, isistance Movement-, the legatee of Mossadegh nationalism, is .sorganized and feeble though it shows some signs of reviving,
38. Soviet bloc trade is at this moment of small importance ) the Iranian economy. The Soviet Union has recently made 'oposals both for the furtherance of trade and for the provision ' economic and technical aid. The aid proposals have been ijected by the Iranians while the trade discussions are still 1 progress. On the other hand, arrangements with the 'Western .1 consortium are working well. -
39. Although neutralist and ultra-nationalist feelings smain active- under the surface, the. régime seems stable at the DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED ?esent time. A prudent distrust of,Russia, whether Tsarist or Dviet, has always' been, and seems likely to remain, one of the LOtates of Iranian policy. For the long run Iranian stability 3 dependent on the solution of its fundamental social and ïonomic problems.
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IRAQ
40. . . The present government, of Iraq, thanks' largely to the strong leadership of Nuri Said'', is anti-Commuhist ;.and pro- .Western-* 70% of Iraq's large oil revenues are "being spent on a .soundly conceived development programme. The country has ample resources to support a much larger population. . • •
41. However, Iraq has serious socio-economic problems and Nuri Said has numerous enemies. Moreover, social .discontent •" and-the popular sympathy which Nasser's Arah nationalism finds in the masses and in part of the middle classes, especially students, ; •( stimulated hy Egyptian propaganda through broadcasts' and agents) could seriously affect the stability of the country and might alter national policy.
42. ^The Communist' Party of Iraq has about 2,000 active - supporters, has -long been under severe government repression and has been demoralised and virtually inactive during the past year. The Party has been badly splintered and negotiations for.- unity have been only partially successful. Approaches to other political groups for the formation of a national front have been unproductive.
43. Iraq-exports . almost nothing to Communist countries 'and imports only small amounts, from Czechoslovakia, Poland and Rumania. Soviet economic penetration is thus virtually nil.
So long as Nuri Said holds power, Iraqui policy will probably remain firmly, on its present, course. If he should - : fall, it is an open question what the effects would be on Iraq's foreign policy and internal stability.
SYRIA -
45. The anti-Western force which governs Syria today is a loose coalition consisting of opportunistic., extreme nationalist and socialist politicians and soldiers. This coalition can agree on no positive domestic programme and is held together largely by realand stimulated fear of inter-i vention, directly, or at the instance of Iraq, Turkey, Israel, the United Kingdom, Prance and "thé United .States'. In the face of political and;: economic pressure, especially from Iraq, it allied itself with Iraq's regional rival, Egypt. In order to gain countervailing power against the allies of Iraq, Turkey and Israel, it turned to the USSR as the international rival of -the United Kingdom, Prance and the United. .States.
46, v Egyptian political support financed by Saudi money, :. DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED and later popular reaction'to the Suez . conflict, permitted this coalition ànd'the military clique which stands behind..it, to con- solidate its position. It imposed martial law, instituted press censorship and decimated the,- conservative, wing of the Populist. -..:. Party through a treason trial of leading opposition figures and the elimination of conservatives from ...key positions -in;. the. Syrian civil service. Pro-Western politicians Who remain atilarge.ldare not confess'their sentiments publicly arid,,with the press and radio controlled: by the government, pro-Western elements are denied media of expression, even if they had the courage to use them.
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47. The Syrian Communist Party "by Middle Eastern standards . is relatively large and well organized (over 10,000 members). Its leader, Khalid Bakdash, of Kurdish .origin, has long been a prominent figure in international Communism and spent three years in Moscow dUring the '30s. The Syrian Communist Party was proscribed, in 1947, but- this had little effect on its: internal cohesion. It has been openly tolerated since 1954 and Bakdash was elected to the Syrian Parliament, the first Communist to become a-member of an Arab legislature. Front organizations are active and influential. '..,•'
48. . The Soviet bloc has not. yet made much economic progress . , in Syria, except as a supplier of arms. However Syria has trade agreements with all the bloc countries and Communist China and 2Qffo of the Syrian cotton crop is .going to bloc' countries. The Satellites have made- various offers of machinery on easy terms. Syria reached an agreement with Czechoslovakia for arms purposes early in 1956. Additions to this deal were subsequently negotiated and by October 1956, the value of the Syrian contracts approached £20 million sterling. .The. bulk of the arms ordered under these contracts had been delivered, by -the end of October. .... A list of• the main items known to have been supplied is at AnnexB..
49. Further negotiations with the Soviet bloc began in ' November. 1956 and a second deal was concluded for .additional arms •of about the same value, in exchange for. goods and cash. ; It seems probable that Syriaohas received very favourable terms. It is believed that no arms deliveries were made ,in November 1956. Shipments were resumed early in December and continued throughout that month and January. Items known to have been included in deliveries during these two months are listed at Annex C„ Airfield and port facilities are being improved and,about; 200 Soviet bloc technicians are in Syria.
50. The use of these weapons by Soviet '''volunteers" cannot be entirely ruled; out. It is probable however that the Syrians have acquired these weapons chiefly to enhance^ their prestige-.
51. . The conflicting elements in Syrian politics share a general -concept of Arab nationalism but are. at loggerheads in. their -interpretations and. in the policies; they advocate, for its realisation. The main divisions are between modernists, and . traditionalists, • radicals..-..and. conservatives, and regionally, between Damascus and Aleppo, There is a major, division between elements favouring union with Egypt (mainly in Damascus),, and those favouring union with Iraq, (mainly centering around Aleppo);."/: These various divisions are reflected both within the Army, which.: exercises major•political power, and within the civilian groupings. Syrian instability, which has permitted "the present Soviet infiltra- DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED tion, is likely to persist, and could therefore facilitate, further penetration-by Moscow. -.•••"-,.".-
LEBANON • -
52.. The Lebanon is the most developed and is so far the most politically stable of the Arab countries. It has not normally, been .subject to serious nationalistic crises. The present Lebanese government is wary , of the USSR and strongly .. favours bo-operation with, the West, though it is often compelled
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to demonstrate solidarity v/ith the other Arah states. Soviet arming .of Moslem Syria and Egypt and the instability in the. former have alarmed the Christian and Druze communities who together constitute a majority in the country. Except for the visit of Soviet Foreign Minister Shepilov in June 1956, the Soviet Union1s diplomatic activity in : the Lebanon has been insignificant.
53. / - In proportion, to the population, the Communist Party is the largest of any Arab country. • The Party.is illegal but tolerated. It is controlled by the Syrian Communist leader,. ., Bakdash. Front organizations, especially the Partisans of Peace, are active.- .
5b. ; ' In an attempt to avoid balance-of-payments problems and faced with.high-cost exports, the Lebanon has signed trade agreements with almost:all Communist countries since the latter part of 1955. However, it is not expected that the Lebanon will tie its economy to that of the bloc.
55. Present Lebanese stability rests on "a bargain among all religious communities in the country to share proportionately political, administrative., and so in part also economic, benefits. This fact, together with the relatively high standard of living, prosperity, and a certain social equilibrium with a considerable middle class, has made it difficult for the Communist Party to . . influence political decisions. As soon as there are enough' ,- Lebanese,to insist . that office and power-be shared on secular grounds, that-is,.'on the basis of competence or ideological:'.; agreement, the. old order, which has so far changed but little, could be wrenched rather violently.
56. Although Lebanon1s'alignment might be affected by a change of leaders, the greater short-range threat lies in possible subversion^ from Syria abetted by Egypt.
JORDAN
57. Jordan has only by recent' historical accident been fashioned into a state. Its existence has depended on àn Uneasy- balance among its covetous neighbours and on British support more than on any coherence and sense .of. a common destiny among-the quarrelling elements of its population. Power is. shared between the pro-Western but .young and often irresolute King, and a few Army officers and'politicians strongly influenced by Nasser and the street, • The mass of the population, composed of primitive nomads, miserable peasants and embittered refugees, has as its only political focus the Palestine issue. . The people are anti- DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED Western in that they believe the Western Powers to.be unalterably biased in favour of Israel.' They have been attracted to:the USSR by its posture as the champion of '' the: Arab cause' against Israel. Since he obtained arms from the Soviet bloc, Nasser has become ' their hero.
58. The end of British hegemony, .brought a more strongly . anti- Western Group of politicians into office. Though only a handful - are anti-Western by conviction, the rest'are opportunists and only the King has had the courage to take in public a position that is' pro-Western insofar as it is anti-Communist. The Army is generally loyal to the King but perhaps could not be relied 'on to deal with demonstrations against him on popular causes.
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59« ; The Communist Party is. now only nominally illegal. It has ahout 250 members,- at least 5,000 active supporters, and an influence out of proportion to these small numbers. It took an active part in the elections last October (under the thinnest of covers), and now has' three deputies in the hO-member Chamber and one sympathiser in the Cabinet (the Minister of Agriculture). The propaganda of the Party has been most effective among the ex- Palestinians. Front organizations are very active. Two left-wing parties with another nine .seats in the Chamber have on occasion collaborated with the Coramunists8.
.60, Although Jordan desperately needs outside assistance, Soviet economic penetration has so far been negligible. Last June Czechoslovakia contracted to buy phosphates in exchange for machinery, but trade with the bloc remains very small. Even the ending of the British subsidy, which has brought acute financial problems, has not resulted in any direct Soviet offers of aid, , It remains to be seen whether the agreement for financial help for defence purposes from Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia will be effectively carried through. If Egypt and Syria are unable to fulfil their obligations under the agreement, Saudi influene may grow and Saudi support for King Hussein may be forthcoming. '
61»' In spite of the growing direct influence of Jordan's Communist Party, an actual Communist take-over of this small, isolated and scarcely viable country seems unlikely. The danger would, of course, be much more acute if Syria were to fall under Communist control. For. the time being a proplongation of the present unstable equilibrium, based on. the mutual fears of its neighbours, seems more probable. Should this equilibrium be disturbed by external events or by a violent internal crisis, partition would- likely be Jordan's fate. Such a partition could hardly be managed without very serious repercussions, perhaps, a general Middle East conflict.
ISRAEL
62, Israel's social and political structure, its general. . ( orientation toward the West and the Soviet Union's attitude toward the Arab-Israeli conflict combine to make Soviet influence in the country at present negligible. Neither the existence of a small,, legal Communist Party (v/hich draws most of its strength from the Arab minority) nor Israel's limited trade relations with the USSR can alter this situation. Especially since the Suez conflict, the chances of Communist influence on Israeli policies are nil, .
SAUDI ARABIA
DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED 63. There are no political parties in Saudi Arabia, hence no Communist Party. Communist doctrine is- opposed by ' the absolute monarch who bases his patriarchal government on a fundamentalist interpretation of Islamic law. King Saud's generally anti-Soviet outlook has been reinforced by his growing distrust of Nasser and. Quwwatli'and their policies and his apparent satisfaction with his : recent dealings with the US, King Saud's prestige in the Islamic world as Guardian of the Holy Places gives additional importance to his recent public moveô to draw closer-to such countries as Iraq, Jordan, the Lebanon, Morocco and Tunisia. However, Saudi.
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Arabia has. maintained its alliance with Egypt, Syria and the Yemen,- still lends some material and moral- support to these countries' and is reluctant to say anything publicly or t'o take any overt action which might offend them.
6i+. , Public opinion in Saudi Arabia is almost impossible to gauge except in terms of policies that are enunciated and followed by the King and his advisers. However,, the King's attitude towards the USSR and the U.S is not entirely shared by his ministers and advisers. Many, of the .latter are imported but are nonetheless extremely influential. A small number of those near the King are believed to favour following Nasser's example. Moreover, many ,of the King's ministers and counsellors have a generally anti-Western animus deriving mainly from the West's support of Israel. Nevertheless, anti-Western individuals in Saudi Arabia seem considerably less likely than their colleagues in other Arab countries to advocate pro-Soviet policies..
65. A certain number of new factors may. tend to affect the orientation of Saudi Arabia such as:
(a) the formation of a proletariat in the large oil. centres and in the ports;
(b) the great popularity of Nasser evident during his visit to Ryadh last summer, which. no doubt gave food for thought to King Saud;
- the new orientation of the policy of the Yemen, which may permit the USSR to gain increased • influence on the Arabian peninsula;
(d) overtures by Iraq to settle long-standing dynastic differences with Saudi Arabia.
YEMEN
66. The Yemen is a theocracy whose government is in the hands of an autocratic, religious leader, the Imam. - Society is on a primitive tribal pattern, there is no popular representation and law and order, is maintained by repression.
67. • The Government, apparently motivated largely by the prospect of getting what it can while rival powers are. vying for its allegiances, welcomes all proffered offers of friendship and economic assistance. In cheerful pursuance of this policy of neutral opportunism - and encouraged by considerable-free
DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED advice from Egypt - Imam Ahmad has signed an all-embracing economic development -agreement with the US-Yemen Development Corporation, continued until recently an agreement with a West. German oil prospecting firm, renewed a I928 Treaty of Friendship v/ith the Soviet Union .and a 1938 Treaty of Friendship with .. Czechoslovakia, negotiated trade agreements with both the USSR and Czechoslovakia,' sent his Crown Prince to Moscow on a visit which resulted in a Soviet pledge, of economic, development1' : assistance, and entered into a military assistance pact.with Egypt and Saudi Arabia.
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68. As a result of the military deal with, the USSR, the Yemen xpects to get ahout 09 million in arms and has already received Lght field artillery, anti-aircraft guns, rifles, automatic sapons and ammunition. There are ..about a dozen "Soviet technicians i the country. Primary factors in the Yemeni decision to accept Dmmunist bloc offers were (l) the examples of Egypt and Syria; id (2) a growing appreciation that if Yemeni irredentism toward Ien is to be realised, the assistance derived from "Arab unity" id "positive-neutrality" would have to be strengthened by Soviet cms. The Yemen's growing ties v/ith the Soviet bloc, when con- Ldered in that context, appear to have resulted from energetic alesmanship on the part of the bloc and do not arise from any . leological sympathies. . There are signs that the Imam is becoming /vare (possibly through King Saud) of the dangers of' too ready an- cceptance of Communist help and advisers.
69. The fact remains, however, that the Yemen, in the course f little more than a year, has established closer ties with the Dmmunist bloc than with any Western nation. ! IYPT
70. Egypt lies geographically at a highly strategic cross- Dads of the Arab world and is in many ways the most important rab country. It has a large population and aspires to political id cultural leadership of the Arab world. Its population is growing Dry rapidly (about half a million a year) while its sources of salth remain relatively static. Social discontent and Egyptian Dalousy of the more fortunate Arab states, especially the oil- Daring states such as Iraq., are thus likely to increase. Egypt Lll remain for a long time a centre of discontent and revolutionary Dndencies.
71. The present ruling group in Egypt, dominated by Nasser, Dpresents a group of extreme Egyptian nationalists who came to Dwer by means of a military coup against a corrupt civilian bgime. It has virtually no organized civilian support and tringently represses any sign of civilian and military dis- " ffection. _ • V .
72. The first aim of this group is to rid Egypt, the Arab Drld, and all the African area of all aspects ,of foreign control. t describes this course as independence from either bloc ("Positive Dutralism"), but since its aimis to destroy the traditional Dstern positions, its objectives coincide in :this,réspect with iose of the Soviet bloc. To that parallelism of aims has been Ided an element of increased dependence- on the .'USSR. Between gyp ti sin objectives and Egyptian capabilities there is a wide
DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED Lscrepancy and to; get the arms and money to carry out its policies, ie Nasser. regime . has had to form a closer liaison v/ith Moscow than, "positively neutral" policy would seem -to call for.
73. The Egyptian Communist Party, does not serve as, the rincipal. weapon in furthering Soviet aims in Egypt. The Party 3 splintered, all of its factions are proscribed, and the rincipal leaders are in gaol. Certain "Front" organizations re, however, still active and certain government services
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and news media have "been infiltrated. The Party counts ahout 2,000 members, a large share of whom are in prison. . This state of affairs is quite compatible with.: present Soviet policy. The Soviet Union may judge that a strong and influential Communist movement sharing power in Egypt would frighten other Arab countries.. It would also . place on the Soviet Union unwanted responsibility for the. Egyptian economy, and perhaps involve it further in'Middle East .conflicts. The Soviet Union does, however, wish to consolidate its present position and to increase Egyptian dependency on the USSR. A principal weapon in this reépect is. the Soviet economic relationship with Egypt resulting from the arms deals.
74- In 1955 a credit of ^250 million was arranged for the purchase of arms through Czechoslovakia, though the deal was actually financed by the USSR. Payment is to be made largely by means of Egyptian cotton. The Egyptian motivations were: their wish to be armed against Israel, and their difficulties in marketing their cotton crop and their desire to enhance Egyptian prestige and to secure Arab leadership in competition especially with pro-Western Iraq. In addition to this arms deal there were arrangements for training Egyptian military and industrial personnel in Czechoslovakia, Poland and the Soviet Union (estimates range up to"1,000). A second arms deal'of considerable size but of which the details are unknown was concluded after the Suez crisis. Since the first arms deal in September 1955 Egypt has to date received: about 50 IL 28 bomber aircraft; at least 100 MIG fighter aircraft; about 300 medium and heavy tanks; 100 self- propelled guns; 'about 200 armoured personnel carriers, and an. assortment of.rocket launchers, bazookas, mines, small arms, radar wireless and associated military equipment. To these should.be added two destroyers, h minesweepers, 15 - 20 motor-torpedo boats. Some smaller ships and- possibly submarines.
75. By the end of 1955? Egypt had.trade agreements with all Soviet bloc countries except Albania. During the first nine months of 1956 .approximately 12.5% of Egypt's imports came from, and 35'3% of its exports went to the bloc as compared with 6% and ' lk% respectively during the calendar year 1954. Czechoslovakia has ^ delivered the first oî* several swing bridges, as well as railroad, equipment and Hungary has made arrangements for construction of bridges and a power station. The Soviet Union has offered to build a nuclear physics . laboratory in Egypt. Since the end of the Suez fighting the USSR' has stepped up deliveries of petroleum products and wheat. In marked contrast to its policy towards' Afghanistan- and India the USSR has so far extended no credits to Egypt except for arms.
76. Today Egypt- has become heavily dependent, economically and for military supplies, on the Soviet Union and embroiled with the West. DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED Politically, as a result of the relation between the Soviet Union and Nasser, and an.overlap of their immediate policies, the USSR has been able to pose, more effectively as the champion of Arab nationalism and to exploit this force for its own ends. Both Cairo and Moscow (and their - powerful and influential radios) reinforce each others' efforts in pro- pagating hostility to Israel, to the West,; to Arab feudalism, - to "imperialism and colonialism", and in inflaming Arab opinion
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nerally. Soviet and Egyptian long-run aims are not identical,, ypt would undoubtedly try to oppose efforts "by the USSRwhich re obviously designed to substitute Soviet for Egyptian fluence in this region, and probably is less than satisfied th Soviet proffers of big-power agreements to emb argo arms ipment to the Middle East and to bring about permanent peace, tween. Israel and the Arab states.. These latent or potential fferences, however, do not seriously affect the fact that viet and Egyptian policies are at present in step. The viets are in some areas content to have the Egyptians act on eir own to further these common interests. v 77. The internal situation in Egypt contains deep-seated cial, economic,and political factors tending to produce stability. These include the growing gap between the rising pulation and limited resources and the consequent inability the régime to. fulfil the basic popular expectations which e régime itself encouraged. These factors could be triggered f should Nasser's Soviet-backed policies meet with a serious litary or political setback or should the economic expectations om external aid be frustrated.
78.* To the extent that Nasser's Soviet-backed policies fail, o-Nasser elements can be expected to lose confidence in the rtues of reliance on the Soviet, and the influence of anti- sser elements .can be expected to increase. In these circumstances, ere would, probably be considerable pressure from many sections moderate opinion, especially the professional and trading classes, r Egypt to deal with the West on a basis of political neutrality, ovided that this, brought a large flow of new wealth into Egypt. : deed, many people in Egypt would probably welcome such collabor- ion now if left to their own devices. However, the fall of sser could bring into power more radical forces either of the right of- the left. This would not entail an abandonment of the basic jectives of Egyptian nationalism and would probably mean a ntinuation of Egyptian efforts to enlarge its independent rôle by aying off Russia against the West.
DAN
79» The Sudan's recent transition to independence was latively smooth and has not given rise to strong anti-Western elings. The mass of the population has its attention focused inly on its immediate needs and the numerically small Communist rty takes advantage of their unsatisfied aspirations to nent.unrest.
80, The Government is in control of the situation, internally,
DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED i free to follow.a foreign policy in general friendly to the st, although it pays lip-service to solidarity with the Arab ague and neutralism. Israel is not the irritant in Khartoum at it is in Cairo. Western Europe is a well-established market r Sudan cotton.. Aid from Western nations is also looked upon th favour as offsetting attempts by Egypt to extend its fluence'.
81. The Communists' chief front organization, the Anti- perialist Front, has one member in the present Parliament, but s confined itself largely to nationalist activities.
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In general the Communists seem content for the time being, to let Egypt take the lead in subversive activities. The main opposition party, the NUP, seems to have obtained financial backing from Egypt, and has committed itself publicly to a pro-Egypt and anti-Western • policy. A change of government after the elections in October would therefore be unfortunate, although it is always possible that the NUP in power might repudiate its understanding with Egypt just as it did after it won the first Sudanese elections, three years, ago.
LIBYA .
82. A poor country with virtually no educated élite, a Federal Kingdom with strong centrifugal tendencies, Libya owes its present equilibrium to three factors: the Monarch who incarnates and maintains the unity of the country, the authority and skill of the Prime Minister, and the foreign aid without which the country cannot survive.
83, Although Libya has a Parliament, it has at present no organized political parties. The parliamentary game consists merely in the opposition of persons or interests or in divergencies due to the special demands of each of the three provinces of the .Federal Kingdom. It does not concern conflicts on questions of ideology.
81+. The Communist Party thus does not appear in the political life of the country and seems at present not to have even a clandestine existence except for a few individuals.
85. The Libyan Government has in the past reportedly considered Soviet offers of foreign aid and might conceivably do so again as a bargaining counter in gaining concessions from the US or UK. At least for the near future, Prime Minister Ben Halim will very probably adhere to his promise of early 1956 to continue to reject Soviet Bloc offers.
86. As a result of the reported collaboration between the USSR and Egypt in Libya, and following Egyptian-inspired violence in Libya during the Suez crisis, the Libyan Prime Minister has become aroused at both countries. Fearing an Egyptian plot Ben Hal im, v/ith the support of King Idriss, is attempting to suppress Egyptian and Soviet influence in the country.
87. Yfhile remaining faithful to Arab and Moslem solidarity, Ben Halim has for several months been promoting the idea of a bloc of'Western Arab" states (Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco) as a counterweight to Egyptian leadership. To this end Libya has signed a treaty of friendship with Tunisia and has supported the initiative . of the Tunisian Prime Minister, M. Bourguiba, looking toward a broader confederation of the various independent African states. DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED 88,. However, there are in the Parliaraent and Government and among the King's household strong partisans of a pro-Egyptian policy who are firmly opposed to the Prime Minister. They are affected both by Egyptian influence and by the support which the Soviet Union has given to Arab claims. This sentiment is still more marked among the masses where anti-governmental and anti-Western propaganda tracts have circulated in the last few months, especially at Tripoli.
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ARMS KNOYffl TO BE INCLUDED IN DELIVERIES TO SYRIA BEFORE NOVEMBER, 1956
20 - Mig-I5 aircraft (delivered to Egypt where
later destroyed)
130 (plus)- T-3h tanks
120 - Armoured personnel carriers (BTR-I52)
1+5 - German PZKiV IV
50 (plus)- 100-mm guns (self-propelled)
Some - PZKW III SP guns
25 - 122-mm guns
38 - 122-mm howitzers
32 - 85-mm AA guns 'with fire control radar V Some - 57-mm anti-tank guns
54 (plus)- 37-mm AA guns
200 - Bazookas (or recoilless rifles)
Some ' - Rocket launcher vehicles (32 tube x 130-mm)
Some radar equipment
Large quantities of ammunition and spares for this e quipment
Large quantities of small arms, S # A. e -A. o
Several hundred vehicles of all types
Ancillary equipment
-Possibly a submarine DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED
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ARMS KNOWN TO BE INCLUDED IN DELIVERIES TO SYRIA DURING THE PERIOD DECEMBER 19 5JANUARY 1957
20 (plus) ' - Mig-17 aircraft
i+0 (plus) - Medium tanks
About 40 - Armoured personnel carriers
100 (plus) - Guns ( including 85-mm AA with radar and 37-mm, AA)
Some - Rocket launcher vehicles (32 tube x 130-mm)
Large quantity - Artillery ammunition
Small arms.
Small arms ammunition
- Vehicles (including heavy vehicles and
fuel tankers) 16 (?) Tank transporters 8 - MTBs Some - Sea Mines DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED
V.
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