MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED States but Also in the Oil-Producing Countries
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CONSEIL DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL NATO UNCLASSIFIED and 568" PUBLIC DISCLOSED EXEMPLAIRE N0 COPY OR ICIHAL : ENGLISH ' % 4T ' 16th April, 1957 • DOCUMENT —— , • ^ ^ ( ^ JEmmi \ i- . : ' ' - ' THE MIDDLE EAST ' • Report by the .Committee of Political Advisers - The Soviet Union and the Middle East The USSR seeks everywhere to hring about the ultimate . Communist objective of world domination. It pursues this object- ive by flexible and opportunist methods. Communist ideology in certain respects handicaps them in pursuing their imperialist aims in the Middle East and they make .only limited use Of it. They present themselves in this area primarily as the champion of nationalism, particularly Arab nationalism. The fact that in so doing they are supporting nationalist feelings which are predomin- antly anti-Western makes these Soviet tactics especially effect- ive and dangerous. From the point of view of NATO, the main Soviet threat is not at present an attempt to take over territories but rather: . (a) to.destroy the strategic positions of the Western Powers in the Middle East, to disrupt defensive arrangements such as the Baghdad Pact and to secure the removal of Western bases; (b) to establish a stranglehold on Western oil supplies and thus to be in a position'to weaken both the Middle East and the West. / 2. The Soviet- Union seeks to obtain a voice in all important decisions affecting the Middle East. It has already obtained this voice to the extent that certain countries of the area r- particularly Egypt, and Syria - have helped this Soviet ambition by 'themselves making use of Soviet influence and drawing on Soviet support as a counterpoise to the West. 3. .In pursuit of its. objectives, Soviet policy seeks to discredit and undermine the position of governments and groups in the Middle East which are-willing to co-operate with the-West. This serves to increase instability -in the area and encourages the rise of elements embittered against the west, sometimes inexperienced and perhaps-irresponsible and reckless. The USSR, seeks to'create and aggravate difficulties for the West by bring- ing these elements into control especially in the oil-transit DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED states but also in the oil-producing countries. k.. Western ideas and technology have had an unsettling effect .in. this area and their impact has been intensified by, and has in turn accelerated, the disintegration of the traditional religious and social structure. The Arab states are now sovereign but are painfully aware that they remain'dependent on the great powers for capital, arms and technical skills: for this they are NATO' OEORSg NATO SECRET -2- O-MC57)63 inclined to "blame the West. United hy common history, culture, language and'religion, they are nevertheless-:, rent hy so many rivalries and. conflicts that they aée^miabIeJto reach unity of action "in^'the face of the great powers *or to" develop" effective political- and economic measures^in common.^ ,y»Even within each country there are such sharp di'vïSidhîs' t'ha-t^there is no concensus on the methods and ultimate purpose of the government. Conser- vative businessmen, landovmers, traditional rulers and chiefs, minority groups in the area, are still' trying to develop a mutual- ly advantageous relationship with the "West. Of the Arah pop- ulation, however, two-thirds are under 30 years, almost all poor, and even those who have power or jobs are unsure of themselves and of the security of their position. In these circumstances- Arab nationalism" presents itself as a vague concept characterised by strongly- negative tendencies, anti-Western, anti-colonial, and on- the widest basis, anti-Israeli. Mingled with these impulses there are v:\r-icd personal and dynastic ambitions. 5. To exploit Arab nationalism, the USSR by 1-955 proclaimed its readiness to establish mutually profitable relations with any régime Intent on following "independent" foreign and domestic policies, i.e. any. regime which might be prepared to' move away from the West. By- this initiative, Russia reasserted her tradit- ional ambition to-, play a major rôle in the Middle East. In Europe the development of NATO strength blocked Soviet expansion.. Under these circumstances the USSR took a serious viev/ of the signature of the. Baghdad Pact. It may have feared this develop- ment and in any event it reacted sharply-to it as possibly prov- iding the groundwork for an extension of Western military bases in the area. ' 1 6. At -this time the USSR responded favourably to the overtures from the leading Arab opponents .of the Baghdad Pact - Egypt and Syria - for the supply of arms. It became increasing- ly clear that the USSR was prepared to supply weapons'", diplomatic support, markets, technical assistance, and, in1some instances, credits to states which .rejected alignment with the West. 7. The effect of the new Soviet policy on the Middle East was drastic. For. the first time, non-Communist, anti-Western nationalists were able to look to the Soviet Union for help that promised to offset Western influence in the Arab world. Above all, they saw the possibility of settling scores with'Israel (which they view as a creation of imperialist Western powers), thus redeeming Arab honour with Soviet help and. re-uniting the "Arab' homeland"', which Israel'geographically cuts asunder. More than any, other consideration this weighed in determining the attitude of most Arabs and in giving the USSR an entrée into the Middle East. DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED 8. There are further reasons why the Arabs are inclined to look favourably toward the USSR, and to blame the West for many things it has not done or could not have prevented. While many Arabs recall the history of Western efforts from the"crusades onward to establish control in the Middle East,, they know ' little of Turkish, Iranian and Afghan encounters with Russia-, ' NATO SECRET -2- -3- NATO SECRET 57 W and give no credit to those who prevented Russian armies from reaching the Arah world. The West has substantial political influence in several Middle Eastern states and plays a major role in the most important enterprises in the economies of these states. It remains the major purchaser and supplier of commercial goods in all.Middle Eastern states, the sole purchasers of their oil, and until recently, the sole source•for capital, technicians and arms. Knowing this, certain Arab governments are . inclined to see closer relations with the USSR as providing a countervailing balance against Western influence in the area. Thus Soviet influence has been advanced in the area . on the invitation of nationalist independent governments without the use of Soviet armed forces and with only limited • recourse to the apparatus of international Communism. Soviet Methods 9. To take advantage of Middle Eastern receptivity, the Soviet Union has made skilful use of a wide variety of weapons. These include economic relations, propaganda, diplomatic manoeuvres, the furnishing of arms to certain states and, though in a limited way, the activities of local Communist movements. 10. The large expansion in Soviet bloc trade with the Middle East is marked by the Increase in trade agree- ments from 7 in 1953 to 31 in 1955. The greatest measure Of-Isuccess appears to have been achieved in those countries which had no oil resources, were not committed to Western• defence alliances and, with the exception of Syria were experiencing balance of payment difficulties. Egypt, Afghanistan and Syria were the most prominent among the Middle Eastern countries where Soviet influence grew, and this was partly related to arms deals made with the Soviet bloc. Since the last half of 1955 the pace of trade has. quickened and trade now involves mostly Soviet bloc capital goods and arms in barter exchanges for agricultural products. Large-scale credits were given to some countries, and the entire battery of trade agreements, technical assistance and trade fairs was used. - Although the initiative in the Soviet economic offensive has come from the Soviet Union, the satellites have played a very important p^rt in it. 11. Reduction in the. rate of increase of Russia's economic expansion for 1957 should not have much effect on its economic offensive in this area. Economic and military assjistance- has become an integral part of SovTet~dïplrom:a~cy and is likely to endure as long as the "competitive co- existence" policy continues. DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED 12. Military, even more than economic aid has been the most spectacular demonstration of Soviet support for the Arabs. Egypt and Syria have received Soviet arms on favourable terms in quantities which are very substantial in proportion to their capacity to absorb them. Afghanistan and the Yemen have also received large arms supplies on favourable terms. The arms furnished are largely from stocks which are obsolescent•in the Soviet bloc and which they can easily spare'at little cost. In this way important Middle East states are being- brought into -3- NATO SECRET NATO SECRET -k- C-M(57)63 re.liance -upon' the Soviet bloc for military supplies. Similarly, these states are being brought to rely on Soviet bloc markets, for their „exports ; . .. : 13. Such, states are bound to think twice before taking actions which might, antagonise the USSR,. They could only be rescued from their eventual economic and. military dependency ' at substantial cost'to the rescuer. Moreover, by acting as. supplier to these states the USSR, wins friends in army circles and gains -the' advantages arising from the presence of Soviet technicians and the influence they may ticve on military'and economic policy.