THE DEVELOPMENT OF TAIWAN’S NATIONAL MOVEMENT 1
Sean Glasson
Abstract
Taiwan has always had a unique position in the Far East, both in terms of geography and the national identity and political institutions that are not only critical for citizens of Taiwan, who make their home on the island, but are also critical to the major powers in East Asia, such as the
United States, China, and Japan. Besides the influences of foreign policy on the Taiwanese evolution, the various effects of the globalization that have swept the world in the last several decades have had an even more dramatic effect on Taiwan by comparison, as the island has rushed to embrace free trade and social media both as economic boons and as tools for securing its place as a functioning polity that is nominally part of another but practically a state unto itself.
The events of the past twenty years and the global trends that have accompanied them have transformed the thinking of Taiwan’s population as they consider what course they should take going forward. This paper seeks to look at how that change came to be, and how it has already affected the policies and actions of both Taiwan and its neighbors
Introduction
Of the many things that help to define a nation, none is more important than the shared characteristics that bind one’s people together. All other things, from politics and economics to trends and pop culture, are essential components as well, but are mainly built on this base. While no nations in the world share the exact same national identity, most of them share some common features with others, usually as a result of displacement, assimilation, or colonial and historic THE DEVELOPMENT OF TAIWAN’S NATIONAL MOVEMENT 2 legacies. These identities tend to be built on several common themes, consisting of geography, history and culture, ethnicity, and expressed ideals. Of these themes, some can be more or less significant than others, depending on the nation in question, and they are all important to keep in mind as we look at the subject of this paper.
Taiwan is one of the youngest states that exist in the world today, both in the time of its de facto independence and in terms of national identity. The island is also one of the most important geographic features of East Asia. Taiwan’s geographical position makes it key to
Chinese ambitions to dominate the South China Sea and the efforts of the United States and others to contain China. The tensions over Taiwan have threatened to become open conflict several times over the last few decades, but fears about provoking a large, destructive war have helped to prevent any of these incidents from reaching the breaking point. Both China and The
United States have made Taiwan a key piece of their foreign policy in Asia, with the Taiwanese keeping the latter close while warily engaging with the former. In the meantime, Taiwan has also made an effort to establish ties with other nations, with an emphasis on its neighbors in east Asia.
These relationships are key to understanding the character of Taiwan’s national identity, even as it faces losing its de facto nationhood in the meantime.
Another important thing to keep in mind when studying Taiwan is the unique and diverse groups that make up its population. Most foreigners think of the people of Taiwan as Han
Chinese, and while the vast majority of the population is, there is a distinction made between the several different groups within the Han. There are also aboriginal Taiwanese who have lived on the island for far longer than the ethnic Chinese have. These ethnic groups have had the greatest impacts on Taiwanese culture, especially in how the groups have remained distinct and THE DEVELOPMENT OF TAIWAN’S NATIONAL MOVEMENT 3 intertwined at the same time, which is one of the most significant parts of the Taiwanese national identity.
A final key piece of Taiwan’s national identity to consider is the impact of the digital revolution on the people living on the island, and the emphasis Taiwan has put on establishing itself not only as a thriving economy with de facto independence but also as one of the global leaders in the world of computing and information technology. This sense of innovation and modernity colors all other aspects of what makes up the national character of Taiwan, and is very important to consider when looking at Taiwan in the world today.
Historic Overview: European Colonists to Qing Occupation
The island of Taiwan, officially known as Formosa, has had human settlements since over five thousand years ago, long before the Han Chinese began to settle there. The native people are culturally linked to many of the indigenous groups belonging to the Polynesian people, who stretch from Hawaii to Madagascar. While the island was known to the people of
China and their neighbors for centuries, there was never an organized effort to claim Formosa.
Taiwan’s aboriginals lived with relatively little contact with the rest of the world until the sixteenth century, when Dutch explorers established a trading post on the island, in order to have a base near China and Japan. Only a few decades later, the Spanish joined them, establishing separate bases in the north of the island. During this time, neither party expressed a major interest in Taiwan itself. The native people were cautious towards the Europeans, and would often ally themselves with either the Dutch or Spanish to fight other tribes on the island. The major shift occurred in the early seventeenth century, when the Han Chinese began settling in large numbers on Taiwan. This was due to the Manchu invasion that would end the Ming
Dynasty and displace it with the Qing Dynasty. The Chinese settlers came from the Fujian THE DEVELOPMENT OF TAIWAN’S NATIONAL MOVEMENT 4 province in the south, among them the “founder” of Chinese Taiwan, known as Koxinga in
Western literature (Jacobs, 2014). Born to a Han Chinese father and a Japanese mother in
Nagasaki, he lived there until age seven, which is when his father moved him to the Ming court at Fujian. He would go on to pass the service exams common to Chinese government and serve in the government of several Ming emperors during the Manchu invasions. After the fall of
Fujian, he fled to Taiwan, where he organized the Han settlers and seized control of the island from the European colonists.
Han Chinese rule did not last long. Koxinga was an avowed loyalist of the old Ming dynasty, and his family continued that policy after his death. The Qing were quick to organize an expedition to Taiwan, and assumed control of the island in 1683. While this was the beginning of
Taiwan’s role as an appendage to the Chinese mainland, Qing rule was not strictly Chinese in two ways: firstly, the government was dominated by Manchus, who are distinct from Han
Chinese; and secondly, that the Qing never exercised control over the entire island, and instead preferred to focus on the Chinese settlements on the coast while leaving the highlands to the aboriginal Taiwanese people (Jacobs 2014). Those circumstances would continue well into the nineteenth century.
Japanese Occupation and the Nationalist Arrival
Qing rule over Taiwan lasted for two centuries, during which the island became a key feature of Chinese trade with foreign traders from the West. This occurred without any real effort towards development on the part of the Qing government, nor was there any major investment in the assimilation of the aboriginal tribes. The Japanese seized Taiwan after the First Sino-
Japanese War ended in 1895 (Chen and Hwang, 2015). In the first twenty years of the THE DEVELOPMENT OF TAIWAN’S NATIONAL MOVEMENT 5 occupation, the colonial rulers focused just on the economic development of the island, modernizing the industry and the transportation systems on the island (Jacobs, 2014). While unrest and rebellion were suppressed ruthlessly, the main goal of the colonial government and military was to maintain order, which included treating the natives as foreigners. This system endured until the First World War. After WWI, the Japanese began a system of cultural suppression and assimilation on Taiwan, banning the native languages and customs while introducing Japanese as the official language for education, government, and public life (He,
2014). This program accelerated during the invasion of China and the Second World War, and endured until the end of the Japanese Empire in 1945.
Though the Chinese were given administrative control of Taiwan after the Japanese defeat, peace did not last long. The Chinese Civil War, put on hold so that the Japanese could be fought by a united Chinese front, resumed quickly after the end of the Second World War.
During this renewed conflict the United States would provide little aid to the forces of Chiang
Kai-shek, who was considered a better alternative than the pro-Soviet forces under Mao Tse- tung. The Chinese Communists would go on to defeat Chiang Kai-Shek and the Kuomintang forces. They fled to Taiwan and established a dictatorship while still claiming to be the legitimate government of Taiwan. It was the latter action that resulted in the status of Taiwan today, and will be crucial to understand when looking at modern Taiwan’s policy towards the rest of the world.
The Kuomintang: Dictatorship and Democracy
The Nationalists of Chiang Kai-shek ruled Taiwan for half a century, and spent most of that time actively oppressing the island’s population, both Chinese and aboriginal. After the end of the Civil War, Chiang imposed martial law on Taiwan, which wouldn’t be lifted until 1987, THE DEVELOPMENT OF TAIWAN’S NATIONAL MOVEMENT 6 well after his death. This period, commonly referred to as the White Terror, also saw enforced assimilation programs similar to what had been instituted under the Japanese occupation, with
Chinese customs, lifestyle, and language all being promoted while native practices and customs were suppressed (He, 2014). The new arrivals also looked down on the descendants of the old
Han settlers, viewing them as inferior to the “pure” Chinese who came with the Nationalists.
Ironically, this would result in a resurgence of popularity in Japanese culture when Taiwan opened itself to the world. While the Kuomintang rule wasn’t democratic by any measure, the party allowed for elections among its own members for positions of power, with the one exception being Kai-Shek’s position as President of Taiwan.
During most of Kai-shek’s rule, Taiwan’s government was still widely regarded as the legitimate government of China by the international community. Taiwan retained its seat on the
Security Council of the United Nations. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) was shunned as an illegal regime by the West and the regions of the world under its control (Cabestan, 2009).
The United States was the key to this, as it used the threat of an American-backed invasion from
Taiwan to help keep China in check. This was American policy since the end of the Civil War, when Taiwan was seen as a potential staging ground while the Chinese fought their forces on the
Korean Peninsula (Cabestan, 2009)
This policy changed with the détente between the United States and China in 1972, when the Nixon administration took the “One China” policy and switched its recognition from the
Republic of China (the official name of Taiwan’s government) to the PRC, which is today recognized as the true Chinese government. It wasn’t long after this that mainland China began opening itself to foreign investment, establishing ties with developed states that made it even harder for Western powers to continue to recognize the Nationalist regime on Taiwan as the THE DEVELOPMENT OF TAIWAN’S NATIONAL MOVEMENT 7 legitimate government of the mainland. This was the death blow to Kai-shek’s aim to return to
China, and signaled a shift in the conventional thinking regarding Taiwan (Cabestan, 2009).
After Kai-Shek’s death in 1975, there was an interim period as the Vice-President served out the remainder of his last elected term (Lee, 2010). His son Ching-kuo assumed the presidency in 1978, and while similar in his use of power, he began a gradual loosening of government control over Taiwan, ending the programs of enforced assimilation while also ending the White Terror and legalizing political parties. This process would continue until his death in 1988.
Taiwan came under the leadership of Lee Teng-hui, the first president of Taiwan who had been born on the island. Unlike his predecessors, Lee actively sought to turn his country into a true democracy. He also opened the Taiwanese economy and used an ambitious foreign policy to gain friends and allies in the international arena, ironically following a similar model to that used by the CCP when it sought to develop its economic base. This policy proved just as effective in
Taiwan as on the mainland, albeit on a smaller scale, as nations like Korea and Japan began trading and investing more in Taiwan, while the United States strengthened its role as Taiwan’s protector and ally when dealing with China. Lee’s reforms resulted in the liberalization of
Taiwan’s political order, and the debates that went underway directly led to the formation of
Taiwan’s second major party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). There are several issues that divide Taiwan, with the most pressing two being as follows- the shifts occurring in the global economy and its effects on Taiwan, and their relationship with China and where that relationship should go in the future,
The Two Chinas and Their Common Struggle THE DEVELOPMENT OF TAIWAN’S NATIONAL MOVEMENT 8
To this day, the governments of China and Taiwan both claim to be the legitimate government of both countries. This has made it awkward for any country seeking to do business with the two countries, and has even resulted in “bidding wars” between them for diplomatic recognition by other countries, during which China and Taiwan each offer investment and aid packages to the states that recognize them as the legitimate government. These tend to occur between developing countries, as the developed states of the world all recognize the PRC as
China’s legitimate government. Both the Taiwanese and Chinese governments are constantly considering each other when examining changes to domestic and foreign policy, and the populations of the countries follow suit. While both Taiwan and China declare to this day that all options are on the table, their actions clearly indicate their preferred solutions.
Both would like to establish a peaceful solution to their split, but that is where the similarity ends. China seeks to have Taiwan officially submit to the rule of the government in
Beijing, similarly to how Hong Kong did during the 1990’s which is not a viable option for most
Taiwanese (Diamond & Sin, 2014). While relations have become less strained when compared to the Cold War, with trade between the two China’s growing larger each year, the question of reconciliation hasn’t become any easier to address. They see two paths forward- one in which
Taiwan agrees to officially rejoin China while maintaining a high degree of autonomy and self- rule, or failing that, a declaration of independence resulting in the end of Taiwan’s role as the so- called “Republic of China”. The latter is completely unacceptable to China, whose emphasis on reunification stems from their insistence on national sovereignty and their view of Taiwan as an internal affair.
Besides the question of Taiwan’s status with regards to China, the two share overlapping claims in the surrounding waters. While Taiwan’s ambitions in the South China Sea are not THE DEVELOPMENT OF TAIWAN’S NATIONAL MOVEMENT 9 nearly as great as Chinese, the two both claim territory that is disputed by neighboring countries, namely Vietnam and the Philippines. Meanwhile, the two both claim the Diaoyu Islands, which are claimed and controlled by Japan, where they are known as the Senkaku island chain. In both cases, China actually agrees with Taiwan, saying that their claims are a part of the “Taiwan
Province” which is still nominally a part of China. While their claims overlap, their ability to actually contest those claims differ greatly, with China being far more capable of exercising control over the territory it seeks to rule. Taiwan is constrained not just by its capabilities, but by its efforts to retain good relations with its neighbors.
Taiwan and Japan: Friendly Rivals
The only real sticking point in Taiwan-Japanese relations is the disputed island chain that they both claim, known as the Diaoyu’s or Senkaku’s in each country, respectively.
The five islands have been controlled by Japan since the 1970’s, when the United States returned the islands after occupying them since the end of the Second World War. China also claims this chain, and counts it as part of the Taiwan province. There have been two reasons for the tensions over the islands; namely the presence of oil and natural gas reserves in the waters nearby, and the symbolic value given to it by China and Japan as part of their respective claims to patriotic sentiment among their populaces. Compared to the two, Taiwan is neither capable of exercising their claim as well as them or as inclined to focus on it when forming foreign policy towards them.
Despite the Japanese occupation of Taiwan in the past, the people of Taiwan view Japan more favorably than any other country in the world, including both the United States and China
(Chen and Hwang, 2015). This is due to several factors. One is that the Japanese occupation is viewed in a more positive light given the civil war that followed it and the White Terror period THE DEVELOPMENT OF TAIWAN’S NATIONAL MOVEMENT 10 that came afterwards. Second, the Japanese have had a presence on Taiwan for centuries, such as during the Song Dynasty, when the wokou raided the southern China coast from bases on Taiwan
(He, 2014).
However, the true key to their friendly relationship stems from two points, namely similar cultures and the fear of a resurgent China, with the latter proving the most important lever of all. Taiwan has received overtures from China, and has deepened its relationship by increasing the flow of goods and people between the two countries. That said, Taiwan has shown little interest in simply submitting to the government in Beijing (Cabestan, 2009). A major part of this reluctance is the example of Hong Kong. The city only came under Chinese rule during the nineties, and did so with assurances that they would be able to maintain a high degree of autonomy, the same way Taiwan would hope to if and when it reunifies with China. However, as time has gone on that autonomy has slowly been eroded by the central government, and while
Beijing hasn’t reacted to unrest with the same amount of force that it did during Tiananmen,
Taiwan hasn’t been reassured by what it has seen. The Chinese government has found that, while its policies have led to a growing economy with an expanding middle-class and a powerful military, taking democratic freedoms away from people who are used to them is not an easy process. Taiwan, for its part, looks to international support to help keep China at bay while strengthening their hand in any negotiations, and a strong relationship with Japan is right on the mark with that policy.
Their hopes for closer relations have been aided by the change in Japanese defense policies during the last decade. As China has grown in both economic and military strength, the
Japanese government has responded by increasing defense spending and taking a more active role in national and regional security. This process has accelerated under the leadership of THE DEVELOPMENT OF TAIWAN’S NATIONAL MOVEMENT 11
Shinzo Abe, who at the time of writing was proceeding with plans to amend the Japanese constitution to allow greater flexibility in the use of their military. On the diplomatic front,
Taiwan has been one of the most important relationships cultivated by Japan, and they have both reached out to nearby countries, notable Vietnam and the Philippines, in an effort to increase regional cooperation in the face of China’s resurgence. These actions take on an even greater sense of urgency given the perceived erosion of American influence and power on the global stage.
Then there is the second major point- the cultural similarities between Taiwan and Japan.
Their mutual history and the common traits of East Asian cultures both lend to this, but there are several other features that play into this. For one, they both rely heavily on the globalized system, with large chunks of their economies based in international practices, ranging from trade and tourism to education (He, 2014). These links are made even stronger by the cross-cultural exchange between the two that is made easier due to the advent of social media technology.
Another factor is that they are both considered full-fledged democracies, with developed political institutions and a functioning media establishment. Taiwan is one of the Four Asian Tigers, namely the small but developed economies of Asia that have scene remarkable growth over the past twenty years, but is the only member which is both close enough to feature in the security concerns of Japan (compared to Singapore) and doesn’t hold any major grievances about the country’s imperialist past (i.e., South Korea). These connections, coupled with economic and security necessity, are key to understanding the relationship between Taiwan and Japan, as they look west with a wary eye. But even with those in mind, a coalition in East Asia’s effectiveness becomes extremely limited when one considers the regions future with a reduced American presence. THE DEVELOPMENT OF TAIWAN’S NATIONAL MOVEMENT 12
Taiwan and the United States: The Bulwark Against Communist China
Taiwan has been supported by the United States since the end of the Chinese Civil War.
At the time, the United States was just entering the Cold War, and mainland China was controlled by Mao Tse-tung and the Communists, who were perceived as close allies to the
Soviet Union. Thus, any course that could bring the U.S. leverage was explored and, if viable, pursued. In the 1940’s, the theory of containment was dominant in American foreign policy, and
Taiwan, while still a dictatorship in practice, was key to containing communism in Asia.
Coupled with this was the fact that, if the United States and its allies recognized the Taiwanese government as the legitimate government of China, they had an easier time of dealing with the
Soviets in the United Nations (Lee, 2010). This came to the center of the stage during the Korean conflict, where the threat of expanding the war to mainland China by, among other things, launching an invasion from Taiwan helped to bring the Chinese to the table and negotiate an armistice. It would also play a similar but smaller role during the Vietnam War,
In the 1970’s, this stance shifted. Richard Nixon pursued détente with China both in order to help end the Vietnam War and as a way to possibly drive a wedge between the Chinese and the Soviet bloc. At the same time, he was far from willing to withdraw American protection from
Taiwan, which may have allowed for a conflict between China and Taiwan, resulting in massive loss of life and the disruption of regional and global trade. So, as part of the détente policy towards China, Nixon agreed to switch American recognition from the Republic of China
(Taiwan) to the People’s Republic of China ruling on the mainland. This came with an unofficial acknowledgement of Taiwanese self-rule, thus kicking the question down the road for future leaders. THE DEVELOPMENT OF TAIWAN’S NATIONAL MOVEMENT 13
Later events proved how precarious the situation remained. In the mid-1990’s, as
President Teng-hui began transitioning Taiwan from a dictatorship into a democracy while also sowing the seeds of the independence movement for Taiwan. Mainland China responded to these events by firing missiles into the waters surrounding Taiwan. The United States sent two carrier groups into the area in an attempt to keep the tensions from escalating into conflict, and eventually the situation calmed down. However, ever since the Taiwan Strait Crisis the idea of missile attacks on Taiwan from the mainland has been a grave fear of both the Taiwanese leadership and the United States government.
The United States is no longer as interested in fighting communism, given the collapse of the Soviet Union and most of its satellites while China has slowly transitioned into a capitalistic economic system. Nevertheless, Taiwan’s role as a hedge against Chinese expansion into the
South China Sea hasn’t changed (Lee, 2010). In the present day, Taiwan figures more prominently in the future aspirations of China than ever before, and the question of its’ status is of even more importance to the United States consequently. The United States now also has an added political dimension to it, as any fight over Taiwan could be characterized as a defense of democracy and freedom. On the other hand, a declaration of Taiwanese independence would see adamant Chinese opposition and could lead to a major conflict that the United States, given its presence in the region and historic ties to Taiwan, could be drawn into.
Coupled with this is the fact that, given the rhetoric coming from the government of the
United States government, any softening towards China on the subject of Taiwan’s ability to self-govern could be viewed as evidence that the American presence in Asia is weak enough to challenge (Lee,2010). While the initial rhetoric of President Trump in late 2016 and early 2017 regarding China and Taiwan was considered notable (even shocking) for its belligerence, at the THE DEVELOPMENT OF TAIWAN’S NATIONAL MOVEMENT 14 time of writing the United States has gone out of its way to maintain the status quo of the Taiwan question, likely in an effort to make China more flexible on other issues, namely trade and the denuclearization of Korea. While this geostrategy has an undeniable logic behind it, a major failure on any one of those fronts could add to the sense of American fatigue being sensed by the states in the region, Taiwan included. Given China’s growing military power and the perceived withdrawal of American attention from the global “playing field”, Taiwan has two options; namely, to either pursue a policy of détente with China, or seek closer ties to its neighbors. So far, it has sought to do both.
“Go South” and the ASEAN Partnership
In the years since the fall of the Soviet Union, the globalized system has come to embrace most of the world, and military conflict has become less widely used as a result, particularly among the major powers of the world. In lieu of this, soft power, primarily centered in economic development and trade, has become one of the most effective tools in the execution of foreign policy. In this, China has led the way, and at the time of writing has remained the most successful state in the use of soft power. Its neighbors in Asia, while lacking in the ability to offer the same scale of benefits as China, have proven the swiftest in responding in kind in an effort to strengthen ties amongst themselves in order to deter potential Chinese aggression.
Taiwan, arguably more than any of its neighbors, has successfully incorporated this new approach into its foreign policy, yet that incorporation has yet to create a firm commitment to mutual security among its neighbors.
Since the opening of China, Taiwan has sought to establish itself as a viable economic partner both for the mainland and the growing states of Southeast Asia. These policies have been THE DEVELOPMENT OF TAIWAN’S NATIONAL MOVEMENT 15 official for some time, and are collectively referred to as the “Go South” policy, or GSP (Bing,
2017). While on the face of it these policies are simple economic initiatives, in the modern world they can and are seen as soft power plays, an effort to strengthen Taiwan’s economic and diplomatic ties with its neighbors. This accomplishes three tasks at once, serving to encourage growth for Taiwanese firms, improve relations with neighboring states, and making China more reluctant to disrupt the economic stability of Southeast Asia.
These efforts have been complicated by the disputes between several states over territory in the South China Sea. China’s infamous nine dashed line has set many of its neighbors on edge, with Vietnam and the Philippines in particular seeking to actively contest China’s exertions of power in the region. Taiwan claims several of the most hotly disputed island chains in the
South China Sea, including the Spratly chain, but unlike China is focused primarily on the islands themselves and the territorial waters and EEZ’s they each individually come with. China, by contrast, claims the entirety of the South China Sea as defined by the Nine Dash Line as its historic territorial waters and EEZ. Besides this, Taiwan isn’t nearly as capable of exercising its claims as China, and its wish to strengthen ties with the other contestants in the region have led its leaders to scale back Taiwan’s insistence on its rights to the disputed chains in question.
Nevertheless, the competing claims between the states of Southeast Asia have kept them from responding effectively to Chinese actions as a group.
The rise of the globalized system significantly impacted the GSP’s implementation.
While it made it easier for Taiwan to engage with its neighbors through trade and diplomacy, the same could be said for mainland China (Bing, 2017). Coupled with the increased investment of
Chinese capital in the development of the states of Southeast Asia, and the buildup of reefs and seabeds in the South China Sea, the ASEAN states have been caught in a bind: they seek to THE DEVELOPMENT OF TAIWAN’S NATIONAL MOVEMENT 16 benefit from trade with China, yet are concerned with the perceived rise of Chinese militarism.
They would like to speak and act against China’s actions, but risk alienating the Chinese business and capital that they are hoping will lead to local development. All of the states in the region have looked to the United States as both an economic and military hedge against China’s growing influence, but the perceived decline of American interest in the former leaves the
ASEAN states with few alternatives.
The Evolution of Taiwan’s Economy
Like many Asian states, Taiwan has transitioned from a largely agrarian economy to an export oriented, industrial economy, all in a relatively short amount of time. This was largely due to the strong hand used by the government of the Kuomintang in order to facilitate development on the island (Robert and Lewis, 2008). Before the end of the Chinese Civil War, what development that had been created in Taiwan was largely the result of Japanese colonial government in an effort to make the island more productive.
When the Kuomintang arrived, they set out to ensure that the island wouldn’t fall into
Communist hands. One of the ways they ensured this was by undertaking land reform that resemble that which Mao Tse-tung would use when he consolidated power in China. The regime of Chiang Kai-shek undertook several major initiatives to ensure increased literacy rates and higher productivity in the people of Taiwan. Most importantly of all, he began using agricultural subsidies wherein food surpluses were traded to friendly countries for industrial materials in an effort to build an industrial base on Taiwan. These policies would build a solid foundation for the economic growth further down the line, but most domestic growth was stunted by the White THE DEVELOPMENT OF TAIWAN’S NATIONAL MOVEMENT 17
Terror, which severely limited outside investment into Taiwan. Once the regime ended that policy, the island’s economy began growing exponentially, earning its place among the “Asian
Tiger” economies of the region. This position was made stronger during the 1990’s when the financial collapse hit while the government of Taiwan still restricted investments into the island.
The subsequent loosening of Taiwan’s investment policies set the stage for the country’s current economic system, which remains one of the strongest of its kind in the world, with a heavy emphasis on trade and manufacturing.
Trade and its Role in Taiwan
Taiwan’s economy is, like most of its fellows in East Asia, highly dependent on manufacturing and the export of electronics and other manufactured goods to foreign markets.
While this paved the way for its emergence as a developed economy, it has also left Taiwan’s economy highly dependent on the global market, and faced hard economic circumstances during the global recession in 2008 (Hughes, 2014). This has proven even more critical when looking at
Taiwan’s foreign policy, as its integration with neighboring economies are key to its strategic outlook. An important thing to keep in mind when considering the importance of trade to the economy of Taiwan is its lack of recognition as a country. Without such, it has proven tricky for the Taiwanese to participate in international forums such as the World Trade Organization
(WTO) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), especially with China actively seeking to hinder Taiwan in such forums in an effort to make things harder for the Taiwanese leadership.
There has actually proven to be a divide on this subject between the Kuomintang and the
DPP on the issue of foreign trade. The former has recently emphasized greater trade and economic integration between Taiwan and China; the latter opposes it while strongly advocating THE DEVELOPMENT OF TAIWAN’S NATIONAL MOVEMENT 18 for strengthening ties with its neighbors in Southeast Asia (Qi, 2013). Their respective positions exemplify their different approaches to the question of China, with the Kuomintang favoring eventual reconciliation while the DPP is slowly moving in favor of a distinct Taiwan apart from
China.
These policies have NOT come without a cost to the people of Taiwan. Like most of the other participants in the globalized system, there has been a rise in inequality between the various classes of Taiwan, with a loss of manufacturing jobs to foreign competitors, mainly
China (Qi, 2013). Aggravating this problem is that, like other East Asian societies, Taiwan’s population is rapidly aging due to their extremely low birthrate. Because of these trends, there have been less jobs to go around for a working population that is having to invest more in the care of its elders, whether through personal spending or government revenue. These trends have come coupled with growing fears over the actions of China in the areas around Taiwan. Tensions over these trends proved decisive in recent elections, as the more protectionist policies of the
DPP led to its winning both a majority of legislative seats and the presidency (Hughes, 2014).
Economic Nationalism in Taiwan
Like many other states around the world, Taiwan’s leadership regards safeguarding and improving the national economy as one of their most important roles. This has led them to follow a pattern that is well known to East Asia, namely the development of a state directed economy in an effort to facilitate development on a scale that is both fast and large (Chen, 2014). However, over the last several years the question of which direction to go has persisted for several administrations in Taiwan, and public dissatisfaction with the results has resulted in surprising electoral outcomes. THE DEVELOPMENT OF TAIWAN’S NATIONAL MOVEMENT 19
Like its neighbors in China, Japan, and South Korea, Taiwan’s economy amazed onlookers as it rapidly and successfully built an industrial base complete with developed infrastructure, housing, and basic services, all within a few decades. This was due in large part to the use of the government in an effort to direct economic growth into areas that leadership on the island gave priority to (Chen, 2014). Thus, when political pluralism entered the picture with the end of the dictatorship of the 1990’s, economic was no longer an effective issue to campaign on, given the general sense of optimism and contentment with regards to the national outlook. Given this, political campaigns tended to focus on cross-strait relations and social justice, namely the identity-driven politics between Taiwanese and mainlanders (Chen, 2014). And yet, this trend experienced a shift in the last decade.
Globalization, long the key to the successful development of economies in Asia and around the world, began to display its negative impacts, namely the loss of manufacturing jobs from developed states to low-wage economies and rising amounts of income inequality. As this occurred, there was a shift in the rhetoric and issues being discussed by both the Democratic
Progressive Party and the Kuomintang (Qi, 2013). The former, best-known for emphasizing
Taiwan’s distinctiveness from China and a more independent approach to foreign policy, began to speak more towards the economic anxieties of the classes of Taiwan that were feeling the negative impacts of globalization most acutely. While not advocating for withdrawal from the globalized economy, the DPP did stress the need for the government to better care or the people who lost in the globalized system and to train new members of the economy to better compete in that system (Qi, 2013). More importantly, it criticized the outsourcing of Taiwanese jobs, capital, and investment to other economies, with a special emphasis being placed in China. THE DEVELOPMENT OF TAIWAN’S NATIONAL MOVEMENT 20
The Kuomintang, on the other hand, has focused on the more traditional issues of cross- strait relations and the state of the economy as it exists. While this strategy had succeeded in the past, it failed to account for the growing hostility to economic that were seen as benefitting
China at the expense of Taiwan, and how the Kuomintang was perceived as the party that advocated the most strongly for those policies (Qi, 2013). This was one of the central reasons for the Kuomintang’s defeat in the 2016 elections. This new form of economic nationalism has managed to shift the political debate in Taiwan, and has touched on a number of related issues, from overseas investments to the diversification of the global energy markets.
Energy in Taiwan: Now and Future
The question of energy resources is one that troubles most of the nations of the world, and Taiwan is no exception to that trend. Indeed, as an island whose population is concentrated in urban clusters on the coast, as well as an economy that relies heavily on trade, the issue of rising sea levels is one of the most important that Taiwan faces. However, there is a factor that complicates any effort by Taiwan to shift to alternative energy sources: their economies reliance on the manufacturing and exporting of goods, both of which require massive amounts of energy
(Chiu, 2013).
As a region, East Asia has always lacked energy resources compared to other areas of the world, and as such have been dependent on foreign imports for the last several decades. In recent years, however, there has been a growing movement towards energy independence among the nations in the region. China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan have all enacted policies to decrease their dependency on foreign energy while decreasing their carbon emissions. All are either signatories to the Paris Climate Accord or, in Taiwan’s case, have pledged to meet the THE DEVELOPMENT OF TAIWAN’S NATIONAL MOVEMENT 21 deal’s goals independently (Hu, Lin, Fen, Lien, and Chung, 2016). While China has the space to construct large installations of solar and wind-power generators, the other three named all face geographic limits on their ability to invest in alternative energy, with Taiwan facing the greatest challenges of all. The majority of the land on the island has either been developed already, is privately owned, or has been reserved for conservation. This leaves Taiwan with the challenge of building energy infrastructure in developed areas, which brings challenges building in undeveloped areas doesn’t have.
At the same time, neither China or Taiwan have abandoned their efforts to secure energy resources in the areas around them, especially those off of their coasts (Chiu, 2013). In both the
Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute and the myriad claims in the South China Sea, the potential for discovering resources like oil and natural gas is a major factor in the interest of the various regional players in staking a claim in those waters. While these disputes are far from simply being about energy resources, their presence adds to the tense atmosphere in the region. Taiwan in particular is vulnerable to this trend, given its unique status in the international arena (Chiu,
2013).
Every trend in the energy market has an impact on the Taiwan, and the people feel it. The islands economy relies heavily on shipping and manufacturing, and both rely on the availability of fuel and reasonable prices to match. A major increase in the price of fossil fuels results in higher operating costs for both of these sectors, and also negatively impacts the average person’s finances by causing more out-of-pocket expenses for transport and other energy-based expenditures.
For all of that, Taiwan’s energy prospects remain optimistic. The goals the island’s government has set are ambitious, but there is an ever-growing market for alternative energies THE DEVELOPMENT OF TAIWAN’S NATIONAL MOVEMENT 22 that they can tap into (Hu, Lin, Fen, Lien, and Chung, 2016). Coupled with initiatives to encourage less personal energy consumption and more private-public partnerships, and given an ever-growing coalition of young people and environmentalists calling for their completion,
Taiwan stands a decent chance of meetings its commitments on schedule.
The Role of Business in Taiwan’s Foreign Policy
Soft power comes in many shapes and forms, and economic policies including aid and development packages are among the most widely used in the present day. But another tool in the use of flexible foreign policy tolls is the directing of private industry. While fickler and less easily managed then direct government spending, the use of private development has been the most effective tool for the building of a national economic base for centuries (Liaw, 2016). In
Asia, this has been done through a prism of state-managed/controlled initiatives in order to foster growth, with a reliance on foreign capital to build its local bases before relying more and more on their own.
It can’t be denied that the growth of private industry in Taiwan is a testament to both successful policies on the part of the government and the ingenuity and ambition of individuals in the private sector. And at the time of writing, Taiwan’s position as one of the prime destinations for foreign capital continues to hold firm due to solidly private sector-friendly policies. Yet in the present day these same policies have resulted in organization and consolidation of major industries and business on an unprecedented scale since the end of the
White Terror (Brookfield, 2010). Compared to many other states that are a part of the developed world, Taiwan’s corporate protections and anti-corruption measures are notable weak, leading to fears of corruption that, in a young democracy, could bring all kinds of problems to Taiwan. THE DEVELOPMENT OF TAIWAN’S NATIONAL MOVEMENT 23
The debate over whether or not to rely on forces beyond government control in order to bring about growth has faced various regions and governing regimes for large stretches of human history, and in the present day, that argument continues. In Taiwan, the argument often boils down to the simple matter of trust. The question is- can the people who hold the most influence in Taiwan’s private sector and financial institutions, many of whom have ties, economic and personal, to mainland China, be trusted to help foster pro-Taiwan policies while working with actors on the international stage who may have reasons to seek the failure or redirection of those policies?
The recent shifts in Taiwan’s political landscape can provide a glimpse into what the
Taiwanese public thinks. The members of that perceived financial elite were handed a deafeat when the Kuomintang, the party that has historically favored pro-industry policies, lost control of the presidency and Legislative Yuan in 2016 (Liaw, 2016). While the victorious Democratic
Progressive Party is not inherently anti-corporate, its reputation for emphasis on private capital flowing at the state’s direction when necessary could prove a hindrance when seeking to use private capital as a tool in foreign policy. And the question of Taiwan’s methods when pursuing development and growth will remain as Taiwan’s public undergoes major shifts in its composition.
A Closer Look at Taiwan’s Ethnic Divisions
Taiwan’s national outlook has been strongly influenced by the Kuomintang over the last seventy years, largely due to the monopoly of power and force that the party held until the democratization of the island in the 1990’s. Yet at the time, the Kuomintang remained primarily
Chinese in both makeup and in outlook, which was distinct from the views of the vast majority THE DEVELOPMENT OF TAIWAN’S NATIONAL MOVEMENT 24 of Taiwan’s population. This was a circumstance that the Kuomintang still feels the impact of today, and is one of the reasons it has faltered in recent elections.
While most of Taiwan’s population is descended from Han Chinese, this bloc is divided into two major groups. The smaller of these are considered Chinese, and constitute roughly fifteen percent of the islands population. This group is distinct from the other Chinese as they are
Han who either came with the Kuomintang after their loss of the Civil War or are descended from them (He, 2014). The larger of the two groups are considered Taiwanese, and are made up of those who trace their descent to the first Han migrants who arrived in the seventeenth century.
This group is far larger than the other, comprising roughly four out of five people living on the island (He, 2014). The remaining population is made up primarily of Taiwanese aboriginals, who consist of various tribes of Austronesian background.
The distinction between the two different Han groups has played a notable role in the politics of the island over the last twenty years, and is a central part of the national identity of
Taiwan. During the dictatorship under the Kuomintang, the island was ruled by a small group of individuals, most of whom were born on the mainland (Liu, 2013). Since the democratization of the island, however, political power has shifted into the hands of an ever-growing number of
Taiwanese individuals. At the same time, there has been a corresponding rise in rhetoric from
Taiwan’s leadership emphasizing its distinctiveness from China. Meanwhile, the political institutions were also reformed to ensure the representation of Taiwan’s ethnic minorities, reserving legislative representation for the aboriginals of the island.
While often overlooked when discussing the relationship between China and Taiwan, the aboriginals have had an influence on the public discourse around the issue. When it is said that the two share much in terms of culture and history, the native tribes are often used by pro- THE DEVELOPMENT OF TAIWAN’S NATIONAL MOVEMENT 25 independence factions as foils in order to emphasize the differences between the two (Liu, 2013).
Coupled with this is the fact that large numbers of Taiwanese citizens who identify Han as their primary ethnic background also identified a close relative as an aboriginal, the most prominent example being the current president of Taiwan (Liu, 2013).
The Demographic Shift of Taiwan and its Implications
As mentioned above, Taiwan faces a demographic shift that holds major implications for its society and policies for the foreseeable future. Compared to its neighbors, the island’s rapidly aging population presents an even more pressing problem, given the size of Taiwan’s population
(Lin, Lahiri, and Hsu, 2015). In all states faced with this trend, there are several common issues, most notably the effects on government spending. As the working population becomes smaller, the government and private citizens will have to pay more in order to maintain the health and comfort of their elderly, which will produce a strain on the finances of individuals and the state.
While increasing productivity can help this problem, it isn’t occurring quickly enough to compensate for the losses in the workforce (Lin, Lahiri, and Hsu, 2015).
The Taiwanese have several potential solutions that can address this trend. One is to redirect funding from other government functions to increase welfare spending (Lin, Lahiri, and
Hsu 2015). While this is one of the simpler options, it is one of the most difficult to actually fulfill, given that there are various interests that have a stake in any fight over spending, especially if defense spending is being looked at. Raising revenue through taxes faces the same problems, with the added problem of adversely affecting levels of spending and investment by individuals and businesses. The easiest solution to enact is for Taiwan’s government to encourage individuals to save more money in order to help pay their own expenses once they retire, and they have already taken steps to do so (Lin, Lahiri, and Hsu, 2015). Another way to THE DEVELOPMENT OF TAIWAN’S NATIONAL MOVEMENT 26 address this problem has been to rely on a larger amount of foreign labor, taken mainly from undeveloped countries that are relatively close to Taiwan. However, these solutions, while easiest to enact, is also the least likely to produce swift, tangible results.
The demographic changes in Taiwan spell a change in the population’s idea of itself in the context of China, as well as that of the region and the world. Taiwan’s Millennial generation does not have the same experience as their parents and grandparents, who remember the White
Terror and the years before the Nationalist retreat to the island. This has had two contrasting effects on members of this group; on the one hand, they have only known a less restrictive and totalitarian China, and are more willing and likely to make connections with people on the mainland. This leads to more positive thinking towards the mainland and its people. The flip side of this is that a growing number of young Taiwanese see themselves as just that, Taiwanese, while viewing China as a neighbor with whom they share historic, cultural, and economic links, but separate from Taiwan itself.
The question of Taiwan’s demographic shift will remain one of, if not the most, pressing issue facing the island’s public. As time goes on, the government’s ability to address this trend, or lack thereof, will have a major impact on Taiwan’s future. Whether or not the people of
Taiwan eventually decide that too much has changed for them to rejoin the mainland as a single country, that decision will reflect on how the identity of Taiwan has changed in the minds of its people, and hint at how it might shift going forward. Moving forward, it remains to be seen if the institutions that make up the island’s government are flexible enough to address the demographic shift while avoiding major unrest or radical shifts in public policy.
The Constitution and Institutions of Taiwan THE DEVELOPMENT OF TAIWAN’S NATIONAL MOVEMENT 27
Taiwan has claimed the mantle of a democratic government since the end of the Second
World War, when China first adopted its constitution. While technically in effect since then, the constitution was never truly applied to the whole of the country as the Chinese Civil War resumed and the Kuomintang was driven to flee the mainland (Roberts and Lewis, 2008).
Despite the provisions that called for a democratic government, Chiang Kai-shek used the fall of
China as an excuse to declare a state of emergency and keep all power centered in the hands of the Nationalist leadership, namely himself and a few others. It was only with the end of the dictatorship in the 1990’s that the constitution came back into effect, and only in 2004 that the constitution was amended to reflect the radical changes that had occurred since it was first adopted in the 1940’s (Roberts and Lewis, 2008).
While national identity is not in itself defined as the institutions of the state, said institutions play a role in helping young nations create their common identity. In Taiwan, the way the government is structured is unique, based as it is off the principles of Sun Yat-sen. The first President of China, Sun Yat-sen established three major ideals for the government of China to follow, expressed as minzu, minquan, and minsheng, which translate as nationalism, government by the people, and the people’s welfare, respectively. Sun Yat-sen, in naming these, saw it as the role of government to use nationalism to bind together the various groups within
China, be ultimately answerable to the people through actions like referendums, and to ensure to general welfare of the public by providing food, clothing, healthcare, and housing.
The Republic of China (ROC), as Taiwan still calls itself, has technically existed continuously since the fall of the Qing Dynasty (Roberts and Lewis, 2008). It is defined by a system that in some ways represents a presidential model, but some key characteristics make it stand out. The
Taiwanese have divided their state into five branches, which are as follows: THE DEVELOPMENT OF TAIWAN’S NATIONAL MOVEMENT 28
The Legislative Yuan: The Taiwanese legislature, a unicameral body whose membership is currently made up by a total of 113 people. While the ROC was founded in 1912, the
Legislative Yuan wasn’t created until the late 1920’s when Sun Yat-sen managed to bring northern China under the rule of his government. Its membership has been reduced drastically since the retreat of the Nationalists to Taiwan, today having less than a sixth of the size of the
Yuan after the end of the Second World War (Roberts and Lewis, 2008). The Legislative Yuan is designed to and in practice does take the lead in domestic policy, with the ability to write and pass laws that the president of Taiwan cannot veto. While the majority of seats are determined by votes based in districts, a significant number of them are awarded proportionally to the parties that receive significant number of votes in the elections. To ensure the representation of the
Taiwanese aborigines, the Legislative Yuan reserves eight seats for their membership (Roberts and Lewis, 2008).
Executive Yuan: This branch of government consists of ministers, committee leaders, and cabinet officials. While in theory dominated by a premier, by the time of Taiwan’s democratization the concentration of power in the hands of the president was established, and even the end of the dictatorship did not eliminate that completely (Roberts and Lewis, 2008).
Today, there is a type of power sharing within the executive, as every elected president must consult with the premier on the selection of department heads and cabinet officials.
The presidency itself is similarly structured compared to similar systems in the world.
Elected directly by popular vote, the president of Taiwan has is the commander-in-chief of the islands’ armed forces, as well as being responsible for conducting foreign relations (Roberts and
Lewis, 2008). This last duty has proven tricky, as most of the world refuses to officially recognize the government of Taiwan in the face of pressure from the PRC. Despite the near THE DEVELOPMENT OF TAIWAN’S NATIONAL MOVEMENT 29 absolute power to conduct foreign policy, the presidency’s’ lack of a veto has resulted in the very limited role the president has in domestic affairs, though this is mitigated by the bully pulpit that holding the office grants to whoever holds it.
Judicial Yuan: This branch of Taiwan’s government comprises the court system of the state, from the Supreme Court down. Similar to the United States, the major courts have three levels, and most cases, criminal or civil, can eventually make their way to the Supreme Court
(Roberts and Lewis, 2008). However, despite its name the Supreme Court of Taiwan does not address issues with regards to the constitution. A separate body, known as the Constitutional
Court, handles any affairs regarding politics, the presidency (including impeachment) and interpreting Taiwan’s constitution (Roberts and Lewis, 2008). The judges on all of these courts are appointed for life, or until they have resigned. They can be removed from office, but only if found guilty of a crime.
Examination Yuan: While the three branches listed before this are based off of Western political structures, this branch draws inspiration from old Chinese systems used during major dynasties such as the Han and Qing (Roberts and Lewis, 2008). This body focuses exclusively on the examinations taken by those who seek to become civil servants in Taiwan’s government.
Control Yuan: Similar to the Examination Yuan, this branch is strongly influenced by traditional practices of Chinese government used during ancient dynasties. The Control Yuan is designed to act as a watchdog for all of the other branches of Taiwan’s government. The scope of this branches power ranges from impeachment and audits to the enforcement of transparency and human rights laws. The leadership is nominated by the president of Taiwan, and then must be confirmed by the Legislative Yuan. This led to a confrontation in the mid-2000’s, when the legislature refused to confirm President Chen’s nominees (Roberts and Lewis, 2008). THE DEVELOPMENT OF TAIWAN’S NATIONAL MOVEMENT 30
These different branches reflect the synthesis that Taiwan has experienced after its separation from China. While retaining in essence many old Chinese ideals and practices in the practice of government, the influence of Western ideas and philosophy of government is much more apparent when compared to the PRC. This divide, visible in the institutions of Taiwan’s governing bodies, is harder to see but still present in the island’s population, and has had a major impact on the identity of Taiwan’s public.
The Major Parties of Taiwan
There are two parties that dominate the political landscape of Taiwan, namely the
Kuomintang (Nationalist) Party and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). generally viewed as center-right and center-left, respectively, smaller parties’ peel off votes from the far ends of the political spectrum. The Kuomintang has benefitted from decades of single-party rule during the late twentieth century, while the DPP has only recently gained prominence in national discourse (Subba, 2016). This has turned out to aid the DPP, as their opposition to the perceived old-guard within the Kuomintang has made them popular with the youth and minority groups within Taiwan. Conversely, the business community, military, and public employees tend to favor the Kuomintang, given their views on improving cross-strait relations with China and their emphasis on stability/security (Qi, 2013).
While viewed as a choice for stable leadership since the beginning of the twenty-first century, the Kuomintang has recently suffered electoral defeat at the hands of the DPP. A major factor in this was the growing awareness of the social issues brought on by globalization and economic integration with China, namely growing inequality and a loss of jobs in manufacturing, the largest sector of employment in Taiwan (Subba, 2016). The DPP emphasized the party determination to address these issues, and also attacked the foreign policy of the Kuomintang as THE DEVELOPMENT OF TAIWAN’S NATIONAL MOVEMENT 31 being too friendly with the mainland. While improved relations with China have proven politically popular in the past, China’s growing militarism turned into a liability in Taiwan’s elections in 2016. Coupled with an advanced and highly effective social media campaign that relied on the youth of Taiwan, the Kuomintang was successfully painted as out-of-touch, resulting in their defeat (Subba, 2016). This last development is important to note when looking at local politics in Taiwan. The number of people who have come of age in the era of globalization has been growing for years, and will continue to do so for the forseeable future.
This group is not averse to trying to improve relations with China, but are far from willing to sacrifice any autonomy in order to do so. The Kuomintang has undeniably played the key role in setting the stage for Taiwan to become what it has, but its focus on China has cost it at the polls, given China’s perceived belligerence towards its neighbors and the increasingly suppressive actions being taken by China’s government towards its citizens in Hong Kong and elsewhere.
Despite the victory of the DPP in the last elections, the Kuomintang remains a powerful force in Taiwan, and they will continue to affect the debate in Taiwan on all of the issues facing the public. That said, what will determine Taiwan’s future political dynamic is how successful, if at all, the DPP is at addressing the issues created by the globalized system the island has been locked into. Besides the question of the future relationship between China and Taiwan, these domestic problems will play the most important role in the evolution of Taiwan’s national outlook.
A Look at Independence: In Theory and Practice
A central part of addressing Taiwan’s national identity is answering a seemingly simple question- should Taiwan seek official separation from China or eventually rejoin the PRC? This has yet to be answered effectively since the end of the Chinese Civil War, and when it is, that THE DEVELOPMENT OF TAIWAN’S NATIONAL MOVEMENT 32 answer will have major implications for both the Asia-Pacific region and the world at large
(Sullivan and Lowe, 2010). As it stands now, Taiwan is recognized as a province of the PRC, which is the recognized government of all China, while unofficially conducting domestic and foreign policy independently from the mainland. Any attack on Taiwan from China without a declaration of independence from the former would certainly bring American involvement in one of several forms, ranging from calls for international actions to coming to the aid of Taiwan directly (Sullivan and Lowe, 2010). This knowledge, coupled with the impact such a conflict could have on regional stability and trade, make such an event unlikely, though not impossible.
That leaves the scenarios of either reconciliation or independence, with small variations possible for each one.
On one hand, consider a scenario where Taiwan officially declares itself an independent nation from the PRC, renounces the official name of Republic of China, and seeks recognition from the major powers of the world as such. This would It is all but guaranteed that such an event would lead to an attack from China seeking to bring Taiwan under its direct control by force. In this event, the rest of the world would have to choose to take a side, and considering the state of current affairs, would most likely refuse to recognize Taiwan for fear of the repurcussions of spurning the PRC (Sullivan and Lowe, 2010). All iterations of this scenario are certain of Taiwan falling under the PRC’s direct control.
Then there is the alternative- reconciliation with the mainland and the Chinese
Communist Party. While widely considered the eventual fate of cross-strait relations, none are certain on the details of what such an agreement would look like with most assuming a model similar to that which brought Hong Kong into the PRC (Sullivan and Lowe, 2010). The problem this idea meets is that, given the example of Hong Kong, Taiwan’s public is reluctant to attempt THE DEVELOPMENT OF TAIWAN’S NATIONAL MOVEMENT 33 a similar arrangement given the erosion of civil liberties in the city that have occurred over the last several years. While in a much more powerful position than Hong Kong, the sale remains hard to make.
This leaves the question in the same place as it stands now- de facto independence while operating with full autonomy. Until the two sides can reach an agreement that both sides can find practically workable and convince their publics to take, there is no situation where the Taiwan question can be resolved without military conflict. Nevertheless, fear of this informs Taiwan’s public outlook of watchful engagement, which has been characteristic of the island’s national identity since the opening of China and the end of the White Terror.
The Youth of Taiwan and Its Impact on National Discourse
When it comes to the establishment of a national identity in a people’s mindset, there is no group more essential to convince then the young. This has been the widely accepted view of education for decades, if not longer, and the Education Yuan has gone through a great deal of effort to ensure that their students are prepared for the global economy and aware of Taiwan’s place in it, as well as the problems facing the country. Like many of its neighbors, Taiwanese society places a massive amount of emphasis on the success of their young people when it comes to academics, particularly in areas of high value such as science, math, and engineering. By the keys measures of a state’s education system, namely graduation rates and larger numbers of people with higher levels of education, Taiwan is consistently placed among the most successful in the world.
And yet, for all of that, the youth of the island do not face the same world as their parents and grandparents have. Like many of their counterparts around the world, this generation has been widely mocked for lack of drive, respect, and all-around measures of success. Known as the THE DEVELOPMENT OF TAIWAN’S NATIONAL MOVEMENT 34
“Strawberry Generation”, these people, far from the lazy free-loaders that some like to portray them as, face an economy where wages are stagnant and youth unemployment in major cities is notably high (Weiss, 2014). Taiwan’s youth faces an uncertain future, and have been among the most vocal advocates for change from the status quo. This was made apparent in the last decade, as the Democratic Progressive Party consistently appealed to various groups on the basis of economic uncertainty, particularly the youth, and successfully capitalized on those fears (Weiss,
2014). They also succeeded in addressing another of the Strawberry Generation’s concerns-
China and the independence question.
Unlike their parents and grandparents, who either grew up under the White Terror of
Chiang Kai-shek or even in China during the Second World War and the Civil War, the youth of
Taiwan have only known a world where they and the mainland were distinct from each other in most ways (Weiss, 2012). For most of them, a more benevolent China, less concerned with military preeminence and more with economic development, has been the norm, and the globalized system has been well established for much of that time as well. They are also far more used to and comfortable with democratic norms and the ideas that they are built on, namely the rights of self-determination, freedom of expression, and equality. Given these factors, their hostility towards the PRC is greater than their predecessors, with the youth of Taiwan viewing themselves as Taiwanese in larger numbers than previous generations.
This hostility has also been directed at the institutions of Taiwan itself. In 2014, an alliance of student organizations and civic groups occupied the Legislative Yuan in an event known as the Sunflower Movement. Among general complaints about lack of representation and consideration, the protests were specifically aimed at the policies of economic integration with mainland China, which were widely perceived by young people as unfair bargains that harmed THE DEVELOPMENT OF TAIWAN’S NATIONAL MOVEMENT 35
Taiwan in the long run (Weiss, 2012). The occupation didn’t last long, nor was it especially violent, but it sent shockwaves through a land that had, until the 1980’s, been kept under brutal martial law. And since that incident, Taiwan’s youth has only grown in boldness as members seek to challenge what they see as the status quo.
That is not to say that young people on the island are ignorant of the challenges inherent to their situation. Much has been made of the fact that 82% of young Taiwanese favor independence from China, but that statistic had a qualification: if China was guaranteed not to attack Taiwan in the event of such a declaration (Weiss, 2012). Taiwan’s youth is well aware of its reliance on foreign protection (i.e., the United States) in the maintenance of its de facto independence, and the likely impact seeking to officially separate from China would have on that stance. With that in mind, the general attitude of the Strawberry Generation is to work within the present norms, namely seeking economic policies that do not favor the mainland at the expense of themselves without seeking to needlessly antagonize the PRC. With that said, the increasingly influential bloc of young voters has little to no interest in pursuing a settlement with the mainland, as the latter’s perceived crackdown on freedom of expression and press harden many of the young attitudes towards China (Weiss, 2012). Regardless of their ethnic background, the
Strawberry Generation views itself overwhelmingly as Taiwanese, and that sense of common identity is the foundation of nationhood, particularly in an era where technology has managed to reshape human interactions and the globalized system has transformed the way business is done across borders.
The “Silicon Valley” of Asia
The status of Silicon Valley as the global capital of innovation and technology has been undeniable for some time, yet that hasn’t stopped many states from seeking to emulate THE DEVELOPMENT OF TAIWAN’S NATIONAL MOVEMENT 36
California’s success in new, cutting-edge fields. Taiwan, along with its neighbors in Japan,
Korea, and China, have all sought to establish zones that can compete with Silicon Valley, and have even cooperated with one another in an attempt to achieve that goal more quickly (Fung,
Aminian, and Tung, 2015). As a group, the states of East Asia have cultivated a well-deserved reputation for investing in and adapting to the latest and best technologies to be found in the world, regardless of whether the place of origin was Cupertino, CA or Tehran. At the same time, companies in East Asia have also blazed ahead on innovative ideas from the miniaturization of objects and living space to the use of digital media and electronic payments to build a simple yet effective bike-use business.
With that in mind, Taiwan has successfully carved itself a niche in the business of innovation that has been established in Asia, namely in the development of IT (information technology. While states such as China and Vietnam still manufacture greater numbers of electronics than Taiwan, the island compensates for this by working with companies such as
Apple on the physical design and electronic structuring of products themselves. In this, Taiwan has a leg up on many would-be “Eastern Silicon Valley’s” in that its emphasis on originality and innovation puts it ahead of a large number of its competitors (Fung, Aminian, and Tung, 2015).
This innovation “arms race” hasn’t simply been left to private industry. Local governments have gone out of their way to pursue policies encouraging the growth of technology centers. Taiwan has taken this strategy and applied it effectively, seeking to encourage R&D centers specifically (Fung, Aminian, and Tung, 2015). The appearance of Taiwan helping to lead the way in such crucial aspects of life has helped to foster a sense of competition among its citizens, both towards one another and, more importantly, with the other states of East Asia. The ability of a competitive spirit to forge strong bonds cannot be underestimated, and in this day and THE DEVELOPMENT OF TAIWAN’S NATIONAL MOVEMENT 37 age is more prevalent than ever, particularly given the advent of social media and digital platforms that have changed the world so much since their arrival.
The Rise of Social Media and Its Implications
The age of digital technology, and the revolution that it has brought to virtually all aspects of life, has made itself felt in every part of the world, and Taiwan, positioned as it is in the developed region of East Asia, is no exception. Indeed, the island’s public has proven to be one of the quickest and most effective at adapting to the new trends of social media platforms, with major implications for numerous parts of an individual’s daily routines (Li & Zhang, 2016).
For all of that, it’s the impact that social media has had on group activities that has shown the most significant impacts. Beyond personal use, some of the biggest influences of digital technology have been felt in the political world, for better or for worse.
Taiwan’s population, famous for innovation and industry, is well aware of the need for emphasizing foreign events when considering its actions on a domestic scale, and social media technologies have proven to be one of the most effective tools for judging when and how to shift their policies, and for determining when a course of action is or is not the right approach to take
(Li and Zhang, 2016). The unrest in Hong Kong is a perfect example of this. The “one government, two systems” model agreed upon when the city was returned to China was and still is viewed as a model for Taiwan’s return to mainland authority, and the commitment of authorities on both sides to upholding that agreement was still in question.
The result was a harsh response to the unrest by the ruling government in Beijing, one that almost immediately led to a cooling to the popularity of the Hong Kong-style agreement in
Taiwan. Yet, people observing the events during the crackdown noted how the Chinese authorities behaved in a much more restrained manner compared to the more infamous chaos THE DEVELOPMENT OF TAIWAN’S NATIONAL MOVEMENT 38 during Tiananmen Square (Li and Zhang, 2016). It was widely considered that, given the ease of access to information brought about by social media, the CCP recognized that consequences of using the same force as had been used then would have been felt throughout their foreign affairs
(Li and Zhang, 2016). That concern, coupled with a wish not to devastate an economic boon to the rest of the country, was the primary motivation behind Beijing’s relatively light handling of the protests. And even despite the restraint on Beijing’s part, social media brought the realization of Taiwan’s fears home in a way that had been all but impossible before, and significantly impacted Taiwan’s positions moving forward.
Besides major single events like Hong Kong, social media has also made it easier for
Taiwanese citizens to connect with individuals and groups on a scale hitherto unseen. Young environmentalist donated to international funds and movements, while indigenous groups established ties with organizations dedicated to maintaining traditional cultures and practices
(Chen, Ping, & Chen, 2015). These ties, besides serving the purpose of exercising freedom of speech and allowing for new forms of assembly, also served the purpose of establishing links between Taiwan and various peoples and organizations throughout the world, further binding them into the community of nations created by the globalized economic system, and establishing the identity of Taiwan’s people, with both their counterparts around the world and amongst themselves. The former in particular has proven apt, as Taiwan’s public has increased its support for separatist efforts in other regions of the world. While not separatists in the strictest sense of the word, Taiwan’s position is such that its government and public tend to look favorably on other movements seeking to break off pieces of territory from old countries (Chen, Ping, &
Chen, 2015). The most recent examples of these have been those of the Catalonians in Spain and the Kurds in the Middle East. While disappointment with those outcomes registered with the THE DEVELOPMENT OF TAIWAN’S NATIONAL MOVEMENT 39
Taiwanese public, the massive differences between those two groups and Taiwan’s situation helped to mute much of the public sentiment that was generated in favor of mirroring their example.
Taiwan in the International Arena
Taiwan status as a de jure appendage to the Chinese state has made it difficult for the former to operate in international forums and organizations due to its lack of status. In this, it joins a number of states with enough clout to make their presence known who yet lack the same status as recognized countries, such as California. While not essential to Taiwan’s success, these circumstances have limited Taiwan’s options on a number of fronts, ranging from diplomacy and trade to travel.
The former is one of the most easily recognized consequences of its lack of statehood.
While internationally acknowledged as an autonomous region that conducts itself very much like a country, no major country (or most minor ones) can deal with Taiwan as a country for fear of repercussions from mainland China. In the case of the United Nations, Taiwan is refused a seat because to this day it still technically claims the title of the Republic of China, and each country can only have one seat, with the PRC holding that seat in the present day. This is further complicated by the fact that the PRC and most of the world simply recognize Taiwan as a province of China, nothing more. On the flip side, there are a number of international organizations that do not require a state to be independent in order to be a member, like the IMF, and for others, such as the IMO, it is very easy for non-members to sign voluntary compliance treaties in order to secure their commitments to international law.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF TAIWAN’S NATIONAL MOVEMENT 40
Conclusion
The world as we know it is changing, for better or for worse, and states and regions across the globe look to the future with an anxious eye, with Taiwan among the most anxious of all. The repercussions of the global economy, the revanchist actions of mainland China, and the major shifts in the environment and society at large are the drives of this, and Taiwan’s future will hinge on several key factors. The adjustment of the country’s economy in the face of globalization’s backlash, as well as the maintenance of strong relations with its neighbors and solid ties with its allies, will play large roles in shaping the course of the island’s future.
As time goes forward, and the dynamics of the world change in ways both good and ill, another, even more important key for every state seeking to weather those shifts will be how they hold their public together. Taiwan is no exception to this, and will need to rely on the growing sense of solidarity among its citizens if it is to maintain its status as a state that operates as an independent nation in all but name. Through the common histories of its citizens, as well as the cultural ties throughout their diverse population and the use of new technology and trade to bind itself even closer to the community of nations in Asia and the world at large, an identity is taking root in Taiwan’s citizens. This identity is already having a dramatic impact on Taiwan’s government and society, and will continue to change the dynamic of the forces within the island’s public.
This change will have implications not just for the public of Taiwan but for all of the countries that have a stake in the stability of East Asia. While few seek to actively disrupt the status quo in any meaningful way, there is no way to know if anyone will succeed in doing so, and if so, if change can be controlled. In the end, responsibility for managing these changes, whenever and however they come, will rest with the newly-defined Taiwanese people. THE DEVELOPMENT OF TAIWAN’S NATIONAL MOVEMENT 41
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