sign in sign up
<<
Home , Nuclear explosion, Nuclear weapon

Design We’ve Done a Lot but We Can’t Say Much

by Carson , Raymond E. Hunter, and Jacob J. Wechsler

he first atomic were made by them or under their direction, and in- written information about the manufacture, at Los Alamos within less than stalled by them in much the same way as testing, and assembly of the various pieces of two and a half years after the they might have put together a complicated a . T Laboratory was established. setup of laboratory equipment. Immediately This gap had to be filled by the Labora- These first contained a tremendous following the end of the , a large fraction tory, and particularly by the newly formed Z array of high-precision components and elec- of those who had been involved with these Division, which was responsible for ord- trical and mechanical parts that had been left Los Alamos to resume activities nance . Z Division had been designed by Los Alamos staff scientists, built interrupted by the war. They left behind little moved to in Albuquerque where it could be in closer touch with the militarv personnel who might ultimately have toy assemble and maintain completed weapons and where storage facilities for weapons and components were to be established. For several years the Laboratory people at Sandia, and many of those at Los Alamos, were heavily engaged in preparing a com- plete set of instructions, manuals, and manu- facturing specifications, in establishing pro- duction lines for various parts, and in in- structing teams in the handling, testing, and assembly processes for weapons having the original pattern. Los Alamos continued to supply the more exotic compo- nents, including the nuclear parts, initiators, and detonators required for the stockpile. At the same time, work at Los Alamos proceeded on developing a completely new implosion system, which evolved into the Mark 4, with improved engineering and production and handling characteristics. The device, the first , atop the 100-foot tower on which it was Successful demonstration of essential fea- mounted for the test on , 1945. Norris Bradbury stands next to the device. tures of the new system, in the Sandstone

LOS ALAMOS Winter/Spring 1983 159 160 Winter/Spring 1983 LOS ALAMOS SCIENCE Weapon Design

The nation’s stockpile of nuclear weap- ons has included about fifty designed by the Laboratory, each having unique nu- clear yield, size, weight, shape, ballistic performance, and safety features. Shown here are a number of early designs. (a) The Mark 5 was a smaller and lighter implosion weapon than previous designs. Its weight was one-third that of the weapon and one-half that of the weapon. The nuclear war- head was loaded through the doors in the casing. (b) The Mark 7, which could be carried on the outside of an airplane rather than in a bomb bay, added nu- clear capability to smaller, faster fighter . (c) The Mark 8, an early pene- tration bomb, could penetrate 22 feet of reinforced concrete, 90 feet of hard sand, 120 feet of clay, or 5 inches of armor plate before detonating. (d) The Mark 17 was the first deliverable thermo- nuclear weapon. This massive bomb weighed 21 tons and could be carried in a B-36 after modifications were made to the bomb bay. Pilots who test-dropped the weapon reported that the plane rose hundreds of feet after the weapon was dropped, as if the bomb released the plane rather than the reverse. (e) Two weapons armed with the W28 . The W28 warhead was a high-yield, small-diameter thermonuclear device. (f) The Mark 19, a projectile weapon, added nuclear capability to artillery that previously fired conventional shells. (Photographed at the National Atomic Museum, Albuquerque, .)

LOS ALAMOS SCIENCE Winter/Spring 1983 161 test series at Eniwetok in the spring of 1948, Laboratory was formed. Such studies con- understanding of means of initiating a small- ended the laboratory-style layout of weapons tinued here during the war, though at a scale thermonuclear reaction was adequate. and opened the way for mass production of necessarily modest rate partly because the The other, the Item shot, demonstrated that components and the use of assembly-line Laboratory’s primary mission was to de- a booster could be made to work. techniques. In addition, the Sandstone tests velop a fission bomb as rapidly as possible, Quite fortuitously, in the period between confirmed that the growing stockpile of partly because a fission bomb appeared to be one and two months preceding these experi- -235 could be used in implosion prerequisite to the initiation of any ments but much too late to have any effect weapons, which were much more efficient thermonuclear reaction, and partly because on their designs, a new insight concerning than the gun-type weapons in which the theoretical investigation of the feasibility thermonuclear weapons was realized. uranium-235 had previously been used. of achieving a large-scale thermonuclear re- Almost immediately this insight gave In mid 1949 the Sandia branch of the Los action—at least the “Classical Super” form promise of a feasible approach to Alamos Laboratory was established as a then considered—was enormously more dif- thermonuclear weapons, provided only that separate organization: the Sandia Labora- ficult than that required in connection with the design work be done properly. This tories, operated under a contract with obtaining an fission reaction. approach was the one of which Western Electric. New plants set up at Studies of possible thermonuclear weapons Oppenheimer was later (1954) to say, “The various locations around the country gradu- continued here in the years immediately after program we had in 1949 was a tortured ally took over the production of components the war, but these too were necessarily thing that you could well argue did not make for stockpile weapons, although Los Alamos limited in scope. Only one of the small but a great deal of technical sense . . . . The continued to carry appreciable responsibili- capable group working on the Super during program in 1951 was technically so sweet ties of this sort until some time in 1952. the war continued on the Los Alamos staff that you could not argue about that.” On The experience gained in the successful after the spring of 1946. In addition, the need this new basis and in an impressively short development of the Mark 4 put the Labora- for improvements in fission weapons was time, considering the amount and novelty of tory in a position to move much more evident and pressing. And, for several years the design work and engineering required, rapidly and with more assurance on the at least, the computing resources available the Mike shot, with a yield of about 10 development of other new systems. A here (or anywhere else in the country) were megatons, was conducted in the Pacific on smaller and lighter weapon, called the Mark completely inadequate for a definitive han- , 1952. 5, was tested successfully in 1951. Further dling of the problems posed by a thermo- As tested, Mike was not a usable weapon: advances followed very rapidly in subse- nuclear weapon. it was quite large and heavy, and its quent test series and have resulted in today’s Nevertheless, in 1947 the pattern emerged thermonuclear , liquid , re- great range of options as to weapon size, for a possible “booster,” that is, a device in quired a refrigeration plant of great bulk and weight, yield, and other characteristics. The which a small amount of thermonuclear fuel complexity. Nevertheless, its performance Laboratory can now prepare a new design is ignited by a fission reaction and produces amply confirmed the validity of the new for nuclear testing in a form that can readily that in turn enhance the fission approach. In the spring of 1954, a number of be transferred to the manufacturing plants reaction. In 1948 it was decided to include a devices using the new pattern were tested, for production of stockpile models. test of such a system in the series then including the largest nuclear The early concern for safety in handling planned for 1951. Following the first test of a (about 15 megatons) ever conducted by the nuclear weapons, especially during the fission bomb by the Soviets in August 1949, . Some of these devices were takeoff of aircraft, led to the development of President decided at the end of readily adaptable (and adopted) for use in mechanical safing mechanisms that ensured that the United States should the stockpile. no would occur until re- undertake a concerted effort to achieve a Since 1954 a large number of ther- lease of the weapon over a target. These even though no clear monuclear tests have been carried out mechanisms eliminated the tricky and some- and persuasive pattern for such a device was combining and improving the features first what hazardous assembly of the final com- available at that time. In May of 1951, as demonstrated in the Item and Mike shots. ponents of a bomb during flight. part of the Greenhouse test series, two The continuing objective has been weapons Studies of the possibilities of using experiments involving thermonuclear reac- of smaller size and weight, of improved thermonuclear reactions to obtain very large tions were conducted. One, the George shot, efficiency, more convenient and safe in han- began in the summer of the design of which resulted from the crash dling and delivery, and more specifically 1942—almost a year before the Los Alamos program on the H-bomb, confirmed that our adapted to the needs of new and

162 Winter/Spring 1983 LOS ALAMOS SCIENCE Weapon Design

carriers. with this highly toxic substance. To reduce the mission of the moment. One should also Other developments in weapon design, this hazard, much less sensitive high ex- note that the great improvements realized in though less conspicuous than those already plosives are, where possible, being employed guidance and accuracy have made it referred to, have also had real significance. in new weapon designs or retrofitted to possible to meet a given objective with a Some of the more important of these have to existing designs. smaller explosion and, hence, a smaller nu- do with safety. The rapidly developing capa- A quite different development has to do clear device. A missile can therefore now bility in fission weapon design made it with weapon security. In the event, for carry a number of , each specifi- possible to design a weapon that would example, that complete weapons should be cally tailored to meet the characteristics of perform as desired when desired and yet that captured by enemy troops or stolen by a the carrier. A consequence of integration is would have only a vanishingly small terrorist group, it would evidently be de- that the weapon system—a carrier with its probability of producing a measurable nu- sirable to make their use difficult or im- warhead or warheads—is required to be clear yield through an accidental detonation possible. A number of schemes to achieve ready for immediate use over long periods of of the high explosive. Thus, the mechanical such a goal can be imagined, ranging from time. safing systems were replaced by weapons coded switches on essential circuits (so that This change from general-purpose bombs that, because of their design, had intrinsic the weapon could not be detonated without to weapon systems has had significant ef- nuclear safety. Today all nuclear weapons knowing the combination) to self-destruct fects on warhead design and production. For are required to have this intrinsic safety. mechanisms set to act if the weapon should one thing, a very much larger premium Another major development in nuclear be tampered with. A variety of inhibitory attaches to reducing the maintenance ac- weapon safety has to do with the high ex- features have been considered, and some tivities associated with a nuclear device to an plosives themselves. Most of the have been installed on weapons deemed to absolute minimum. Today, warheads require that have been used in nuclear weapons are warrant such protection. essentially no field maintenance and will of intermediate sensitivity. They can reliably A final development worthy of attention is operate reliably over large extremes in envi- withstand the jolts and impacts associat- the advent of “weapon systems.” This term ronmental conditions. As a separate , ed with normal handling and can even be refers to the integration of a carrier missile since a new carrier involves considerably dropped from a modest height without det- and its warhead, that is. to the specific greater cost and lead-time than does a new onating. Still, they might be expected to tailoring of the warhead to the weight, shape, warhead, the production schedules (and detonate if dropped accidentally from an and size characteristics of the missile—as in budget limitations) for the carrier govern the airplane or missile onto a hard surface. the case of a Minuteman ICBM or a sub- production schedules and quantities of the Since, as noted above, all weapons are marine-launched . The mis- warheads. intrinsically incapable of producing an acci- sile-cum-warhead constitutes an integrated In response to the considerations men- dental nuclear yield, accidental detonation of system that is optimized as a unit. This tioned here, as well as to new insights in the high explosive would not cause a nuclear integration contrasts with the earlier situ- explosive device behavior, a rapid evolution explosion. Detonating explosive would, how- ation in which nuclear devices were to be in design requirements and objectives has ever, be expected to disperse any taken from a storage facility and loaded on occurred and may be expected to con- associated with it as smoke or dust and one or another suitable plane (or mated to a tinue. ■ thereby contaminate an appreciable area separately designed re-entry ) to meet

LOS ALAMOS SCIENCE Winter/Spring 1983 163