13 International Organizations and Institutions

Lisa Martin and Beth Simmons

International organizations (IOs) and institu- another for many years to come (Neumann tions (IIs) have become an increasingly and Sending 2010). We offer some sugges- common phenomenon of international life. tions on research strategies that might con- The proliferation of IOs, the growth in treaty tribute to a better empirical base from which arrangements among states, and the deepen- to judge theoretical claims. ing of regional integration efforts in Europe The chapter proceeds as follows. The first and in other parts of the world all represent section provides a brief intellectual history of formal expressions of the extent to which modern research on IIs and IOs from the post– international politics has become more insti- World War II years to the “regimes movement” tutionalized over time (MacKenzie 2010; of the 1980s, and defines terms. We distinguish Reinalda 2009; Green 2008). international organizations, understood as The scholarship on IOs and IIs has bur- entities, from international institutions, under- geoned in response. In the past decade, theo- stood as rules. The second section sketches ries devoted to understanding why these three general clusters of theorizing and charac- phenomena exist, how they function, and terizes how each views the questions of organ- what effects they have on world politics and izational and institutional creation, decisions other outcomes of concern have become about membership and design, change and increasingly refined. The methods employed evolution, and institutional and organizational in empirical work have also become more effects. We do not offer these approaches as sophisticated. The purpose of this chapter is either exhaustive or mutually exclusive, but to draw together this divergent literature, to rather as representative, semipermeable frame- offer observations on the development of its works that share certain assumptions and various theoretical strands, and to examine diverge elsewhere. Increasingly, a number of progress on the empirical front. We predict scholars straddle or draw selectively from that a broad range of theoretical traditions – more than one approach. realist, rational functionalist, constructivist – The third section is devoted to an examina- will exist alongside and in dialogue with one tion of the empirical literature on the effects

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of IIs and IOs. Empirical research has devel- law and organizations who made little explicit oped significantly over the past decade as effort to link their analyses to theories of scholars have turned from the question of state behavior (see the chapter by Simmons why such arrangements exist to whether and in this volume). how they significantly impact behavior and The best of the early work in this genre outcomes. We examine these questions with looked at the interplay between formal IOs, respect to international cooperation, rule rules and norms, domestic politics, and gov- compliance, and distributional outcomes. We ernmental decision making – themes we note, too, the growing number of studies that would recognize today as being near the cut- have looked for broader effects associated ting edge of international institutional with IIs and IOs, some of which have been research. However, the initial effect of the undesired and even unanticipated. behavioral revolution on studies of IOs and The final section delineates some recent IIs was to further remove their study from developments and directions for future the central problems of world politics, espe- research. As IOs and IIs have increased in cially during the Cold War. The most clearly number and complexity, research has turned identifiable research program in this respect to the question of how to multiple entities was that devoted to voting patterns and and layers of rules relate to one another, as office seeking in the UN General Assembly well as how they accommodate and some- (Alker and Russett 1965; Keohane 1966). times even privilege particular actors at the This literature choose to focus on difficult- domestic and international levels. to-interpret behavior (what did these coali- tions signify, anyway?) and imported methods uncritically from American studies of legislative behavior. Studies of the UN BACKGROUND AND DEFINITIONS that focused on bureaucratic politics with links to transnational actors made more Background progress, since they opened up a research program that would ultimately lead to more The term international institution has been systematic reflection on nongovernmental used over the course of the last few decades actors (Keohane and Nye 1977; Cox and to refer to a broad range of phenomena. In Jacobson 1973). the early postwar years, these words almost The centrality of formal IOs and formal always referred to formal IOs, usually to international legal agreements to the study of organs or branches of the United Nations international relations has waxed and waned. system. This is hardly surprising. Such The major international conflict for a rising organizations were the most ‘studiable’ (if generation of scholars – the Vietnam War – not necessarily the most crucial) manifesta- raged beyond the formal declarations of the tions of what was ‘new’ about postwar inter- United Nations. Two decades of predictable national relations (see Martin and Simmons monetary relations under the purview of the 1998). The postwar research was largely IMF were shattered by a unilateral decision descriptive and focused almost exclusively of the United States in 1971 to close the gold on formal international legal agreements, window and later to float the dollar. OPEC such as the Charter of the United Nations, was hardly constrained by long-standing Security Council resolutions and treaties legal constraints or multilateral forums when relating to trade and alliances. A divide it quadrupled oil prices in the 1970s. It seemed to have opened up between students became apparent that much of the earlier of international relations – who were tremen- focus on formal structures and multilateral dously influenced by realists such as treaty-based agreements, especially the UN, Morgenthau – and scholars of international had been overdrawn (Strange 1978).

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The events of the 1970s encouraged stipulate the ways in which states should thoughtful scholars to theorize international cooperate and compete with each other’ governance more broadly. The study of (Mearsheimer 1994–95). ‘international regimes,’ defined as rules, This definition has several advantages. norms, principles, and procedures that focus First, it eliminates the moving parts that lent expectations regarding international behavior so much confusion to regimes analysis. (Krasner 1983) demoted the study of IOs as Underlying principles, while perhaps of ana- actors and began instead to focus on rules or lytical interest, are not included in the defini- even ‘understandings’ thought to influence tion of an institution itself. Rules and governmental behavior. Research in this vein decision-making procedures, referring defined regimes for specific issue-areas, for respectively to substance and process, are which this approach has been criticized both simply ‘rules’ in this conception. This (Hurrell 1993; Kingsbury 1998), and viewed definition allows for the analysis of both regimes as focal points around which actors’ formal and informal sets of rules, although expectations converge. Principles and norms the difficulty of operationalizing informal provide the normative framework for regimes, rules is unavoidable. while rules and decision-making procedures A second advantage of this definition is provide more specific injunctions for appro- that it separates the definition of an institu- priate behavior.1 tion from behavioral outcomes that ought to The definition led to some debates that be explained. Regularized patterns of behav- were of questionable utility, such as what ior – frequently observed in international exactly counted as a “norm” or a “rule.” The relations for reasons that have nothing to do consensus definition of “regime” offered by with rules – are excluded. The narrow defini- Krasner and his colleagues was roundly criti- tion strips institutions from posited effects cized as imprecise and even tendentious and allows us to ask whether rules influence (Strange 1982; De Senarclens 1993). But behavior. Contrast this approach with other overall, the regimes concept was an impor- well-accepted definitions. Robert Keohane tant effort to make the study of international (1989) defines institutions as ‘persistent and institutions (very broadly understood) more connected sets of rules (formal and informal) relevant to international politics. that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations’, which makes it impossible to test for the impact of Definitions institutions on activities and expectations. Similarly, Volker Rittberger has argued that The regimes literature engendered such defi- an arrangement should only be considered a nitional confusion that scholars in the 1990s regime if the actors are persistently guided sought a simpler conception as well as a new by its norms and rules (Rittberger and Zürn label. The word “institution” has now largely 1990), making inquiry into the effects of replaced “regime” in the scholarly IR litera- regimes on behavior tautological. While it ture. Though a range of usages exists, most may be problematic in any given case to tell scholars have come to regard “international whether particular patterns are rule-driven, institutions” as sets of rules meant to govern such a project should be the subject of empir- international behavior. Rules, in turn, are ical research and not the result of an overly often conceived as statements that forbid, generous definition. require, or permit particular kinds of actions Finally, this definition is relatively free (Ostrom 1990). John Mearsheimer (ironi- from a particular theoretical perspective. cally a neorealist who doesn’t believe that There are no qualifying criteria about the institutions are effective) provides a useful social construction of rules, nor about whether definition of institutions as ‘sets of rules that rules are explicit or implicit, nor their about

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efficiency-enhancing characteristics.2 This dealing with principal-agent issues (Vaubel definition probably downplays but need not et al. 2007 Vauble 2006) as well as questions exclude “constitutive rules” that have been relating to the organizational culture of the central to constructivist theories (Ruggie entity (Barnett and Coleman 2005). To be 1998). It is clearly consistent, however, with sure, IOs are usually based on rules (proce- the “regulative rules” that dominate empiri- dural and normative), and their staffs often cal constructivist research (Finnemore and participate in the creation, implementation, Sikkink 1998). This definition thus allows and interpretation of substantive rules theorists writing from a range of perspectives (Alvarez 2005). But it is analytically impor- to devise their own conditional statements as tant to distinguish rules from forums and theoretically driven hypotheses. For exam- especially corporate or bureaucratic actors. ple, it should be possible to test claims to the After all, some institutions, such as extradi- effect that rules are most effective when tion agreements, may not have organizations actors share intersubjective interpretations of associated with them at all; and some IOs, what the rule requires, or that rules influence such as the UN, may embody multiple insti- behavior if they lead to improved outcomes tutions understood as rules. for governments. It therefore allows for the systematic evaluation of a broad range of theoretical claims using a single definition of institutions.3 THEORETICAL APPROACHES While many find it convenient to use the TO IOS AND IIS word “institution” to refer to both rules and organizations, for purposes of this essay we Prelude: Realist Schools of Thought make a distinction between the two. International organizations are associations Theories of IIs and IOs have had to contend of actors, typically states.4 IOs have member- with the dominant paradigm in international ship criteria, and membership may entail relations from at least the 1930s to the 1980s: privileges (as well as costs). While a state realism. Virtually all realists see power exert- may unilaterally decide to follow a set of ing the true influence behind the façade of rules – the United States, for example, can these structures. Hans Morgenthau attributed decide to abide by the Law of the Sea with- apparently rule-consistent behavior either to out any other state’s permission – a state convergent interests or prevailing power rela- cannot typically unilaterally decide to join an tions, arguing that governments ‘are always IO; they have to be admitted. Some organiza- anxious to shake off the restraining influence tions, such as the United Nations General that international law might have upon their Assembly, may be little more than forums for foreign policies, to use international law state actors to deliberate, debate, or to share instead for the promotion of their national information. More ambitiously, IOs consti- interests ....’ (Morgenthau 1985). For tradi- tute “corporate actors” that take positions in tional realists, IIs and IOs are epiphenomenal the name of their membership. Many, such as to state power and interests (Carr 1964). the World Bank and the IMF, rely on more or Neorealists’ role in institutional analysis in less structured bureaucracies to implement the 1980s and 1990s was been that of force- their decisions; these bureaucrats themselves ful critic. On the logical side, Joseph Grieco have or may develop interests independent of (1988) and John Mearsheimer (1994–95) the state membership (Oestreich 2007). Some argue that relative-gains concerns prevent go as far as to speak of international organi- states from intensive cooperation: since the zations as exercising “sovereign” powers benefits of cooperation can be translated into (Sarooshi 2005). When we speak of interna- military advantages, concerns about the dis- tional organizations, then, we are often tribution of the gains impede substantial

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sustained cooperation (but see Snidal 1991; (Kaja and Werker 2010), while Kuziemko Powell 1991). Joanne Gowa uses this logic to and Werker find that a country that rotates argue that allies are much more likely to onto the UN Security Council can expect a trade during periods of bipolarity than during cool 59% increase in bilateral aid from the periods of multipolarity, when there are United States (Kuziemko and Werker 2006). greater uncertainties about friends and foes A new breed of realist is now also explor- (Gowa 1994). Lloyd Gruber’s work is a real- ing the extent to which states try to use inter- ist caution about assuming international national organizations to achieve their institutions provide joint gains. Powerful security objectives. Of course, this has always states, in his view, often have the ability to been the purpose of military alliances. Call present others with a fait accompli to which them “soft realists”; these scholars analyze they are forced to adjust, sometimes making how states use IOs to engage in “institution- them worse off than they were before the alized balancing” behavior, by which is agreement was made (Gruber 2000). And, of meant the use of pressures and threats in course, realists are the first to note that multilateral institutions for the purpose of formal international organizations are ulti- securing their security interests (He 2008). mately either dominated by the most power- The world’s most powerful countries – work- ful states, or are designed to be irrelevant to ing through the G-8 – increasingly co-opt international affairs (Mearsheimer 1994–95). international organizations to achieve their Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom (1996) embel- preferred outcomes over debt relief and ter- lish a familiar realist theme in their claim that rorist financing (Gstöhl 2007). This New deep cooperation – anything other than super- Realism sees power and interest at work in a ficial policy adjustments about which states broad range of ostensibly “cooperative” mul- care little – requires enforcement. tilateral institutions. The strength of realist theorizing has been This basic insight cannot be neglected by its insistence that international institutions any theoretical approach that purports to are rooted in the interaction of power and explain international politics. It does pose national interest in the international system. one important puzzle, however: if govern- A plethora of recent research with clever ments are not likely to be constrained by the research designs has recently presented a rules to which they agree, why do they spend strong reminder of the exercise of power time and other resources negotiating them in behind IOs and IIs (Stone 2011; Foot et al. the first place? If IOs and IIs are little more 2003). One branch of empirical research than a power play, why not bribe and threaten explores the extent to which powerful states the old-fashioned way? Why pay a nickel for simply buy off the cooperation of smaller a Security Council vote? Why work through ones in international organizations. Several multilateral institutions at all? new studies document the extent to which lending by international financial institutions reflect the geopolitical interests of the major Rational Functionalism powers, and the United States in particular (Reynaud and Vauday 2009; Stone 2004). Rational functionalism developed in the Several scholars acknowledge power rela- early 1980s as one response to these kinds tions in IOs by modeling and coming up with of puzzles. By the mid-1980s, explanations monetary estimates of aid or concessionary of international regimes became intertwined financing funneled to countries by powerful with explanations of international coopera- countries. Kaja and Werkman estimate that tion more generally. The work of Robert developing countries that sit on the board of Keohane (1984) drew from functionalist the World Bank scoop up an additional $60 approaches that emphasized the efficiency million in “bonus” loans from that institution reasons for agreements among regime

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participants. This research sought to show are characterized by the existence of multiple that IOs and IIs provided a way for states to Pareto-optimal equilibria. When states face overcome problems of collective action, high coordination problems, the dilemma is not transactions costs, and information deficits the temptation to defect from cooperative or asymmetries. This approach has produced outcomes, but how to choose among equi- a number of insights, which we will discuss libria. Choice in coordination games may be and extend below. Furthermore, the strength relatively simple and resolved by identifica- of this approach has largely been its ability to tion of a focal point. But some coordination explain the creation and maintenance of IOs games involve multiple equilibria over which and IIs. It has been weaker in delineating the actors have divergent preferences. German their effects on state behavior, an issue to scholars have contributed to the further which we turn in the next section. refinement of the basic functionalist logic by This rational/functionalist research agenda developing ‘problem structural typologies’ originated with Keohane’s After Hegemony (Rittberger and Zürn 1990) and by unpacking and Krasner’s edited volume on International ‘problematic social situations’, which Regimes cited above. Their work was infor- Michael Zürn defines as those in which the med by a fundamentally important insight: Pareto optimum on the one hand and the individually rational action by states could individually rational Nash equilibrium on impede mutually beneficial cooperation. the other are not congruent (Zürn 1997). The Institutions would be effective to the degree logic is functionalist: states build institutions that they allowed states to avoid short-term in order to achieve collectively desirable out- temptations to renege, thus realizing availa- comes. Some constellations of interests are ble mutual benefits. In particular, institutions conducive to regime formation, while others could help to focus expectations on a coop- are not. erative solution, reduce transaction costs, and Rational functionalism has also made pio- provide a greater degree of transparency. neering forays into explaining the form that Reputational concerns and the prospect of institutional choice will take. While argu- repeat interactions were supposed to render ments linking problem structure with institu- cooperative rules effective. Recent applica- tional form are not new, a number of scholars tions of this basic functionalist logic have have recently placed rational functional been applied in issues ranging from the set- explanations of institutional and organiza- tlement of territorial disputes (Simmons tional design at the center of their intellectual 2005) to international cooperation with agenda. Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal (2001) respect to freshwater resources (Dombrowsky explore how five dimensions of design – 2007). In short, institutions could be explained membership, issue scope, centralization of as a solution to the problem of international tasks, rules for controlling the institution, collective action, providing a response to the and institutional flexibility – vary across puzzle posed by realism . organizations and institutions. These authors Once a basic functionalist logic was in argue that particular choices over form are a place, researchers began to refine their con- response to distributional and enforcement ceptions of the strategic conditions that give problems arising from the number of actors rise to cooperative arrangements. Some relevant to the provision of joint-gains, as authors, recognizing that the prisoners’ well as uncertainty about behavior or the dilemma (PD) was only one type of collec- state of the world. tive-action problem, drew a distinction One of the most promising insights about between collaboration and coordination this line of analysis regards the ways in which problems (Snidal 1985; Stein 1983; Martin institutional design will respond to the exist- 1992b). While collaboration problems are ence of various types of uncertainty. When exemplified by the PD, coordination games states are uncertain about the state of the

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world or the distributive impact of an agree- forms of cooperation than would have been ment, they are likely to design institutions possible in the absence of flexibility mecha- with loopholes. Barbara Koremenos (2005) nisms is in tension with the notion that states theorizes that uncertainty about the distribu- join IOs and IIs precisely for their binding tional effects of agreements leads directly to effects. One function that IOs and IIs per- the use of renegotiation provisions in interna- form is that they make it possible for states to tional agreements. Similarly, Peter Rosendorff commit themselves to levels of cooperation (2005) argues that uncertainty domestic pres- that would not be credible in their absence. sures for protection lead trade institutions Some IOs have fairly clear “hands-tying” such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) features: the International Criminal Court to offer flexibility, in particular, in the form of has independent authority to prosecute cer- the Dispute Settlement Procedure, while tain kinds of war crimes, largely removing Lawrence Helfer and co-authors make a impunity for these crimes. Simmons and similar argument for derogations from human Danner (2010) argue that the ICC’s hands- rights agreements (Helfer et al. 2011). Some tying quality serves as a binding mechanism but not all of the expectations about uncer- that leads to a reduction in international vio- tainty can be confirmed in studies of negotia- lence. Similarly, almost all bilateral invest- tion processes, which make a good ment treaties provide for international complement to the design outcomes that most arbitration in the case of an investment dis- researchers analyze (Thompson 2010). pute. States agree to such arrangements to Research on flexibility provisions raises bolster their credibility to treat investors an interesting design dilemma: Does wide- fairly. The ultimate goal, of course, is to tie spread participation in a particular agree- one’s hands sufficiently to attract foreign ment depend on such provisions? Is there a direct investment (Elkins et al. 2006). trade-off between depth of cooperation and Mansfield and Pevehouse (2006) specify a the breadth of membership? Logic – and, causal mechanism by which democratizing increasingly, empirical evidence – suggests leaders use IO membership to credibly this is indeed the case, although Michael commit to democratic reforms. Dreher and Gilligan (2004) finds that the broader–deeper Voigt find evidence that countries that join a trade-off disappears if the agreement allows variety of IOs effectively gain credibility by for variance with respect to the demands on doing so: delegation to IOs, they find, has a each member. Kucik and Reinhardt (2008) robust and felicitous impact on a country’s argue that flexibility provisions within the risk ratings, which they argue is a decent GATT/WTO have encouraged countries to proxy for credibility (Dreher and Voigt join, and to make commitments to greater 2011). reductions in tariff levels. Theirs is one of the Another approach to institutional design, most rigorous empirical demonstrations to still within the rationalist tradition, is the date that flexibility does indeed support application of principal-agent models. These higher levels of trade cooperation. Maggi models provide a framework for understand- and Morelli (2006) focus on the voting rules ing decisions to delegate authority to IOs used in various IOs. Because decisions of (Lake and McCubbins 2006; Sarooshi 2005). IOs must be self-enforcing, they argue, often For example, Nielson and Tierney (2003) the only sustainable voting rule is unanimity, explain institutional reform in the World offering an explanation for the widespread Bank with a delegation model, concentrating unanimity requirement, but also specifying on environmental policy reforms; similarly, conditions under which other voting rules Siebenhüner (2008) explains organizational might be sustainable. learning in international environmental The hypothesis that flexibility is desirable organizations in terms of principal-agent because it allows states to commit to deeper theories. One of the major normative issues,

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from an agency perspective, is the extent to functionalist approach lies in accurate ex ante which IOs remain accountable to the states specification of games and interests. Empirical that comprise them (Grant and Keohane researchers wanting to test functional expla- 2005) – an issue upon which practitioners nations often find it difficult to determine have written extensively as well (Cooker precisely what games are being played with- 2005). Empirical work on the extent of out observing the outcome of state interac- “independence” of IOs is growing and is get- tions, leading to a lack of refutability and loss ting more systematic (see, for example, of explanatory power. While recognizing the Haftel and Thompson 2006). need for independent measures of interests, Informational problems, in the rationalist researchers have found it difficult to construct approach, are central to the understanding of them. Rationalist theories of the kind dis- design and functioning of IOs. The idea that cussed here are also silent on how to think IOs might be useful for solving cooperation about some of their central concepts. The problems through the provision of informa- concept of “focal point” is frequently relied tion and signaling was borrowed initially upon as a way to reduce transactions costs, from the domestic literature on legislative but just why some solutions are accepted as actors. That literature emphasized that legis- focal is rarely discussed. The notion of lative structures could be designed which “common knowledge” helps to solve games would allow legislators to learn about the with multiple equilibria, but what informa- policies they are adopting, thus avoiding tion is held in common by actors is asserted inefficient outcomes (Gilligan and Krehbiel rather than explained. Appeals to “reputa- 1990; Krehbiel 1991). IO theorists have tion” are ubiquitous in this literature, but applied these insights at the international there is nothing more socially determined level, analyzing various IOs from the UN than one’s reputation. The assumptions that Security Council to the WTO to international these concepts are unproblematic has, how- human rights IOs as credible sources of ever, been challenged most directly by schol- policy information that help various audi- ars working from sociological assumptions. ences to determine the quality of particular policies, such as a military intervention in the case of the Security Council (Fang 2008; From the English School to Thompson 2006; Voeten 2005; Chapman Social Constructivism 2007). Others have extended the informa- tional theory of IOs as a mechanism to Rational functionalist approaches have been enhance states’ accountability to domestic roundly criticized by theorists that place actors who may favor outcomes such as prime analytical importance on the social improved human rights, a cleaner environ- context of state behavior. While rational ment, or liberal trade, and thereby indirectly functionalism focuses on explaining cooper- increase the possibilities for cooperative ation under anarchy, social constructivists outcomes at the international level (Mansfield have questioned the primacy of anarchy, and et al. 2002; Dai 2007). In all of these models, have sought to reassert social context into the IOs generate credible information about understanding of international relations. governments’ policies that end up producing While rational functionalism explains IIs more cooperative outcomes. and IOs in terms of various forms of market Rational functionalist approaches are failure, constructivists situate international notable because the method of analysis treats institutions in their intersubjective social institutions both as environmental constraints context. and as objects that are consciously chosen A number of scholars, frequently associ- and manipulated by actors. However, one ated with English scholarship, have empha- of the major drawbacks of the rational sized the importance of international society

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in maintaining international order. Bull and dilemmas of interdependence than have Watson (1984) define international society in American scholars working in a more func- state-centric terms, as a group of states that tionalist vein. have ‘established by dialog and consent John Ruggie and Friedrich Kratochwil common rules and institutions for the con- have done the most to advance the central duct of their relations, and recognize their insights of the English school and adapt them common interest in maintaining these to the study of IOs and IIs. In their view, arrangements’. International society, in this intersubjective meaning explains the role that conception, is the legal and political idea on IOs and IIs play in international life. In a which the concept of international institu- critique of the regimes literature as it was tions rests (Buzan 1993). Martin Wight’s developing in the United States, these authors work emphasized the role of cultural unity in noted the inconsistencies of trying to describe the identity of an international society (Wight a subjective world of norms and beliefs with 1977). Bull, on the other hand, saw the pos- a positivist epistemology based on observed sibilities of international society for any behavior (Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986). In group of states that shared coherent goals, Kratochwil’s view, ‘… interpretations of such as limits on the use of force (Bull actions by the actors are an irreducible part 1977). Others offer a subjective interpreta- of their collective existence. We as observers tion of international society that is echoed in therefore can go only as far as looking ‘at the contemporary constructivist assumptions: facts’ of their overt behavior; beyond that lies international society exists because those the realm of intersubjective rules which are who speak and act in the name of states constitutive of social practice and which an assume that it does (Evans and Wilson interpretive epistemology has to uncover’ 1992). (Kratochwil 1988). It is crucial in this view The English school has offered a defini- to understand the ways in which specific tion of institutions that is much broader than institutions are embedded in larger systems the one we employ in this essay; scholars in of norms and principles, such as the liberal this tradition also typically eschew reference economic order of the postwar period (Ruggie to specific issue-areas. Institutions in this 1982). view are ‘a cluster of social rules, conven- Constructivist approaches are highly atten- tions, usages, and practices …, a set of con- tive to the framing of rules and norms as ventional assumptions held prevalently clues to a deeper understanding of their among society-members … [that] provide a intended meanings. When a rule is embedded framework for identifying what is the done in the context of international law, for exam- thing and what is not in the appropriate cir- ple, governments have to forgo idiosyncratic cumstances’ (Suganami 1983). English claims and make arguments based on rules school scholars have been concerned with and norms that satisfy at a minimum the con- ‘institutions’ as broad as the balance of dition of universality (Kratochwil 1988; see power and the practice of diplomacy (Evans also Kingsbury 1998; Hurrell 1993). Indeed, and Wilson 1992). Their work has tended to most constructivist theorists would go further de-emphasize formal organizations (Crawford and insist on the mutually constitutive nature 1996), viewing these as important only to the of norms and actors’ identities. International extent that they ‘strengthen and render institutions define who the players are in a more efficient the more basic institutions particular situation and how they define their of diplomacy, international law, and the roles, and thus place constraints on behavior. balance of power’ (Evans and Wilson 1992). Constructivist scholars emphasize that inter- Furthermore, scholars in this tradition national institutions can alter the identities have on the whole been less interested in and interests of states, as a result of their economic issues and rather less taken by interactions over time within the auspices of

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a set of rules (Arend 1999; Onuf 1989) or instantiations of social goals, values, and within a specific organization that actors aspirations (Coicaud and Heiskanen 2001). imbue with meaning (Johnston 2001). This Christian Reus-Smit sees the rise of what he gives rise to an analysis that (compared with refers to as multilateral forms of legislation realist or rationalist approaches) takes noth- as a result of the shift of legitimacy from ing for granted: the relevant actors, their absolute rulers to popular sovereignty, and interests, and their understandings of rules associated norms of procedural justice. Self- and relationships are all open to interpreta- legislation mandates that those subject to the tion. Moreover, constructivism emphasizes law should create it. Nondiscrimination feedback effects and the complexity of social means all are equally bound. In combination, interactions, it lends itself naturally to the these values give rise internationally to mul- view that institutions cannot be treated as tilateralism (Reus-Smit 2004). IOs (e.g., the simply exogenous or purely objects of choice UN Security Council) may be conceptual- (Ruggie 1992). ized as representing the cumulative legiti- Social constructivist approaches have macy of the post-war order, and the desire to been especially appropriate for appreciating maintain this order has a moderating effect the ways in which international institutions even on the great powers (Westra 2010). create, reflect, and diffuse intersubjective International rules and the forums in which normative understandings. One important actors hammer them out in turn become key contribution to the literature on IOs and IIs focal points for discursive struggles over has been to theorize their role in furthering legitimate political agency and action (inter- normative convergence among actors. nationally and domestically). By many Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) sketch out accounts, rules and organizational member- various stages of the norm ‘life cycle’ and ship become critical resources in the interna- note that IOs contribute to norm ‘cascades’ tional politics of legitimacy (Reus-Smit by ‘pressuring targeted actors to adopt new 2004). policies and laws and to ratify treaties and One branch of research associated with by monitoring compliance with international sociological theories focuses on the role of standards’. In this way, IOs can be ‘chief IOs as international bureaucracies with socializing agents’ pressuring violators to agency in their own right. These scholars conform (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998).5 emphasize that organizations have agency; Checkel (2005) provides a framework for they make loans, send peacekeepers, inocu- studying socialization processes, specifying late babies, and maintain databases. They how the mechanisms of strategic calcula- have long been viewed as actors providing tion, role playing, and normative suasion can international collective or redistributive goods lead to socialization. Johnston (2008) elabo- (Kindleberger 1951; Gregg 1966), but increas- rates these mechanisms, as well as social ingly they have also come to regulate many of mechanisms such as backpatting or sham- the social, political, and economic problems ing. He theorizes that these powerful proc- traditionally within nation-states’ purview esses of socialization that are heightened (Smouts 1993). Organization theorists point among members of specific international out that through the development of specific organizations. competencies, organizations can potentially As it does in all aspects of politics, legiti- transform agendas and goals (Cyert and macy plays a key role in constructivist March 1992). Moreover, these entities can accounts of IOs and IIs. The essence of most function as creators of meaning and of identi- theorizing in this vein is the issue of how ties (Olsen 1997). Some have urged far and to what extent international organiza- greater attention to the sociology of IOs, as tions and rules come to be understood by well as the ways in which intergovernmental states and civil society actors as legitimate organizations interact with nongovernmental

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organizations (De Senarclens 1993). In a definitely taken a quantitative turn. This sec- critical vein, Barnett and Finnemore (1999) tion discusses the empirical literature on draw attention not only to IO autonomy, but effects of IOs and IIs on patterns and modes also to the potential for pathological behavior of interstate cooperation, organized roughly when IOs become bureaucratized. These by mechanism. Paralleling the discussion efforts represent a synthetic look at interna- above, we begin with the self-consciously tional organizational structures, normative rational and move to the rather more socio- standards, transnational actors, and govern- logical research. In addition, we highlight mental decision making (Barnett and Coleman some of the empirical research that tests for 2005). broader institutional effects as well. In short, the works of social constructivists One way to gauge the impact of IOs and have drawn attention to the intersubjective IIs is to test for their coercive impacts. As nature of IOs and IIs. The former insists on agents of their state members, IOs are some- understanding these in the context of the times used as mechanisms to enforce the broader purposes of the major actors in world norms, values, and preferred outcomes of politics. Constructivists have incorporated their members. Why might we expect coer- the importance of social meanings into their cion via IOs to differ from its unilateral analysis of IOs and IIs, and have more fully cousin? Lisa Martin’s research demonstrates developed the notion that institutions and that cooperation on economic sanctions interests are mutually constitutive. Both increases when sanctions are imposed in an approaches have provided ways to think institutionalized environment (Martin 1992a). about the links between norms and institu- Rather than free-riding on the sanctioning tions. It is to international organizational and efforts of others, Martin shows that highly institutional effects on state behavior that we institutionalized environments have assisted turn in the following section. self-regarding states to overcome their col- lective action problems and impose sanctions on specific targeted states. Part of her logic is that international organizations are a forum THE ROLE OF IOS AND IIS: for the credible bundling of issues in a way EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF that makes deals “stick.” INSTITUTIONAL EFFECTS Several studies have looked into the conse- quences of coercion by IOs: does the United Empirical studies of IOs and IIs have bur- Nations enforce the peace and help to settle geoned in the last couple of decades. A grow- disputes? Do international financial institu- ing body of research is developing that tions enforce internationally accepted stand- addresses many of the specific theoretical ards of open and responsible economic mechanisms discussed in the previous sec- policies through conditionality? These insti- tions. Some set up competing tests of the tutions have the potential to imposed costs on various mechanisms implied by the theories, states for contravening international norms. but increasingly studies are combining the Some scholars note that enforcement actions insights from decades of theorizing in inter- are actually quite rare (Chayes and Chayes active ways, finding, for example, that coer- 1995). The empirical research on the conse- cive mechanisms sometimes reinforce quences of coercive multilateralism is mixed. socialization pressures, or that socially con- On the one hand, some studies have found structed focal points help to reduce transac- that IO-imposed sanctions may increase the tion costs. The empirical studies below likelihood of conflict resolution in civil wars represent a variety of methodologies, but the settings, especially if the targeted state is a empirical literature in the last decade on the member of the international institution effects of IOs and IIs on cooperation has imposing the sanctions (Escribá -Folch

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2010). On the other hand, while the United signing of treaty agreements that protect Nations has not often sanctioned countries investors’ interests (Elkins et al. 2006). for human rights violations, when they have, Recent research sees the hand of powerful studies suggest that results may not be salu- countries working through multilateral aid tary. Dursun Peksen (2009) found that the agencies such as the World Bank (Dreher et multilateral imposition of economic sanc- al. 2009a) and IMF (Dreher et al. 2009b) to tions by the United Nations and the European influence states temporarily holding seats on Union were associated with worsening the UN Security Council. Whether such strat- human rights thereafter, as measured by egies “work” – that is, whether such attempts physical integrity indices. Emilie Hafner- can actually buy political support – has yet to Burton argues, however, that the threat of be shown empirically. punishment is critical in the human rights Some institutions are designed explicitly area. Though there may be some endogeneity as enforcement mechanisms. They are issues that are yet to be resolved, she finds designed to “tie actors’ hands” by imposing that trade agreements with clear conse- costs that deter actors from violating certain quences for human rights violations are asso- norms. For example, bilateral investment ciated with improved rights practices, while treaties call for transnational arbitration when agreements with soft human rights provi- investors allege they have not been treated sions are not (Hafner-Burton 2005). The fairly by host states. The prospect of a mon- drawing of firm generalizations about the etary award – enforceable in most domestic consequences of multilateral sanctioning courts around the world – may encourage through IOs has been elusive. some states to respect investors’ rights (Tobin Coercion can also potentially be exercised and Rose-Ackerman 2011; Busse et al. 2010; by economic IOs or their members. By offer- Egger and Merlo 2007). Similarly, the ing benefits (loans, aid, trade, recognition) or International Criminal Court has the poten- imposing costs (exclusion, sanctions, mili- tial to put individuals convicted of heinous tary intervention), IOs can potentially coerce war crimes in prison for life, which Simmons national decision makers to implement and Danner (2010) argue may account for favored economic policies. For example, ratification patterns as well as hiatuses in Witthold Heniscz and others argue that the civil conflict. In these models, the threat of IMF and World Bank have indirectly coerced punishment allows for joint gains by helping particular market reforms by tilting “the states credibly to commit to certain actions. balance of power toward the group (or Most empirical studies in the rational groups) favoring reform by providing that functionalist tradition, however, argue that group with more resources, legitimacy, or IOs and IIs raise costs for noncompliance not rhetorical arguments, and by prompting through organized punishment as much as various groups to join the pro-reform coali- through “reputational” consequences tion” (Henisz et al. 2005). They find that (Joachim et al. 2008). “Reputation” was, of international coercive pressures – measured course, one of the main mechanisms Keohane as conditional IMF loans – have increased developed in his original functional theory of the likelihood of majority privatization and regimes (Keohane 1984). Several empirical regulatory separation, but not of regulatory studies rely on reputational costs to account depoliticization and liberalization of compe- for their findings. Simmons (2000) asks tition in the telecommunications and electric- whether IMF restrictions on manipulation of ity industries (Henisz et al. 2005; see also the current account have influenced state cur- Brune et al. 2004). Other empirical studies rency behaviors, and finds that states that link conditional IMF loans with monetary have made a public declaration to be bound policy reforms, such as independent central by Article VIII of the IMF’s Articles of banks (Polillo and Guillén 2005) and the Agreement are much more likely to eschew

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current account restrictions than nonsignato- studies suggest multilateral trade organiza- ries, a finding extended by Grieco, Gelpi, and tion help to reduce trade volatility as well. Warren (2009; see also Simmons and Hopkins Claiming that trade agreements “foster policy 2005; von Stein 2005). Similarly, Mitchell transparency and convergence in expecta- and Hensel rely on the purported ability of tions, standards, and policy instruments” IOs to raise reputational costs for states when (2008), Mansfield and Reinhardt show that they pressure them to settle their territorial or the WTO as well as preferential trading boundary disputes peacefully. They find that arrangements (PTAs) substantially reduce common membership in various IOs increases the volatility of exports, leading to a higher the possibilities for the “passive” influence volume of exports. These studies seem to of IOs, but such a finding leaves wide open suggest that trade agreements are for the the exact nature of such influences (Mitchell most part self-enforcing, inasmuch as they and Hensel 2007). It is fair to say that many do not distinguish the more passive influence of these studies assert rather than document of “expectations” and reciprocity (Kono actual reputational damage as the unseen but 2007) from the more active application of presumably operative mechanism likely to WTO enforcement (legal retaliation). Some account for cooperative state behavior. While scholars emphasize the ability of the WTO to quite reasonable in many cases, “reputation” structure liberalizing negotiations in the first is difficult to observe empirically, which has place. Christina Davis, for example, attributes encouraged some researchers to turn to the trade liberalizing effect of the WTO to its experimental methods to test for the plausi- ability to link bargains across sectors, increas- bility of this mechanism (Tomz 2007). ing the range of actors with a stake in the Many empirical studies in the past couple negotiations’ success. Like Martin, Davis of decades have been designed to test the finds that the ability of international organi- claim that international organizations and zations to link issues enhances the prospects institutions increase cooperation by creating for international cooperation (Davis 2004). focal points that help to coordinate behavior. Rationalist theories also emphasize the A theoretically strong argument can be made nature of the information environment and that the mutual liberalization of markets is how IOs and IIs influence this environment. the paradigmatic “cooperative dilemma.” In The hypothesis most often tested is that IOs the absence of a clear rule (focal point), actively (and IIs passively) promote more states are tempted to protect their producers credible, unbiased information on the behav- from competition. Trade agreements create ior of actors than would be available in their clear focal points and reduce the transaction absence, making it possible to overcome costs of continual bargaining over terms of market failures that impede cooperation. market entry. If institutions could matter any- A spate of empirical studies has explored the where, it should be in ongoing commercial implications of such informational models. relations, where transaction costs are high David Bearce and co-authors credit the and temptations to defect from liberal trade informational functions of IOs (in this case, may exist, but the potential for joint gains is alliances, and conditional on power relations) also high. It was surprising, therefore, when with substantially reducing the risk of conflict Andrew Rose found in an initial study that among their members (Bearce et al. 2006; see there is no evidence that the WTO has influ- also Haftel 2007; Hansen et al. 2008). Several enced trade patterns (Rose 2004; see also empirical tests now exist that seek to show Gowa 2005). However, Goldstein et al. that the information-producing function of (2007) find that once the actual institutional IOs helps domestic audiences hold their standing of various states is taken into leaders accountable, which can have the account, the GATT/WTO has, in fact, effect of moderating governments’ behaviors substantially increased trade flows. Some in the direction of international norms.

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Xinyuan Dai’s domestic constituency mecha- the Security Council is in his view all about nism depends on the ability of international finding out what other political elites will human rights and environmental institutions tolerate, not what they have internalized as to produce credible information on a govern- legitimate. He provides qualitative evidence ment’s rights practices and pollution pat- that the Security Council has behaved rather terns, and she produces case studies on air inconsistently, but that nonetheless govern- pollution and human rights to illustrate her ments act as though the Council’s support is theory (Dai 2007). James Morrow makes a valuable. He sees Security Council decisions different argument that also depends on the as creating focal points regarding socially information function of international institu- acceptable uses of force through a process of tions. In his view, ratification of an agree- elite political judgment (Voeten 2005). ment itself reveals information in some cases. Terrence Chapman and Dan Reiter argue that Specifically, he argues ratification reveals gaining the approval of the UN Security information by signaling governments’ intent Council is useful for domestic political to comply with the laws of war, but that this reasons as well. UN approval for a US mili- signal is only effective for democratic gov- tary intervention greatly increases the extent ernments. He finds that the Geneva of public support for such interventions Conventions helps democratic governments (measured as presidential approval ratings), to cooperate through reciprocity because of and they argue that this is because the the information conveyed by the fact of rati- American public is thereby better informed fication ( Morrow 2007; see also Leeds of the likely success in these cases (Chapman 2003). and Reiter 2004). The UN Security Council has proved an Constructivist theories have inspired a rich especially fertile ground for testing theories empirical foray into the role of IOs in setting about the information functions of IOs. standards of appropriateness, diffusing inter- Alexander Thompson sees the Security national norms, and mobilizing various group Council as a medium for the transmission of socialization mechanisms to shape actors’ strategic information and, in particular, infor- behavior (Johnstone 2010). Inspired by the mation about the level of international sup- insights of scholars in political science as port offered to the coercing state. Thompson well as sociology, empirical work is looking argues that IOs that are known for their inde- into how and when states become “social- pendence, relative autonomy, and neutrality ized” to international norms through their are able to convey information both about the membership in international organizations. intentions of a potentially coercive state as Finnemore (1993, 1996) and Legro (1997) well as potential allies’ support. His qualita- study specific examples of norm promotion tive case study of the first Gulf War provides in international politics, finding that IOs can some suggestive evidence that in the absence play a crucial role in the systematic disper- of a UN Security Council resolution, the sion of beliefs and standards of appropriate United States would have faced much more behavior. Several interesting case studies international opposition to intervention, have argued that even in the most unlikely largely because many more states would case – that of China – states have changed have been highly skeptical of US intentions important aspects of their behavior as a result (Thompson 2006). Similarly, Erik Voeten of socialization in the context of international (2005) argues that states seek the blessing of organizations (Kent 2007; Acharya, and the Security Council not to find out what Johnston 2007). constitutes “appropriate” behavior, but rather Increasingly, researchers have noticed that to find out what kind of opposition they will IOs play a crucial role both in adopting face if they decide to go ahead and intervene norms promulgated by various international militarily in another country. Approaching civil society groups, and in promulgating

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these norms to their state membership. Cora bureaucratization of science (Drori 2003) to True-Frost’s case study of the United Nations the ratification of human rights treaties Security Council suggests that this central (Wotipka and Ramirez 2008). security institution has taken up the norms of World polity theorists have always been “human security” offered by a range of non- keenly aware that many of the apparent influ- state actors. These norms go well beyond its ences of IOs and IIs are quite superficial. traditional concerns with interstate conflict, “Institutional isomorphism” is the phrase and deal with issues such as women’s equal- they use to describe the adoption of bureau- ity, HIV/AIDS, and children’s rights. As “the cratic forms and formal policies that often do sole organ with the capacity for collective not signal either the capacity or the willing- judgment and mobilization of force in inter- ness fully to internalize the norms of western preting the UN Charter” (True-Frost 2007), scripts. This observation is consistent with the Council’s decision to “consume” and also empirical research that finds that the sociali- to promulgate broad notions of human secu- zation effects of IOs are quite conditional. rity has had an important impact on interna- While some have claimed that Western dem- tional conceptions of legitimate collective ocratic IOs have had an important socializing action in this area. Susan Park makes a simi- effect on new members from the eastern bloc lar point about the World Bank. The bank’s (Gheciu 2005), Frank Schimmelfennig’s case contacts with environmental NGOs overtime studies reveal that membership in the EU and have altered its “identity” as an institution NATO – both conceptualized as institutions and made it much more sensitive to the envi- with the capacity to socialize new members ronmental impact of its development projects to accept the liberal human rights norms of (Park 2005). These case studies analyze IOs the majority of members – influence the as both consumers and diffusers of norms human rights of liberal parties, but not those internationally. of antiliberal parties in Eastern and central One of the more well-developed lines of Europe (Schimmelfennig et al. 2006; inquiry into the role of IOs in shaping out- Schimmelfennig 2005). Several studies in the comes worldwide has been the contribution of human rights area note that international sociologists who advance theories of the socialization pressures quite often lead to world polity. As formulated by John Meyer, incomplete internalization of norms and the “world polity” refers to a rationalized but decoupling of form and practice (Hafner- decentralized world order centered in the cul- Burton et al. 2008). Bearce and Bondanella tural West and consisting of models or (2007) offer a possible resolution to this con- “scripts” that shape states, organizations, and flicting evidence, suggesting that short-term individual identities and ultimately their socialization efforts show little effect, but behavior (Meyer et al. 1997). This approach that in the longer term joint participation in eschews the radical individualism assumed by formal intergovernmental organizations does rational functionalism, and sees states as lead to interest convergence among mem- embedded in broader social structures of bers. Meanwhile, in East Asia, Becky which memberships in IOs and participation Shelley’s research suggests that the United in IIs are an expression. IOs exemplify and Nations has had a complex and ambiguous teach states the tenets of modern statehood – impact, in some cases delaying democratiza- from sovereignty to bureaucratic rationality to tion, and in some cases, such as Taiwan’s, the adoption of human rights. “Embeddedness” contributing only very indirectly (Shelley in the world polity – often proxied by mem- 2005). While undoubtedly IOs contribute in berships in IOs and participation in IO spon- some degree to changes in form and values, sored conferences – has been used to explain empirical research on the extent to which a range of outcomes, from the spread of genuine internalization takes place is quite public education (Meyer et al. 1992) to the speculative, not least because there seems to

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be no good way to observe norm internaliza- this section, we briefly sketch out what we tion in any reliable way. see as some of the most promising directions The central methodological difficulty in for ongoing and future research in this field, many of these empirical studies of the conse- noting where appropriate, authors who are quences of IOs and IIs has been to show that already engaging in research on these issues. they contribute to a causal explanation of We consider, in particular, the emergence of outcomes (Downs et al. 1996). Statistical networks of IOs and IIs; the relationship analyses have had to grapple – with varying between IOs and civil society; new directions degrees of success – with the problem that in work on IOs and domestic politics; and membership in IOs and commitments to IIs some normative issues. are themselves choice variables, creating hoary problems of endogeneity when trying to estimate “institutional effects.” Some of IOs, IIs, and Networked Politics the empirical research reflects skepticism. Ringquist and Kostadinova (2005), for exam- The rapid growth and diffusion of IOs and IIs ple, question whether environmental proto- has led some scholars to move their analysis cols have any causal impact, arguing that in to a different level, considering how clusters the case of sulfur dioxide emissions, states such as “regime complexes” (Raustiala and that intended to reduce emissions signed the Victor 2004) influence both institutions 1985 Helsinki Protocol, but that the protocol themselves and state behavior. As clusters of itself had no discernible effect. Oona institutions grow, networks emerge – some- Hathaway has made the same argument times including formal organizations, some- about human rights treaties (Hathaway 2002; times not (Kahler 2009). In these cases, IO but see Simmons 2009). influence is both direct and indirect; net- Overall, empirical work on IOs and IIs in works create possibilities for linkages the past decade has been rich, varied, and between states that would be difficult to increasingly sophisticated. It has ranged from forge in their absence. The network effects of military conflict to commercial relations to IOs may be at least partially responsible for human rights, embracing case studies as well the collective effect of these organizations in as statistical work. Reflecting the trends in mediating and settling international disputes theorizing, the boundaries between “schools (Dorussen and Ward 2008). Networks of of thought” have come down, and scholars are organizations may also enable learning within increasingly testing claims about how power institutions, as in the case of diffusion of and norms interact and even reinforce one capital taxation (Cao 2010; De Lange 2010). another (Hurd 2005; Neumann and Sending Networks of memberships in IOs magnify 2010). While there is room for skepticism, the the possibilities for cooperation and expanded thrust of much of the literature has been to joint gains among members, Scholars have show that the influences of IOs and IIs are found, for example, that trade relationships much more wide-ranging than might have are enhanced not just by belonging to the been supposed only a decade or two ago. WTO, but by participation in a broad net- work of IOs, including those that are prima- rily political or even cultural (Ingram et al. 2005); or by a thickening population of FUTURE DIRECTIONS regional organizations that operate alongside global institutions (Tavares 2010; Kirchner This survey of the extensive and growing and Dominguez 2011). As scholars consider literature on IOs and IIs suggests much the role of these networks in global govern- progress, yet many questions that continue to ance, they find a dense network of civil soci- demand answers and ongoing research. In ety actors who participate in both IOs and in

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politics at the local level (Armstrong 2010). together the institutional and societal dimen- Some consider these networks in terms of sions are needed. their “multiplier effects,” or the extent to which organizations overlap, coordinate their activities, and reinforce their messages and IOs, IIs, and the Domestic activities (Blavoukos and Bourantonis 2011; Connection Heintze and Zwitter 2010). The high level of institutionalization of most areas of interna- IR has long recognized that there are sys- tional relations suggests that the study of tematic connections between regime type these networks will become a more promi- and foreign policy orientations (see the nent aspect of scholarship in coming years. chapter by Schultz in this volume). For example, there is a long tradition in the study of international institutions of linking regime IOs and Civil Society support or “regime conducive foreign poli- cies” to reciprocity and conflict manage- IOs and IIs constitute structures within which ment, especially through IOs and IIs. Zuern international civil society actors operate stra- (1993) (Underdal 1995: 116; see also Cortell tegically. Some authors view these structures and Davis 1996). However, given the roots as placing limitations on the autonomy and of contemporary work on IOs and IIs, agency of NGOs. IOs constitute and affect at domestic politics have often received short least in part the international “opportunity shrift. This aspect of the literature has under- structure” in which civil society actors pursue gone rapid transformation in recent years their interests (Tarrow 2005; Joachim and (see Simmons 2009), and we anticipate sig- Locher 2009). Indeed, some scholars have nificant movement in this area in the near argued that the existence of IOs – and their future. cautious embrace of civil society participa- One approach to the problem of domestic tion in their activities – has had a good deal politics is to acknowledge that certain domes- to do with the growth of international civil tic actors have incentives to use and delegate society over the past several decades to IOs and IIs. In trade, for example, govern- (Reimann 2006). But as Kathryn Sikkink has ments delegate to IOs to realize join gains for pointed out, much depends on the extent to a society as a whole when they are blocked which institutions are “open” or “closed” to by domestic economic groups. Several schol- civil society participation: ““.... for some ars have interpreted international dispute activists, international institutions are part of settlement in trade, as well as territorial con- the solution, and for others they are the prob- flict, in this way (Goldstein 1996; Davis lem” (Sikkink 2004). IOs have exhibited 2012; Simmons 2002). In general, if pursuit substantial variation in the degree to which of gains over time involves short-term sacri- they have welcomed or opposed the partici- fices, turning to international institutions can pation of elements of civil society, even be an attractive option for domestic policy- within the same issue-area: compare, for makers. These institutions can enhance the example, the relative ease with which the commitment of the state as a whole. From a World Bank has engaged civil society to the domestic perspective, more importantly, they IMF’s grudging moves toward transparency. mobilize and empower particular interest What accounts for the nature of IO interac- groups, thereby shifting the weight of domes- tion with civil society actors, and what will tic politics. Through these mechanisms, IOs be the consequences of such interaction (or have an impact on the provision of domestic lack thereof)? So far, work on these ques- public goods, such as education (Bassett and tions has been intriguing but primarily Maldonado 2009; Martens et al. 2007) and descriptive; analytical frameworks that tie social/welfare policies (Ervik et al. 2009),

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areas that have not yet received sustained of ‘output oriented’ mechanisms. Such attention from IR scholars. discussions will have wide relevance, as Beyond interest groups, domestic politics demands for greater transparency and broader interact with IOs and IIs via the judicial participation in the decisions of the WTO, system. International norms and agreements the IMF, and the World Bank have recently are often adjudicated in domestic courts highlighted. (Simmons 2009; Sikkink 2011). As interna- Andrew Moravscik argues that when com- tional agreements take on a legal form, they pared to domestic regimes – and “calibrated are interpreted by domestic courts. Judges to reasonable expectations in the ‘second- can therefore use international law as a basis best’ world constrained by transaction costs, on which to make judgments (Alter 1996; commitment problems, and justice claims” Conforti 1993). In contrast, we can identify – the EU does in fact meet reasonably criteria growing instances in which national courts of democratic legitimacy (Moravcsik 2004). challenge the rulings and actions of interna- Others disagree, pointing to the conspicuous tional organizations, from sanctions imposed lack of contestation over political leadership by the Security Council, to acts of Interpol, and policy at the highest levels of the institu- to EU decisions about patents (Reinisch tion (Follesdal and Hix 2006). The EU has 2010). Regardless of the sign of this effect, responded to criticisms of a democratic defi- the fact of judicialization of the relationship cit by allowing for increased civil-society between IOs and domestic politics remains a participation, but scholars appear divided on pressing issue. whether this has significantly improved democracy on a regional level in Europe (Steffek et al. 2008; Smismans 2006). Despite Normative issues rejection of the European constitution, Risse and Kleine have argued that the process by The domestic level of analysis also allows us which European basic agreements are to ask questions of normative significance. adopted and changed retains a good deal of How and under what conditions can charac- legitimacy (Risse and Kleine 2007). What teristics valued in domestic politics be pre- are the standards by which we are to judge served in governance structures at the whether processes and structures within IOs international level? This concern has pro- are normatively acceptable? Once our scope gressed furthest in the discussion of the of analysis moves beyond the EU, is it pos- ‘democratic deficit’ in the EU .Critics of EU sible that we will find that different issue- structure argue that the inability of national areas require different sets of standards? parliaments to deeply influence EU decision Arguments such as those raised by Keohane, making, combined with the weakness of the Macedo, and Moravcsik (2009; see response European Parliament, mean that the EU itself by Gartzke and Naoi, 2011) about the rela- falls far short of the democratic standards it tionship between multilateralism and democ- demands of its members. This concern has racy have begun to scratch the surface of led to creative thinking about the meaning of these complex normative issues. ‘democracy,’ and whether the procedures that assure legitimacy on the international level should mimic those on the domestic level (Weiler 1995). Fritz Scharpf (1999) has CONCLUSIONS cogently argued that the lack of a strong ‘European identity’ means that measures The political study of international institu- such as majority voting that assure legiti- tions reveals a vibrant and diverse body of macy within states cannot do so on the scholarship. In recent decades, research has European level, and argues instead in favor turned from the study of formal IOs to the

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study of regimes and institutions, informal as synthesize our understanding of IOs and IIs. well as formal. For the most part, this turn For example, inspired by the writing of has been salutary, as it has reflected a broad Foucault, Neumann and Sending advance a interest not only in formal organizations but conception of international organizations as a in the deeper role that rules and norms play form of governing rationality (“governmen- in a system of formally co-equal states. tality”) that embraces liberal norms in the Initially, this turn was instigated by the context of state power challenged (though observation that much of what is interesting hardly rendered impotent) by globalization about world politics – especially during the (Neumann and Sending 2010) Cold War period – seemed to take place Several positive developments in the insti- among intensely interdependent actors, but tutional literature should be highlighted as beyond the purview of formal interstate we wrap up this discussion. First, scholars organizations. This turn was furthered by a from a range of approaches are showing a rational-functionalist approach to the study greater willingness to drop the assumption of of institutions, which took up the puzzle of unitary state actors and to engage systemati- how we could understand international coop- cally the world in which we live. For the eration at all, given the assumptions of neo- rationalists, this has meant looking to domes- realism prevalent in the American international tic institutional conditions that make it relations literature at the time. Meanwhile, in rational to delegate authority to international European circles, theorists of international institutions. For others working from a more society worked from sociological assump- sociological point of view, this has meant tions on a parallel question: how can order be drawing in a wide array of transnational maintained in an anarchical international actors that have been empowered by democ- society? ratization or international institutionalization These theoretical orientations have made itself. Much of the recent literature has fur- for interesting theoretical fireworks, as we thered our understanding of the complex have seen in the broader debates between milieu in which institutions operate by sys- today’s constructivists and rationalists. This tematically examining the relationship debate is clearly reflected in the institutional between governments, domestic coalitions, literature as a distinction between those who IOs, and transnational actors. view international institutions (including Despite these gains, weaknesses remain. institutional form) as rational responses to The major weakness we would point out is the strategic situations in which actors find the lack of confidence we have in the ability themselves, versus those who insist on a sub- to draw strong inferences from much of the jective interpretation of social arrangements research to date. Some scholars would, of (which may or may not be ‘rational’ and are course, deny that this is the point of the exer- unlikely to be understood through he use of cise, but we feel that more attention to the positive methodologies). These approaches causal mechanisms advanced, as well as in turn have spawned subsets of coherent much greater attention to research designs scholarship, such as the German school that allow for systematic comparisons across among the rationalists, or those who give time, across states, or across international primacy of place to normative explanations institutions, would greatly enhance our abil- among the constructivists. Each school has ity to explain the world around us. A careful its more state-centric proponents: the English look at literatures that develop theories of school among the constructivists; those domestic and transnational politics, for exam- whose mission it was to meet neorealism on ple, should be drawn upon more systemati- its own terms among the rational functional- cally if we are to understand the sources and ists. Theorizing is getting much more eclec- effects of international institutionalization. tic, drawing from a range of traditions to We also advocate thinking conditionally

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about institutional effects, as some of the Armstrong, J. David, ed. 2010. Civil Society and compliance literature has begun to do. Both International Governance: The Role of Non-State the research completed so far and the direc- Actors in Global and Regional Regulatory tions we identify for future research suggest Frameworks. Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon [England]; a promising and productive future for studies New York: Routledge. Barnett, Michael N, and L Coleman. 2005. “Designing of international institutions. Police: Interpol and the Study of Change in International Organizations.” International Studies Quarterly 49:593–619. Barnett, Michael N, and Martha Finnemore. 1999. NOTES “The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations.” International Organization 53 1 Subsequently, some scholars have divided this (4):699–732. definition and labeled the principles and norms Bassett, Roberta Malee, and Alma Maldonado. 2009. underlying an international relationship the “meta- International Organizations and Higher Education regime” while reserving the term “international Policy: Thinking Globally, Acting Locally? Milton regime” for specific rules and procedures in a given Park, Abingdon, Oxon; New York: Routledge. issue area. Aggarwal 1998, 4. Bearce, David H., and Stacy Bondanella. 2007. 2 “International Organizations, Socialization, and 3 Of course, this definition is not neutral in one important sense: it embodies our preference for the Member-State Interest Convergence.” International testing of theoretical propositions using social-scien- Organization 61 (4):703–33. tific methods. Bearce, David H., Kristen M. Flanagan, and Katharine 4 We limit ourselves in this chapter to public M. Floros. 2006. “Alliances, Internal Information, international organizations and institutions, and and Military Conflict among Member-States.” leave the analysis of private authority structures to International Organization 60 (03):595–625. Chapter 13. Blavoukos, Spyros, and Dimitris Bourantonis. 2011. The 5 This approach bears some affinity with socio- EU Presence in International Organizations. London; logical institutionalism, which emphasizes the role of New York: Routledge. “world culture” in explaining institutional isomor- Brune, Nancy, Geoffrey Garrett, and Bruce Kogut. phism across countries, but which might also account for growing participation in the network of interna- 2004. “The International Monetary Fund and the tional institutions that can result from such socializa- Global Spread of Privatization.” Imf Staff Papers 51 tion. See Meyer and Rowland 1977, Meyer et al. (2):195–219. 1994, and Thomas, Meyer, Ramirez, and Boli 1987. Bull, Hedley. 1977. The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics. New York: Columbia University Press. Bull, Hedley, and Adam Watson. 1984. “Introduction.” In The Expansion of International Society, ed. H. Bull REFERENCES and A. Watson. Oxford [Oxfordshire] New York: Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press. Acharya, Amitav, and Alastair I. Johnston, eds. 2007. Busse, Matthias, Jens Königer, and Peter Nunnenkamp. Crafting Cooperation: Regional International 2010. “FDI Promotion through Bilateral Investment Institutions in Comparative Perspective. Cambridge; Treaties: More Than a Bit?” Review of World New York: Cambridge University Press. Economics 146 (1):147–77. Alker, Hayward R., and Bruce M. Russett. 1965. World Buzan, Barry. 1993. “From International System to Politics in the General Assembly. New Haven: Yale International Society – Structural Realism and University Press. Regime Theory Meet the English School.” Alter, Karen. (1996) ‘The European Court’s political International Organization 47 (3):327–52. power’. West European Politics, (19):458–60. Cao, Xun. 2010. “Networks as Channels of Policy Alvarez, José E. 2005. International Organizations as Diffusion: Explaining Worldwide Changes in Capital Law-Makers. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Taxation, 1998–2006.” International Studies Press. Quarterly 54 (3):823–54. Arend, Anthony Clark. 1999. Legal Rules and Carr, Edward Hallett. 1964. The Twenty Years’ Crisis, International Society. Oxford: Oxford University 1919–1939: An Introduction to the Study of Press. International Relations. New York: Harper & Row.

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