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1990 The Latest Wave: A Critical Review of Regime Literature

Keeley, James F.

Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich Canada

Keeley, J. F., "The Latest Wave: A Critical Review of Regime Literature." In. David G. Haglund and Michael K. Hawes (eds.), World Politics: Power, Interdependence and Dependence, (Toronto, ON: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich Canada, 1990), pp. 553-569. http://hdl.handle.net/1880/45007 book part

Downloaded from PRISM: https://prism.ucalgary.ca THE LATEST WAVE: A CRITICAL REVIEW OF REGIME LITERATURE

James F. Keeley

In the late 1960s, the preoccupation of mainstream international relations theorists in North America with realist-defined issues of military security began to break down. Trade, investment, and monetary developments led to a rediscovery of economics as a factor in international political life. A literature on interdependence and transnational relations began to develop. Other issues, such as the man­ agement of the environment, also arose as themes in international relations. In 1975, the journal International Organization presented a special issue, "Inter­ national Responses to Technology," which might be seen as representing an early approach to the issue of international regimes.1 In 1977, Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., produced Power and Interdependence, which tried to come to grips with interdependence and world politics, in part through the ana­ lytical device of "regimes."2 In 1982, another special issue of International Or­ ganization focussed explicitly on the regimes concept.3 Since that time, regimes have constituted a significant, though debated, focus in the North American in­ ternational relations literature, with International Organization as the major forum for their discussion and exploration. The regime literature does not present a coherent whole, although it does display certain strong tendencies. The general concept of a regime points broadly to regularized, conscious, co-ordinated, long- (or at least medium-) term patterns of behaviour, ostensibly co-operative in nature, by which states (and other actors?) seek to manage their coexistence. It defines and approaches a general problem- area of international relations as occurring within and constituting ill-defined and possibly quite unstable communities. This orientation puts it somewhat at odds with that of realism, in which a zero-sum competition over national security among unified, rational state actors is the root formulation. Although one might argue that it is nowhere required by the concept, regimes tend to be approached to some degree as fairly benevolent, if not also voluntary, management devices created and maintained by dominant states. The literature thus tends to focus,

*The author wishes to thank Sheila K. Singh for her comments on an earlier draft; he is responsible, however, for all statements made here.

553 554 World Politics above all, on the great powers, and, in some cases, has an ideological and apol­ ogetic content as well as an empirical and/or a theoretical one. It also shows a tendency to be drawn into the old dispute between liberals and realists. In the following pages, we shall survey very briefly a few main points in the regime literature, noting some concepts, themes, analytical devices, problems, and applications.

Some Fundamentals International actors exist in a web of relations that allows both individual and co-ordinated, as well as co-operative and competitive, behaviour. These actors, seeking to manage their affairs and their environments, exist in at least a weak social situation. In this setting, the existence of others implies possibilities for both resistance and co-operation, and for shared as well as competing or in­ dependent interests and judgements on the part of others: the "war of all against all" does not capture its complexity. Regimes are management devices in this weak society. As such, they are affected, in part, by "objective" factors at work in the international system regardless of the knowledge or perceptions of actors; but they also can and do reflect how these actors define and understand their situations. Thus, we find in the dominating definition of international regimes, Krasner's, a strong emphasis on essentially psychological and normative factors, on how actors understand and organize their world:

Regimes can be defined as sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations. Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice.4 Regimes thus touch on the creation, transformation, and action within social constructions of reality as much as they do upon an objectively defined reality. If this conceptualization is accepted, then the realist concentration on "objective facts," such as distributions of power, is inadequate as the sole basis for an un­ derstanding of international relations. How actors understand their world is not fully predictable on the basis of power alone; thus, how they attempt to organize their world cannot be fully predictable on this basis, either. Rather, an analysis limited strictly to power implicitly operates within assumptions about the possible existence and the character of such understandings. A difficulty arises, however, in that the primary non-Marxian alternative to realism is some variant of liberal pluralism; thus, the old debate identified in earlier chapters of this volume tends to be revived in a new guise in the regime literature. Some problems occur in Krasner's definition. There seem to be difficulties in identifying its components (principles, norms, etc.) in specific cases. Aggarwal thus relegates principles and norms to a "metaregime" existing somewhere above a specific regime of rules and decision-making procedures, and presumably in- The Latest Wave 555 forming a variety of such specific regimes.5 This approach shifts rather than solves the problem, and the identification problem leads to others. Given sufficient loose­ ness in defining principles and norms, just about any groups of behaviours could be dumped into a box labelled "regimes" and treated as if they somehow formed a coherent whole: the criteria for identifying and distinguishing among regimes are not well developed. This is a matter of some importance to Krasner's def­ inition, since he proposes that changes of principles and norms be regarded as changes of regimes, while changes of rules and decision-making procedures be regarded as changes in regimes. A diminished ability to identify and distinguish among these components would also affect attempts to examine regime change, since what is changing may, therefore, be difficult to specify. A problem also arises concerning relations among regimes (assuming we do not treat them as essentially isolated). Aggarwal's approach does lead to one ordering possibility: that some, more specific, regimes may be connected to, "nested" in, or otherwise dependent on, other broader regimes in a hierarchical relationship. So, he suggests, trade and monetary regimes are ultimately located within a structure of the international distribution of power. In similar terms, we might argue that specific formalized regimes may exist within a structure of broader and more fundamental concepts of international law. In a parallel vein would be some arguments about "issue-structural" versus "overall structural" explanations of changes in specific issue-areas, the theoretical problems of in­ creasing incongruities between power distributions in different issue-areas in an issue-structural analysis, and the possibility that some forms of power and some issue-areas are ultimately dominant, are "trumps," however difficult or costly to play.6 The nesting argument, then, has potential, although we should not ignore the possibilities for more complex and flexible and less hierarchical relationships as well. Assuming we can identify the principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures of interest — that we can, in effect, specify a regime in at least useful, although not necessarily definitive terms — what are its other key characteristics? Listed here are six important considerations regarding the appearance and sus- tainability of regimes.7

1. Formation: whether contractual, imposed, or spontaneous.8 There is a tendency to assume a contractual model, aided no doubt by the convenience of focussing on international organizations and on formal multilateral ar­ rangements as key mechanisms for and definitive statements of interna­ tional regimes. The idea of an imposed order points out the possibility of malevolent or coercive regimes, while the contractual approach favours a view of regimes as voluntary and benevolent, and encourages liberal analyses. The idea of a spontaneous order suggests the fundamental, al­ though largely ignored, relevance of international customary law as a basic example of a regime (as well as a basic regime in "nesting" approach). 2. Strength: the degree of compliance with regime rules. This consideration is connected to a focus on processes of regime creation and erosion. In 556 World Politics

the regime literature, it centres largely on the theme of hegemonic stability, and is connected to analyses drawn from the collective-goods literature. Another approach, that of Haas, links regime strength with cognitive rather than power considerations.9 3. Form: here again, there may be a tendency to identify regimes with formal international organizations, or at least formal multilateral statements of principles. As already noted, however, a consideration of the procedures, institutions, and character of international customary law, which are highly decentralized, might modify this tendency. 4. Scope: the range of issues covered by a regime. This consideration touches on the very definition of the issue-area within which the regime is operating. Haas starts at this point in treating regimes as disputable packages of specific issues, brought together in more or less strong and stable, and thus more or less changeable, regimes.10 5. Modes of resource allocation: the means used to distribute resources or, we might suggest, rights. These could be markets and private right systems, or some form of joint-management system. Some argue that a tendency exists in the literature, deriving perhaps from collective-goods analyses and ideas of "global commons," to focus on, if not favour, joint- management schemes." 6. Actors: this term permits a variety of actor types to be involved in in­ ternational regimes — states, private actors, individuals, international or­ ganizations, and so on. By and large, states are regarded as the dominant actors in international regimes.

In terms of basic theoretical orientations to the concept of international re­ gimes, Krasner has identified three positions.12 The key question here seems to be, "Do regimes matter, or are they mere epiphenomena?" The positions are:

1. Structuralism: argues that regimes are epiphenomena, manifestations of the distribution of power, rather than having a significant independent existence or effect. In such a formulation, regimes are variables dependent on power. This position is readily identifiable as realist. 2. Grotianism: the opposing position, one that argues the significant existence and effects of regimes: that regimes are independent variables in their own right, permeating international life. The very concept of regimes, as Krasner notes, tends to favour this position, since it argues their importance for study as causal factors, whereas the structuralist position would see them primarily as outcomes, and perhaps only as incidental outcomes at that. 3. Modified structuralism: the classic, uneasy middle ground. This position incorporates elements of realism, including a focus on states and a concern for state power, while arguing that regimes do have effects on international behaviour that make them worth studying. Thus, regimes are seen as being The Latest Wave 557

significant intervening variables between power and outcomes. Aside from organizing behaviour, regimes may affect actor definitions of interest or the distribution of advantages and disadvantages, two possibilities of in­ terest from a Grotian perspective as well. Krasner himself identifies the Grotian position with liberalism; thus, the old realist- liberal debate is revived rather than being transcended by this formulation.13 This association with the old debate is a fundamental limitation on the ability of regime theory to point to new directions in the analysis of international relations, as­ suming that it can resolve its other difficulties.

Approaches and Themes Although the regime literature is not strongly organized around any one theory, a number of thematic points do seem to recur in various combinations. As an illustration of some of these, we will look at two major and connected streams of thinking in the literature: the use of rational-actor analyses and the "theory of hegemonic stability." These are strongly associated with the modified- structuralist position, itself the main theoretical path of development in the regime literature. They deal with or arise from two basic questions: how do regimes form? and why do they form? This chapter focusses mainly on the latter question. The specific focus of individual scholars will, of course, vary, and each stage in this argument is subject to its own disputes. There are also approaches that operate outside of these lines of analysis, at least to some degree. Why do states resort to international regimes to organize their coexistence? Rational-actor analyses derived from economics provide one way of searching for the answer. Presumably, if actors engage in relatively co-operative behaviour, they do so because the pay-offs are greater for such behaviour than for unilateral efforts. A classic statement of this possibility — and of its difficulties — is found in the Prisoner's Dilemma game. In such a game, both parties can be better off by co-operating, rather than by competing with each other: it is a non-zero- sum game in which each may benefit. However, either party may be better off if it lets the other engage in co-operative behaviour and then exploits this situation by refusing to co-operate in turn. Since both parties realize this, there is a strong tendency for defection to occur and, thus, for both parties to suffer (or at least do less well than they could) because of their inability to solve the problem of co-operation. If, however, this game is repeated many times, there is a greater chance that co-operative patterns of behaviour may become established, as there is both an opportunity for learning that co-operation pays off and that trust may be possible, and a potential penalty for defecting in the loss of future benefits from co-operation.14 A different, yet related, line of reasoning is found in theories of collective goods.15 These goods are indivisible (their enjoyment by one does not reduce the amount available for enjoyment by others) and freely available (if they are 558 World Politics available to any in a group, they are available to all). In many cases, actors may be unable to provide these goods for themselves by unilateral action, and thus may require co-ordination to obtain them. In other cases, one or a few large actors may be able to provide the good to others, although not necessarily in such quantities as might be desired. In either case, a major problem may be the "free rider" — an actor who receives the goods but refuses to contribute resources for its supply. If there are enough free riders, the level of resources available for its supply may be insufficient to meet the demand, or even to allow the provision of the good in any quantity at all. Again, we face a problem of co-ordination to achieve mutual benefits. What benefits might regimes offer? Specific, concrete gains might be obtained by regulating otherwise potentially costly or destructive behaviour in certain issue- areas. In the absence of such co-ordination, oceans may be overfished or polluted, trade may be hindered by protectionism or special bilateral arrangements, and so on. However, since regimes are solutions to problems of co-ordination for mutual benefit, in this capacity they may, themselves, be treated as collective goods. Among the more general and abstract benefits offered by regimes as so­ lutions to co-ordination problems, Keohane notes the following:I6 1. Regimes increase the predictability of behaviour, insofar as they set out rules or guidelines to which actors are expected to adhere. As uncertainty is reduced and the expectation of regular, beneficial co-operation develops, costly hedging against defection by others (which can include being pre­ pared to defect oneself) can be reduced or avoided. 2. Regimes provide generalized sets of rules, including those regarding rights and liabilities, which might then be applied in a variety of relevant re­ lationships among sets of actors, rather than leaving them to work out fresh rules for each such relationship. Aside from the simplicity and pre­ dictability thus achieved, this system reduces the difficulty of working out new bilateral relations by allowing the parties to draw on existing structures of rules. Conversely, these rules may render illegitimate, and thus more costly, certain other kinds of agreements and relationships. Thus, regimes may provide standardized, agreed-upon formulas and procedures to help actors govern their relations. Once such a framework exists, it is easier to use it again than to create a new framework. So, for example, the In­ ternational Atomic Energy Agency's safeguards system could acceptably replace a network of bilateral arrangements, providing a set of standardized obligations and rights acceptable to suppliers and recipients, and thus be seen as less of an intrusion on sovereignty than were bilateral safeguards. Once the principle and the practice of international safeguards had been accepted, the IAEA system could be drawn upon and modified in creating the system of non-proliferation treaty safeguards. 3. Under some circumstances, regimes may reduce differentials among actors in the information available to them. By reducing asymmetries in infor­ mation, they may make agreement more likely by reducing fears of being The Latest Wave 559

taken advantage of. They may also create greater "transparency" in agree­ ments among other parties, so that actors have a better idea of what others are doing in their agreements. Here, again, the IAEA's safeguards systems could serve as an example.

The "theory of hegemonic stability" follows particularly from the collective- goods approach. It argues that regimes may be characteristically, if not necessarily, dependent on action by a single, highly capable actor that is able to underwrite the costs of organizing a regime, which then becomes available for other actors.17 Provision of a collective good by one capable actor is one response to the problem of co-ordination, although free riding by others may make the supply of the good less than optimal. It is not that co-ordination by a group of actors is im­ possible, but rather that it is more difficult to achieve than action by one or a few powerful actors. Such an actor may simply impose its system, or it may make some effort to persuade others of the desirability of its activities, or it may try to take the interests of others into account in an effort to reduce en­ forcement costs. Thus, while regime theory points out the benefits of co-operation, the construction of a regime to obtain these may require, or at least be favoured by, substantially unilateral action by the powerful. If we accept this account of the creation of a regime, what happens should the hegemon decline? Strict adherence to the theory argues that a regime will decline as the hegemon loses the power to reward co-operation and punish de­ fection. This line of reasoning favours a structuralist position. A more Grotian or modified-structuralist argument is that actors may learn to co-operate and, therefore, may come to value a regime (thus, that regimes may affect, perhaps transform, the interests and the interest calculations of participants). The pos­ sibility then exists that a regime, even if established by a hegemon, may survive that actor's decline as other capable actors come to its support.18 A final element, somewhat undeveloped, that could be connected to this stream of thinking concerns the role of domestic politics. In this, the regime lit­ erature might build on examinations of the interaction between foreign (especially economic) policy and domestic political institutions and structures.19 When the focus is on a hegemon, this element would tend to centre on the internal politics of that actor, for example, the response of its population to the relative increase in the burden of maintaining the regime as its relative capability declines. Rational-actor analyses and the theory of hegemonic stability have become major foci of thinking in the regime literature: the former offers a set of powerful and attractive analytical devices, while the latter offers an apparently powerful hypothesis. Taken together, they draw on elements associated with structural real­ ism, yet they may also be adapted to liberal analyses and conclusions, seemingly bridging the gap between these schools.20 Certain difficulties and problems arise, however, in these two foci and from their interconnection. First, both the "free rider" emphasis in collective-goods analyses and the concentration on the hegemon tend to assume the legitimacy of the regime and the general desirability of the goods it provides. Neither requires, but both tend 560 World Politics

to invite, treatments of regimes as benevolent, desirable, legitimate, and voluntary. Thus, although in one form it seems realist in character, the theory of hegemonic stability seems to have been developed along mainly liberal lines. Robert Gilpin's work demonstrates that this liberal tendency need not arise: he treats hegemons as creating regimes for their own benefit, rather than implicitly or "objectively" acting for the good of the entire community.21 Oran Young, as already noted, allows for regimes to be created through imposition and spontaneous development as well as through contractual means. Although Krasner identifies Young with the Grotian position, Young's recognition of imposed regimes in particular would seem to challenge his easy placement in this camp.22 There are, in any event, alternatives to this fundamental tendency in these streams. Second, both collective-goods analyses and the theory of hegemonic stability tend to approach nonhegemonic actors primarily as presenting problems to be solved by a dominant state acting on behalf of all right-thinking persons. They are actors that must be organized by the hegemon, because of their own lack of capabilities (if not also the attractiveness of free riding), for the sake of the community as a whole. A strong and widely used theory of regimes from a non- hegemonic perspective does not seem to exist as yet. Third, it is worth noting that the theory of hegemonic stability seems to be used particularly in studies of economic issues (the major focus of the regime literature itself) but less, and more questioningly, in security-area studies. Perhaps power is less concentrated in the security area than in economics, although the theory should still apply within blocs.23 It is at least interesting, and a challenge for older realist theories of international relations, that the favoured economic regime (formed on liberal principles) should seem to be identified with the principle of hegemony,24 while classic realism prefers the balance of power in security af­ fairs. Perhaps liberals are the true supporters of hegemony? However, one might argue that the differences in the handling of the security and the economic realms merely reflect differences, from the perspective of a dominant state, between re­ lations within and relations among hegemonic systems. More generally, it is in­ triguing that the utility of regime theory is questioned most in the area most amenable to a basic realist approach, while it is very widely used in an area in which liberal economic analyses (with attendant implicit or explicit political assumptions) are most strongly entrenched. It is a curious attempt, perhaps, to provide particularly structural-realist underpinnings for a liberal economic analysis. Fourth, there is a close connection between the theory of hegemonic stability and the perception of a decline in U.S. power. Thus, for critics such as Susan Strange, the theory of regimes more generally reflects a specifically American set of preoccupations.25 One might more generally suspect that the theory, par­ ticularly as it points to the erosion of regimes with the decline of the hegemon, might readily degenerate into a form of special pleading for rising states to support the order of things created and favoured by that hegemon. Beyond this is the empirical question of whether or not American hegemony really is declining.26 The Latest Wave 561

Fifth, it is not, in fact, clear just how well the theory of hegemonic stability works. Keohane, prominent in its development, has been careful to note its am­ biguities and inadequacies.27 Others have seen fit to modify it, or to challenge it more substantially.28 The simplicity of the theory, its connections with both the well-developed analytical devices of rational-actor models (thus, with appar­ ently rigorous theory) and currently popular structural realism, yet also its re­ lationship to both liberal regimes and analyses and to American concerns, has its attractions despite these limitations. As well, the absence of a well-developed alternative capable of outweighing these factors may account for its persistence in the face of difficulties. If no other approach can replace it, but a sense of its inadequacies spreads, it might persist as a negative starting point, a source of anomalies, for theoretical and empirical work. A final feature of rational-actor models is that they focus on certain technical difficulties in convergence processes among actors, rather than on the substance of the expectations and understandings among which this convergence is supposed to occur. The benefits of such a well-developed set of analytical devices, in laying bare the implications of interdependent decision making, among other things, are clear and attractive, as are their associations with one variety of realism. However, they may tend to encourage assumptions of shared orientations and judgements on substantive issues on the part of actors, or the alternative of the imposition of one solution on others, which might then be justified through various arguments. In either case, the substantive content of a dispute may be ignored or treated as unproblematic, with the focus then falling on the processes and problems of organizing action. This focus is not objectionable in itself, but it does overlook the implication in the Krasner definition that how people understand their world may affect their activities, and thus their attempts to organize action, within that world. While the combination of rational-actor analysis and hegemonic-stability the­ ory is the best developed in the literature, it is by no means the only possibility, as the work of Gilpin and Young, among others, demonstrates. One intriguing alternative is found in the early framework proposed by John Ruggie.29 This framework was centred on the two concepts of a negotiated collective situation and a negotiated collective response. The former focussed particularly on the nature of the interdependent relationship among actors, while the latter was con­ cerned with the objectives and the forms of response adopted by those actors in dealing with this situation. These components, being rather better developed than the "principles, norms, etc." of the now-dominant definition, perhaps could have avoided some of the difficulties that definition faces. While it kept open the possibility for game-theoretic and related analyses, this framework also placed emphasis on understandings of the situation. Unfortunately, the framework does not seem to have been strongly developed into a theory, and was displaced by the later lines of analysis. Related to this early framework, however, is the work of Ernst Haas on cog­ nitive factors in international regimes.30 Haas focusses on how actors understand 562 World Politics individually, and construct jointly, their situations and especially how they con­ struct the issue-areas governed by regimes. Depending on the degree of consensus on these understandings, on the means by which issues are connected within the regime, and the bargaining styles of the participating actors, regimes may be more or less vulnerable to changes in power and knowledge. For example, issue-areas and regimes held together by "tactical linkage," short-term efforts to extract quid pro quos, may be particularly vulnerable because they lack any other source of coherence than immediate advantage. Haggard and Simmons note the predictive difficulties of a cognitive approach, in part because of the problem of predicting knowledge and in part because of the need to incorporate power considerations.31 Mention should also be made of the work of Friedrich Kratochwil on the concept of norms and on the power and functioning of social conventions.32 Kra­ tochwil draws particular inspiration from the Scottish philosopher David Hume. While some implications of his work can be directed to the question of regime change, it is, as he points out, also relevant to the question of why and how regimes work in the first place. His approach, as well as those of Ruggie, Haas, and perhaps Young, is less dominated by rational-actor techniques of analysis and emphasizes the social character of regimes. In this, these approaches open up regime theory to considerations drawn from the realm of sociology, for ex­ ample, the work of Durkheim and more recently Foucault, and even to analyses that could draw on the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein on the use of language.33 These approaches generally place more stress on how actors interpret and un­ derstand their world, and are less tied to the fundamental model of rational, individualized actors acting on the bases of power and calculations of self-interest. They are, thus, free to depart substantially from both realist and liberal assump­ tions about actors and about international relations. Such freedom also means, however, that the methods, theoretical statements, and conclusions that these sorts of approaches will produce will clash somewhat with the more standard methods, approaches, and conclusions of the discipline.

Some Applications The concept of a regime is quite loose. The term could be used by a variety of scholars, within a variety of approaches, and with a varying level and character of theoretical content. "Regime" would well be, or become, a mere buzzword as a result, the latest fashionable term in a discipline somewhat prone to fashion. One can, therefore, expect a wide range of applications of regime notions, or at least a widespread use of the term, in a variety of empirical areas of study. The listing given here is intended, however, to cover applications of a more or less theoretically conscious nature. The breadth of actual applications suggests the pervasiveness of the phenomenon touched on by regimes (or, at least, the truth of the biblical injunction "seek and ye shall find"). It suggests the potential importance of regime theory in bringing co-operative behaviour and the concept The Latest Wave 563

of an international society into the heart of international relations theory, thereby mounting a serious challenge to contemporary realist theory. Early realms of interest were the broad areas of environmental regulation and technological co-operation. These were the foci for the "International Re­ sponses to Technology" issue of International Organization, a portion of Power and Interdependence, and the work of M'Gonigle and Zacher.34 In the narrower area of nuclear nonproliferation, Rochlin provides an illustration of an application of an early Haas-Ruggie approach, while Schiff's is a later application; Smith tests hegemonic stability theory in the nonproliferation context more recently.35 Other areas have included food, human rights, and international law.36 In the troubling area of security, Jervis, in particular, has been a leading writer, although Haas, Lipson, and Nye, among others, have also been at work.37 The relative nature of power (and, thus, the tendency to zero-sum rather than non-zero-sum games), and the high stakes and costs of errors and thus the par­ ticular allure of hedging against defection in the military-security area, among other factors, appear to pose substantial problems for regime development. This area, then, seems to present a limiting case for regime theory. It is, above all, in the broad area of international economic relations — generally, in trade and in monetary relations — that regime analyses have proved to be most popular, and where the theory of hegemonic stability has been most often applied or tested. Kindleberger, Aggarwal, Zacher, Keohane, Krasner, and others have been active in this area.38 It is particularly here, as well, that the curious combination of liberalism and realism in the regime literature is strongest. Outside of the major stream identified here, associated with a combination of rational-actor analyses and hegemonic-stability theories, there are a variety of writers. Gilpin, Young, Haas, Kratochwil, Ruggie, and Rochlin have already been noted in this regard, but they are by no means the only ones.39

International Regimes: New Wave or New Fad?

The literature on international regimes has grown quickly over the last decade, but does this concept represent a new, potentially a very substantial, departure in the discipline of international relations, or is it merely one of a series of fads, as some have charged? Some significant reviews of the literature point to a variety of problems facing it: it is too tied to American concerns and perceptions, it is vague at key points, it is state-centric, it tends to be biassed toward liberal and status-quo orders, and so on.40 At the same time, at least some see hope for it, although their prescriptions to cure its ills may vary. Young, for one, holds out some aspiration for the concept "reintegrating the subfields of international politics, economics, law, and organization."41 This survey of the regime literature has itself been rather negative in tone, finding that literature to be flawed in some fundamental ways, but it would not simply dismiss regimes out of hand. The concept could be simply the latest fad, 564 World Politics or could succumb to its many problems, yet, if that were to be its fate, it would be a tragedy for the discipline. The regime concept allows a fruitful extension of a line of thinking that has opened up, particularly since the recognition of interdependence in the theoretical literature, that actors (states and others) are caught in a set of strategic interdependent relations of both zero-sum and non-zero-sum character, that these actors both act within and create systems of regularized behaviours and expectations, and that their understandings of the world constitute significant factors in international relations. This set of considerations points both to some central problems currently facing regime theory and to a direction for a response. On the one hand, regime theory could challenge structural realism, which seems to offer little grasp on social or community phenomena because of its fixation on power and on a theory that is hamstrung by an unreasonable parsimony. The international world, it seems, may not be, or at least may not necessarily be, a Hobbesian state of nature; indeed, the whole "state of nature/state of war" formulation may be not only highly conditional but also seriously misleading. Simplistic realism — and structural realism is simplistic — simply will not do. Thus, and conversely, too ready and uncritical an adoption of realist devices and reasoning, in an attempt to protect the concept of regimes from realist attacks, could be harmful. On the other hand, the defects of a liberal analysis, as well as of an analysis assuming that American concerns, attitudes, and perceptions are synonymous with those of everyone else (or, at least, of all right-thinking actors), are also clear, however attractive such analyses may become when writers turn from theory to prescrip­ tion. One fundamental problem of regime theory, then, is that it has been placed in a continuum between a simplistic realism and an apologetic and hopeful lib­ eralism. In such a contest, over the long term one would expect the liberals to be "mugged by reality." It would not, after all, be the first time for them. The existence of other streams of thinking besides rational-actor analyses and liberal-oriented hegemonic-stability theory points to both an opportunity and a danger in the future of that literature. An escape from tendencies to treat regimes as Good Things (and from U.S. preoccupations about regimes), even if some aspects of a rational-actor analysis were retained, could open up regime thinking to serious questions arising primarily on the political-theoretical Left, in the realm of international political economy. It could broaden and deepen our understanding of regimes as reflecting communities or a rough international society. If regime theories are perceived, however, as apologetics for liberal orders and for the United States, one can expect that this possibility will be lost as the regime baby is rejected along with the liberal/U.S. bathwater, as liberal analyses fail, and as American concern over the global position of the United States waxes and wanes. If this is what happens — that is, if the current lines of development of regime theory persist — then the concept will turn out to be a fad. If, however, the question, the problem, of international society can be posed in regime theory in a way that escapes the limitations of structural realism while not sliding into the liberal camp (or adopting alternatives such as therapeutic do-goodism or Ut­ opian Marxism), then the possibility for a genuinely new development in The Latest Wave 565 international relations theory presents itself. Such innovation would require some backtracking from the currently dominant line of theoretical development in the regime literature that has captured the regime concept in a debate primarily be­ tween a realism that rejects it and a liberalism attempting to use realist theories, devices, and approaches to support liberal analyses. We are not required to turn away from power and from disputes as central factors in political life. Neither are we required to forgo the use of rational-actor analyses as ways of gaining insights into the implications of interdependence. Regime theory gives us a chance to build on the insights of realism while escaping the restrictions of its structuralist formulation. It gives us a chance to move beyond the old liberal-realist debate, to draw on philosophical, sociological, and other sources of insights that could liberate us from this debate, and thus possibly to grapple more successfully with a world that fits neither a narrow realist nor a liberal perspective. It gives us a chance to bring real political philosophy — real inquiries into the character of political life, rather than the special pleadings and schemes of ideologues and apolitical Utopians or their equally sterile rejection in the name of the eternal verities of power — back into the study of international relations.

NOTES

1. John G. Ruggie, ed., "International Responses to Technology," a special issue of International Organization 29 (Summer 1975). 2. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr. Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977). 3. This was later reissued as Stephen D. Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983). 4. Krasner, International Regimes, 2. 5. Oran R. Young, "International Regimes: Toward a New Theory of Institutions," World Politics 39 (October 1986): 106-7; Vinod K. Aggarwal, Liberal Protectionism: The In­ ternational Politics of Organized Textile Trade (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 4, 16-20. 6. Aggarwal, Liberal Protectionism; Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, 11-22,42-54. 7. Save as otherwise noted, these are drawn from the listing in Stephen Haggard and Beth Simmons, "Theories of International Regimes," International Organization 41 (Sum­ mer 1987): 496-98. 8. Oran R. Young, "International Regimes: Problems of Concept Formation," World Politics 32 (April 1980): 349-51. 9. For example, Ernst B. Haas,"Why Collaborate? Issue-Linkage and International Re­ gimes," World Politics 32 (April 1980): 357-405. 566 World Politics

10. This is a major element in Haas's "cognitive" approach to regimes. See his "Why Collaborate?" 11. For example, John A.C. Conybeare, "International Organization and the Theory of Property Rights," International Organization 34 (Summer 1980): 307-34. 12. Krasner, ed., International Regimes, viii, 5-10, 355-68. 13. There are other possibilities: some regime theorists who employ the "theory of hege­ monic stability" also draw to some degree on Gramsci's concept of hegemony, a Marxian notion. See, for example, Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). 14. See Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984), for an examination of the development of co-operation over time in a Prisoner's Dilemma situation. For a critique of Axelrod, see Joanne Gowa, "Anarchy, Egoism, and Third Images: The Evolution of Cooperation and International Relations," International Or­ ganization 40 (Winter 1986): 167-93. For some approaches to regimes using Prisoner's Dilemma and other game-theory analyses, see, for example, Arthur A. Stein, "Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World," in International Regimes; and Kenneth A. Oye, "Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies," World Pol­ itics 38 (October 1985), later published as Kenneth A. Oye, ed., Cooperation under Anarchy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985). 15. See, for example, Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965). 16. Keohane, After Hegemony, 85-109. 17. See Keohane, After Hegemony, 31-46, for a discussion of hegemony and the theory of hegemonic stability. 18. Keohane, in After Hegemony, holds out this possibility. 19. See, for example, Peter J. Katzenstein, "International Relations and Domestic Struc­ tures: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States," International Organ­ ization 30 (Winter 1976): 1-46; and Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States (Madison: University of Wis­ consin Press, 1978). Haggard and Simmons, "Theories of International Regimes," 513-17, call for increased attention to domestic political factors to correct an excessive reliance on systemic, especially structural, theories. 20. Keohane, in After Hegemony (e.g., p. 9), is quite clear about this. 21. Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). Haggard and Simmons, "Theories of International Regimes," 502, charac­ terize Gilpin's approach as a "malign" view of regimes. It might be more accurate simply to note that it is nonliberal. 22. See note 8 above. 23. For a study of the East European case, see Valerie Bunce, "The Empire Strikes Back: The Transformation of the Eastern Bloc from a Soviet Asset to a Soviet Liability," International Organization 39 (Winter 1985): 1-46. 24. See, for example, Stephen D. Krasner, "State Power and the Structure of International Trade," World Politics 28 (April 1976): 317-47. The Latest Wave 567

25. Susan Strange, "Cave! Hie Dragones: A Critique of Regime Analysis," in Inter­ national Regimes. 26. For example, Bruce Russett, "The Mysterious Case of Vanishing Hegemony; Or, Is Mark Twain Really Dead?" International Organization 39 (Spring 1985): 207-32; and Susan Strange, "The Persistent Myth of Lost Hegemony," International Organization 41 (Autumn 1987): 233-60. 27. Robert O. Keohane, "The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in Inter­ national Economic Regimes, 1967-1977," in Change in the International System, ed. O.R. Holsti, R.M. Siverson and A.L. George (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1980). See also After Hegemony, 35-39. 28. See, for example, Timothy J. McKeown, "Hegemonic Stability Theory and 19th Cen­ tury Tariff Levels in Europe," International Organization 37 (Winter 1983): 73-92; Peter F. Cowhey and Edward Long, "Testing Theories of Regime Change: Hegemonic Decline or Surplus Capacity?" International Organization 37 (Spring 1983): 157-88; Arthur A. Stein, "The Hegemon's Dilemma: Great Britain, the United States, and the International Economic Order," International Organization 38 (Spring 1984): 355-86; Duncan Snidal, "The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory," International Organization 39 (Autumn 1985): 579-614; and Roger K. Smith, "Explaining the Non-Proliferation Regime: Anomalies for Contemporary International Relations Theory," International Organization 41 (Spring 1987): 253-81. 29. John G. Ruggie, "International Responses to Technology: Concepts and Trends," International Organization 29 (Summer 1975): 557-84. 30. See note 9 above. 31. Haggard and Simmons, "Theories of International Regimes," 509-13. 32. For example, "On the Notion of 'Interest' in International Relations," International Organization 36 (Winter 1982): 1-32; "The Force of Prescriptions," International Or­ ganization 38 (Autumn 1984): 685-708. 33. See also Friedrich Kratochwil and John G. Ruggie, "International Organization: A State of the Art on the Art of the State," International Organization 40 (Autumn 1986): 753-76. On Wittgenstein, see, for example, Hanna E Pitkin, Wittgenstein and Justice (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972). 34. See notes 1 and 2 above; R. Michael M'Gonigle and Mark W Zacher, Pollution, Politics, and International Law: Tankers at Sea (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979). See also "Restructuring Ocean Regimes," special issue of International Organization 31 (Spring 1977): 151-384. 35. Gene I. Rochlin, Plutonium, Power, and Politics: International Arrangements for the Disposition of Spent Nuclear Fuel (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979); Benjamin J. Schiff, International Nuclear Technology Transfer: Dilemmas of Dissem­ ination and Control (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Allanheld, 1984); Smith, "Explaining the Non-Proliferation Regime." 36. Raymond F. Hopkins and Donald J. Puchala, eds., "The Global Political Economy of Food," special issue of International Organization 32 (Summer 1978); Jack Donnelly, "International Human Rights: A Regime Analysis," International Organization 40 (Sum­ mer 1986): 599-642; Robert H. Jackson, "Quasi-States, Dual Regimes, and Neoclassical 568 World Politics

Theory: International Jurisprudence and the Third World," International Organization 41 (Autumn 1987): 519-50. 37. Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," World Politics 30 (January 1978): 167-214; "Security Regimes," in International Regimes; "From Balance to Concert: A Study of International Security Cooperation," in Cooperation under Anarchy; Ernst B. Haas, "Regime Decay, Conflict Management and International Organizations, 1945-1981," International Organization 37 (Spring 1983): 189-256; Charles Lipson, "In­ ternational Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs," World Politics 37 (October 1984): 1-23; Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Nuclear Learning and U.S.-Soviet Security Regimes," International Organization 41 (Summer 1987): 371-402. See also Stein, "Coordination and Collaboration," 299-304. 38. See Krasner and Oye, and previous notes, for various authors and studies. Charles R Kindleberger, The World in Depression, 1929-1939 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), while not explicitly linked to regime theory, has been influential; see also Kindleberger, "Dominance and Leadership in the International Economy," International Studies Quarterly 25 (June 1981): 242-54; Aggarwal, Liberal Protectionism; Jock A. Fin- layson and Mark W. Zacher, "The GATT and the Regulation of Trade Barriers; Regime Dynamics and Functions," in International Regimes; Zacher, "Trade Gaps, Analytical Gaps: Regime Analysis and International Commodity Trade Regulation," International Organization 41 (Spring 1987): 173-202; Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence; Keohane, After Hegemony; and Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985). 39. For example, Roger A. Coate, Global Issue Regimes (New York: Praeger, 1982). See also Richard L. O'Meara, "Regimes and Their Implications for International Relations Theory," Millennium 13 (Winter 1984): 1-13. 40. For example, Strange, "Cave! Hie Dragones"; Haggard and Simmons, "Theories of International Regimes"; Young, "Toward a New Theory of Institutions"; James N. Rosenau, "Before Cooperation: Hegemons, Regimes, and Habit-Driven Actors in World Politics," International Organization 40 (Autumn 1986): 849-94. 41. Young, "Toward a New Theory of Institutions," 105.

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Haas, Ernst B. "Why Collaborate? Issue-Linkage and International Regimes." World Pol­ itics 32 (April 1980): 357-405. Haggard, Stephen, and Simmons, Beth A. "Theories of International Regimes." International Organization 41 (Summer 1987): 491-517. Keohane, Robert O. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984. Keohane, Robert O., and Joseph S. Nye, Jr. Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition. Boston: Little, Brown, 1977. Krasner, Stephen D., ed. International Regimes. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983. Kratochwil, Friedrich. "The Force of Prescriptions." International Organization 38 (Au­ tumn 1984): 685-708. Kratochwil, Friedrich, and Ruggie, John G. "International Organization: A State of the Art on the Art of the State." International Organization 40 (Autumn 1986): 753-76. Olson, Mancur. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965. Oye, Kenneth A., ed. Cooperation under Anarchy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985. Ruggie, John G., ed. "International Responses to Technology." Special Issue of International Organization 29 (Summer 1975). Snidal, Duncan. "The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory." International Organization 39 (Autumn 1985): 579-614. Young, Oran R. "International Regimes: Problems of Concept Formation." World Politics 32 (April 1980): 331-56. . "International Regimes: Toward a New Theory of Institutions." World Politics 39 (October 1986): 104-22.