Dissertation Proposal Gabriel Arsenault, March 2014

Title: The Social Investment State and the Social Economy: The Political Origins of Quebec’s New Social Model, 1995-1998 Supervisor: Rodney Haddow Committee members: Christopher Cochrane and Alain Noël

By the end of the 1990s, it became evident that Quebec had developed a distinct social model (Vaillancourt, 2003; Noël, 2013). This state of affairs raises two puzzles. The first is about what that model is: How are Quebec’s social policies put together so that Quebec has the social model that it has? The second puzzle is about the causes of that model. Whereas all provincial welfare states have unique traits, Quebec is arguably the only province to really have a distinctive “social model”: why has Quebec developed a distinct social model in the mid-1990s? In my dissertation, I seek to resolve both puzzles, which I present in more details in sections 1 and 2, respectively. I then introduce my research strategy and design (section 3), present a preliminary breakdown and overview of my dissertation’s chapters (sections 4 and 5), discuss my method and field work (section 6), and suggest a preliminary timeline for the completion of my research (section 7).

1. Debating the explanandum: What is Quebec’s social model? The presence of a number of social innovations in Quebec suggests that Quebec has a distinct “social model”. To dispel any confusion, let me provisionally define a social model as a coherent set of features characterizing a number of social policy fields. This definition conveys three core ideas. First, a social model is restricted to a state’s social policies, i.e. the “welfare state”. In contrasts, most definitions of the Quebec model refer to a model of economic development (Bourque, 2000; Lévesque 2003; Rigaud et al. 2008). Second, a social model extends over several policy fields; it is a more general construct than, say, a “family policy model”. Third, rather than referring to the sum of a welfare state’s idiosyncrasies, a social model implies some coherence between a welfare state’s policies. This coherence can be achieved in different ways. The “Nordic” model is coherent insofar as it tends to be distinctively pro-labour across policy fields (Esping-Andersen, 1985); the more recent Danish “flexicurity” model is coherent insofar as a distinctly high social security is thought as a compensatory measure for distinctly high labour market flexibility (Wilthagen and Tros, 2004). Does Quebec have such a social model? If so, what is it? Debates regarding Quebec’s social model tend to normative (e.g. Boivine and Fortier, 1998; Venne 2003, Côté and Lévesque, 2009, Wright 2010) or, when undertaken by academics, focused on just one or two policy fields. The few Canadian social scientists who have written on Quebec’s current welfare state understood as a single system, however, concur that Quebec has a distinct social model. I nonetheless distinguish between two surprisingly “parallel” readings of Quebec’s social model. One reading stresses the more egalitarian nature of Quebec’s welfare state, whereas the other reading stresses its greater reliance on civil society actors. Let me schematically present these two readings, in turn. The “egalitarian” reading is the most common one. It argues that the Quebec welfare state has a “model” insofar as it has progressively grown to become more egalitarian and generous than other provincial welfare states since the 1990s. This distinctive feature holds

1 across a number of policy fields including higher education (lower post-secondary tuition fees), family policies (universal child care, more generous family allowances, more generous, flexible, and inclusive parental leaves), a high minimum wage (fixed at 46% of average hourly wages), some segments of health care (universal drug insurance plan, extended public home care system), and social housing (high housing allowances, greater provision of social housing). Taxes are also higher in Quebec while poverty and inequalities are lower. A clear account of this reading is found in Alain Noël’s work (e.g. 2013, 2010). Peter Graefe roughly shares this reading, although he seems especially careful not to overemphasize the distinctiveness of Quebec’s welfare state and he appears less confident of the sustainability of Quebec’s social model (Graefe 2012; Graefe and Orasch 2013). In contrast, Rodney Haddow shows, in a forthcoming book, that the distinctiveness of Quebec’s social model, at least when compared with that of Ontario, shows little signs of abatement in most policy fields. Consistent “egalitarian interpretations” of Quebec’s social model are found in Gérard Bouchard’s cultural analysis (2013) as well as in the writing of Béland and Lecours (2006, 2011). In the political realm, the view that Quebec is distinguished by a progressive social model has been most strongly upheld by Gilles Duceppe, who, while leading the Bloc Québécois, had continuously framed Quebec as being to the left of Canada on both moral and economic issues (see Caron 2008 and forthcoming for a critical perspective of this “framing”). In the popular press, Jean-François Lisée (2008, 2012) has arguably been the most competent at popularizing – and defending – this interpretation of Quebec’s social model as distinctively generous when compared to other provinces. More nuanced in his endorsement of this model, economist Pierre Fortin has also highlighted the distinctively social-democratic features of Quebec’s social model in his monthly columns in L’Actualité (see Fortin 2013 for a collection of his best columns). Consistently, right-wing critics of Quebec’s social model regularly describe Quebec’s welfare state as a distinctively “nanny state” (Marcotte, 2011), or, more politely, as relying on exceptionally high taxes and public debts (Bouchard et al. 20051). Although not in contradiction with this first reading of Quebec’s social model, a second reading instead stresses the unusually large participation of civil society in Quebec’s welfare state since the 1970s (Hamel and Jouve, 2006). Most closely associated with this reading are social economy scholars working within the UQÀM-based Centre de recherche sur les innovations sociales (CRISES). Perhaps more than anyone else, Yves Vaillancourt (e.g. 2003, 2012) has argued that, especially since the mid-1990s, social policies in Quebec have become to a unique degree in the federation co-produced – and, less often, co-constructed – by civil society actors. The distinction between co-production (i.e. co-decision in the implementation of policy) and co-construction (i.e. co-decision in the design of policy) is always porous, but good examples of co-production by the community sector include the centres de la petite enfance (Gravel et al. 2007), social enterprises offering home support services (Vaillancourt and Jetté, 2009), co-operative and not-for-profit social housing (Ducharme and Vaillancourt, 2006), social economy training and professional insertion enterprises (Larose et al. 2005), community groups working in health and social services (Jetté, 2008), cooperative health care clinics (Girard, 2012), social economy enterprises offering perinatal services, and ambulances organized as workers’ co-operatives, while the best example of co-construction is the 2002 Act to combat poverty and social exclusion (Noël, 2002; Ninacs et al. 2003).

1 This is the manifesto for a cleared-sighted (lucide) Quebec. Interestingly, the signatories include Pierre Fortin and Lucien Bouchard, a key thinker and founder of Quebec’s new social model, respectively.

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Which of the two readings of Quebec’s social model is the right one? As John Gerring (2012, 19) aptly puts it, “the fundamental problem of descriptive inference is that for any given subject there are often multiple perspectives, each more or less valid… there is usually more than one plausible answer to the innocent question: What is that?”. Hence, there are certainly different plausible ways of understanding “Quebec’s social model”. That said, I would like to produce a third interpretation of Quebec’s social model that is both more comprehensive and theoretically more fruitful than either the egalitarian or the civil society reading. In constructing my concept of “Quebec’s social model”, I make four moves (which I now only present very schematically). First, I preliminarily characterize Quebec’s welfare state as being both more egalitarian and more reliant on the social economy than other provincial welfare states (which are comparatively less egalitarian and more reliant on the private sector). Second, I conceptualise Quebec’s welfare state’s greater egalitarianism as “greater social investments”. As further discussed in section 2.1, the social investment literature distinguishes between “old”, passive social policies and “new”, active social policies. Whereas all mature welfare states have taken a “social investment turn” in the 1990s (i.e. reorienting their resources toward active social policies), some have taken it more than others (Bonoli, 2013); I argue that the social investment turn was taken more sharply in Quebec in the mid-1990s than anywhere else in the federation2. More precisely, the generous social programs that most clearly set Quebec apart in the federation are “active” social. In contrast, cross-provincial differences in “passive” social policies tend to be much smaller. Hence, unemployment protection is a federal responsibility since 1940; Quebec has its own pension plan since 1966 but it is substantively very similar to the Canada Pension plan (and Canada’s Old Age Security applies to Quebec as in any other province); social assistance is relatively generous in Quebec but not distinctively so (Tweddle et al. 2013; see also Boychuck, 1998); and the 1984 Canada Health Act prevents major cross-provincial variations in the provision of health care (Lazar, 2009). A “social investment” reading of Quebec’s social model, then, is arguably more precise than the unqualified egalitarian reading and it has the advantage of situating the Quebec case in the comparative literature on the social investment state. Third, I characterize the policies promoting the social economy as active social policies and, therefore, as constitutive of Quebec’s social investment turn (see sections 2.2. and 5.1). Since the mid-1990s, Quebec’s social investments are then both quantitatively and qualitatively distinct from those of other provincial welfare states. From a theoretical viewpoint, I seek to contribute to the social investment literature by introducing the concept of social economy, which is virtually unknown to political scientists, the (Anglophone) political science literature on the social investment state and the (largely francophone) sociology literature on the social economy being currently completely isolated from one another. Fourth, I seek to broaden the context in which the concept of Quebec’s social model is embedded. Both the egalitarianism and the civil society readings presented above limit their understanding of the Quebec model to the Canadian context and seem to assume that Quebec only has a distinctive “model” when compared to other provinces. I wish to challenge this assumption by systematically comparing Quebec to other nations and by suggesting that Quebec’s social investment turn is qualitatively distinct in broad comparative perspective: its

2 While I am clearly not the first to situate Quebec’s social model within the social investment literature (e.g. Fortin 2013; Noël, 1996, 2013; Jenson and Saint-Martin, 2003; Vaillancourt, 2003; Lisée 2008; Côté, Lévesque and Morneau, 2009), this specific formulation is mine.

3 systematic integration of social economy enterprises in the social policies of the mid-1990s is arguably unmatched in other OECD countries (see section 2.2). My concept of Quebec’s social model, then, is both multidimensional and multilevel (Goertz, 2006). At its core (level 1), it involves distinctively generous active social policies (dimension 1) that rely on the social economy (dimension 2). The policy fields of child care, perinatal services, home support services, and social insertion currently exemplify this core. At its periphery (level 2), it involves generous active social policies that do not (distinctly) rely on the social economy (e.g. lower post-secondary tuition fees, generous parental leaves, universal drug insurance plan, a strict pay equity policy), or social policies that rely on the social economy but without being distinctively generous (e.g. cooperative health care clinics and ambulances) or about social investment (social housing?). My contention is that this concept is both more accurate and theoretically fruitful than either the ‘egalitarian’ or the ‘civil society’ readings of the Quebec social model.

2. Debating the explanans: Why does Quebec have a distinct social model? Why does Quebec have a distinct social model characterized by relatively high social investments embedded in the social economy? In sections 2.1 and 2.2., I review the literatures on the social investment state and the social economy, respectively. In part 2.3, I sketch my own argument, bridging these two literatures with that on Quebec’s social model. Because I offer a different conceptualisation of Quebec’s social model, I unsurprisingly find existing explanations of Quebec’s social model unsatisfying.

2.1 The social investment state In an ambitious book synthesizing research on the social investment state, Hemerijck (2013) distinguishes three periods in the history of the welfare state: Keynesianism and social policy expansion (1945-1975), monetarism and neoliberal retrenchment (1975-1995), and social investment (1995-). The social investment state is first and foremost characterized by a shift from the “passive” social policies of the Keynesian era toward “active” social policies3. After clarifying the key concept of active social policy, I present the key puzzles of the social investment state and show how this literature shines light on the Quebec case.

2.1.1. What exactly differentiates an active from a passive social policy is surprisingly unclear in the social investment literature. The concept of “active social policy” is never defined in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. Rather, it seems to be implicitly defined in terms of “family resemblance” (Goertz, 2006). When used by leading social investment state scholars - such as Bonoli, Hemerijck, and Häusermann – active social policies tend to be defined in terms of three characteristics. First, active social policies address the “new” risks associated with women’s entry into the workforce and post-industrialisation (e.g. single parenting, obsolete skills) – in contrast with the “old” risks of male breadwinner industrial economies (e.g. illness, old age, and unemployment). Second, active social policies are viewed as springboards and so favour instruments that foster human capital and employability (such as vocational training and education) whereas passive social policies are viewed as safety nets and so favor instruments

3 In this priority shift, the social investment state literature usually stresses the expansion of active social policies, while the “dualization” literature stresses the retrenchment of passive social policies and the marginalization of market outsiders (e.g. Emmenegger et al. 2012).

4 such as income replacement. Third, active social policies seek to (re)integrate the non-employed4 into the labour market, thus functionally differing from the “passive” social policies of the post- war era, which chiefly sought to protect workers from excessive reliance on the market (Esping- Andersen, 1985). In so doing, active social policies are depicted as win-win policies striking a “just middle” between Keynesian and neo-liberal social policies. In contrast to the latter, they provide help to disadvantaged people by investing in their human capital and responding to their needs; in contrast to the former, they secure returns for society in the shape of lower social assistance expenditures and higher tax revenues. By increasing labour market participation active social policies may in fact entirely pay for themselves and even yield some savings. Child care and active labor market policies (e.g. training) are the quintessential active social policies (e.g. Bonoli, 2013) because they meet all three criteria, addressing “new” social needs while fostering human capital (for children and workers, respectively) and employment (for non-employed women and unemployed workers, respectively). The problem is that these three characteristics do not necessarily come together. Homemaking policies, for example, are widely viewed as active social policies (e.g. Hemerijck, 2013), increasing employment among women and responding to the new reality of working mothers and daughters; yet homemaking has never been about human capital, employability, or the “stimulation” of dependent people (the way “early childhood education and care”, or ECEC, is now about). Explicitly adopting a ‘family resemblance’ definition of active social policies, I suggest that a policy qualifies as an active social policy if it meets at least two of the three criteria discussed above. Whether policies meet individual criteria is not always evident, however. In particular, whether the “goal” of a social policy is to increase employment or to address a new social need is often a matter of contention. Consider social housing. In prioritizing social housing in the mid- 1990s, was the chief motivation of Quebec policy makers to boost labor market participation or to shield unemployed workers from the market? Insofar as social housing helps residents find a job (e.g. by giving them a stable address) and provides stability for their children (with long-term pay-offs for society), spending in social housing could plausibly be interpreted as sound social investments (that pay for themselves). Social housing policies could also be interpreted as classical passive social policies, addressing the old risk of homelessness by providing a safety net to wage earners. What this observation suggests is that “describing” the material features of a policy may not quite suffice to categorize it as either a “passive” or an “active” social policy: interpreting the original intents of policy makers is also required5. I further explore this possibility in section 5.5.

2.1.2. Thus clarified, the social investment state raises two related puzzles (Bonoli, 2013). The first is about understanding what was incomplete with Pierson’s (1996, 2001) analysis. In the 1990s, Paul Pierson concluded that the fiscal pressures were such that welfare states could at most “resist” to retrenchment; net expansion was literally not an option6. How exactly were these pressures to slim down the welfare state overcome in the late-1990s, a time of persistent “fiscal hard times” (Hausermann, 2010)? If the structural changes prompting the demand for a new

4 Keynesianism sought to reduce unemployment; social investment goes further by seeking to maximize employment levels. Hence, since they are not technically “unemployed”, stay-at-home mothers are not targeted by Keynesian policies; but since they are not “employed”, they are targeted by social investment policies. 5 Wendt (1998) reminds us that constitutive explanations may be about both description (of “natural kinds”) and interpretation (of “social kinds”). 6 More precisely, Pierson (2001) identified three possibilities: re-commodification, cost containment, and recalibration (i.e. zero-sum resource transfer from one policy field to another).

5 social investment state (i.e. post-industrialisation and women’s entry into the workforce) are well-known, the politics of addressing these demands in the post-neoliberal era are poorly understood. Ironically, what is arguably the best work examining these politics focuses on pensions, a quintessential “old risks” policy (Hausermann, 2010). The literature on the social investment state so far has been mostly descriptive (e.g. Jenson and Saint-Martin 2003; Palier 2012; Hemerijck 2013) or prescriptive (e.g. Giddens 1994, Esping-Andersen, 2002); much work remains to be done to clarify the politics leading to the (evolving) social investment state (but see Bonoli and Natali 2012; Bonoli 2013). Second, although virtually all welfare states have taken a “social investment turn” of some sort since the late 1990s, some have taken it much more than others. For example, while this “turn” has been generally weaker in southern Europe, it has been especially sharp under the left governments of Tony Blair (1997-2007) in Britain (Third Way) and of Poul Nyrup Rasmussen (1993-2001) in Denmark (flexicurity). What accounts for this variation? In his latest book, Giuliano Bonoli (2013) tackles these two puzzles by emphasizing five “movers” of the social investment state, which I present in declining order of importance. First, as mentioned above, the structural changes in the economy brought about by women’s entry into the workforce and post-industrialization created a demand for active labor market and family policies. Second, left-wing parties are more enthusiastic about active social policies as they allow them to pursue equality without jeopardizing their credibility in economic management; ceteris paribus, then, a social investment turn is more likely when the Left controls government. Third, expanding new social policies may arguably be more “visible” than making cuts in passive social programs, and so the politics of shifting resources away from passive social policies toward active social policies are arguably more about “credit claiming” than about “blame avoiding”. Fourth, social learning among different governments allows for the diffusion of win-win active social policies. Fifth, whereas fiscal times are “hard” for virtually all OECD governments, budgetary constraints are especially tough in southern Europe. I argue that these explanations fail to explain the emergence of a distinct social model in Quebec.

2.1.3. The basic puzzle of Quebec’s social investment turn has a familiar structure. In the mid-1990s, Quebec was facing fiscal “hard times” partially induced by dynamics playing at the federal level. In November 1993, the federal Liberals won a majority government, and, following the deterioration of the country’s finances under the Mulroney government, their top priority was to reduce Canada’s debt-to-GDP ratio. In February of 1995, finance minister Paul Martin announced a “zero deficit plan” for the 1996-1997 fiscal year. The plan worked: from a 42- billion deficit in 1995, Martin managed to produce a 3.8-billion surplus in 1998. To achieve this deficit-reduction, however, provincial transfers were cut by over 30% between 1996 and 1998 (Imbeau and Leclerc 2002, 72)7. In all provinces, including Quebec, these transfer cuts gave rise to substantial welfare state retrenchments, especially in health care (Lazar, 2009) and education (Tupper, 2014). In Quebec, these transfer cuts arrived at an especially bad time, as in 1995, Quebec’s debt-to-GDP ratio was the highest in the country (Imbeau and Leclerc 2002, 68). In such a difficult fiscal context, the PQ’s decision to simultaneously expand its welfare state in areas such as childcare, homemaking, and social housing is surely worth investigating. (Although ponctual but major cuts were made in health care and education during the Bouchard

7 Also: the size of the federal public service sector was reduced and cuts were made in the unemployment insurance (Guest, 1999).

6 years, Quebec’s social investment turn cannot only be understood in terms of welfare state recalibration. Hence, income taxes, corporate taxes and sales taxes were increased under Bouchard (Imbeau and Leclerc 2002, 73; see also Haddow 2014, chapter 3). Significant cuts were also made in non-welfare areas, such as transports and the Ministère de la Métropole (Imbeau and Leclerc 2002, 72)). Since budgetary constraints were especially tough in Quebec, why has the social investment turn been more pronounced in Quebec than in other provinces? In accounting for Quebec’s social model, a partisanship-based explanation immediately comes to mind. My understanding is that ‘partisanship’ is a necessary but insufficient cause of Quebec’s distinctively sharp social investment turn. My hypothesis is that the presence of a Left(ish) government was necessary as Liberals under Daniel Johnson (son) or Jean Charest would have never led similarly bold social reforms. Partisanship seems insufficient, however, insofar as provincial NDP governments in Saskatchewan (1991-2007) and British Columbia (1991-2001) have not championed a similarly significant social investment turn. A partisanship-based explanation suffers from at least three other drawbacks. First, it potentially relies on a measurement error insofar as the “leftist” orientation of the PQ under Bouchard (1996-2001) could be called into question. Under Parizeau, the social-democratic orientations of the PQ were clear enough. For the sovereigntists’ referendum failure, Parizeau not only blamed the “ethnic vote”: he also blamed capital. Bouchard’s social-democratic orientations were much less obvious when he became premier. A conservative MP between 1988 and 1990, Bouchard initially seemed mainly interested in the deficit – not in social policies (Raymond, 2011). Second, as argued by Haddow and Klassen (2006), social policy issues are not as partisan in Quebec as they are in other provinces, the main party cleavage in Quebec being structured around identity issues. To wit, between 2003 and 2012, Charest’s Liberals left the Quebec model largely intact (Haddow 2014; Noël 2013; but see Jenson 2009). Third, an explanation stressing class more broadly is challenged by the fact that employers broadly “consented” to Quebec’s social investment turn (e.g. Tougas, 2001, but see Korpi 2006). Canadian provinces differ with regard to only two of the five movers of the social investment state identified by Bonoli - budgetary constraints and partisanship – and these two movers cannot explain why the social investment turn has been sharper in Quebec than in other provinces. The presence of the other movers – possibility of social learning, post- industrialisation, and politics of credit claiming – are common to all mature welfare states; they explain the ubiquity of the social investment turn, not cross-national differences. Consider social learning. For social learning scholars, the emergence of the social investment state is largely a matter of – to employ Heclo’s (1974) phrases – “puzzling through” rather than “powering through” (Saint-Martin 2002; Jenson and Saint-Martin 2003; Hemerijck 2013). In the early 1990s, so their narrative goes, public officials first learned about the win-win virtues of active social policies and then progressively succumbed to their charm. Although plausible, the argument begs the question: why do some governments fail to learn? Why have Ontarian public officials, for example, still failed to learn what their Quebec correspondent learned almost twenty years ago? Also, to my knowledge, we have neither archival nor interview material showing that Quebec employers and conservatives were actually convinced by these “social investment” arguments. Häusermann (2010, 2012) points to a sixth “mover” of successful social investment turns: broad coalitions. Quebec is arguably the most likely province for such coalitions to be forged and to survive, and so for two (related) reasons. First, Quebec relies on concerted action (concertation) structures to a greater extent than other provinces since the election of the first PQ

7 government in the late 1970s (Tanguay 1984; Bourque 2000; Haddow and Klassen 2006; Haddow 2014) and one of the few generalizations that have been established in political science is that coalitions are facilitated by what is variously called concertation, “consensus democracy” (Lijphart, 1977), “corporatism” (Katzenstein, 1985), or “coordinated capitalism” (Hall and Soskice, 2001). The mechanisms linking concerted action and coalitions are diverse, but Swank and Martin (2012, ch.8) stress that when employers participate in national corporatist negotiations with unions they get to learn about the effects of social policies and to think in terms of the national good, which, in turn, leads them to be more favourable toward the welfare state. Coalitions may also be favoured by a shared national identity. Two main mechanisms could be distinguished. First, taking Denmark as their paradigmatic case, Campbell and Hall (2009) argue that countries with strong national identities are more likely to develop an ideology of social partnership, which entails a willingness to work together for the common good. Haddow (2014) argues that nationalism similarly underpinned Quebec’s concerted interest intermediation (i.e. Quebec concertation and nationalism are not independent of one another). He also suggests that coalitions on socio-economic issues are facilitated by a party system whose cleavage is based on national identity instead of class (Haddow 2014). In less theoretical terms, Laforest (2007) and Mahon (2013) seem to be making a similar argument, suggesting that a shared national identity clarifies “where” concerted state action is to take place: whereas the Ontarian community sector divides its efforts between the provincial and federal governments, the Quebec community sector is more cohesive, only appealing to “its” national government. Contributing to a textbook on Canadian social policies, Vaillancourt (2012b) similarly argues that, ultimately, Quebec’s distinctive social model stems from its national identity: “…in Quebec’s political culture, the social stakeholders who wish to develop and enhance social policy turn first toward their provincial and national state, and not toward the federal state when they seek to have a national policy” (132-133). According to the second mechanism, Quebec nationalism buttressed a pro-welfare coalition because Quebec nationalism itself has a pro-welfare bias, having emerged at a time when the French Canadians of Quebec were markedly poorer than English Canadians8 (Béland and Lecours, 2008, 2011; Bouchard, 2013). For Alain Noël (2010, 2013), the Quiet Revolution left Quebeckers of French Canadian heritage with a positive attitude toward the welfare state by successfully undoing the double “social traps” of linguistic inequalities and low trust toward the state. To this day, public opinion in Quebec is generally more sympathetic to welfare state expansion and redistribution than in other provinces (e.g. Wiseman 2007; Cochrane and Perrella, 2012) and the Quebec state is still more interventionist (Haddow, 2014). These considerations thus suggest that Quebec’s social investment turn might be best understood as resulting from a broad coalition (e.g. Noël, 2013). As further discussed in section 2.3, however, we know virtually nothing about the “substance” of the alleged coalition(s) underlying Quebec’s social investment turn.

8 Why were French Canadians poorer? This question is at the heart of the debate in Quebec historiography (e.g. Rudin 1997, ch.3-4). The Montreal school stresses the Conquest. French Canadians had traditionally been poorer because they did not control their political institutions and were victims of racism. The Laval school, in contrast, stresses a backward culture and the role of the Catholic Church. More recent explanations have stressed the significance of “early” agricultural disadvantages in Quebec relative to Ontario (e.g. Noël, 1993).

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2.2. The social economy The concept of “social economy” is now largely recognized and promoted by governments in Europe, Quebec, and Latin America (Vaillancourt, 2013). It is also the object of a growing scholarship on both sides of the Atlantic. Yet, this concept is poorly known in the English-speaking world, where it is incorrectly assimilated to the non-profit or third sector (Defourny, Develterre, and Fonteneau, 1999; Ascoli and Ranci, 2002). In English Canada, in spite of Paul Martin’s enthusiasm for the social economy and the creation, under his government, of a social economy hub, the concept remains largely unrecognized (Quarter et al. 2009). Since the 2006 election of a Conservative government, in particular, the nascent federal interest for the social economy quickly faded (Laforest, 2011b). In this section, I clarify the concept of social economy (2.2.1); argue that the promotion of the social economy may be viewed as a “social investment” policy (2.2.2); and review the literature seeking to explain the “civil society” reading of Quebec’s social model (2.2.3).

2.2.1 The concept of économie sociale (or économie sociale et solidaire)9 first appeared in France and francophone Belgium toward the end of the 19th century, but was to be institutionally recognized and promoted by public policies in France only in the early 1980s, as the socialists were voted into power (Gardin 2006, 25-26). The concept was then diffused to southern Europe (e.g. Spain in 1989), to Quebec (1996), to some other European countries (e.g. Sweden in the late 1990s), to the European Union (2000), and, more recently, to Latin America (Archambault, 2007; Vaillancourt, 2013). Reflecting this increase in popularity, the United Nations commissioned a task force on the social and solidarity economy in 2012 (UNRISD, 2014). Different governments define the social economy in slightly different terms, but three characteristics of social economy enterprises (SEEs) are usually emphasized10. First, SEEs are managed independently from the state. In the Canadian context, this concretely implies that SEEs are not organisationally part of any ministry and are not subordinated to any minister. Second, their main mission is to serve their members or their community by undertaking an economic activity. Unlike non-profits, SEEs may make some profits, but they are not about the maximization of profits. Profits are thus not distributed only according to capital inputs, as in publicly traded companies, and limits are sometimes imposed to how much profits can be made11. Third, SEEs must be democratically self-managed, which usually mean that they have an elected board of directors (unlike several “non-profits”, e.g. those which are Church-based). Three types of organizations tend to unite these three characteristics: co-operatives, mutual societies, and non-profit associations that produce goods or services. Official definitions suggest that these three characteristics are individually necessary and collectively sufficient attributes of social economy enterprises. For operationalization purposes, however, they are often viewed as individually unnecessary but sufficient attributes of social

9 A distinction is sometimes made between économie sociale and économie solidaire. Whereas social economy enterprises, such as cooperatives, are in principle independent of state funding, solidarity economy organisations, such as NPOs, rely on state monies for their existence (Draperi, 2007). 10 I know this from skimming the websites of different social economy organisations, such as Social Economy Europe (European Union), CEPES (Spain), CEGES (France), ConcertES (Belgium), and INAES (Argentina). To my knowledge, a systematic comparison of national definitions has yet to be produced. 11 Italy thus limits the profits of social cooperatives by legislating that the amounts of profits to be divided among shareholders must not exceed 80% of the total, and that the rate of profits for each share “cannot be higher than 2 per cent of the rate applicable to the bonds issued by the Italian post service” (Borzaga and Santuari 2001, 171).

9 economy enterprises. For example, the Liège-based International Centre of Research and Information on the Public, Social and Cooperative Economy (CIRIEC) includes as SEEs “voluntary non-profit organisations that are producers of non-market services for households, even if they do not possess a democratic structure” (Monzón and Chaves 2012, 22).

2.2.2. As mentioned above, the literatures on the social economy (e.g. Pestoff, Chaves, Laville) and the social investment state (e.g. Bonoli, Hemerijck, Häusermann) are completely isolated from each other. Active social policies and the social economy policies are nonetheless closely intertwined as the former may rely on social economy enterprises and as both policies share the twin goals of promoting equality by increasing employment levels. In the last few decades, social economy enterprises have been increasingly involved in the delivery of paradigmatic social investment state services, such as child care, homemaking, and social insertion. Such social services have been provided by multi-stakeholder social co- operatives in Italy since 1991; there were no less than 14,000 such co-ops across the country by the end of 2008 (Carini et al. 2012, 7). Similar social co-ops are legally recognized and funded in Belgium, Portugal, Spain, and France (Laville 2010, 225). Social co-ops with the narrower purpose of socially integrating people with disabilities have become particularly popular in Sweden (Stryjan, 2001; Stryjan and Wijström, 1996) and Portugal (Perista, 2001). Sweden has also extended full subsidization to child care cooperatives in the early 1990s (Lorendahl 1997; Pestoff 2009, 129). As mentioned above, SEEs also deliver a broad array of services in Quebec. (In fact, in my literature review, I have found no other welfare state that sought to integrate social economy enterprises in so many social policy fields. This preliminary finding at least suggests that Quebec’s social economy-based welfare state is large by international standards). The integration of social economy enterprises in the social investment state is not a coincidence. One of the intellectual gurus of the social investment turn, British sociologist Anthony Giddens (1998), emphasized the role of civil society in “third way” welfare states (see also Hirst, 1994). The basic argument is that, by tapping civil society’s resources, “third way” welfare states could be more democratic and egalitarian than neoliberal welfare states, while not being as costly, inefficient, and bureaucratic as traditional social democratic welfare states. In Britain, these ideas were first championed by Tony Blair’s Labour government and they are now resurfacing under the label of the “Big Society” in David Cameron’s conservative-led coalition government12. A similar line of reasoning was taken by other Western governments. In societies that do not recognise the social economy (e.g. the UK, the Netherlands, or Germany – see Monzón and Chaves 2012, 39), these “civil society resources” do not refer in particular to SEEs; in those which do (e.g. Spain, Portugal, Quebec, Wallonia), however, these “civil society resources” do chiefly refer to SEEs. In such societies, the distinction between supporting active social policies and supporting the social economy in proximity services thus becomes blurred. Social economy enterprises do not only operate in social proximity services, however. They are present in virtually all sectors of the economy, including finance, agriculture, and forestry. Some governments, such as the French, the Spanish, and the Quebec governments,

12 Soon after taking power, Conservative officials announced that “[C]o-operatives, mutuals, charities and social enterprises are to be encouraged to have much greater involvement in the running of public services… to allow public sector workers to bid to take over public services by forming co-operatives” (Corbett and Walker 2013, 453). Critics have however argued that Cameron has used the concept of Big Society to conceal neoliberal welfare state reforms (e.g. see Ishkanian and Szreter 2012).

10 actively promote the social economy in all these sectors (Monzón and Chaves, 2012). I argue that such promotion efforts should be viewed as constitutive of the social investment turn. I defined above the social investment turn as a turn toward active social policies and active social policies in terms of three emphases: human capital and employability, the integration of the non-employed into the labour market, and “new” social risks. Bridging the Quebec literature on the social economy with the political science literature on the social investment state, I now argue that social economy policies qualify as active social policies as they meet two of these three criteria. First, the social economy turn in Quebec has been centrally concerned with the “new risks” associated with women’s entry into the labor market. Hence, the initial impetus for the promotion of the social economy came from the 1995 Women’s March Against Poverty13 and its call to provide good jobs to women. The Fédération des Femmes du Québec was then making the argument that it was unfair of governments’ job creation programs to privilege the male-dominated construction industry during economic hard times instead of the female-dominated social economy sector14. Indeed, the social economy sector was and remains dominated by women: in 2000, 76% of social economy workers were women. This proportion was even higher in the social economy sector of perinatal services (98%), child care (96%), and home support services (90%) (Méthé 2008, 31). Second, as emphasized in the 1996 social economy workshop’s report, Osons la solidarité! (to be presented in section 3.3), “state investment” in the social economy pursues the same twofold goals as traditional active social policies: furthering equality and social inclusion by promoting employment (see also Graefe’s 2006) – in stark contrast with the traditional social democratic strategy of furthering equality through de-commodification. Social economy policies are nonetheless a distinct type of active social policies. One way of discriminating among active social policies requires making a distinction between predistributive and (re)distributive policies (Hacker, 2011). In the latter, the state distributes resources produced by non-state actors through taxation (redistribution) or produced by the state itself (distribution). In predistribution, in contrast, the state affects how non-state actors distribute resources. To further equality and social inclusion in fiscal hard times, the Left can enact (re)distributive social policies that will hopefully “pay for themselves”. As Hacker (2011) reminds us, however, the Left can also enact predistributive policies that seek to make the market itself more egalitarian and socially inclusive. Although Hacker does not evoke the social economy in his paper, policies aiming to promote a more “social” economy15 seem like archetypical predistributive policies.

2.2.3 According to the civil society reading, social economy enterprises are central to Quebec’s social model. Yet, before the 1995 Women’s March Against Poverty, outside a few academic circles, virtually no one in Quebec had heard about the social economy (D’amours 1999, 1). Nine months later, at the March 1996 conference, a large consensus between community groups, unions, employers, and government officials was formed around the necessity to promote the social economy (Lévesque, 2013; GTES 1996, 43). Why was a “social

13 The March was organized by Françoise David, from the Fédération des Femmes du Québec. Between May 26 and June 4 of 1995, 850 women marched over 200 km to Québec city to protest against poverty. See Appendix 1. 14 Marche des femmes contre la pauvreté. 1995. Cahier des revendications et guide d'animation. 26 mai au 4 juin 1995, p.4. 15 Hence, almost per definition, SEEs take their social responsibilities seriously (e.g. Béland, 2012). Co-operatives and other social enterprises are also known to have a more compressed wage structure (e.g. Burdín and Dean, 2009).

11 economy sector” suddenly recognized and enthusiastically invigorated through policies? Why has this “social economy turn” not occurred in other provinces? The European literature on the social economy fails to provide theoretically grounded hypotheses. Even more than the social investment literature, the social economy literature does not seem concerned with causal questions, focusing entirely on descriptive and normative issues. Social economy scholars have so far built a case for the social economy (see in particular the work of Henri Desroche and Jean-Louis Laville) and have started to map the geography of the social economy. Hence, the CIRIEC has calculated that, in Europe, the social economy’s share of national GDP is highest in Sweden (11%), the Netherlands (10%), Belgium (10%), Italy (9%), and France (9%)16. According to one of its surveys, the social economy is recognized the most by the public officials of Portugal and Spain (followed by Belgium, Italy, and France) and is recognized the least by those of the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Germany, and Austria (Monzón and Chaves, 2012, 39). Systematic cross-national comparisons of public policies promoting the social economy have yet to be produced (but see Chaves and Demoustier 2013 for an exploratory analysis). Most importantly, however, social economy scholars have not yet tried to really explain cross national variations in social economy. The literature on Quebec’s social model is more useful. Among Quebec social economy scholars, there is little doubt that the demand for a greater recognition of the social economy sector came from the community sector, especially from women’s groups during the Women’s March Against Poverty (e.g. Lévesque, 2013). Then, between the March 1996 Conférence sur le devenir social et économique and the October 1996 socio-economic summit, the leadership of community activist Nancy Neamtan in promoting the social economy sector – inter alia in welfare state areas such as homemaking, social housing, social insertion, and child care - is now unquestionable (e.g. Bouchard 2012, 90). But this explanation only begs further questions: why was the community sector suddenly so influential in Quebec? How have community actors interacted with unions, employers, and government officials?

2.3 Tentative argument Before the 1980s, Quebec did not have a very distinctive welfare state (Vaillancourt 2003, Noël 2013). Quebec sought to have more autonomy in social policy (e.g. with pensions), but its social policies were not significantly different from those of other provinces. Progressively in the 1970s and 1980s, Quebec started to experiment with some innovative community-based social policies (Vaillancourt, 2003) and lower university tuition fees (e.g. Kai and Miao 2010, fig. 3). Then in the mid-1990s, as Quebec acquired more autonomy in social policy, Quebec consolidated a distinctive social model (Vaillancourt 2003; Noël, 2013), chiefly characterized by active social policies relying on the social economy. Underlying the emergence of this new model are both “slow-moving causal processes” spanning over several decades (such as women’s entry into the labor market, the development of a vibrant cooperative sector, and the emergence of Quebec nationalism) and “quick” causes, linking slow-moving causal processes with outcomes in the mid-1990s. In my dissertation, I attend both these ‘long’ and ‘short’ causes. This section is necessarily speculative as I have not yet started my fieldwork. My strategy is to preliminarily focus on the period between the 1995 Women’s March and the enactment of the key policies defining Quebec’s social model, in the immediate aftermath of the 1996 summit. Once I have a better idea of what happened in the mid-1990s, I will be better situated to gauge the deeper ‘slow-moving causal processes’ at work. Regarding the politics of the mid-1990s, I

16 The correspondent figure for Quebec is “over 8%” according to the Chantier de l’économie sociale’s website.

12 try to adjudicate between four (collectively exhaustive) main hypotheses. I argue that, although power differentials were very real (e.g. employers presumably had a stronger veto power than the community sector, and governmental officials were ultimately the ones in charge), one group has not imposed its will on the others, as a strong power resource explanation (H1) would suggest (e.g. see Raymond, 2011). Rather, I argue that there has been quite a bit of negotiation and deliberation between employers, unions, government officials, and community actors during the mid-1990s as to what kind of welfare state would be best suited to Quebec. To get at the “substance” of these negotiations and deliberations, instead of reading actors’ interests from their structural position in the economy (the approach taken and advocated by Häusermann 2010, 2012), I investigate what actors “were actually fighting for”. I then distinguish between coalitions and political exchange. In political exchanges “actors accept policy changes that are not in line with their priorities but in return get some of their own requests included into the deal” (Bonoli and Natali 2012, 294). In welfare state modernization, for instance, the Left can accept retrenchments in passive social policies if the Right accepts expansions in active social policies. In coalitions, in contrast, actors with different preferences find a single policy - not policy packages or “deals” - that satisfies all parties. I further distinguish between unidimensional and multidimensional coalitions. In the former, different actors agree on a given policy for similar reasons. Policy learning involves such coalitions where both the Left and the Right may come to publicly laud the “win-win” virtues of a policy that would further equality without requiring extra tax money (Hemerijck, 2013). In multidimensional coalitions, in contrast, actors agree on a given policy for different reasons; they share a policy stance while lacking a common argument. Hence, religious conservatives and employers may commonly oppose public child care, albeit for drastically different reasons (Häusermann, 2010). Table 1 illustrates these three (mutually non-exclusive) latter overarching interpretations of Quebec’s welfare state politics during the mid-1990s. First, as proponents of the “learning” school suggest, perhaps the different actors present at the 1996 summit were convinced of the win-win nature of active social policies and thus supported the social investment turn for similar reasons (unidimensional coalition, H2). The second possibility is that a multidimentional coalition formed as the Left and the Right17 could find different dimensions (material and non- material) of a social economy-based social investment state appealing (H3). Perhaps the Left was seduced by this new model because it promised new spaces of participatory democracy while the Right consented to it because it promised to employ people formerly on social assistance; or perhaps the Left was enthusiastic about it because it favoured greater equality, while the Right appreciated that it involved “less state” than the traditional welfare state. Third, the 1996 socio- economic “consensus” may perhaps be best understood as a simple political exchange: capitalists got the zero-deficit plan, while labour got a more generous welfare state (H4).

17 I use the terms ‘Left’ and ‘Right’ very loosely here. They might very well not feature in my dissertation.

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Table 1: Coalitions and political exchanges underpinning the social investment turn Left preferences Right preferences Material Less poverty Zero deficit and debt reduction dimension Greater employment for women and Greater employment marginalized populations Fewer people on social assistance Non-material New spaces of participatory Social services relying less heavily on dimension democracy the state (less bureaucracy)

Undermines the legitimacy of the profit motive

In emphasizing these coalitions and political exchanges, I pay attention to the role of policy entrepreneurs in making them possible (as in Häusermann, 2010). Entrepreneurs engineer coalitions, or “build teams” (Mintrom and Norman, 2009), by creatively finding a common ground between actors with different preferences. Presumably connected to the “epistemic community” (Haas, 1992) of social economy scholars based at the Université du Québec à Montréal and at several universities of francophone Europe in the early 1990s18, policy entrepreneurs might have exploited the multidimensional nature of social economy enterprises (e.g. “social” but “not bureaucratic”) to facilitate coalitions between actors usually holding contrasting views on social policy. Obvious policy entrepreneur “suspects” include: Nancy Neamtan (who headed the Groupe de travail sur l’économie sociale in preparation for the summit) and Claude Béland (who presided over the Caisses Desjardins and who headed the Chantier de travail sur l’économie et l’emploi in preparation for the summit). To avoid giving the misleading impression that the mid-1990s were ‘pure contingencies’, I shall also pay attention to long-term causes. Hence, a specific institutional setting allowed these (presumably) complex coalitions and political exchanges to take place. As discussed above (2.1.3), such coalitions arguably depended on an original quadripartite concertation that included the community sector. This original concerted action structure may explain to a large extent Quebec’s distinctive social model: In the “corporatist” countries of Europe and East Asia the usual bi-partite or tri-partite corporatist arrangements exclude the community sector (the natural advocate of the social economy) and in pluralist societies (e.g. Canada outside Quebec), such concerted state action is relatively less important. But this explanation raises the question: Why has Bouchard privileged a quadripartite concerted action structure? On this question, the literature on the Quebec model is silent. My intuition is that the inclusion of the community sector is a result of older coalitions forged within the sovereignty movement (see Savage 2008 for a similar argument concerning unions). Concerted action in Quebec started soon after the election of the first PQ government, in 1977 (Tanguay, 1984), at a time when the community sector was not overly enthusiastic regarding the sovereignty project. During the 1980 referendum, the community sector did not clearly support the YES camp (Venne 1996, 46). In contrast, in 1995, the community sector, led by the Fédération des femmes du Québec and Solidarité populaire Québec, was enthusiastically supporting the sovereigntist cause. Bouchard was then acting in continuity with the quadripartite

18 References to francophone European scholars of the social economy abound in the report of the Comité d’orientation et de concertation sur l’économie sociale, Entre l’espoir et le doute (1996).

14 structure established during the debates around the sovereignty project throughout the 1990s. For example, during the Bélanger-Campeau commission, employers and the Liberal party formed the ‘No’ side, while community groups, the Mouvement populaire des Caisses Desjardins, artists, farmers, and unions sided with the Parti Québécois on the ‘Yes’ side19. Recall that the 1996 conference was taking place only a few months after the referendum; Bouchard might have felt hard-pressed not to invite his allies from the community sector, who had done their share during the referendum campaign. This partial explanation raises somewhat more ‘fundamental’ questions: Why has the community sector come to support sovereignty in the 1990s? Why were the community sector and the co-operative sector significant forces in Quebec society at the time? Why was there a concerted action tradition to begin with? To answer these questions, “longer” causes need to be probed.

3. Research strategy and design 3.1 Focusing on just one case Virtually all mature welfare states have taken a social investment turn since the 1990s (Bonoli 2013; Hemerijk 2013). In my research, however, I study the modernization of just one welfare state, the Quebec welfare state. Why (just) that case? From a broad comparative perspective, Quebec is not a crucial case (Eckstein 1975, Gerring, 2007): it is not clearly a most likely, a least likely, an extreme (although its reliance on SEEs seems high), or a deviant case. If my sole objective were to contribute to the comparative politics literature on welfare state transformations, I would adopt a different research design. My goal, however, is to explain that case – both “constitutively” and “causally” (Wendt, 1998). Although Canadiannists should draw from the comparative politics literature (White et al. 2008) Canadian politics must not be reduced to a subfield of comparative politics and studied only to advance the theoretical goals of comparative politics. In comparative politics, explaining a case is often seen as only a means to make more general claims (Gerring, 2004)20. In area studies, in contrast, priorities are reversed: theories are tools employed to explain particular cases. In the field of Canadian politics, explaining Canada should be an end in itself. For students of the Canadian welfare state, the Quebec case is especially interesting as it is a deviant case when compared to other provinces. Whereas all provincial welfare states have unique traits, Quebec is arguably the only province with a distinctive “social model”. Explaining why Quebec has that welfare state therefore appears to be an urgent task for scholars of Canadian politics. For comparativists more broadly, my research should also be of interest. First, Quebec’s social investment turn has been very little studied by social investment state scholars, who tend to be quite Europe-focused, and so a gap in our empirical knowledge of that case needs to be filled. Second, and most importantly, I aim to show that the social investment state literature would benefit from paying closer attention to the social economy. Viewing social economy policies as “social investment” policies allows a more comprehensive reading of welfare state

19 Claude Béland, Ghislain Dufour, Gérald Larose, and Lorraine Pagé, for example, participated to both the Bélanger-Campeau commission (1991) and the socio-economic summit (1996). 20 Gerring (2004) famously defined a case study as “an intensive study of a single unit with an aim to generalize across a larger set of units”. Explaining that single unit is thus essentially a means to produce a generalization rather than an end in itself.

15 modernization – in Quebec as well as in Europe and beyond. Consider southern Europe. Studying its social economy promises to produce a more balanced assessment of southern European welfare states. Widely recognized as laggards in active social policies (Bonoli, 2013), Spain, Portugal, Italy, and France are less often recognized by political scientists as leaders in social economy policies (Chaves and Dumoustier, 2013). The “social economy turn” has been even sharper in some regions of these countries, most famously Emilia-Romagna (Gonzales, 2011), the Walloon Region (Coutiez and Moens, 2013), and the Spanish Basque Country (e.g. Azurmendi et al. 2013; Kasmir, 1996). Consider now the case of Sweden. My research points to a specificity of the Swedish social model that is largely overlooked by the mainstream political science literature on the welfare state - its reliance on the social economy in the areas of child care, social housing, and social insertion (Lorendahl 1997, Stryjan 2001; Pestoff 2009; Vamstad 2012). These observations raise questions of central importance for students of European welfare states: Why is a distinct social economy sector recognized in some countries and not in others? Why do some states invest more than others in the social economy? Why do some welfare states rely more heavily than others on the social economy for the delivery of social services?

3.2 Focusing on a critical juncture I have reported in sections 1 and 2 that, to a large extent, Quebec’s social model really emerged in the mid-1990s (Vaillancourt, 2003; Noël, 2013), in the aftermath of the 1996 socio- economic summit. I argue that Quebec’s welfare state was at a critical juncture at the time of the summit. Following Mahoney (2000), I define critical junctures (CJs) by two properties that are individually necessary and collectively sufficient. (i) CJs constitute junctures insofar as actors are free to choose among several alternatives and (ii) CJs are critical because “once a particular option is selected it becomes progressively more difficult to return to the initial point when multiple alternatives were still available” (Mahoney 2000, 513). To make my argument, I need to establish two claims: that actors at the summit could genuinely choose among significantly different alternatives and that attempts at overturning these decisions during the Charest government (2003-2012) met with increasing resistance. By the late 1990s, the first claim could already have been established; only now, however, can the second claim be properly assessed. By focusing on the critical juncture of the mid-1990s, I read history “forward” rather than “backward” (Capoccia and Ziblatt, 2010). Reading history “backward” means to trace the genealogy of an event (e.g. by tracing the genealogy of Quebec’s 1997 child care policy back to the first subsidized child care spaces after World War II). The danger with this approach is to produce a teleological and deterministic account of that event. In contrast, reading history “forward” means going back to the event itself and analysing what actors were “actually fighting for” in their situation of uncertainty, exploring their motivations in choosing certain alternatives and avoiding others. To avoid producing an account that over-stresses contingency and agency (Pierson, 2004), however, I situate this critical juncture along older ‘paths’, underlying the legacies and constraints that structured the decision process during the mid-1990s.

3.3 Focusing on the core of Quebec’s social model Between the March 1996 conference and the October 1996 socioeconomic summit, the Groupe de travail sur l’économie sociale (GTES) was asked to find ways to support Quebec’s social economy (see section 5.1). Its final report, Osons la solidarité!, made bold and innovative recommendations for the social economy taken as a whole as well as for social economy

16 enterprises in the cultural, agricultural, environmental, ICT, and social services sectors21. In the “social” sector, the GTES’ recommendations targeted five main policy fields: child care, perinatal services, home support services (or homemaking), social insertion, and social housing. Incredibly, all but one of the latter recommendations were received favorably by Bouchard’s government (Canadian Press, 1996)22. To a very large extent, the “core” of Quebec’s social model – characterized by high social investments and the social economy - emerged out of the GTES and was instituted en bloc in the aftermath of the summit. Rather than trying to account for every aspect of Quebec’s social model, my dissertation chiefly focuses on explicating this “core”. My expectation is that common causes underpin the various reforms (e.g. in social economy, child care, social insertion) underpinning this core. A critic might object that the GTES was epiphenomenal, “reflecting” rather than causing the social reforms of the mid-1990s. This is an empirical claim which I would rather test than simply assume (and in section 5, I suggest that the GTES was actually very influential). To the very least, investigating the activities of the 1996 social economy workshop - which has become, since 1999, the Chantier de l’économie sociale – allows me to circumscribe the policy sectors constituting Quebec’s core social model. This core has since remained largely intact. On the current board of directors of the Chantier sit social economy associations representing the five social policy fields identified above - two social insertion associations (Collectif des entreprises d'insertion du Québec and the Conseil québécois des entreprises adaptées), one child care association (Association québécoise des CPE), one perinatal association (Réseau des Centres de ressources périnatales du Québec), one home support services association (Coalition des entreprises d’économie sociale en aide domestique), and one social housing association (Association des groupes de ressources techniques du Québec). My research addresses all of these policy fields. As illustrated in the tentative chapter breakdown below, I plan to have one chapter focusing on the recognition of the social economy and on policies promoting social economy enterprises independently of their activity sector and then four chapters exploring in further detail sectorial social investment policies relying on the social economy. In each chapter, I seek to examine the extent to which the mid-1990s constitute a critical juncture, why a distinctively sharp social investment turn was (or was not) taken, and investigate why social economy-based policies were privileged. In so doing, am I not selecting on the dependent variable? The argument against selecting on the dependent variable usually runs as follows. (1) The only case that falsifies the statement “if X, then Y” is one that includes an X and a non-Y. (2) Selecting only cases of Ys (i.e. selecting on the dependent variable) therefore precludes the possibility of finding a falsifying case; (3) A research design that selects on the dependent variable is a flawed research design (Geddes 1990; King, Keohane and Verba 1994). The logic is impeccable, but does not apply to my research - the goal of which is not to test a general “if X, then Y” statement, but rather to clarify the causes of a specific outcome in a particular case. Single cases often exhibit very limited variation on the dependent variable. As further discussed in section 6, however, limited variation on the dependent variable is only an insurmountable problem for causal inference in correlational research (Goertz and Mahoney, 2012). More qualitative research typically relies on critical pieces of evidence found within a single case to adjudicate between alternative causal hypotheses.

21 Appendix 2 lists the GTES’ 25 sectorial recommendations. 22 As shown in Appendix 2, the one recommendation that has not been followed required the funding of a child care system based on multi-stakeholder cooperatives.

17

4. Tentative chapter breakdown (and page count23) Chapter 1: Introduction (30 pages) Chapter 2: Quebec’s new social model (50 pages) Chapter 3: The social economy sector (50 pages) Chapter 4: Child care and perinatal services (50 pages) Chapter 5: Social insertion (50 pages) Chapter 6: Home support services (50 pages) Chapter 7: Social housing (50 pages) Chapter 8: Conclusion (30 pages)

5. Overview of empirical chapters Sections 1, 2, 3, and 6 of the proposal introduce the chapters of the dissertation which focus on the theory and methodology (i.e. 1-2); section 5 of the proposal introduces the more “empirical” chapters of the dissertation (i.e. 3-7). Each of these ‘empirical’ chapters asks the same core question: why has Quebec gone forward with distinctively generous active social policies24 relying on the social economy? (In the case of chapter three, the question would read ‘why has Quebec come to recognize and fund a social economy sector?’). Perhaps the explanation will be entirely different for each sector (social economy, child care, social insertion, homemaking, and social housing). This is very unlikely, however, given that the sectorial reforms were made en bloc after the 1996 summit. (The general explanation, attentive to both commonalities and differences between sectorial stories, will be presented in chapter 2). Chapters 3-7 share the same basic quadripartite structure. Section (i) of each of these chapters clarifies how Quebec currently compares with other provinces and countries, specifying to what extent Quebec exhibits higher (or lower) social investments and relies more (or less) strongly on the social economy. Then, following Roberts (2013, 1430), I distinguish the three time periods assumed in critical juncture arguments: the antecedent conditions, the critical juncture, and the aftermath. Section (ii) investigates the antecedent conditions - the “slow moving” causal processes structuring the politics of the mid-1990s. Section (iii) focuses on the mid-1990s, investigating the “quick causes” (e.g. coalitions and political exchanges weaved by entrepreneurs) underpinning the social reforms of the post-summit and debating whether these reforms qualify as “junctures”. Section (iv) covers the period from the mid-1990s to today, paying due attention to attempts at dismantling the PQ’s new social programs. This step is necessary in order to determine whether the putative juncture of the mid-1990s was a critical one. Let met emphasize that sections (ii-iv) are thus argumentative, rather than ‘narrative’ in nature.

5.1 The social economy sector This chapter seeks to explain why, in the mid-1990s, Quebec recognized and substantially increased its support to the social economy sector. Section (i). As mentioned above, Quebec is the only province to recognize a social economy sector. It also has the biggest co-operative sector and is my far the province that most

23 I am using the template recommended by Dunleavy (2003). 24 Social housing policies may not qualify as active social policies.

18 actively supports its co-operatives (Laforest and Heneberry, 2011). How Quebec’s social economy policies compare relative to those of other countries is less well-known. Section (ii) mostly seeks to explain why Quebec’s “un-named” social economy had become a significant force in the 1990s (see Petitclerc, 2007; Petitclerc and Lévesque, 2010). It focuses in particular on the development of the cooperative sector during the 20th century (e.g. the creation of the Conseil québécois de la cooperation et de la mutualité in 1940), the experiments in social economic development in the 1980s (e.g. creation of the RESO), and the institutional inclusion of cooperatives and community groups in broad decision settings in the 1980s and early 1990s – e.g. through the Forum pour l’emploi (1987) and the Bélanger-Campeau commission. (It is also in this section that I seek to clarify the roots of Quebec’s concertation tradition, started during the first Lévesque government). Section (iii) demonstrates that the mid-1990s were a “juncture”. It would itself be divided into four subsections. The first focuses on the 1995 Women’s March. As suggested above, since the notion of social economy was virtually unheard of at the time, its adoption by the Women’s March is puzzling. Then, when the marcheuses arrived at the National Assembly, Parizeau surprised them by agreeing with almost all of their demands (Venne, 1995) – partly because the referendum on sovereignty was only six months away and because the March had been such a media success (Maisonneuve 2003, 80-81). With respect to the social economy, the government created the Comité d’orientation et de concertation sur l’économie sociale, COCES. It is worth recalling that in their document, however, the Women’s March Against Poverty had not overly stressed the concept of social economy– the privileged concept being that of “social infrastructures” (the expression ‘social economy’ was in fact only evoked once in the document). For reasons that remain to be elucidated, Parizeau nonetheless immediately created a comity on the social economy, which produced a report on the existing social economy in Quebec and Europe. The second subsection focuses on the 1995 referendum. Why was the community sector, lukewarm about the sovereignty project in 1980, campaigning alongside the PQ during the 1995 referendum? What role have the other future protagonists of the socioeconomic summit played in the referendum? In particular, can the support of the community sector (including women’s groups and the Caisses Desjardins) to the ‘Yes’ side explain why it was invited to the 1996 conference and socioeconomic summit? The third subsection focuses on the period spanning from the March conference to the October socioeconomic summit. Why did Bouchard call the conference and then the summit? Why did he invite community groups? Were other (non) invitations controversial? Why was a social economy workshop instituted? Recall that at the end of the conference, the government announced the creation of a Commission sur la fiscalité et le financement des services and two chantiers de travail - one on the economy and employment (which was to be presided over by Claude Béland, from the Caisses Desjardins) and one on social services. The Chantier de travail sur l’économie et l’emploi supervised four workshops on the issues of: the social economy (the GTSE, presided over by Nancy Neamtan), the private enterprise and employment, Montreal’s economic development, and regional economic development. Both of these chantiers as well as the commission on fiscal issues and the different workshops were asked to deliver their conclusions in time for the socio-economic summit, to take place between October 30th and November 1st of that year. We know very little about the working of the GTSE. In particular, how were the workshop’s members chosen? Why did it select the social economy projects that it

19 did? What were the contentious issues? How much was Nancy Neamtan in contact with Claude Béland and government officials between the conference and the summit? The fourth subsection focuses on the socioeconomic summit and its immediate aftermath. Why were virtually all the – bold and innovative - demands of the GTSE received so positively? In particular, why was a consensus built around the concept of the social economy? Did the PQ conduct polls to assess the popularity of these measures? Recall that several measures favourable to the social economy were taken immediately after the summit. First, following Neamtan’s report, the GTSE’s funding was extended for a two-year period, and then in April 1999, the Chantier de l’économie sociale became a permanent, autonomous non-profit organization, acting as the peak association of the social economy sector. Second, the Quebec government established a whole web of financial institutions to fund social economy enterprises (see Bourque et al. 2013; Elson et al. 2009). In 1997, the government instituted the Réseau d'investissement social du Québec (RISQ), which exclusively funds Quebec social economy enterprises. Bouchard also established the Centres locaux de développement in 1998, which support local social economy enterprises through the management of two funds: the Fonds de développement des entreprises d’économie sociale the and the Fonds locaux d’investissement. Thanks to these financial institutions established in the mid-1990s, investment in social economy enterprises grew from a total of $20 million in 1997 to $136 million in 2004 (Bourque, Mendell and Rouzier 2013, 194). Third, the PQ government created the Comité sectoriel de la main- d'oeuvre de 1'économie sociale et de l'action communautaire (CSMO-ÉSAC), to provide training and needs analysis for the social economy and to track the progress of job creation and enterprise development. Other gestures symbolizing the recognition of the social economy sector include the establishment of the Maison de l’économie sociale (2001) and the Office of the Social Economy within the Ministry of Finance (2002). Section (iv). In the first subsection, I shall go over the Liberal rule of 2003-2012. My preliminary conclusion is that, for the social economy, the Charest years are characterized by continuity. Without an obvious change in mandate, the Office of the Social Economy was transferred to the Ministry of Regional and Economic Development (2003), and, following the 2006 Sommet de l’économie sociale et solidaire, the Liberal government helped creating the Fiducie du Chantier de l’économie sociale (2007), which provides very patient capital to Quebec social economy enterprises. Other measures include a Plan d’action gouvernemental pour l’entreprenariat collectif (2008) and a strategy to favour Quebec social economy enterprises in public procurement (presented in Le Québec mobilisé contre la pauvreté, 2010-2015). 25 In the second subsection, I briefly describe the evolution of the social economy under the Marois government (2012-2014), so far responsible for a Social Economy Reform Act (2013).

5.2 Child care and perinatal services This chapter seeks to explain why Quebec developed, in the mid-1990s, distinctly generous child care and (possibly also distinctively generous) perinatal services delivered by social economy enterprises. Section (i). Table 2 provides evidence of Quebec’s greater investments in child care relative to other provinces since – but only since - the mid-1990s (in 1992, Quebec still spent less on child care than Ontario and the Canadian average). The data come from the Childcare resource and research unit’s latest study (Friendly et al. 2013). By OECD standards, Quebec’s

25 In 2009, the City of Montreal also established its own policy of social economy promotion and instituted a municipal Office of the Social Economy with the mandate of implementing social economy projects.

20 provision of child care is quite generous, falling just below that of Scandinavian countries, France, and Belgium26 (see also Godbout and St-Cerny 2008).

Table 2: Provincial “efforts” in child care Percent of children 0-12 years for whom Total allocations for regulated child care there is a regulated child care space (unadjusted dollars) 1992 (%) 2012 (%) 1992 ($) 2012 ($) QC 6,8 37,4 140,726,000 2,392,649,000 ON 8,1 15,4 420,140,000 865,100,000 CA 7,5 20,4 761,959,000 4,016,815,891 Data: Friendly et al. (2013)

From a comparative perspective, child care’s reliance on the social economy is very high in Canada (e.g. Turgeon 2010) and so Quebec is less of an outlier – although Ontario has privileged school-based kindergarten for four- and five-year olds since the 1980s (Mahon, 2013). Prentice (2006) reports that about four fifth of Canada’s center spaces are delivered through non- profit child care centers, which are almost always democratically controlled by parent-users. That said, she acknowledges that different provinces and territories have very different requirements when it comes to parental participation in child care centers' boards of directors (Ferguson and Prentice, 2000). Hence, whereas Ontario, Alberta, and British Columbia do not require parents to be represented on these boards, Saskatchewan requires parents to form a majority of board members, while Quebec requires parents to form at least two-third of board members of social economy child care centres – i.e. the centres de la petite enfance (CPEs). Research has been much sparser with regard to perinatal services and I currently do not know how Quebec compares with other provinces and countries. (In fact, I am aware of not a single social science text on Canadian perinatal services). Section (ii) focuses on the history of child care and perinatal services, mostly from the early 1970s, when federal programs such as Local Initiatives Project and Opportunities for Youth fuelled the emergence of Quebec’s garderies populaires, to the mid-1990s. More than in any other provinces, it seems, community-based child care providers in Quebec organized and pressured their provincial (national) government to fund community-based child care. Section (iii). With the merging of the Canada Assistance Plan into the CHST in 1996 federal transfers for social assistance stopped being earmarked for means-tested programs, which allowed Quebec to pursue more universalist social policies (Haddow, 2014)27. Less than a year after the reform in federal transfer payments, on May 15, 1997, Pauline Marois presented at the National Assembly the bill announcing the establishment of the system of centres de la petite enfance. The Bouchard government’s decision to establish this child care system, however, seems to have been taken shortly after the March 1996 conference – although during the 1995 referendum, Bouchard was already indicating that a sovereign Quebec could have more generous

26 Ministère de la famille et des aînés. 2010. Données comparatives sur les politiques familiales du Québec et celles des pays membres de l’OCDE. Gouvernement du Québec, p.27. Available online : http://www.mfa.gouv.qc.ca/fr/publication/Documents/Comparaisons_internationales-complet.pdf 27 The passage from CAP to CSHT was probably favoured by the strong presence of the Bloc in Ottawa (Guest 1999, 249-250).

21 family policies (Venne 1996, 52). In her memoirs, Pauline Marois explains that immediately after the conference, Bouchard had asked the Comité des priorités to elaborate a set of policies to support young families (Marois 2011, 153). Only two months later, on May 14, 1996, Marois presented Bill 11, which revealed the government’s intention to limit public child care funding to parent-controlled non-profit child care centres (in contrast with previous liberal governments which also funded for-profit centres). The idea of universal childcare seems to have attracted a wide support and a surprisingly narrow opposition. Marois (2011, 153) mentions that many people within the PQ thought it was unreasonable to increase funding for child care centres in such a difficult fiscal context, but that they were silenced by Bouchard. Tougas (2001) reports that Quebec business neither supported nor opposed the child care reform (see also Haddow 2014). In his memoirs, pharmacy magnate Jean Coutu in fact tells how even the workshop he supervised between the March conference and the October summit - on the private enterprise and employment - stressed the importance of the “‘petite école’ and inter-generational solidarity for Quebec’s long-term economic prosperity (Coutu 2011, 407). Among bureaucrats and policy experts, educationally-rich child care was viewed as crucial for child development (Jenson 2001), and in a report published by a child care workshop in January of 1995, child care issues were explicitly casted in terms of “investments” (Lalonde-Graton 2002, 230). Were conservatives and employers convinced by these “social investment” arguments - which could scarcely rely on scientific data at the time (but now see Lefebvre and Merrigan 2008; Fortin, Godbout and St-Cerny, 2013)? Why was Bouchard insisting on the importance of child care reform? The role of the social economy in the provision of child care seems to have been more controversial. In February of 1995, a number of education groups, including the school commissions and the Centrale des enseignants du Québec (CEQ), demanded a school-based system of kindergarten and child care centres (Lalonde-Graton 2002, 234). Through the Commission des États généraux sur l’éducation (1995-1996), a heated debate opposed proponents of school-based child care centres (e.g. the Associations des services de garde en milieu scolaire du Québec, backed by the CEQ) to proponents of social economy child care centres (e.g. the CIRGQ, backed by the CSN and the GTES) (Lalonde-Graton 2002, 335-6). Trying to strike a compromise between these two views, in Rénover notre système d’éducation: dix chantiers prioritaires (October 1996), the Commission des États Généraux sur l’éducation recommended universal full-day school-based kindergarten for five-year-olds and half-days in either school-based kindergarten or child care centres for four-year-olds. Why has the government ultimately sided with proponents of social economy centres? Why did the government believe in the superiority on parent-controlled centres? The GTES’s preference for social economy-based perinatal services was also satisfied. In the aftermath of the summit, following the GTES’ recommendation, ten social economy-based centers of perinatal services - the centres de ressources périnatales – were recognized and given funding28. Section (iv). Although the social economy-based child care system established in the mid-1990s has not been dismantled by the Liberals (Noël 2013, Haddow 2014), daily costs in CPEs have risen from $5 to $7 and the dominance of the social economy in child care has been challenged through a process of “layering” (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010). As could be expected, the Liberals favoured the empowerment of for-profit providers (Gingrich, 2011): since the

28 My information on perinatal services essentially comes from the website of the Réseau des centres de ressources périnatales du Québec : http://www.reseaudescrp.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=64&Itemid=97

22 introduction of a new tax credit in 2008, spaces in commercial “non-funded” child care centres have exploded. In March 2008, only 2% of spaces were found in non-funded child care centres; in March 2013, this proportion had risen to 15%29 (see Jenson, 2009; and see Haddow 2014 for an up-to-date account of Quebec child care policy since the mid-1990s). Less controversially, in 2004, the Liberals decided to maintain and reinforce Quebec’s nascent social economy-based system of perinatal services. There are now twenty social economy-based centers of perinatal services spread across the province.

5.3. Social insertion This chapter seeks to explain why, in the mid-1990s, Quebec significantly increased its support to social economy enterprises working in social insertion. Following the GTES’s report, I focus on two work-integration social enterprise (WISE) initiatives: disability-friendly enterprises (entreprises adaptées) and training businesses (entreprises d’insertion). Both initiatives seek to integrate socially disadvantaged people into the labor market. Disability- friendly enterprises compete in the market while employing mostly workers with disabilities (at least 60% in Quebec); to compensate for the loss in revenue resulting from the lower productivity of workers with disabilities, they receive government funding – which also allows the government to save on social assistance and workers with disabilities to gain a higher income than they would have gained had they stayed on social assistance. Funding disability-friendly enterprises has been widely acknowledged as a social investment “win-win” policy (Fortin, 2006). Training businesses similarly compete in the market while being subsidized for employing and actively training individuals lacking job skills and suffering from a poor job record (e.g. 78% of current beneficiaries are high school dropouts according to Fontan and Noiseux 2012, 233). Section (i). My preliminary research suggests that WISEs focused on training are well established in Europe (e.g. Gardin, Laville and Nyssens 2012; Stryjan 2001; Perista 2001) and Quebec but remain weakly institutionalized in English Canada (Ninacs and Toye 2002, 77) – although many individual WISEs do exist to integrate into the labor market people with disabilities (e.g. Common Ground Cooperative in Toronto) and people on the margin of the labor force (e.g. Inner City Renovation Inc. in Winnipeg). Also, the specific concept of entreprise adaptée seems foreign outside Quebec and francophone Europe (e.g. see and Fortin 2006). Section (ii). The first training businesses emerged in the early 1980s but remained disorganized and unrecognized until the mid-1990s (Fontan and Noiseux, 2012). Disability- friendly enterprises, in contrast, had been supported by the Quebec government since the initiation of the Programme de subvention aux entreprises adaptées (PSEA) in 1980 – following the creation of the Office des personnes handicapées du Québec (1978). Section (iii). In 1996, training businesses from all over the province founded the Collectif des entreprises d’insertion du Québec (CEIQ) and established seven criteria for a business to qualify as a training business30. Shortly after, the 1997 Canada-Quebec Labour Market Development Agreement in Principle transferred federal training dollars and staff to Quebec and fuelled the creation of Emploi-Québec, now responsible for all training and employment services in the province (Haddow, 1998; Saint-Martin 2002b). These new resources allowed Louise Harel and the Ministère de l’emploi et de la solidarité to recognize the CEIQ’s criteria and to follow

29 These data are available on the website of Quebec’s Family Ministry: http://www.mfa.gouv.qc.ca/fr/services-de- garde/portrait/places/Pages/index.aspx. 30 See the Collectif’s web site: http://www.collectif.qc.ca/criteres

23 the GTES’ report by instituting the Cadre de reconnaissance et de financement des entreprises d’insertion. Emploi-Québec now provides training businesses with about half their revenues – the other half coming from the market (Fontan and Noiseux 2012, 240). This new program made a significant difference. In 1996, training businesses accounted for 1,250 jobs; in 2006, they accounted for 3,200 jobs (Guindon et al. 2006, 14-15). As is typical of the social economy literature, the secondary literature on Quebec training businesses does not really attempt to “explain” any of these changes (e.g. Larose et al. 2005; Archambault, 2011; Fontan and Noiseux, 2012). How did Quebec’s training businesses come to organize in 1996? Was this organizing prompted by the creation of the GTES? Why did the government decide to recognize and fund these SEEs? Were government officials convinced by social investment arguments? What were the contentious issues? The mid-1990s have arguably been less dramatic for disability-friendly enterprises. Thanks to the PSEA, there were already 38 adapted enterprises employing 1600-1700 individuals with disabilities in 1985. In 1995, however, these numbers had stagnated: there were 39 adapted enterprises employing 1800 individuals with disabilities (GTES 1996, 58). Surprisingly, in spite of the “win-win” properties of these enterprises, I am aware of no policies enacted in the mid-1990s that directly targeted disability-friendly enterprises. Why has the government not sought to do more to help these SEEs? Perhaps the PQ government reasoned that its broader social economy reforms were already indirectly assisting disability-friendly enterprises. Hence, by 2006, employment in disability-friendly enterprises had increased by 67% (since 1995): there were 44 adapted enterprises employing 3000 individuals with disabilities (Guindon et al. 2006, 14). Where this growth comes from is unclear. Perhaps it can be accounted by the new financial institutions targeting social economy enterprises. A complementary explanation is that disability-friendly enterprises – as well as, incidentally, training businesses – benefitted from sectorial “non-social” policies of social economy promotion. In particular, in 1998, David Cliche revealed the environment ministry’s Plan d’action québécois sur la gestion des matières résiduelles (1998- 2008), which, following another recommendation of the GTES’ report, promised $6 million per year for five years for social economy enterprises working in waste treatment centers (i.e. ressourceries)31. In 2004, there were no less than sixty one social economy enterprises working in these centers, including six disability-friendly enterprises and fifteen training businesses (Guindon et al. 2006, 12). That the environment ministry spent such scarce resources on social enterprises suggests that Bouchard himself had endorsed the GTES’ report (see Séguin, 1999). Section (iv). Arguably the most significant social insertion policy since the mid-1990s has been the Liberals’ 2008 national strategy to integrate persons with disabilities in the labor market, which involved an additional $33,5 million for disability-friendly enterprises over a period of five years in the hope of creating 825 jobs32.

31 Ministère du développement durable, environnement, faune et parcs. 1998. Plan d’action québécois sur la gestion des matières résiduelles (1998-2008). Gouvernement du Québec. Online: http://www.mddep.gouv.qc.ca/matieres/politique1998-2008/ (Accessed on February 10th, 2014). 32 Ministère de l’emploi et de la solidarité sociale. 2008. Stratégie nationale pour l’intégration et le maintien en emploi des personnes handicapées. Le pacte pour l’emploi. Gouvernement du Québec. http://www.mess.gouv.qc.ca/publications/pdf/ADMIN_strategie_handicapes.pdf (Accessed on February 10th, 2014).

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5.4 Home support services This chapter seeks to explain why, in the mid-1990s, Quebec helped establish a social economy-based system of home support services. Section (i). Since home care is not an insured service under the Canada Health Act, we find substantial inter-provincial variation in the provision of home care and of home support services in particular33. According to the Canadian Health Care Association (2009, 24-25), provinces roughly fall into two camps with regard to home support services: those that provide home support services chiefly through the public sector (Quebec, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and Prince Edward Island) and those that provide them chiefly through the market (Ontario, British Columbia, Alberta, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Newfoundland and Labrador). Concordantly, Jenson and Philips (2000, 30-31) conclude that in the 1990s, “Quebec reinforced an existing… model in which the public sector maintains a significant role… Ontario marked a change toward a ‘contractual model’, forcing even voluntary sector care into a system that is competitive and market-mimicking if not completely market-based”. The social economy component of Quebec’s home support services is unparalleled in other provinces. In English Canada, the Victorian Order of Nurses (VON), founded in the late 19th century, has traditionally been the main provider of home care services. While it continues to provide an impressive array of care services, VON has now been largely outgrown by the market and public institutions (e.g. Lawson and Thériault, 1999; Jenson and Philips, 2000). Similarly, according to my preliminary literature review, social economy enterprises do not occupy the center stage in the provision of home support services in other countries. Section (ii). Quebec’s first home support policy was enacted in 1979 and officially remained in place until the early 1990s (see in particular Vaillancourt, Aubry and Jetté, 2003; Vaillancourt and Jetté, 2009). According to this policy, the centres locaux de services communautaires (CLSCs) were in charge of home support services; yet, they would increasingly contract out these services to NPOs and for profit firms as the 1980s progressed (Vaillancourt, Aubry, and Jetté, 2003, 57). In the first half of the 1990s, under the Côté reform (much concerned with cost containment), a number of pilot projects were launched to find alternative ways to deliver home support services. Some of these projects included social economy enterprises employing unskilled workers formerly on social assistance. In spite of Vaillancourt and Jetté’s serious historical work, a number of questions remain unanswered. Where does the interest in “social economy enterprises” – rather than the “community sector” more broadly – came from? To what extent were decision makers influenced by “social investment” ideas? Were social economy enterprises depicted as sites of participatory democracy? Section (iii). During the Women’s March, the latter social economy projects were criticised for only providing unstable, badly paid jobs. In their reports, both the COCES and the GTES insisted on the importance of social economy enterprises providing “real jobs” to women. During the October 1996 summit social partners agreed on the key policy - the Programme d’exonération financière pour les services d’aide domestique (PEFSAD) - that was to establish a province-wide system of social economy providers of home support services (Vaillancourt, Aubry, and Jetté 2003, 73). Organised as co-ops – whether multi-stakeholder co-ops, users’ co-

33 Home care services refer to both “health care” services provided by health care professionals and “home support” services, such as cleaning, cooking, and grocery shopping.

25 ops, or workers’ co-op – or NPOs34, these social economy enterprises provide diverse home support services for people with limited autonomy, including preparation of non-diet meals, housework, help with errands and grocery, laundry and ironing, and minor home renovations. As with child care, the greatest opposition to a social economy-based system of home support services seems to have come not from employers, but from the union federation that would have represented home support services workers in the public sector (i.e. CLSC-based) system– in this case, the CSN (Vaillancourt and Jetté, 2009). According to Jenson and Philips (2001, 36) the goal of privileging social economy enterprises with stakeholder-controlled boards of directors “might have been less to democratize than to weaken the power of other interests, especially unionized workers and health-care professionals”. This hypothesis raises a number of questions: should the social economy-based system be construed as a compromise between a market-based system (presumably employers’ first preference) and a public system (the CSN’s preference)? Was the “democratization” aspect of social economy enterprises significant in this compromise? If a key goal of the social economy-based system was to weaken unions, then how can we explain the FTQ’s recent inroads in unionising home support services workers? Also, as the GTES’s report makes clear, the only promoter of a social economy-based home support services system was the GTES itself (see Appendix 2); has no other actor “pushed” for that alternative? Section (iv). Attentive observers seem to agree that home support services are currently undergoing a process of “policy drift” (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010), as funding for social economy homemaking enterprises has not been adjusted to the increasing cost of living since the late 1990s (e.g. Neamtan, 2010).

5.5. Social housing Sections (i-ii). Canada’s housing regime is typical of Anglo-Saxon countries, characterized by generous fiscal advantages to home owners and a small social housing sector (Hulchanski 2004; Kemeny 1995, 2006). Interprovincial differences are relatively small as social housing policies were almost entirely federal policies until the mid-1990s. Then, in 1993, the federal government completely stopped funding new social housing units (until 2002) – and so without compensating the provinces for this loss in investment (Hulchanski, 2004). Only Quebec, British Columbia and, more recently, Manitoba, have since developed their own programs to sponsor social housing (Vaillancourt 2013b, 141). Quebec is also the only province to continue funding co-operative housing developments (Cameron et al. 2012, 15). The “social economy turn” in Canadian social housing occurred in the 1970s. From the aftermath of World War II to mid-1970s, the Canadian Mortgage and Housing Corporation mainly funded state-owned and state-managed housing (HLMs); after the mid-1970s, it progressively shifted its funding priorities to housing co-operatives and NPOs, as they were cheaper and perceived to be less stigmatizing (Vaillancourt and Ducharme, 2001). Section (iii). In 1995, the PQ launched a first social housing program, the Programme achat rénovation pour coopératives et OSBL (PARCO), which, however, never got beyond the experimental stage (Ducharme and Vaillancourt 2005, 116). Quebec’s presence in social policy was only secured after the 1996 socioeconomic summit, which led to the creation of two closely related programs: Accès-Logis (1997), and the Fonds québécois d’habitation communautaire, or

34 In practice, these different statuses bear on who sits on the boards of directors: users, workers and community members in the case of solidarity co-ops, users only in the case of users’ co-ops, workers only in the case of workers’ co-ops, and an unspecified mixture of these different actor categories in NPOs.

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FQHC (1997). Initially given a budget of $5M per year for five years, Accès-Logis is responsible for funding cooperative and NPO housing in Quebec. The FQHC is a more original institution, bringing social economy actors at the center of social housing policy making. With a board of directors constituted of a majority of community and social economy members from the social housing sector (e.g. the Confédération québécoise des cooperatives d’habitation), the FQHC helps to manage the main social housing programs of the Société d’habitation du Québec (SHQ) – Accès-Logis (1997-) and, later, Logement abordable Québec (2002-) – and to raise non- government funds for social housing projects (Ducharme and Vaillancourt, 2005). The PQ’s decision to expand the public provision of housing was far from pre-ordained (see Saillant 2012 for an excellent account of this period from the standpoint of a social housing activist). In fact, the 1997 report of the Groupe de travail sur l’examen des organismes de travaux (led by influential minister Joseph Facal) had recommended to simply abolish the Société d’habitation du Québec (Ducharme and Vaillancourt 2005, 117). Given the withdrawal of the federal government in social housing and the lack of initiative in most other provinces, this recommendation hardly seemed radical. Why has it not been followed? Only a single study has explored the origins of Accès-Logis and the FQHC (i.e. Ducharme and Vaillancourt 2005). It cautiously stresses the role of community groups and the institutional design of the FQHC. Housing was a priority for community groups. The Front d’action populaire en réaménagement urbain and the Association des groupes de ressources techniques du Québec had actively lobbied for a Quebec social housing policy after the federal withdrawal and the 1995 Women’s March had demanded 1,500 new social housing units per year. Attentive to these community groups, the GTES recommended in its report to fund social economy housing for old people and to institute the FQHC (a project that had been initially proposed by the Confédération québécoise des coopératives d’habitation). Then, the fact that the new social housing programs were supposed to partly rely on non-governmental “social funds” made them more appealing for those worried about Quebec’s public finances (Ducharme and Vaillancourt 2005, 116). Although valuable as an exploratory analysis, this study leaves many questions unaddressed. Was the government simply responding to a demand from the community sector or was it convinced by “social investment” arguments? (Should Accès-Logis be interpreted as an active social policy?). Were employers actually in agreement with the PQ’s social housing policy or was social housing part of a larger “political exchange”? Were social economy actors ready to accept lower governmental spending in order to have a greater control in social housing management through FQCH? Section (iv). Arguably the biggest change in social housing since the mid-1990s came from the federal government. In 2001, it launched a new provincial/federal cost-sharing social housing program, Affordable housing. Quebec adopted it (Logement abordable Québec, LAQ) in 2002. As attested by its action plans to combat poverty and social exclusion (2004-2010; 2010- 2015), Quebec’s commitment to Accès-Logis, the FQHC, and now LAQ has not abated. On its website, SHQ claims that Accès-Logis alone has funded over 20,000 new housing units since its inception in 1997 – a number which comes close to the 1,500 housing units per year initially demanded by the Women’s March.

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6. Method and Field Work 6.1. Process tracing In their admirable book, A Tale of Two Cultures, Goertz and Mahoney (2012, 88) clarify that “in small-N qualitative research, the main leverage for causal inference derives from within- case analysis, with cross-case methodologies sometimes playing a supporting role… In large-N statistical research, the main leverage for causal inference derives from cross-case analysis with within-case methodologies sometimes playing a supporting role”. My research strategy is consistent with this understanding of small-N qualitative research: studying only a single case, the main leverage for causal inference in my research derives from a within-case analysis. In cross-case analysis, evidence supporting causal claims is correlational in nature. In within-case analysis, evidence is usually marshalled through variants of a “process tracing” method (e.g. what Hall 2003 calls “systematic process analysis”). Goertz and Mahoney (2012, 93) specify that “[P]rocess-tracing is used to evaluate hypotheses about the causes of a specific outcome in a particular case”. As “evaluating hypotheses about the causes of a specific outcome in a particular case” is what I aim to do, I overwhelming rely on process-tracing to answer my main research question. Process tracing is fundamentally about finding “diagnostic” pieces of evidence within a case that contribute to support or reject alternative explanatory hypotheses (Hall 2003, George and Bennet 2005, Goertz and Mahoney, 2012). Process tracing methodologists distinguish two main types of “tests”: smoking gun tests and hoop tests. Smoking gun tests are about finding evidence that is sufficient to confirm a hypothesis, whereas hoop tests are about finding evidence that is necessary for a hypothesis to hold (or about finding evidence that is sufficient to reject that hypothesis). A “deterministic” language needs not be used, as a condition could be “quasi- necessary” or “largely sufficient” for a hypothesis to be true. Typically, in fact, these tests are not absolutely decisive, as the strength of any historical evidence can vary substantially on a continuum. In my fieldwork, I will look for diagnostic pieces of evidence by consulting written secondary and primary sources and by conducting interviews with protagonists of Quebec’s new social model. These diagnostic pieces of evidence are essential to allow me to adjudicate between my theoretically-informed causal hypotheses (section 2.3).

6.2. Written sources Journals Key journals regularly publishing on Quebec’s social economy include : Coopératives et développement (1985-1996); Économie et Solidarités (1996-2011), Nouvelles pratiques sociales (1988-), Vie économique (2009-), Canadian Journal of Nonprofit and Social Economy Research (2010), and The Philanthropist (1972-). Research chairs publishing work on Quebec’s social economy also regularly publish research notes. The cahiers of CRISES (1986-) and LAREPPS (1992-) are especially valuable.

Readily available primary sources A wealth of written primary documents can be found in libraries and on the Internet, including: - TV archives (RDI’s archives) and old issues from newspapers (e.g. La Presse, Le Devoir, The Gazette, Le Soleil), magazines (e.g. L’Actualité, Les Affaires, Forces) and yearly publications (e.g. L’Annuaire du Québec, 1996-).

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- Institutional websites (e.g. the website of the Chantier de l’économie sociale seems to have exhaustive records of the evolution of the social economy in Quebec since 2000) - Various types of government publications (e.g. legislation, workshops’ or commissions’ reports) - Some governmental archives, including hansards (35th legislature), electoral programs and premiers’ speeches (www.archivespolitiquesduquebec.com) and press releases (http://www.premierministre.gouv.qc.ca/actualites/communiques/archives.asp)

Archives (in archive centers) My priority is to read the transcripts of the March 1996 Conference and of the October socioeconomic summit35 and to get my hands on all the available documentation on the GTES36 (e.g. the briefs submitted to the GTES). From my last visit at the Centre d’archives nationales (Vieux-Montréal), I know that the Fonds d’archives Lucien Bouchard promise to contain valuable information on the socioeconomic summit from a governmental perspective. Ghislaine Raymond’s work also points to archives recording unions’ perspective on the summit.

Interviews As Goldthorpe (1991) reminds us, the key advantage enjoyed by social scientists over historians is that they can generate new data, inter alia, through interviews. Most key actors of the 1996 socioeconomic summit are still around: now is the time to interview them. A (very) preliminary list of individuals I would like to interview may be found in a separate Excel document. Through these interviews, I seek to know more about all the “key moments” of the mid-1990s and to learn about the perspectives of the government (including elected officials, top and lower-level bureaucrats), the opposition, the employers, the unions, and the community sector37. For now the “key moments” I would like to better understand include (in chronological order): the Women’s March Against Poverty, the Comité d’orientation et de concertation sur l’économie sociale (COCES), the March 1996 Conference, the Chantier de travail sur l’économie et l’emploi (and the GTES in particular), the Chantier de travail sur les réformes gouvernementales, the Commission sur la fiscalité et le financement des services

35 Secétariat du sommet sur l’économie et l’emploi. 1996. Sommet sur l’économie et l’emploi. Transcriptions. Le mercredi 30 octobre 1996. Québec, Sténographes officiels Riopel, Daigneault, Gagnon, Larose et Laplante, 346p; Secétariat du sommet sur l’économie et l’emploi. 1996. Sommet sur l’économie et l’emploi. Transcriptions. Le jeudi 31 octobre 1996. Québec, Sténographes officiels Riopel, Daigneault, Gagnon, Larose et Laplante, 367p; Secétariat du sommet sur l’économie et l’emploi. 1996. Sommet sur l’économie et l’emploi. Transcriptions. Le vendredi 1er november 1996. Québec, Sténographes officiels Riopel, Daigneault, Gagnon, Larose et Laplante, 44p. 36 I assume Nancy Neamtan could help me with this. 37 “Community” groups include : women’s groups (e.g. Fédération des femmes du Québec), representatives of the cooperative movement (e.g. the Caisses Desjardins) and of the broader social economy (Chantier de l’économie sociale, Conseil québécois de la coopération et de la mutualité), childcare associations (Concertation interrégionale des garderies du Québec, Association québécoise des CPE), perinatal associations (Réseau des Centres de ressources périnatales du Québec, Regroupement Naissance-Renaissance), social insertion associations (Collectif des entreprises d’insertion du Québec, Conseil québécois des entreprises adaptées), homemaking associations (Coalition des entreprises d’économie sociale en aide domestique, Fédération des coopératives de services à domicile et de santé du Québec), and social housing associations (Confédération québécoise des coopératives d’habitation, Réseau québécois des OSBL d’habitation, Association des groupes de ressources techniques du Québec, Front d’action populaire en réaménagement urbain).

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publics, the October 1996 Conference38, and the aftermath of the summit (1996-1998), when key policies regarding the social economy sector, child care, perinatal services, social insertion, home support services, and social housing were established.

7. Preliminary timeline I have a strong preference for taking no more than five years to complete the program, which means that I should defend by the end of August 2016. The following timeline was thought out accordingly.

2014 Spring: get ethics certificate + prepare fieldwork + present at CPSA (May) Summer-Fall: archival work + interviews

2015 Submit an article manuscript to a peer-reviewed journal based on dissertation research Write a full first draft of the dissertation

2016 Teach a course Finish the dissertation Defend

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38 Names of participants can be found in the Fond d’archives Lucien Bouchard (see Raymond 2011, appendix B).

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Key Primary documents Comité d’orientation et de concertation sur l’économie sociale, 1996. Entre l’espoir et le doute. Québec, May. Groupe de travail sur l'économie sociale. 1996. Osons la solidarité! Rapport du Groupe de travail sur l'économie sociale. Marche des femmes contre la pauvreté. 1995. Cahier des revendications et guide d'animation. 26 mai au 4 juin 1995.

Appendix 1: Chronology of the mid-1990s

26 May – 4 June 1995: Women’s March Against Poverty (under the leadership of the Fédération des Femmes du Québec)

June 1995: Parizeau institutes the Comité d’orientation et de concertation sur l’économie sociale

30 October 1995: Referendum

29 January 1996: Lucien Bouchard becomes premier

18-20 March 1996: Conference on the Social and Economic Future of Quebec. We established: - Commission sur la fiscalité et le financement des services publics chantiers de travail - Chantier de travail sur les réformes gouvernementales (consultations ministérielles) - Chantier de travail sur l’économie et l’emploi, which supervised four workshops : économie sociale (GTES), emploi et entreprise privée, relance de la métropole, régions et municipalités.

30 October – 1 November 1996: Socio-economic summit

1997: key policies in the social economy sector, child care, perinatal services, home support services, and social housing

1998: key policies in social insertion

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Appendix 2. List of the 25 projects promoted in the GTES’ report39

Name of the project Main promotor Has it Comment been realized? 1. Journées nationales de la Associations nationales du Yes The Journées de la culture culture milieu culturel take place on the last weekend of September (1997-) 2. Le réseau de fermes Épillet Groupe Épillet Yes Government loan guarantee of 900 000$ 3. Projet pilote d’une usine Table de concertation agro- No flexible de transformation alimentaire du Centre-du- de produits agricoles Québec 4. Réseau CIM Réseau CIM No 5. Coopérative de solidarté Fédération des coopératives Yes Formal recognition of multiservices d’alimentation ‘coopératives de solidarité’

6. Projet pilote en matière de MRC de Matapédia et de No réorganisation de services Nicolet-Yamaska de prévention des incendies 7. Réseau de ressourceries du Recyc-Québec; Front commun Yes Plan d’action québécois Québec pour une gestion écologique sur la gestion des matières des déchets; Ministère de résiduelles (1998-2008) l’environnement et de la Faune 8. Système intégré d’aide à la Conseil régional de No décision pour une utilisation développement de l’Outaouais durable du territoire et des ressources 9. Soutien à la mise en valeur Fondation de la faune du No des habitats fauniques Québec 10. Hébergement des personnes Regroupement d’OSBL Yes Part of the mission of âgées Accès-Logis, 1997 11. Boulot-Dodo Office municipal d’habitation Yes The Loi sur la Société de Montréal; office municipal d’habitation du Québec d’habitation de Québec was amended in April 2002 to increase the participation of tenants in the management of public housing Fonds d’habitation Confédération des coopératives Yes Fonds québécois communautaire d’habitation du Québec d’habitation communautaire 13. Centre d’information et de CMSQ; CMTBQ; MQCJ; No formation sur le patrimoine AAPMAQ; CIMP bâti 39 Main source: Guindon, Charles, Nancy Neamtan, Marcel Arteau, Hélène Simard. 2006. Entreprendre solidairement. Bilan 1996-2006. Sommet de l’économie sociale et solidaire, 16-17 novembre 2006. Conseil québécois de la coopération et de la mutualité and the Chantier de l’économie sociale

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14. Entente sur la Collectif des entreprises Yes Cadre de reconnaissance et reconnaissance et le d’insertion; conseil régional de de financement des financement des entreprises développement de l’Île de entreprises d’insertion d’insertion de l’Île de Montréal (1998) Montréal 15. Création d’emplois pour Association québécoise des Debatable Benefited from general personnes handicapées dans établissements adaptés SEE policies but from no les entreprises adaptées sectorial policy 16. Protocole de reconnaissance Association des services de Yes Entente intervenue entre le des groupes réhabilitation sociale du ministère de la Sécurité communautaires intervenant Québec (ARSQ); publique du Québec et les dans le domaine de la Regroupement des organismes associations provinciales réhabilitation sociale communautaires du Québec de ressources (ROCRQ); Association des communautaires œuvrant résidences communautaires du auprès de la clientèle Québec (ARCQ) pénale (ASRSQ, ARCQ, ROCRQ) dans le cadre du Chantier de l’Économie sociale, 1996 17. Communautique Institut canadien d’éducation Debatable Benefitted from RISQ, but des adultes; Puce from no sectorial policy communautaire (Guindon et al. 2006, 16) 18. Coopératives jeunesse de Regroupement québécois des Yes Recognition in 1996 (and services coopératrices et coopérateurs central in the 1999 Plan du travail d’action jeunesse) 19. Service d’aide à domicile Groupe de travail sur Yes Programme d’exonération l’économie sociale financière pour les services d’aide domestique (1997) 20. Centres de la petite enfance Concertation inter-régionale Yes Bill 145 (1997) des garderies du Québec 21. Services de garde organisés Cinq associations d’agence de No en coopératives de solidarité garde du Québec 22. Centres de services en Naissance-Renaissance Yes 10 Centres de ressources périnatalité périnatales were recognized and given funding in 1997 23. Fonds de développement Fédération des coopératives Yes 1997 : creation of a $15 des coopératives funéraires funéraires du Québec million fund du Québec

24. Expérimentation de coupes Conférence des coopératives Yes Forestry cooperatives éclaircies commerciales forestières du Québec gained access to nearly 4 000 hectares for commercial thinning in public forests (1997) 25. Intensification de Centre de services aux réseaux No l’aménagement forestier d’entreprises du secteur forestier

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