Sefide Staff Report Pole" 8154/7/ : A Country and a Policy Disintegrate The following is the conclusion of a need to negotiate the Initiative for a politi- seems to view the agreements as a pattern Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff cal settlement will not come from the Lao. for the future. It is difficult for some ob- report, "Laos: April 1971," prepared by The latest series of attacks all along the line servers to see how agreements violated so James G. Lowenstein and Richard M. in Laos may, however, force Lao leaders to blatantly, by both parties, can be regarded alter their attitude toward negotiation, par- as a realistic basis for a future settlement Moose. ticularly if additional American or Thal help when they have not accomplished this end No one we met in Laos, American or Lao, is not forthcoming. Finally, as far as U.S. so far. Yet the statement is persistently seems to have a prescription for the future policy is concerned, it is quite apparent that heard in Vientiane—from both Lao and other than to continue to do what is being many- American officials regard the contin- United States officials—that the . Geneva done now. Some observers pointed out to us ued prosecution of the war in Laos as an es- Agreements of 1962 can be implemented af- that, in the long run, the odds are heavily sential adjunct of our current military strat- ter the war in Vietnam is settled or in con- against defending Laos, given the advan- egy in Vietnam because, in their view, it ties junction with a settlement. And • no one tages the. North Vietnamese enjoy. These down two or more North Vietnamese divi- seems willing to admit the possibility that are a 1,300-mile front along which they can sions and permits us to exploit Lao territory there may he no final settlement but merely attack; short, well-developed and increas- to interdict the Trail, thereby buying time a continuation of the war in Vietnam, ingly heavily defended supply lines; a sanc- for Vietnamization. In this sense, we are in- though perhaps at a somewhat reduced tuary largely safe from direct attack; a pop- deed using the Lao for our own purposes at level. ulation 10 times that of Laos; and a' larger, an increasingly heavy cost to them in lives es.s and territory. At the same time, U.S. offi- more experienced and better motivated If there Is no settlement in Vietnam and army. In their more optimistic moments Lao cials also believe that if U,S. air activities In and Americans, as well as most Western ob- Laos were stopped, the military situation the war also continues in Laos, Laos will re- servers, expressed a guarded belief that the would be even more serious In Military Re- main a hostage available to the North Viet- Lao will be able to cling to what remains of gions II, III, and IV and that all of Military namese should they wish to draw American their territory until the war ends in Viet- Region II, Including the vital base at Long airpower away from Cambodia and South nam, believing that the war in Vietnam will Tieng, could be lost. Vietnam, embarrass the United States, end in an agreed settlement in which the cis threaten or bring the Chinese into great powers will participate and that this The Thai irregulars constitute a new com- closer involvement. Perhaps the only real settlement will lead to a similar resolution plicating factor, one not yet fully acknowl- protection the Lao have is whatever limits of the situation in Laos. edged by some accustomed to dealing with the North Vietnamese wish to place on C44 Laos within the context of an Indochina themselves. Some U.S. officials believe that There Is a sporadic dialogue between the war. Some observers pointed out to us, how- these limits include not taking over the Pathet Lao and Lao governments, and a ever, that it would seem to follow from the whole country but continuing to use Lao ter- Pathet Lao representative has arrived in presence of these Thai in a key strategic lo• ritory as a supply route While assisting the Vientiane within the past week to present cation in Laos that the Thai will inevitably Pathet Lao as a political—as well as military new proposals. But these new proposals are be parties to any negotiation with the North —force with the final, objective of a parti- apparently harder than previous proposals Vietnamese, the • issue for them being the tioned Laos in which the eastern portion and include a demand for a bombing cessa- line demarcating areas of influence in Laos. will be governed by the Pathet Lao and the tion throughout Laos—not just in parts of And in connection with areas of influence, it western portion by a regime not unsympa- Laos, as in previous demands—before talks was pointed out to us that the practical ef- thetic to North Vietnam. Meanwhile, the area can begin. fect of the Chinese road Is that the Chinese under government control shrinks steadily, Thus, the prospect of negotiations seems border has already been shifted southward the cost to the United States-rises, the Pa- slim indeed. In the first place, the Pellet to encompass a substantial portion of north- thet Lao consolidate their hold on territo- Lao and North Vietnamese are In the strong- ern Laos. ries no longer under government control est military position they have ever enjoyed, Both the and the and the Lao government's professed policy and it is difficult to imagine what, trom United States government seem to consider of neutralism continues to hang by the sin- their point of view, they might gain by a themselves tied inextricably to the concept gle human thread of Prime Minister Sou- compromise which did not bring an end In of the 1962 Geneva Agreements. Prime Min- vanna Phouma. He, In turn, seems to be in- U.S. bombing of the Trail. In the second ister indicated in his con- creasingly isolated from other powerful po- place, as long as we continue to provide the versation with us that he regards these litical figures in his country who wish to in- Lao with the means of continuing the war, agreements as a commitment on the part of volve the United States, or the Thai, even even though at a high cost to us in money the great powers in general, and the United further In the defense of what remains of and an exorbitant cost to them in lives, and States in particular, to provide military as- their country, knowing that they cannot pos- as long as the leaders of Laos see no crucial sistance and financial support. He also sibly defend it themselves.