US–China Strategic Competition and Washington's Conception of Quad Plus
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BEIJING, QUAD AND THE QUAD PLUS US–China Strategic Competition and Washington’s Conception of Quad Plus AKRITI VASUDEva Abstract* To demonstrate leadership in the Indo- Pacific and build on global concerns about dependence on Beijing in the aftermath of the coronavirus pandemic, the United States has sought to engage in regular meetings with a grouping of “like- minded” countries to collectively fight COVID-19 and its aftereffects. Discus- sion has ranged from vaccine development to ensuring supply- chain resilience to upholding international norms. What does this coalition imply about the evolu- tion of Sino–US great- power competition over the past two decades and what does it mean for the Indo-Pacific going forward? This article considers what factors motivated the development of the Quad Plus coalition and why it is consequential, how it fits into the US relationship with China and the Trump administration’s Indo- Pacific Strategy, and what its future may look like under the Biden administration. Introduction Over the past 15 years, China has emerged as a serious contender to dethrone the United States as the preeminent global superpower. Its gross domestic product in purchasing power parity terms has tripled between 2005 and 2019, surpassing that of the United States,1 and by the US Department of Defense’s own admission, China’s defense modernization over the past 20 years has put its military capabilities “ahead of the United States” in areas such as integrated air defense systems and land- based conventional and ballistic missiles.2 China has also made tremendous investments in antiaccess/area- denial (A2/AD) capabilities aimed specifically at frustrating US efforts to defend allies and partners in Asia in the event of a conflict,3 to say nothing of its innovation in emerging technologies such as cyber and artificial intelligence,4 forcing the United States to play catch up. * Sections of this paper are based on and draw from a piece written by the author and Dr. Jagannath Panda for The National Interest in September 2020. See: Jagannath Panda and Akriti Vasudeva, “U.S.- China Competition and Washington’s Case for ‘Quad Plus’,” National Interest, 28 September 2020, https:// nationalinterest.org/. 28 JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS SPECIAL ISSUE 2020 US–China Strategic Competition and Washington’s Conception of Quad Plus Nor is this competition only in terms of economic and military prowess. Beijing has also sought to compete with the United States for diplomatic, geopolitical, and strategic influence globally, by investing huge sums of money into countries in Asia and Africa to provide public goods such as infrastructure and connectivity.5 How- ever, due to the lack of much of a pushback from Washington, this Chinese jostling for influence has turned into aggression. For years, by unilaterally advancing its land and maritime claims through salami- slicing tactics against neighbors such as Japan, India, Philippines, Vietnam, and others; economically coercing countries, such as by forcing them into debt-for- equity swaps as in Sri Lanka6 or through antidumping tariffs such as with Australia;7 and refusing to adhere to international law such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,8 China has been chipping away at the US- led liberal international order without a credible challenge from Washington. Although the United States in the past recognized and acknowledged the challenge China posed to the rules-based order9 and made some efforts to ad- dress it through the Pivot/Rebalance to Asia,10 Washington has now begun to articulate a comprehensive response spanning the economic, military, diplomatic, and strategic domains through the Indo- Pacific Strategy.11 The goals of this strategy are to ensure that the Indo-Pacific region, which imagines the Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean as one strategic system,12 remains free and open for navigation, overflight, and commerce for all countries; is anchored in respect for international law;13 and is not dominated by a “revisionist power”: China.14 And in this endeavor to defend the US-led global order, the Trump administration has sought to develop and strengthen coalitions with like- minded nations such as the Quadrilateral, or Quad, grouping with Japan, India, and Australia. How- ever, more recently, in response to the outbreak of the coronavirus, which began in Wuhan, China, the United States has initiated a new framework for Indo- Pacific cooperation, dubbed “Quad Plus” by the media.15 This article considers what factors motivated the development of the Quad Plus coalition and why it is consequential, how it fits into the US relationship with China and the Trump administration’s Indo- Pacific Strategy, and what its future may look like under the Biden administration. US–China Great- power Competition and Quad/Quad Plus The genesis of the Quad Plus lies in the United States’ strategic competition with China, particularly over the past 20 years. To understand the drivers of and motivations behind the development of this coalition, we need to examine the evolution of the US approach toward China since the 2000s. JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS SPECIAL ISSUE 2020 29 Vasudeva The Trump administration’s policy toward China can be described as adversarial, with the 2018 National Defense Strategy naming Beijing as a “strategic competitor” that aims to achieve “Indo- Pacific regional hegemony in the near- term and dis- placement of the United States to achieve global preeminence in the future.”16 Analysts have warned that “a new type of Cold War” is now afoot,17 with Washing- ton taking an increasingly confrontational stance toward Beijing on areas such as trade, technology, and human rights, particularly in the aftermath of the coronavi- rus pandemic that Pres. Donald Trump has repeatedly called “the Chinese virus.”18 However, 20 years ago too, Condoleezza Rice, then a foreign policy advisor to George W. Bush’s campaign and eventually National Security Advisor and Secre- tary of State, had identified China as a “strategic competitor” that “would like to alter Asia’s balance of power in its own favor,” and had proposed that the United States “should never be afraid to confront Beijing when our interests collide.”19 Thus, it becomes pertinent to ask: (1) why did it take two decades for the United States to decisively address the challenge from China and what factors explain how US policy toward China has come full circle in this time?; and (2) in what ways has this evolution impacted the conception of the Quad, the Indo- Pacific strategy, and the Quad Plus? These questions are considered below, analyzing each US administration in turn. The George W. Bush administration came into office at a time when the world was starting to come to grips with the rise of China. This administration had a hard- nosed view of China militarily, ideologically, and geopolitically. During the campaign, candidate Bush asserted that the United States “must deal with China without ill- will—but without illusions.”20 He criticized the Clinton administra- tion for being soft on Beijing, particularly with regard to threats China made to Taiwan,21 and pledged to strengthen relations with allies in Asia, particularly Ja- pan. The mid 2000s was also when Sino–US economic and trade issues became acute, due to concerns in Washington about Chinese currency manipulation to keep export rates low, Beijing offering state-owned enterprises land sops and other subsidies to compete with foreign firms, and American companies being asked to surrender technology to continue accessing Chinese markets.22 Thus, the Bush administration was aware of the risks that China posed, as articulated by Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick in a speech in September 2005 regis- tering alarm about Chinese military modernization, lack of transparency, and in- tellectual property theft, among others concerns.23 However, the Bush government had little policy space to address some of these challenges, dealing as it was with more pressing threats such as terrorism, two wars, and a domestic financial crisis. In addition, the United States and China were already fairly economically intertwined by then, and China’s more assertive 30 JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS SPECIAL ISSUE 2020 US–China Strategic Competition and Washington’s Conception of Quad Plus foreign policy stance, such as confrontation with US naval vessels24 and threaten- ing of freedom of navigation in the Indo-Pacific commons or coercion of neigh- bors through “salami- slicing” tactics,25 was still a few years away. Thus, overall, the Bush administration believed it could constructively engage China on economic issues and that being a “responsible stakeholder” and playing by the international rules and norms was fundamentally in Beijing’s interest.26 However, the administration did take steps to hedge against China’s rise. It was under President Bush that the idea of the shared values of democracies as a bal- ancing force against China came about. Former Bush administration officials Michael J. Green and Daniel Twining wrote shortly after leaving office that “a network of Asia- Pacific great and regional powers, united by a shared democratic identity and the desire to hedge against Chinese domination, could work to pre- serve a multi- polar regional order as American preponderance eventually wanes.”27 This vision called for strengthening relations with countries such as Japan, India, and Australia and became the underlying rationale for the Quad, which was imagined