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S-0902-0007-02-00001

Expanded Number S-0902-0007-02-00001

Items-in-Africa - Question of - organizations and individuals - People's Organization (SWAPO)

Date Created 29/07/1978

Record Type Archival Item

Container s-*>902-0007: Peacekeeping - Africa 1963-1981

Print Name of Person Submit Image Signature of Person Submit RECEIVED South West Africa People's Organ! ition NOV - 81879

Solidarity — Freedom — Justice

SWAPO OBSERVER MISSION to the 801 Second Avenue Room 1401 New York, N.Y. 10017

Telex - 237249 Telephone: (212) 986-7863/7864

November 8, 1979.

Dr. Kurt Waldheim Secretary General Room 3800 United Nations New York, N.Y. 10017 Your , President of SWAPO Mr. wishes me to acknowledge with thanks receipt of your letter dated 5 November 1979, regarding a proposed meeting in Geneva on Namibia and further directs me to express SWAPO's acceptance of your kind invitation. SWAPO delegation will be composed of eight members led by Mr, Sam Nujoma himself.

Please accept, Your Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

Sincerely,

Pheo-Ben Gurirab Permanent Observer Note of Meeting between the Secretary-General and SWAPO held on 23 March 1979

Present : The Secretary -General Mr . Farah Mr. Ahtisaari Mr . Jonah Mr . Omayad Mr. Muganda Mr. Thorn"berry

Mr. Muyongo Mr . Gurirab Mr. Harautenya Mr. Tjirimuje

The Secretary-General velcomed the SWAPO delegation at 1515 hours and said that he had now been informed of the progress of the proximity talks. However, he would be glad to know how the matter was seen by SWAPO.

Mr. Muyongo said that SWAPO had come to assist with the process of clarification. Their position had not been changed in any way during the talks. The discussions had centered on two matters. Clarifications had been sought and given relating to the restriction of SWAPO forces to bases inside Namibia; whether they would be monitored by UTITAG; and relating to the restriction to bases of SWAPO forces outside. In regard to the latter matter, it was up to the Front Line Governments in cooperation with SWAPO to see that the ceasefire was not violated. There had been discussion of the time between the signing of a ceasefire lette • and the ceasefire itself in the context of possible further infiltrations. SWAPO had emphasised that such period would be used to get information to their people inside the country and would not be used for the infiltration of further personnel. SWAPO had emphasised that they would need three weeks in this regard because their forces in Namibia were scattered rather than being concentrated in one base. Mr. Muyongo said that a misunderstanding seemed to have arisen regarding SWAPO 's position as to restriction to bases in the neighbouring countries. The Five Western Governments had seemed to be under the false impression that SWAPO did not agree to this. The Front Line Governments, in conjunction with SWAPO, had then made it quite clear to the Western Governments that SWAPO was in agreement that the restriction to bases in the neighbouring countries would be undertaken in conjunction with the Governments of those neighbouring countries. Regarding liaison offices, the Front Line Governments had said that if the personnel to be sent to such offices were civilians, then the creation of such offices would present no problem. If they were military personnel, however, this would create

cc: The SEcretary-General Mr. Farah Mr. Ahtisaari Mr. Jonah - 2 - difficulties. This was also SWAPO's position.

The Secretary-General asked whether discussion of liaison offices had taken place in the absence of .

Mr.Muyongo said that it had taken place in the absence of Angola.

The Secretary-General said that he still did not know whether Angola accepted the idea of such liaison offices.

Mr_. Muyongo referred to the suggestion of electronic monitoring devices. These had not been mentioned to SWAPO by the Five Western Govern- ments. After SWAPO had heard about them from other sources, they asked the Western Governments. The Western Governments said that this was a sugges- tion of the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General said that this was not the case. He said that he did not even know what they were.

Mr. Muyongo said that they had told the Western Governments that this was a verysensitive matter involving the Front Line Governments. They had said that SWAPO might be opposed to this because these devices were used against Vietnamese freedom fighters. He thought that this idea night have to be dropped. Was it contemplated that the devices would be used in Angola or in Namibia? SWAPO would want to know these things. SWAPO felt very strongly that it was necessary to hear from the South Africans "Before the Secretary-General made any report.

The Secretary-General said that he was not preparing a report. At a given moment, when agreement had been reached he would present to the Security Council an explanatory memorandum giving his interpretation of his previous report of 26 February. But, he emphasised, this could only be done after agreement had been reached between the parties concerned.

Hr. Muyongo said that the Five Western Governments had suggested that, they would recommend that the Secretary-General should lay down a date for a ceasefire. SWAPO felt that it was better to keep away from naming a date until had agreed this time. SWAPO would need, for practical reasons, to know about the ceasefire in advance.

The Secretary-General repeated how he would propose to proceed. He said that he could not emphasise too much that agreement between the parties must be reached before the matter was taken further. He then referred to the question of the monitoring of SWAPO bases inside IIamibia. He asked whether the Five Western Governments had indicated to SWAPO how many such bases might come under UN monitoring.

Mr. Huyongo said that the Five Western Governments had suggested that SWAPO personnel inside Namibia should have the option of either restriction to base in Namibia; laying down their arms and joining the election campaign; or withdrawing from the country. SWAPO had said that the proposal stated clearly that such personnel were to be restricted to - 3 - base in Namibia. SWAPO had said that they did not know how many such armed personnel there were in Namibia. They had not discussed with the Western Governments how many such bases there might be. The Western Governments had said that they now understood SWAPO's position.on restriction to base in Namibia. The Secretary-General raised the question of whether there might be two bases inside Namibia as in the case of the proposed restriction of South African forces.

Mr^ Muyongo said that SWAPO had kept saying to the Western Governments:- What is the other party saying? He said that this question of two bases had not been touched on at all in the discussions.

The Secretary-General said he thought it was important to know this matter but it could be gone into again. He asked whether SWAPO would agree on the liaison offices?

Mr. Muyongo said that President Neto had had a different understanding altogether to that of the other Front Line Governments. He himself felt that the question of liaison offices, and, indeed, the whole question of monitoring by the neighbouring countries, was entirely up to the neighbouring countries. SWAPO had felt that perhaps existing UH facilities in these neighbouring countries could be made use of rather than there being new offices created.

The Secretary-General said that the idea of using existing UITDP offices had been mentioned. This had never been done before. The UNDP dealt with economic development matters; the liaison offices would have strictly political purposes. He felt that one should, if possible, not mix up these two separate functions in the same office. He asked again whether SWAPO had agreed to the setting up of such offices.

Mr. Muyongo said that this was up to the neighbouring countries, not to SWAPO. But SWAPO could live with this proposal.

Mr. Jonah asked whether SWAPO had accepted the committment that SWAPO bases in the neighbouring countries would be monitored by those Governments?

Mr. Muyongo said that restriction to base of SWAPO forces in the neighbouring countries would be done by the Governments of those neighbouring countries in cooperation with aWAPO.

The Sec rotary-General referred to the report which he had been given that SWAPO had agreed not to increase its forces in Namibia prior to the ceasefire.

Mr. Muyongo confirmed this and said that SWAPO did so agree.

Mr. Gurirab added that this agreement was given subject to the other side not attacking SWAPO during that period. He said that the onus - U - had been placed on the Five Western Governments to obtain such an assurance.

The Secretary-General asked whether the Western Governments had agreed to obtain such an assurance.

Mr. Ahtisaari said that the request had been passed over by the Western Governments to South Africa, on 22 March. He said that he wished to return to the question of the options which SWAPO personnel might have at the time of the ceasefire when in Namibia. He asked whether SWAPO wanted to allow those persons vho could in this manner be restricted to base to stay in the bases until the end of the period?

Mr. Muyongo said that SWAPO did not feel that those SWAPO personnel restricted to base should have the option of leaving it.

Kr._ Ahtisaari asked whether any length of time for personnel inside the country at the time of the ceasefire to come forward and be identified had been alluded to?

Mr^. Nuyongo said that this had not been discussed. He referred to SWAPO's hope that it could be given some advance notice of the likelihood of the despatch of the ceasefire letter.

The Secretary-General said that he contemplated sending out the new ceasefire letter which would set out a timetable.

Mr. Ahtisaari said that there could not be any date for a ceasefire until agreement had been reached between the parties. He referred to the report which he had received of a meeting of political parties convened by South Africa in for 30 March 1979.

Mr. Huyongo asked whether SWAPO could not perhaps be given a hint that the letter would go in, say, tvo days.

Mr. Hamutenya referred to the notion advanced by the West that the Secretary-General night set out a ceasefire date which would operate as an'kction inducing attempt'to make South Africa take a decision.

Mr. Ahtisaari repeated that there could not be a letter until there was agreement. He said that between the sending of the letter and the ceasefire it was contemplated that there would be a lapse of 15 days. The possibility could be examined of trying to give SWAPO slightly more notice.

Mr. Muyongo agreed that there should be South African agreement before anything further was done.

Mr. Hamutenya referred to the question of electronic devices. When SWAPO had confronted the Five with this proposal and asked if it had been communicated to South Africa, the Five had tried to suggest that the idea came from the Secretariat. SWAPO would be asked about this question. They would be asked by other liberation movements whether they were not introducing dangerous elements into Africa. The Secretary-General said that the idea had not cone from the UN.

Mr. Ahtisaari said that the matters which had been communicated to the Secretariat had all teen declassified. His staff had been given an elementary explanation on the subject and had been given a little film show. They now knew no more about it than that. However, he said, he himself suspected that South Africa was presently using very much more sophisticated devices than anything the UN had been told about. He emphasised that any such devices as were used must be on side of the border. Their range was extremely limited. There was no question of them being used to seek to know what was going on in the neighbouring countries.

Mr. Tjirirauje asked whether UNTAG would arrive in Namibia before or after the ceasefire date.

Mr. Ahtisaari said that if UNTAG had to monitor the ceasefire then it meant its personnel must be there a few days before the ceasefire.

The Secretary-General^ thanked the SWAPO delegation for their attendance and the meeting closed at 1600 hours. Note of Meeting between SRSG and SV7APO held on 26 March 1979 in Room DC-335

Present: Mr. Ahtisaari Mr.Caine Mr. Omayad Mr. Muganda Mr. Thornberry

Mr. Muyongp Mr. Gurirab Mr. Hamutenya Mr. Tjirimuje Mr. Shihepo Mr. Johannes

Mr. Ahtisaari welcomed the SWAPO delegation at 1555 hours and gave an account of what had occurred subsequently to SWAPO's meeting with the Secretary-General on 23 March. The Secretary-General had seen the Front Line Governments and the Five Western Governments after the SWAPO meeting. He had urged the Five Western Governments to press on South Africa the need to comply with resolution h35. He said that he did not expect any South African answer before the end of that week. He referred to his meeting on 23 March with Bishop Kauluma of the Anglican Church, and said that he hoped that one of the outcomes of the proximity talks might prove to be a reunified approach on the part of the Churches. He referred to the implications for South Africa's position on Namibia of the Information Ministry scandal. He said that it hadbeen renortpd in the Washington Post of 25 K'arcn tnat Ibe Information ''inistry nad been alleged to have been supplying money to the DTA. He referred in this context to the allegations sometimes made that the UN would not be impartial in Namibia.

Mr. Huyongo^ said that he wished to deal with two matters. First of all, he wished to update the course of events which had taken place the previous week, and he wished to consult with the Special Representative regarding his various plans if implementation commenced. He was anxious that SWAPO1s standpoint should be stated as precisely as possible in any future UN documents. During the meetings with the Five Western Governments, SWAPO had made no new proposals. He referred to the discus- sion of confinement to location of SWAPO troops inside Namibia. He wished to emphasise that"whether there will be two bases or one is really your problem". SWAPO itself had expressed no views on this matter. Nor was SWAPO able to give any exaet number of its troops in Namibia. This would be known only on the ceasefire date. In regard to monitoring SWAPO

cc: The Secretary-General^ Mr. Urquhart Mr. Farah - 2 - forces outside Namibia, he said that this was beside the point. SWAPO's position was and had always teen the same:- monitoring outside Namibia vas a non-starter. If, however, the Front Line Governments had said that they would give their co-operation in ensuring that there would be no breach of the ceasefire, then their word should be taken. In this matter, SWAPO would cooperate with the Front Line Governments. Ke would emphasise that the period between the sending of the ceasefire letter and the ceasefire itself was not for the infiltration of SWAPO troops into Namibia, but to ensure that their people were informed. Regarding liaison offices, he said that SWAPO had made their position very clear. This was to be cleared with the neighbouring countries. It would be better that they were civilian rather than military. If they were military, then the pandora's box of monitoring would be opened up. SWAPO also felt that it would be better to use existing offices. There were Namibia offices in Lusaka and in Botswana. These were political offices. One would not there need new offices. Mr. Muyongo

then turned to the matter of implementationof the . SWAPO would wish to discuss matters relative to implementation, perhaps administrative matters. If the proposal were to go through then there were questions which they still wished to ask for information purposes. These questions would relate to the police monitors, the position of South African troops confined to base, the procedure for elections - for example, would there be single member constituencies or would the election be on a proportional basis. Mr^. Muyongo asked whether SWAPO and the Special Representative could sit down and discuss these things.

Mr. Hamutenya asked whether there had been any further response regarding logistics.

Mr. Muyongo asked what the UN had in store for the political parties. Would they receive financial support from the UN in the interim period?

Mr. Hamutenya asked whether criteria had been established to determine a political party for the purposes of the elections under UN supervision and control.

Mr. Ahtisaari said that the Se'cretary-General 's concern had related principally to Luanda where there was no political office. The Secretary- General was, in principle, reluctant to use non-political offices for political purposes such as liaison. He referred to the recruitment of civilians for the first and second waves of UNTAG emplacement and said that he hoped that these would, if possible, be drawn from the Secretariat. He said that possibly the easiest group to recruit would be the third wave ,involving about 600 people, who would be there for one month to supervise the electoral procedure. These would be seconded by Governments. Regarding the definition of political parties for electoral purposes the question of numbers and size of support would have to be discussed when UHTAG was emplaced. He said that there might have to be frequent consultations with the political parties inside Namibia. - 3 -

Regarding the electoral processes, he emphasised that one could not dis- cuss the events of last December because these were void. One could not discuss many of the electoral matters in the abstract. Mr. Ahtisaari emphasised the spread of UN centers and sub-centers throughout the country. He referred to the plans for police monitors and said that what South Africa had offered in this regard in August 1978 they had re-endorsed in January. He referred in particular to the South African offer that UN police monitors could be present at the interrogation of prisoners. He asked Mr. Thornberry to outline the proposals for the functioning of UN police monitors.

Mr. Thprnberry spoke of the manner in which UN proposals had been formulated within the framework of the proposal for a settlement (S/12636). He referred to the manner in which the survey mission had obtained information relating to the numbers, functions, structure and location of within Namibia, and, in the light of this information, how it had then formulated the UN proposals for monitoring activities of such South African police.

Mr. Ahtisaari spoke further of the difficulties of civilian recruitment. Regarding possible contributor countries for logistical support, he said that the UN had made a follow-up of new approaches subsequent to SWAPO's suggestions contained in its letter of 6 March. So far, many requests had been made but no positive replies had been forthcoming. He suggested that Mr. Gurirab keep in touch with Mr. Jonah and Col. Dibuama to learn progress on this front. He said that this was what he was doing too. Regarding the funding of political parties, he said that it was hard to work out any basis for financial assistance. What had to be guaranteed was that every political party was allowed to receive funds. He said that the UII could not directly support any political party, neither SWAPO nor anyone else. He agreed that some sort of criteria might have to be worked out in order to establish how a a political party would be entitled to be registered for election purposes. These criteria, he said, might relate to the kind of support which it night have in the country. On the other hand, he said, there might be certain difficulties in this because this would be the first election to be held in Namibia under genuinely free conditions.

Mr. Muyongo said that in Namibia the UN would be supposed to be impartial. But, as the situation now stood, it was only SWAPO inside Namibia who had nobody in authority to stand up for it. In these circumstances, he said, how would SWAPO know whether or not the SRSG was in fact being impartial.

Mr. Ahtisaarisaid that on the subject of impartiality, one of his duties was to watch that the Administrator-General did not favour anybody; for example, in formulating the electoral proclamation. Mr. Muyongo asked what would be the relationship between the Special Representative and the Administrator-General.

Mr. Ahtisaari said that the Administrator-General must talk to all theparties. This must also include SWAPO. So far as his relationship with the Administrator-General went, this was clearly set out in the settlement proposal (document S/12636) . From this it would be seen that the Special Representative had to satisfy himself at each stage in the procedure indicated in that proposal. He also had the right to make proposals to the Administrator-General. He would emphasise that in regard to a number of areas set out in the settlement proposal, the processes could not go forward until he had been satisfied that the previous stages had been adequately completed. This was one of the reasons why the UH could not accept any fixed or absolute date for elections. A series of very clear stages was set out in the settle- ment proposal.

Mr. Muyongo referred to the possibility that there might have to be 5,000 registered supporters of. a political party before it could go on the ballot list.

Mr. Ahtisaari reiterated that this would be the first real elec- tion. He had, at this stage, no firm views in this matter. This suggestion would have to be looked at very carefully on the ground.

Mr. Muganda said that he felt it would be useful if SWAPO had a Standing Committee to deal with all these matters after implementation began and to keep in close consultation with the Office of the SRSG.

Mr. Ahtisaari said that he had the intention of dealing again in the future with the question of the Administrator-General's impartiality.

Mr. Gurirab raised the question of what he called the "black boxes". SWAPO wanted to know whether there had been some kind of trade-off. He referred to the fact that Mr. Pik Botha had begun to concentrate now on the question of monitoring of SWAPO bases outside Namibia. His recent statements had begun to play down the question of bases inside the country. He wanted to know at what point the black box element had come into the discussions.

Mr. Ahtisaari reiterated the position of the Secretary-General and of himself relating to the recent proximity talks. The UII had not initiated these talks; but had been available for consulta- tion. The main purpose of the talks was to clarify outstanding questions. The idea of devices to assist in the surveillance of the frontiers of Namibia had not come from the Secretary-General as he had already emphasised. The Uft had not participated in all the proximity talks and he therefore did not know what information had been given to SWAPO on this subject. Sofaras the UN was concerned, the idea of the devices had been mentioned in order to increase the scope of potential technical aids for any monitoring of the borders that had to be undertaken by UIITAG. He said that the matter had been blown up out of proportion especially in the press. He suspected that the South Africans must already be using devices on the frontier which vere very much more sophisticated than anything that had been suggested to the UN. One reason why the matter might have been brought up could have been to afford South Africa a possibility to get away from some of its previous positions. No decision whatsoever had been taken in regard to the surveillance devices. He said that whether UIITAG needed black boxes or Toyota land cruisers should, he hoped, be for the UN to decide as a matter of operational necessity without external interference on any side. One thing which he wanted to emphasise was that it would be necessary to monitor border traffic in all directions. He referred to his previous suggestion that SWAPO might wish to come and be fully informed of the information which the UN had at the present on this subject. Though SWAPO had not yet taken up this offer, he would emphasise that the offer stood. SWAPO should come and ask what the UN had in the way of such basic information. He would reiterate that such information as the UN had was wholly declassified.

Mr. Muyongo said that South Africa had tried to use these devices - sensors and other techniques - indeed, they might well have tried to use even better ones. But they had failed in the border areas of Namibia.

Mr. Ahtisaari thanked the SWAPO delegation for coming to see him and said that he had felt that the talks during the previous week had been very useful. They had shown, inter alia, SWAPO's positive intentions in regard to the process of international settlement and the proposed elections under UN supervision and control.

Mr.Muyongo said that SWAPO was not getting into the details of implementation at this time, but he felt that this would be necessary at some point. He said that SWAPO must look after the interests of the whole Namibian people. SWAPO did not want things pertaining to a settlement to take place without its knowledge. It wished for its views to be taken into account. While he accepted that the Special Representa- tive must be impartial as between all the various parties during the electoral process, he would stress that it had been as a result of SWAPO's struggle that the present situation had come about. He would therefore suggest that the Special Representative should bear in mind the distinc- tion between those who had brought the situation about and those who had not done so. There were, in the end, he said, only two factors involved in Namibia:- South Africa and SWAPO. He said that SWAPO would continue to hold itself available in regard to the process of conveying informa- tion and for other consultations.

The meeting concluded at 1712 hours. Note of Meeting "between the Secretary-General and SWAPO held on 19 March at 1900 hours cc: Secretary-General^ Mr. Farah Present: Secretary-General ^- Ahtisaari Mr. Farah Mr- Jonah Mr. Ahtisaari M*. Thornberry Mr. Jonah Mr. Omayad Mr. Muganda Mr. Thornberry Mr. Muyongo 4 Mr. Hamutenya Mr. Gurirab Mr. Tjirimuje Mr. Johannes Mr. Tlhabanello

The meeting opened at 1907 hours and the Secretary-General welcomed the Vice President of SWAPO and his delegation. He referred to the three out- standing issues:- monitoring and restriction of SWAPO armed forces in Namibia; »monitoring and restriction in neighbouring countries; and the composition of UNTAG. He said that in his report of 26 February he had tried to cut the Gordian knot by making particular proposals while at the same time informing the Security Council of the various open questions. South Africa had rejected this report and had aecused the Secretary-General -of double- crossing them in the report. South Africa was also criticising the Five for not keeping him fully informed about the background to the report. He had appreciated SWAPO's answer from President Tlujoma through his cable and his letter in which his approach had been accepted in principle. He said that in regard to SWAPO's comments on composition, the UN had tried to take those comments into account. Regarding monitoring, the Secretary-General said that ^understoodheXSWAPO accepted monitoring only in Namibia and had made no reference to the that position outside. He said that South Africa rejected the establishment of monitored bases in Namibia. It said that SWAPO had no forces in Namibia and therefore no need of bases. The UN said that their impression was that there were such forces and such bases. South Africa had again rejected this idea a little earlier that day, and accused the Secretary-General of conniving with SWAPO to allow it to infiltrate forces into Namibia. He had emphasised that such an interpretation was South Africa's and certainly did not reflect the views of the Secretariat. Outside Namibia, South Africa insisted that SWAPO bases be monitored by UNTAG. He had told South Africa that this was rejected by the neighbouring countries. He had advanced the idea of liaison offices in the neighbouring countries to facilitate communications. This liaison arrangement was not acceptable to Angola. It was also rejected by South Africa. The Secretary-General said that there was in this regard a deadlock. The Five were now discussing these matters with all the parties concerned. The SEcretary-General said that he had his meeting with Mr. Botha that after- noon. No new elements had emerged. South Africa had maintained its position.

Mr. Muyongo said that SWAPO's view was that South Africa had not accepted anything anywhere. SWAPO wanted to ask regarding the documents submitted to - 2 - the Secretary-General's office, what consideration had been given to its various suggestions. There vere one or tvo elements in the Secretary-General's report with vhich SWAPO did not agree. SWAPO did not see why there had "been anything inserted into the report about the monitoring of SWAPO forces out- side Namibia. Perhaps the UH officials who had gone to Cape Town and had been told that the Front Line would accept such a proposal. But, however, he said, it was not in the western plan. He said that when his delegation had met the Special Representative and the military commander in Luanda, SWAPO had thought that it had clarified everything. He then referred to the document relating to military dispositions recently circulated by the South African Government and asked for information regard- ing this document which had not been shown to SWAPO at any time. He said that SWAPO's position was very well reflected in the Luanda communique and, in particular, regarding the observance of the ceasefire. Regarding liaison offices, he said that different views were conveyed to the Front Line States from the Secretary-General's office. Apparently in the Secretary- General's telephone calls it had been stressed that the nature of these offices would be civilian. However, the message to President Heto in Luanda had indicated that the functions of the offices would be military. The various heads of state at their meeting in Luanda had wanted to know why different messages had been sent from New York. SWAPO felt that there was no need for new offices in the neighbouring countries. It suggested that the UN could possibly have people seconded to existing offices in these countries. If the liaison offices were for military purposes, then SWAPO would have nothing to do with them.

The Secretary-General dealt first with the matter of composition. He stressed that his proposals were a compromise. He said that SWAPO and South Africa both appeared to have opposed points of vriew. What vas acceptable to South Africa was unacceptable to SWAPO and vice versa. He said that in close consultation with the Security Council he would choose two further battalions. He then dealt with the question of logistics and explained why such logistical proposals had originally related to western countries. He emphasised that there had been no offers from anybody else and then gave an account of the various inquiries the UN had made in search of alternatives in African and other countries. As regards liaison offices, there had clearly been some misunderstanding. The proposed offices were civilian and their function was to improve communication. He said that he thought that this well-meant idea would not work because Angola and South Africa would not accept it. Regarding the military document, he said that the title which appeared on it when transmitted by South Africa had not been there before. Mr. Ahtisaari had made it clear to South Africa that it had never been accepted by the UN.

Mr. Ahtisaari said that he did not know what the motives of South Africa had been in regard to the military document. He then read to the SWAPO delegation paragraph 7 of the letter from the Secretary-General to the South African Prime Minister of 15 March. He said that for the UH this was a non- paper; for the UH it did not exist. He said that he could make a very long - 3 - list of deviations from the proposal for a settlement which had been advanced during the recent consultation procedure. He said that under no circumstances had any member of his team in Swakopmund or in Cape Town given to the South Africans the idea that there could be UN monitoring in Angola and . On the mission's return to New York he had been in touch with the Five Western Governments regarding the South African request for such monitoring and the Western Governments had clarified the matter still further. Mr. Muyongo replied in regard to composition that as to logistics he thought that some countries were now willing to participate. SWAPO believed that the Western countries should stay out of logistics, especially those who participated in drafting the proposal. He referred to what would happen if they did participate and if the plan then broke down. He referred in particular to the and to the Federal Republic of Germany. He alluded to Sweden and said that, if there were a request from the Secretary- General, Sweden would be willing to add signalling to the functions which it would otherwise fulfill. Mr. Jonah said that this was new information not previously known to the UN. Mr. Hamutenya said that if were to agree to signalling, it would also be acceptable to SWAPO. Mr. Muyongo referred to paragraph 12 of the Secretary-General's report of 26 February. He said that it was unnecessary to make the reference there made to the restriction of SWAPO to bases in the neighbouring countries. He said that it did not appear anywhere in the western plan. Mr. Ahtisaari replied that paragraph 8(a) of the western proposal, and the annex, seemed to provide adequate justification for the proposal contained in paragraph 12 of the Secretary-General's report. However, he observed, on this as on other matters, the proposal was at times ambiguous. He would emphasise that the UN had not been party to the discussions. Mr. Tjirimuje said that SWAPO could not see how troops outside Namibia, whether in South Africa or in the neighbouring countries, could be connected with the monitoring proposals, whether those troops belonged to South Africa or to SWAPO. The Secretary-General again referred to the South African position that SWAPO had no bases in Namibia, which standpoint, he said, had been advanced again that day.South Africa had become furious about his report in this area, accusing him of wanting to create new bases which were not there before and which were not directly alluded to in his report. On the other hand, the Front Line states had made it very clear that they would take the responsibility of ensuring compliance with the proposal but that such compliance would be effected by themselves and not by the UN.

The Secretary-General, in closing the meeting, at 1957 hours, contemplated the possibility of a further meeting after the proximity talks had continued somewhat longer.

:,A.vt/^*ix:uv-t.;tel'J>£^%^^tf-^^ LETTER DATED 6 MARCH 1979 FROM THE PRESIDENT OE SWAPO ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL

Your Excellency,

In accordance with established principle of geographical representation regarding troop - contributing countries to UNTAG, SWAPO would like to make adjustments and concessions to its recommendations submitted to the UN. Special Representative of the Secretary General, on Februrary 10, 1979 in Luanda, as follows:

Africa: Asia: Bangladesh . P\vAj> i- c) Western Europej^/"" - ^ (iV-i.. Vv*c^ u-v.-vf^>-e \ Latin America: Panama With regard to the other two infantry battalions to be added, after consultations, we propose from Africa and Jamaica from Latin America. In addition, SWAPO wishes to suggest that the 200 monitors required, as well as a deputy military commandar of UNTAG, be drawn from the proposed Nigerian contribution. Concerning logistic units, SWAPO proposes: Romania: an engineering company

Holland: a medical company : a supply unit India: a signal unit SWAPO is in agreement with Your Excelllency in respect of the tasks envisaged for Sweden and Denmark. I will submit to Your Excellency, in due course, our proposals with regard to air-force and maintenance units. It remains our understanding that only those SWAPO armed forces inside Namibia at the time of the cease-fire will be confined and monitored by UNTAG with their arms and ammunition.

SWAPO strongly feels that it should be consulted regularly on all relevant issues concerning the entry into force of the cease-fire and the emplacement of UNTAG. -2-

In this regard, SWAPO is still awaiting the letter on the cease- fire, as indicated in paragraph 18 of document S/13120 of 26 February 1979. We shall, accordingly, send our reply. Suffice it to say here that SWAPOTs views on cease-fire are well-known and were reiterated only recently in Luanda on 10 February 1979. Until and unless the outstanding issues mentioned above are resolved satisfactorily, SWAPO will find it difficult to co-operate in the proposed immediate commencement of the emplacement of UNTAG in Namibia. In conclusion, I wish to request Your Excellency to circulate this letter to the members of the Security Council for their information,

Accept, Your Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration, Yours sincerely,

Signed: Sam Nujoma President of SWAPO RCA I'MR JJJ

MOM + o

/7u: ' 2-.;. 74 HILTELS ADDIS* P37C49 si;,i?-; u;

MARCH 2ND 1979

TELEX MO. 237£49 SWAPO UR SUAPO UR NEW YORK (USA)

KINDLY FORWARD THE FOLLOWING/MESSAGE TO THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL, DR. KURT VALPH El M, ON OFF I. XT J AL. SWAPJ1 POSIJI OJj^^LL.QilllD.LMJ I HP LEM EN T AT I 0 N OF_ R ES 01&Q,..QU^ W&Ji l~91 b ); *' HIS EXCELLENCY, IJpT~iafi^~T'ALT^ UNITED NATIONS, NEV YORK STOP SUAPO OF M AM I F,JkA.. TOTALLY RhJKCTS PPOPOSAL PY UN £ rENERaL""TO' INCLUDE |M'ATO(oUNTRI ES" I N "THE MILITARY COMPONENT OF,/ UMTAG' rap: NAMIBIA" ANIU-RE' -ITERATES ITS POSITION ON ITS REC OMy EI^AT ION -CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES, M.AIJELY, ANGOLA, , INDIA, IRAQ, JA:IAICA, FJ/^IL:^D, SWEDEN, YUGOSLAVIA AMD ALOMn, SWAPO1 S UrmE-Fo TAN DING REGARDING CONFINEMENT OF SWAPO ARHED FORCES HAS PF.KM THAT ONLY THOSE SWj-lPO ViPji^D' FORCES INSIDE MAMIT1A f\}>L TO PE CONFINED AMP MONITORED WITH THblR ARMS AND ATLMUNITION AND NOT THOSE IN THE NEIGHPOURING OJJNTP.IES STOP ULIT_IL_ALL-THE MB otnT" ISSUES '"APE" RESOLVED SUAPO FINPS IT D'iFFIC^ULT TO CO-OPEP.ATE WITH AND ACCEPT' PARTI C IP ATI OM IN THE"" PROPOSED COMMENCEMENT OF THE EMPLACEMENT OF UNTAG IN NAMIFIa ON 15'TIAPCH J979 STOP ONCE AGAIN, I Rf.-ASSURE YOU, YOUP EXCELLENCY, 01L CO-OPERATION IN YOUR EFFORTS TO HAVE RESOLUTION 435 (1973) IMPLEMENTED1'

SAM NUJOMA PRESIDENT OF SWAPO •* • > ..' .

TO: TKE.2:ci:ii ;:;-.'- GENERAL ••y^:W^^!^?^

^V^^'S-^^S'^'Si^i'- jii* -. •:'\X;/^.^r:rj;x-^l^;S>?V"r-^^:^ --" '> v • . . Attached please find the text of the press release issued by SWAPO. This is a •$ much milder Version than the original statement which was not issued, probably as a consequence of your message to Sam Nujoma. . . The original statement also attached for easy refer- ence.

rv • •r . u* F.tT. Liu 12' February 1979 NNNN - - ZCZC DAL2193 LAD 055 _ - - *< E I] MI NYK i^~. • .--:a r "i r D § £3n - F _ „—-^*—•*^ *™" .LUANDA (UN) 12 17.00 - - """ 027 URQUHART THORNBERRY MOST IMMEDIATE CONFIDENTIAL. I RECEIVED AT 12.30 GMT 12/2 FOLLOWING SWAPO PRESS RELEASE WHICH EVIDENTLY REPLACES THE ONE TRANSMITTED MY 024 OF 10/2. QUOTE A SWAPO DELEGATION, LED BY ITS PRESIDENT, CO*MERADE SAM NUJOMA, HELD CONSULTATIONS WITH THE DELEGATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE MR., IN LUANDA, FROM FEBRUARY 9 TO 10,1979. PARAGRAPH IN THE COURSE OF THE DISCUSSIONS, IT BECAME CLEAR TO SWAPO THAT SOUTH AFRICA IS PUTTING FORTH.NEW PRECONDITIONS REGARDING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS PLAN FOR NAMIBIA'S INDEPENDENCE, AS OUTLINED IN THE SECRETARY- GENERAL'S REPORT. PARAGRAPH IN THE FIRST PLACE, THESE PRECONDITIONS INCLUDE THE IDEA THAT SWAPO GUERRILLA FORCES WILL BE CONFINED

TO BASES OUTSIDE (UNDERLINE OUTSIDE) NAMIBIA IN THE NEIGHBOURING

COUNTRIES AND BE MONITORED THERE. PARAGRAPH IN THE SECOND PLACE,

THERE IS A PLAN TO CREATE CONCENTRATION CAMPS (EUPHEMISTICALLY

CALLED QUOTE RECEPTION CENTRES UNQUOTE) INSIDE NAMIBIA TO WHICH

NAMIBIANS RETURNING FROM EXILE WILL BE CONFINED FOR AN INDEFINITE

PERIOD. PARAGRAPH IN THE THIRD PLACE THERE IS A COMPLETE DEVIATION

FROM THE TIMETABLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS REGARDING THE VARIOUS

STAGES OF PHASED WITHDRAWAL OF SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS FROM NAMIBIA PRIOR TO THE PROPOSED UNITED NATIONS-SUPERVISED AND CONTROLLED

ELECTIONS. ACCORDING T0~ THE UNITED NATIONS PLAN, SOUTH AFRICA IS EXPECTED TO START THE REDUCTION OF HER TROOPS IN PHASES FROM JTHE DATE OF CEASEFIRE, ONCE THE UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING FORCE "-1 - ••* - Jl--~ -*** ™> - " '* •••,..— ^.. «... —— -— -- •— — -'*..—.!.- - -~--. - -T. •• - .•.!-„- ••««.- .-'-'-• <• - • -«• -- - -- ..... HAS BEEN DEPLOYED. IN TERMS OF THE UNITED NATIONS PLAN, THIS IS THE ONLY PRECONDITION FOR SOUTH AFRICA TO START WITHDRAWING HER ARMED FORCES . PARAGRAPH CONTRARY TO THIS, WHAT IS NOW BEING PROPO-

SED IS THAT THE REDUCTION OF THE ENEMY TROOPS WILL BE

UPON SOUTH AFRICA'S OWN CONCEPT OF THE QUOTE PEACEFUL NATURE --.J~B!""7-<»il ,j., ...... ,..--,.. _„—..,.. UNQUOTE OF THE RETURNEES AND SOUTH AFRICA'S OWN ARBITRARYY Va*««. DEFINITION OF SWAPO 'S QUOTE SCRUPULOUS RESPECT OF THE CEASE-FIRE UNQUOTE . PARAGRAPH IF ACCEPTED, THESE PRECONDITIONS WILL SUBSTAN- TIALLY MODIFY THE UNITED NATIONS PLAN:, AND AS SUCH SWAPO crassETssjsrss NATURALLY REJECTS THEM. PARAGRAPH HOWEVER ON ITS PART SWAPO fW-" • -VTTT-"***' «^T"11^1iWI*»-"*F'** REAFFIRMS ITS COMMITMENT TO AND WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE IN THE

FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL 'S REPORT IN ITS FINAL AND DEFINITE FORM, AS ENDORSED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S

RESOLUTION 435 (1978) . PARAGRAPH THE STRUGGLE CONTINUES UNQUOTE

PLSE RELAY THIS MESSAGE TO SRSG AHTISAARI. I HAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT DECISION ISSUE NEW RELEASE CAME AS CONSEQUENCE RECEIPT SECGEN'S MESSAGE

COL

=02121515 UNITED NATIONS

Distr. General Assembly GENERAL A/AC.131/SR.291 17 October 1978

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

UNITED NATIONS COUNCIL FOR NAMIBIA

SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 291st MEETING

Held at Headquarterse, New York, on Friday, 27 October 1978, at 11 a.m.

President; Miss KONIE (Zambia)

CONTENTS

Special meeting to commemorate the Week of Solidarity with the people of Namibia and their liberation movement, SWAPO

This record is subject to correction.

Corrections should be submitted in one of the working languages. They should be set forth in a memorandum and also incorporated in a copy of the record. They should be sent within one week of the date of this document to the Chief, Official Records Editing Section, Department of Conference Services, room A-3550.

Any corrections to the record of this meeting and of other meetings will be issued in a corrigendum.

78-57937 2507E (E) A/AC.131/SR.291 English Page 2

The meeting was called to order at 11.20 a.m.

SPECIAL MEETING TO COMMEMORATE THE WEEK OF SOLIDARITY WITH THE PEOPLE OP NAMIBIA AND THEIR LIBERATION MOVEMENT, SWAPO

1. The PRESIDENT recalled that, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 31/150, the week of 27 October was being observed as a week of solidarity with the people of Namibia and their liberation movement, SWAPO, as proposed by the President of Senegal at the Dakar International Conference on Namibia and Human Rights, held in January 1976.

2. On the proposal of the President, the members of the Council observed a minute of silence in tribute to the memory of the heroes who had fallen in the cause of the liberation of Namibia.

3. Mr. LIEVANO (Colombia), speaking as President of the General Assembly, recalled that on 27 October 1966, the General Assembly had declared that South Africa's mandate over Namibia was terminated and had assumed responsibility for the destiny of the Territory. A year later, that mandate had been entrusted to the United Nations Council for Namibia, and the post of United Nations Commissioner for Namibia had been established. Since then, the Council had done admirable work to maintain international interest in Namibia. It had established the United Nations Fund for Namibia and the Institute for Namibia, thereby demonstrating the solidarity of the United Nations with the Namibian people and with its struggle to become the fully sovereign master of its own destiny.

4. Namibians were adding a further chapter to the long history of man's search for freedom. The United Nations for its part, had been seeking through negotiations to avoid useless bloodshed in Namibia. The celebration of a week of solidarity with the people of Namibia was a warning against the policy of and the illegal administration of the Territory, persecution of the people's leaders, discrimination against the African population and attempts to violate Namibia's territorial integrity. was an integral part of Namibia and constituted one of its most important natural resources.

5. He wished to pay tribute to the Council for Namibia for its work in programming the future of an independent Namibia and for the way in which it was now administering that nation's interests. He was also grateful to the Secretary-General and his co-workers, who had explored all the roads that could lead to the achievement of complete independence by Namibia in a peaceful manner. He also wished to reaffirm the irrevocable commitment of the United Nations to ending South Africa's illegal administration of the Territory and to transferring to the people of Namibia the power freely to decide their own destiny.

6. The SECRETARY-GENERAL said that the meeting, which had been convened in accordance with General Assembly resolution 31/150, provided an occasion for the international community to reaffirm its support for the people of Namibia in their unremitting struggle for freedom and independence.

7. When the General Assembly had terminated South Africa's mandate over Namibia 12 years earlier, the United Nations had entered into a solemn obligation to A/AC.131/SR.291 English Page 3

(The Secretary-General) protect the interests of the Namibian people, to ensure that they exercise their inalienable right to self-determination and to create the necessary conditions for the achievement of nationhood in peace and unity.

8. When he had addressed the Council a year ago, he had emphasized the urgent need for all parties to act jointly and in conformity with United Nations resolutions. He had made it clear that Security Council resolution 385 (1976) must be the basis for any solution to the problem of Namibia and that the essential requirements for such a solution were the holding of free, fair and impartial elections under United Nations supervision; the release of all Namibian political prisoners; the abolition of discriminatory and oppressive laws and practices, and the granting of full facilities for all Namibian political exiles to return to Namibia without risk or intimidation.

9. In the past 12 months, there had been considerable diplomatic activity on the part of a number of Member States with a view to achieving a break-through on that issue. As a result, the Security Council had adopted resolution 431 (1978), embodying the legitimate aspirations of the Namibian people. In that resolution the Council had requested him personally to appoint a special representative for Namibia to ensure the Territory's early independence through free elections under United Nations control. The subsequent visit to Namibia by his Special Representative had given him the necessary information to formulate a plan of operations. Security Council resolution 435 (1978), approving his report for the implementation of the proposal for a settlement, and his explanatory statement, had laid the basis for an internationally acceptable solution. In that resolution the Council had also welcomed SWAPO's readiness to co-operate in implementing his report, and had called on South Africa to do the same forthwith.

10. Developments subsequent to that resolution were described in his latest report to the Security Council and had since become a subject of intense diplomatic consultations. It was most important to maintain the momentum for the attainment of the ultimate objective, the withdrawal of South Africa's illegal administration from Namibia and the transfer of power to the people of Namibia in accordance with the Security Council's resolutions. He therefore again urged the Government of South Africa to recognize the realities of the situation and to seize the opportunity to break the impasse by extending its full co-operation to the United Nations without further delay.

11. One particular issue which caused great concern was South Africa's recent decision to proceed to hold unilateral in December 1978, in gross violation of resolution 385 (1976) and subsequent Security Council resolutions. The United Nations had consistently maintained that only elections held under its supervision would be considered valid, and that any unilaterally held elections would be regarded by the international community as null and void.

12. In conclusion, he wished to pay tribute to the Council for Namibia for its valuable contribution to the cause of the Namibian people on behalf of the General Assembly. Under the able presidency of Ambassador Konie, it had succeeded in mobilizing world opinion and material support in favour of the struggle for independence. Its achievements included the establishment of the fund for Namibia, A/AC.131/SR.291 English Page 4 (The Secretary-General)

the Institute for Namibia and the Nationhood Programme. He also wished to express appreciation for SWAPO's contribution to those endeavours and for its co-operation under the leadership of its President, Mr. Sam Nujoma.

13. There could be no doubt about the United Nations position on Namibia and the path which it had chosen for a just and lasting solution. Failure to achieve an internationally acceptable settlement must inevitably lead to greater conflict in the region, with tragic consequences for all concerned.

14. Mr. LEPKETTE (France), speaking as President of the Security Council, said that the organization of the special meeting of the Council for Namibia was yet another example of the untiring activity of the United Nations in the cause of Namibia; he emphasized the special responsibility of the United Nations towards that international Territory, in which the presence of South Africa had been illegally prolonged. The present meeting was above all an opportunity for the international community to express its support for the Namibian people in their efforts to achieve independence.

15. For years the Security Council had been trying to find a peaceful solution to the situation in Namibia, the international repercussions of which endangered peace and stability in the area, and to put an end to the sufferings of the Namibians and enable them to join the community of independent nations. The basis for that solution had been defined in Security Council resolution 385 (1976), calling for free elections under United Nations supervision and control. On that basis, the five Western members of the Security Council, after lengthy negotiations with both the South African Government and SWAPO, had submitted a proposal, on 10 April 1978, for the settlement of the Namibian question. That proposal had been endorsed by the Security Council in resolution 431 (1978), on 27 July 1978, and the Council had requested the Secretary-General to appoint a Special Representative and submit his recommendations for the implementation of that proposal. On that same day, the Security Council had stated in resolution 432 (1978) that the territorial integrity of Namibia must be assured through the reintegration of Walvis Bay. On behalf of all the members of the Security Council he wished to thank the Secretary-General, his Special Representative and their co-workers for the remarkable work they had done, and were continuing to do in that complex area.

16. On 29 September 1978, the Security Council, in resolution 435 (1978) had approved the Secretary-General's report containing the recommendations he had made on the basis of the Special Representative's mission to Namibia, and had decided to establish a United Nations Transition Assistance Group. It had also welcomed SWAPO's preparedness to co-operate in the implementation of that report and to sign and observe the cease-fire provisions. It had, furthermore, declared that all unilateral measures taken by the illegal administration in Namibia in relation to the electoral process were null and void. That was particularly important in the light of the South African Government's announcement, on 20 September 1978, of its intention to organize elections in Namibia unilaterally.

17. In view of that situation, the Foreign Ministers of the five Western members of the Security Council had visited Pretoria for discussions with the South African Government, which were reported in the document transmitted by the Secretary- General to the Security Council on 21 October, in which he stated that he and his A/AC.131/SR.291 English Page 5

(Mr. Leprette, France)

Special Representative would continue their efforts to solve the problems involved. The Security Council, for its part, would spare no effort to pursue the course set in resolutions 385 (1976), 431 (1978) and 435 (1978) and work for the independence of Namibia, through free elections under United Nations supervision.

18. Mr. SALIM (United Republic of Tanzania), speaking as Chairman of the Special Committee of 24, observed that the special meeting of solidarity with the people of Namibia and their liberation movement, SWAPO, could not have been more aptly timed, coming as it did at a time of crisis, when recent Security Council efforts to bring about a just and peaceful settlement in Namibia had been frustrated by the defiance of the South African regime. Indeed, the news from southern Africa was increasingly ominous. While he did not wish to anticipate the decisions which would shortly be taken by the Security Council and the General Assembly regarding the latest developments in that region, he wished to emphasize that the racist regime in Pretoria had clearly demonstrated its complete lack of good faith and its determination to perpetuate its stranglehold over Namibia as long as the international community, by its lack of firmness, permitted it to do so.

19. After long and protracted negotiations, the Security Council had in 1978 set in motion a process which could have put an end to the bloodshed and suffering of the Namibian people, and brought about a peaceful transition to independence through free and fair elections under United Nations supervision. The fact that SWAPO and the African States had been prepared to accept an electoral process which involved the illegal South African Government, even with effective United Nations supervision, represented a tremendous concession. For the leaders of SWAPO, it had been more than a concession. It had been an act of faith in the United Nations and an effort to put an end to the suffering of the Namibian people once and for all. SWAPO1s acceptance of the Secretary-General's report on the Western proposal had been given in the face of continued persecution and oppression of its members by the Pretoria regime and despite South Africa's treacherous attack on the refugee camp at Kassinga and the brutal massacre of Namibian refugees.

20. The objections of the Pretoria regime to the Secretary-General's plan for implementing the Western proposal had once again shown the futility of seeking to co-operate with that regime. Its objections revealed clearly that South Africa had no intention of allowing free and fair elections for a constituent assembly that was genuinely representative of the Namibian people. As the Foreign Minister of Sweden had stated on 26 October in the Second Committee, the South African Government apparently still feared the verdict of the people and appeared to be trying desperately to find a way of avoiding free elections.

21. South Africa's reaction had come as no surprise, however, for the racist regime had already revealed its hand by registering voters unilaterally, without waiting for the appointment of the United Nations Transition Group whose presence might have prevented fraud and intimidation. It should now be clear that the regime was determined to do everything possible to ensure the election of its chosen puppets, and that the sole purpose of its original alleged acceptance of the Western proposal had been to disguise such manoeuvres under a cloak of legitimacy. Its decision to proceed unilaterally with the December elections was part of those A/AC.131/SR.291 English Page 6 (Mr. Salim, Tanzania) manoeuvres. It was thus abundantly clear that the regime was determined to maintain its domination over Namibia through military repression, diplomatic chicanery and calculated fraud. 22. The recent effort by the Security Council represented a sincere attempt to arrive at a just, peaceful and honourable solution of the Namibian question. In making that effort, the international community, and the African States in particular, had been motivated by an earnest desire to end the bloodshed andsuffering of which the Namibian people had been the principal victim, and to prevent war from spreading to and eventually engulfing neighbouring African States. It would seem to be abundantly clear that that effort was being sabotaged by South Africa's continued intransigence. The international community must therefore draw the logical conclusion from the racist regime's latest defiance of the United Nations. The people of Namibia and of Africa as a whole saw Namibia as a test case. Either South Africa must comply voluntarily with the wishes of the international community, or the latter must take the necessary steps to secure its compliance. The course chosen by the United Nations would have far-reaching implications with regard not only to Namibia but also to international peace and security.

23. Lastly, he wished to recall the obligation which the United Nations had assumed in 1966 when it had assumed direct responsibility for Namibia and its people. The United Nations had a duty to bring justice, freedom and independence to Namibia and could not afford to fail in that duty. Member States must increase their collective support for the people of Namibia under the leadership of SWAPO, their sole and authentic representative. At the level of the United Nations, they must continue to encourage the Council for Namibia, under the dedicated leadership of Ambassador Konie, to redouble its efforts in support of the just struggle of the Namibian people.

24. Mr. FERNANDO (Sri Lanka), speaking as Chairman of the Co-ordinating Bureau of Non-Aligned Countries, recalled that two months earlier on Namibia Day, he had observed that for the first time in the long history of united Nations responsibility for Namibia, there was the real possibility of a peaceful settlement which might enable the people of Namibia to exercise their inalienable right to self-determination and independence. He was now forced to express the gravest pessimism about the possibilities of such a peaceful settlement. 25. Over the past year, the five Western members of the Security Council had been negotiating to find a peaceful solution to the question of Namibia, with the support of the five front-line African States and, indeed, of the international community. Those negotiations were now in jeopardy, however, and there could be no hope of salvaging the situation without some basic measure of good faith on the part of the parties concerned. After accepting the proposals for a settlement in Namibia, on 25 April 1978, the South African regime had now shamelessly gone back on its agreement in a way which had shocked the entire international community. The non-aligned countries categorically rejected South Africa's latest moves and would continue to oppose any imposition of structures of convenience on the people of Namibia. Namibia must be brought to an early independence through free elections under United Nations control. A/AC.131/SR.291 English Page 7

(Mr. Fernando, Sri Lanka)

26. The people of Namibia and their liberation movement, SWAPO, had agreed under persuasion to accept the good faith of the South African regime in considering the Western proposals as a possible means for the attainment of independence. The United Natons had expressed cautious hopes in that regard, but those hopes had now been ruthlessly dashed. The South African Government had once more revealed its true intention, which was simply to hold on to power in Namibia and deny the people of Namibia their right to self-determination and independence.

27. The non-aligned countries had always supported the people of Namibia in their just struggle for that right, and on 2 October 1978 had admitted SWAPO as a full member of their movement. On that occasion, the Foreign Ministers of the non-aligned countries had condemned South Africa's intransigence and its arrogant attempts to hold sham elections in Namibia, and had demanded that South Africa desist forthwith from taking unilateral steps in Namibia in defiance of the United Nations. The non-aligned countries strongly condemned the South African regime for its continued illegal occupation of Namibia, its persistent violations of the Charter, and its attempts to perpetuate its domination in Namibia, as evidenced by its latest volte-face.

28. He wished to pay tribute to the people of Namibia, who had endured tremendous hardship under the ruthless South African regime. The international community had a duty to ensure that their sacrifices were not in vain, and to protect them from unnecessary anguish. Their independence was simply a matter of time and, whatever the obstacles placed in their way, their eventual triumph was inevitable. The South African regime had only delayed that triumph, but in doing so it must bear full responsibility for the consequences of its intransigence. The outcome in Namibia would also show the effectiveness of the United Nations, and Namibia's success in achieving self-determination and independence would be a milestone in the history of the non-aligned movement.

29. Mr. HILMY II (Observer, League of Arab States) said that the illegal occupation of Namibia by South Africa represented an arduous challenge to the United Nations which had the obligation to support, by all means, the struggle of the Namibian people for self-determination, sovereignty and independence. South Africa had betrayed the trust of the international community as represented by the and then by the United Nations. Instead of respecting its mandate, by preparing the Namibian people for self-government, South Africa had reacted brutally to the aspirations of the Namibian people and had arrogantly defied the legal jurisdiction of the United Nations over the Territory.

30. The United Nations, through the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Council for Namibia, had continued to give steadfast support to the struggle of the Namibian people and had warned South Africa of the serious consequences of its actions. Security Council resolution 435 (1978) provided an example of United Nations efforts to put an end to South Africa's policies.

31. SWAPO had been open-minded and flexible on the question of the initiative of the five Western countries and its attitude indicated that it was ready for a peaceful solution so long as that meant full independence and territorial integrity for Namibia. It was clear, however, that South Africa did not wish Namibia to A/AC.131/SR.291 English Page 8 (Mr. Hilmy II, Observer, League of Arab States) become fully independent in terms of sovereignty and territorial integrity but intended to give only nominal independence, aimed at creating a satellite State. It had therefore engaged in calculated frauds in the electoral process and had defied United Nations control over that process.

32. Security Council resolution 435 (1978) was no longer sufficient because of the seriousness of the situation in the Territory. The Security Council must fullyapply the provisions of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter to South Africa, for such action would create an economic and military crisis in that country which would discourage it from further defying the Namibian people and the United Nations.

33. The persistence of South Africa in illegally occupying Namibia was due to the economic and military support which certain countries continued to give South Africa. The collaboration of the Israeli regime with South Africa in all fields was well known, and included even the production of nuclear weapons. Such collaboration represented not only a threat to the Africans and the Arabs but also to the maintenance of international peace and security.

34. The position of the League of Arab States in support of the just cause of Namibia was that the Territory should become an independent State immediately, under the leadership of SWAPO, which was the authentic representative of the Namibian people. The territorial integrity of Namibia should be respected and should not be a matter for compromise; Walvis Bay was part and parcel of Namibia. Any effort to solve the problem of Namibia must be conducted under the full control and auspices of the United Nations and in accordance with its resolutions. In the meantime the Arab countries would continue their sanctions, including the oil embargo against South Africa until Namibia had become sovereign and independent and until the African population had become masters of their own destiny in Azania.

35. Mr. SIMBAHANIYE (Burundi), speaking as Chairman of the Group of African States, said that the African Group wished to take that opportunity to condemn vehemently the racist South African regime that continued to occupy Namibia illegally. Numerous resolutions adopted by the Organization had remained a dead letter owing to the arrogance of the South Africa regime.

36. The African Group reiterated its condemnation of the racist South African Government for its illegal occupation of Namibia, its blind repression of the Namibian people, its decision to annex Walvis Bay, its policy of bantustanization and its militarization of Namibia. The African Group also condemned the shameless pillage of Namibia's natural resources by South Africa and the capitalist transnational corporations, in contravention of Decree No. 1 for the Protection of the Natural Resources of Namibia. The mobilization of tribal armed forces by South Africa, aimed at triggering a fratricidal war, was illegal and should be rejected by the entire international community.

37. The African Group categorically rejected and condemned the so-called internal elections planned for Namibia as part of the South African authorities' plot against Namibia. It was not sufficient to declare that those elections would be null and void; they must be strongly condemned. No ambiguity could be tolerated on A/AC.131/SR.291 English Page 9

(Mr. Simbananiye, Burundi) that point, and consequently the joint statement by the Foreign Ministers of the five Western Powers and the South African Government (S/12900) represented a deviation from the relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 385 (1976) , 431 (1978) and 435 (1978). Those elections should therefore be unequivocally condemned and it must be realized that the United Nations presence in Namibia during that electoral process was ill-timed and even dangerous in some respects.

38. In view of the deterioration in the situation and the policy of betrayal of the Namibian people the African Group had called for an emergency meeting of the Security Council in order to request it to take the appropriate measures provided for in the Charter to ensure compliance with its decisions and safeguard international peace and security in that part of the world. The Council would thus be consistent and do justice to those people, who were struggling courageously and successfully for their dignity and survival. The United Nations must end South Africa's odious system of subjection and exploitation, and the international community must support the Namibian people in their struggle in the prisons, in the forests and in the fields. He wished to pay tribute to SWAPO, the spearhead of that revolution and the sole authentic liberation movement of Namibia, and also to the front-line States.

39. At a time when a plot was being hatched to exclude SWAPO from any authentic decolonization process, he wished to reaffirm the African Group's unwavering support for that organization, and he wished to congratulate it on its important victories, both internally and at the diplomatic level. It was because of the South African Government's fear of SWAPO that it was imprisoning and assassinating the leaders and sympathizers of that movement, and preventing SWAPO from participating freely in the elections provided for in United Nations resolutions.

40. The Council for Namibia had accomplished its task satisfactorily. It was essential that the Nationhood Programme should be fully implemented and the African Group hoped that the international community would take appropriate measures to that end.

41. He wondered how long the international community would continue to stand by and watch an entire nation being persecuted and how long the United Nations could have a clear conscience after doing no more than adopt resolutions and declarations of solidarity with the people of Namibia, who were being oppressed for strategic reasons and selfish material interests. The time had come for Members of the Organization to assume their individual responsibilities and demand evacuation of Namibia by South Africa, support the armed struggle of the Namibian people and, above all, undertake effective international action to counter the unilateral measures planned by South Africa for internal elections. Namibian political prisoners must be freed unconditionally.

42. That was the true message of solidarity for the Namibian people. The African countries would be engaged in the same struggle as the people of Namibia until victory was attained.

43. Mr. HARRIMAN (Nigeria), speaking as Chairman of the Special Committee against Apartheid, said that, at no time in the history of their struggle had the people of Namibia, under the leadership of their liberation movement, SWAPO, had greater need A/AC.131/SR.291 English Page 10

(Mr. Harriman, Nigeria) of solidarity. Any hopes created by the efforts of the five Western members of the Security Council had been dashed by the South African illegal administration, which was occupying Namibia by force of arms. The South African Government, at the highest level, had recently gone so far as to claim that SWAPO had rejected the move towards a peaceful settlement and wished to take power in Namibia by force. The recent joint communique of the Western Powers and South Africa represented a step backwards. Only the greatest hypocrites among Member States would take the position that it was in fact SWAPO that had rejected the call for fair and free elections. He did not wish to pre-empt the discussions that were to be held in the near future in the Security Council, but the fact was that the Pretoria regime had reaffirmed its intention of proceeding with internal elections in December, without giving any guarantee of United Nations supervised elections in 1979. South Africa's strategy was clearly to ensure that its own hand-picked leaders were elected to office in Namibia. In the meantime, the militarization of the Territory had continued unabated for the purpose of strengthening the future puppet regime with backing similar to that given by the United States to the Government of South Viet-Nam.

44. The latest report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council (S/12903) as expected had not thrown much light on the matter, and the five Western Powers had nothing new to offer except a recommendation that the Secretary-General's Special Representative should proceed to for further consultations, and he might possibly even be expected in the future to deal with the puppet Government which South Africa proposed to elect in December 1978. The core of the problem was the apartheid regime of South Africa, and the only option left for black Africa was to demand the imposition of full sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter. That was the view of the international community, with the exception of certain Western States and their multinational corporations.

45. The Special Committee against Apartheid reiterated its solidarity with SWAPO in the face of attempts by the illegal administration in Namibia to impose apartheid, create bantustans, and foment tribal war by recruiting blacks to fight SWAPO, whose supporters were being subjected to repressive laws and regulations, arrested under the Terrorism Act, and dismissed from their jobs as a result of pressure brought to bear by the South African Government on their employers. Blacks continued to be exploited as a source of cheap labour, while capital investment flowed in. The situation in southern Africa as a whole was not improving, and the five Western Powers would need to review their strategy if the problem was to be solved. The only result of the visit to South Africa by the Foreign Ministers of the five Western Powers was their failure to admit that they had failed. After 17 months of effort nothing but the "carrot" remained of the so-called "carrot and stick" policy of the five Western States, and especially of the United States, towards South Africa. He did not know how successful those States would be in persuading the rest of the international community to be patient a little longer; he hoped that a miracle would occur and that they would join the rest of the world in applying the full weight of the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter against South Africa.

46. Mr. SUWONDO (Indonesia), speaking as Acting Chairman of the Group of Asian States, said that the present act of solidarity on the part of the international community with the people of Namibia and SWAPO, coming at the crucial point in the A/AC.131/SR.291 English Page 11

(Mr. Suwondo, Indones ia) struggle for independence, would contribute much to the emergence of a free and independent State of Namibia. The people of Namibia were closer to freedom than they had been a year ago and the day was rapidly approaching when all Namibians would be free. The credit for the final emergence of the independent State of Namibia would in large part lie with the struggling people of Namibia under the leadership of SWAPO. The Asian Group would not accept any settlement in the Territory unless it provided genuine independence for the people of Namibia.

47. The Asian Group believed that the Council for Namibia was in a position to make constructive contributions in the complex transitional phases leading to independence, and should therefore play a significant role in that process. It had carried out its responsibilities with dispatch and had undertaken a number of praiseworthy activities on behalf of the Namibian people. It had represented the interests of Namibians at international conferences and in international organizations and bodies within the United Nations system, and had been successful in winning full membership for Namibia in various international agencies. In compliance with General Assembly resolution 31/152, SWAPO, as an observer to the Council for Namibia, had been accorded a standing invitation to participate in all international conferences convened under the auspices of the United Nations, and representatives of SWAPO participated in all the Council's meetings and accompanied all its missions to consult with foreign Governments. Such missions had succeeded in mustering international opinion against any so-called internal arrangement and in securing support for the territorial integrity of Namibia. The Council had issued travel documents for Namibians which were recognized by more than 80 countries, and it had obtained approval from the General Assembly for the establishment of the United Nations Fund for Namibia and the Nationhood Programme for Namibia. Lastly, the United Nations Commissioner for Namibia had made invaluable contributions on behalf of the Council. Such contributions had gone a long way towards bringing about a State capable of dealing with the demands imposed by sovereignty.

48. Both South Africa's negative response to the United Nations plan for independence, embodied in Security Council resolution 435 (1973) and the failure of the initiatives undertaken the previous week by the five Western members of the Security Council to achieve any substantial reversal in the position of the South African Government were disheartening. The so-called compromise reached by the five Western members and the Pretoria regime must be considered a deviation from the provisions of the Secretary-General's final report and Security Council resolution 435 (1978). The international community should be alerted to the motives behind that latest act of defiance by the South African Government. The internal elections planned by South Africa were toally unacceptable to the international community. The Asian Group would therefore like to reaffirm its position that any settlement in the Territory must be achieved in accordance with Security Council resolution 435 (1978).

49. In conclusion, he wished to reaffirm the Asian Group's commitment to the people of Namibia in their struggle for self-determination and genuine independence.

50. Mr. ONU (Observer, Organization of African Unity) said that he had hoped that the Council would be celebrating the independence of Namibia, rather than commemorating another week of solidarity. That hope was far from being realized A/AC.131/SR.291 English Page 12

(Mr. Onu, Observer, OAU)

because the illegal administration in Namibia, abetted if not aided by some of its Western friends, was moving to set up a puppet regime in the Territory. What the Organization of African Unity (OAU) wanted was genuine independence for the people of Namibia, so that they would be masters of their own destiny. It was convinced that only under the leadership of SWAPO could that be achieved. However, SWAPO supporters in Namibia were being persecuted daily by the monstrous South African regime.

51. On the occasion of the week of solidarity, the OAU rededicated itself to the cause of the struggle of the Namibian people, under the leadership of SWAPO, their genuine representative. Many were trying to deny SWAPO the fruits of its struggle by supporting so-called "political parties" which danced to the tune of their South African master. He hoped that the international community would see through the vicious conspiracy against SWAPO as revealed in the recent joint communique between South Africa and the five Western members of the Security Council. He called on all friendly and progressive countries to ensure that South Africa did not succeed, and on all those who cared for human rights and justice to support SWAPO in word and deed. In spite of overwhelming odds, the Namibian people, under the leadership of SWAPO, would triumph because their cause was just.

52. Mr. ESQOEA-GUERRERO (Dominican Republic), speaking as Chairman of the Group of Latin American States, said that the occupation of Namibia by the South African Government was a flagrant violation of the fundamental principles of human coexistence and a challenge to the authority of the United Nations. The Latin American countries expressed their support for their brothers in Africa fighting for an independent, free and sovereign Namibia, capable of shaping its own destiny. Those who cherished freedom, human rights and self-determination of peoples could not allow South Africa to continue to interfere in the affairs of Namibia, especially since the General Assembly had terminated its mandate over the Territory as long ago as 1966. Strong measures needed to be taken to restore order, and the time had come for the Security Council to take effective measures against South Africa and those who directly or indirectly helped it to commit a crime against humanity.

53. Mr. HOLLAI (Hungary), speaking as Chairman of the Group of Eastern European States, said that, after the latest meeting of the five Western members of the Security Council in Pretoria, at which the leader of the racist Government of South Africa had lectured his partners on the values of Western democracy and the free world, on the validity of the domino theory and the so-called threat of communism in that part of the world, South Africa had flatly rejected the Secetary-General1s proposal on Namibia and had thus at the same time virtually rejected the prospects for a peaceful transition and settlement in Namibia.

54. Even before the diplomatic exercise of the five Western Powers, the course of events in Namibia had clearly demonstrated South Africa's persistence in its policy of preparation for a so-called unilateral declaration of independence. It had launched a massive attack on SWAPO, which was waging a patriotic struggle on the diplomatic front, as well as on the battlefield, for the survival of its people and the establishment of an independent Namibia. A/AC.131/SR. 291 English Page 13

(Mr. Hollai, Hungary)

55. During the negotiations with the five Western Powers, Pretoria had dramatically stepped up its military build-up, introduced new air and naval units and increased the offensive capability of its army of occupation, thus posing a direct threat to neighbouring independent African States, particularly Angola. The persecution of Namibian patriots had sharply increased since the appointment of the Administrator-General.

56. At its ninth special session the General Assembly adopted a clearly defined programme for the independence of Namibia, reaffirming that Namibia was the direct responsibility of the United Nations and that the Namibian people, under the leadership of SWAPO, their sole authentic representative, must be enabled to attain self-determination, freedom and genuine independence within a united Namibia, including Walvis Bay. The General Assembly had stressed its commitment to end South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia by ensuring its complete and unconditional withdrawal to enable the people of the Territory to exercise freely their right to self-determination and independence. It should also be borne in mind that the General Assembly had rejected the idea that South Africa could have any legitimate interests in Namibia with regard to which SWAPO should be pressed to make concessions in any internationally acceptable instrument.

57. The international community should redouble its efforts, stand firm and be consistent in demanding the implementation of the United Nations resolutions in Namibia. The time was ripe for invoking sanctions and taking practical steps against racist South Africa under Chapter VII of the Charter. With the assistance of Member States, the Council for Namibia should once again appeal to Governments and mobilize public opinion on an even greater scale in order to put effective political, economic and diplomatic pressure on Pretoria. The main trading partners and supporters of South Africa should now decide whether to accede to the demand of the United Nations and the oppressed people of Namibia that they should sever all links with the racist regime of Pretoria, or to pursue their selfish interests and maintain their collaboration with the apartheid regime.

58. He wished to reassure SWAPO and the Council for Namibia that the Group of Eastern European States would fulfil its obligation to help the Namibian people achieve genuine independence.

59. Mr. GAUCI (Malta), speaking as Chairman of the Group of Western European and Other States, said that the perseverance of the Namibian people had found a matching response in the work of the Council for Namibia, which had resulted in a steady erosion of South Africa's stranglehold on Namibia over the past few years, and a highly critical phase had now been reached.

60. The right to the exercise of self-determination and independence by the Namibian people was acknowledged by all, but South Africa would prefer a sham form of independence so that it could maintain economic and political influence in Namibia. Every illegal act of the South African authorities had manifestly been directed towards that aim. It was therefore not surprising that the opposition of the people of Namibia had been resolute and had gained widespread support.

61. The Group of Western European and Other States wished to reaffirm the validity of its positions. Hence its insistence on progress judged satisfactory by the A/AC.131/SR.291 English Page 14

(Mr. Gauci, Malta)

United Nations. It supported genuine independence for Namibia, as had been made clear in the individual contacts that many members of the Group had had with the South African Government. It would only recognize elections held under the supervision and control of the United Nations, on the basis of and in conformity with the conditions laid down in Security Council resolutions 431 (1978) and 435 (1978).

62. It was highly regrettable that, despite all evidence of universl indignation at their methods, the South African authorities continued to place obstacles in the way of genuine self-determination of the Namibian people, even at that late stage.

63. The course upon which the United Nations had embarked, on the basis of the active efforts of the five Western Powers and in consultation and co-operation with SWAPO and the front-line States, had been a valid medium for positive and peaceful change. Those efforts should be pursued and encouraged until a solution compatible with the verdict of the people of Namibia was reached. Any other arrangements designed by South Africa to thwart those aspirations would be null and void, and would only cause delay and frustration, for the consequences of which South Africa would bear sole responsibility.

64. The Special Representative's hand would be strengthened if he had the full backing of the international community, and the outcome of his efforts would have important consequences for the people of Namibia, for peace and security in Africa, and for the standing of the Organization.

65. The Group of Western European and Other States wished to express its solidarity with the people of Namibia, its admiration for their just cause, and its support for their peaceful efforts. It would stand behind them until their cherished ambitions were realized.

66. Mr. TERZI (Observer, Palestine Liberation Organization) said it was no coincidence that the peoples of Namibia and Palestine shared the same history of suffering, colonialism and foreign domination. Resolutions adopted by the General Assembly and the Security Council with regard to those peoples had been completely disregarded by the racist regimes of Pretoria and Tel Aviv, which received extensive support from the same forces. The Namibian and Palestinian people were equally determined to struggle, under the leadership of their respective liberation movements, SWAPO and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), to achieve their inalienable rights, particularly the right to self-determination and independence, so that their peoples could live in dignity and freedom in independent, sovereign States of their own.

67. In paying tribute to the freedom fighters and those who supported them, he could not fail to condemn those who helped the forces of oppression. The provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter should be applied fully against the Pretoria and Tel Aviv regimes. As the Palestinian people, through the PLO, had condemned the so-called "elections in full autonomy" under the bayonets and boots of the zionist racist illegal occupation, so the people of Namibia condemned the proposal to hold elections in similar circumstances, in violation of Security Council resolutions and the principle of free elections. Despite the attitude of A/AC.131/SR.291 English Page 15

(Mr. Terzi, Observer, PLO) the Western Powers, his organization maintained its faith and trust in the United Nations as a vehicle for peace and justice. The similarity between the practices of the two racist regimes was very clear, and it was no coincidence that the President of the Israel-South Africa Friendship Society was none other than Menachem Begin. Both- regimes, by their disregard for United Nations resolutions, had created conditions which threatened international peace and security.

68. He conveyed to the leadership of SWAPO a message of greetings and solidarity from Mr. Yasser Arafat, the Chairman of his organization. The struggle would continue until liberation.

69. Mr. GURIRAB (Observer, South West Africa People's Organization) said that liberation was the spirit of the age, and the freedom fighters who had dedicated their lives to that noble cause were its martyrs, heroes and champions. There was no higher purpose than to fight, kill or die in the cause of liberation. The situation created by successive colonial regimes and foreign administrations in Namibia had deprived the people of that Territory of their basic rights, reduced them to labour units, and alienated them from their land and their natural resources. The People's Liberation Army of Namibia had been established in order to end that state of colonial oppression and foreign domination. On behalf of the Namibian people he acknowledged the sentiments of solidarity and support that had been expressed. SWAPO was constantly aware of the courageous struggles against colonialism and oppression that were being waged in many parts of the world, and in particular those waged by the Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe, the African National Congress of South Africa and the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania, the Palestine Liberation Organization, POLISARIO and FRETILIN. He assured them of SWAPO1s continued solidarity and support.

70. It was often asked whether armed struggle was compatible with negotiations. One was the product of the other; the armed struggle created the necessary favourable conditions for the transfer of power, and negotiations were an integral part of that struggle. It was not out of goodwill or admiration that SWAPO had been asked to participate and assist in the search for a negotiated independence for Namibia. His organization had finally come to accept the report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council (S/12827) approved in resolution 435 (1978), as the only basis for a negotiated settlement and therefore categorically rejected the joint communique issued in Pretoria recently on behalf of the five Western members of the Security Council and the racist representatives of South Africa. He likewise expressed SWAPO's continued belief that the United Nations Council for Namibia remained in the vanguard of United Nations efforts to assist the people of the Territory in the attaianment of freedom and genuine independence. He renewed SWAPO's pledge to co-operate with the Council and with the Commissioner for Namibia, both in that capacity and in his capacity as the Secretary-General's Special Representative, and to pursue consultations with the Secretary-General with a view to the implementation of the recommendations in his report.

71. As Mr. Sam Nujoma had said, the patience of the people of Namibia had run out. The Group of African States and other friends in the United Nations and throughout the world were therefore being asked to press for the convening of a meeting of the Security Council, as soon as possible, with a view to imposing A/AC.131/SR.291 English Page 16

(Mr. Gurirab, Observer, SWAPO) comprehensive mandatory sanctions on South Africa, because it had chosen to confront, rather than co-operate with, the United Nations.

72. Mr. AHTISAARI (Commissioner for Namibia) said that the twelfth aniversary of the termination of the mandate of South Africa over the Territory represented an appropriate occasion for the international community to reaffirm its commitment to the legitimate right of the people of Namibia to genuine independence and self-determination. The obligations assumed by the United Nations and the international community remained cardinal to all endeavours to find a just solution to the Namibian situation.

73. During the current year the question of Namibia had dominated the deliberations of the United Nations, at the level of the Security Council and of the General Assembly, as a result of crucial developments concerning the implementation of Security Council resolution 385 (1976). Those developments had culminated in the adoption of Security Council resolutions 431 (1978) and 435 (1978) designed to achieve a solution of the situation in Namibia through free and fair elections in the Territory under the supervision and control of the United Nations. The Secretary-General's latest report (S/12903) had focused on the most recent developments, in that regard.

74. The United Nations Council for Namibia had continued to play an active role in 1978 and, in particular, had made substantial progress on the implementation of the Nationhood Programme for Namibia established under the terms of General Assembly resolution 31/153. In consultations with the specialized agencies, the Council had in principle approved 77 projects for the pre-independence period. Initial pledges from Member States had already reached $6 million. He wished to express his appreciation to contributing countries and to make a general appeal for further contributions. He also wished to pay a particular tribute to UNDP for its decision to increase the indicative planning figure for Namibia.

75. The Institute for Namibia had accelerated its training of Namibians to prepare them for positions of responsibility after independence. Enrolment at the Institute had been increased to 200 students. The Institute had also initiated a number of research studies related to current Namibian problems with a view to identifying options for an independent Namibia. In addition, the United Nations Fund for Namibia, under the Council's direction and in association with the agencies concerned, was now sponsoring 500 students for further studies in host countries.

76. In August 1978 he had visited Namibia to conduct a survey on behalf of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council resolution 431 (1978). He had been impressed by the burning desire of the people of Namibia for genuine and true independence. The observance of the week of solidarity brought back memories of that visit and called to mind the responsibility of the international community to meet those legitimate aspirations. The coming months would be more crucial than ever in the quest for genuine independence.

77. In conclusion he wished to record his appreciation of the assistance he had received from the President and members of the Council as well as from SWAPO, and the Organization of African Unity. A/AC.131/SR.291 English Page 17

78. The PRESIDENT said that in the history of the United Nations, few decisions had had the immense significance of the decisive act by which the General Assembly had, in 1966, assumed direct responsibility for the Territory of Namibia until independence and thus become solemnly committed to supporting the self- determination and national independence of a people fighting to attain their inalienable rights. In the following year, the General Assembly had consolidated its responsibility to support the legitimate aspirations of the Namibian people by establishing, at its sixth special session, the United Nations Council for Namibia with a mandate to administer the Territory until independence. The fanatics of Pretoria had, throughout the years, refused to abide by the General Assembly and Security Council resolutions demanding the complete withdrawal of the illegal administration of South Africa from the Territory. They had also intensified their brutal oppression of all Namibian patriots under the leadership of SWAPO, the sole authentic representative of the Namibian people. In order to consolidate its control over the people- and resources of the Territory, South Africa had also greatly expanded its military presence in Namibia.

79. After long and fruitless efforts to negotiate their independence, Namibian patriots had had no choice but to resort to armed struggle. The dramatic history of that struggle had yet to be fully told.

80. The favourable changes in the international community as well as the courage and competence of Namibian patriots had created conditions for the success of the liberation struggle of the people of Namibia. However, the racist exploiters were now presenting to the international community treacherous schemes to mislead the Namibian people and world opinion in order to perpetuate their neo-colonial control of the resources and people of Namibia. The attempts of certain States to create a basis for a negotiated settlement had led nowhere; nor had the efforts of the Secretary-General to assist a peaceful transition to independence yielded any significant results. The decision of the colonialist regime of Pretoria to hold so-called elections in Namibia under the control of its illegal administration reflected the total rejection of the terms of Security Council resolution 385 (1976) .

81. At its ninth special session the General Assembly, in its Declaration on Namibia and Programme of Action in Support of Self-Determination and National Independence for Namibia, had already defined guidelines for the United Nations in the light of the continued challenge posed by the illegal presence of South Africa in Namibia. The international community would not accept any regime which the illegal South African administration might impose upon the Namibian people. The United Nations Council for Namibia would intensify its efforts in support of SWAPO and the Namibian people until the solemn commitment assumed by the General Assembly in 1966 was fully realized.

82. In conclusion she announced that the Council had received messages of solidarity from a number of Heads of State and Government, Foreign Ministers, and ^specialized agencies of the United Nations. They would be circulated as official documents of the Council.

83. Mr. REGO-MONTEIRO (Secretary of the Council) read out the following message from the President of the Republic of Senegal: A/AC.131/SR.291 English Page 18 (Mr. Rego-Monteiro) "The United Nations today celebrates the week of solidarity with the people of Namibia in their struggle to regain their fundamental rights.

"I have pleasure, on this occasion, in conveying to the United Nations Council for Namibia the congratulations and encouragement of the Senegalese Government and people for your effective action in protecting the rights and interests of a people unjustly kept under the yoke of a colonialism which has been discredited and condemned by the international community.

"In the twelve years since the General Assembly terminated South Africa's mandate over the Territory of Namibia, the obstinacy of the South African Government in failing to comply with the decisions of the General Assembly and the Security Council has prevented the United Nations from exercising its responsibility. Senegal, which is closely following developments in that difficult situation, appreciates the dynamic role of the Council under the chairmanship of Zambia.

"The United Nations Council for Namibia will undoubtedly have helped to make known the sufferings of the Namibian people by drawing the attention of the international community to them.

"In short, Senegal has a particular interest in the celebration of this week of solidarity, which provides a further opportunity for mobilizing all efforts with a view to enlisting all-out support for the legitimate struggle of the Namibian people under the leadership of SWAPO.

"The hopes for a negotiated settlement occasioned by the Security Council's adoption of resolution 435 (1978) appear to be evaporating once again, in view of South Africa's refusal to comply. "Because it remains convinced that the united Nations provides the appropriate framework in which to seek an internationally acceptable solution to the Namibian problem, Senegal believes that the Security Council must now apply all the measures provided for in the Charter, to isolate the racist regime of South Africa.

"My Government and I assure you of our continued co-operation."

84. He announced that messages had also been received from the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Zambia, the Arab Republic of Egypt and Japan. The Government of Angola had issued a statement.

The meeting rose at 1.50 p.m. N NNNZT Z CZ C D AL 2040 L AD 050

MI NYK

.LUANDA CUfl) 10 15* 00

PDM

024 MOST IMMEDIATE URGENT FOR SECRETARY GENERAL WALDHEIM

SAM NJOHA PRESIDENT OF SWAPO ASKED ME TO COMMUNICATE FOLLOWING

MESS'AGE TO YOU WHICH HE READ TO ME AT END OF FORMAL MEETING

WITH SWAPO OFFICIALS HELD IN LUANDA 10 FEBRUARY 0900 MS GMT.

MJOMA STATED FULL TEXT MESSAGE WILL BE RELEASED TO PRESS BY

SWAPO 11 FES QUOTE SWAPO "S COMMENTS AMD RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE

UN SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UN PLAN.

A. CEASEFIRE

IN THE LETTER TO DR. WALDHEIM, DATED S SEPTEMBER, 1973

SWAPO MADE ITS POSITION VERY CLEAR OM CEASEFIRE OR CESSATION OF

HOSTILITIES REFFERED TO IN PARAGRAPH 14 (A) OF HIS REPORT.

SWAPO *S POSITION REMAINS THE SAME, THAT IS S

I. FIRST AND FORMOST , 'SWAPO AND S.A. MUST ENTER

INTO A FORM AL_ AND_BI HP I KG INSTRUMENT OH A CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT

WHICH MUST BE AUTHENTICATED BY THE SG TO ENSURE THAT IT IS

SCRUPULOUSLY OBSERVED AND ADHERED TO BY BOTH PARTIES CONCERNED.

2, ' SWAPO REMAINS REIADY AND WILLING TO SIGN SUCH

A CEASEFIRE AMD TO HONOUR IT PROVIDED THE SOUTH AFRICAN REGIME

UNDERTAKES TO DO THE SAME. £. A DATE AND TIME WHEN THE Cfc.Aic.KlRh COGENCES AND TAKES IMMEDIATE EFFECT SHOULD BE DETERMINED,FIXED AND RESPECTED

KKK 4. OWING TO COMMUNICATION DIFFICULTIES, CESSATION OF ACTS OF HOSTILITY WILL BE BROUGHT INTO FULL EFFECT WITHIN THEREE WEEKS_OF THE_CEASE_FIRJE.

5. IN EFFECTUATING AND MONITORING THE CEASEFIRE THE SG '5 FINAL A^ DEFINITIVE REPORT MUST BE STRICTLY ADHERED TO.

CONFINEMENT /MONITORING OF TROOPS

ia SWAPO WILL UNDER-TAKE TO SUBJECT ITS 2,500 GUERRILLA FORCES TO CONFINEMENT TO BASES INSIDE NAMIBIA AND MONI-

TORING BY UNTAG. '""

2. THE 2,500 SWAPO ARMED FORCES WILL ALL BE COMF1 NED WITH ALL THEIR ARMS AND AMMUNITION.

3. SWAPO GUERRILLA ARMY, BEING MOBILE, HAS HO

"EHMANENTLY STRUCTURED BASES, THEREFORE, FOR THE PURPOSE OF IM- RKE«E3ff£MTC£SM PLEMENTING THE UN PLAN, JJ_H_AS' BEEN AGREED UPON' DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN SWAPO AND THE FIVE THAT SPECIFIC BASIS WILL HAVE TO BE INDETIFIED TO WHICH SWAPO ARMED FORCES WOULD BE COMF1 NED.

4. SWAPO WOULD WISH ITS TROOPS TO BE CONFINED

TO THE FOLLOWING AREAS? WI «DHOE_Kj__OWDANGWA , ,

AM) RUNU*

5. . SWAPO WILL PROVIDE MILITARY LlASON OFFICERS

IN ORDER TO ENSURE EFFECTIVE COORDINATION AND CONSULTATION WITH THE MILITARY COMPONENT OF UNTAG. I';

CM RETURN OF EXILES

1. ALL NAMIBIANS PRESENTLY LIVING OUTSIDE THE

COUNTRY WILL BE EXPECTED TO RETURN TO THEIR RESPECTIVE HOMES OR

ANY OTHER PLACE OF THEIR CHOISE AND NOT TO SPECIAL / 'KSKKKXZSN

RECEIPTION CENTRES ".

2. THE UNHCR MAY ASSIST IN PROVIDING TRANS-

PORTATION AND OTHER NECESSARY FACILITIES TO ENABLE ALL RETURNEES TO REACH THEIR HOMES.

3* SWAPO IS READY TO PROVIDE ALL THE RELEVANT

INFORMATION REGARDING THE RETURNEES.

A. TO THE BEST KNOWLEDGE OF SWAPO THERE ISN

AN ESTIMATE NUMBER OF 3£±000_MAMIBI.ANSOUTSIDE NAMIBIA., THE MAJORITY

OF WHICH IS IN THE NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES OF ANGOLA, ZAMBIA, AND

BOTSWANA. THE REST ARE TAKING UP STUDIES ELESEWHERE ABROAD.

D. COMPOSITION OF UNTftG (MILITARY}

1. SWAPO REJECTS AS UNACCEPTABLE SOME OF THE COUNTRIES, ESPECIALLY NATO MEMBERS CONTAINED IN THE SG 'S LISV CONCERNING THE MILITARY COMPONENT OF UNTAG. SWAPO VIEWS THE SG 'S PROPOSAL TO BE HEAVILY WEIGHED IN FAVOUR OF RACIST SOUTH AFRI- CA ^TRADITIONAL ALLIES -THE NATO COUNTRIES.

2. SWAPO STRONGLY'RECOMMENDS TO THE SG THE FOLLOWING COUNTRIES: . / ANGOLA cm TANZANIA ail) JKMX2KX NIGERIA aV) ALGERIA cv>

(VII) JAMAICA

3, THE DEPUTY COMMANDER OF THE UNTAG (MILITARY

SHOULD BE AN AFRICAN. SWAPO RECOMMENDS NIGERIA FOR THIS POSTIONo

CIVILIAN COMPONENT OF UNTAG

1* SWAVO STRONGLY BELIEVES THAT THE CIVILIAN

COMPONENT OF UNTAG SHOULD BE COMPOSED ON THE BASIS OF EQUITABLE

GEOGRAPHICAL A® POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS. .WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE ACCEPTED PROMCIPLE OF GEOGRAPHICAL AND POLITICAL DISTR1BUTI OK, SPECIAL CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE AFRICAN REGION SINCE

NAMIBIA IS, FIRST AND FORMOST AN AFRICAN PROBLEM,

TO THIS END, AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 33 OF SG 'S REPORT,

SWAPO WOULD LIKE TO PROPOSE THE FOLLOWING COUNTRIES FOR CONTRI-

BUTION OF PERSONNEL ON SECONDMENT OR LOAN TO THE CIVILIAN COMPONENT

OF UNTAGs

CD ZAMBIA (X) BOTSWANA

a i) GUINEA-CONAKRI (XI) GUYANA am BENIN an.) IRELAND (IV)

) POLAND

£VI> LIBYA OCV) HUNGARY evil) MADAGASCAR OCVI) BARBADOS

win SIERRA LEONE (XVII) ROMANIA

/" SWAPO AGREES WITH THE SG 'S PROPOSAL, REGARDING FINLAND, SWEDEN, YUGOSLAVIA AND PAJ3AMA .. F. " OTHER WAITERS

1. "SWAPO DETAINEES " IN ZAMBIA AND TANZANIA:

THE ALLEGATION THAT SWAPO IS HOLDING SOME 1800 NAMIBIANS UNDER

DETECTION IK CERTAIN FROM-LI HE COUNTRIES IS AS PREPOSTEROUS AS IT

IS MALICIOUS. SWAPO INVITES THE AUTORS AMD PERPRETRATORS OF THIS

ALLEGATION TO THE FRONT-LI HE COUNTRIES AND SATISFY THEMSELVES

THAI THERE ARE MOT SUCH DETAINEES.

2* UPON CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT, STEPS MUST BE TAKEN

TO ENSURE THAT ANGOLA BANDITS OF UNITA/FNLA AND MERCENARIES ARE

PROMPTLY EVACUATED FROM NAMIBIA SO AS TO PREVENT THEM FROM CARRYING

OUT CRIMINAL ACTS WHICH MIGHT PRECITPITATE RUPTURE OF THE CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT.

3. IN ACCORDANCE WITH RELEVANT POVFEE PROVISIONS OF THF

UN PLAN, '-'APO DECLARE THAT ANY ARREST, DETENTION,_ INTIMIDATION

OR IMPRISONMENT ANY OF ITS RETURNING MEMBERS WILL CONSTITUTE A

FRAGRANT VIOLATION OF THE CEASFIRE GREFMF.NT WITH SERIOUS

CONSil.Tu'nf'CES.

4 ELECTION <;UST BE HELD ON THF. BA?IS OF SINGLE

>'»E!1:3 E R CO M S T IT UE !•! CY.

5. SWAPO WISHES, ONCE AGAIN, TO RF-^FFCCV'I ITS coMinTt-ir.iiT TC COOPE^AT^: WITH THE pECRETASY-czNErtAL A NO HIS STAFF

IN THE EFFICACIOUS IMPLEMEKT AT IOM OF TH1 lit-! PLAN REGARDING EARLY

DECOLONISATION OF NAMIBIA. U'JQUOTE THIS MESHAEGE IS FROM SRSG

AHTISSAURI C3ALCAZAR)

COL - s

< I ' . Mr. Peter Onu:

I/ Expressed concern that neither the OAU President or the Secretary-General had been included in Mr. Ahtisaarifs itinerary. -It was quite possible that the question of Namibia might be raised at the next meeting of the OAU Council of Ministers in Nairobi this month if there were any unresolved issues.

2. Considered that the OAU had a role to play in the UN Plan of Operation, particularly with regard to the repatriation of refugees. He explained that the OAU had a special office, of long standing, which dealt with the Namibian refugee problem. Misunderstandings would be avoided if^UNHCR consulted with the OAU with regard to the modalities"~"for the return of the refugees.

3. Questioned the wisdom of using Mr. Ahtisaari to negotiate sensitive matters with SWAPO, particularly where the latter has taken a strong stand. He gained the impression from Mr. Sam Nujoma that Mr. Ahtisaari had endeavoured to persuade SWAPO to take a position on the UN monitoring of bases in neighbouring countries much against its will. Mr. Ahtisaari should guard against getting involved in controversial problems which could • 'cast doubts on his impartiality. Such matters should be • left to the good offices of the Front-line States,, ,_>'•

•-Mr. Sam Nujoma:

1. Opposed to the suggestion that SWAPO bases in neighbouring countries be monitored by the United Nations. He said it was unacceptable. If the United Nations tried, there would be friction. 2. Opposed to the inclusion in the United Nations force of contingents from U.K., Canada, Federal Republic of Germany and Australia. 3. insisted that a Nigerian contingent be included in the United Nations force* If that can be arranged, SWAPO would have no objection to contingents from the and Ghana. Nigeria, he said, was 'capable of providing signals and logistic support thereby obviating the need to rely on the Western countries referred to in paragraph 2 above. 4. Favoured the inclusion of Sudan, despite South African objections. Agreed, however, that Ireland could provide a suitable alternative. 5. Raised no objection to the inclusion of contingents from Yugoslavia and Rumania. 6. Hoped it would be possible to accept a contingent from India. SWAPO favoured India over Bangladesh. 7. Required assurances beforehand that all repressive laws, including the terrorism act, would be repealed in Namibia. Otherwise SWAPO would not be able to return to the Territory. 8. Rejected any suggestion which would require Namibian refugees to be confined in any form of concentration camps» Understood that camps formerly used by UNITA refugees had been set aside for Namibian returnees and that they would be required to remain there for an indefinite period. He maintained that Namibian refugees, as citizens of Namibia, had the right to proceed to any part of the Territory and should accordingly be given the necessary facilities to do so.

90 Required assurances that the DTA would not be recognized by the United Nations and that the necessary vigilance would be exercised to ensure that the Administrator General would - 2 - not use his powers to promote the interests of that group. 1O. SWAPO would not accept any modification of the terms of resolution 435 or of the clarifications which were given by the Secretary-General in explanation of that resolution. '?'•'&¥&&'.: -"'.' >i'?.'. V-££ ^- '-.•••

", •£, --

^

W

Compliments of '~f ( f,

S.W.A.P.O Observer Mission to the U.N.

801 SECOND AVENUE ROOM 1401 NEW YORK, N.Y. 10017 Telephone: (212) 986-7863 STATEMENT OF SAM NUJOMA, PRESIDENT OF SWAPO TO THE SECOND ANNUAL MEETING OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE (summary) Lf-J

1978 was an eventful year in the history of SWAPO's liberation struggle. Its guerrilla forces have stepped up their activities and have succeeded in keeping under SWAPO's control semi-liberated areas in all the regions, especially in the Northern, North-Western and North-Eastern regions. On the political front, SWAPO leadership and cadres have successfully disseminated the name and influence of the Party throughout Namibia establishing Party branches in all of the regions, districts and sections of the country.

The enemy is seeking first to deprive SWAPO of the support of the Namibian people and the international community; secondly, to destroy SWAPO and the Namibian revolution and lastly to impose a neo-colonial puppet regime on the Namibian people. SWAPO1s response is to intensify the armed struggle^ which should continue to be the main and leading factor in the national resistance against the Apartheid regime in Namibia. This does not mean that SWAPO excludes any genuine efforts for a negotiated settlement based on the.report of the Secretary-General and for complete implementation of Resolution 43^ (1Q-7B) . But, it should be understood that until r" its true interests and genuine political aspirations are realized, honoured and respected, SWAPO will have to continue to intensify the struggle. DECLARATION OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE SOUTH WEST AFRICA PEOPLE'S ORGANISATION (SWAPO) OF NAMIBIA ADOPTED BY ITS SECOND ANNUAL MEETING HELD AT GABELA, P.R. OF ANGOLA, 4-7 JANUARY 1979

On the basis of its analysis of the current phase of the liberation struggle, the Central Committee is convinced that Pretoria and its imperialist mentors are engaged in new manoeuvres aimed at imposing a puppet regime in Namibia. In view of this, the Central Committee reaffirms that armed struggle is and remains the main method of liberation in Namibia. It condemns and rejects the secret deal hatched up in Pretoria on 16 October 1978 between Pretoria and the five imperialist powers led by the U.S., allowing South Africa to conduct bogus elections in Namibia. The purpose of those elections was to legitimize and perpetuate the illegal occupation of Namibia through the imposition of a puppet administration in Windhoek. SWAPO rejects any attempt or scheme aimed at undermining its hard won national and international recognition by putting it on the same footing with the South African Quislings. On the other hand, the Central Committee reiterates r1 •-•-' --••-•- — —— ...... , . . — • SWAPO1s commitment to the full and scrupulous implementation of the Secretary-General's final and definitive -r-ep-oxj; as endorsed by Security Council 435 (1978).

MKP/JH 25 January 1979 Note for the File

Subject: Secretary-General's Interview Over West German TV on Namibia

This afternoon I spoke with Mr. Ben Gurirab, SWAPO's Observer to the United Nations, concerning the above matter. He said that he was attending a Central Party meeting in Africa at the time Renter's carried the report of the alleged statement by the Secretary-General. Knowing the Secretary-General's position, he knew that the report must be erroneous, and informed SWAPO leaders to that effect. He appreciated the clarification which I gave him and said that under the circumstances he would not request any further action to be taken by the Secretary-General.

A. A. Farah

15 January 1979 cc: Mr. R. Ahmed I J.

The s^r^afe-GeneralA ""I £/\/

l/V Subject: S

The Deputy Representative of SWAPO telephoned me this '// / afternoon to express concern over certain remarks relating to SWAPO which a" Reuter's report had attributed to the Secretary-General. He did not provide me with a copy of the report, but said that it was dated 9 January and had originated from Bonn. According to the Deputy Representative, the report read as follows: "The United Nations Secretary-General, Kurt Waldheim, said that the united Nations has not recognized SWAPO as the sole representative of Namibia. Mr0 Waldheim said in a programme broadcast on West German television last Thursday that the United Nations* plan was aimed at enabling all citizens to take part in free elections without fear. Asked by a reporter whther the UN General Assembly and Security Council had recognized SWAPO as the sole representative of the Namibian people, Mr. Waldheim said "No, by no means"." The Deputy Representative said that since there were many resolutions of the United Nations recognizing SWAPO as the sole and authentic representative of the people of > Namibia, he hoped the Secretary-General would be able to clarify the situation.

A. A. Farah

10/January 1979 \J \

The Secretary-General,

Subject:

I spoke to the Deputy Representative of SWAPO this afternoon concerning your interview over West, German television. I informed him that Reuter's report of 9 January had grossly distorted the interview and taken it out of context. He asked vfoether the Secretary-General would, under the circumstances, issue a disclaimer, particularly since the report had been given considerable publicity in South Africa and in Namibia,, I replied that this was not the first time that a journalist had distorted the position of the United Nations or of the Secretary-General, and that it was not the practice to reply to each and every bit of distortion. Moreover, apart from the copy of the Reuter's report which SWAPO had provided, the United Nations Press Office had not received any other adverse account of the interview,, I suggested that it might be politically counter-productive if a rebuttal was issued at this stage, thereby giving further publicity to the report. The Deputy Representative said that he would consult with Mr. Ben Gurirab over the weekend and contact me again on Monday. Meanwhile, I have asked Mr. Ahtisaari's office to provide me with any press cuttings it may have on the matter. Evidently, Reuter's report was broadcast over Radio South Africa on 9 January and it has been given some prominence in the Windhoek Advertiser. I will keep you informed of developments.

U -A A. A. Farah

12 January 1979 w - THE DECLARATIOf] OF THE CEITRAL CO^ITTEF OF THE SOUTH $, , l-e^^.J— VEST AFRICA PEOPLE'S OP.nAilISATIOM (S1TPO) OF cr ADOPTED RY ITS SECOilD AWuTL ?"EETI?!n HELD AT PAPELf. P.P.. OF Af'GOLA/r-7,JANUARY, ID?1}.

The Second Annual <:ectinr of tha Central Comnitteo of SV'APO was hold at Cabela in the Peools's Republic of Angola fron January,4-7, 1979. \ The opening session was attended by a hi^h-rankino delenation of TLf- V'orkers' Party led'hy Conmandant Antonio Pos Santos Franca (Hdalu), Mcpbgr of Political Bureau of n.r.L.A.-Workers' Party who delivered a special nessane fron Conrade Dr. Anostinho Meto, President of HPLA-t-'orkers1 Party and of the People's Republic of Annola.

The presence of the representatives of rPLA-'forkers' Party at the neetirin i.'as a re-affimation of the already existing fraternal ties of friendship and solidarity in the common stru^nle of the Angolan and Jlanibian peoples anainst inperialism, colonialism, racism, and neo-colonial reaction.

The neetin^ of the Central Committee also received revolutionary orcetinns and piossa^es of solidarity fron friendly novernnents, Connunist, '-.'orkers' Parties and other national liberation movenents.

Of particular significance, was an urgent and inspiring messane from S'-'APO National Hoadquaters in V'indhoek conveyed to the noetinn.

Connizant of the prevailing tension and the ever sharpenino contradic- tions betv;een the forces of progress and liberation, on the one hand, and those of oppression and exploitation, on the other, in the world in oeneral and southern Africa in particular, the Central Committee critically and comprehensive- ly analysed the current phase of the strunnle of the f.'amiblan people, under the leadership of their vanguard Movement, SHAPO, at the military political, ch'plo- natic and other fronts and adoptee! new strategies and tactics.

On the basis of this analysis, the Central Corcnittee is convinced that the racists in Pretoria and their imperialist mentors are enraned in new and more sinister manoeuvres,machinations and intrinues aimed at ipposin" a puppet regime in Namibia with a view to perpetuatinf racist domination and capitalist exploitation in our country. - 2 -

Against this background, the Central Committee re-affirms that: 1. The armed strunnle is and remains the main method of liberating Namibia.

2. The bulk of the human and material resources of the fovement shall be deployed in the intensification and prosecution of the armed liberation strunnle.

3. The Central Committee welcomed with enthusiasm the special messane from the SWAPO National Headquaters. .

•*>. The Central Committee, fortified in the knowledge that the broad masses of the Nanibian people are firmly behind SVfAPO, will never accept any neo-colonial solution and will persevere in the strunnle for nenuine independence.

5. The Central Committee, thus, vehemently condemns and rejects the secret deal hatched up in Pretoria on I6th October, I97B between the racist renime of Pretoria and the five imperialist powers led by the United States; this secret deal, allowing South Africa to conduct bonus elections in Namibia, was intended to legitimise and perpetuate the illenal occupation of our country through the imposition of a puppet administration in Windhoek.

6. SHAPO denounces and rejects with the same vehemence and with scorn any attempt or schemes aimed at unctermininn its hard-v/on national and international recognition and support by puttinn it on the same footinn with the South African quislings.

7. The Central Committee re-affirms SHAPO's resolve to build a classless, non-exploitative, non-racial and just society which *W assure the restoration of social ownership, control and management of Namibia's natural resources.

8. In pirsuit of the objectives of overthrouwinn racist oppression and capitalist exploitation and for the construction of a sncfalfst society, the Central Committee appeals to all proorossive forces, especially the socialist community, to redouble assistance to thr> Nanibian people, throuoh SMP0. - 3 -

9. The Central Committee, fu: thermore, expresses its profound orati- tude and appreciation to the OAU, especially the Front-line States and the non-Alioned countries, Nordic countries and Holland for their continued material, political, diplomatic and moral support, and urnes them to continue and increase the same.

10. The Central Committee, in the same vein, re-i terates SVAPO's commitment to the full and scrupulous implementation of the UN Secretary General's final and definitive report as endorsed by Security Council Resolution 435 (1978). In this context, the Central Committee commends the UN council for Namibia for its persistent efforts in support of the just strunple of the Mamibian people and pledges SWAPO's continued close co-operation with it.

11. The Central Committee pays its hinh tribute to the memory of the fallen Namibian patriots who have made ultimate sacrifices for the cause of the total liberation of Namibia.

12. The Central Committee salutes the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) for its brilliant exploits and impressive victo- ries scored aoainst the enemy, and extolls the nail ant and heroic Namibian patriots to persevere in the struggle and to march "forward in unity and in strenoth towards certain final victory.

13. The Central Committee expresses its profound thanks to Comrade Dr. Agostinho Neto, President of MPLA-Workers' Party and of the People's Republic of Anriola, the Party, Government and the people of Anoola for makinn it possible to hold its Second Annual Meetinn in the beautiful and scenic surroundinqs of Gabela and for all the facilities and arrangements provided.

14. The Central Committee re-affirms its militant solidarity with and extends revolutionary salutations to the liberation movements, namely, AMC (S.A.) Patriotic Front (Zimbabwe), Polisario (W. Sahara), PLO (Palestine), Frentelin (East Timor), those in teia and Latin America, and all other forces finhtinn for liberation, socfaf progress and denocracy.

000000000 000000000 ', '. STATZM3ST BY COKRAD3 SAM I'UJOKA. P?.ZS H^IIT 0? S'.TAPO TO S3COITD ArDTUAL K3TTI1TG 0? C3NTRAL COMMITTB3 Comrade, Representatives of MPLA-Workers' Party, Comrade, Members of SWAPO Central Committee, Comrades,

It is a pleasing occasion for me to welcome you all to the Gabela District of a liberated People's Republic of Angola.

It is also an important moment to observe that we are meeting here in the Second Annual Meeting of the Central Committee of our Mighty Movement barely Forty-Eight hours after the phasing out of that eventful year-1978, and the emergence of the new year-1979. As I wish you a happy New Year, I sincerely hope that we are all entering the year- 1979 with a redoubled determination and resolve to still dedicate our efforts towards a protrac- ted struggle for national and social liberation of our country and people.

Comrades, before I proceed on with my remarks and observations on the Namibian struggle, please, allow me, to extend, on your behalf and, in the name of our struggling people, our revolutionary salutations and congratulations to Comrade President Agostinho Neto, the illustrious leader of the Angolan Revolution and veritable Freedom Figther;to the Central Committee of MPLA-Workers1 Party, the Government and people of the PRA for the tremen- dous achievements and successes scored in the fields of economic and social development and the consolidation of Angolan national independence during the past three years of independence.

The courage and heroism with which the Angolan people, under the leadership of MPLA, waged a bitter and protracted struggle to defeat and liquidate Portuguese colonialists their agents from the Angolan soil is, by any yardstick, an inspiring factor in our national resistance and insurrection against the fascist Boer regime in our country.

An added element to this is the fact that the liberation of Angola ch?.nr;cd the balance of forces in favour of the just cause of the Namibian people. It re-defined and extended the borders of the struggle in Namibia, a historical factor which has shaken the foundations of racist South Africa's continued illegal occupation of our country.

More important still is the fact that MPLA-Workers1 Party and the ltS||Si?^r™ent of the PRA renders uninterrupted and selfless material contribu- iliiilr »iftft to our strungle, thus enabling SWAPO not only continue but to expand intensify its military and political activities against the racist oppre- tw in Namibia. For this concrete material assistance, political and diplomatic support, we are, indeed, very grateful.

Also, please permit m to pay tribute to all the distlnguised members of SWAPO Central Committee, the Commanders, combatants, men and women of the PLAN as well as those comrades inside the country and those serving in our Missions abroad, for the continued dedication and committ- ment to the just cause for Namibia's total liberation, and for putting across SWAPO's view point to the international comminity. We are all called upon to intensify our efforts in this direction.

Comrades, the year 1978, which has just elapsed, was an eventful year in the history of our people's noble efforts to liberate themselves from racist South Africa's colonial domination, oppression and exploitation.

During the course of that year, our people, led by SWAPO, made far-reachinq stridesaswell as great sacrifices at all fronts-military, poli- tical and. diplomatic. Our guerrilla forces of the PL.AN have not only expand - ed our areas of military activities, but have also stepped up armed opera- tions1 irv a IT the:>regiotTS, -especially, in ithe Northern, North^Wes-te.rn..an,d North-Eastern regions wherp'we-now haVfi semi -11 berated areas under our control He all know of PLAN'S numerous cons pi nuous military victories over the fascist forces of the racist enemy, tiase; at Katirria Mulito5in- August, 1978, and several other successful elimination of hundreds of enemy forces* v military installations,' bridges and water-pipes of the enemy all over Namibia.

In short, our guerrilla'fighters'have so'much established their presence in all nooks'find comers.'of Na'mibia to the extend that the racists' . position in Namibia has become shaky,11 insecure and frightened.

Comrades; our military, efforts have been 'increasingly supplemented by our political struggle inside'the country i where 'our. comrades have persistently arid with ever redoubled vigour,carried on a relentless': strugale, although under very difficult conditions and at gun point. But, defying all-the fascistlc forces of racist South'Africa's reppression, 'the SWAPO leadership and cadres have successfully disseminated ithe name : and influence of our Party throughout the country, establishing Party . branches in all the regions, districts and sections of the country. '••,•;.• ''-.-•••.•• I.1*,-:' ••'••;. ii •'.' ••••'•. ' .--i*•'••!• )1 ' > -'•• It is significant-to place on record here that..1978 was a Mstoric year when our people,Bunder the leadership of our vanguard of Revolution, SWAPO, once again registered their open and total rejection of-.the .'• intrigues and plots by racist South Africa qnd its imperialist Sponsors. These including the bogus December "elect-ions" through which the Pretoria racists sought to impose a puppet regime on our people.

With increasing frustration of its diabolical and reactionary schemes In Nqmibia, the regime has progressively become desperate and has resorted to repressive methods of organised and institutionalised violence and terror compaign against SWAPO and the Namibian people. The enemy aims at, first, depriving SWAPO the support of the Namibian people and international commu- nity; secondly, destroying SWAPO and the Namibian Revolution and, lastly, to im- pose a neo-colonial, puppet regime on our people.

Part of these organised violence and terror compaign against SWAPO and the Namibian people was fascist South Africa's barbaric attack on Kassinga and other Namibian centres in southern Angola, killing and wounding over 1000 Nan.4' -'an children, women and elderly people and many ethers including comrade Nashilongo Taapopi missing. During the course of these terror campaigns, we lost some of Namibia's best and brave sons and daughters including comrades Jonas Haiduwa, Wilbard Tashiya Sheya (i'.akada), Sacharia Ithete, Gordon SMimi (Uhuru), David Mbango and some others. They all made supreme and selfless sacrifices for the total liberation of Namibia.

Inside the country, the fascist regime has intensified its repre- ssive methods of arbitrary arrest, detention, imprisonment, killing and •intimidation of SWAPO leaders, members and supporters. As you all are aware, only in December last year six comrades including SWAPO Deputy National Chairman, Daniel Tjongarerg Secretary, Johannes Axel, Secretary for Legal Affairs, Lucia Hamutenya were arrested and detained under section 6 of the so-called Terrorism Act, and last Sunday December 31st, Five SWAPO officials including our Secretary for Foreign Relations, comrade Festus llaholo, were arrested.

At this juncture, may I ask all of you to join me in observing a minute of silence in memory and honour of those brave sons and daughters who laid down their sacred lives in the struggle for the liberation of Namibia and oppressed mankinn world-over.

Comrades, we have also scored remarkable successes at the diplomatic front, SWAPO has continued to gainfurther international support and recognition. It suffices to mention SWAPO's admission as a full member of Non-Aligned Movement on October 2, 1978. What is Important to point here is the fact thu. ^e successes if are a result of the intensification of military, political and diplomatic activities by members of the Central Committee, Party functionaries and our fighting cadres of PLAN.

Distinguished Members of Central Committee, we are now approaching a crucial stage in the history of our country. We are faced with not only the Boer regime represented by P.M. Botha but by the entire reactionary forces of international Imperialism. We should expect the Pretoria fascists, in collusion with their imperialist sponsors, to step up their dirty manoevres, intrigues and plots against the true interest and genuine political aspirations of our people.

In view of these plots and reactionary efforts on the part of im- perialist forces aimed at depriving the Namibian people the benefits of a bi- tter and protracted struggle for which they made great sacrifices, armed struggle should continue to be the main and leading factor in our national resistance against the Boer regime of apartheid South Africa in Namibia; although this does not exclude any genuine fforts for a negotiated settlement based on the report of the UN Secretary General and for complete implementation of resolution 435(1978).

Our struggle is a just one; and our resistance against the occupation Boer regime has well defined aims and objectives, that is, total national and social liberation of our country and the achievement of genuine independence. Until °ur true interests and genuine political aspirations are realised, honoured and respected, we have to continue to intensify the struggle.

Comrades, let us all be realistic. If we are to achieve these noble aims and objectives of our struggle, much is demanded from each and everyone of us. All members of the Central Committee as well as Party functionaries and cadres should live up to expectation.

All those of us who are entrusted with certain duties should make sure that these responsibilities, tasks and duties are carried out. The leadership must show a nood example worthy of emulation by the other members of the Party .

It has been brought to my attention that some members of the Central Committee do not honour and respect the responsibility en- trusted upon them by the oppressed Namibian people. 1 understand thai some simply use the Central Committee as a means to seek personal name or amass individual comforts. Some go around / c disgracefully 1n public under the influence of alcoholic I 11 kiW^ t ,ion.

From now on» every member of the Central Committee must always remember that his main task is the liberation of Namibia. It is therefore important that we should all develop the spirit of collective or team work in order to improve the efficiency of alj Party organs.

I strongly feel that those members of the Central Committee who have either decided to become professional students or those who are func- tionally unproductive should be dropped and be replaced with those who are capable and willing to contribute to the struggle for the speedy realisation of Namibia's Independence.

I would like to re-iterate that, we are now entering a critical stage of our struggle which demands that each and everyone of us stands on his feet 1n making sure that the programmes of our Party are fully imple- mented.

In conclusion* comrades, I would like to express our profound grati- tude and appreciation to the Front -line states of Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia which have also become targets of racist military attacks and aggressions; OAU member states, the socialist countries, Nordic countries, Holland, national and international organisations which have rendered concrete material and humanitarian assistance to our people, through SWAPO.

We re-affirm our support for and solidarity with the struggling peoples of Zimbabwe (Patriotic Front), Sou;'•; Africa (ANC), Palestine (PLO); West Sahara (POLISARIO), East Timor (FRENTELIM ) and all other progressive forces fighting against fascism, imperialism, colonialism, racism, Zionism and oppression world-over.

I sincerely hope that this meeting resolves to continue to intensify the armed and political liberation struggle in Namibia and to ensure that the year 1979 becomes the year of Namibia's liberation and achievement of national independence.

Long live SWAPO; Long Live MPLA-Workers' Party; Long Live Anti-imperialist forces world-over

A LUTA CONTINUA: NNNN

ZCZC DAL 1764 UNS837 VIA ITT CTC098 ZMA143LOCS07 CAG238 US NY CO ZALU 048

LUSAKA 48/47 10 1507

1 FILE NO. ! ACT:ON DR KURT WALDHEIM 1 TO SECRETARY GENERAL

U.N. HEADQUARTERS L

MEW YORK

SWAPO.EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE SERIOSULY OBJECTS TO CEDRIC

THORNBURRY'S INCLUSION AS MEMBER ON SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE

AARTHISAARI 'S STAFF. SWAPO HAS REASON TO BELIEF HIS ROLE

TO BE PREDUTICIAL TO SATISFACTORY SOLUTION OF THE NAMIBIAN

PROBLEM

M MUYONGO VICE-PRESIDENT cc: J^G- Mr. Sytenko Mr. Gleissner Mr. Ahtisaari Tang Farah 7Mr. Urquhart AR/FMG RA :

1 December 1973

Dear Mr. President, I wish to faring to your attention the attached letter dated 29 November 1978 addressed to me by Mr. Theo-Ben Gurirab, Permanent Observer of the South West Africa People's Organization• Yours sincerely,

Kurt Waldheira

His Excellency Baron Rftdiger von Wechmar President of the Security Council New York Summary of attached cables

1. £he aim of the 4 December elections is to elect a constituent assembly to draw up a constitution for Namibia.

2. Ehis is evident from pronouncements by Steyn and .

3. As a reaction to the proposed elections SWAPO has called for a country-wide boycott.

4. SWAPO understands that South Africa intends to attack SWAPO settlements in Angola and Zambia, including the Namibia institute in Zambia.

5. Increased repressive measures against SWAPO members or supporters in recent days are aimed at intimidating SWAPO leadership in the hope that the boycott of the elections will be called off.

6. £he recent expulsion of Justin Ellis of Windhoek and Father Klein Hitpass of Tsumeb is in line with South Africans policy of silencing its critics. re.

South West Africa People's Organization

Solidarity — Freedom — Justice

SWAPO OBSERVER MISSION to the United Nations 801 Second Avenue Room 1401 New York, N.Y. 10017

Telex - 237249 Telephone: (212) 986-7863/7864 November 29; 1978.

Dr. Kurt Waldheim Secretary-General Room 3800 United Nations New York, N.Y. 10017 Your Excellency, ^ I have the honour to enclose these communications and to request Your Excellency to draw the attention of the members of the Security Council to the same for an appropriate action.

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Sincerely yours,

-jc^ Theo-Ben Gurirab Permanent Observer •2r,7ZZ~ S-JAPM UR RCA TELEX TBLESO PC A MOV 23 0914* ;..• -; 4^ 3Vi«r>n UR idfa226 SWAPO G

23.11.78 THE FOLLOWING TELEX WAS RECEIVED FROM WINDHOEK THIS MORNING • ATTENTION COMRADE PEN GURIRAB J') THE PRESENT POLITICAL SITUATION IN NAMIBIA BEFORE THE SOUTH AFRICAN SPONSORED ELECTIONS IS TENSE. THERE ARE DAILY REPORTS OF INTIMIDATION BETWEEN MEMBERS OF THE MAIM PARTICIPATING GROUPS., DTA AND AKTUR. UNLIKE WHAT IS BEING TOLD TO THE INTERNATIONAL PRESS, THE AIM OF OF THE PRESENT ELECTION IS TO ELECT A CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY WHICH WILL DRAW UP THE CONSTITUTION FOR NAMIBIA - A CONSTITUTION WHICH WOULD FORM THE BASIS FOR ANY FURTHER ELECTION - YXXX THIS IS EVIDENT FROM PRONOUNCEMENTS PY STEYM AND DIRK MUDGE. DIRK MUDGE AT A REPUBLICAN PARTY MEETING IN V.'INDHOEK ON 21ST NO- VEMBER 1973 TRIED TO FIND AN EXCUSE FOP NOT HAVING AN ELECTION UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE UNITED NATIONS. IN THIS POLICY SPEECH AT THIS MEETING HE MAKES THE FOLLOWING THINGS VERY CLEAR: 1) THERE IS A STRONG LIKELYHOOD OF NO ELECTION NEXT YEAR BECAUSE •SWAPO AND COUNTRIES IN THE UN CANNOT BE RELIED UPON'. 2) THE DECEMBER ELECTIONS ARE NOT MAKE-BELIEVE ELECTIONS, THEY ARE REAL AND SHOULD BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY. 3) THE BODY ELECTED IN DECEMBER WILL ASSUME THE POWERS RESTED IN THEM BY THE PROCLAMATION AG 63. 2 D1) AS A REACTION TO THE PROPOSED SOUTH AFRICAN ELECTIONS IN NAMIPIA, SWAPO HAS CALLED FOR A COUNTRY-WIDE BOYCOTT OF THESE ELECTIONS. IN MANY QUARTERS, FROM THE RACIST GOVERNMENT THERE HAS BEEN RUMOURS THAT SWAPO IS PLANNING A GENERAL STRIKE, WHICH IS A WAY OF PREPARING FOR A CLAMP-DOWN ON US THROUGH AG 26 THE PRETEXT BEING THAT THEY WANT TO AVOID POLITICAL TROUBLE DURING THE ELECTION I PERIOD. 0 SWAPO IS ASKING FOR A BOYCOTT, WELL AWARE HAT EMPLOYERS AND THE ILLEGAL AUTHORITIES WILL NOT ALLOW IT TO TAKE PLACE AS PEACEFULLY O AS SWAPO HAS PLANNED IT. IT IS ALSO CLEAR THAT MANY OF THE IEOPLE WHO ARE TO VOTE ARE NOT NAMIB1ANS. OUR APPP.OX IM ATET1 ON IS AS FOLLOWS:

70 00 0 ANGOLAN REFUGEES AND UN1TA BANDITS 92 300 SOUTH AFRICAN CIVIL SERVANTS, ARNXXX ARMED FORCES, POLICE 122 030 BLACK LABOURERS COERCED OR BLACKMAIL INTO REGISTERING LEST THEY LOSE THEIR JOBS AND/OP SALARIES 6 0 IT H«5 FURTHER COME TO OUP ATTENTION THROUGH VEILED THREATS AND 6 RELIABLE INFORMATION! THAT SOUTH AFRICA PLANS TO HIT SWAPO BOTH HERE AMD ABROAD BEFORE OP. AFTER THE ELECTION THAT THEY INTEND ATTACTIMG SWAPO SETTLc.KH.NTS, BOTH IN AVGOLA AND ZAMBIA WITH THE INCLUSION I OF THE MAMIBIAN INSTITUTE IN ZA'1BIA=HALL THESE HEAVILY CONTRIBUTES 0 TO SOUTH AFRICA INSINCERILY AS REGARDS THE PURPOSE OF THE DECE'IEEF. ELECTIONS. 0 SOUTH :J-RICA BEING PARTY TO THE NAMIBIA^ CONFLICT, CANNOT CONTROL AND SUPERVISE ELECTIONS. IT IS JUST AS APSUHD AS SWAPO DEMANDING TO CONTROL THESE OP. AMY ELECTIONS, WMI E PEINC PARTY TO THE CURRENT CONFLICT.

WITH COMRADELY GREETINGS

DJK TJONGARtRO . • ' ^37249 SWAPM UR RCA TELEX TBLESO RCA NOV 28 091 A* .^7L^iC SWiPM UK 666226 SWAPO G

23.11.78

THE FOLLOWING TELEX WAS RECEIVED FROM WINDHOEK THIS MORNING

HTTILNTION C011F.ADE PEN GURI RAE THL PRESENT POLITICAL SITUATION IN NAMIBIA BEFORE THE SOUTH A-RICAN SPONSORED ELECTIONS is TENSE. THERE ARE DAILY REPORTS OF INTIMIDATION BETWEEN MEMBERS OF THE MAIN P ARTI.CI P ATI NG GROUPS,DTA AND AKTUR. UNLIKE WHAT IS BEING, TOLD TO THE INTERNATIONAL PRESS, THE AIM OF OF THE PRESENT ELECTION IS" TO ELECT A CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY WHICH WILL DRAW UP THE CONSTITUTION FOR NAMIBIA - A CONSTITUTION WHICH WOULD FORM THE BASIS FOR AMY FUPTHER ELECTION - YXXX THIS IS EVIDENT FROM PRONOUNCEMENTS BY STEYN AND DIRK MUDGE.

DIRK J'.UDGE AT A REPUBLICAN PARTY MEETING IN WINDHOEK ON 21ST NO- VE'IPEF. 1973 TRIED TO FIND AN EXCUSE FOR NOT HAVING AN ELECTION UNDtr. THE AUSPICES OF THE UNITED NATIONS. IN THIS POLICY SPEECH AT THIS MEETING HE MAKES THE FOLLOWING THINGS VERY CLEAR:

15 THERE IS A STRONG LIKELYHOOD OF NO ELECTION NEXT YEAR BECAUSE •S'.rJO AND COUNTRIES IN THE UN CANNOT BE RELIED UPON1. 23 THE DECEMBER ELECTIONS ARE NOT MAKE-BELIEVE ELECTIONS, THEY ARE REAL AND SHOULD HE TAKEN SERIOUSLY. 3) THE BODY ELECTED IN DECEMBER WILL ASSUME THE POWERS RESTED IN .u THEM BY THE PROCLAMATION AG 63. AS A REACTION TO THE PROPOSED SOUTH AFRICAN ELECTIONS IN NAMIBIA, SWAPO HAS CALLED FOP A COUNTRY-WIDE BOYCOTT OF THESE ELECTIONS. IN MANY QUARTERS, FROM THE RACIST GOVERNMENT THERE HAS BEEN RUMOURS THAT SWAPO IS PLANNING A GENERAL STRIKE, WHICH IS A WAY OF PREPARING FOR A CLAMP-DOWN ON US THROUGH AG 26 THE PRETEXT BEING THAT THEY WANT TO AVOID POLITICAL TROUBLE DURING THE ELECTION D PERIOD. o SWAPO IS ASKING FOR A BOYCOTT, WELL AWARE HAT EMPLOYERS AND THE ILLEGAL AUTHORITIES WILL NOT ALLOW IT TO TAKE PLACE AS PEACEFULLY AS SVAPO HAS PLANNED IT.' IT IS ALSO CLEAR THAT MANY OF THE IEOPLE WHO ARE TO VOTE ARE NOT NAMIBIANS. OUR APPROXIMATED ON IS AS FOLLOWS:

70 00 0 ANGOLAN REFUGEES AND UNITA BANDITS 93 300 SOUTH AFRICAN CIVI-L SERVANTS, ARNXXX AP.MED FORCES, POLICE 123 003 BLACK LAECURERS COERCED OR BLACKMAIL INTO REGISTERING LEST THEY LOSE THEIR JOBS AND/OR SALARIES 6 0,3,3 OLD AGE PENSIONERS WHO CANNOT RECEIVE THEIR PENSIONS WITHOUT REGISTRATION CERTIFICATES 5 330 DEAD PEOPLE E 100 030 WHITES IN THE TERRITORY AND FROM THE REPUBLIC. S WE THINK THAT A REALISTIC PERCENTAGE OF THOSE WHO REGISTERED 0) VOLUNTARILY AND OUT OF IGNORANCE SHOUL D PE 26-30 PERCENT. G) IT HAS FURTHER COME TO OUP ATTENTION THROUGH VEILED THREATS AND j5> RELIABLE INFORMATION THAT SOUTH AFRICA PLANS TO HIT SWAPO POTH HERE AMD ABROAD BEFORE OP. AFTER THE ELECTION THAT THEY INTEND ATTACTING SVAPO SE.TTLc.r-. ^.NTS, POTH IN ANGOLA AND ZAMBIA WITH THE INCLUSION E OF THE NAMIBIAN INSTITUTE IN ZA'IBI A=H ALL THESE HEAVILY CONTRIBUTES JO TO SOUTH AFRICA INSINCERILY AS REGARDS THE PURPOSE OF THE DECEMBER ELECTIONS. 0 SOUTH M.-RICA PEING PARTY TO THE NAMIBIAN CONFLICT, CANNOT CONTROL AND SUPERVISE ELECTIONS. IT IS JUST AS ABSURD AS SWAPO DEMANDING TO CONTROL THESE OR ANY ELECTIONS, WMI E PEINC PARTY TO THE CURRENT CONFLICT.

WITH COMRADELY GREETINGS

DJK TJONGARERO CO 3 ATTENTION COMRADE PEN CURIRA3 23.11.1978 0 INTIMIDATION 3 THE SOUTH AFRICAN REGIME HAS FEEM TRYING THROUGH STEYN AND THE LOCAL PRESS TO TELL THE WORLD THAT SUAPO IS PLANNING TROUBLE DURING THL DECEMBER POGUS ELECTIONS. FIR-iT THEREIWAS THE ALLEGATION OF A STRIKE. WHEN SVAPO DENIED Tllli, IT IS FEING RUMOURED THAT SUAPO IS FLAMMING A GENERAL UMPEST. TO GIVE CREDIBILITY TO THESE LIES THE FOLLOWING THINGS HAVE BEEN DOfJL IM AM ATTEMPT TO PROVOKE SWAPO 'INTO DOING SOMETHING'.

1) ON MONDAY AND TUESDAY, 21ST AND 22ND NOVEMBER, A COMPIN AT I ON OF SA SOLDIERS AND POLICE BATON-CHARGED UNSUSPECTING PEOPLE AT OMULAMBA IN WALVIS BAY. OMULAMBA IS A RENDEZVOUS NEAP KUISEP.HOND WHERE WORKERS, VIRTUALLY ALL SUAPO MEMBERS OR SUPPORTERS, ALWAYS COME TOGETHER AFTEF. WORK, HAVE THEIR DRINKS, PLAY, CHAT AND EVEN TRADE ON A SMALL SCALE. T) IN THE PANDEMONIUS AMD STAMPEDE UH1CH INSUED MANY PECPLE WERE •^ INJURED AND PROPERTY DAMAGED AND LOST. A YOUNG POY OF ABOUT 12 YEARS* A SON OF A SWAPO MEMPER WAS ALSO TAKEN BY THE SOLDIERS AMD HIS FACE PAINTED WITH WHITE PAIMT. THEY RELEASED HIM ONLY AFTER THOROUGH LY SOAKING HIM IN WATER. £5 ON WEDNESDAY, 23RD NOVEMBER, APPARENTLY BECAUSE THE SWAPO DID NOT ACT, A POLICE/SOLDIER RAID WAS CARRIED OUT IN THE WORKERS' QUARTERS AND PROPERTY OF MANY INCLUDING MONEY HAS BEEN CONFISCATED. 3) AT KAMANJAE UHERE A SVAPO MEETING IS TO TAKE PLACE ON THE 26TH NOVEMBER, OUR POSTERS ARE BEING TORN OFF EY WHITE DTA AND AKTUR ORGANISERS. 1 N OTHER CASES THEY PASTE THEIR POSTERS ON OURS AND VHITXXXXX WRITE ANTI-SUAPO SLOGANS ON THEM. MEANWHILE, BLACK TERRORISTS OF THE SA TERRORIST GANG CARMY) IN UNIFORMS GO AROUND TELLING PEOPLE THAT NO SWAPO WILL EE ALLOWED INTO , THE MEETING WILL NOT TAKE PLACE AND THAT AMYEODY HOUSING 'THOSE SUAPO'S)'VILL BE IN TROUBLE. THE LOCAL POLICE ARE MERELY LOOKING 'INTO IT*. 4) AT WHERE ANOTHER SWAPO MEETING IS TO TAKE PLACE OH . THE 25TH NOVEMBER, rtKMY AND SA: 3.3)9633* -43 -:53=356 3,=9 ) = 3574*d3« E-KMORVN ARMY AND SABC EMPLOYEES ARE ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN PLANNING THE DISRUPTION OF THE MEETING WITH THE POSSIBILITY CF i.E.P.1 OU5LY HARMING OR KILLING ONE OR TWO SWAPO LEADERS. TWO SABC EMPLOYERXXXX EMPLOYEES ARh. TO PE SPECIFICALLY DRIVEN TO OKAKARARA OVER THE WEEKEND TO IDENTI-FY THESE SUAPO LEADERS. 5) REPORTS FROM NORTH CENTRAL AREAS HAVE IT THAT MANY FARM UOPKEPS (BLACK) ARE LEAVING THE FARMS OF THEIR WHITE EMPLOYERS OUT Or FEAR OF BEING FORCED TO VOTE AGAINST THEIR WILL. THIS EXODUS IS HOU EEING BLAMED ON SVAPO1 S CALL FOP. A BOYCOTT AND PLANS ARE 1 BEING MADE FOR EFFECTIVE ACTION AGAINST SWAPO. q ALL THESE ACTIONS ARE AIMED AT INTIMIDATING THE SWAPO LEADERSHIP AND THE FOLLOWERS IN THE HOPE THAT WE MIGHT CALL OFF THE BOYCOTT. 3 OTHERWISE IT IS INTENDED TO PAVE A WAY FOR A CLAMP DOWN ON SWAPO IN TERMS OF AG 26 'TO PREVENT TROUBLE'.

MEANWHILE DTA AND AKTUR MEMBERS ASSAULT EACH OTHER ALMOST DAILY. PUT THIS IS NOT REGARDED AS POLITICAL VIOLENCE. AG 26 IS NOT APPLICABLE TO NON-SUAPO MEMBERS.

WE WILL KEEP YOU POSTED

THE STRUGGLE CONTINUES

£ DEPT. OF INFORMATION AND PUBLICITY E Oi PS. INFORMATION ABOUT POSSIBLE ATTACK ON NYANGC AND INSTITUTE IS VERY SERIOUS.

GREETINGS nto o HAVE YOU RECE THIS TELEX ISZMT THE TELEX ES JUST AS THEY WERE. WHAT is HAPPENING 3 IN THE SECURITY COUNCL? ^36226 SVAPO G* L'.': .'[/I" S-.:,;PX r OM COMRADE" BEN CURIRA3 23.11•1978 ' / .rfTIMIDATIOX,,,"

THE SOUTH AFRICAN REGIME HAS BEEN TRYING THROUGH STEYN AtJD THE LOCAL PRESS TO TELL THE WORLD THAT SWAPO IS PLANNING TROUBLE DURING THE DECEMBER BOGUS ELECTIONS. FIRST THEREIUAS THE ALLEGATION OF A STRIKE. WHEN SWAPO DENIED THIS, IT IS BEING RUMOURED THAT SWAPO IS PLANNING A GENERAL UNREST. TO GIVE CREDIBILITY TO THESE LIES THE FOLLOWING THINGS HAVE BEEN DCNL IN AV ATTEMPT TO PROVOKE SWAPO 'INTO DOING SOMETHING'.

1) CM MONDAY AMD TUESDAY* 21ST AND 22ND NOVEMBER* A COMBINATION OF 5A SOLDIERS AND POLICE BATON-CHARGED UNSUSPECTING PEOPLE AT CMULtMBA IN WALVIS BAY. OMULAMBA IS A RENDEZVOUS .VEAP KUISEPMOMD UHtRt WORKERS* VIRTUALLY ALL SWAPO MEMBERS OP SUPPORTERS* ALWAYS COMi. TOGETHER AFTER WORK* HAVE THEIR DRINKS* PLAY, CHAT AND EVEN TF.APE OM A SMALL SCALE. 0) IN THE PANDEMONIU5 AND STAMPEDE WHICH INSUED MANY PEOPLE WERE INJURED AND PROPERTY DAMAGED AND LOST. A YOUNG BOY OF ABOUT \Z YEAP.SB A SON OF A SWAPO MEMBER WAS ALSO TAKEN BY THE SOLDIERS AND HIS FACE PAINTED WITH WHITE PAINT. THEY RELEASED HIM ONLY AFTER THOROUGH LY SOAKING HIM IN WATER. 2) ON WEDNESDAY* 23RD NOVEMBER* APPARENTLY BECAUSE THE SWAPO DID NOT ACT, A POLICE/SOLDIER RAID WAS CARRIED OUT IN THE WORKERS' QUARTERS AND PROPERTY OF MANY INCLUDING MONEY HAS PEEH CONFISCATED. 3) AT KAMANUAE WHERE A SVAPO MEETING IS TO TAKE PLACE ON THE 26TH NOVEMBER* OUR POSTERS ARE BEING TORN OFF BY WHITE DTA AND AKTUR ORGANIZERS. I N OTHER CASES THEY PASTE THEIR POSTERS ON OURS AND WHITXXXXX WRITE ANTI-SWAPO SLOGANS ON THEM. MErtNWHILE* BLACK TERRORISTS OF THE SA TERRORIST GANG CARMY) l:-4 UNIFORMS GO AROUND TELLING PEOPLE THAT NO SWAPO WILL PE ALLCVED INTO KAMANJAB* THE MEETING WILL NOT TAKE PLACE AND THAT AMYEODY HOUSING 'THOSE SWAPO1 S )'WI LL BE IN TROUBLE. THE LOCAL POLICE ARE MERELY LOOKING 'INTO IT'. 4) AT OKAKARARA WHERE ANOTHER SWAPO MEETING IS TO TAKE PLACE OH THE 25TH NOVEMBER* ARMY AND SA: 3.3)9633' -43 -:53=3)6 6*=9>=3574+38* EKMORVN ARMY AND SABC EMPLOYEES ARE ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN PLANNING THE DISRUPTION OF THE MEETING WITH THE POSSIBILITY e CF SERIOUSLY HARMING OR KILLING ONE OH TWO SWAPO LEADERS. •TJ TWO SABC EMPLOYERXXXX EMPLOYEES ARE TO PE SPECIFICALLY DRIVEN TO OKAKARARA OVER THE WEEKEND TO IDENTIFY THESE SWAPO LEADERS. To 53 REPORTS FROM HORTH CENTRAL AREAS HAVE IT THAT MANY FARM WORKERS

ALL THESE ACTIONS ARE AIMED AT INTIMIDATING THE SWAPO LEADERSHIP AND THE FOLLOWERS IN THE HOPE THAT WE MIGHT CALL OFF THE BOYCOTT. OTHERWISE IT IS INTENDED TO PAVE A WAY FOR A CLAMP DOWN OM SWAPO IN TERMS OF AG 26 'TO PREVENT TROUBLE".

MEANWHILE DTA AND AKTUR MEMBERS ASSAULT EACH OTHER ALMOST DAILY. BUT THIS IS NOT REGARDED AS POLITICAL VIOLENCE. AG 26 IS NOT APPLICABLE TO NOH-SWAPO MEMBERS.

WE VILL KEEP YOU POSTED

THE STRUGGLE CONTINUES

OF INFORMATION AND PUBLICITY r i E CD PS. INFORMATION ABOUT POSSIBLE ATTACK ON NYAN GO AMD INSTITUTE Q) IS VERY SERIOUS. li —*• GREETINGS CO £1 C) HAVE YOU RECE THIS TELEX 1SJ.NT THE TELEX ES JUST AS THEY VERE. VHAT IS HAPPENING IK THE SECURITY COUMCL? 335225 SWAPO C* Jj724" SV.'lPy. UF-WIM3QV 2 0) J£ £37249 SWHPH UR ,<]) RCA NOV 2o 1 149 23399SD CT-E UR TEST » I £37249 0

« - •237249 SUaPM UR ' •? RCA NOV 28 141 1* ~ i £37240 SVriPM UF. • i .1 THE FOLLOWING TELEX WAS RECEIVED FROM WINDHOEK THIS AFTERNOON: =

PRESS RELEASE 28.11.78. -;

THE EXPULSION OF JUSTIN ELLIS OF WINDHOEK AND FATHER KLEINHITPASS '-' OF TSUMEB DID NOT COME AS A SUPPISE TO SWAPO. IT IS VERY MUCH '^ THE PPIN LINE WITH SOUTH AFRICA'S POLICY OF SILENCING ITS CRITICS £ p . IT IS COMMON KNOWLEDDGE THAT JUSTIN AND FATHER KLEINHITPASS APE MEB * t MEN OF GOD WHO STAND FOR JUSTICE AND RIGHTOUSNESS, THE TWO WORDS 1 (§ THAT MAKE STEYN AND HIS SOUTH AFRICAN POSSESS SEE RED. i- THIS CALLCUS ACTION OF MR STEYN OF BRANDING PEOPLE AS UNDESIPAPLE 0) AXJD EXPELLING THEM ON THE EVE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONTROLLED Q) ELECTIONS ONLY SHOWS HOW 'FREE AND FAIR ' THE ELECTIONS ARE.

H- SWAPO IS ALSO NOT SURPRISED BY THIS ACTION BECAUSE IT CONFIRMS '— THE INFCPJIATION WE HAD THAT MR STEYN WAS SOON COIN G TO CD ACT AGAINST 'CERTAIN INDIVIDUALS' . ALTHOUGH WE WERE NOT VERY •£2 SURE THAT SOME PEOPLE WERE GOING TO BE EXPELLED FROM THE COUNTRY.,_ O IT IS CEPTAIN THAT AG 26 IS SOCN GOING TO BE APPLIED TO A NUMBEP " •« OF 5VAPO LEADERS AND MLMFLR5 'TO PREVENT TROUPLE DURING THE •^ ELECTION PERIOD'. THE JUSTIFICATION FOR THAT HAS ALREADY BEEN PRLPAPED BY THE FALSE STORIES IN LOCAL DTA AND AKTUR PAPERS THAT -5 SUAPO IS EITHER PLANNING A STRIKE OR GENERAL UNREST DURING THE 4 ELECTION PERIOD. ' i

THE APPLICATION OF AG53 AGAINST THESE TWO SPIRITUAL LEADERS £ IS PUT A FORERUNNER OR THE PLANNED GENERAL DETENTION THROUGHOUT £ THE COUNTRY. THAT THEY HAD ANYTHING TO DO WITH SUAPO OR THAT THEY § DISTRIBUTED PAMPHLETS AGAINST THE ELECTIONS IS A BLATANT LIE AND DOES * IN ANY CASE NOT JUSTIFY TH4S ACTION AT ALL. THEIR ONLY CRIME IS THAT g THEY PUBLICALLY SPOKE AGAINST THE DICTATOR OF THE DAY. . K- * SOME INDIVIDUALS MAY EE SILENCED.. BUT THE TIDE CANNOT AND WILL £ E,» NEVER BE STOPPED. THIS MR STEYN OUGHT TO KNOW. ALSOTHOSE "^ £ WHO TODAY BRAND OTHERS AS UNDESIRED ELEMENTS, WILL DEFINITELY BE 3) THE UNDESIRED ELEMENTS OF TOMORROW.- HISTORY HAS PROVED THIS AND 3) NAMIBIA IS NO EXCEPTION TO THE COURSE OF HISTORY.

2 THE STRUGGLESCONTINUES AND VICTORY IS CERTAIN.

... ,«.-.-,;~,,-,.».,j6rf»--:-.- ' ' -.-•-•- 3 DJK TJONGARERO — "-' ' ~~' '•-".•" . " •. _•- -i '**!! *C ^ H O E.K

8Sb226 SWAPO G

COM PAD ELY GREETINGS PETER MAIJNING* £ 237249 SUaPM URO %_ -As c ''3

K UR PC A MOV 3d 1149 23399bD CT-E UR xi 7SA" SUrtPIl URO 0 O 237249 SVaPM UR RCA NOV 28 Mil* £3724° 5VAPM UP. THE FOLLOWING TELEX WAS RECEIVED FROM WINDHOEK THIS AFTERNOON:

PRESS RELEASE 28.11.73.

THE EXPULSION OF JUSTIN ELLIS OF WINDHOEK AMD FATHER KLEINHITPASS OF TSUMEB DID NOT COME AS A SUPPISE TO SWAPO. IT IS VEPY MUCH THE PPIN LINE WITH SOUTH AFRICA'S POLICY OF SILENCING ITS CRITICS 8 . IT IS COMMON KNOVLEDDGE THAT JUSTIN AND FATHER KLE1MHITPASS ARE MEB MEN OF GOD WHO STAND FOR JUSTICE AMD RIGHTOUSNESS., THE TWO WORDS THAT MAKE STEYN AND HIS SOUTH AFRICAN BOSSESS SEE RED. THIS CALLOUS ACTION OF MR STEYN OF BRANDING PEOPLE AS UNDESIRABLE OT AND EXPELLING THEM ON THE EVE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONTROLLED CD ELECTIONS ONLY SHOWS HOW 'FREE AND FAIR • THE ELECTIONS ARE. SUAPO IS ALSO NOT SURPRISED BY THIS ACTION BECAUSE IT CONFIRMS THE INFORMATION WE HAD THAT MR STEYN WAS SOON COIN G TO ACT AGAINST 'CERTAIN INDIVIDUALS' . ALTHOUGH WE WERE NOT VERY SURE THAT SOME PEOPLE WERE GOING'TO BE EXPELLED FROM THE COUNTRY, 0 IT IS CERTAIN THAT AG 26 IS SOCN GOING TO BE APPLIED TO A NUMBER OF SWAPO LEADERS AND MLMFERS "TO PREVENT TROUBLE DURING THE > ELECTION PERIOD1. THE JUSTIFICATION FOR THAT HAS ALREADY BEEN PREPARED EY THE'FALSE STORIES IN LOCAL DTA AND AKTUR PAPERS THAT SWAPO IS EITHER PLANNING A STRIKE OR GENERAL UNREST DURING THE _ ELECTION PERIOD. fa 03 THE APPLICATION OF AGS3 AGAINST THESE TWO SPIRITUAL LEADERS O IS BUT A FORERUNNER OR THE PLANNED GENERAL DETENTION THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. THAT THEY HAD ANYTHING TO DO WITH SWAPO OR THAT THEY DISTRIBUTED PAMPHLETS AGAINS-T THE ELECTIONS IS A BLATANT LIE AND DOES IN ANY CASE ?JOT JUSTIFY THIS ACTION AT ALL. THEIR ONLY CRIME IS THAT THEY PUBLICALLY SPOKE AGAINST THE DICTATOR OF THE DAY. SOME INDIVIDUALS MAY BE SILENCED., BUT THE TIDE CANNOT-AND WILL NEVER BE STOPPED. THIS MR STEYN OUGHT TO KNOW. ALSOTHOSE WHO TODAY BRAND OTHERS AS UNDESIRED ELEMENTS, VILL DEFINITELY BE THE UNDESIRED ELEMENTS OF TOMORROW. HISTORY HAS PROVED THIS AND NAMIBIA IS NO EXCEPTION TO THE COURSE OF HISTORY.

THE STRUGGLESCONTINUES AND VICTORY IS CERTAIN.

DJK TJONGARERO VIMDHOEK.

o66226 SWAPO G 13 a

COMPADELY GREETINGS PETER MANNING' 13 ••.-.•.= SUrtPM URO 31 O • NNNN

ZCZC DAL 17S4

UNS837 VIA ITT CTC098 ZMA143 LOC807 CAG238 US NY CO ZALU 048 LUSAKA 48/47 10 1507 COPY

FILE NO. ACTION DR KURT WALDHEIM TO SECRETARY GENERAL

U.N. HEADQUARTERS

NEW YORK

SU'APO. EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE SERIOSULY OBJECTS TO CEDRIC THORNBURRY'S INCLUSION AS MEMBER ON SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE AARTHISAARI'S STAFF. SWAPO HAS REASON TO BELIEF HIS ROLE TO BE PREDUTICIAL TO SATISFACTORY SOLUTION OF THE NAMIBIAN PROBLEM

M MUYONGO VICE-PRESIDENT l •*• MKP/JH

Le 26 octobre 1978

Monsieur le President, J'ai I'honneur de porter a votre connaissance le texte d'un telegransme que Monsieur Sam Hujcana, President de la SWAPO »*a adresse le 23 octobre 1978 par l»intermsdiair© de 1'Observateur perraanent de la SWAPO aupres de I1Organisation des Nations Unies* Veizillea agreer, Monsieur le President, lea assurances de roa tres haute consideration*

Kurt Waldheira

Son Excellence Monsieur Jacques Leprette President du Conseil de SecuritS BY HAND care of Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations One Dag HammarskjSld Plaza 245 East 47th Street New York, New York 1OO17 RA checked with Mr. Ahtisaari, who spoke to Mr. Gurirab. The latter requested that the SG kindly send the message from Mr. Nujoma to the President of the Security Council. (/) South West Africa People'^Organization Solidarity — Freedom — fusiinl

SWAPO OBSERVER MISSION to the United Nations 801 Second Avenue Room 1401 New York. N.Y. 10017

Telex -237249 Telephone: (212) 986-7863

The Chief Representative of SWAPO Comrade Theo-Ben Gurirab SWAPO Observer Mission to the UN 801 Second Avenue Room 1401, New York, N.Y. Tel: (212) 986-7863

Telex: 237249 Dear Comrade Gurirab, kindly transmit the following cable to his Excellency the UN Secretary General Dr. Kurt Waldheim Stop The Secretary General United Nations,New York Cable Your Excellency, I would like to comment on the communique issued by the Foreign Ministers of Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Britain and the USA with the minority white South African regime in Pretoria, which in the view of SWAPO is a betrayal of the struggle of the Namibian people for genuine freedom and independence which they have suffered, sacrificed and died for stop This communique is unacceptable and rejected by the overwhelming majority of the Namibian people stop The whole exercise is a manoeuvre by the South African racist regime aimed at maintaining its colonial interest in Namibia and to impose -2- on our people its evil intention of creating homelands and Bantustans through a neo-colonial settlement, against the popular political aspirations and demands of the Namibian people for self-determination and national liberation stop It is clear in the mind of every Namibian patriot that the Pretoria regime intends to create a puppet regime in Namibia through bogus election in December; such a regime will certainly be manipulated and controlled from Pretoria stop There is no doubt that such a puppet regime would ask South Africa to maintain in Namibia its repressive armed forces to continue to suppress the Namibian people's resistance against oppression, foreign domination and exploitation stop The communique does not ensure the implementation of the report of Secretary General adopted by the UN Security Council resolution 435 (1978) stop The UNO should not allow itself to be used by the Preotria racist regime to legitimise its evil intentions and illegal acts to impose a neo-colonial solution against the interests of the Namibian people stop Certainly, there is no basis emanating from the joint communique for the UN Special Representative to go now to Namibia, except within the framework of resolution 435 and the report of the Secretary General that have been rejected by the Pretoria racists stop In the view of SWAPO, the presence of the United Nations Special Representative's technical staff in Namibia will be interpreted by South Africa that UN has consented to and approved the holding of the so-called elections in December it is therefore necessary that the UN -3-

Secretary General withdraw the remaining UN Special Representative's

technical staff from Namibia stop SWAPO therefore demands Security Council invocation of chapter Vll of the UN charter and impose comprehensive, mandatory sanctions against South African racist regime to accept implementation of the UN resolutions and in particular Security Council resolution 435 (1978) stop

October 23, 1978

Sam Nujoma

President of SWAPO Notes of a meeting held in the Secretary-General's Office on 3 October 1978

Present: The Secretary-General Mr. , President, SWAPO Democrats (NNF) Mr, M. Ahtisaari Mr. A.A. Farah

Mr. Shipanga said that after a long period of exile, his return to Namibia by no means meant collaboration with South Africa. His first task, he said, had been to ascertain public opinion and to obtain a better picture of conditions. He had travelled extensively within Namibia and had been saddened by what he had seen. 3*he African population was being meted harsh treatment by the South African.authorities. Moreover, South Africa was engaged on a large-scale military build-up. United Nations' intervention was most^necessary; He said he had arranged for copies of the Secretary- General's report to be printed and distrubuted amongst the population, to inform them of the issues at stake and of the intentions of the United Nations. Referring to the Security Council debate, he said he had found the clarifications given by the Secretary-General clear and helpful. It was necessary, he added, for the United Nations to establish a strong military, police and civilian presence in the territory in order to create confidence and stability. On the question of elections, Mr. Shipanga said that South Africa's proposals did not have the support of the population, but only that of the DTA led by Dietrich. Mr. Shipanga was convinced that the South African-sponsored elections would fail for want of support. Referring to internal conditions, he said that the uncertainty and instability which characterised the present situation were having an adverse impact 'on the economy. Unemployment had increased and there was a risk of general unrest. Mr. Shipanga suggested to the Secretary-General that: - 2 -

1. The United Nations should establish without delay a firm date on which elections would take place. It was necessary to remove uncertainty about the constitutional future of the country. The people of Namibia were anxious for free and fair elections, but a.t the same time wanted to make sure that once the election date was set that they would not be altered. 2. The United Nations force in Namibia should be international in composition. Namibia was the responsibility of the inter- national community and not solely of Africa.

The Secretary-General said that the election date was tied to the adoption of his report by the Security Council which envisaged a preparatory period of seven months. With the adoption of the report on 29 September 1978 the way was now open for establishing a date. With regard to the United Nations force in Namibia, the Secretary-General said that the principle of equitable geographical distribution would be adhered to.

* * * *

AAF/aa cc: SG RA/AR Notes of a meeting hole in the Secretary-General's Office on 15 September 1978

Present: The Secretary-General Mr. Sara Nujoma, President of SWAPO i'-lr. Ben Gurirab, SWAPO Observer to the UN Mr. M. Ahtisaari Mr. A". A. Far ah

The Score, ba ry-G oner a 1 said that Ambassador Salim of Tanzania had inronued him of SWAPO's dissatisfaction with the delay taken by South Africa to reply to the Secretary- General's Report. Ambassador Salim also said, that the African Group was considering calling for a meeting of the Security Council next week in an effort to hasten matters. The Secretary-General said, he had met Mr. Eksteen (South Africa) earlier in the day to express his concern. The Secretary-General told Mr. Nujoma that ho had no information on South Africa's position towards the Report. According to some, South Africa's first reaction had been "evasive"; South Africa had since asked for clarification on a number of points. lie understood that the Western Group was now in contact with Pretoria in an attempt to overcome difficul- ties. Mr. Nujoma said SWAPO fully supported the recommendations in the Report. However, he had made a number of observations in a letter addressed to the Secretary-General. He remarked tnat there were some aspects of the situation which had not been touched upon in the Report, e.g., the registration of voters. In any -democratic process, he said, voter registra- tion was the starting point.. He charged thcr _v h?>d been unfair practices during the registration; people had been forced to register for the DTA under threat. He maintained that fresh voter registration must take place before elections could be held. If it was not possible to amend, the Report to cover'- that aspect, the matter should be mentioned during the Security Council debate. Mr. Nujoma tnen referred to the question of the proposed UN police contingent. He said that the figure of 36O in the Report was insufficient to cover th-e country adequately, or to monitor effectively the activities of the South African police who were conducting a campaign of terror. SWAPO wanted that figure to be doubled. - 2 -

Referring to the powers of the Special Representative,, Mr. Nujoraa felt that the Special Representative should be ranked higher than the Administrator General, and should be the final authority. The Secretary-General explained that under the Plan the Special Representative would have the power to oppose or prevent the implementation of action proposed by the Administrator General if the former did not agree with it. Should South Africa not act in accordance with the latter and spirit of the agreed Plan, or should there be a refusal to co-operate fully with the Special Representative, the Secretary-General would not hesitate to bring the matter immediately to the attention of the Security Council. Mr. Nujoraa reiterated that the registration process as conducted by South Africa was completely unacceptable to SWAPO. It would, have to be repeated, he said. Mr. Ahtisaari said that during its visit the mission deliberately did not examine the question of voter registration because of its possible adverse implications. At the time, the mission did not wish to give South Africa the opportunity to claim that the mission had. looked into the registration system and had found nothing wrong with it. I-lr. Nujoraa, in answer to a question by the Secrctary-Gcnor: confirmed tnat SWAPO would be prepared to submit a written document to the Secretary-General declaring a cease-fire provide that South Africa agreed to do likewise. On the question of peace-keeping forces Mr. Nujoiaa said that he had received word from President Kaunda that Zd-^bia was prepared to contribute a battalion to the UN force. Pi'.-.; i.^.ont Neto of Angola was also ready to do the same. The Secretary-General remarked that many countries had expressed to him their willingness to contribute to the UN peac keeping force, and he aid not contemplate any difficulty in mot lizing the required number. However, no action would be taken on the matter until after the Security Council gives its appro-, for the stablishment of the force. * * *

AAP/aa cc: SG ' Mr. Ahtisaari RA/AR

i ~- -^_j ROUTING SLIP FICHE DE TRANSMISSION

TO: A: The Secretary-General FROM: DE: Mr. Gleissner's Office Room No. — No de bureau Exfens ion — Poste Date 8.9.78 FOR ACTION POUR SUIT/E A DONNER FOR APPROVAL POUR APPROBATION FOR SIGNATURE POUR SIGNATURE • FOR COMMENTS POUR OBSERVA-HQNS MAY WE DISCUSS? pouRRioita-'NOus EN PARLER ? YOUR ATTENTION VOTRE ATTENTION AS DISCUSSED COMME CONVENU AS REQUESTED SUITE A VOTRE DEMANDS NOTE AND RETURN NOTER ET RETOURNER FOR INFORMATION POUR INFORMATION

At the request of Amb. Chale of the United Republic of Tanzania, we are sending you a letter of today's date from the Permanent Representatives of Tanzania and Zambia addressed to the Secretary- General. A copy has been given to us for action this evening and it will be reproduced as a document of the Security Council under symbol S/12841 tomorrow morning.

COM.6 (2-781 PERMANENT MISSION OF THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS 8OO SECOND AVENUE NEW YORK. NEW YORK 1OO17

972-916O

Sept 8, 1978

His Excellency Dr. Kurt Waldheim Secretary-General of the United Nations New York

We have the honour to enclose herewith the text of the letter dated September 8,1978, addressed to your Excellency by the President of the South West Africa People's Organization, Mr. Sam Nujoma. The letter deals with the various aspects of your report submitted pursuant to paragraph 2 of the Security Council Resolution 431 (1978) concerning the situation in Namibia ( S/12827). We shall be grateful if the said letter is circulated as soon as possible as an official document of the Security Council

Please accept, Mr. Secretary-General, the assurances of our highest consideration.

Salim Ahmed Salim Gwendoline Konie Permanent Representative of the Permanent Representative of United Republic of Tanzania to Zambia to the United Nations the United Nations Chairman of the Special Committee on President of United Nations The Situation With Regard to the Council for Namibia Implementation, of the Declaration On The Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO) OF NAMIBIA

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT P. 0. Box 577 Telephone 74692 Ext. 2 LUSAKA Solidarity — Freedom — Justice ZAMBIA.

Ref. No. September 8, 1978

The Secretary-General United Nations Headquarters United Nations New York

Mr. Secretary-General,

Further to the discussion we had with Your Excellency on Tuesday, September 5, 1978 concerning the various aspects of your report contained in Document S/12827, I would like, on behalf of the Central Committee of SWAPO and in the name of the oppressed people of Namibia, to place on record the following:

2. The objective of the struggle of the people of Namibia, under their National Liberation Movement, SWAPO, has always been and remains the total liberation of our country. SWAPO, representing the aspirations of our people, has consistently fought for the attainment of this objective,

Because of the intransigence and arrogance of the enemy

which had blocked all possible peaceful avenues to our country's independence, SWAPO was compelled to resort to the

/2 The Secretary-General United Nations September 8, 1978 armed struggle in order to attain our objective. In the pro- cess, hundreds of our best sons and daughters have sacrificed and are sacrificing their lives.

3. But while carrying out the armed struggle, SWAPO has always maintained the position that whenever possi- bilities arose for a meaningful negotiated termination of the illegal occupation of our country by the South African racists, SWAPO would not hesitate to lend its support to such efforts. The history of our own movement in this direction is clear and requires no further elucidation. It was SWAPO which encouraged and supported the African States as well as the other supporters of our liberation struggle to promote efforts in the Security Council which culminated in the adoption of Security Council Resolution 385 (1976). It has also been SWAPO which has never for one moment hesitated to encourage and support any and all efforts geared towards the implementation of this and other relevant resolutions of the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly.

4. It will be recalled that when the five Western Members of the Security Council decided to embark on their initiative with a view to securing the implementation of Security Council Resolution 385, SWAPO was not found wanting in

/3 The Secretary-General United Nations September 8, 1978 encouraging such efforts. Indeed, as you are aware, Mr. Secretary-General, SWAPO has been one of the principal parties involved in the negotiations at various occasions and various places.

5. For more than fifteen months now, SWAPO has been directly involved in the diplomatic exercise initiated by the Five Western Members of the Security Council aimed at finding a basis for a genuine negotiated settlement for Namibia. Our attitude and contribution to this exercise has always been based on good faith, sincerity and honest desire to help accel- erate the process towards Namibia's independence.

6. We have sought to remain firm and unswerving in defence of the inalienable rights, legitimate aspirations and true interests of the oppressed people of Namibia. At the same time, however, we have demonstrated flexibility and a spirit of compromise in order to ensure that progress is made.

7. It is because of SWAPO's statemanship and willingness to make necessary concessions that this exercise has reached the present stage.

8. The joint communique issued in Luanda on July 12, 1978 by SWAPO and the representatives of the Five Western

/4 The Secretary-General United Nations September 8, 1978

Governments, marked a significant break-through in this diplomatic exercise.

9. In Luanda, the two delegations were able to agree, for the first time, to proceed to the Security Council so that the decolonisation process of Namibia be started. Had SWAPO rejected the Western Proposal because of certain diffi- culties contained therein, it would have been impossible for the Security Council to have met. Thus, when the Western Five took the initiative leading to the Security Council meeting of July 27, 1978, SWAPO supported and encouraged its friends and supporters, Africans and non-Africans, to go along with the adoption of Security Council Resolution 431 (1978). Clearly, Mr. Secretary-General, all these efforts by SWAPO were under- taken in the firm conviction that wherever it was possible to attain the objectives for which our people have been fighting with the minimum of bloodshed and sacrifice, that course of action should be embarked upon. This principled position of SWAPO is also in keeping with our firmly held view that negotia- tion is an indispensable and equally important element of the struggle of any people fighting for its liberation.

10. SWAPO has studied your report contained in Document S/12827 submitted pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security

/5 5. The Secretary-General United Nations September 8, 1978

Council Resolution 431 (1978). We have taken note of the fact that this report was prepared after a survey mission led by your Special Representative, Mr. Ahtisaari. We have also noted the careful and reasoned way in which this report has been written. SWAPO wishes to commend your efforts and those of your Special Representative and his colleagues for having produced this report.

11. In general, SWAPO, having studied this report wishes to declare its support for the same. However, there are some specific areas of concern which we wish to underline. Our support for this report is therefore based on the under- standing that the areas of concern would be overcome.

12. Our major area of concern is the question of registration of voters. We have noted that the Secretary- General 's report is silent on this question. At the same time, however, we wish to draw your attention to paragraph 6 of the proposal of the Western Five (Document S.12636) which inter alia stipulates "the implementation of the election process, including the proper registration of voters and the proper and timely tabulation and publication of voting results will also have to be conducted to the satisfaction of the Special Representative." Despite this provision, it is a known fact

/6 The Secretary-General United Nations September 8, 1978 that the South African racists have continued with the uni- lateral registration of voters. They have done so despite the opposition firmly expressed by the United Nations. Clearly, therefore, the South African illegal racist regime began to interfere with the election process long before the anticipated beginning of the transition period. Their uni- lateral action was a calculated defiance of the United Nations position. It was also a rebuff to the spirit and letter of the Western proposal on this question. But our concern is not only related to the South African defiance because by now the International Community has come to expect such systematic acts of defiance. Our concern derives from the fact that in undertaking the unilateral registration of voters, the South African racist authorities have engaged in acts of harassment, intimidation and victimization of many Namibians. They have also engaged in calculated frauds by registering some people who are not Namibians. Clearly, therefore, the South African illegal regime has, through the process of unilateral registra- tion, tried and is trying to create conditions most favourable to its own ulterior designs in Namibia. SWAPO cannot accept this situation.

13. SWAPO, which derives its legitimacy from the

II The Secretary-General United Nations September 8, 1978 overwhelming support of the people of Namibia, has always maintained that we are prepared for free and fair elections in the territory. For such elections to be held, a climate of confidence, free of fraud, intimidation and harassment, must be created. It is on that basis that SWAPO has suppor- ted one of the fundamental provisions of Security Council Resolution 385, that is to say, the holding of elections under United Nations supervision and control. And it is for the same reason that we cannot accept a situation where South Africa is trying to create further faits accompli in the terri- tory and attempting to preempt the legitimate expression of the people of Namibia. We would therefore insist that this question of registration should be looked at afresh and we would prefer that a new registration of voters be undertaken immediately upon the beginning of the transition process.

14. We have studied the sections of the report dealing with the composition, power and functions of UNTAG (paragraphs 21-34 of your report). We are satisfied with the provisions concerning the military component. We consider, for example, the proposed strength of the force, as contained in paragraph 26 of your report, to be both realistic and sound, considering the special circumstances that prevail in Namibia. We have taken note of the fact that we shall be consulted con-

/8 8,

The Secretary-General United Nations September 8, 1978 cerning the composition of this force. We have some defi- nite views which we have already brought to your attention in the course of several meetings that we have had with you.

15. We are concerned with the provision of para- graph 30 in respect of the civil police element of UNTAG. We would like to point out that in not objecting to the pro- vision that the existing police force, who will be provided only with side arms, will be responsible for normal police duties during the period of transition, we took that position on the clear understanding that the United Nations police will effectively monitor the performance of the existing police. Such monitoring would include the assurance that they behave in an acceptable manner so as to ensure that no intimidation, harassment or victimization takes place. In the course of the negotiations, we had been assured by the Western Five that United Nations police officers would accompany existing South African police whenever and wherever the United Nations Special Representative deems it necessary for them to do so. We there- fore believe that in the fulfilment of these responsibilities, the number proposed in your report, that is to say approximately 360 experienced police officers, will not be adequate. We would definitely prefer a significantly higher number. In making this point, we wish to stress once again the need to

/9 The Secretary-General United Nations September 8, 1978 create a climate of confidence in the territory so that the people of Namibia can decide for themselves their ultimate destiny, free from the omni-present harassment, intimidation and victimization by their South African oppressors.

16. Another major area which we wish to address our- selves to is the question of cessation of hostilities (referred to in paragraph 14(a) of your report). It should, in this connection, be noted that the very nature of the South African occupation regime is based on violence against our people and persistent aggressions against independent African States. The South African regime has never stopped or relaxed its repressive violence against Namibians internally and its naked aggressions against Angola and Zambia. The South African regime must put an immediate end to its murders of Namibians, including women and children, as they did in their massacre at Kassinga. The International Community and more particularly the Security Council should see to it that South Africa's notorious lawless- ness is brought to a halt.

17. SWAPO has taken up arms to resist the violence and repression of the occupying forces. When conditions can be created for putting an end to that violence, the necessity for the continuation of the armed struggle will no longer be

/10 10,

The Secretary-General United Nations September 8, 1978 there. You will recall, Mr. Secretary-General, that at our meeting with you on Tuesday, September 5, 1978, we made it very clear that we attach the utmost importance to the scru- pulous honouring of the ceasefire. In this connection, we had proposed that a formal and binding instrument be signed by SWAPO and South Africa. Such a ceasefire agreement is logical and necessary to avoid further confrontations and to ensure a scrupulous observance of the provisions of the cease- fire. We hereby reiterate our readiness to sign the agreement provided that the South African regime does the same. We would also propose that the agreement be authenticated by the Secretary-General. This is a further demonstration of our good faith and commitment to seriously honour and abide by the resolution of the Security Council aimed at implementing the proposal in accordance with resolution 385 (1976).

18. One last area which we wish to place on record is our understanding, in respect to the role, duties and powers of the United Nations Special Representative. We take note that these have been partly defined in both the proposal of the Western Five and in your report. The Western Five and you, Mr. Secretary-General, know our position on this. We would have preferred that the whole operation leading Namibia

/H 11

The Secretary-General United Nations September 8, 1978 to independence is handled by the United Nations. We would have preferred to see the role of the United Nations Special Representative more clearly defined to include that he would see to it that Namibia attains genuine freedom and that during the period of transition it would be his role to ensure the fair and honest preservation of security, law and order. In any case, we wish to stress that it is our understanding that at any time the United Nations Special Representative is not satisfied by any action or measure adopted by the 'Adminis- trator General1, that action or measure will not be effected.

19. With the above understanding, SWAPO accepts the Secretary-General's report and pledges its full co-operation for a speedy action by the Security Council. In so doing, SWAPO is conscious that it is fulfilling its historical responsibili- ties as the legitimate and authentic representative of our people.

20. I shall be most grateful if you would arrange for the circulation of this letter as an official document of the United Nations Security Council

Please accept, Mr. Secretary-General, the assurances of my highest consideratio] t Summary Notes of a Meeting held on 6 September 1978

PRESENT: The Secretary-General Mr. T. Tlou, Permanent Representative of Botswana to the United Nations (Chairman of the African Group) Mr. R. K. Ramphul, Permanent Representative of Mauritius to the United Nations Mr. L. N'Dong, Permanent Representative of Gabon to the United Nations Mr. Blancson, Deputy Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the United Nations Mr. M. Ahtisaari General Hannes Philipp Mr. A. A. Farah Mr. M. Pedanou

The Permanent Representative of Botswana, on behalf of the African , Group, welcomed the opportunity to exchange views with the Secretary-General on the question of Namibia. Referring to the Secretary-General's report to the Security Council, he said that the concerns of the African Group were essentially those expressed earlier to the Secretary-General by Mr. Sam Nujoma (SWAPO) and the representatives of the Front Line States. The most important concern arose over the question of registration. There had been widespread reports of fraud, intimidation and other illegal practices committed by the South African authorities during the registration process. The African Group wanted to know whether it would be possible for fresh registrationsto take place.

The Permanent Representative of Botswana said that another concern related to the military aspect of the report. While the African Group was satisfied with the proposed size of the UN peace-keeping force, it was necessary for that Force to be supported by a sufficient number of UN police, particularly if there was to be an effective supervision and control of the elections. On the question of the cost of the UN operations, the Permanent Representative of Botswana said that the African Group concurred with the proposal in the report that the operations should be financed

•*•/*•• - 2 - entirely from the UN budget, particularly since the territory was a UN responsibility. On the question of a ceasefire, the Botswana Permanent Representative disclosed that SWAPO had informed the African Group that it wanted a formal ceasefire agreement signed by SWAPO and South Africa and for the document to be authenticated by the Secretary-General on behalf of the Security Council.

With regard to the composition of the UN military and civilian presence in Namibia, the Botswana Permanent Representative said that Africans should be appointed to positions in the higher echelons of the UN Force. There should be an African deputy in the military force and an African at the head of the police force. There should also be an African deputy to the Special Representative. Concluding, the Botswana Permanent Representative said that the African Group was happy with the speed with which the Secretary-General had responded to resolution U31, and conveyed to the Secretary-General and to the Special Representative the appreciation of the African Group. • Ambassador Ramphul touched upon the date of elections, suggesting that sufficient time should be given to the population and to the political parties to prepare for the elections. He criticised the fact that the question of registration had not been mentioned in the report, despite the fact that there had been widespread allegations about fraudulent acts committed by the authorities in the compilation of lists. He also suggested that the role of the Special Representative vis-a-vis the Administrator General should be well defined. Referring to the proposal for a ceasefire agreement, Ambassador Ramphul foresaw some difficulty on the part of South Africa co-signing a document with SWAPO. In the circumstances, he suggested that each party could submit an acceptably worded communication to the Secretary-General expressing their agreement to the cessation of hostilities. Finally, - 3 -

Ambassador Ramphul expressed surprise that the report mentioned the name of SWAPO only on one occasion. He thought this was unfortunate, since SWAPO was recognized by the United Nations as the sole and authentic representative of the people of Namibia. The Permanent Representative of Gabon wanted to know whether the Secretary-General could, in fact, amend his report to make it more acceptable to the parties concerned. Amendments, he said, could come from both sides - South Africa and SWAPO. He also wanted to know whether it would be possible for the Secretary-General to ascertain South Africa's reactions to the various suggestions that had been made by African states. He emphasized that the African Group attached great importance to the question of registration, and enquired whether it would be possible, after a ceasefire came into effect, for Namibian refugees or exiles to register for the elections. He also enquired who would decide the type of ballot after registration had been completed. Finally, he suggested that the transition period should start after the deployment of UNTAG personnel in Namibia and not on the date the Security Council adopts a resolution on the subject. The Deputy Permanent Representative of Nigeria raised questions relating to voter registration. He asked that registration of a larger group of voters be envisaged since the present population estimates might not be accurate. He also wondered what measures could be taken to ensure that some segments of the population, farm workers for instance, were not prevented from participating in the electoral process. The Secretary-General replied to the various questions as follows: "1. REGISTRATION: This was an important matter which merited urgent consideration. 2. AMENDMENTS TO THE REPORT: The report could be amended to secure the agreement of the parties concerned. However, the report and the recommendations therein were in response to a Plan of Action proposed by the Western Powers. If the Plan vas changed and a new mandate given to that effect the report could be changed to meet the new circumstances. Amendments to the report could be effected through a statement by the Secretary-General giving clarification and interpretations where necessary. 3. SIZE OF THE FORCE: The figures recommended in the report were based on the findings of the UN military representative - General Philipp - and took account of the extensive borders of Namibia and the requirement that the UN Force not only monitor South African and SWAPO forces within the territory, but also to prevent infiltration from across the border.' 1*. FINANCING OF THE UN FORCE: It was necessary for the UN Force to be financed from the UN budget. The estimated cost ($300 million) could not be financed from voluntary contributions. Reference was made to the Cyprus situation where the UN peace-keeping force was in danger of being withdrawn because of serious financial difficulties arising out of a sufficient flow of voluntary contributions. 5. CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT; This could be done in the form of formal documents signed separately by the parties concerned.

6. SOUTH AFRICAN LETTER OF 6 SEPTEMBER 19T8; The letter raised grave new problems which could complicate the situation. It was important that such points, as well as those raised by others, should be clarified before the Security Council is asked to make a decision. 7. COMPOSITION OF UNTAG: Formal approaches would be made to Governments for contingents to the UN Force immediately after the Security Council gives its approval. He recognized the need to include African contingents, at the same time keeping in mind equitable geographical distribution. Also, he took note of the African Group's wish that the Deputy Commander of the UN military force be an African. - 5 -

8. UN POLICE CONTINGENT: The suggestions regarding the proposed UN police contingent have been noted. 9. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE AITD THE ADMINISTRATOR GENERAL; This would have to rely on the manner in which Mr. Ahtisaari handled himself in this regard.

10. COMMENCEMENT OF TRANSITIONAL PERIOD: The suggestion in the report that the transitional period come into effect immediately after the Security Council adopted the Plan of Action was in keeping with the proposal in the Plan". Mr. Ahtisaari added further comments on some of the questions, particularly those relating to the voter registration and the appointment of senior Africans in the UN Force.

1 September 1978

AAF/dj cc: Secretary-General's Office Mr. M. Ahtisaari Mr. R. Ahmed/Mr. A. Rohan ATIONS Distr. GENERAL

C S/128U1 8 September 1978

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 8 SEPTEMBER 1978 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA AND ZAMBIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

We have the honour to enclose herewith the text of the letter dated 8 September 1978, addressed to Your Excellency "by the President of the South West Africa People's Organization, Mr. Sam Nujoma. The letter deals with the various aspects of your report submitted pursuant to paragraph 2 of Security Council resolution U31 (1978) concerning the situation in Namibia (S/12827).

We should be grateful if the said letter could be circulated as soon as possible as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Salim Ahmed SALIM (Signed) Gwendoline KONIE Permanent Representative of the Permanent Representative of United Republic of Tanzania to Zambia to the United Nations the United Nations President of United Nations Chairman of the Special Committee on Council for Namibia the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples

78-193^8 ^> lu INESSENTIAL NOTE ON A MEETING WITH A DELEGATION OF SWAPO HELD ON 5 SEPTEMBER 1978, AT 12:45 -

Present; The Secretary-General Mr. Martti Ahtisaari • "Major General "Hannes Philipp Mr. M.K. Pedanou Mr. Sam Nujoma, President of SWAPO Mr. Theo-Ben Gurirab, Permanent Observer of SWAPO to the U.N. One aide.

Referring to his report to the Security Council (S/12827), the Secretary-General said that informal consultations were taking place in order to clarify a number of points before a formal meeting of the Security Council could be held. In this connexion, he would be grateful for the views of SWAPO. Mr. Nujoma expressed appreciation for the efforts of the Secretary-General and Mr. Ahtisaari in preparing the report. SWAPO agreed with the report in the main, except for a number of points on which some clarifications were necessary. _ > 1. Question of registration of voters - Mr. Nujorna recalled that South Africa had been conducting its own registration. This had been carried out literally at gun point in some areas. In other areas, people were forced to register and join the Alliance through threats of eviction from their homes, denial of treatments in hospital, withholding of salaries and pensions, confiscation of livestock, as well as through direct intimidation and torture. In addition, members of the Angolan rebel movements of UNITA and FNLA and South African citizens had been registered as voters. It was obvious that the registration conducted by South Africa was as illegal as the appointment of the South African Administrator - General who, it should be pointed out, had enacted laws for suppressing SWAPO members inside Namibia. It should also be noted that the registration was taking place while people were still in jail. SWAPO would therefore recommend that the registration snducted by South Africa be cancelled and that the United ations should initiate its own registration, which could be Dnducted in the presence of South African authorities. r. Nujoma also observed that the elections should be held m^i^m^^ ountry-wide and on a basis of one man one vote. i Role of the Special Representative - Mr. Nujoma felt that the functions and powers of the pecial Representative should be clearly spelled out. In his connexion, the Special Representative should be esponsible for maintaining law and order during the transitional eriod. He should be responsible for the implementation of •he Security Council resolution in order to prevent South Africa "rom exploiting any loop-holes that might exist in the mandate. According to the report, the Security Council would have "the rinal say" with regard to problems that might arise; but on 'small matters", the Special Representative should be able to iake final decisions. x;t>'-~ ^""1*." ^j'S'-f'V^y ~ •'..;. 5. Question of cease-fire - Mr. Nujoma said that SWAPO and South -Africa should sign a cease-fire agreement which would be binding on them. Such an agreement could be signed by the Secretary-General on behalf of the United Nations. Mr. Nujoma assured the Secretary-

Seneral that SWAPO would fully co-operate in aii the arrangements for a cease-fire. 4. Questions relating- to UNTAG - a) Mr. Nujoma recalled that SWAPO had already suggested that the staff of the military component of UNTAG should be recruited |f rom Algeria, Angola, Congo, Guinea-Conakry, Guinea- Bissau, Libya, Nigeria, Tanzania and Zambia (for Africa), Sweden, and Finland (for Western Europe), Romania and Yugoslavia (for Eastern Europe), Guyana and Jamaica (for Latin America) and India (for Asia) .

A.. - 3 -

b) Mr. Nujoma reiterated SWAPO's suggestion that the Deputy Commander of UNTAG military component should be an African. In this connexion, he had recently contacted President Obasanjo of Nigeria who had promised to submit the candidature of a Nigerian officer. c) As for the civilian component of UNTAG, Africans should be recruited for policy-making positions in the Office of the Special Representative. Dr. Oladapo Fafowara, Director of Africa Department in the Nigerian Ministry for Foreign Affairs should be considered for such a position. d) While SWAPO felt that the number of 7,5OO troops could be adequate, it found the number of 36O for the police force was rather small, considering the large number of the South African police. SWAPO would therefore recommend that the number of the United Nations police force be increased. In addition, it would suggest that the Head of this force be an African. This would help restore confidence in the Namibian people, most of whom had already suffered a great deal at the hand of the ruthless South Africa police. e) The financing of UNTAG operations should be the responsibility of the United Nations as a whole and the working language should be English. f) In conclusion, Mr. Nujoma said that, having committed itself to supporting United Nations action in Namibia, it would be desirable that SWAPO should be, if possible, consulted on the appointments for UNTAG. This, he said, would contribute to the success of the operations. 5. Location of SWAPO forces - Mr. Nujoma suggested that SWAPO forces which were divided into small mobile units, should ba confined to five centres to be located at Tsumeb, Ondangua, , Katima-Mulilo and Windhoek. United Nations control over SWAPO forces would be easier if they were confined to these five locations. In reply - 4 - to a question by Major General Philipp, Mr. Nujoraa stated that SWAPO troops would be carrying their arms. These troops, he added, would be part of the future national army of Namibia. The Secretary-General said that he had taken careful note of the observations made by Mr. Nujoma on behalf of SWAPO. He briefly commented on some of the points raised as follows. He was fully aware that the registration of voters conducted by South Africa was not in accordance with the proposals of the Five. Although this and other problems were not mentioned in the report, ways and means to overcome them would have to be worked out. South Africa had already objected to the passage in the report concerning the United Nations police contingent. Although the Group of Five had not referred to a United Nations police force, it had become obvious that this would be needed. The composition of UNTAG military and civilian components would not be an easy task because the South Africans too had \ their own views. However, efforts would be made to ensure an equitable geographical distribution. Following statements by Mr. Ahtisaari and Major General Philipp referring to the points raised by Mr. Nujoma, the Secretary-General suggested that arrangements should be made for a more detailed discussion between Mr. Ahtisaari, Major General Philipp and SWAPO.

M.K. Pedanou/ld 7 September 1978 cc: Mr. AA. Farah Mr. Ahtisaari Major General Philipp Mr. Ahmed AR/PMG The Secretary-General of th« United presents his compliments to the President of the Security Council and has the honour to Vi , enclose a copy of a communication he has received from the Permanent Observer of the South West Africa People's Organization,

21 August 1978 •v «', r.Aiuf/ //^ est Africa People's Or/aHizStion g. , Solidarity — Freedom—/atf/fe ^*C •V-ttui*-****

SWAPO OBSERVER to the United Natio 801 Second Avenue' Room 1401 New York, N. Y. 10017

Telex - 237249 Telephone: (212) 986-7863

August 18, 1978

Dr. Kurt Waldheim Secretary-General Room 3800 United Nations New York, N.Y. 10017

Excellency,

The President of SWAPO Sam Nujoma wishes me, on behalf of the Central Committee;, to convey the concern and trepidation felt regarding the reported representations to Excellency by the representatives of the illegal occupying regime in Namibia. We have learned that racist South Africa is charging S.FAPO for responsibility over"unabated acts of violence against the local population" in northern Namibia and is requesting Excellency to do something towards "a cessation of these incidents so as to lower tension in the border area".

In this connection, it is our firm conviction based on reports from our own sources and from others connected with the racist military organization that South Africa has, once again, amassed large numbers of troops and equipment along the northern border. The next, logical step, in our view, is that Vorster and his co-horts are planning to launch another massive attack on SWAPO, hoping to force us to abandon the diplomatic efforts for a negotiated settlement.

Excellency will recall that on the eve of the meeting scheduled for 8th May 1978 between the five and SWAPO, the fascist troops of South Africa launched a genocidal attack on our refugee settlement at Kassinga, killing and wounding more than 1,000 innocent Namibian children, women and elderly persons. The strategy then as now was to enrage SWAPO so much so that we -would break down the talks. They failed then. Now they want to repeat the same sinister plan.

This time, however, they hope to get the United Nations involved in order to give credibility to and support for their fabricated stories of "increased armed activities in Namibia" for which they claim SWAPO is responsible.

SWAPO wishes to go on record in categorically refuting and rejecting all these allegations. South West Africa People's Organization Solidarity — Freedom — Justice

SWAPO OBSERVER MISSION to the United Nations 801 Second Avenue Room 1401 New York, N. Y. 10017 Telex - 237249 Telephone: (212) 986-7863

August 18, 1978,

Dr. Kurt Waldheim Secretary-General Room 3800 j United Nations ! New York, N.Y. 10017 Excellency, i The President of SWAPO Sam Nujoma wishes me, on behalf of [ the Central Committee,to convey the concern and trepidation felt regarding the reported representations to Excellency by the representatives of the illegal occupying regime in Namibia. We have learned that racist South Africa is charging SWAPO for responsibility over"unabated acts of violence against the local population" in northern Namibia and is requesting Excellency to do something towards "a cessation of these incidents so as to lower tension in the border area". In this connection, it is our firm conviction based on reports from our own sources and from others connected with the racist military organization that South Africa has, once again, amassed large numbers of troops and equipment along the northern border. The next, logical step, in our view, is that Vorster and his co-horts are planning to launch another massive attack on SWAPO, hoping to force us to abandon the diplomatic efforts for a negotiated settlement. Excellency will recall that on the eve of the meeting scheduled for 8th May 1978 between the five and SWAPO, the fascist troops of South Africa launched a genocidal attack on our refugee settlement at Kassinga, killing and wounding more than 1,000 innocent Namibian children, women and elderly persons. The strategy then as now was to enrage SWAPO so much so that we -would break down the talks. They failed then. Now they want to repeat the same sinister plan. This time, however, they hope to get the United Nations involved in order to give credibility to and support for their fabricated stories of "increased armed activities in Namibia" for which they claim SWAPO is responsible. SWAPO wishes to go on record in categorically refuting and rejecting all these allegations. - 2 -

SWAPO also firmly disassociates itself from any responsibility for the tense situation that has developed in Namibia and which is referred to in the Secretary- General's press statement of 16 August 1978. Such a responsibility rests squarely on South Africa. Moreover, we trust that the Secretary-General's statement is not based on South Africa's version of the situation.

Throughout the period that we have been involved in a diplomatic activity in Namibia, we have persistently and systematically catalogued vicious acts of repression, torture, indiscriminate arrests, imprisonment and murder of our people perpetrated by the Pretoria authorities. We have put all these on record in the Security Council and the General Assembly, especially during the Ninth Special Session on Namibia. At this stage, we wish to draw the attention of Your Excellency to two very important and timely documents emanating from inside Namibia. The first is a memorandum submitted by SWAPO delegation to Mr. Ahtisaari in Windhoek on 8 August 1978. The second is another memorandum submitted by Namibian Church leaders to Mr. Ahtisaari.

The two documents speak for themselves. Suffice it to state, at this juncture, that there is no agreement for ceasefire in Namibia, as a result of continued illegal occupation, intensified repression and violence for which South Africa is singlehandedly responsible. This is the root cause of the confrontation and violence and this is the problem to be addressed. Over the years of Your Excellency's Ambassadorial assignment at the United Nations and during the current tenure of office, SWAPO leaders have enjoyed the best relations of cordiality and co-operation on all issues concerning Namibia.

We value this extremely and intend to maintain it. This note is a precautionary measure to alert Your Excellency to South Africa's persistent and intensified threats which are more than likely to be translated into barbaric acts causing more deaths and destruction. In conclusion, we wish to request Your Excellency, most respectfully, to transmit the text of this letter and copies of the two documents to the President of the Security Council for the month for consideration. Please accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

Sincerely yours,

Theo-Ben Gurira Permanent Observer Enclosures: V "

Note for the File

Mr. Theo-Ben Gurirab, SWAPO Observer to the United Nations, accompanied by his Deputy, Mr. Kahana, met with Mr. Farah today at their request.

Mr. Gurirab explained that SWAPO had received informa- tion of a South African plan to launch another attack against SWAPO refugee camps and bases in Angola. South Africa, he said, had realized that its May 1978 attacks against SWAPO in the area had not been the military success it had claimed. However, before striking again, South Africa was endeavouring to create the impression that, while it wished peace, it was being provoked into taking further armed aggression against SWAPO. South Africa, he continued, hoped that when it carried out its planned strike, international reaction would not be as negative as it was after the Cassinga attack.

Mr. Gurirab considered that the complaint against- SWAPO made to the Secretary-General by South Africa over the past week, as well as related statements by the Administrator-General in Namibia and by the South African Foreign Minister, were all geared to creating a climate favourable to its aggressive plans.

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Referring to the Secretary-General's press statement of 16 August 1978, Mr. Gurirab said that Mr. Nujoma considered it unfortunate. Ths statement, i in Mr. Nujomaf s - view, tended -to give credibility to South African claims that SWAPO was responsible for the current tense situation in Namibia. It made no mention of the repressive measures being taken against SWAPO by South Africa or of the continued illegal detention and brutal treatment of SWAPO leaders and supporters.

Mr. Gurirab added that SWAPO would address a written communication to the Secretary-General exposing South Africa's manoeuvres and describing the repression which was being conducted against SWAPO in Namibia.

Mr. Parah replied that the Secretary-General's statement was prompted by reports from several sources concerning the serious situation developing in the northern sectors of Namibia. It was in keeping with the Secretary- General's responsibilities to call upon all parties to exercize maximum restraint. The statement neither named any of the parties nor did it apportion blame for the present state of affairs. However, the Secretary-General could not disregard the report of tension or of increased military activities, particularly since they could lead to an explosive situation. Mr. Farah said that the

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reference to "the heightening of tensions" was directed towards South Africa's repressive policies. The reference to increased armed activities covers not only

i the activities of SWAPO but also of South Africa. Mr.

Farah added that the Secretary-General did not wish to see a repeat of the Cassinga attacks nor countenance a situation which could wreck United Nations efforts for an early and peaceful solution of the Namibian problem. Mr. Farah gave assurances that the Secretary-General was aware of the internal situation in Namibia but considered that it would be improper for the Secretary- General to make public comment on South Africa's policies in the territory before receiving the report of Mr.

Ahtisaari.

Mr. Gurirab appeared satisfied with the explanation given by Mr. Farah. It was agreed that Mr. Gurirab would meet with Mr. Farah at 11:OO a.m. on 18 August to hand over SWAPO's communication to the Secretary-General.

18 August 1978 . A.A. Farah

cc: Mr. Ahmeed v Mr. Urcruhart Note for the File

In the absence of Mr. Theo-Ben Gurirab I met his Deputy - Mr. Shafashike Kahana - in my office on 11 August 1978. I explained to Mr. Kahana that the Secretary-General had received a communication from the South African Permanent Mission conveying the concern of the South African Government over various present incidents involving SWAPO forces along the northern border of Namibia. I said that in view of the delicate mission which was being undertaken in the territory by the Secretary-General's representative, it would be helpful if SWAPO could restrain its forces so that an atmosphere of calm could prevail during this crucial period. The reply of Mr. Kahana is summarized in the attached note. I

A.A. Farah 11 August 1978 cc: Mr. R. Ahmed POSITION OF SWAPO

1) No ceasefire has been agreed upon and consequently a war situation prevails. Until there is a ceasefire agreement, SWAPO will continue the armed struggle.

2) South Africa has not taken any action to create conditions of calm. It continues with its policy of criminal intimidation by its detention of SWAPO leaders, members and sympathizers, and by arbitrary arrests of persons associated with the organization.

3) The Secretary-General may be assured that SWAPO will take no action likely to harm or prejudice the United Nations mission now in Namibia. On the contrary, SWAPO will co-operate fully with the United Nations in its work for the independence of the territory. '•V ft 'f T \ South West Africa People's Organization

Solidarity — Freedom — Justice

SWAPO OBSERVER MISSION to the United Nations 801 Second Avenue Room 1401 New York, N. Y. 10017

Telex - 237249 Telephone: (212) 986-7663/7864

SWAPO MEMORANDUM TO HIS EXCELLENCY, MR. M. AHTISAARI, THE UN SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE IN WINDHOEK, NAMIBIA.

Your Excellency,

We heartily welcome the United Nations Organization's

presence in Namibia, through you, as Special Representative of

the Secretary Gerneral of the UNO, and your entourage. We strongly believe that your coming here is to be regarded

as the UNO taking its rightful and legitimate responsibility over this international territory, Namibia. It is our submission that the road to free and fair elections may be possible only with maximum UNO supervision and control during the transition to independence. It is further our submission that certain measures should

be undertaken to safeguard and guarantee a smooth operation

aimed at fair and free elections. Conditions conducive to free

elections should be created in Namibia to ensure the full participation of all Namibians in the decolonization process.

We wish to point out certain issues that are of paramount importance in attempting to create an atmosphere: REGISTRATION

We strongly believe that the present registration of voters,

is totally undemocratic, unfair and involves a lot of malpractices for the following reasons:

No indentification is needed upon registration, as a

result people can register as many times as possible.

In addition to that,aliens can also register as voters.

As a matter of fact, a lot of UNITA refugees, as well

as South Africans (white and black) who do not even qualify in terms of Mr. Steyn's proclamation h;ive already registered. \

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•~ Namibians born in Walvis Bay, are excluded from

registering while they regard themselves as Namibians

and not South Africans. Meanwhile South .Africans who

have not yet decided whether they want to be

Namibian citizens are allowed to register. This goes

particularly for white South African civil servants in all fields who are here on transfer and who have been working here for the past four years. They are

fence-sitters who will go back if they don't got what they want in Namibia. - The four year residence qualification as determined by Mr. Steyn is, in our opinion, inadequate and unfair.

It should be borne in mind that every white person in Namibia is a South African citizen. It therefore makes

it quite difficult to differentiate between a South African

and Namibian South African, unless a birth certificate

is produced. - The figure of 400,000 eligible voters in Namibia is, in our opinion, randomly determined by Mr. Steyn more so because we disagree with the authorities on the size of the population. They claim approximately 800,000,

while we believe the number to be between 1,2-1, 5

million inhabitants. This seems to necessitate a proper

census to determine the number of eligible voters in

Namibia.

Needless to mention that in addition to the many malpractices involved in this process, the police, the army, and the white employers, particularly in the so-called operational areas and the rural areas such as farms and reserves, are working together in forcing

people to participate in the registration process,

various methods of blackmail, such as, -3-

- No medical treatment,

-No employment opportunities,

- Threats of expulsion from work, or actual expulsion

in the event of not registering, are used against

people who are not in possession of registration receipts,

to mention only a few. The selection of sites for the present registration have been those where people are forced to take out Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) membership. - We recommend that a proper census be undertaken before registration in order to calculate the number of eligible

voters in Namibia. - We recommend that people identify themselves upon registra-

tion either by birth certificates or baptism certificates.

- We recommend that impartial UN Officers be appointed as electoral officers, having the functions of registering

voters as well. - We recommend that neutral sites for registration be found and not magistrate or police offices xvhich induce fear into the people.

- We recommend mobile units, shopping centres and churches to be used for registration.

Furthermore AG 37 forces people not to criticize this current process or call people to refrain from registering. SWAPO has already paid fines of close to Rl,000 for five of its members who have called upon people not to participate unless the process is carried out under the supervision and control of the UNO; four others are still awaiting trial for contravening AG 37.

We can keep on listing the many malpractices and irregularities involved in this process, but that is not the point that we want to make. We believe that for the envisaged electoral process to be free, fair and democratic, it is only proper for the UNO to see to it that the whole registration process as initiated and supervised by

Mr. Steyn, should nullified and be conducted under the supervision and control of the UNO. -4-

This is in accordance with the letter and spirit of the accepted proposals. This point needs to be emphasized because even during the rehoboth tribal elections of October / November 1977, which took place under the auspices of Mr. Steyn, where Dr. Africa, a DTA

"Leader" won as captain, of the , there were irregularities which led to the nullification of the voters' role and the outcome of the elections. These irregularities were:

- Names of mimtoera of dea.d people appeared on the voters role - A number of people voted more than once. DTA "Leaders" and organizers are the registration officers and these people are boosting their membership by obtaining names from graveyards. POLITICAL PRISONERS It is of prime importance that these prisoners be released unconditionally and very soon.

Detention, particularly under the monstrous AG 26 and the terrorism act, still continues and is exclusively aimed at crippling SWAPO activities here at home.

The political trials which have now increased considerably with the concommitant high fines and penalties must be stopped as these are clearly aimed at draining SWAPO's coffers before the election campaign.

Registration orders on our acting vice president - now in his sixth year of confinement to Walvis Bay and comrade Hendrik Witbooi need to be repealed forthwith. It stands to reason that SWAPO cannot possibly take part in a political process while so many of its leaders, members and supporters are in goal. TORTURE Despite denials by Mr. Steyn and his followers we have proof that torture in detentions has reached alarming proportions. -5-

There are comrades in detention now who have been brutally tortured and beaten up and later forced to leak their own blood from the floor.

Others have been buried alive and exhumed when they became unconcsious. Yet others have been submerged into water until they lost their consciousness. "Torture - cancer in our society" by hunke and ellis lists more forms of torture which are real. Our people, a]1 of them SWAPO members and / or leaders, face these brutalities daily in prison, hence the urgency of having them released.

RADIO

It is needless to mention to you, your excellency, that the state owned and controlled radio broadcasting service, which presently carries only DTA and PRO - South Africa and anti-SWAPO propaganda needs some attention too. We recommend that all political parties have access to this public service so as to present the views of everybody or else it should be stopped. FAMILIARIZATION TRIP There are certain areas which are closed to certain political parties, particularly SWAPO, and it is in these areas where maximum intimidation and victimization takes place. We cannot agree with statements that certain areas are closed to you on this important mission. Your delegation, so we believe, needs to visit areas like Owambo, Kavango, Caprivi, as well as Herero reserves, which have unofficially been declared DTA areas and talk to all people there, and we mean all people, even those who are not favourably disposed toward South Africa. You need to see and speak to prisoners and those in detention, particularly those who have been tortured severely. We don't expoct you to be prescribed by South Africa which places you should not visit because it is by seeing these places and talking to a broad spectrum of people that you will be able to draw up an unbiased report and come up with positive recommendations to the Secretary General.

G/.. -6-

REPRESSIVE MEASURES

Your excellency, 3^0x1 would be quite aware of the various anti-SWAPO measures called AG's which Mr. Steyn has enacted since he assumed power as the one ruler of Namibia, in September 1977.

These regulations do not only threaten us daily, they do not only ban SWAPO unofficially, they make it difficult, if not impossible for us to participate freely in the proposed process of decolonization. We think here specifically of AG 9, 10, 26, 34, 37, 43, 50. These proclamations, if an atmosphere condusive to free political activities is to be created, need to be repealed complete]y. INTIMIDATION

Iti is common knowledge that the South African forces (civilian and military) are involved in a drive of intimidation against

SWAPO supporters:

- People are refused medical treatment, - SWAPO members are brought to court for political trials, - South African forces have been intimidating SWAPO members, by doing rounds asking people what political group they support,

- teachers and ministers have been intimidated into

refraining from uttering anti- South Africa sentiments,

-people who don't, belong to the DTA are chased off their

homes in the reserves, with their houses burnt down and cattle slaughtered maliciously, - Trade licences are refused to people who are not DTA supporters, - pensioners are forced to become DTA members in order to

receive their pensions.

PEOPLE WITH ARMS

It is our submission that in the letter and spirit of the

proposals, and in the interest of the Namibian people all arms should be confiscated.

II... Vv

- It is no scctet that the majority of the whites in

Namibia either belong to commandos or shooting clubs and are thus in possession of fire arms. -- On the basis of this we would wish to recommend that all arms should be kept in safe custody.

- We would, further recommend that the police only be

allowed to carry service revolvers and all 01 ?(••!• arms must

be kept in .safe custody,

- We recommend that the ethnic batal lions which ;i re part

and parcel of the he totally disarmed, as indicated in the proposals. TIME TABLE AND INDEPENDENCE DATE Finally, your excellency, it is our submission that in accordance with the Security Council Resolution, that has brought

about your coining to Namibia, and in the letter and spirit of

the Western proposals, the independence date is not as important

as the time tabJe which makes provision for a well planned operation,

than a hasty one doomed to failure because of lack of planning as we 11 as t i me. To hasten the date of independence, as some quarters believe, •would only cause chaos and confusion. The time table of the proposals should be followed, We wish you a very fruitful stay in Namibia , and as xve have

said, we would give our cooperation if needed.

Thanking you on behalf of SWAPO of Namibia.

Windhoek 8.8.78 GLGL AQ70 AFP - 0181 T/ i NAMIBIE: DECLARATION DU PRESIDENT DE LA SWAPO/ LAGOS, 1/9 (AFP) LA SWAPO (ORGANISATION DU PEtVf*LE DU SUD-OUEST AFRICAIN) ESTIME PU'IJNE ADMINISTRATION DE LA NAMIBIE PENDANT UN AN PAR LES NATIONS-UNIES SERAIT SUFFISANTE POUR PREPARER DES ELECTIONS JUSTES ET LIBRES, A DECLARE VENDREDI A LAGOS LE PRESIDENT DE CETTE ORGANISATION, M. SAM NUJOMA. M. NUJOMA, BUI DOIT QUITTER LE NIGERIA VENDREDI SO IR OU SAMEDI POUR NEW YORK, OU IL PARTICIPERA All DEPAT DE L'ONU SUR L'INDEPENDANCE DE LA NAMIBIE, A RENCONTRE JEUDI LE CHEF DE L'ETAT NIGERIAN, LE GENERAL OBASANJO, AUQUEL IL A DEMANDE UN SOUTIEN MATERIEL PLUS IMPORTANT. LA SWAPO A REJETE LES LISTES ELECTORALES DRESSEES PAR PRETORIA, CAR ELLES CONTIENNENT NOTAMMENT DES NOMS DE PERSONNES DECEDEES, A RAPPELE M. NUJOMA. LA SWAPO LAISSERA AU SECRETAIRE GENERAL DE L'ONU, M. KURT WALDHEIM, LE SO IN DE DECIDER DES PAYS QUI PARTICIPERONT A LA FORCE DE MAINTIEN DE LA PAIX EN NAMIBIE, MAIS ELLE ESTIME TOUTEFOIS QU'IL SERAIT IMPORTANT QUE QUELQUES PAYS AFRICAINS Y PARTICIPENT, A D'AUTRE PART PRECISE M. NUJOMA. INTERROGE SUR L'ATTITUDE D'UN FUTUR GOUVERNEMENT DE LA SWAPO A L'EGARD DES COMPAGNIES MINIERES INTERNATIONALES OPERANT EN NAMIBIE, M. NUJOMA A INDIQUE QUE LE PREMIER OBJECTIF ETAIT DE LIBERER LE TERRITOIRE ET QUE LE GOUVERNEMENT NAMIBIEN FERAIT FACE AUX AUTRES PROBLEMES UNE FOIS L'INDEPENDANCE ACQUISE. EJP GC BQ AFP 011621 Notes of a meeting held in the Secretary-General's Office on 29 July 1978

Present: The Secretary-General Mr. Sam Nujoma, President of SWAPO Mr. Ben Gurirab, SWAPO Representative at the UN Mr. Hartti Ahtisaari. Mr. A. A. Far ah

The Secretary-General informed Mr. Nujoma of the arrange- ments for the Security Council meeting to be held later that day. At the Council's informal consultations earlier in the day the had insisted that the mandate of the UN peace-keeping force be made clear. The Secretary-General said that the Council finally agreed that the mandate of the UN 'force be clarified after the return of the UN survey mission to the territory. Such a procedure, he eiqplained, had been followed in the case of Lebanon, and was in keeping with the report of the survey mission during the third or fourth week of August, thus enabling him to submit a report to the Security Council taking account of the mission's findings and recommendations. The Secretary-General said it was possible that the Security Council would meet towards the end of August or the beginning of September to consider his report. Mr. Nujoma said that SWAPO would wish to participate in that meeting of the Security Council, to ensure in at the powers of the Secretary-General's representative were adequate and explicit. He remarked that under the Western proposals, the role was vague and somewhat ambiguous. The Secretary-General, commenting on the Walvis Bay draft resolution, said that South Africa was unhappy about its contents. Foreign Minister Botha, whom he had met the previous day, had accused -the five Western powers of having betrayed South Africa. The Secretary-General was hopeful that the problem would be resolved. I»lr. Nujoma remarked that Walvis Bay was a decolonization issue and one on which he could admit no compromise. He added that the changes brought about by the independence of Angola and Mozambique had changed the geo-political situation in the region. SWAPO would wish to be consulted about the composition of the UN force in Namibia as well as on the civilian personnel. However, he recognized that the final decision would rest with the Secretary-General and he had full confidence in his judgement.

AAF/aa cc: SG RA/AR