- . COMBINED ARMS RESEARCH LIBRARY I ' . 1 II I IIII II IIi ~~~I~~ ~iill~~ll j~ 1 1I1Irlll lll ll lll li 3 1695 00425 8091 , . ILITARY REVIEW VOLUME XXIX OCTOBER 1949 NUMBER 7

EditoT in Chief COLONEL H. R. EMERY

North American Edition Editor: LT. COL. M. N. SQUIRES: Assistant Editor: CAPT. K. SHERMAN

Spanish-American Edition .. Editor: LT. COL. A. F. BRUNO; AS8i~tant Edit()T8! MA.J. J. A. ANDINO, MAJ. W. MARTORANI. LT. L. A. MONSERRATE.

Brazilian Edition Editor: MAJ. H. A. HERRERA, Brazilian Army. Assistant Editors: MAJ. V. P. D. COl1TINHO, Brazilian. Army. CAPT. E. C. SANeTos, Brazilian Air Force

Administrative Officer Production Managm' LT. M. M. SUSYNNA CAPT. R. B. WINNINGHAM

CONTENTS TUB INVASION OF NORWAy-AN EXAMPI.E OF EXTENDED STRATEGY ______.. ______Lt. Col. J. A. Bassett, In!

TIlE 11TH AmnORNE DIVISION IN THE LEYTE MOUNTAIN OPERATION ______Maj. J. B., Seay. In! 17

AN IN'fIWDUCTION TO TUE ECONOMICS QIo' MOBILIZATION ______Lt. Col. C. T. Schmidt. Inf 25 A PROGHESS REPORT ON TUE UNITED 'STATES CONSTABULARY ______Capt. H. P. Rand, FA 30

THi'~ USE OF PSYCHOLOGY BY LEADERS______Lt. Col. H. E. Townsend, In! 39

THE REGULA:rING STATION IN WORLD """AU II ______Lt. Col. P. H. Slaughte~·. TC 48 CO:\Ii'tIAND POST EXERCISES ______Lt. Col. H. P. Persons, Jr., CLtC 56

Mll,ITARY NOTES AROUND THE WORLD ______~ ______63

F(IJU;WN MILITARY DIGESTS ______._~ ______73

Psychological Warfare and the Soldier______73

lVintcr Experiences of the GeTman 11.1"1' P'orce Grou.nd Units______I!. ______78 Staff Work ______.. ______-- ___ . _ __ 86

Russian Far East Defense ______88 Employment of the Canadtan Army Ot'crscas ______. ______92 The First Weelc in the Battle of France ______95 Military Writing ______105 Britain's Territorial Armu ______' ______107 B ',KS Fon THE MILITARY READER ______III

1 'LI'l'ARY ltEVIEW-Publish~d monthly by the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth. Kan~, . in the English~ Spanish. and Portuguese languages: Entered as second-class matter August 31, 1934, at the Post \ tfice a:t Fort Leavenworth. Kansas, under the Act of March 3, 1879. Subscription rates: $3.50 (U.S. cur.. rency· per year in the United States and other countries of the \Vestern Hemisphere: $4.50 a year in aU other·· count '25. Reprints are authorized. provided credit is given the uMILITARY REVIEW," C&GSC, Fort I.teaven­ worth Kansas.. O,U'R AUTHORS

Lieutenant Colonel James A. Bassett Captain H. P. Rand has just completed was US liaison officer to British Airborne a 3-year tour in Germany as Assistant Headquarters' during the Normandy in­ S-3 of the 1st Constabulary Brigade and vasion 'and later served as G-4 of the First is now attending the Advance Field Artil. Airborne 'rask Force in the invasion of lery Course at Fort Sill. He has been an Southern France. He then served in the instructor at the Field Artillery School Strategy Section, Operations Division, and has served as battery commander in WDGS,oand on the Joint War Plans Com­ the 13th Armored Division. mittee, JCS, in Washington. He was a graduate student at Georgetown t,Tniver­ Lieutenant Colonel Horace E. Townsend sity for 2 years, where he obtained a MA joined the 5th Infantry Division in 1940 degree in international relations in 1948. and served with that unit in the European He has been an instructor at the C&GSC Theater throughout World War II as an since that time. infantry commander and Assistant G-4. He was a student at the C&GSC in 1946­ Major Joseph B. Seay was on duty con­ 1947 and has been an instructor since structing camps and airfields in the US that time. and Brazil early in the war, and he joined the 11th Airborne Division in 1943 shortly Lieutenant Colonel P. H. Slaughter was' after its activation, He served in various Transportation Officer, Western Base Sec· capacities wlith the Division from New tion (England) in 1943-1944, and Com· Guinea to Jaban, and was onc of thc staff manding Officer, 42d Regulating Station, officers who ~arachuted onto the Manar­ in the ETO in 1944-1945. Later, he served awat positioh on G December 1944 dur­ as Assistant Chief of Transportation of ing the Leytc operation described in his the European Theater, Deputy Port Trans· article. He has· been an instructor at the portation Officer at San Francisco, and C&GSC since 1948. Transportation Officer at Fort Leaven· worth. He graduated from the C&GSC in Lieutenant Colonel Carl T. Schmidt has 1948 and has been an instructor since written several articles for the MILITARY that time.' REVIEW, the most recent ofwhich was "The Limitation of Total War" (September ,Lieutenant Colonel H. P. Persons. Jr., 1949). He i'i the author of several books is now serving with the 82d Airborne Divi· and articles on economic, political, and sion. During World War .II, he serwd as military subjec~s and holds a doctor's de­ S-3 and Executive Officer of the 31th f\AA gree in economics from -the University of Brigade in North Africa, the Mediter· California. He was a C&GSC instructor ranean Theater, and the European Th,·ater. froin' 1946 to 1949 and is now assigned to He was an instructor at the C&GSC from th~ 3d Armored Division. 1945 to 1949.

, \ THE, INVASION OF NORWAY An Example of Extended Strategy

Lieutenant Colonel James A. Bassett, Infantry Instructor, Command and General Staff College

PART I that these were caused by other than un­ THE INVASION favorable weather. In fact, an entry in the Introduction JodI Diary, dated 28 February 1940, shows ON 9 April 1940, all the important these two operations were to be inde­ strategic centers of Norway were simul­ pendent of each other-the decision to. taneously ~ttacked by German forces launch Exe1'cise Weser (DEmmark and Nor­ totaling less than 20 thousand men, plus way) first being due to political reasons. air and naval elements. By 5 May 1940, That the invasion of Norway 'was out­ southern Norway, which contains 85 per­ right German aggression is undeniable. cent of the total population, had been However, the importance of this campaign occupied, and by 9 June 1940 all of Norway fer future historical study lies not in its had been cleared of organized resistance. testimony of German guilt but in the Thus, the seizure of a modern state of methods enabling its success. The campaign almost 3 million people, and an area of demonstrated the almost perfect integra­ strateg'ic importance in the war against tion of all military and non-military means Allic,d sea power, required less than 2 of warfare-a modern example of extended months and the total employment of not strategy. marc than six divisions, plus naval and air Initial Actions fOl'tt's. Of course, the Norwegian cam­ paign would have been much more difficult, TC1'rain.-Norway is an elongated, ex­ if not impossible, without the simultaneous tremely rugged country, whose major popu­ seizure of Denmark, which required two lation centers are located on its deeply in­ mol'" Ilivisions. df'nted coastline. This ruggedness would 'rh;, was a small portion of the total highly favor the defense if properly or­ Gel'l'lan war potential as is evidenced by ganized. But this same feature lays the the c' ncurrent preparation and .launching defense open to defeat in detail, due to the of tJ, major campaign in the West. AI­ sparsity of communications between the tholJ :, the launching of the offensive in the separated and exposed popUlation centers, We,. had a number of successive post­ particularly if surprise is gained in the pon,· ''''nts, there is no evidenae to show attack.

In hI' bold invasidn of Norway in J940, Germany made extensive use of :'sychological and pol~tical factors, but she integrated these non 'nilitary means with a plan based on sound military principles 4 MILITARY REVIEW

~ The Gennal! plan.-The German mili­ n;ls from sho~e to cease firJng. However, tary plan called for the simultaneous this probably occurred afte~ the surrender seizure of the six major strategic centers of ultimatum was accepted. i Norway-Oslo, Kristiansand, Stavanger, Meanwhile, the second p~rt of the Ger­ Bergen, Trondheim, and Narvik-by sea­ man force, led by the heavy cruiser borne and ah'borne landings. Employing Bliiche1', moved straight up the fjord on limited forces, the operation was depend­ the inner defenses of Oslo !ft Fort Oscars­ ent for success upon surprise and audacity borg. ,These defenses, hol(iin~ their fire,­ in the attack, enhanced both by previous sank the Bliicher at close ~ange. Ft. Os­ psychological and political preparations carsborg was later taken by{ a combination and by maximum utilization of all non­ of bombing _and ground alltack from the military means of warfare. In order to rear 'by troops which had fleen landed at analyze properly the application of tl~e points farther down the fJ,ord. Captured - latter elements, their effect upon the for­ German plans show that th;lse two actions mer, a~d the integration of all efforts in in Oslofjord were to be! simultaneous, the total offensive, it is first necessary to However, if repulsed at Clscarsborg, the review the action from 'the Norwegian forces allotted. thereto, iincluding the viewpoint. , pocket-battleshIp Luetzo'U/. ex-Deutsch­ Oslo.-At about midnight 8-9 April 1940, land, were to assist at l!Iorten and to the air-raid alarm sounded in Oslo, the seize additional facilities dn the opposite capital and largest city in NOI'way, caused side at the fjord near M~ss. The latter by the entrance of foreign warships into plan was apparently folldwed after the Oslofjord. These warships had been chal­ sinking of the BWcher. ' lenged by a small Norwegian m:med whale­ At about 0830, German transport planes boat, Pol Ill, patrollinc.: the entrance, put it began landir:g on Oslo's

l{l·istainsand.-The German forces at­ lenged by a small patrol boat, to which they tacking Kristiansand on the-extreme south replied "Sei ruhig" (Be quiet!), this force, -coast, of Norway at dawn were met with ied by minesweepers, -proceeded cautiously fire from the coastal defenses and several up the fjord, ignoring the fire of a small small destroyers stationed there. The Ger­ fortress, Leroy. This force, after being man light cruiser Karlsruhe was severely delayed by a few mines which had been damaged (later sunk; by submarine), and hurriedly laid after the initial challenge, the German forces withdrew. However, the arrived about 0400 at the entrance to the Norwegian commander soon received a inner harbor, which was guarded by two telegram in the code of the Norwegian forts, Kvarven and Hellen. Both opened Navy stating that British and French war­ fire, apparently damaging the Konigsberg, ships were coming to help. Shortly, several but this fire was not returned. The Ger­ destroyers were sighted flying the French mans, instead, sigmilled in English: "Stop flag. After they had been joyously received shooting." Kvarven was immediately cap­ in the harbor, the French flag was struck tured by a landing party, while Hellen and the German colors hoisted. The city, was later bombed out. under German air attack and at the mercy At about the same time that the German of the naval guns, surrendered. naval force entered the harbor, German The actual source of this telegram is soldiers appeared in the streets of Bergen, undetermined. It may have been a clever reputedly coming from several German German ruse, for there is adequate evi­ freighters which had arrived at Bergen dence that German ships were directed to several days earlier. These troops ad­ use British disguise. On the other hand, , vanced with white flags attached to their it may have been an authentic order from bayonets, quickly taking over the town the Norwegian' High Command rectifying with no resistance. pl'evious instructions, and the resultin<>; Tt·ondheim.-Surprise also succeeded at action a mere coincidence, since it is known Trondheim Fjord. Brettenes Battery on that previously the Norwegian govern­ the eastern shore opened fire on the Ger­ ment was prepared to resist any infringe­ man squadron, consisting of one light ment of her neutrality-British or ler­ cruiser and several destroyers, about 0300, man. Such instructions to resist 0 the but its searchlight cables were cut by the British were actually issued to the N, val first return salvo. Blinded by searclHights Commander at Narvik and later rescin~ed. on the German ships and a smokescreen, Sill mnger.--The most modern airport in the Battery's fire was ineffective. Fort Norway, Sola, was located about 20 miles Agdenes on the opposite shore apparently south of Stavanger. This installation, did not fire. There are some implications guardvd by only 20 Norwegian soldiers, that the commander of Ft. Agdenes was was t;':;en from the aii· in the same manner involved in some treachery, but the evi­ as Fo' ,'ebo at 0$10. Led by one company dence is inconclusive. The German force of pal' ,:'hute troops, 250 transports rapidly proceeded quickly up the fjord. By 0800 lande., approximately five thousand men, or 0900; the disembarked troops had effec­ and tL city was taken with little resist­ tively secured the town, occupying the ance. nearby Vaernes airfield the next morning­ Bel' II.-A German naval squadron, in­ all without further resistance. cludin lhe light cruisers KOln and Konigs­ Narvik.-Narvik, the northernmost point be"'u, ,proached the entrance to Bergen, 'of the initial German attack, is the hub of the Sl ,nd largest city in Norway, about communications in northern Norway and 0100 " 9 April 1940. Despite being chal­ the terminus of a railroad from the Swed­ MILITARY REVIEW 6 . iL ish ii'on ore mines at Kiruna. A squadron talion nor of Narvik, but belng the senior of nine German destroyers of the latest officer on the scene, he was lo~ked to for in­ type enteredthe fjord at dawn in the midst structions. Perceiving the ·utter c(mf.usion, of a snowstorm, 'This squadron had suc­ he offered the surrender ~f the town. cessfully eluded a British naval force sta­ Colonel Munthe-Kaas believe!> that Colonel tioned off Narvik with the aid of bad Sundlo acted in this instanc~ in good faith weather and the decoy actions of the battle in what he believed to be a s~ving of civil­ cruiser Schamho1'st and heavy cruiser ian lives. However, there is ~mple evidence Hipper. This German force was challenged that Sundlo was a good friend, if not an at the entrance to tl).e inner fjord by one adherent, of Quisling. He la,ter accepted a of the two old Norwegian coast defense position in Quisling's administration. ships stationed at Narvik, the EidsvoZd. Subsequent' Actihn A German officer was sent aboard demand­ ing immediate surrender. After rejecting The situation.-Althoughl0sI0, as well the demand, and while awaiting the offi­ as other initial targets, >'jas completely .:er's return to his ship before opening fire, under German control by the end of the in accordance with old custom, the Eidsl!old first day, the initial repulsei.t Fort OseaI'S­ was torpedoed and sunk. borg had a major effect on the Gel'man i Upon entering' the harbor, the German campaign. As will be disctissed in detail 'destroyers were met by the gunfire of the later, the German plan envi~aged' the early Norge, the other Norwegian ship, After capture of the Norwegian King and Gov­ sinking one German destroyer and damag­ ernment and their immedia;te replacement ing a second, the NOI'gc was sunk by tor­ by a subservient regime, which would make pedoes. Confronted by this naval force and complete the paralyzation fof Norwegian German troops debarking from the holds resistance, as occurred in penmark. The flliichcr had on board the (~estapo detach­ of German merchantmen, Colonel SundIo, the senior Norwegian officer at Narvik, ment and German administ~ation staff as­ surrendered the town. There haS-been much si9,'ne'd to this task. Its sinking, and the controversy -over the exact action at subsequent delay i~ seizing Oslo caused by Fort Oscarsborg, gave aIm/pst 8 hours res­ Narvik, and Colonel Sundlo's role in par­ pite, enabling the King and Government, ticular. On the basis of a personal inter­ after refusing the surrerlder _urtimatum view with Colonel O. Munthe-Kaas, Nor­ wegian Army (Norwegian Military At­ presented by the German~-iMinister about 0430, to escape north. Th escape of the tache to'the United States), who partici­ King and Government 1'aders - enabled pated in the later fighting around Narvik, Norwegian organized res stance to con· the following appears to be correct. No tinue for some 2 months and forc('d the garrison was stationed in Nal'vik, but a German forces into a more lengthy cam­ battalion had been ordered to the town paign. from a nearby camp early in the morning, t\VO companies of 'which arrived, 'another OslQ region.-The immediate (,crman being captured intact as they debarked tasks, when confronted b.$ this sitnation, unsuspectingly on a ferry landing. But were fi.rst to consolidat~ their Jllsition these ,troops became so intermixed with the. around Oslo, and then tOI drive n, l'th to startled and curious populace, who, in turn, establish communications with theic forces were intermixed with the alread'y advanc-. in Trcmdheim. In accomplishing t:,~ first ing German troops, that organized resist­ task, the German forces met little l'esist-­ ance became impossible. Colonel Sundlo anee. General mobilization of No1'\' '\Y was was not in command of the Norwegian bat­ ordered shortly after thfj Germa,: naval,

j THE INVASION OF NORWAY 7 NORTHERN EUROPE

MOSCOW. Vi

~.

• KIEV I 8 MILITARY REVIEW I' I force entered Oslofjord.' But the very cen­ the narrow waters of the fjord. Yet, Wil­ ters which were now in German hands, and liam L. Shirer * recorded on 21 Apri11940: which contained all the major arsenals, "What the Germans fear most, I gather, is, were those on which the Norwegian mobi­ that the British Navy will get into Trond­ lization was based. The efforts to mobilize, heim Fjord and wipe out the German gar­ therefore, became hopelessly confused. rison in the city before th!! Nazi forces By 15 April, despite an initial delay of from Oslo can possibly get there. If it 2 days until forces were available and a does, the German gamble ip lost." This' was the same sort of Allied hesitation that shortage of artillery, the German forces defeated the Dardanelles campai'gn in had secured Ostfold, the southeastern dis­ World War I. trict between Oslofjord and the Swedish bOI·der. Considerable Norwegian military ,The battle for Trondheim.-A landing supplies were captured, and the Germans was made at Namsos on 14 April and rein­ had pushed north and west of Oslo, cutting forced on 16-18 April to al total of one the main routes to Bergen and Krist­ British brigade plus a de'mi-briuade of iansand. The Germans could now direct all French Chas8eurs Alpins. But this column their ~fforts on the essential task of clear­ was stopped at Steinkjer, well short of its ing the main routes to their forces in goal, on 21 April by German forces from Trondheim. The 1st Norwegian Division', Trondheim. The Germans made an am­ southeast of Oslo, withdrew into Sweden phibious envelopment of the Allied column and was interned on 15 April 1940. The with the aid of a German destroyer and. 3d Norwegian Division surrendered north torpedo boat still operating in Trondheim of Kristiansand on 16 April. By 22 April, Fjord. the Germans had secured all the 'southern, Two British brigades landed at Andal­ coast. Small Norwegian units continued> snes on 17-19 April and pro.ceeded rapidly resistance i'n the rugged southwestern to secure the critical roap junction of hinterland for some days, notably at Voss Dombas, which connects t~e route from to which the Bergen forces withdrew, but And~lsnes with the main no~th-south route, this had no effect on the subsequent opera­ the Gudbrandsdal, from Osl to Trondheim. tions,. On 14 April, one company 0 ' German para­ Allied a1·d.-Taken by strategical sur­ chute troops had been dropped at Dombas prise, the British Navy had failed to pre­ to block this junction, but apparently it vent the invasion of Norway. Although was scattered in the drop and q)lickly political su'pport was immediate, Allied eliminated. The British force was diverted troops were too late and ineffective. from advancing on TrondlJeim, nowever, to aid the Norwegian forcEls to the south. The Allies, perceiving that Trondheim The latter, for the first tIme, wen' pro· was the strategical key to Norway and that viding some semblance of ol'ganized resist­ it must be retaken quickly if any effective ance to the German adv~nce alont:' the resistance was to be made, orjginally Gudbrandsdal. But overwhelming Gc'rman planned for a direct naval assault up air superiority, due to the German pnsses· Trondheim Fjord, assisted by a double land sion of all Norwegian airfields, mad~ these envelopment from landings to the north efforts futile. Unable to support their and south at Namsos and Andalsnes. How­ forces against such odds, th~ Allje:;; evac· ever, the direct assault was abandoned due uated their Andalsnes forces duriI'" the to the pious hope ,that the envelopment night of 1-2 May and the Namsos 'orces would prove sufficient without risking * Bc"Zin "Diary. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, naval forces against German air power in 11)42). p. 257. THE INVASION OF NORWAY 9 , the next night. By 5 May 1940, all organ­ of World War 1. * In this study, he pointed ized Norwegian forces in southern Norway out that Germany lost the war due to the had surrendered. continental strategical concept which tied The baftl.e for Narvik.-Meanwhile, the Navy to the German Bight rather than fighting had been going on in the N arvik allowing it to operate offensively on the ,area. Some Norwegian units had been on high seas from positions in Denmark and, guard duty along the Finnish border dur­ Norway. This work, and the attention ing the previous winter, due to the Finnish­ given it in German military and naval Soviet War. These were able to block effec­ circles, was well known in the British Ad­ tively the German drive north from the miralty. This thesis must have had many Narvik area and thus allow a more orderly adherents in the German Naval Staff, for mobilization in the ,surrounding districts. at least as early as October 1939 the Naval On 10 April 1940, a British destroyer force Staff had prepared studies for a Norwegian engaged the German destroyers in Narvik campaign. An entry in Admiral 'Raeder's harbor, sinking one and damaging three War Diary records that he first discussed others. But the British were forced to the significance of Norway for sea and air withdraw, due to their own losses, after warfare during a conference with Hitler having sunk several German supply ships. on 10 October 1940. In a memorandum On 13 April, a British force returned, led written sometime later, Raeder states he by the battleship Wa1'spite, and sank the also discussed the danger of British occu­ remaining German destroyers and supply pation of Norwegian bases, but this may vessels. have been an attempt to support the Ger­ man announced "reasons" for the attack. The Norwegian forces gradually forced In any event, he apparently received a the Germans back toward Narvik. Rein­ lukewarm reception to his plans at that forced by Allied landings, they retook the time. town on 28 May 1940. The blocking of Political contacts.-MeanwhiIe, as part German ore traffic from the Swedish mines at Kiruna was the strategic purpose of of the over-all German foreign penetra­ ,Allied operations at Narvik, into which tion program of the Foreign Policy Office they put a total of 15,000 troops. But the (APA) of the Nazi Party (NSDAP), victory at Narvik was short-lived, for the Alfred Rosenberg had made the acquaint7 Allied reverses in France forced a with­ ance of Vidkun Quisling, an ex-Norwegian drawal. During the night of 8-9 June, all Army officer and leader of a Norwegian remaining Allied forces in Norway were Nazi party (Nasjonal Samling). Quisling evacuated, taking along the NorWegian had convinced Rosenberg of the advantage Kin;; and Government, which had moved to of Norway's coast to Germany in event of northern 'Norway upon the evacuation of war with Britain and of his ability to turn the Trondheim area. On 9 June 1940, the the country over to Germany, provided he last remaining Norwegian organized force received adequate German support. The surrendered. latter began as early as August 1939, when 25 members of the Nasjonal Samling' se~ PART II lected by Quisling were given a 14-day ANALYSIS course in Berlin under Rosenberg's spon­ German Preparations sorship. SI '-'tiegical concept.-A -retired German Sometime after the general war broke naval officer, Vice Admiral Wolfgang out, Quisling reported that Britain was Weg' 'ler, published in 1929 a very pene­ « Die Seestrategie des Welt Kriegcs. (Berlin: F. trati.g· criticism of German naval strategy G. Mitt1er and Son. 1929). 10 M~LITARY REVIEW planning to occupy Norway under the guise existence of favorable psychological and of aid to Finland. Rosenberg brought this political preparations. The latter would information to Raedel"s attention, and on facilitate the use of all non-m;i1itary means 11 December 1939 he took Quisling to talk of warfare to the maximum ~dvantage, as to Raede'r. Thus, Quisling's plan and in­ w~1l as the maximum emplolfment of sur­ formation, although belittled by both the prise and deception. In his directive for German Legation in Oslo and the Foreign the operation (Fall Weseruebung) issued Office who considered that Norway would 1 March 1940, Hitler prescribed that the defend her neutrality against anyone, sup-, principle to be followed was to give the ported Raeder's own plans. Armed with appearance of a "peaceful" occupation for this support, Raeder was now able to con­ protection of the neutrality o:f the Scandi­ vince Hitler. navian states. If there were qpposition, The decision.-A' German Naval Staff full military action would be employed. meeting was held on 12 December 1939 However, the military force to be employed with Hitler, who had meanwhile l'eceived would be as small as possible, its numerical l'epol'ts from Rosenberg on Quisling and weakness to be balanced by daring actions seemed' "entranced with the possibilities of 1j.nd surprises. In proper military proce­ incorporation of Norway into the German dure, such a fOl'mal directive would only empire," according to Raeder. The various be issued on the, basis of a most careful' aspects of the subject were discussed and estimate of the situation ,prepared by the the Navy recommended the occupation of staff oj' the high command. Norway: (a) by peaceful means in con­ Norwegian Preparations junction with Quisling, or (b) by force. Pacifism.-The attitude of Norway be­ Hitler decided to receive Quisling in order tween the two wars was typical of all the to form a personal impression, and he then western democratic countries-war was a ordered the High Command (OKW) to thing of the past, because cooperation be­ prepare plans for the occupation of Nor­ tween nations, exemplified in the League of way in the spring. Raeder records that Nations, made war almost impossible. This this order was issued on 12 December 1939 general attitude was overly pronounced in and that Hitler received "Q" on the same Norway, since she could point to more than day. Rosenberg stated Quis1ing~ was re­ 'a century of peace, having successfully ceived by Hitler for "personal instruc­ weathered World War I as a neutral. Even tions" on 16 and 18 December, and that after the example of Ethiopia, Austria, Hitler's decision was based on Quisling's and Czechoslovakia, the attitud~ of "it work as reported by Rosenberg. However, can't happen here" prevailed, for Norway an entry by JodI in his war diary, dated had no minorities and no subversive ele­ the middle of January 1940, states Hitlel' ments worthy of note. Even though Quis­ "makes up his mind to utilize the Danish ling had founded his Nasjonal Sa'Ylliing a'nd Norwegian space for the German war­ Party in 1933, he was looked upon as an fare." eccentric, and his pal'ty was a national .The decision to undertake the occupation joke. This attitude is best typified hy an of Norway (and Denmark) appears to incident related by Mrs. Florence J. Har­ have been an afterthought in the over-all riman, United States Minister to Norway. Germa:n war plan. However, the estimate At a diplomatic party in the fall fof 1939, that this could be accomplished by mini­ a woman ventured that the Nazis might mum forces and wi.thout effect on the im­ want southern Norway. The woman was pending major offensive in the West could immediately "hooted down" as a war­ not but have weighed heavily the previous monger. THE INVASION OF NORWAY 11 Defenses.-In such an atmosphere, re­ tiated dual trade agreements with both armament was 'extremely unpopular and England and Germany in an attempt to this attitude' was reflected in the"state of solve the ore traffic problem. the armed forces. Although there were coastal fortifications in all the important German Psychological and fjords, they were extremely ancient and Political Program entirely lacking in antiaircraft protection. The Germans 'capitlilized on the condi­ The navy had some 50 ships of all sizes, tions in Norway in their psychological and the majority more than 25 years old with political preparations. First, they strength­ no modernization. The air force had less ened the feeling of security and com­ than 50 combat planes, all obsolete, and placency. Second, they restrained any )In­ only 85 pilots. Nineteen Curtis Pursuits, friendly tendencies through fear. Third, a recent acquisition, were captured by the they developed the conditions necessary for Germans still uncrated, at Kjeller, the revolution, if needed. main military air base near Oslo, on 9 Trustfulness.-Beginning early in 1933, April 1940. The active army of 1,900 offi­ the Nazis determined on the necessity. of cers and 12,000 men had no tanks or anti­ winning over the Northern countries. The tank guns, few antiaircraft and machine method was cultural penetration. The Nor­ guns, and little ammunition..Total mo­ dic Society was formed in all these coun­ bilization would provide an additional tries for the ostensible purpose of exem­ 100,000 men, but there was a lack of plifying an!I furthering Nordic culture, trained officers and equipment for these. with which the German was identified. The The events of the Finnish-Russian war Society's leader, Lohse, was selected by had invoked an ,almost naive belief in the the Foreign Policy Office of the Nazi Party superiority of ski troops, for which Nor­ (NSDAP). Nordic artists and scientists way was admirably equipped. were invited to Germany, and exhibits of. Neutrality policy.-Upon the outbreak their work were fostered. All this was de­ of general war in September 1939, Norway signed to show the close ties of Germany was convinced she could maintain her tra­ to the Scandinavian countries, to give an ditional neutrality as in WorId War I, impression of deep friendship for them, oblivious to the fact that modern total and to intensify the existing unawareness warfare had produced revolutionary of reality. Germany further strengthened changes with respect to geography. Her this program by the formal offer of non­ handling of the City of Flint affair is an aggression treaties in the spring of 1939. almost perfect example of her determina­ Whether intentional acts on the part of tion to abide by intricate international pro­ Germany or mere chance, a series of false cedure. The City of Flint was a captured alarms occurred in Norway during the Uni! l'd States freighter, carrying a Ger­ winter of 1939-1940 which may have served man prize crew and British prisoners of to further quiet any Norwegian who might war. Norway's protest to Britain over the view ominous events with less trust than ,lit!"rrrk affair demonstrated her official the government. A day or two before imp" ,·tiality, although this served to Christmas in 1939, reports were received hei,u:,ten Germany's concern, intensified in Oslo that a large German fleet on its by I:nisling's reports, over an imminent way to Norway had passed the Danish BriT,; h plan to occupy Norwegian bases. islands in the Baltic. Military leaves were Refr ing a proffered treaty of non-aggres­ cancelled and forts were manned, but no sioe :l the spring of 1939 due to fear of a fleet appeared. In February 1940, the Nor­ seen 'lgly pro-German attitude, she nego­ wegian Legation in Berlin reported, from , ,12 MILITARY REVIEW

a "reliable source," an impending German de resistance of' the rec~ption was the naval expedition against southern Nor­ showing of a new German film depicting, way. Again, no :fleet materialized. When the conquest of Poland, culminating in the Norwegian Legation in Berlin sent a the bombing of Warsaw. This was ohvi­ similar report on 5' April 1940, it was re­ ously intended to be a warning. Evidentl'y ceived with much skepticism in Oslo. The to offset any possibl,e alarming reaction, -Psychological Warfare Section of the Ger­ Dr. Brauer on the next day invited the man General Staff may have' read the old Norwegian Foreign Minister, Dr. Koht, . fable of "Cry Wolfl" along with the United States, Danish, and That the first phase of German psycho­ Swedish Ministers and their wives, for logical preparations was extremely suc" dinner on 19 April-a subtle bit of decep­ cessful is attested by the lateness of the 'tion furthering the first phase of the Ger­ Norwegian mobilization order, despite man psychological program. adequate warnings. British reports of Revolution.-The third phase of the German ships sighted in the Nortl). Sea and German psychological and political pro­ Balti'c were received on 8 April. These gram-the development of revolution­ 'Teports, were confirmed by a report from only brought returns after the invasion the United States Legation in Copenhagen b~gan, but they had received careful prepa­ that a large German naval force, had ration. Quisling, picked by Germany to he passed into the Kattegat. That same after­ the organizer and leader of the potential noon, German soldiers, survivors of a tor­ revolution, had a background strangely pedoed German transport, Rio de Janei1'o, similar to other contemporary conspirator­ landed on the south coast, stating they dictators. He had been a brilliant military were en route to Bergen to help the Nor­ student and young officer. While serving '\vegians defend their country against Rl'l a member of an international relief Britain and France. Still, general mobili­ mission to Russia during the postwar era, zation was not ordered until early on 9 he had been converted to Bolshevism. April 1940. 'i 'Later, returning to Norway and retiring Te1·ror.-The seco*d phase of the Ger­ from the Army, Quisling offered to organ­ man psychological campaign-the produc­ ize "Red Guards" for the Norwegian Labor tion of terror-had its beginnings prior to P.arty. Rejected in this effort, he turned the operation. In contrast to the first to the new Farmers Party, apparently with phase, it only reached its climax after hos~ the idea of forming "Green Guards" and tilities had commenced. Veiled threats as became an outspoken opponent of the to the possible consequences which an un­ Laborltes, Serving as defense minister fl'iendiy attitude toward Germany might during the short regime of the Farmers invoke had been used in the diplomatic in­ Party in 1931-1933, he invoked widespread tercourse between'lhe two countries during public dislike by a strange "assault" in­ the winter of 1939-1940. These, threats cident on his person, believed to be faked, were particularly pronounced du~ing the and an incendiary speech against the Oity of Flint affa.ir and during the course Labor Party Leaders. ' of 'the Finnish-Soviet War. A curious as­ Soon after, Quisling formed his own pect of the program occurred a few days party, Nasjonal Samling, patterned on before ,the German invasion. On the night Nazi lines. His new party initially gained of 5 AprH 1940, the German Minister in considerable support from the yohth ele­ Oslo, Dr. Curt Brauer; held a reception at ment, 'but this support gradually dedined his Legation, attended by various persons and the party never polled sufficient votes , in the Norwegian government. The piece to place a member in the Storting,. Some THE INVASION OF NORWAY 13 of the characteristic "lines" of the Nazi As related above, Quisling received "per­ program bacldired on Quisling. For in­ sonal instructions" from Hitler 'in De­ stance, the :wearing of colored shirts was cember 1939. In ,the spring, his party outlawed. Since there were practically no paper, Pritt Folk, which had declined to a Jews in Norway, anti-semitism had to be third-rate weekly, suddenly revived into a directed against "spiritual Jews.'; daily. He was again called to Copenhagen Rosenberg was evidently fooled as to on 4 April 1940 for a conference with Quisling's ability, probably due to Quis­ Piepenbrock, German Chief of 'Counter­ ling's own delusions. In a report on one Intelligence Service, presumably for last­ of Quisling's visits, Rosenberg described minute instructions. Quisling returned to Quisling as being one of the best-known Oslo ~n 8 April, the day before the attack. officers of the Norwegian General Staff, Thus, the German preparations for revolu­ having the high regard of the King and a tion were complete. following of two to three thousand sup­ porters, including large sections of the The Production of Paralysis Army. In any event, Quisling sold his Military acts.-With the openiJJg of mili­ plan for an overthrow of the Norwegian tary action on 9 April 1940, fue Germans government, with German support, first to intensified their psychological warfare to Rosenberg and then to Admiral Raeder in gain both widespread terror and paralysis, 1939. In doing so, he obtained the train­ the onE; aiding the other. The overwhelm­ ing of selected party members in Germany ing German air superiority made the first and financial support to the extent of easy. It will be recalled that both the main 200,000 gold marks in January 1940. naval base at Horten and the city of Among the other lesser-known conspira­ Kristiansand were surrendered early on tors active during this period was lIagelin, the first day, largely through threat of the Norwegian agent for the purchase of wholesale bombing. As the Norwegians armament in Germany. Without the knowl­ continued resistance, numerous towns were edge of his Norwegian superiors, Hagelin completely leveled, particularly wherever also acted as Quisling's representative in the King and Government were located. Berlin. After the decision on Norway was Some of this undoubtedly was for terror­ taken, a German representative of Rosen­ istic effect. Threat of naval bombardment berg, Scheidt, was placed in the Naval was also used in the same manner. Attache's office in Oslo as liaison with Political acts.-Both the policies of Qui~ling. Through Scheidt, Quisling re­ friendship and terror were followed in the ceived his funds. On one of his visits, diplomatic efforts of Dr. Brauer, the Ger­ Qui"ling showed Rosenberg a letter from man Minister to Norway. Abou~ 0430 on Colonel Sundlo, the senior officer at Narvik, 9 April 1940, Brauer presented an ulti­ which stated he was against the iiresent matum to the Norwegian Foreign Minister, govl'rnment and that it was "a good idea Dr. Koht. It stated that the German gov­ and ,\ useful one to spend one's time risking ernment had unimpeachable evidence of an one',_ neck for the national revival." Sundlo Allied plan to occupy Norway; tliat even beca"l€ Chief of State Police under Quis­ i.f the Norwegi~ns desired to resist, they lin!!,', Another of Quisling'S adherents was did not possess the force to do so; there­ Jon.. ,Lie, Chief of the Norwegian State fore, the German Government had decided Polic Carl J. Hambro, iIi I Saw It Hap­ to come to Norway's aid and prevent S1:lch pen! ' Norway, page 97, attempts to prove an Allied plan. It demanded the surrender Lie 'mocent, but Lie became Quisling's of all military installations and all com­ Min, I,er of Police. munications and the complete censorship 14 MILITARY REVIEW of all news. It finally guaranteed that the and Government, but the ship was sunk. territorial integrity and political' inde­ Quisling attempted by 'telephone on thl! pe~dence of Norway wo'uld be l'espected In morning of 9 April to order the command. accordance with the long friendship be. ing officer of the Elviran District, to which tween tl;le two countries. Then Dr. Brauer the Government fled, to capture the King. remarked as to the terrible consequences A German force, led by the Air Attache in that would befall Norway should she not an official Legation car, was stopped short accept these demands immediately, for of the same goal. The Germans finally German forces were already engaged in had to depose Quisling in order to obtain military operations (of which the Nor­ the cooperation of the administrative wegian government was by that time well functionaries in Oslo. aware). An Integrated Plan Confusion.-Paralysis and despair were gained through the suddenness of the at­ Sound military principles.-As has been tack and the resulting confusion. Aside seel}, the military action of the campaign from its purely military considerations, made full use of the German psychological the simultaneous attack on aU the major lind political pr~parations and all the Norwegian centers with complete strate. means of psychological warfare, but de­ gical and tactical surprise undoubtedly had pendence was not placed on these to' the a paralyzing psychological effect. 'I'he re­ detriment of sound military principles. sulting confusion in the Norwegian mo­ German air superiority-the modern domi­ bilization plans has already been noted. nant weapon-was overwhelming. The This confusion was further .heightened by ground forces were superior at the decisive the seizure of the powerful Oslo radio by , points, both in organization and technical Quisling, who announced about 1000 on 9 equipment, if not in numbers. Use was April that he was now the head of govern· made of air transport for movement to ment, that all mobilization orders were can­ gain speed and surprise. Although the celled, and that resistance to the German German naval forces were inferior to those forces should cease. Quisling had distrib­ which the British were expected to employ, uted in the streets of Oslo the preceding the Germans depended on strategical sur­ evening leaflets stating that the existing prise to gain their objectives before the government must be overthrown and that British could become effective. The Ger­ the Nasjonal Samling must take over. The man plan violated the principle of con· Norwegian Government, having earlier reo centration, opening their forces to defeat treated northward, had only the small in detail, but they depended on immediate radio 'at Hamar, capable of reaching only dislocation of the enemy and the slowness a small section of the country, with which of Allied reaction to prevent defeat until to combat this propaganda: The question­ concentration could again be gained. This able action of Colonel Sundlo at Narvik, plan nearly failed in regard to Narvil<, but the commander at Ft. Agdenes, and others, the imminence of the blow in the West also tended to heighten the confusion. must have been taken into account. Even , . Legality.-The Germans, realizing the in the selection of the date for the attack, psychological effect of legality, made con· military considerations outweighed "ther tinuous but futile llttempts to gain the fac~ors. Despite the urging of Qu;sling recognition of Quisling by the King, after and Admiral Raeder for an ear{ier date" failing to capture the King as planned. the most favorable weather for the mili­ The BlUcher had aboard the SS and, Ges­ tary action was apparently the cont! "lling tapo agents who were to capture the King factor. Thus, the non-military merns of THE INVASION OF NORWAY 15

, warfare were not to replace all or any part anticipated greater returns from their of a sound military plan, but to supplement psychological w~rfare and the paralyzing and enhance its chance for success. effect of their onslaught---similar to the Emphasis on surprise.-It is true, how­ complete 'capitulation in Denmark. There ever, that the military plan depended to a is evidence t~t the failure of Dr. Brauer large extent on ~he achievement of sur­ to obtain legality for Quisling by ac­ prise, including the use of ruses and decep­ quiescence of the King produced somewhat tion, which reflected the German confidence of a political crisis in Hitler's headquar­ in their psychological preparations. All ters. However, there is some evidence that preparations were cpnducted in extreme Dr. Brauer had not been fully informed as secrecy and made to appear as if they were to Quisling's destined role. Admiral Raeder a part of the preparations for the offensive sharply criticized the mishandling of the in the W e~t. The concealing of troops in political end of the operation in his sum­ the holds of merchant ships arriving at mary dated 22 April 1940. Bergen and Narvik (and possibly Trond­ Such anticipation is similarly reflected heim) reduced the number of transports in the instructions issued to the troops re­ accompanying the naval convoys into the garding the patient attitude to be taken North Sea, thereby further aiding 'strate­ toward the Norwegians. The remarks of gical deception. Hambro, cited previously, survivors of the Rio de Janeiro have al­ states the trade agreement with Germany ready been noted. Parachutists landing at allowed the use of double crews on Ger­ Dombas, surprised at the resistance, ex­ man freighters transporting fish in order claimed: "But-they are firiI)g on us!" to facilitate loading. The German naval Expected non-resistance may have also order for the operation directed that all been the reason for the BlUcher's close ap­ forces were to fly the British flag upon proach to Ft. Oscarsborg. It is reported entering ports and to use British signals, that a German naval officer later stated because of information that the Norwe­ that no resistance was expected from Ft. gians would not oppose a British invasion. Agdenes at Trondheim. The exception to this order was to be at But the complete success of the cam­ Narvik. There is also some evidence of the paign, despite such set-backs, only testifies German use of Norwegian and Red Cross to the completeness of the over-all inte­ uniforms. grated German plan. Such completeness is A n example of audacity.-The confidence also reveaJed by the inclusion of an eco­ which the Germans had in the success of nomic section on Von Falkenhorst's staff, their psychological production of Norwe­ concerned with the immediate use of cap­ gian op'timism is reflected in a' unique ex­ tured enemy supplies and native resources, amph' of'reconnaissance. One afternoon in and the immediate resurrection of Nor­ Feb"Iary 1940, a German transport air­ way's economic production to aid the total plm", landed on ,Fornebo airport from German war effort. The inclusion of troops whir'1, some 30 passengers disembarked and from Austria, whose youth had been spent scati 'fed over the field taking pictures, in Norwegian homes (termed by the Nor­ mak";g- sketches and writing notes. When wegians : Wiener-barn), attests to the de­ ask< " for papers, the pilot produced a per­ 'tailed planning. mit ".' investigate the Altmark, about 40 milt ,t\vay. This incident,'occurring at the Conclusions heig- , of the "Altmark affair," went al­ The contention of one author, that the mos' lllnoticed. purpose of the Norwegian campaign was to ' L itations.-The Germans apparently test wh~ther the Allies were prepared for 16 MILI'J;'ARY REVIEW

total warfare in the West, can be definitely chological SUCCeSS was the strengthening of refuted from the evidence now available". the Norwegian attitude of "it can't happen Although there may have been some effect here." This is the principal condition on Allied morale-pmpaganda of the which enabled German surprise. German deed-th~ campaign was undertaken be­ "Comparative National Psychology" de­ cause of a definite decision that the "Nor­ manded that the weak and strong points {if wegian space" was needed for the German all countries be studied. The Germans were war effort. In his directive for the opera­ thus intentionally prepared, "tion, Hitler gave as the object of the opera­ There were certain German failures in tion: (a) to pI'event British encroachment the psychological field, notably the over­ into Scandinavia and the Baltic, (b) to estimation of Quisling's strength"within. guarantee the "ore base" in Sweden, and Norway and the temper of the Norwegian (c) to give the German Navy ann Air Government, but these were largely mis­ . Force a "wider start line" against Britain. takes in technique and not in principles. Once the decision was 'undertaken to That Quisling did add considerably to the occupy Norway (and Denhi~rk), the execu­ weakening of effective resistance by his tion was not left to military force alone. ,attempt to counteract the mobilization All means, military ann non-military, order over the Oslo radio is attested by which would contribute in any way'to the both Dr. Halvdan Koht and Mr. Carl J. paralyzation ann dislocation of the enemy, Hambro, the Norwegian Foreign Minister were exploited. Even the handicap of naval and President of the Storting, respectively. inferiority was overcome by the use of The lesson to the United States is clear. surprise and audacity, attributable in no The unrealities of pacifism and the belief smal1 part to the adroit exploitation of the that all peoples desire to live as we would non-military means of warfare. like them to live are too prevalent in the That psychological and political condi­ United States today, just as they were in tions favorable to the German plan of op­ Norway. These "national maladjustments" eration existed in Norway, even before are the sustenance of psychological war­ the decision was taken, was no accident. fare. We certainly have among us persons Long, conscientious study had been given deluded by foreign ideologies. These per­ to psychological warfare in Germany. One sons are the sustenance of revolution. of the basic tenets evolved was: Propaganda cannot win wars, nor can 'it prevent Psychological wnrfare must score its mo:-:t de­ defeat. but its psychological techniques, if applied cis.ive SU{,CGsses prior to the outbreak of armed persistently and timed accurately. can be a deciding hostilities. * factor in battles. particularly in total war.** Certainly, Norway proves this conclu­ - Norway proves that propagand!l can win sion, for the one outstanding German psy­ the battle for time. We must understand and be prepared for warfare of extended .. Col. A. Blau. Intellectual lVa-r!are, (Potsdam: Voggenreitter. 1988). quoted in German Psycho­ strategy. logical Warfare, ed. by Ladislas Farago. (New York: Committee for National MQrale. 1941, p. 49.) Col. *~ F. Bertkau and H. Franke. "Intellectual Warfare," Blau was on the Derman General Staff, and this Handbuch dOT neuzeitlichen WehrwisBcnschaftell. work is considered the basic German text in this (Berlin: Gruyter. 1936), Vol. 1. pp. 105-9. quoted field. , in GeT.man Psychological Warfare, p. 57.

The most powerful influence for peace today is the spiritual force exerted by a strong nation of free peoples who have the will to remain free and who are determined to'assist free men everywhere in protecting their. cherished freedoms. ' • Lieutenant Geneml Albert C. Wedemeyej' The' 11th Airborne Division 1n the " . Mountain Operation

Major Joseph B. Seay, Infantry Instru,ctor, Command and General Staff College

'T ODAY, most of our inst;uction and crossing of the Leyte Mountains by the plans for future warfare are based on the 11th Airborne Division. larger ,operations of World' War II. In The Leyte mountain operation of the gen~al. this is sound. because the, indica­ 11th Airborne Division teaches two lessons tions are that in any future war we must 4 that have been' generally overlooked. The be prepared to attack or to defend on a first is that the ground training given to large scale from the very start of hostili­ . airborne units, which is erroneously called ties, .Our e'nemies will not permit us the highly specialized airborne unit training, time to delay with small. isolated forces would be a valuable asset to any ground while we organize and plan for· a major combat unit. This training involves oper­ I defen.se or counterattack. Therefore. we' ating with little equipment and little ar­ i must do our organizing and planning on a tillery support, and planning and executing i large scale now, with due

Inti;", mountain jungles of Leyte in 1944, the 11th Airborne Division sUPi"ied its ,combat elements almost entire!y by liaison planes for a mor.'n and a half, a resourceful solution to a difficult supply problem 18 MILITARY' REVIEW

Division land~d on Leyte at Bito B~ach, a and companies maneuvered in, Indian-type narrow strip bounded on the north and combat. Unusual and ingenious measures south by' swift, unfordable rivers, and on were adopted to overcome the obstacles the west by a formidable swamp, , imposed by the terrain and weather. The general'situation at the'time or'the ' The Artillery Problem landing is shown on Map 1. The 96th and 7th Infantry' Divisions of XXIV Corps By 1 ,December, almost all combat el'e­ were in contact with the Japanese' in the ments had advanced beyond range of the foothills around Dagami and Burauen. The division artillery's 75-mm ,pack howitzers, Japanese were. resisting furiously and The most forward elements of the divi­ were successfully landing reinforcements sion had advanced beyond the range of the at Ormoc. Corps Field Order No. 28, re­ two 105-mm Battalions attached f~om the ceived 22 November, directed the 11th Air­ 7th Infantry Division. The advance' to borne Division to relieve the 7th Infantry Lubi had ·been supported by the Corps Division in place. 'It further directed 7th , 155-mm howitzers and 155-mm guns, but Infantry Division,to swing south, cross now the nature of the terrain and the lack the mountains by the Abuyog-Bay Bay of well-defined lines and accurate maps road to the west coast, and attack north to for pah'ols called for closer support and ,crush the Japanese between its attack and pinpoint accuracy. The division commander the attacks 'of the 24th Indntry Division therefore decided to drop an artillery bat· 'and the }'irst Cavalry Division from the tery, and ultimately a battalion if neces­ nOl,th and east. sary, into a forward position from which By 28 November, the relicf had been it could support all forward elements of completed. Patrols had been sent west­ the division. Manarawat-a small table ward to locate trails, villages, and Japa­ top about 200 yards long by 160 yards nese troop concentrations. The 511th wide, rising 150 feet above the river and Parachute Infantry Regiment had been surrounded on three sides by sheer cliffs­ alerted to spearhead the move to the west was' chosen for this artillery position. coast through the pass between Mahonag From this central location, 360 degree and Anas (see Map 2), for the purpose of support could be rendered the combat splitting the Japanese position in two. troops throughout the operation. During this first 10 days, the rains had To drop one battalion of airb~rne 75­ rendered the few roads almost impassable. mm pack howitZers simultaneously would US Highway 1, paralleling the coast, was require 13 C-47 airplanes. Based ou San, never completely usable during the opera­ Pablo Air Strip No.2 was one C-47 plane, tion.· The move of the division northward which was employed when necessary on' from Bito Beach to the line of departure air-sea rescue work. On 3 and 4 December, had to be made by amphibious tractors Battery A, 457th Parachute Field Artil­ and landing craft. Any vehicular traffic lery Battalion, was dropped on the ;Wan­ to or beyond the line of colltact was out of arawat position by making 13 sorties with the question. the one C-47 plane, The mountains around The fighting from Burauen through the the table-top position forced the pilot to mountains to Anonang, Lubi, and Man­ follow a ,moori-shaped canyon, m~ke a araw~t was marked by. several events. blind turn to the right, drop, hisl stick of COmpany G and the headquarters of the troopers and equipment from a 30,/-foot l/11th Parachute ~nfantry Regiment were altitude, and then'zoom up sharply cO the amb),lshed. C]lb'planes dropped smnll arms , left at the end of the 200-yard drop zone. nnd food..to su~rounded ·forces.. Battalions Onlr superior flying -and the highl· pro­ THE 11TH AIRBORNE DIVISION IN THE LEYTE MOUNTAIN .OPERATION 19.

MAP 1. THE WAR WITH JAPAN" lEYTE CAMPAIGN

30 MilES

187

674

6"

4'7 ,.2 ,th AIRBORNE Relieves '" 7th DIVISION 221 l8 NOVEMBER 1944. 20 MILITARY ,REVIEW: ficient jump mastering by the artillery borne G-4, to consider air supply. At first battalion commander made possible the glance, the picture' did not appear too drop of the entire battery without the loss bright. In spite of our air superiority, of a man or a weapon. many J ap planes broke through to strike During this same period, the assistant our rear areas. C-47s could not fiy safely division commander, the Dilllision G-3, without fighter cover. The prevailing low representatives of the other general staff ceiling and bad weather prevented {;-47 . sections, and a detachment from the signal flights into the mountains for days at a company with an SCR-694 radio, were time, and drop zones wer~ so 'small that it pal'achuted in to Manarawat to establish was difficult or impossible to hit them a division forward command post, using flying at the speed and altitude necessary the, division artillery liaison planes for for the larger planes. One C-47, attempt. the drops. ing an emergency ration drop to a bat­ Manarawat became an important Mm­ talion' of the 511th Parachute Infantry munications center. Six trails converged Regiment, crashed into Mt. Catmon. The there. A portable surgical hospital was 5~th Troop Carrier Wing had only five dropped in and casualties were evacuated planes and facilities available on a full by walking or by litter parties. A supply time basis to supply the 32d Infantry Divi· dump was established, using carabao sion, which was in a situation similar to caravans for transportation at first. A that of the 11th Airborne Division. platoon of engineers was jumped in to clear The 11th Airborne Division was able to and level a dog-leg strip that could be secure the services of six L-5s from a used with difficulty to land liaison planes liaison squadron. With these planes, the to evacuate the seriously wounded to a 11 L-4s organic to the division artillery, hospital on the rear air strip at San Pablo. and the part-time services of the C-47 A platoon of paratroopers from B Com­ rescue plane, the division set up and pany, 187th Infantry, was jumped in to operated an air supply system that was to guard the hospital. This'released a like make it possibl!l to accomplish its mission. number of men from the 511th Parachute The cub planes -were concentrated at Infantry Regiment for duty with the regi­ San Pablo Strip No.2. A provisional air ment in its forward position. All the cargo resupply detachment was organized jumps, e~cept the artillery battery's drop, from division service units and supplies were made from L-4 liaison planes of the were stockpiled and packaged for cub de­ divisiQn artillery. livery. Systematic supply runs were planned and executed. Priority was to the Supply Difficulties forward-most units in contact. The dump The carabao caravans proved inade'luate at Manarawat was built up as a reserve to for transporting supplies. They were slow be drawn from by carrying parties from and required many animals with a driver the "forward units when the weather closed for .each animal. The'drivers had to be fed in. Strangely enough, Manarawat was imd guarded and did not relish the 2-day often open for drops at times when most trip to Manarawat. Forward from Man- . of the forward drop zones were closed in. arawat, the trails were not secure from In addition, the one C-47 made aIr of its ,the en~my and were almost impassable for drops at Manarawat, because the drop carabao anyway. It became evident that zones of the outlying 'units were too small the entire supply system must' be revised or inaccessible to C-47s. A 4-day l~vel of if the combat forces were to receive ade­ supply was thus built up at Manarawat. quate support. .one would expect an air­ Calls for unit air supply were m~de to THE 11TH AIRBORNE DIVISION IN THE LEYTE MOUNTAIN OPERATION 21

Supplying the forward elements of the 11th Airborne Division in the mountain jungles of Leyte was 'a difficult problem caIling for unusual measures. Carabao caravans (left, above) proved inadequate. Air supply, mainly using oniy small liaison planes, was tried and proved successful. Manarawat (right, above, as seen from the air) became an important communications center in the Division attack against the Japanese. Right, a man parachuting into Manarawat. Below, one end of the small air strip at Manarawat. showing some of the planes used in the unusual supply system.-Photos by permission of The Infantry Journal Press. 22 MILITARY REVIEW

. G-4, forward, at Manarawat. Priorities 187th Infantry and other units ov~r a were .established and requisitions sub­ period of 5 days. mitted by·· radio to the rear where they . The airborne assault caused more were filled at the San Pablo dump. Here trouble. It came at dusk on the 6th. The a group of lightweight men packaged the surprise was complete, "and the Japs cap­ supplies, loaded the planes, and for par­ tured and held most of the strip until the .ticularly difficult drops, rode in the rear division could organize its engineer ~at­ seats to push out the cargo. Free drop talion, signal company, and headquarters 'was used for all cargo except artillery battery of. the division artillery for a ammunition, some fragile medical supplies, counterattack. The division engineer led and radio equipment. Artillery ammuni­ the counterattack, which was soon rein­ tion was dropped entirely from the C-47 forced by the 674th Field Artillery Bat­ onto the gun position. Pilots flew from talion. After 2 days, the strip was cleared. daylight to dark, 2 to 12 hours a day, in fair and bad weather. On many days, a Effects of the Attack thick gray fog hugged the mountain areas, Four days after the attack, the liaison and the pilots had to circle to find an planes were partially repaired or replaced opening near the drop zone. Once under and the supply system was back in opera­ the ceiling, they made the drop and spiraled tion. upward, hoping to break out on top The interruption in the supply was felt before encountering a mountain peak. immediately and severely by the" troops in the mountains. Troops in the forward Japanese Attack positions had little or no reserves. The On 6 December, the Japanese struck the Manarawat dump was almost depleted be­ division rear area with an airborne attack fore aerial resupply could be resume.d. on the dump at San Pablo Strip No.2, San Just when operations got back to normal, Pablo Strip No.1, and the Buri Strip. The the weather became even worse. Open skies . Japanese plans, it was learned later, had were rare a'hd the pilots had difficulty in been a coordinated attack with the 26th finding holes in the overcast. Japanese"' Division moving eastward When the weather "opened up again, the through the Mahonag-Anas "pass, with the attack was vigorously renewed. The situa­ remnants of the 16th Japanese Division tion was a precarious one from the· supply standpoint and the sooner the operation moving south and east from the Mt. Lobi was completed the better. The dhl'ision area. Both units were to converge on commander regrouped his forces, heavily Burauen at the time of the drop. weighted his main effort, and pushed One regiment of the 26th Japanese Di­ through the Mahonag-Anas pass to the vision got through the pass, but it attacked Ormoc Bay area on the west coast. Burauen 5 days late. It was repulsed with Clearing the Leyte Mountains was by no heavy losses and scattered in the hills west means easy. Strong points were redueed of Burauen, to starve in small groups or by companies, battalions, and compo:;ite be annihiIiated or captured by 11th Air­ groups, and by coordinated attacks by bor:rle Division patrols. The 16th Japanese battalions. The last of these major s¥rong Division assembled about 1,500 men at a points was at Anonang; which was cap­ point 1,500 yards from the Buri Strip. tured in the Battle of Purple Heart Hill These troops attacked, and several hundred on 26 December 1944. The division t '1en of them reached Buri Strip, dug in, and began to move back to Bito Beach to pre­ had to be destroyed by a battalion of the pare for its next operation-the div:;oion THE 11TH AIRBORNE DIVISION IN THE LEYTE MOUNTAIN OPERATION 23 .

121 (-) XX

408 (-) ~11 FWD CP

511 (-)~11

11 REAR

152

674 .'5

408 (-)

511 (-)

I I 711

MAP 3. .I 221 (.) TARRAGONA JAP~NESE PARACHUTE 152}1!!2e ATTACK AND SITUATION ON 152 ~ 6 DECEMBER 1944.

MAP 4. ATTACK THROUGH MAHONAG 6 DECEMBER - 24 DECEMBER 1944 24 MILITARY REVIEW

combined amphibious-airborne attack into for air supply in the airhead in an air. Southern Luzon to strike the Manila gar­ borne operation. rison in the rear. This seemed easy after The 75-mm pack howitzer proved itself Leyte. valuable far beyond expectations. The one The Lessons battery which was dropped into the moun­ tains fired many thousands of rounds on An analysis of the air supply opera­ targets that could not be hit by,the larger tions in the Leyte Mountains shows that calibers back on the plains. . for short hauls of 25 to 50 miles in moun­ The air supply system used by the 11th tainous terrain liaison planes are actually Airborne Division in the Leyte mountain superior to C-47s. This estimate considers operation was not entirely satisfactory be­ the cub's rapid loading and take-oft' time cause of the small number and low capac­ from crowded strips, its ability to use im­ ity of planes available and the uncertain provised strips, and the inability of the weather. The :attachment of an entire larger planes to come in low through the liaison squadron to the division would have mountain passes and to drop their cargo helped. Troops were often on half or third on small drop zones. Further, enemy,planes ra.tions for 1 or 2 days at a time. When do not; as a l'ule; attack the cub planes, forward drop zones were closed in, for­ while. C-47s must fly with fighter escort. ward units had to send carrying parties to The types of cargo that can be handled by ·Manarawat for supplies, depleting the the liaison craft are food, small arms, fighting strength of the units. Existence automatic weapons ammunition, 60-mm was on a hand-to-mouth basis and support and 81-mm mortar ammunition, communi­ was never certain, which put th~ com­ cations equipment such as radios and radio mander in a very undesirable position. batteries, and medical supplies and equip­ But the division, nevertheles;, had a ment. Artillery ammunition must be car­ mission to accomplish. The remarkable ried by C-47 and parachuted to the drop feature of the operation is that the divi­ zone. This will normally be possible, be­ sion di'd supply its combat elements en­ cause the area'that is large enough for the tirely by air for a period of a month and droQ.J of a battery of artillery is also large a half, using only 17 liaison planes, and a enough to hit with a C-47 drop of ammuni­ single C-47 plane occasionally. This sup­ tion. port enabled the division to au!omplish its As ~ result of this successful air supply mission. It advanced through the jungle­ operation, the division commander recom­ covered mountains of Leyte in extremely mended that an L-5 squadron be attached bad weather, overcame an enemy that was to each airborne division. Not only would well dug in and adequately supplied, cut these phines prove invaluable in operations the Japanese defenses in two, and de­ similar to the one described here but also stroyed all Japanese forces in'the area.

The troop carrier pilots, and their ,associates in combat, the airborne, t'roopers, will play the leading role in future aerial combat. Major General James M. Gavin AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ECONOMICS OF MOBILIZATION

Lieutenant Colonel Carl T. Schmidt; Infantry Former Instructor, Command and General Staff College

The Problem and technology must be organized and I . N WAR, the belligerent with the operated for the particular purposes of greater industrial potential has an enor­ war. The ability of a nation to solve this mous advantage over its enemy. A nation problem is a big part of its over-all war whose economy in peacetime employs effi­ capabilities. ciently and on a large scale an abundance The purpose of this article is to present of human and material resources is also briefly certain of the basic organizational strong in its industrial potential for war. and control requirements of a war economy. But even the biggest human and material Central Control resources and the most advanced industrial technology do not'of themselves guarantee Few persons today, other than conscien­ victory. In some respects, specific prepara­ tious objectors, dispute the government's tions in the fields of resources and tech­ obligation to take charge of military man­ niques must be made a part of a nation's power mobilization. Left to themselves, peacetime security measures. For exampl'e, individuals would not volunteer their stock-piling of raw materials, develop­ services quickly enough nor in sufficient ment of substitute materials, and pro­ numbers to meet the needs of the armed vision of certain facilities and equipment forces. Moreover, the uneven flow of vol­ may he required. unteers from various walks of life would Beyond all this, however, a nation's tend to disrupt industries whose continuous ability to shift its economic system quickly operation is essential to the war effort. and etficiently to war conditions is of vital' Similar considerations point to the need importance. The industrial requirements for governmental mobilization of the in­ of war are so different from those of peace, dustrial labor, materials, and machinery and I'hey are so urgent and large, that of the nation. (except for nations constantly on a war Put in simplest terms, the argument for footil·!.c-) a special organization of the in­ national governmental control and cmlr­ dustrial system for war is necessary. That dination of industrial mobilization in war­ is, tho potential of population, materials, time rather than dependence upon indi­

The'ibility of a nation to shift its economic system efficiently and quiciJy from normal peacetime pursuits to the conditions of war ;s one of tIe big factors' in its over-all capability of waging successful war MILITARY REVIEW vidual actions is this: The decisions made' 3. To control prices and ration scarce by individuals for themselves, however goods. reasonable they might appear from the 4. To undertake economic warfare. individual standpoint, are likely to be in­ sufficient, or too slow, or wrong, from the Increasing War Production standpoint of the nation as a whole, when When war comes, there is a tremendous the nation is faced by the ,overwhelming increase in the demand for many civilian proble~ of survival and victory in war. and military goods. Yet, in the face of Mobilization Tasks this rising demand, a number of obstacles which may put a heavy brake on industrial What, then, are the tasks of national output are likely to arise. if left alone. government in economic mobilization for One such obstacle appears when there is war? a heavy-handed general mobilization of The aim of a war economy is to insure manpower for' the armed forces. That is, the maximum utilization of the nation's many skilled workers may be withdrawn resources of manpower, materials, and from mines, factories, and railways at the equipment in the effort to defeat the enemy. very time that their skills are most In order to make an adequate supply of urgently needed in the operation of war manpower available to the armed forces, industry. Their places may be taken hy and, at the same time, to allot a sufficient older and younger workers~by women, and number of workers to the production of by recruits from non-esseiltial industries. war materials and essential civilian goods, But these people will at first be less effi­ it is necessary to utilize all available labor cient than the former workers. At the power. Labor must be directed into the same time, a speed-up of labor and higher necessary production fields through a prices of goods may lead to unrest, high system of priorities and drafts. labor turnover, and reduced productivity. In order to curtail civilian production Steps have to be taken to counteract all and expand war production, the flow of this..For one thing, over-mobilization of raw materials must be controlled so that manpower for the armed forces must be essential production is adequately sup­ avoided. On the basis of a detailed study plied. As an aid to financing the war and of national manpower requirements, cer­ the smooth operation of the economic sys­ tain age groups and certain occupations tem, it is necessary to establish a system must be made exempt from military con­ of price controls. The rationing of scarce scription, at least for a time. Further­ civilian items is imperative in order to more, activities of labor and management insure'the maximum efficiency and morale that hinder the expansion of essential of the population. In addition to stressing production have to be restricted. It will domestic war production, it is also neces­ probably be necessary ·to recruit unskilled sary to undertake measures that will lower workers, older men, women, and young the war production of the enemy-that is, people for work in war industries. These to engage in economic warfare. new workers must be trained. If they are To sum up, the essential tasks in eco­ brought to centers of industry,. they must mobilization are: n~mic be housed. At the same time, lab?l' must 1. To allocate properly, labor, materials, be withdrawn from the less important and facilities., trades and industries. Obviously, if the 2. To curtail civilian production and pressure of war is heavy enough. con­ expand war production. scriptive measur~s will be appliedas much AN ,INTRODUCTION TO THE ECONOMICS OF MOBILIZATION 27

to industrial manpoWer as to military that the government gets by borrowing manpower. is provided by the banks, and it is an It is also necessary that the production ' addition to the purchasing power already of non-essentials-like elaborate houses, available to the country at large. Moreover,

, pleasure automobiles, and jewelry-be the government I bonds held by the banks curtailed and that the output of munitions, may be used by them as a basis for ex­ , machines that make munitions, and other panding their cre.dits to individuals and essential supplies be greatly expanded. business firms. Thus, there is a tendency The prime means to this end is a system for the total purchasing power in the of priorities. Under a priorities system, nation to rise more rapidly than the amount a specific ranking is attached to the vari­ of goods available for purchase. ous industrial orders, processes of produc­ The name we give to this situation is tion, and supplies of materials, in accord­ i'nflation. Prices of goods and wages of ance with a scale of their importance to .labor rise, some more, some less. The gov­ the war effort. Furthermore, under this ernment, business firms, and" individuals system, materials, transportation facili-. compete for labor, raw' materials, and ties, and loans are allocated by the govern­ finished goods. Some people stand to profit ment to the various industries in accord­ from the mounting prices. Others, whose ance with the importance and urgency of incomes lag behind the rise of prices, make their war production. heavy sacrifices. These are the people who live on more or less fixed incomes-re­ War Finance ceivers of rent, interest, salaries, and, to The government needs a vastly increased a smaller extent, wages. In other words, amount of money, '01' purchasing power; inflation results in a hidden kind of taxa­ during war. How can the government get tion, a taxation that is uneven and hap­ this purchasing power? It can be obtained hazard in' the burdens it places on the either by borrowing or taxing. people. ' Outright, straightforward taxation is Much the same thing happens if the the most logical method. The taxpayer's government goes in for the old-fashioned purchasing power is definitely and quickly method of obtaining more money simply by curtailed. This has the effect of reducing grinding more dollar bills out of the print­ non-essential consumer demand for goods ing presses. Currency inflation is an easy that should go into war production. but an inequitable and dangerous method But taxation has its limitations. It is a of war finance. It is dangerous because it slow way for the government to get money. leads to inefficient production and low In war, the government needs money in a . morale. 'The conclusion is that, if the gov­ hurry. This is the main reason-together ernment in wartime supplements tax with the largely incorrect notion of many measures with loans, it must take steps to peop!" that war can be financed less pain­ prevent inflation. fully by m~ans other than taxation-that govel'lll11ents in wartime resort in large Price Controls measure to borrowing. Obviously, it is desirable to avoid the Th,.' big danger in large-scale borrow­ spiral of higher and higher prices. Rising ing, "".loan financing, i~ not that the gov­ prices of munitions will' complieate the ernll1"nt has to pay interest on war bonds pr'oblems of war finance. Rising prices of and ,I'entually pay the principal back. es~ential consumer goods will lead to labor The p,ain trouble is that it makes for price unrest and wage increases. Higher wages inflat "JIl. Most of the purchasing power mean increased costs of production, and 28 MILITARY REVIEW

, manufacturers' will soon raise their prices 'warfare. Economic warfare is another further. The changes in prices will cause aspect of military {lconomics. Essentjally, many economic and social troubles. These economic warfare attempts to reduce the reasons make price control necessary. By enemy's war potential by destroYing or the same token, wages must be regulated, capturing the materials and facilities' in order to eliminate labor disputes and to necessary to his war effort and by block­ hold down labor turnover in industries. 'ing the movement of supplies to him'from Under a system of price fixing, the abroad. It requires a blending of miptary quantities of goods demanded will be in and economic measures. Air power has excess of the quantities supplied at the increased to a tremendous extent the range fixed prices. That is, there will not be over which military measures of economic enough goods available to meet all de­ warfare may become effective.' At the mands. In order that the scarce goods same time, an ever-wider sector of the may go to the people and industries that economic system has been placed in the need them most in the interests of the war service of war, resulting in an increase in effort, action must be taken to withhold the objects of economic warfare and in a them from less important ones. This is ~ountry's vulnerability to its effects. achieved by means of priorities. In othe; words, the systems of price control and of Aspects of Economic Mobilization priorities supplement each other. ' It is important for military men to be aware of the importance of these measures Rationing of economic mobilization. The ability of a When the supply of consumer necessi­ nation to use them effectivel:, is one of the ties-food, clothing, shelter-falls below main elements in its ability to make war. prewar levels, rationing of these necessi­ We should bear in mind that a totali­ ties has to be introduced so that they will tarian country such as the Union of Soviet be distributed fairly. Otherwise, people Socialist Republics has a big start on us with plenty of money, old friends of the in economic preparation for war. Tick grocer" and persons who have nothing them off: labor conscription; directing better to do than shop will find means of workers, materials, and funds to the in­ getting more shoes and meat than people dustries that the government believes most who have less money and time and more important from a national standpoint; patriotism. Although rationing is neces­ severe labor discipline; curtailment of the sary to the fair distribution of scarce (Jutput of consumers' goods; and price con­ goods in time of war, it leads to black trol. Totalitarian nations haye these things, market operations, by which purchasers not just in wartime, but all the time. Their 6btain' goods not available at ceiling people are accustomed to them, the gov­ prices or in excess of the quotas allotted ernment officials know how to operate them. to them. No government has succeeded in Industrially,'such a country can go' to war eliminating the black market entirely, and overnight. it is likely to persist until free trading is It is not surprising that nations whose restored. economic system are relatively free in Economie Warfare peacetime often find themselves ill-pre­ In ,addition to these measures taken to pared when war begins. The Bri~ish and maximize domestic war, production, it is French appeasement of Nazi Germany be­ also necessary to undertake measures that fore 1939 came, at least in part, from a will lower the war production of 'the recognition that neither their armit" nor enemy-that is, to engage in economic their economies were ready for war The AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ECONOMICS OF MOBILIZAT10N 29

'United States entered the last war some­ We must remember this lesson. We have what better prepared. The war in Europe, been saved in the past by the precious gift had been in progress for some time, and of time and space that enabled our people Britain and France had placed with us to beat their plowshares into swords after large orders for munitions. American war had been thrust upon them. But mod­ military production was further stimulated ern weapons are destroying our old safe­ by the lend-lease program. But even with guards of time and space. this advance preparation, the United States was on the strategic defense for However, as World War II has shown, many months after the Pearl Harbor if democratic countries can withstand the attack. But for the oceans surrounding initial shock of war, ~nd if they are 'not Britain, the Dominions, and the United utterly surprised by the enemy, they can States, it is unlikely that any democracy develop both their military and their eco­ anywhere ip. the world would have sur­ nomic power as effectively as any auto-, .•ved the attack of the Axis powers. cratic regime.

The major defects of past industrial mobilizations have been inexperience of civilian plant operators in producing purely military items, inefficient allocation of material due to competition between the services and between them and private enteJ;prise, dlliays caused by retooling, by shortage of skilled manpower in some areas while surplus existed in others. The funda­ mental defect, however, was the lack, during peacetime years, of coordinated preparation by the industrial and military establishments for the future effort that would be demanded of them jointly. To remedy past defects and assure a quick, effective wartime conversion, legislation should be enacted that will permit wartime allocation of materials in the proper measure for key plant operation; control over manpower to eliminate plant raiding and work dodging; a system of priorities that will requce competition between essentials and nonessentials; and the placing of educational orders that will keep industry acquainted with military, developments. General of the,A?"mY Dwight D. Eisenhower A Progress Report on the United States Constabulary

Captain H. P. Rand, Field Artillery

A N EARLIER article 'in the MILITARY took over the functions of th'e Third United REVIEW discussed the history, organiza­ States Army and many Third Army tasks tion, and operation of the United States became its responsibility. Dhting February, ·Cqnstabulary from the time of its incep­ the headquarters moved fr~m Bamberg to tion in early 1946 until the end of the Heidelberg, which had bepb. Third Army first 6-months' period of 6peration. * headquarters. Third Arnh in Europ~ Many changes have taken place since then phased out on 15 March t947, and Con­ to affect the structure and operations of stabulary headquarters returned to full· the Lightningbolt force. However, the time duty on its primary mission. name, primary mission, distinctive uni­ A general Theater reorganization took form, and Insignia remain as in the past. place during this same period. Certain The purpose of this article is to bring administrative functions; previously per· readers up-to-date. formed by the Base Sections, were now concentrated under newly, organized units, Personnel and Organization the Military Posts. Constabulary Head· Early in 1947, the redeployment of en­ quarters functioned as headquarters of list~d men took on large proportions and the Second District of Military Posts, the no compehsating shipments of replace­ 1st Infantry Division serving as head­ ments arrived from the Zone of Interior. quarters of the First District. The divid­ As a result, the Constabulary found itself ing line between First and Secohd Mili­ greatly understrength. In order to alle­ tary Districts was the geographical viate this situation, it was decided to make boundary between the German states of one troop in each squadron inoperative, Bavaria (First District) ~nd Hesse and retaining four line troops and a headquar­ Wurttemberg~Baden (Second District). It ters froop as tpe basic organization of the is to be noted that no sU<'h dividing line squadron. In addition, the light tank existed between the area ~ of the United troops, which had been organic in all regi­ States Constabulary and the 1st Infantry ments, were inactivated. The reduction of Division as far as their respectivl' pri­ lirie troops to four per squadron was in mary functions were concerned. This. line with a new table of organization ·for additional ta~k remained with Constabu­ which early War Depal"tment approval lary Headquarters until the Districts were was anticipated. phased out in the spring of 1948 t and the A heavy burden fell on the Constabulary Military Posts were placed directly nnder in January 1947, when the headquarters European Command (EUCOM). In the spring of 1947, the Theat,>f re­ '" "Mobility. Vigilance. Justice:' by Lt. Col. A. F. lrzyk. March 194i. ceived a cut in troop strength, aid the

" tiri A PROGRESS REPORT ON THE. UNITED STATES CONSTABULARY 31

Constabulary had to absorb its share. The Of the five' remaining regiments one, Constabulary was called on to submit a the 2d, was concentrated in a single loca­ new table of organization, based on a tion.' A light tank. troop was reactivated reduced troop 'ceiling. The plan which was for it and a recoilless rifle troop added. put into effect provided for a substantial The squadrons of the other four regiments decrease in the number of units within, were located in different towns with specific the Constabulary. One brigade was elim­ operational areas assigned to each. The inated, leaving a total of two. Four regi­ four remaining line troops in each squad­ ments were deactivated, leaving five. Of ron were all ~rganized alike as mechanized 27 squadrons, 11 were deactivated, leaving troops, thus eliminating the motorized 16, These major changes in organization troops which 'existed formerly. were put into effect in several phases, be­ Generally, this organization remained ginning 1 July 1947. In order to retain unchanged until a "remanning table" was units by historical precedence, a general published in April 1948. This provided renumbering process ensued which shifted for a reorganization of all line troops numerical designations from squadron to without making any changes in major squadron. The only squadron unaffected items of equipment. The reason of this by this change was the 1st (Blackhawk) reorganization was the .. fact that the role Squadron, a direct descendant of the of the Constabulary in the Army of 5ccu­ famous 1st Cavalry Regiment. pation had begun to change. During the Under the revised organization, the 1st first year and a half of its' ,existence, the

Since early in 1947~ the role of the United States Constabu!ary in the Army of Occupation in Germany has been gradually shifted from that of , ~ a zonal police. force to military training and normal military duties

Brigade controlled the same area as the Constabulary was primarily a police force. Secone! Military District (states of Hesse .Now the emphasis was shifting to a purely and Wurttemberg-Baden) and the 2d military mission which required changes Brigade, the area of the First Military in training, planning, and organization. District (state of Bavaria). The reor­ Under the remanning table, the line troop ganiultion did not entail any change in was composed of troop headquarters and the operational mission of the Constabu­ line platoons of reconnaissance, rifle, and lary, This mission was to "maintain gen­ weapons type. Each reconnaissance pla­ eral military and civil security; assist in toon consisted of identical sections of the fl,'complishment of the objectives of the l,4-ton trucks and M-8s. The rifle platoons Unit(·d States Government in the occupied comprised rifle squads, riding in 2 1h-ton US Zone of Germany (exclusive of the trucks, and light machine-gun sections of Ber!:!! District and Bremen Enclave) by two squads each. The weapons platoons meal' ; of an active patrol system prepared comprised mortar squads and recoilless to 1; .'e prompt and effective action to rifle sections. New weapons, in addition fore" :,11 and suppress riots, rebellions, to the recoilless rifles, included the rocket and : ots prejudical to the security of the launcher and rifle grenade launcher. US ,. 'cupational policies and forces; and The practice of arming each trooper mail ain effective military control of the with a pistol, in addition to a second indi­ bord's encompassing the US Zone:" vidual weapon such as a rifle or subma­ 32, MILITARY REVIEW chine gun, was discontinued under' the ordnance maintenance and truck outfits remanning table. Only one weapon to a as well as one horse' troop. man was the new basis of individual arming. Mortars,' rQcket launchers, and Operations grenade launchers were also authorized Operational tasks have changed with for all headquarters and special troops. the peaceful 'and almost un~velltful prog­ Constabulary Headquarters was forced ress of the occupation. No civil disorders to move from Heidelberg to Stuttgart in have materialized, the German population February 1948, to make way for Head­ has shown no 'animosity toward the United quarters, EUCOM, which gave up Frank­ States Occupation Forces, and, generally, furt to the Bi-zonal Administration. the German police forces "have assumed respon'sibility for internal security to such With the ever-decreasing need for a an extent that Constabulary operations special-type police force in the European could be materially curtaile.d. Ever since Command, the summ~r of 1948 found the the reorganization effected. during mid­ Constabulary undergoing still another re­ ~947, the emphasis of COl;stab~lary op­ organi~ation. This time, the changes were erations has been on intelligence collec­ radical. Regiments were reorganized as tion and liaison with other agencies, such armored cavalry. One regiment remains as Counter Intelligence Corps, Criminal concentrated in one location; the others Investigation Division, Military Govern­ are reinforced by Constabulary squadrons, ment, and German police. Occasional as previously organized. These remaining patrols show the German populace that Constabulary squadrons do whatever police the Lightningbolt force is still around. work needs to be done while the armored The gradual withdrawal from intensive cavalry units concentrate on training. operations began in early '1947, 'when a The new armored cavalry regiments are Theater directive indicate4 the Theater organized generally under Department of Commander's desire that all military units the Army tables. This latest reorganiza­ occupy forme;- German military installa­ tion was accomplished during the summer tions (kasernes) and, wherever feasible, and fall of 1948 but was not officially withdraw from large, overcrowded Ger­ effected by general orders until 20 Decem­ man cities. This resulted in a progressive ber. On that date, the first announcement concentration of Constabulary units until of the changes was released to the press. all were entirely consolidated by squad­ Under this latest plan, the brigades rons, except for a few small detachments assume functions comparable to those of on border posts and other special placi'!s. a combat command in the armored division, A very unexpected and pleasing ac­ and the brigade headquarters have been companiment of these withdrawals from reorganized to fit this new function. In many locations .were the many complaints due time, it is anticipated that special . from the population over the disappear­ tro,ops assigned to the Constabulary will ance of the Constabulary men. Muny a be attached to the brigades. As of the German felt, and many officials expl'essed early part of 1949, the following special it openly and officially, that the depol·ture units, other than the above-mentioned of the yellow-scarved troopers hall g'iven basic units, are organic in the Constabu­ encouragement to criminal element,;, lary:' a field artillery group with 4 bat­ Similarly, of course, many a Mjiitary talions; 2 engineer combat battalions ~1 Government liaison and security "fficer of which was the first Negro Constabulary requested that the Constabulary ret;'rn to unit); several smaller engineer units; his area to assist him and the G, rman A PROGRESS REPORT ON THE. UNITED STATES . CONSTABULARY 33 law-enforcement agencies in maintaining is to turn over some of the US Zone in­ low crime rates and generally in giving ternal security responsibility, formerly everyone a feeling of security. Since the belonging exclusively to tHe Constabulary, Theater Commander's policy was and is to the Military 'Posts who have military to hand the internal functions back to the police and service troops at their disposal Germans, none' of these calls for return to cope with any civil disorders. The tend­ were granted. ency is clearly a return of the Constabu­ The zonal border security functions lary to "normal" military duties. which the Constabulary assumed at the Many observers attribute the unevent­ beginning of its operations were turned ful and smooth execution of the occupation over to the German border police forces to the Constabulary's operations. If it had during the fall of 1947. The Germans were not been for the preventive actions of the given the responsibility for keeping illegal Constabulary during 1946 and 1947, for crossings of the border to a minimum. their ever-active patrols, their effective in­ Allied personnel alone remained the re­ telligence c.ollection, and their close liaison sponsibility of the Constabulary, since with local authorities, the internal situa­ the German police have not as yet been tion in the US Zone of Germany might given authority over them. With the com­ well have been entirely different. It is plete opening of the British and French difficult, if not impossible, to fully assess interzonal bounda·ries during 1948, the last the actual effect of the Constabulary. remaining Constabulary border posts there However, in fairness to the tremendous were withdrawn. Only on the Russian effort made by the Constabulary, this border are permanent check points for speculation should be part of the record. Allies maintained. A few "international During a typical month in 1946 and trains," operating across national borders, 1947, anywhere from 400,000 to 1,000,000 are still spot-checked by the troopers to miles were travelled by foot, motorcycle, collect information on the effectiveness horse, and vehicular patrols of the Con­ and efficiency of German controls. stabulary. From 8,000 to 15,000 road During 1946 and 1947, the Constabulary blocks were established, and from 1,500 made a continuous effort to help German to 2,700 L-5 liaison plane missions were law-enforcement agencies to regain theil' flown. These operations were accomplished operational know-how and prestige, which from more than 200 stations. Today, all they had lost while operating as stooges Constabulary units occupy only about 20 for Hitler's Third Reich. This was accom­ locations. plished by joint patrols with German As in its early days, the Constabulary police, by having German police present is still being used for unusual missions. at clwck points, and by loaning' them At one time, two full squadrons were em­ equipment, such as vehicles and radios. ployed in a 2-day operation to comb an While no specific orders have been issued area for a large number of AWOL soldiers discontinuing this practice, it was found known to be in hiding. A brigade headquar­ no lor.c>;er necessary, since the German ters was charged with this mission, since police :lgencies have become more and the area involved covered 'two different more ,. If-sufficient. The equipment, as well regimental zones. Close coordination with as the' .personnel available to them, has German police, CIC, and Military Govern­ impro\ ",j in quality and quantity to' an ment was effected and the mission ex­ extent \'here the German police are not ecuted without incident. depen" nt on Constabulary assistance any During a recent search for a murderer, longe]' At the present time, the tendency the entire Constabulary was employed 34 -MILITARY REVIEW

Since 1947, the activities of the US Con· stabulary in Germany have been shifting gradually from police work to military training. Above, Major General I. D. White, Commanding General of the Constabulary, inspects a firing range at a M:26 medium tank training school at Vilseck, January 1949. Left, men of the 2d Constabulary Brigade search a displaced persons camp at Windsheim in May 1948, during an actual raid'to recover contraband. Below, mim of Troop B, 16th Constabulary-Squadron, sup· ported by M-8 tal1ks, assume a riot forma· tion during field- practice maneuvers in Berlin in February 1948.-US Army photos. A PROGRESS REPORT ON THE UNITED STATES CONSTABULARY 35

On Army Day, 1949, the 6th Armored Cavalry (US Constabulary) 'staged an impressive review at Grafenwohr. Above, General Lucius D. Clay, CG EUCOM and Military Governor, is shown "trooping the line." Below, ,a platoon of M-26 medium tanks, carrying men of the 370th tlnfantry Battalion, passes the reviewing stand.-US Army photos. 36 MILITARY REVIEW setting up road 'bI9.cks and check points lary establishe.d check points for the con­ throughout the US Zone to apprehend the voys on the roads. Some 50 ,L-5 airplanes criminal. furnished an air umbrella day' and night, Check and search operations to clean communicating by radio or flags with the out ,known areas of crime are still under­ 'convoys to determine whether they had taken occasionally. Anything from wanted encountered any trouble. persons to large stocks of "black market" Several times, the Constabulary has been goods arid weapons are the usual results of called upon to assist in searches for lost these well-ph~nned operations. aircraft. Its ready availability, great mo­ Prior to the issue of the new German bility, and fine communications facilities currency, the Constabulary played a vital lend themselves well to special missions part in the distribution of the money. of this type. First, under Top Secret orders, details Training were called to Frankfurt at irregular in­ As the concentration of Constabulary tervals to assist in the transport of the squadrons commenced early in 1947 and boxes containing the money from the train the emphasis began to shift from police to the 'vaults of a bank. To avoid security work to military training, the life of the breaches, no officer. or enlisted man was average trooper underwent decisive employed on these operations more than changes. In the past, he had spent the once. After the 24,000 boxes were safely bulk of his time on patrols, or at check deposited, over a period of several months, points, speed traps, and other locations. the task of distributing them again was Now he began to receive an ever-increas­ tossed into the Constabulary:'; lap. Due ing amount of training. For a long time, to the geographical proximity of one of the due to the large turnover in personnel, the brigade headquarters, the task was turned training was concentrated on p'erfecting over to the brigade. The planning was dif­ the individual soldier. Basic subjects ficult be~ause of the Top Secret classifica­ were' repeated again and again, with em· tion of the operation and the many agencies phasis on weapons firing. inyolved. Military Government was in over­ . Later, with the'introduction of a train­ all charge. French and British military ing program foro all Constabulary rein­ and civilian agencies participated. The US Army Transportation Corps was com­ forcements, small unit training, was in­ mitted to furnish the truck transportation. itiated and successfully carried out. In An infantry regiment supplied the labor tl).e fall of 1947, the platoon was. declared for the stevedoring. Military Police units the basic training unit, with only occa­ furnished local security. All of these, as sional work under troop and squadron well as housekeeping units, had to co­ control. The reason for this was mainly operate during the planning stage. The the decision on the part of the command­ operation was executed smoothly and effi­ ing general that junior officers and non­ ciently, the Constabulary employing a commissioned officers of all grades needed tdtal of 200 "jeeps," 100 officers, and 500 the training in their jobs as commanders enlisted men. A total of some 50 convoys andleaders. were organized in Frankfurt and dis­ Not until the spring of 1948 did the patched throughout the occupied areas. Constabulary attempt major unil tactical Every Constabulary vehicle involved wa~ training. Troop exercises were conducted equipped with a machine gun 'and every in which both reconnaissance (cavalry) convoy had a minimum of two radio sets. and dismounted (infantry) problem" were CIC. pers.Dp.nel attached to the Constabu­ executed. Units of troop size were ordered A PROGRESS REPORT ON THE UNITED STATE,S CONSTABULARY 37 into the field for periods of 1 to 2 weeks wide intelligence .and to evaluate it. The to become accustomed to field life and to intelligence net. established by the Con­ carry out troop problems. The results of stabulary is exemplary, and its intelligence this training cycle' were very gratifying. reports are of the greatest ·value to the Along with the tactical improvements in Theater G-2. There are intelligence NCO's all units, an increase in morale was noted in each line company to keep the men throughout. Reenlistment figures went up, "intelligence-conscious" at all times. and deficiency reports went down. During Weekly classes on intelligence are pre­ the summer months, most elements of the scribed to impress constantly on the troops Constabulary participated in field maneu­ that each of them is a potential agent. In vers of from 1 to 3 months' duration at addition to organic personnel, the Con­ Grafenwohr, one of the former German stabulary has various intelligence agencies Army's largest maneuver areas. Several attached to it. Through daily spot reports, joint exercises, from CPX's to full-scale as well as weekly intelligence summaries maneuvers, were held with the 1st Infantry and other periodic publications from all Division, which spent the entire summer regiments, the intelligence net functions there. uninterruptedly. With the 1948 reorganization to armored Whenever special conditions indicate cavalry accomplished, the divergencies in particular areas of intelligence interest, tactical doctrine which 'existed during the the flexible system of coverage is adjusted early days are bound to disappear. With to concentrate on the desired spot, and a non-standard type of unit under the appropriate measures are taken to cope command of officers of all ground force with the situation. Thus, for example, re­ branches, there used to be a good deal of ports may indicate unrest among the disagreement as to how to employ the population in certain towns. As a result, mechanized troops of the Constabulary a show of force of armored vehicles will with their %,-ton and M-8 vehicles. Some quickly and elfectively quiet the restless units employed their outfits dismounted, populace. When strikes occur' or unde­ others used armored cavalry tactics, still sirable political activities increase, intelli­ others developed a doctrine all their own. gence agents are concentrated and the The new armored cavalry type of organi­ frequency of reports is stepped up. Thus, zation eliminated this problem. by one means or another, the Constabulary Of course, a period of retraining was keeps abreast of any activities in the zone needed to acquaint officers and men with which may threaten internal security. their new equipment and indoctrinate The Constabulary School them with armored cavalry tactics. All regiments operated tank training centers 'The Constabulary School at Sonthofen durir!" the retraining phase, which will be undertook the teaching of non-Constabu­ clima.,ed during the maneuver season at lary subjects and of non-Constabulary stu­ Grafr:!lwohr this year. dents during 1947. In the early days, the School had d~itself entirely to im­ Intelligence proving the standards of officers and en­ SiJ,,·c the Constabulary is the only major listed men specifically for Constabulary foret' 'in the European Command whose work. Later, it took up .general subjects, unit, ;,re spread throughout the US Zone such as courses under War Department of 0,· upation, with area security respon­ Circular No.9, a Military Police course, sibili' \, for the entire zone, it is in a better and various other subjects, but in June posit: ·n than other units to collect zone- 1948, the School was closed and became 38 MILITARY REVIEW

available for the headquarters of the D. White, who succeeded General Harmon , Field Artillery Group. during the war as commanding general of Commanders the 2d Armored Division. The Constabulary's founder and leader The two Brigades have experienced only in its'early days was Major General Ernest one turlJover in commanding generals. In N. Harmon. He relinquished command on the 1st Brigade, Brigadier General F. B. 1 May'1947 to Major General Withers A. Prickett commanded from the activation Burress, who had commanded the 100th until his, return to the United States in Division and had been Theater G-2 im­ November 1947; his successor is Brigadier. mediately preceding his Constabulary as­ General Arthur G. Trudeau. The 2d signment. General Burress left the force Brigade was commanded' by Brigadier in April 1948, and turned command over General Hobart R. Gay until his redeploy­ to Major General Louis A. Craig. The ment and relief by General Edmund B. present commander is Major General I. Sebree.

The Army must not be considered as unavailable for any other role than battle or preparation for battle. There are many secondary roles which make the Army an asset to the peacetime life of the nation without sacrificing our readiness for war•. An outstanding current -example is the occupation and military government of conquered territory. Of course, this was at its in­ ception a purely military role. It was a part of fighting the war. Since VJ-Day it has been a continuation of war or aftermath of war: a vital element in the struggle to win the peace: The Army has been kept on this job partly because it was there, partly because no other government organization is able to take its place, and partly because the deteriorating international situation has dictated the adv;isability of risking only military forces in such exposed posi­ tions. However, I believe the record of Army administration in both Germany and Japan has been not only a testimonial to its versatility and adaptability but also a complete rebuttal of the charge that the American Army is militaristic in its approach to the civic problems which fall to its responsi­ bility in Military Government. Geneml, J. Lawton Colli1ls The Use of Psychology by Leaqers

Lieutenant Colonel Horace E. Townsend, Infantry Instructor, Command and General Staff College

KNOWLEDO:E of human behavior is a method of acquiring an understanding of requisite of leadership. Man is a funda­ human behavior than by actually com­ mental instrument of war. Other instru­ manding men. ments may change, but he remains rela­ The second method of acquiring an un­ tively constant. Unless his behavior and derstanding of men is through study. elemental attributes are understood, gross However, effective learning depends on mistakes will be made in planning and knowing what and how to study. The ex­ executing military operations. periences of others may be studied. Older Therefore, the military commander must and more experienced leaders can teach know his men. He must btl able to mold the the younger with less experience. This behavior of all under his command into a method has limitations. Unfortunately, ex­ singleness of purpose and effort. This perience cannot be completely transferred result will not just happen. The desired to the unexperienced. Methods, or tech­ behavior must be thoroughly planned and niques, can be taught, but the requisite systematically promoted. Techniques must understanding of behavior essential to be selected and applied with an under­ proper selection and application of tech­ standing beforehand of the behavior which niques still remains to be acquired by will be elicited in response. some other means. ' The subject of human behavior can be Understanding Huma,n Behavior studied per 8e. This scientific study of There are two ways in which the mili­ human behavior is known as psy\!hology. tary leader can acquire the requisite knowl­ Psychology is knowledge of human be­ edge of human behavior. havior acquired by scientific means. It is The first of these is through experience information secured by systematically col­ in actually commanding. men. Since the lecting, investigating, classifying, and for­ beginning. of military history, command­ mulating facts about human behavior and ers have used this method to acquire a then using these facts to establish general simpL, empirical understanding of human truths, or laws, governing behavior. In beha\ ior. In addition, through long ex­ the absence of experience in command, the periCl'L'e in command, they have become study of psychology provides a limited skillfn] in applying this .knowledge to understanding of what the soldier thinks build :1lld fight armies. There is no better and why he behaves the way he does.

The v~il;tary commander must know his men. He must be able to mold the hehavior of his me~ into singleness of pu~pose and effort, and tltis !.\In be accomplished through experience and study of psychology 40 MILITARY REVIEW

The inexperienced leader who' seeks to. limited. As a science, psychology has been know his men through study should study in existence only a little over half a cen­ both psychology and the leadership expe- ' tury. It has not yet explored the intr~cate rience of others. He thus acquires a store human being to a point of being able to of techniques used successfully by 'others predict with certainty his behavior in all as well as an ability to understand the situations. Until further advances are l'esponse elicited by their application. The made, leadership must remain an "art" ability he gains through study will not be of skillful application and knowledge , comparable with that acquired through ex­ gained mainly through experience. perience, but it constitutes the best avail­ 3. Psychology establishes only general able substitute. ~tudy is the only prac­ rules of behavior. These ,rules must be ticable means that can be used to applied with sound judgment and consider­ understand men during periods of rapid ation for actual circumstances. expansion of the a;"my when time prohibits 4. A little knowledge can be dangerous. learning through experience. The most ,Men are not to be experimented 'with. effective leaders combine command experi­ Therefore, the leader must utilize only ence and continual study of related those psychological teachings that he ,SUbjects. understands thoroughly and knows have Caution in Application been proved to be sound. 5. Little research has been done in mili­ The application of psychology in leader­ tary psychology. Military psychology is a ship, must be tempered by an understand­ special application of general psychology. ,ing of its capabilities and limitations. It Not all of its teachings can be applied, nor is, therefore, desirable to consider the should an attempt be made to do so. The capabilities and limitations of psychology military environment is vastly ,different as an aid to leadership. They may be from that tested by the general psychol­ bl'iefly listed as: ogist.' Capabilities.-A knowledge of psychol­ ogy assists the leadel' to: Behavior and Cause 1. Anticipate possible behavior reac­ All behavior is the result of some ante­ tion fl'om his men. cedent cause. Behavior does not just "hap­ 2. Influence his men to intel'pl'et a situa­ pen." The behavior of an individual is not tion objectively. based on chance or al'bitrary whim. It 3. Bring about a favorable adjustment results always fl'om some cause that can of his men towards a situation. be discovered by analysis of the behavior 4. Adjust the situation to benefit his situation. Every soldier believes he has men. good and sufficient reasons for what he 5. Better know himself and seek self­ does or fails to do, but often these causes improvement. are not known to his leaders. Modifying Limitations.-The use of psychology in behavior, then, begins with examining the leadership is subject to the following limi­ l'esult to determine the cause for behnvior. tations: There are two basic factors which cause 1. Psychology, can only supplement com­ behavior. These are the situation anll the mand ,experience. Psychology is only an individual. Both are interrelated aAd affect additional tool to be used in attaining each other. Thus,' to modify behavior, leadership objectives. It should never be it is necessary to alter either tJ,c in­ mistaken for an objective. dividual, the situation, or both. The 2. The conclusions of psychology are cause for any particular behavior can be, THE USE OF PSYCHOLOGY BY LEADERS 41 located through analysis of the situation, sequence in which the behavior problem the individual, or both. This close rela­ should be solved. tionship can be expressed by the formula: Situation+Individual (Cause), = Behav­ The Situation and Behavior ior (Result) ~ How the individual reacts in a particu­ lar situation depends not on the situation Correcting the Cause as it actually is but on how the individual To modify behavior, correct the cause. perceives it to be. Many times, a change After, locating the cause of undesirable in behavior results by assisting the indi­ behavior, the leader must do something vidual to see the situation in its true per­ about it. 'The individual is not relieved of spective. For example, the behavior of responsibility for improper behavior sim­ men will be greatly affected by the per­ ply because he has good and sufficient sonal conduct of their leaders. If the reasons for it. Such behavior still must leader indicates by word or deed that he be corrected. Modification will be much considers a situation critical and likely more effective if the cause is corrected to affect personal safety, it will be so in­ rather than merely placing the blame and terpreted by the individuals who observe relying on authority to correct the result. him. Hence, it follows that the leader For example, military discipline is best assists his men in properly interJilr~ting a accomplished when the technique of punish­ situation by setting an example for them. ment is applied, not because a person is The situation cannot always be modi­ guilty (blame), but rather to correct fied. In military life, the leader and his (cause) his future behavior and to prevent men will frequently face military situations similar behavior in others. Since the in­ which do not permit extensive modifica­ dividual has ultimate control over his be­ tion. The leader looks out for his men's havior, the leader will get best results by welfare best by teaching them to interpret helping him to help himself. To do so, the' properly and overcome situations as they leader must, alter either the situation or must be. In addition, the effective leader the soldier. will do all within his authority to alleviate Military leaders must often postpone the hardships of war for his men. To this seeking the cause. The cause approach to extent, he can, and does, alter the situation under;;tanding is used consistently in re­ for his men. spect to problems involving things such as The military leader must locate the motors or weapons. In the past, it has not cause for behavior. If a behavior problem been used enough in problems involving affects many persons, leadership tech­ people. However, in human relationships niques probably will be most effective when (parti<:nlal'ly among military personnel), aimed at correction of the situation. When emergency situations continually arise in the problem affects only a few persons, which i he result is momentarily more im­ techniques definitely should be directed at portal)' than the cause.' The leader must the individual. If the problem arise~ with­ deal '\ ,th these situations promptly and out a change in the situation, the situation effectivdy. He must exercise his authority may still require more favorable inter­ and ~,cure a desired behavior result. pretation by the men. Later, ',s time permits, the cause can be Common Behavior Situations exami· 'd and corrective action taken to prevel, recurrence. This process in no The following military situations com­ way v 'ates the "cause-result" approach monly require' assistance from the leader to COl ,ding behavior but only alters the to assure proper individual adjustment. 42 MILITARY REVIEW

L Frequently encountered in the train­ whole is of, little consequence. It is ing period. sufficient to understand that envir{}nment u. Loss of home and family relation­ means past experience. This past experi. ships. ence is the only modifiable part of the b. Regimentation. personality. Hence, modifying behavior c. Discipline.· by modifying the individual means alter. d. Strenuous physical demands.' ing the effect of past or present experi. e. Lack' of customary privacy. ences which contribute to causing his /. Subjugation of personal interests present behavior. and desires. Since personalities result from experi· g. Malassignment. eNce, no two personalities are identical, h. Rivalry and competition. for no two personalities have identical past i. Personal problems at home. experiences. Hence, because a situation is j. Lack of promotion. interpreted in light of past experiences, 2. Frequently 'encountered in overseas behavior between individuals will vary noncombat duties. widely. No two people act and think ex· u. Uncertainty concerning the future. actly alike. Each individual tends to react b. ' Separation from familiar surround­ or respond to a situation according to how ings. he personally "feels" towards the leader c. Isolation and continued monotony. and "how" the leader chooses to direct his d. Long endured privations. behavior. e. Unfavorable climate. Face-to-face leadership is necessary to 3. Frequently encountered in combat. cause desirable individual behavior. The u. Fear resulting from danger. wise and capable leader recognizes that b. Mental and physical fatigue. individuals vary widely. and pe selects , c. Unlimited tour of duty in ground techniques suitable to the individual per· combat units. sonality in modifying behavior. This d. Uncertainty regarding postwar "personalized" application of leadership plans. techniques is commonly referred to as face­ e. Loss of unit identity in the replace­ to-face leadership. It requires l'espect for ~ent system. the dignity and individuality of each, /. Freqllent loss of close friends. human being under the leader's command. Personality and Behavior It is the leadership required of the platoon leader who daily fortifies each jndividual Personality is the second factor to be under his command to meet his personal considered in the "cause-result" formula situations. To be effective, it requires a for behavior. Personality is a collective constant, honest, interest in the daily term used by the psychologist to describe affairs of others and a willingness to set the individual. Personality is not syn­ aside personal desires to help someone else. onymous with mind but is' inclusive of it. Here are some scientific techniques com· It is t'he sum total of a human being. It monly used in the army to assist individu· encompasses the intellectual, emotional, als to adjust themselves to militarJ' situa­ and physical structure. In brief, it is all a tions. The use of all these sel"'CS to person has been, is, and all that he hopes precondition the individual, thus'a'.·,iding to be.. undesirable behavior before it'occu' ". Personality has its origin and develop­ 1. Standardized and made avai]:,',le by ment in heredity and environment. The ex­ the army. tent to which each contributes to the u. Job selectien. THE USE OF PSYCHOLOGY BY LEADERS 43

b. Classification of jobs "and abilities. will be as good" or as bad, as information c. Personality measuring devices for from them indicates. Their plans, orders, use in assignment and reassignment. and actions will all reflect the individu­ d. Assignment and reassignment. ality of their personalities. Thus, division e. Career management programs lead­ and higher unit commanders need to know ing to promotion. and apply "face-to-face" leadership. Any f. Constant development' of individual person with whom the leader has personal clothing, equipment, and subsistence. relations will be affected by the person­ g~ USAFI and educational programs. ality of the leader. Remember, it is not h. Training, both physical and mental, enough just to obtain results. The results to fortify the indivJdual to overcome must be obtained in a way that enhances obstaCles. the confidence, respect, and loyal coop­ 2. Commonly used by all leaders but not eration of all those with whom'the leader standardized. has intimate, daily, human relations. a. Counselling on personal problems. b. Disciplinary action. Altering Personality c. Group identification. Certain personality characteristics are d. Encouraging letter writing. more susceptible to alteration than others. e., Pass and leave programs for When seeking to elicit desirable behavior change, rest, and recreation. by adjusting the individual personality to f. :Provision of housing and recrea­ cope with a situation, it is important to tion facilities. know what characteristics can be altered. , g.' Red Cross and other agencies to as- Only those characteristics acquired through i sist in solving home problems. experience are alterable. Those that orig­ h. Provision of physical comforts and inated in heredity are beyond possibility. conveniences. Thus, a commander cannot make a bands­ i. Strengthening home ties and re­ man simply by transferring a man to sponsibilities. the band if he has no musical talent. Con­ Commanders of large units must also versely, he can expect best results when employ "personalized" leadership tech­ he assigns men to jobs suitable to their niques. The mi'ture of personality differ­ learning capacity. The following general ences might imply that their understand­ rules govern when seeking to cause, desir­ able behavior by modifying personality. ing and application pertains only to small unit leaders who are in intimate daily con­ Acquired characteristics such as habits, tact wilh all men of their commands. It is attitudes, feelings, skills, interests, and equall,' essential for the general to under­ preferences are easiest for leaders to alter. stand intimately the personalities of his Characteristics such as temperament and staff ,PHI immediate subordinates. Some emotional instability are difficult to modify. will ],,'quire a tight supervisory rein. Inherited characteristics such as intelli; Other" will require urging. Some can be gence, aptitudes, or talents usually cannot truster' with independent missions. Others be modified. ' require detailed and precise orders. Each In those cases where certain unalterable is a . parate personality, and it is too characteristics were not sufficiently en­ much "'J expect' they will act and think dowed by nature to cope with a situation, exact!· alike because of similar training. the individual must be reassigned to duties All ill' '\rmation received from them will within his capabilities. To this extent, ad­ requiJ, interpretation according to the justments to meet the situation must be pel'SOl iity of the sender. No situation made. 44' MILITARY REVIEW

The Leader's Personality Knowledge Endurance The leader must develop a predominant Judgment Initiative personality. So far ·in the behavior equa­ Courage Bearing tion, no consideration has been given to Integrity Justice the leader. The'leader is also a person­ Dependability Enthusiasm Tact . ality and his leadership can be no more Unselfishness ~ffective than ,the development of his at­ A harmonious combination of attributes tributes and his experience permits. Face­ is essential. Only the more easily iden· to-face leadership quickly resolves itself tifiable attributes are listed above. Others into a meeting of two personalities, the' valued highly are combinations, varia· leader and the led. All things being equal, tions, and contradictions of those listed. the stronger personality will predominate. The important thing is to acquire a har· Hence, the lel}der must develop a person­ monious combination of powers in which . ality adequate to cope with all types of one or more traits may often predominate, behavior situations arising in his command. but none must be in opposition. To improve His personality must be expanded, to deal his personality, the leader should select with a, far greater range of behavior prob­ one of the above attributes and consciously lems than he would normally experience apply it daily as he understands it. After as a follower. He must be able to dominate considerable practice, concentrate on the group personalities which are far more selection and application of another. Thus, complex than individuals. If he chooses leadership capacity will become a har· leadership techniques beyond his capacity, monious combination of characteristics or which are not particularly suited to his apparent in all the leader says or does. own personality, he will be accused of in­ Group Behavior sincerity and his efforts will be futile. Hence, the leader must constantly practice While it is true that the leader must self-analysis a1;ld seek to develop char­ constantly employ a face-to-face under· acteristics to improve his personality. standing of human behavior, necessity dic· Thus, he broadens the number and scope tates that he focus major attention on the of leadership techniques which he can em­ direction and influeiwing of military units. ploy effectively. This is particularly applfcable to large Many attempts have been made to char­ force commanders who do .not have the acterize the desirable military leader by advantage of intimate daily contact with .listing personality attributes. These at­ all individuals in their commands. All tempts have, in general, resulted in failure leaders must realize their major efforts because of a lack of consistent interpreta­ belong to the unit they command. Large tion of these traits. It is easy to find in­ forces are not commanded as individuals, stances of great leaders who lacked cer­ but as groups, or military 11.nits. It is es· tain of these qualities to a marked degree. sential, then, to acquire an understanding No great leader possessed them all to the of group behavior and how it can best be nth degree. The list of traits believed in modified to assist the leader in attaining by anyone leader, and how he defines and his mission. evaluates them, are of little consequence. It has already been established that in· The'important thing is that he strive con­ dividuals vary widely in their behivior as stantly to apply them to modify the be­ a result of experience. However; it is para· havior of others. The following is a list doxical that there are remarkable similari· of the most commonly accepted desirable ties in behavior for the same reason. All military personality traits: people seem to possess the same abilities THE USE' OF PSYCHOLOGY BY LEADERS 45 and traits, but to varying degrees..Most members of. tlltQ?it:DUP_ :oRepetition of this of this similarity is due to the society in process molds individual personalities into which people live. In a democratic society, a behavior pattern. Thus, the importance all are exposed to the same' religious, of training men i1S a team. Training that scholastic, governmental and other el}­ .produces behavior patterns creates dis-, vironmental influences which, in turn, tend cipline, for it causes individuals to react to create similar beliefs, attitudes, and cooperatively from force of habit. Further, habits. correct training pr~serves individual in­ Further, when people are united in . itiative during .cooperation sq tliat, in the group effort, the behavior of each indi-" absence of orders, the individmll will re­ vidual in the group ~erves to cause a like sllond. intelligently to what those orders response in ,others. This chain reaction" would have been. Military training, then. serves to minimize the effect of individual seeks. to estaQlish unit behavior patterns differences and mold individual behavior by directing individual effort to the single­ into the pattern of the group. ' ness of purpose of the unit, but without Elventually, the group becomes united destruction of individllal initiative. ' and acquires an identifiable, pr,edictable, Given training and esprit in a unit, the behavior personality. The leader can de­ individual soldier takes great pride in his velop this group personality above a:nd unit. He willingly subjugates' his personal ,beyond the sum total of the p'erso;:;alities desires to unite il). cooperative effort. This of the individuals in it. Once established, is the positive and most effective form of this group personality will tend to persist, discipline-self discipline. To safeguard even though most of the individuals in the the unit personality, r$s, regulations, group change. and behavior codes must be established. Nonconformists must be promptly and Leading the Group judiciously punished. If this precaution is The group personality challenges each not taken, their behavior quickly produces, member to conform and contribute in co­ a chain reaction in others, thus destroying operative effort. Hence, the force of the unity. This is a negative or protective group personality may cause undesirable form of discipline. as well as desirable behavior. The indi­ The group has keener insight or percep­ vidual integrated into a unit noted for its tion. "By pooling personality traits, the POol' disciplinary record will of1;,en be un-" unit will quickly analyze a situation and ruly. even though such behavior is not in the leader. The leader who is decisive, harmony with his individual personality. ' knows his job, and goes about it efficiently, Thus, the development of esprit de corps receives favorable reaction from all mem­ is one of the most effective means of modi­ bers of the group. One who is bluffing or fyip:; the behavior of the group as well is not equal to coping with the situation is as tile individuals in:, it. .The g~e1l-ter the soon found out. Such leaders must rely unit esprit, the greater will be individual solely on authority. This will produce, at eff0·ts to b~ found worthy.. best, a mediocre performance. A i military training is aimed at the Destructive Elements . dev,.!opment of group behavior. When indi­ vid: :d' personalities react properly to one Surprise, boredom, and failure are ano· 'ler in' training'; coordinated effort causes of undesirable group beh,:}vior. Sur­ mll develop. The effect of differences in prise is an' enemy of group unity because per )nalities, is minimized, and' similar perception is faster than adaptability. Tlw coni dbutive behavior will result from all effect is co~fusion, a sense of helplessness, 46 MILITARY REVIEW

and loss of confidence in the unit and its manders from conducting like surveys leader. without'special permission. 'Boredom dulls the keenness of a unit's ,In the accompanying charts are some at­ spirit. Enforced inactivity causes thoughts titudes of groups of American soldiers to turn inward to personal difficulties. which can be used to 'select more effective Situations are magnified out of propor­ leadership techniques by proper interpre­ tion. Dissatisfaction and dissension result. tation. Failure or mediocre 'performance damage Summary the esprit of a unit. When a unit fails, it not only doubts its own capabilities but By qefinition, leadership is the art of loses confidence in its leaders. Since the "infhienCing and' directing people." Psy­ extent of failure is measured in conse­ ,chologically speaking, it is the art of quences, failure in training is not judged "modifying behavior along a desired line by the men as seriously as failure in com­ of action." "Influencing people" accom­ bat. Howev~r, because what is accom­ plishes the desired behavior modification plished in trainirig '~wi11 produce similar without conscious knowledge 'by the com­ performance in battle, both are equally mand. "Direction" accomplishes this same damagi'ng to a unit. Thus, the leader who purpose, but with full realization by the understands his men employs his command command. Both methods are effective and . strictly in accordance with its capabilities. must be employed. Choosing and applying He husbands their capabilities and avoids the most effective method requires a knowl­ dis'sipating their effectiveness in incon­ edge of the behavior to be elicited in re­ sequentjal actions or tasks. He asks noth­ sponse. ing of them that is not necessary to accom­ All behavior has a cause. Most effective plish his mission. Meanwhile, he strives . modification is accomplished when leader­ continuously to enhance the capabilities ship techniques are beamed at the' cause. of his command. The ca,use may be located in one or both of two factors, the situation or the per­ Attitudes sonality. Attitudes are beliefs or opinions that The military leader will be most effective have some measure of permanency. They in modifying behavior when he follows are important to the leader because they these steps: indicate behavior predispositions within Determine the situation in recognition military units. The skillful leader will of possible favorable or unfavorable be­ recognize these behavior' predispositions havior from the individual or the u·nit. and select techniques, to modify them or Assure that the situation is interpreted to modify adroitly the situation' to meet by each individual objectively as it affects them. The assembling and tabulation of the unit and the mission. data on attitudes are highly skilled pro­ Cause a favorable adjustment of the cedures that must be done scientifically if unit towards the situation. results are to have accuracy. This service Adjust the situation (to the exten' of is provided by the Department of the his means) in consonance with the per.. on­ Army. Regulations prohibit unit com­ aiity of the unit. THE USE OF PSYCHOLOGY BY LEADERS 47

THINGS WHICH TEND TO MAKE MORALE HOW MEN RATE VARIOUS MEtHODS FOR SUILDING PRIDE IN OUTFIT PERCENt Of FAVORABLE MENTIONS QUlST/ON. '1N YOUI: OPINION WHICH ONI Q' "THE fOllOWING TEAMWORK, PRIDE IN OUTfIT 30%' THINGS H£ll'S IUILD UP A SOlDIER'S PIIOE IN HIS oumrr

GOOD OfFICER·EM RELATIONS •••••• '_20% PEiCINTAGE OF MEN CHICKING lACH MnH'.OOii·•••Im~ "!Jg!~~. ABOUT THE OUTfIT /N MAGAZINES AND 'APElSUQ( •• '11 31'" fRl£NOUNH5 AMONG EM •••• • •••••••••• '_14% "A SPECIAt SHOULOEI PATCH fOl THAT OUTfIT ONlY,H'·· " ··_16<910 PHYSICAL COMfORT {FOOD, HOUSING, ETC.)···· ••• ','_11% "~~'i.!:!l~: ccg=:g~~!?N TO THE OUtfiT fRO~·,······ _ 15'" REST, lI.ECREATlON, ENTERTAINMENT' ',,10% "~1~~~r:RA~~~~p~~.tfJFlT IN ....MY PAPEIS UI(I THE ••••••_ U"" BElIEf IN MISSION •••••••••••••••••••••••• '. 2% "A SPECIAL IADIO 1I:0ADCASr DIDlCAnD TO. flU OUTfIT:' .,••'" KUPING IIUSY ••••••••••••••••••••••••••• '11%

MISCELlANEOUS' ••••••••••• ·C~~~; ',' ...... '_11% ...... CHAI12 - The commander of a newly activated division de­ sires to establish good morale throughout the divi­ sion quickly. What; predispositions do the men, HOW OFFICERS ESTIMATE THE EFFECT OF OBSTACLES possess which will assist' the commander in the TO BATTLE SUCCESS selection of the proper techniques? They are given in Chart 1. If no extenuating circumstances exist QUESTION "... IN THOSE INSTANCES WHUE OUR UrnE Pta· within the division to cause a deviation from the FORMANC' AS YOU SAW 11 WAS NOT QUITE AS GOOD AS IT MIGHt corre~ HAVE BUN. HOW MUCH DO YOU THINIC EAC" OF THE FActs BElOW n(lrm, the commander can expect results CONtRIBUTED?" sponding to the predispositions in the chart.

{;l"anting that teamwork and pride in outfit should PIICiNT OF OFFICERS SAYING EACH ITlM HAD A. receive the greatest emphasis jn developing morale in the division, how can the division commander best promote pride in outfit '! The answer is given RATHER BAD liTTLE HEVIA in Chart 2. OR VERY BAD EfFECT OISERVED What obstacles should officers of the division be EFfEC~ ~ .,;~US especially prepared to overcome in combat and how ~~gGl~Ng~ .T~~O:S_ ~R~~ B~I~G. IC~I'T I,N. C~~II~_6S~ 25~J +10% serious are those obstacles? It is obvious. by ex­ amining Chart 3, that officers must be trained to be especially concerned for the care and welfare of ~~~~I~~~.N~~~~~~E D.~E.~~.~~~~•• ~~.~~~CAL _•• _.,~3% 33~. 24% the men under their command. Again, techniques LACK OF fOOD, CLOTHING, all PEIlSONAl EQUIPMENT should be developed and practiced to eliminate aU fOR MEN. of the conditions analyzed in Chart 3, but with emphasis on the first four obstacles. LACK OF NEC!SSARY WEAPONS OR TOOLS Suppose that a division has been ordered over­ sea::. and the commander desires to apply leadership ~~~~~~;~ ~iS!~'~S~E~ ~~~ .T~ T~~~ ~E.C~S.S~R.Y•••••1~~;II J38~,1 49% techniques to prepare his men for the combat zone. Do the men feel strongly for our cause? Consider­ LACIC OF SElF.CONfIOENCE AMONG OWN MEN ••••• 11%..... :'37~~ SI% ing the percentage figures in Chart 4. some atten­ tion is required to orient men in training concern­ POOR DISCIPLINE IN COMBAT. • •••••••••• 12"'-il2~51 ing our cause. Should the men be encouraged to believe they will EVERY MAN FOR HIMUlF INSTEAD OF TEAMWORK 1b.",o:~~~~~==~ be overseas for an extended period '! The answer CHART 3 24 0M may be found by studying Chart 5. Obviously. those men who believe the war will last in excess of one year are more reconciled to overseas duty. l'["operly conducted surveys will reveal predisposi­ tioll~ or attitudes, useful to the commander. By DO YOU EVER GET THE FEELING THAT THIS WAR Pl'O]lt'l' interpretation, some indication is gained as 15 NOT WORTH FIGHTING? to the relative effectiveness of various desirable PEl~ENrAGE WHO SAY; leadvrship techniques. Deviations between resultant ONLY ONCI IN SOME.. beh,n ior and predispositions are most likely due to AMONG NEVEl HAVE DOUBTS A GREAT WHIlE TIMES OFTEN sonu' problem peculiar to a particular group or unit. , " , An:,jysis should then be made for specific cause. 51lVER STAI VETUANS --.------.------. 37 ,,2<4;. .':':!4'~~" 5

HOW THE MEN FEEL ABOUT COMBAT DUTY

OPTIMISTS ARHESS EAGER FOR COMBAT THAN OTHER SOLDIERS AnER THE WAR IS OVER, DO YOU THINK THE UNITED STATES WILL BE A CHOICE OF DUTY BEnER PLACE OR A WORSE PLACE TO LIVE IN THAN IT WAS BEFORE NON· THE WAR? COM8AT MIXED COM8AT PEiCENTAG( WHO SAY; THINK THE WAR WILL LAST OVERSEAS CHOICE IN u.s. AMONG BEnEi SAM..,'" UNDEC~DED WO:SE

LESS THAN 6 MONTHS" ••••••• ••• 35% 22%_43~ SILVER STAR VET£RANS .------. 13 16 :;g';-1si/J I.~:I!!I

6 MONJHS TO I yEAR·· .. ••• ··1 41% 21%~7~

MORE THAN 1 YEAR •••••• ·l 57°~ 18Jill.S~ INFANTRYMIN IN US ~------43 12.~/ ~1~!JHI CHART S. CHART <4. The Regulating Station In World War II

Lieutenant Colonel Page H. Slaughter, Transportation Corps Instructor, Command and General Staff College

DURING the course of World War I, warded a daily train to the Regulating three American Regulating Stations were Station. Upon arrival, supplies were established in France, patterned after the bro~en down, and unit trains, or sections French Army Regulating Stations that had thereof, were made up and forwarded daily -been in operation since 1914. to the numerous army railheads. Military operations hafl early demon­ Direct command of the Regulating Sta­ strated that wartime transportation in an tions was vested in GHQ itself, as it was active theater could not be operated on felt that there were too many factors in­ the same pri,nciples as peacetime transpor­ volved to permit command of the station tation. It was soon found that varying by the Army being supported or by the troop strengths reported from the various Communications Zone. railheads made prompt diversions from established routines essential. Successful Physically, the Regulating Station was operation dictated that supplies for troops a verY' large, immobile installation. It con­ in the field be regulated by a central tained large marshalling yards, numerous agency which alone followed the routing of warehouses, freight sheds, a network of supplies from one point to another. It was roadways, and even hospitals and rest further realized that this agency, the areas for combat troops. To draw a parallel Regulating Station, should exercise full with World War II, it might be said that control over shipments to include time and the Regulating Station constituted a small, method of movement, when necessary, as centralized, and self-contained' .A:dvance ,well as -priorities. Flexibility was main­ Section, charged with the supply of the tained by shipments of balanced stocks of Army it served as well as serving as an rations, frozen meat, forage and fuel, and evacuation, hospitalization, and rest center. only one day's supply was held on hand at At the close of World War I, First Army the Regulating Station, at least in theory. had a strength of 250,000 troops while its 'fhe theory, as developed, was that the -supporting Regulating Station was manned Reg·ulating Station should act as an in­ by 1,500 personnel. termediary between the supply bases in the In contrast to the mobility of World War rear and the organization being supplied, II, World War I was characterized my sta­ and would know both the requirements and bilized trench warfare. Transportation the stocks available. Army requisitions was slow, shorter distances were involved, were received and fc"warded to supply frontages were much smaller, and t1'00pS bases in the nar. Supply bases furnished occupied relatively stable positions. No advance notice of' shipments, and for­ system of base, intermediate, and adyance - THE REGULATING STATION IN WORLD WAR II <49 depots was used to insure adequate sup­ Section, Communications Zone. Advance ply of wide frontages and protection of Section, in turn, made the Section Trans­ supplies by echelonment in< depth. The portation Officer responsible for establish- Regulating Station of World War I-im­ ment of the installation. ' mobile and concentrated in small areas European Theater of Operations SOP vulnerable to i?wift air or ground attack­ No. 33 (Revised), June 1944, established was not suitable for furnishing the entire the organization< and functions of Regu­ logistical support and control or-movement lating Stations. This SOP made two con­ for a field army in World War II. Yet it tradictory statements, however, in provid­ was this organization which furnished the ing that "the functions of the Regulating pattern for the Regulating Station de-< Station win be limited to those of a traffic snibed in Field Manual 100-10, 15 Nov control agency" and "the Regulating 1943, and the basis for organization of Officer receives and processes, in accord­ these units in World War II in the ance with SOP 7, all requests and requisi­ European Theater. tions submitted by the forces in the Combat Early in th~ planning stages for Opera­ Zone." Shortly after the activation of tion Ove."lord, the necessity for regulating Twelfth Army Group, Regulating Stations the movement of supplies and troops to and were established by Advance Section, Com­ from the combat zone was recognized. The munications Zone, to support each field Regulating Station was selected as the army. Advance Section regulations speci­ agency t6 perform these functions. The fied that the Regulating Officer's duties

The Regulating Station performed important services in two World Wars, but its functions in the future can be taken over logically by G-4, I transportation, or technical supply officers of Advance Section or Army

various headquarters and staff sections were expanded to inclUde coordination of represented on the planning staff could not construction of facilities, such as pipe agree, however, on the necessity for these lines, railroads, and highways. installations, or on the responsibility for . The Regulating Stations employed in the their command. First Army Group felt ETO were all organized under

Hq Company-Capt, Lt, 39 EM. boundaries to furnish diversion orders and Signal Communications - (Including proper army dump and depot destinations message center, messengers, switchboard, to truck convoys hauling supplies from teletype) 5 Lt, 61 EM. Communications Zone installations. Cour­ TOTAL-46 Officers, 202 Enlisted Men. ier, wire and radio, and later teletype links , It is doubtful if any of the stations ever with Army and Advance Section were also operated with exactly these sections in installed. .these strengths. In most stations, the Air 2. Rail. As the rail lines were rehabili­ Corps: Supply and AG Casual Sections tated and pushed forward, each Regulating were never operational. The additional Station established and manned a rail reo duties of operation of railheads, airheads, consignment point. Supply d,epots in ad­ and convoy regulating posts necessitated a vance and base sections consigned all sup· considerable enlargement of the transpor­ plies for a given army to the Regulati~g tation section. Additional requirements for Station supporting that army, and the vehicle drivers caused augmentation of the Military Railway Service delivered the headquarters company. Varying factors cars to the rail reconsignment point. At from time to time caused readjustments of this installation, Regulating Station per· the strengths of the sections and of the sonnel checked contents of cars and recon.­ stations as a whole. signed them to the army supply railhead in use at that time for that class of supply. The Regulating Station was organized 'l'his procedure was due in part to the as a ,completely self-sufficient activity and time-lag between requisitioning and actual operated its own mess, motor pool,' com­ receipt of shipment-averaging about 7 munications, and security guard, and per­ days-and the possibility of army desiring formed general administration and house­ supplies laid down at a location other than keeping for its headquarters. It was usual that shown at the time of requisition. Due practice to employ civilians as interpreters to the lack of a complete transportation and to augment mess and housekeeping de­ service'in the armies being served, some tails. Outlying detachments either messed army railheads were actually manned by with nearby units or drew rations and Regulating Station. personnel who as­ oper-~ted small messes of their own, if sumed the duties performed by Rail numbers warranted. Transportation Officers (RTO's) at rail­ Although each one of these Regulating heads and depots in the Communications Stations developed its own detailed meth­ Zone. Third Army soon developed a ods of oper~tion, and the conditions in movement-control (RTO) organization and different Armies necessitated variations in operated its own railheads; those of First the functions performed, the following Army were operated by either Army or were the essential functions generally per­ Regulating Station personnel as available; formed: those of Ninth Army were all operated by 1. Highway. As the First and Third Regulating Station personnel throughout Armies advanced after the St. L6 break­ the campaign. through and lines of communication from Due'to limitations on both highway and the beaches beeame longer, the Regulating rail transportation, Twelfth Army Group Stations moved forward and established established tonnage allocations for, each headquarters in close proximity to the Army, and it became a primary concer!' of headquarters of the Army being supported. both Advance Section and Armies that (':lch' They promptly set up movement-~ontrol Army actually received its allocated 'on" and information points at major highway nage daily. Regulating Station persOH:lel,: diversion points near the army rear in conjunction with Army persoyulel, THE- REGULATING STATION IN WORLD WAR II checked the tonnages delivered to the Army 3. Air. When airheads were used for the and reported the figures by service and receipt of supplies, the Regulating Sta­ clasS" to Advance Section daily. A car situa­ tions acted as liaison between Army and tion report was also instituted and sub-_ Advance Section and handled the report­ mitted daily to Army and ADSEC which ing and expediting of supplies from air­ reflected the operations at each railhead­ head to army supply installations. Usually, cars on hand, received, unlbaded, loaded personnel were stationed at the air strip out, forwarded empty, and on hand at end to facilitate handling. of period. Information was also forwarded 4. Supply. ETO SOP No.7, 19 March on this report reflecting any unusual situa­ 1945, delineated the responsibilities of the tions or problems requiring attention. Regulating Station and other organizations As the Armies moved, the Regulating relative to supply of the Armies. These Stations moved with them, displacing the designated responsibilities were principally

~ RAIL RECONSIGNMENT POINT _____ 11

RAILHEAD~ ______~

RAILROAD~ ______AUTOBAHN _____ c ______= 42D REGULATING STATION HQ ___ ®

10 20 rail reconsignment point forward as they supply liaison between Army and Advance nwved. As an example, the 42d Regulating Section, receipt and forwarding to desig­ Station, supporting Ninth Army, moved- its nated depots of all requisitions and re­ l'ail reconsignment point forward seven quests of the Army, providing current and times in the 7 months from September 1944 accurate information to Army on status of b April 1945 and operated a total of 68 requisitions, and controlling the movement dil:-erent railheads during that period. of personnel and supplies to and from the \.s the campaign progressed, the evacua­ combat zone. Technical service officers of ti, \ of wounded and the handling of pris­ the Regulating Station maintained the OJ,' rs of -war, recovered allied military per­ necessary records to accomplish the above s!" nel, displaced persons, captured and missions and maintained constant close e,_ -,-8S materiel, and redeployed troops as­ supply liaison between technical sery;iee s]. 1ed major importance. The Regulating officers of Army and Advance Section. ·It S, lions arranged these movements to the was a frequent and most important duty to rc l' the same as they had in the forward physically- run down and follow-up requisi­ n- ,ement. tions at Advance Section issue depots; and 62 MILITARY REVIEW at intermediate and base section issue, key, (3) Reports and records. or filler depots. b. Supply. 6. LitLison. Regulating Station person­ (1) Receipt and forwarding of req. nel furnished' an intermediate link, which uisitions. was invaluable for liaison, between Ad­ (2) Reports and records. vance Section and Army. The various sec­ c. Liaison. tions were in d;lily intimate contact with (1) Present requirements. the corresponding sections of the Army (2) Future planning. . headquarters and were able to secure both d. Expediting, current and planning information to pass (1) Transportation. to the ,rear. They were also able to keep (2) Supplies. Army staff sections informed as to Com~ (3) Information. munications Zone plans and policies, and e. Unit Admi;nistration. to furnish assistance in selection of rail­ (1) Communications. heads, supply dumps, and other installa­ (2) Personnel. tions to tie in with the construction of rail, (3) Housekeeping. highway, and pipe ,line facilities from the (4) Other. rear. A number of problems arose during the 6. Expediting. Regulating Stations ex­ course of the campaign which were never pedited supply to the Armies in three ways. completely solved and they most seriously First, by tracing, locating, and arranging affected thll efficiency of operations. Among for prompt handling and forwarding of them may be mentioned the following: shipments that were actually enroute from 1. Command Channels and Authority. It supply sources. Second, by personal con­ was common knowledge at higher levels of tact and follow-through on requisitions; Army and Advance Section that the Regu. by locating sources of supply and arrang­ lating Stations were assigned to ADSEC ing for prompt turnover to Transportation and were supporting the Army. However, Corps for forwarding. Third, by enforcing lower echelons of both organizations, as priQrities in forwarding supplies from rail well as numerol\s in~tallations, individuals, reconsignment point to Army railheads. and staffs of intermediate and base sec· This last method requires some explana­ tions and Communications Zone were vague tion. When cars arrived at a rail recon­ in their understanding of the authority and signment point. in numbers beyond im­ functions of these agencies. In emergen· mediate forwarding capacity, Army G-4 cies, when authority should be definitely usually established priorities. These priori­ placed and understood, confusion existed. ties would indicate' the service, class, and During the period of congested rail con­ quantity of supplies most urgently needed, ditions in the Liege area in the autumn of and the Regulating Station would be gov­ 1944, and west of the Rhine bridges in the erned accordingly in selecting the cars to spring of 1946, Armies, Advance Section, be forwarded on the first and succeeding Communications Zone, and Army Group, trains. all attempted, generally through their G·4 7. Summary of Operations. To summa­ staff sections, to issue instructions and rize, it might be said that the operations of control movements. Frequently, il}struc. Regulating Stations comprised the follow­ tions from Regulating Stations were ques· ibg activities: tioned by the Military Railway Service and a. Transportation. valuable time was lost in securing eon­ (1) Movement control. firmation from higher authority.. Iiall had (2) Railhead operation. understood that the Regulating Station THE REGULATING STATION IN WORLD WAR II 53

, The railroad yards at Luneville, France (above), are typical of many railheads operated by Regulating Stations for troop and supply movements in World War n.-us Army photo. Below, the 42d Regulating Station at Luttelfonst, Germany, in April, 1945; the photo is from the files of the author~ . 54 MILITARY REVIEW apoke with the authority of the Advance impossible to give Army accurate informa· Section commander, the situation would tion on the progress of filling requisitions, have been much improved. However, there or any accurate forecast on the arrival are many who believe that the Regulating of shipments prior to actual arrival at Station should have been an agency of the rail reconsignment point. More Theater Headquarters, or at least of Head­ thorough, enforcement of existing direc· quarters, Comqmnications Zone, to permit tives, together with better communications, prompt solution of problems requiring a would have eliminated this problem. high-level decision. 5. Communications. In general, radio, 2. Delineation of Responsibilities. A teletype, and wire communications were detailed SOP should have been.issued spec­ excellent. Courier service was not so satis· ifying t.he exact extent of the responsi­ factory, and special runs. were frequently bilities of the Regulating Station in carry­ required. The, greatest communications ing out its many functions. There was a difficulties were with supply installations distinct tendency on the part of both Ad­ in the rear, rather than with the headquar. vance Section and Army to "delegate" ters involved. Late in the campaign, liai· duties, to Regulating Station personnel son-type aircraft were furnished and were which were actually functions of th~ staff a most valuable addition. With the geo· sections concerned and could hardiy be graphic dispersion of headquarters and in-' accomplished by the Regulating Stati6n. staIIations, and the large amount of per­ Despite this, Regulating Station instruc­ sonal contact required, there was a need tions were sometimes changed through for more planes than were furnished. other channels by the very staff sections Interesting comments were made in that had made the original "delegation" of after-action reports and other documents functions. The "passed buck" was one of by the commanding officers of the Regulat­ the great difficulties encountered in serv­ ing Stations; Continental Advance Sec­ ing as a connecting link between Advance tion; Advance Section; G-4, Twelfth Army Section and Army. Group; Chief of Staff, Communications 3. SU1Jplying Two or M01'e Armies. Zone; and the European Theater General Where two or more Armies were supplied Board. They may be summarized as fol­ over a single transportation network, con­ lows: flicts developed. The problem of diverting a. There was little agreement' on the supplies from one Army to meet emergency necessity for, method of operation, or com­ needs of another was never fully solved, mand authority of, Regulating Stations. nor was that of movement priorities be~ b. The Adva'nce Sections themselves tween two or more Armies. Better liaison, were actually a form of Regulating Sta­ includin'g a direct communication link with tion. G-4 Army Group, would undoubtedly have c. An over-all agency is needed to regu­ solved these problems. When the' , :.pacity late flow between Armies and divert \l'om of a common line of communication' is in­ one to another when necessary. suffi.cient, a controlling agency superior to d. Movement control between Adnnce the Regulating Stations involved is essen­ Section and Ar~ies is necessary. tial to establish priorities. e. A theater agency is needed in fo1'\ 'ard l 4. Lack of Information. Generally speak­ areas to supervise movements into ani; out ing, information from supply sources and of Army areas. ' Advance Section Transportation Section f. Regulating Stations were actuall:: in­ was difficult to secure, inaccurate, and late volved more with expediting than with in arriving. Under these conditions, it was regulating. THE REGULATING STATION IN WORLD WAR II 55

World War II disclosed that these agen­ 4. Emergenci.es that demand immediate cies (as visualized in Field Manual 100-10, action. ' 15 November 1943, and T/O&E 29-22) 5. Size of headquarters and installations were not suitably organized for their re­ involved. 'vised duties in the field, nor were their du­ 6. Geographic 'dispersion of headquar­ ties sufficiently outlined. Many revisions ters and installations. of policies ,and ,ideas were required, tem­ While the Regulating Station porary expedients, were employed, and the perf~rmed very necessary and important functions in organization of these units considerably modified. Misunderstanding existed as ,to World War II, it is probable that it will . the command authority, statjls, and duties not be necessary in any future conflict. All of its operating, liaison, and expediting of these stations; and there was consider­ functions are essential, but should now able overlapping of functions from time to logically be assumed by either the G-4, time. The operation of the Regulating Sta­ transportation, or technical service supply tions was not entirely successful for these officers of Advance Section and/or army. reasons, but it is generally felt that they To insure smooth functioning:however, ap­ contributed materially to the speedy and propriate procedures should be developed uninterrupted flow of supplies to the com­ and published during peacetime. A more bat troops, and to the prompt evacuation complete understanding of the techniques of wounded, excess supplies, troops, enemy and problems of storage, distriblltion, prisoners, and equipment and resources to a~d transportation on the part of future staff the Communications Zone. Perhaps tbeir officers is essential. The ability to meet the most important contribution was in fur­ unexpected must be stressed in training. nishing personal contact between the large headquarters and depots and the many There is a major requirement which must services charged with carrying out these be met if we are not to use the Regulating functions. Station again. It is absolutely essential Today, with the advent of a well-trained that intelligent, well-trained, efficient, and and organized Transportation Service in enthusiastic personnel are available in each neld army, and witq the experience sufficient numbers on the technical service gained by supply and technical services in staffs of the Armies and Advance Section World War II, the operating duties per­ to continually carry out liaison and ex­ formed by the Regulating Stations can and pediting functions in the field. Personnel should be reassigned. There will, however, selected for these assignments must be renw in a definite need for better logistical given no other routine office duties; they Iiai,nn between the field forces being sup­ must be the always-available trouble­ ported and the complex supply organiza­ shooters who can get action when the tion furnishing that support. This continu­ normal system breaks down. ing requirement for logistical liaison is The answer to the elimination of the prin, ;pally caused by the following factors: Regulating Station in a combat theater is 1. Limited supplies, coupled with mul­ twofold-better logistical education of staff tipl" ,lemands. officers in peacetime, and augmentation of 2, Umited transportation facilities. technical service staff sections at Army 3. '_ack of flexibility in routine supply and particularly Advance Section levels in pro, :lures. time of war. 'Command Post Exercises

Lieutenant Colonel Howard P. Persons, Jr., Coa~t Artillery Corps Former Instructor, Command and General Staff College

N 0 MATTER how efficiently the indi­ standing by means of a brief dis<;ussion of vidual staff· officers of a unit perform their the command post exercise with emphasis l'espective jobs, a staff is untrained until on its preparation and conduct. its individual members learn to work as a Definition. and Types team. To weld each staff into an effective team, to' develop coordination between the Command post exercises are field exer­ several staffs, and to train all staffs to cises in which participation is limited to function smoothly is the primary purpose command, staff, headquarters, and com­ of the command post exel'cise, munication personnel. All othei' troops, including the enemy, are represented by Command post exercises permit unit umpires. These exercises vary widely in commanders and staffs to apply their theo­ type. At one extreme is the type which retical knowledge of correct command and resembles the map maneuver. In this type, staff procedures to a wide val'iety of as­ only officers participate; few, if a·ny, com­ sumed tactical situations. They provide munications facilities are provided, and the commander with opportunity to correct command posts are grouped in one loca­ faulty staff procedures, to break down tion. At the other extreme is the type staff compartmentation, and to evolve which closely simulates combat conditions, standing operating procedures which best Command posts are separated by normal suit the functioning of his own and sub­ distances and sufficient headquarters and ordinate headquarters. In addition, after communications troops are provided to the staffs are trained as teams, command locate, install, and move the command post exercises are invaluable to the com­ posts just as would be done in similar mander as a testing medium for field ma­ a situation in combat. neuve~s or field exercise1; in· which all troops, will participate. By playing each Length of these maneuvers first as a command A command post exercise may last for post exercise, the commander can correct several hours or for several days. The deficiencies revealed by the play and thus length of any particular exercise will de­ ir:sure that the maneuver will not fail or pend primarily. upon the purpose of the drag because of faulty staff work. exercise. For example, if the command To> obtain full value from a command post exercise is to test a specific qanp'lver, post exercise, commanders and staff officers both should last the same length of tjme. must have an understanding of exactly In general, a command post exercise should what such..{ln exercise involves. The pur­ last long enough to permit illustrati,.n of pose of this llrticle it to provide this under­ th4i! desired principles but·not so long that COMMAND POST EXERCISES 57

action drags and the participants lose in­ be executing'the plans if they were physi­ terest. Whether 01' not the play of the cally 'taking pa~t in the exercise. exercise is continuous depends again on the purpose of the exercise. If the exer­ Location of Command Posts cise is to test the feasibility of a particular Various schemes have been used in locat­ operations plan, regular training or office ing command posts. In some exercises, it hQul's may be observed. However, if the has been necessary to have all command purpose of the exercise is to provide field posts situated in the same general locality training in command and staff proce­ in the field. The. assembly of several com­ dures, then the play should be continuous. mand posts in one small area has the dis­ "Otherwise, a faulty picture of staff opera­ advantage of creating an artificial !litua­ tions is presented. The staffs concerned tion and producing a lack of" realism, will fail to realize the complications which particularly with respect to signal com­ arise from the necessity for organizing for munications. Experience has shown that uninterrupted operations as well as for locations and movements of command posts adequate rest and sleep. seldom can be exactly as in combat. How­ The ,duration of a command post exer­ ever, it is desirable that the command posts cise may often be reduced by using a time be situated in realistic locations suitable ratio of 1 to 2 or more, i.e., by allowing 1 for the principal play of the problem, even hour of actual time to represent 2 or more if the command posts must remain in the hours of problem time. However, in the same locations throughout the exercise.

Command post exercises permit unit commanders and staffs to apply, their theories of command and staffp~ocedures to various tactical situations. Here is how such exercises may'be prepared and conducted

interest of realism, a time ratio of 1 to 1 Distances separating command posts is desirable. Whenever possible, the time should, when conditions permit, be ap­ ratio which will achieve the greatest real­ 'proximately as they would if the situation ism and still permit development of' the were real. This is particularly true when problem sufficiently to illustrate the de­ normal strength signal communication sired principles should be used. Instead of units are participating. Otherwise, the using' an increased time ratio, it may be players overlook 01' discount difficulties of fea ,ible in some exercises to use a time communication that occur in actual opera­ ratio of 1 to 1 during most of the exercise tions. Except as a last resort, it is unwise by allowing 1 hour, at a critical time, to to hold a command post exercise with the represent the passing of 1 or more days. headquarters in their permanent locations. Obviously, if this system is adopted, great Not only is this practice unrealistic, but car" must be used during the preparation participants will have difficulty in divorc­ of . :le problem to determine just when this ing themselves from day-to-day business til" lapse should occur in order to be effec­ and in concentrating on the play of the th', apd yet not copfuse the play. Another exercise. sol "ion is to use a 1 to l"ratio during the Control pI:, '!ling phase and then change to a 1 to Command post e~ercises are controlled 2 I' cio during the operational phase, which and regulated by two groups: the directors is' ,,e period during which the troops would and the umpires. 58 MILITARY REVIEW

Directors-The directors are charged as such to the players, but is reflected in ­ wtih the over-all responsibility for' pre­ the orders, messages, and information paring, directing, controlling, and super­ which tl~e umpires (in their capacity as vising the exercise. In some respects, this higher, subordinate, and adjacent units) group might be compared to instructors, furnish the players. In all types of com­ since they furnish advice and guidance to mand post exercises, the action of the um­ the umpires and the players but do not pires must be closely coordinated in order usually participate directly in the play of to prevent inconsistencies in reporting in­ the exercise, The directors are the persons formation of enemy action. Umpires 1'ep1'e­ most familiar with the exercise; they are senting opposing forces work closely to­ interested in seeing that the desired prin­ gether to insure that the situation of these ciples are correctly illustrated by the play forces will be coordinated at all times. -of the exercise and that all participants The umpires should be assembled suffi­ follow accepted command and staff pro­ ciently' in advance of the play to become cedures, ­ thoroughly familiar with their duties and The directo): group usually consists of with the problem. During the preliminary an Exercise Headquarters-which dh'ects orientation for the umpires, their duties and supervises the exercise as a whole­ and the general nature of the problem are and a number of unit directors. One unit carefully explained by the principal author director is present with and supervises of the exercise (usually the G-3 of the each of the partillipating headquarters. major participating unit). At this orienta­ The Exercise Headquarters is usually tion, the author of the exercise should give staffed by officers who were responsible for a clear and concise explanation of the ex­ the preparation of the exercise. In some ercise, visualizing how the director would cases, the Exercise Headquarters also rep­ like to see the problem develop, and point­ resents higher headquarters. The unit di­ ing out any significant items or develop­ rectors are selected either from among the ments to be carefully checked. These in­ senior officers of the participating units or structions may consist of a brief of the from some other unit or units. Unit direc­ exercise, a summary of the tasks to be tors'-'always receive the same orientation accomplished, a concept of the play, and as the umpires. In some exercises, the unit suggestions to the s~veral umpire sections directors are actually called umpires. ­ on methods of developing the exercise. After this orientation, the umpires, Umpi1'es-The umpires, under a chief under the direction of the chief umpire, umpire, are responsible to the exercise study the problem and the scenariO', com­ director for the detailed control and coor­ dination- of the play of the exercise. They plete their organization, devise necessary control measures to develop the piay along represent all headquarters and units, in­ the indicated lines, test the exercise by cluding the enemy, that are not represented means of a war-game, and submit recom­ by the players or the director group. mendations for changes to the director. Umpires exert the greatest influence upon Before the exercise begins, the chief mn­ the 'success or failure of the play of the pire satisfies himself that each umpire command post exercise. An adequate knows the particular duty he is to perform number of qua\ified officers must be as­ and that the separate signal' comII¥1nica­ signed as umpires. tion system established for the umpire" is The principal duty of the umpires is to adequate and functions properly. If },')5­ ev.aluate the orders and decisions of the sible, he should-make certain that the b"nd players. This evaluation is not delivered of radio frequencies set aside for his ',se COMMAND POST EXERCISES 59 is not within the receiving capabilities of will act as division headquarters during the players. the conduct of the exercise, consists of the Preparation remainder of the division staff, plus No rules can be laid down for the se­ selected officers from subordinate head­ quence to be used in drawing up a com­ quarters. In this way, junior commanders mand post exercise, since much of the and staff officers are given an opportunity for training at the division level. At the preparation mus~ be done' concurrently. In general, however, these steps should be same time this organization is taking place, followed in the preparation of division, or a chief umpire is tentatively selected and higher echelon, exercises: charged with the responsibility for the preliminary arrangements necessary to. in­ Issuance of the directive-The division , sure a smooth and efficient working of the commander issues either a verbal or writ­ umpire system. ten directive through the chief of staff to the G-3, setting forth the purpose and scope The organization just described is par­ of the exercise. If necessary to guide the ticularly applicable to command post ex­ preparation of the exercise, this directive ercises held during the later phases of a: also indicates the terrain available, the division training program. Whenever pos­ participants,. the date and duration, and sible, the earlier division exercises should the funds available. G-3 receives the di­ be planned and directed by a headquarters rective because he is primarily responsible higher than the division, so that the mem­ for the preparation of the exercise, al­ bers of the division staff can receive train­ though all members of the general and ing in their regular jobs during the play special staff will contribute. of the exercise. 01'ganization of the division staff-As Prepamtion of the problem-Based on' soon as the directive for the exercise has the directive, the planning group prepares been issued, the division staff is organized the problem to bring about the type of into a planning group (sometimes called operation or instruction desired. The the exercise committee), a director group, problem consists of a general situation, and a player group. The planning group, a special situation, and a requirement, to-, which will be charged with preparation of gether with any necessary troop lists, staff the tactical and administrative features of estimates,' or studies on terrain and the e}(ercise (including the problem and weather. How much of this material is issued in written form depends upon the the ~cenario), consists of the G-3 and such athol' general and special staff officers as size and scope of the exercise. In the ma~' be required to assist in the prepara­ smaller exercises, play may be initiated, tion of the particular exercise. The pur­ after an oral briefing on the situation, by POSt' and scope of the exercise will de­ the issuance of oral orders to subordinate tern!ine the size and composition of the commanders. For divisions and larger planlling group. The director group, which units, the problem must be in written form. will exercise over-all supervision over the The form employed in the preparation pIa; of the exercise, usually consists of the of the problem is the same as for any other diy' ion commander and selected members tactical exercise (see Field Manual 21-5), of t i," planning group. In nearly all cases. The situations are drawn so that a loO'ical the ;-3 will be a member of the director solution of the requirement will initiate p:ro p as well as of the planning group, the play of the exercise along the desired sin •. ' he is the staff officer primarily re­ lines and will lead to a correct illustration spo. ;ible for the preparation and conduct of the principles to be taught. Special at­ of 1 'e exercises; The player gl'OUp, which tention and much ingenuity are required '60 MILITARY REVIEW

to write these situations so that they will training or to emphasize specific' features present" a challenge to the players. If the of training, then a more detailed scenario, principal decisions are already made, plans will be required. The scenario may be pre­ nearly complete, logistical support ade­ pared in illustrative form on a map or quate, personnel complications minimized, overlay, in narrative (outline) form, or and the operations proceeding favorably, in a combination of these two methods. The the challenge is practically removed ,from scenario is distributed to the directors and the problem arid a minimum of player umpires,:but not to the players. . activity will result. Selection of umpires-Umpires are des­ In drawing up the situation for the ex­ ignated ~arly enough to permit any neces­ ercise, great care should be taken in formu­ sary training and to permit them time for lating the mission. The mission must be orientation and study of the"problem and stated clearly and in definite terms if de­ scenario. During the first of a series of cisive action along desired lines is expected division command post exercises, most of of all commanders. All features of the the umpires should be provided from situations should be coordinated with the sources outside the division. This permits mission. Ordinarily, a situation should not thll training of commanders and staff be developed which will require a com­ officers in their regular positions before mander to abandon his mission. The back­ attempting to train alternates for these ground should be stated briefly in the positions, insures that these exercises will general situation. Initial locations and dis­ accomplish their primary mission of de­ positions should be announced, the mission veloping the headquarters into teams, and stated, and the administrative situation in provides the division with an impersonal the special situation indicated. The require­ and valuable source of criticism of its ment need only be sufficient to start the operating methods and techniques, For exercise., later exercises, most of the umpires ~ay Preparation of the scenario-Based on profitably be selected from the division ,the problem, the planning group prepares itself. 'This is particularly true of exer­ a scenario for the exercise. The scenario cises held as a testing medium for field ex­ is nothing more than the planning group's ercises or maneuvers. In their position as concept of how the exercise should develop umpires, key comma~ders and staff officers in order to emphasize the desired principles will be in a better position to supervise the exercise and to detect any deficiencies or lessons. It sets forth the phases into in the problem revealed by the play of the which the exercise is divided, the time exercise. This opportunity to -become schedule for each phase, and an outline of familiar with the whole problem and to the action expected during each phase. It detect and correct deficiencies will result . may contain prepared 'messages'or orders in better play during the field exercise. for dispatch at designated times to desig­ nated headquarters. The amount of detail Reconnaissance and orientation-In ac­ included in the scenario depends upon the cordance with the general and special desires of the commander and the purpose situations, arrangements a.re made for the of the particular exercise. If the purpose necessary reconnaissance before the ~tart of'the exercise is to develop coordinated of the exercise by the commanders and training, a very general scenario is pref­ staffs participating and by the U¥l(lires. erable since it allows greater freedom of Provisions are also made for a gpneral play on the part of the participants. If, orientation lecture for all officers just be­ on the other hand, the purpose of the ex­ fore the exercise begins. ercise is to correct specific deficiencies in Administrative arrangements-Since the COMMAND POST EXERCISES 61 division can usually meet all of its own 8. Critique.-Statement of who will at­ requirements, the administrative ,plan on tend, and where and when the critique will. the division level is relatively easy to pre­ be held. pare. However, when a command post ex­ Critiques.-N0 exercise should ever be ercise is conducted on corps or higher level, concluded without a critique. 'Plans for the consideration must be given the following: critique are announced in advance of the Signal communication system and per­ exercise. The plan should include, in addi­ sonnel. ' tion to the time and place, a statement of Clerical assistance. the personnel to attend, and, if necessary" Messing, quarters, and like arrange­ instructions for critiques by subordinate ments. headquarters. Critiques should be held ·as Transportation. soon as practicable after the exercise is Maps. completed. As a matter pf standing oper­ Installation of command posts for um­ ating procedure, an agenda for the critique pire groups. should be prepared. Critiques should be Rents and claims. begun at the scheduled time, should follow Publicity and public relations. the agenda, and should be held in a loca­ Preparation of the training memoran­ tion which will permit everyone to see and dmn-A training memorandum should be hear clearly and to be relatively com­ published about a month prior to the ex­ fortable. The larger the group the greater ercise.The following list of items may be the care which must be exercised in se­ contained in this memorandum. lecting the place for the critique. 1. Announcement.-A brief statement of The agenda for the critique should pro­ the time and place of the exercise. vide for a brief orientation by the G-3, or 2. Purpose.-Pertinent extracts from principal assistant to the exercise director. the directive defining the objective and In this orientation, he should outline the scope of'the exercise. purpose of the exercise, the principles 3. Troops participating.-List of units that were to be illustrated, the instructive taking part in the exercise, including those aspects of the planning, and the expected individuals or units to be excused from the development of the play. Selected sub­ exercise. ordinate commanders should briefly point 4. Uniform and equipment.-Statement out the lessons learned from the exercise. of the uniform and individual field equip­ The chief umpire should point out the ment for the exercise. principal tactical lessons illustrated by the actual development of the play and any 5. Tactical situation and requirement.­ .methods or measures which might have A bl'ief statement of the initial situation given better results. The higher com: and requirement to permit subordinate mander usually concludes the critique, units to plan effectively their training and emphasizing the tactical principles and administrative arrangements. lessons learned from the exercise. In all 6. Control measures.-Sufficient expla­ cases, the critique should be brief and nati.'TI of the control measures and ground cover salient features only. A rehash of rule,; to insure understanding of the con­ the action serves no purpose and only trol -ystem by the participants. bores the participants. The fewer the 7. Records.-List of records, such as speakers at a critique the better. unit ,Journals, operations maps, and reports Summary whi, "J units are to forward to division afte the exercise. In summary, the following points are of 62 MILITARY REVIEW special importance in the preparation and attempted until proficiency has been at­ conduct of command post exercises for tained in small-scale exerclses. divisions and larger units: 4. An adequate number of qualified urn· 1. Each exercise should have as its mis­ pires must be detailed for the exercise. sion the accomplishment of a particular 5. A critique must be held as soon as training objective. practiCal after the completion of the ex· 2. The tadical situation should be drawn ercise. up to illustJ:ate certain principles; it 6. Although the G-3 is primarily respon· should be ad~pted to the size unit involved sible for the preparation and conduct of and to the terrain. these exercises, all members of the general 3. Large-scale exercises should not be and special staff contribute to their success.

For most men, the mattt'r of learning is one of personal preference. But for Army officers, the obligation to Jearn, to grow in their profession, is clearly a public duty. General Omar N. Bradley

It must be remembered that the purpose of education is not to fill the minds of students with facts, it is not to r~form them, or amuse them, or make them expert technicians in any field. It is to teach them to think, if that is possible, and to think always for themselves. Dr. Robert M. Hutchins ,UNITED STATES Guided Bomb The chief of the Air Materiel Command ment of devices to guide missiles with predicted recently that the Air Force speeds up to 700 miles an hour and ranges would have ready for operational use of 5,000 miles. But pinpoint accuracy has within a year a 12,000-pound bomb-about not yet been reached, and "push button" the estimated weight of an atomic bomb­ warfare with such guided missiles is still that can be guided all the way to a target. in the rather distant future. It was also announced that: 4. Research engineers are working on 1. United States aircraft engineers and development of a multi-stage rocket mis­ manufacturers have the know-how to pro­ sile capable of a speed of about 4,000 miles duce operational faster-than-sound combat an hour. Development of such a missile is planes now. The Air Force plans to wait not likely before perhaps a decade. It until at least three more experimental would be launched from the ground in de­ models similar to the supersonic X-I rocket fense against an attack by missiles ap­ plane have been tested. proaching from beyond the earth's atmos­ phere. The X-I-A, now being built, is designed 5. Aerial cameras have been perfected to fly 1,700 miles an hour. The X-I has that will take clear detail pictures at alti­ been flown many times at speeds "several tudes from 40,000 to 100,000 feet. hundred" miles an hour faster than sound. 6. The Air Force has abandoned re­ 2. The conventional machine guns on in­ search on piston engines. Twelve new jet terc~ntor fighter planes will be replaced engines-including turbo-jet, turbo-props, withiq a "relati'{ely short" time with ram and pulse jets-are being developed. roch', missiles having a built-in radar 7. Several new experimental jet bombers homi .• ~ device. This device will guide the are being developed. They include a light miss"~ right to an enemy bomber, regard­ , bombardment type for support of ground less· " the bomber's evasive action. forces, a long-range heavy and a medium TI . e rockets will be launched several bomber to replace the "workhorse" B-29s mile: :rom an enemy bomber, track it down and B-50s. The experimental heavy bomber, at s )~rsonic speed, and,explode within if successful, could replace the B-36, now lethl range by means of a proximity fuse. the world's largest bomber, which has six 3. .111erican research engineers have piston and four jet engi;'es.-The New mad, progress recently toward develop­ Y crk Times. 64 MILITARY REVIEW

Faster Than Sound Rebuilding V~hides Scientists of the National Advisory Army Ordnance .installations in the C9mmittee for Aeronautics (NACA) are United States Zone of Germany have re­ dropping weighted models from airplanes built and reclaimed vehicles, engines, tools, and'thus approaching in a new way the tires, and miscellaneous machine parts hav­ problem of transonic and supersonic' flight. ing a total estimated original cost of more The scientists resorted to the dropping than $110,000,000 in the past 2 years, the or free-fall technique because, in the tran­ Department of the A~my announced re­ sonic range, wind tunnels are choked by cently. the highcspeed air current driven through Cost of replacing this equipment at them. In the free-falling research method, present,prices is estimateii au $220,000,000. 1,000-pound bodies with model wings and Restoration was accomplished at an ex­ tails attached are dropped from a height penditure of approximately $35,000,000, ,of about 40,000 feet. Maximum speeds including $5,250,000.for American rna· range from 1.4 times the speed of sound terials, and $29,750,000 for German labor without a booster to 1.8 times the speed of aJ;ld German materials. sound with a booster.-The New Ym·k Working with stocks of American war Times. materials that remained in Germany after substantial quantities had been shipped Subsonic Research Aircraft back to the United States or transferred Sharply swept back wings and a single to allies through the Office of Foreign vertical fin for a tail are the chief identi­ Liquidation, Ordnance shops in United States-occupied Germany rebuilt ,nearly 38,000 vehicles and trailers of all types in the 2-year period ending 1 April 1949. In addition, some 300,000 tires, 93,000 tubes, hnd thousands of engines, trans­ mission assemblies,. axles, and other auto. motive parts and Ordnance supply items were rebuilt, reclaimed, and l'eturned to depot stocks in serviceable condition. The contributions of the huge "rebuild" program in support of the Berlin· Airlift , Northrop X-4 jet aircraft. and its benefits to the German economy have been important. From reserve stocks fying characteristics of the US Air Force of tractors, trailers, and automotive parts X-4 research airplane recently conpleted supplied by the program, Ordnance outfits by the Northrop Aircraft Corporation. 'were able to re-equip or replace without Th~ plane, powered by two jet engines, is designed for experimenting in the subsonic delay the more than 1,000 Air Force vehi­ zone, that "trouble zone" just short of the des and truck-tractors and trucks of speed.of sound. Its wing span is approx­ seven heavy-truck companies engaged in imately 25 feet, the length about 20 feet, out-loading at the Rhine-Main ana IVeis· and the height about 15 feet. Gross weight baden fields and off-loading at· the 11erlin is approximately 7,000 pounds.-US Air terminus.-National Military Esta:Jish· Force photo. ment. MILITARY NOTES AROUND THE WORLD 65

Assault By Helicopter Less than 4 years after the Japanese copters may be summarized as follows: surrender, the United States Marine Corps 1. The invasion fleet may be dispersed, has nearly perfected an entirely new in­ thereby avoiding the dangers of aerial at­ vasion technique. It eliminates the neces­ tack against a concentration of ships. sity for costly frontal assaults on heavily 2. Troops may be put ashore more defended objects and counteracts the quickly. and at almost any point desired, threat of atomic· bomb attacks on large rather than on the only beach which might invasion fleets. be available for an amphibious assault. The technique features the use of troop­ 3. Troops put ashore from carriers out carrying helicopters protected by Marine of sight of the objective would have the

1:8 Marine Corps troops landing from an assault helicopter in a demonstration of new invasion tactics.-US Marine Corps photo. fight ··r·bombers flown by pilots especially advantage of surprise and could be sup­ trai· ,·d in tactical air support. ported by other troops landed in the more II' the opinion of most Marine Corps conventional manner and equipped with pIal' ,jhg officers, helicopters will replace heavier weapons. the ,oelatively slow, vuinerable assault The aircraft used in this demonstration boai. which spearheaded the major am­ were Marine transport-type Piasecki HRP­ phil!' JUS operations of World War II. 1 helicopters, capable of carrying 10 men T, , advantages gained by using heli­ plus the crew.-Armed Force. 66 MILITARY REVIEW Alaska Radar Incendiary Tack Th~ Air Force recently announced a A device to bl'OW out the tires of enemy plan for the substantial strengthening of vehicles or airplanes has been disclosed by its l'adar aircraft ,varning system in the US Patent Office. It is called an "in­ Alaska. ' cendiary tack" by its invent'Or. The sharp increase in radar control and The 'device consists 'Of a sharp-pointed warning personnel is understood not only tack inside'a thin shell 'Of metal 'Or plastic, to signal the over-all strengthening that surrounded by a charge that will set fire, is due in the aircraft defense system in, to any tire that crunches d'Own on it. In this country's northernmost outpost, but its simplest form, the device would ,consist also to carry out what has been described 'Of a charge 'Of thermite mixed with pitch as a "shift in emphasis" from the outlying or other sticky, inflammable material. Aleutian Islands to the Alaskan mainland. ,This would fi()t only burn a hole in the tire but would also scatter flaming bits It is understood that the strategy shift backwards, forwards, and upwards as the will relegate the Aleutians to a relatively tire burned. minor, naval role, while the mainland air , Another version 'Of the tack would be bases will assume the burden of United h'Oll'OW with a small container 'Of gasoline. States military secllrity in that regi'On. When struck, the h'Ollow tack would act Air defense command officials said that like a hypodermic syringe, injecting gaso­ the strengthening of the Anchorage radar line int'O the tire. A few turns of the wheel control and warning unit was not part of later, a thin disk would be WOrn through, the $161,000,000 radar warning system exposing a concealed match-head charge for the nati~m 'Or the joint United States to the scratching action of the road. The and Canadian netw'Ork now under discus-, resulting flame would cause the ilir-gaso­ sion.-The New York Times. line mixture in the tire to explode. Th~ device could be planted by hand, Personnel Policy Board strewn from the rear of retreating ve­ hicles, or sprinkled from low-flying -Another step has been taken in unifying planes.-Science News Letter. the Armed F'Orces with the establishment of a Personnel P'Olicy Board for the entire Dry Cell BaHery , lI:filitary Establishment. It has peen set up Development 'Of a dry cell battery, using in the Office of the Secretary 'Of Defense magnesium instead 'Of zinc as olle of its with a civilian expert as head. Duties of principal components, has recently been the new board are: To devel'OP sound, announced by the Signal Corps. progressive, and, where desirable, unif'Orm The new battery has approximately policies for civilian and military personnel twice the capacity 'Of the conventional dry of the Military Establishment; to c'Oordi­ cell battery. It can be manufactUTt'd by nate civilian and military personnel activi­ using the same machinery as used in the ties of the several branches of the Military manufacture 'Of the c'Onventional dry cell Establishment; to consolidate numerous in­ type. terdepartmental boards and committees The fact that this battery uses ll':lgnc­ now concerned directly with .civilian or sium, a n'Oncritical material, instead'o; zinc, military personnel policy' matters; and to which is in fairly s~ort supply" aSSU,:lS an conduct or sponsor studies of matters adequate quantity of the dry cell bal ;eries affecting military and civilian personnel of in the event 'Of another national 'mer­ ,the services.-Report to the Army. gency.-Office, Chief Signal Officer. MILITARY NOTES AROUND THE WORLD 67

Flush-Mounted Antennas For speedy new planes, it became a metal sheet. Several other submerged "must" that slowing drag from the pro­ types are set down into the aircraft struc­ truding surfaces of old-type radio antennas ture and covered 'yith a dielectric material. be eliminated. But the antennas, a vital The advantages of flush mounting are part of communication and navigation, had niany. Most important is the elimination of to stay. drag. For example, a'simple streamlined There was only one solution. The an­ i-foot antenna of the old stub type, pro­ tennas had to "go underground." tt'uding from a plane's surface, expended First of the flush-mounted antennas was 200 horsepower at 600 miles per hour, or

F-80 jet fighter with various types of "buried" antennas as standard equipment.-Air Materiel Command photo. the "pick axe" type antenna which rides the force required to pull two low-priced inside the aircraft tail, protected by a automobiles. With fiu'sh mounting, this plastic l'adome. Shaped to follow the con­ useless expenditure of power is eliminated ventional tail lines, it draws its name from entirely. resemblance to the familial' pick axe. Other advantages include the elimina­ Other zero-drag antennas were developed tion of icing dangers, added pro.tection rapidly, including the slot type which from precipitation static, the sealing out bOlT<)WS an analogy from optics for its of moisture, and freedom from:-the fear basic principle. In its most simple form, that external antennas will, be broken off the .Jot type is a slit entered in a thin at high speeds.-Air Materiel Command.

3,O(l')-Mile Range Titanium TI ' United States is negotiating with A newly developed lightweight metal, Gre, ). Britain for permission to fire super­ titanium, much stronger than steel and soni, ,;'uided missiles across the Bahamas. 6nly 60 percent heavier than aluminum, PI ",ident Truman i'ecently signed a bill may become very useful in the entire field autb "izing the Air Force' to construct a of warfare. Uses ranging from airborne 2,00: :nile range (MILITARY REVIEW, June weapons to supersonic missiles will be pos­ 194£, p. 68) for testing guided missiles.­ sible when the metal can be produced at a The 'ew Yark Times. 'reasonable cost.-News report. 68 MILITARY REVIEW ) GREAT BRITAIN Tank Bridges Women's RAF Many different methods of getting tanks The original announcement made in across obstacles, such as tank traps or February 1948 has now been confirmed, ditches, were devised during and after and since 1 February 1949, women have World War II. Two of the more successful been enlisted and commissioned in the devices are those shown here. The top pic­ Royal Air Force. The title' "Women's ture shows,how a bridge is attached to the Royal Air Force" will be used as a collec­ forward part of the tank, is hauled to the tive term to describe serving airwomen. crossing site, placed in position, and then 'Women are now able to volunteer for most used by its carrier and other vehicles which RAF trades, and they are trained side by foilow. siqe with airmen to the same trade stand­ ards. They h~ve the same prospects of promotion to NCO rank as airmen, and have a similar disciplinary code. Initial enlistment for airwomen is for 4 y'ears, with opportunities of ext~nding this to 10 years. A gratuity of $140.00 is pay­ able after 10 years' service. During their tenth year of service, airwomen may apply for reenlistment to complete 22 years with a view to obtaining a pension. The normal commissioning policy will be to select a large proportion of officers from among airwomen for commissions. These women officers will be appointed on short service commissions generally for 4 or 5 years, with possible extension to 10 years. They will be employed in the tech­ nical equipment,' secretarial, medical, dental, education, provost, and catering branches. Short-service commissioned offi­ cers will be eligible for permanent com­ missions. In the future, the assistant sec­ tion officers will be given the rank of pilot officer. Gratuity for the short-service commis­ sion will be at the rate of $260.00 a year. The lower picture illustrates the use of Officers serving on permanent commissions a special vehicle which has no turret but is normally will be eligible for retired pay by equipped instead with a ramp upon which completing a minimum of 20 years' service other tanks will cr.oss the obstacle. The after the age of 21. vehicle with the ramp is driven into the Women with professional qualif\cations diteh ~r tank trap, approach ramps are Jnay be selected for direct appointment to laid down, and the other tanks proceed to short-service commissions in tlie medical, "leap-frog" the vehicle in the ditch.-The dental, education, and catering branch~s.­ 11l1tst1"ated London N eW8. The Aeroplane. * MILITARY NOTES iOUND THE WORLD 69 Midget Submarines Since the end of World War II, little they undertake severely tax the physical has been heard of the midget submarines and mental qualities of the crews. It is a of the Royal Navy. The small, ships are, job for initiativ!l and enterprise, as the however, still in commission. They have war years so often proved. -taken part in recent naval exercises and have demonstrated their capabilities for Originally the "X" class of submarines harbor penetration and other duties for consisted of 12 units, which were built in which such craft are most suited. 1942 and later by Vickers-Armstrong Ltd. Among the most famous exploits car­ Two prototypes had previously been built ried out by these tiny craft during the war at Portsmouth Dockyards. In 1948, four

A closeup of the British midget srlbmarine XE 9. The tube amidships contains the periscope and a microphone for communication with the i'nterior of the vessel.

,wer.' the attacks on the German battleship of the midgets-XE 7, 8, 9, and 12-still Th'j ·tz in the Kaafiord on 22 September remained in service. These vessels have a 194: - the cutting of the Singapore-Saigon displacement of between 30 and 40' tons sea "able during the war against Japan; and are 53 feet in length. They carry a and the attack on the Japanese cruiser crew of three to five men. Each vessel has Tal. '0 at Singapore. one Gardner engine for surface power, and S 'i'vice in the midget submarine is es­ one electric motor for propulsion while sen' 'ally a young man's job, for the submerged. Theil' speed is said to be about 'era; ped quarters and the special tasks 6 knots.-The Sphere. 70 MILITARY REVIEW USSR .HOLLAND Soviet Navy Atom Smasher Russia's Navy is more of a defensive A small atom smasher with a 9,000,000­ )veapon than an offensive weapon at pres­ electron-volt punch has been built at the ent, but may not remain so ·permanently. Philips Research Laboratories'in Holland. Even the possession of some of Ger­ It is so light and easy to handle that it can many's "Schnorkel" submarines, plus be taken to a job instead of moving the others which they may have built with the job to it. . aid of German naval experts, will not re­ This new type of betatron,. a device for lease the Soviet Navy from its ties to the speeding up electrons to high energies, has land for some time to come. no heavy and expensive iron yoke with Historically, the Russian Navy has al­ which such machines are "usually con­ ways been an adjunct to the Army. From structed.-Science News Letter. the days of Peter the Great, Russian ships have acted more as mobile extensions of IRAN static shore fortresses, rather than as in­ Military Aid dependent, far-ranging fleets. This sub­ ,The United States; upon the request of ordination of Navy to Army has even gone the government of Iran, made available to to the extent of arming Russian warships the government of Iran military advisors with guns of land-artillery calibers. in two missions, established under emer­ gency powers granted to the President Regarding the adaptability of Russian during World War II. men to operate and maintain modern ships, The United States Military Mission conflicting testimony has been presented. with the Iranian Army was established in Some experts state that Russian crews September 1947. It consisted of 22 officers function smoothly and efficiently, keeping and 14 enlisted men at the end of Odober up the tradition of a "taut ship." Others 1948, The mission furnished advice and declare that they are not very apt in assistance to the Iranian Ministry of War learning the enormous amount of mechani­ and its several departments. It also ad­ cal detail that goes into the making and vised sections of the general staff with re­ hanaling of a modern warship. spect' to plans and problems concerning There seems to be this much agreement, organization, administrative principles, however: the Soviet Navy of today shows and training methods. a vast improvement over the "bewildered The United States Military Mission with and barnacled" ships of the old Czarist the Iranian Gendarmerie was establ!~hed fleet that were trapped and sent to the in August 1943. The purpose of this Mis­ bottom by the Japanese Navy at Tsushima sion is to advise and assist the Iranian strait in 1905.-Scicncc News Lette?". Ministry of Interior in the reorganization of the Imperial Iranian Gendarmerie. AUSTRALIA To provide Iran with the means of main­ Radioactive Deposits taining internal order, the United States Government geologists reported recently entered into an agreement to sell to Iran that they had discovered highly radioactive 10 million dollars' worth of surplus mili­ mineral deposits in central Australia and tary equipment on a credit basisr The might he on the tl'ail of a vast uranium equipment includes modern fighter-type field. The deposits were discovered 200 aircraft, light tanks, armored cars, and miles northeast of the town of Alice light artillery weapons.-Annual R, :'OI·t Springs.-The New Ym'k Times. of the Secreta1'Y of the Army. MILITARY NOTES AROUND THE WORLD 71

FRANCE, GERMANY Atomic Research Jet Bomber France will produce its own radioactive At the end of World War II, the Ger­ elements for treating cancer' and other mans were striving to take advantage of diseases, although it has no intention of the swept-wing idea in aircraft designing. making atomic bombs. They had produced numerous experimental Dr. Frederic Joliot-Curie, leading atomic aircraft with this futuristic shape. scientist of France, said that perhaps Their first swept-wing jet bomber-the within 2 years, when a second atomic pile Ju'nkers JU-287-had its wings sw~pt for­ is put into operation, it is hoped that ward instead of to the rear as is the .case France will be self-sufficient in radioiso­ with present-day designs. topes for medicine and industry as well as It is understood that Russia captured , research. the Junkers factory at Dessau intact, Dr. Bertrand Goldschmidt of the French stripped it of all tools, dies, and jigs, and Atomic Enm'gy Commission explained that transported the engineers and other per­ the new French atomic pile would have to sonnel to Russia. They also captured run 50 centuries before it would produce enough of the man~made element, plu­ tonium, for one atomic bomb. France's present atomic pile, aside from being the first known to be in operation outside of English-speaking countries, is unique in technical respects. It is called, technically, a heavy water-uranium oxide pile, first of its kind in the world. Brown oxide of uranium is used as the raw ma­ terial for the operation of the pile, instead of the pure meta1.-Science News Letter.

BRAZIL Ju-2S'1, showing swept-forward wing. Military Air Transport In 1931, the Brazilian Minister of War several Ju-287 prototypes which had been decided to use military aircraft to trans­ built. Rumors indicate that they are build­ port mail and passengers, thus creating ing more of the same type of plane. the Military Mail Service. The first trip The Ju-2S7 had a span of 64 feet and wa, made on 12 June 1931 between Rio de was 58 feet long. Its gross weight was Jan,'rio and Sao Paulo and the mail bag 50,100 pounds, with an estimated top speed COlli ained only two letters. By the end of of 515 mph. It had a cruising speed of 465 th[l r year, 61 passengers and 16,000 pounds mph and a range of about 1,000 miles with of . 'lrgo had been flown a total of 1,080 a bomb load of 8,800 pounds. mil,'." If the Russians are producing this air­ I "om this modest beginning has arisen plane from the German plans, they un­ the nresent Air Transport Command. In doubtedly are using jet engines of higher 194'" the ATC carried 34,696 passengers, thrust than those used by the Germans, 211: tons of mail, and 2,080 tons of cargo and the airplane's performance can be ex­ a "tal distance of 3,185,000 miles.­ ,pected to have increased accordingly.­ Br, ,oilian news report. Flying. 72 MILITARY REVIEW

LATIN AMERICA CANADA Military Missions ! Light Geiger Counter One liundred fourteen officers and 112 A 1-pound Geiger counter for uranium enlisted men·are assigned to US Army mis­ prospecting, developed' by the Canadian sions and :'commissiops in 13 Latin Ameri­ National Research Council, together with can' Republics. Established by executive several weighing from 6 to 11 pounds, will agreements anjl ~reaties between the make possible a systematic search for this United States and the, respective govern­ essential atomic energy mineral without . ments, these Army! missions assist their the use of the much heavier Geiger coun­ host countries in military organization and ters now in use. training and promo~e cooperation in West­ ern Hemisphere defense. During 1947­ Radium and uranium prospecting before 1948, seven, mission contracts were re­ the war was largely'a hit-and-miss affair, newed, and negotiations were undertaken based principally on visual observation. for missions in other Latin American Re­ Geiger counters eliminate the hit-and-miss publics. These missions, having supplanted method because this electronic instrument. European military mISSIOns in Latin now used for' many years in detecting America, have done much to improve inter­ radioactivity, will register even' trace American relations. amounts of radioactive substances. Sev­ Army missions' are administered by the , eral light-weight portable types have been General Staff, United States Army. Ne­ developed since uranium has become so im­ gotiations for their establishment, however, pOl'tant in the atomic energy field, but are carried ,on at the diplomatic level. Ilone, as far as known, as light as the new Representatives of the Department of Canadian I-pound, pocket-size instrument. State and Department of the Army meet with representatives of the host govern­ The Geiger-Mueller tube, the heart of ment to formulate a contract, or executive the counter, is small itself. Its power re­ agreement, which sets forth in detail the quirem'ents at first were disproportionately conditions under which the mission will large. Portable counters were made pos­ operate. sible by the new miniaturizing technique The desire to become genuine good neigh­ used in the construction of electronic bors and the military necessity for secur­ circuits. ing the southern flank of the United States The Canadian miniature Geiger counter led to the mission program and to the cali be lowered by cable into a dee.P drill growing inter-American defense plans. The hole in a search for any radioactive ma­ first step was to destroy the prewar myth terial through which the hole might have that continental armies are the finest in passed. One of the steps which had Lo be the world and to convince Latin American taken was to overcome the interference of nations that the US Army could provide the cable, which weakened and distorted better professional assistance and instruc­ the voltage pulse from the counter tuLe. tion. U'nited States soldiers find Latin Ameri­ Success came at last only recently when can military personnel friendly, exceed­ it was discovered that the resister coil in ingly cooperative, and desirous of learning. all circuits was needlessly large. It was Substantial progress has' been made in found that the power of the resistel coil teaching US military doctrines and prac­ could be reduced to almost one-hund"edth tices.-Annual Report of the Secretary of of its, previous power.-Science ,'eWB the Army. Letter. FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS

Psychological Warfare and the Soldier

Digested by the MILITARY REVIEW from an article in the "Australian Army Journal" ,(Australia) August~September 1948.

DURING the American Civil War, a Con­ with the improvements in the more visible federate general wrote to his opponent weapons of war. Nevertheless, it remained protesting in firm but courteous terms for Leon Trotsky, collaborator of Lenin against the latter's "unsoldierly conduct" and organizer of the military victory in in causing printed invitations to surrender the Russian civil war of 1917-1920, to re­ to be distributed in the Confederate late in precise terms his "Strategy of lines. The Federal commander replied in Disintegration" to the more orthodox equally courteous tones, pointing out that, military methods of gaining political ends. after all, he was only trying to induce Trotsky visualized war as. a continuous rebel soldiers to return to their proper process which would cease only when all allegiance. the people of the world had been incor­ porated in the communist, stateless so­ Early Developments ciety. In this struggle, the armed forces The use of propaganda to further po­ had two functions: litical and military aims is as old as his­ 1. To support psychological 'warfare tory itself. The insidious weapons of operations by the ever present threat of rumor, persuasion, and blatant intimida­ physical violence. tioll were employed long before the dawn 2. To confirm, if necessary, after ,a of j he Christian era. The Greeks used short, sharp struggle, the victory already them to the limit of their meager re­ won by psychological attack. SOli' ces. "Divide and Conquer" became a In the Trotsky concept, peace simply cor lerstone of Roman policy. Napoleon could not exist until the communist vic­ c1ihbed to power in the guise of the tory was complete throughout the world. ch,,,npion of the suppressed people of Until that conclusion was reached, psy­ El·, .lpe, 'the apostle of revolutionary re­ chological warfare would not cease for fOl"'\. And Napoleon, even when .his an instant. Any armed clashes which Gr .nd Army stood poised for the invasion occurred during the struggle would simply of England, had his admirers in the be superimposed on the psychological BJ . ish Parliament. assault. Trotsky saw these armed con­ 'nprovements in the means of waging flicts as victory marches for the Red ps' :hological warfare marched parallel Army, against opponents already weak­ 74 MILITARY RE~ ened to the point of disintegration by the. calcJlat~d to work on the predilections, operations of his psychological experts. the hopes, the fears, and the ambitions of Concurrently with the development of the individuals a'nd groups to be influenced. these theories, means for their practical In the case of the immediate victim, application were piling up all over ,the these activities took the form of political world. Thousands of radio transmitters and economic agitation. In the long-range and millions of .listening sets, improved plan, however, more subtle methods were facilities for travel and intercommunica­ adopted. There the immediate aim was to tion, centralized press agencies, movies, create the impression that the Germans improved printing methods, and an ever- were peaceful, ordinary people attending increasing supply of paper, were among strictly to their own affairs. ,The rumpus the means developed. going on at odd places near Germany was Along with the means, skill in their nothing to be alarmed about and was not use had also developed. The growth of going to worry' anyone. The long-range advertising produced men who could pre- aim was to convert indifference to admira­ diet mass reaction WIth some accuracy, tjon, and, wherever possible, active sup­ men who applied scientific analysis to the port for the Nazi system. preparation of their message and the In nearly all cases, the Germans sought choice of methods for transmitting it: to transmit their propaganda through in­ The ~erman' Nazi Party adapted dividuals not directly connected with the Trotsky's theory to their internal struggle NflZi Party, or even with Germany. In fact, for political power. As soon as this goal the more remote the connection the better. was reached, they applied it to the conver­ Many innocent people fell into the trap sion of the German people to the Nazi and became disseminators of Nazi propa­ ideology. Next, they applied it to the at­ ganda. Through the unwitting agency of tainment of ,their ultimate aim-German people with a genuine love of Wagnerian world rule. music, and students of German art, litera­ ture, and science, many people were made The Pre-Belligerent Phase to feel about Germany exactly what the .~ In the pre-belligerent phase of their Nazi wished them to feel. Cultural rela­ psychological w.ar, the Germans sought to tions clubs, pen friends, and photograph weaken and destroy opposition to their exchanges all helped to spread the gospel. aims by a wide variety of means, some Well-written magazine articles and excel­ simple and direct, others tortuous and lent documentary films helped to show the subtle. The basic idea behind all these marvelous job Germany was doing in solv­ ~fforts Was: ing her economic and social problems. 1. To intimidate the immediate victim In every country, there are' people who by violence and threats. feel that society has not recognized their 2. To placate, weaken, divide, and be­ true worth. Every group contains its muse more remote victims. greedily ambitious member. People like For the performance of these tasks, the this lent a ready ear to Nazi blandish­ -·Reich Ministry for Propaganda and Popu­ ments and came to see society being, lar Enlightenment recruited a large and molded nearer to their heart's desire by highly- qualified professional staff. Noth­ the wizards of Berlin. I ing was too big or too small for these peo­ These schemes worked'- They worked to ple. They spread their net in all quarters a greater or lesser degree of succes~ in of the globe, and at all levels of society. every country touched by the Nazi net. The activities of each agency were nicely Why do t~ese things happen in a dC'Jllo­ FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 75 era tic country? They happen because a comes to an end, or can only be carried democratic community is naturally a tol­ on surreptitiously and at great risk. Cul­ erant community. The average democrat is tural groups and other good"will associa­ concerned chiefly with minding his own tions are smothered by defensive measures business, and assumes, somewhat naively and public opinio~. On the other hand, all perhaps, that other people are doing the restrictions come off the- radio; you can same thing. He is accustomed to political say what you like about the other fellow. cranks, economic cranks, and cranks with­ As well as attacking each other's morale, out any particular classification. Very· the belligerents now intensify their efforts often he is a bit of a crank himself. That to attract neutrals to their cause, or at is to say, he has a hobby or an interest on least keep them neutral. All the old which he considers himself to be an au­ avenues are open in this sphere, and, in thority, and about which he is willing to addition, great play can be made with talk to anyone who will listen. He good­ suitably doctored news of military opera­ naturedly accords the same privilege to tions. others. In the days before the war, he The German Radio War saw no harm in listening politely to a The Germans started World War II with. mild defense of German actions. In the a radio propaganda organization in being. process of mowing the lawn before dinner, All they had to do was to adapt their tech­ he forgot all about Germany. But later niques to the new conditions. In doing on, if the subject came up in casual con­ this, they showed considerable skill, al­ versation, he was not unlikely to repeat his though their failure to appreciate properly neighbor's opinion, possibly from no other the psychology of other peoples, notably motive than a desire to contribute to the the British, led them into some amusing discussion. If he had the reputation or blunders. the air of an educated person, he probably So long as the Germans held the initia­ made another convert who was at least tive in field warfare, they held first prior­ ready to say, "It is no business of ours ity with radio listeners in friendly and anyway." neutral countries. While the Nazis held Or take the case of a camera fan who the initiative, their official communiques began to exchange photographs with an seldom departed from the truth, although unknown amateur or camera club in Ger­ they naturally played up favorable situa­ many. In his enthusiasm for his hobby, he tions in detail while gl~ssing over un­ slipped by easy, imperceptible stages from favoTable ones. an admiration of German camera technique In the early stages, lack of coordina­ to an admiration for Germany and the tion led the propagandists into promising Germans. -How was he to know that the military successes which did not material­ pict nres and letters that came to him from ize. This gave the British radio an open­ the other side of the world were prepared ing for an effective counter-stroke. The by professional experts? Germans thereupon effected close liaison between the soldier and the propagandist, The Belligerent Phase so that the radio people would discuss and I: the outbre~k of hostilities closes predict only those things which the army SOlk avenues of propaganda, it opens up was reasonably sure of accomplishing. ne,- ones and removes certain restrictions There we see the exponents of psycho­ frc. 1 some of the methods previously em­ logical and orthodox warfare acting as a pIa cd. Thus, the distribution of litera­ Closely knit unit. tur - and the exchange of correspondence -As a result of this close liaison be­ 76 MILITARY REVIEW tween the soldier and the propagandist, one hand, the people of the occupied'terri­ -the German radio won some good pointS-o tory had to be kept informed of the real For example, during the brief Norwegian' state of affairs in the outside world. On campaign, the German radio broadcast the other hand, it was necessary for the news of mythical British successes. As a Allies to know what was going' on inside result of thi-; build up of hopes, the effect the occupied country, to distinguish be; on morale in BI'itain, and on her friends tween secret collaborators and the people .in neutral countries, was all the greater really engaged in underground resistance when the crash came. ­ activities. Throughout the war, German agents Despite efficient German countermeas­ "planted" suitable news in German-con­ ures, the British effort, coordinated by trolled' newspapers and radio stations in their Political Warfare Executive, at· neutral countries. The German press and tained a high level of effectiveness. By radio then quoted this' news to other neu­ means of secret radios, printing presses, trals as representative of informed opin­ and other means, the people of the occupied ion in the country in which it had been countries were kept informed of the prog­ published. Sometimes prominent people re~s of events, and their morale was sus­ in those countries who had fallen uJ;lder tained throughout the darkest days of the the German spell linked their names with war. Liaison was maintained with the these news items. resistance movements, and their activities were closely coordinated with military Leaflet Raids operations. Both sides began dropping leaflets and Profiting from, the lessons of WorId other literature on each other as soon as War I, the British conducted their psy­ the outbreak of hostilities removed the chological operations in neutral countries impediment of this method of reaching very skillfully. Throughout the war, they the enemy people. In the early stages, the followed a policy of truth. They made no efforts of each belligerent resulted in a promises of early victories; neither did fiasco which strengtheneq rather than they understate the, appalling difficulties weaJ{ened morale. The Germans had been of the way ahead. They acknowledged the well-drilled in what to expect. When mil­ desperate seriousness of their situation. lions of Allied leaflets dropped on them, Nevertheless, they succeeded in creating this was taken as a sign of British weak­ an impression of indestructibility. Amidst ness. The lesson again is that strategic the welter of fear and shattered faith, the propaganda must be very closely coordi­ British alone seemed to be sure, so very nated with military events. sure, of themselves. This policy of truth The British Effort ana restraint, illuminated at intervals by the defiance of Churchill's speeches, proved From the outset, the British realized a most effective counter to the German that the inhabitants of the countries over­ effort. Because the British did not mini­ run by the German armies could still mize failure, they were able, in due course, render valuable assistance to the Allied to make effective use of any military vic· cause, provided they did not sink into a tories that came their way. state of lethargic acceptance of defeat. • The problem of maintaining morale in the In the Pacific, the native peoples over· occupied countries, and of eventually or­ run by the Japanese could not be ,expected ganizing physical resistance, demanded to offer much active opposition to the the establishment of means of more or enemy. However, an Australian ihter­ less regular intercommunication. On the service organization succeeded in bringing FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 77

about a lot of useful passive resistance. prisoners of war. if only to obtain in­ '. This organization maintained the 'faith of formation. the natives in the Allied cause and ob­ Were these efforts really worth while, tained from them much useful information or were they just so much waste of time? about enemy movements., By persuading .Exact figures a~e not available for the the natives to take to the hills, they de­ European theater, but it can be 'said with prived the Japanese of a large proportion certainty that considerable success was of the local labor on which they depended. obtained by the Allies towards the end of On the other hand, the Allies were nearly the war. In the Southwest Pacific area, always able to call in the natives to pro­ statistics indicate that approximately 20 vide labor for Allied operations. percent of Japanese surrenders were the direct result of tactical propaganda. Tactical Activities Taking into account the toughness of the In the'tactical sense, psychological war­ Japanese soldier, that figure must be re­ fare means the propaganda aimed directly garded as significant. at the opposing field forces. Some of it is intended to lower morale and consequently, The Post-Belligerent Phase fighting efficiency. Some is aimed at in­ When the German Army was over­ ducing troops to surrender singly or in running Europe, its advancing formations groups. The first object requires a long­ brought along organized psychological range plan. The second may be attained warfare units to complete the military vic­ by direct methods applied at any point tory by converting the conquered peoples where the situation is favorable. For any to the Nazi ideology. They had some suc­ degree of success, both must be closely cess, as the numerous postwar collabora­ related to the general military situation tionist trials testify. and to the particular situation in the area The British and Americans, in the be­ in which the' propaganda is applied. Both lief that government should spring from should be coordinated with the over-all the conquered and liberated peoples, made strategic propaganda plan. no effective arrangements of a similar In the long-range tactical propaganda nature. But the Russians did. And they field, the Germans staged a very good did it very thoroughly, too. In ,some of radio effort. Generally, the Germans used the countries overrun by their armies, their tactical radio to put on programs they were able to install their communist for Allied troops in selected areas. These nominees in power immediately. Thus, in pro~rams came on the air at regular times Poland, the Russian-sponsored 'Lublin and were really first-class entertainment. Committee assumed power despite the ex­ But the Germans managed to introduce istence of a constitutional Polish govern­ intn them very indirectly a note calculated ment temporarily located in London. In to induce in the listener a longing for Yugoslavia, the communist Tito displaced hon:e and a feeling of hopelessness about and executed Mikhailovitch. In countries his present situation. These programs where the constitutional elements were mi. 'It have been more dangerous if the too strong to permit immediate seizure of GE': .nan Army had been able to support power, they introduced teams of Russian thc" 1 .with military successes in the areas trained communists, many of whom had at ..hich they were directed. been recruited from prisoners of war. In '1th sides used leaflets and bogus news- Germany, trained apostles of communism pa 8rs extensively. \ went into action almost on the heels of the 'll belligerents attempted to win over forward units. 78 MILITARY REVIEW

Postwar Developments least dangerous of all. The real work of As the firing died down, the forces of conversion is being accomplished by hidden, psychological warfare came into full op­ indirect means, by odd remarks, chance eration. All the old tricks of the Germans conversations, liter.ature-the real pur­ were brought ,into play, and more besides. pose of which is deverly concealed-study World events since the close of hostilities groups, or documentary fiims. There is indicate that' the present effort shows practIcally no limit to the means employed. . more evidence of long-range planning, The first line of defense in the present ,more skill, and more ruthlessness than stage. of psychological warfare 'is not on the Germans ever displayed. One after the political platform, in the press, or on another, the countries of Eastern Europe the radio. It is in the home; among one's have fallen victims to the psychological friends and acquaintances. It lies iIi com­ assault. bating the chance remark, the odd twist to a conversation that seems to support the Present-day activities follow the pat­ good intentions of our potential enemies. tern set by the Germans. For the immedi­ Since it is not sufficient simply to deny ate victim, the line is intense agitation, our enemies' undoubted accomplishments intimidation, and violence. For the more in many fields, we must always be ready remote victims, the policy is, on the one to contrast them with our own infinitely hand, persuasion and conversion, and on better ones. the other, undercover agitation and dis­ It is always dangerous to underrate ruption. one's adversaries. How strong they are in Earlier, it was said that the great the military sphere, we do not know for danger to be feared in long-range psycho­ certain. But their many recent ~uccesses logical warfare lies in democratic tolera­ have demonstrated all too clearly their tion, the feeling of personal security, and capacity and strength in the realm of the desire to avoid arguments. We are all psychological warfare. Unless each indi­ too prone to imagine that propaganda is vidual makes it his personal business to contj,ned to the activities of a few agitators combat these elements in his own sphel'e and to be misled by the poor showing of of activity, subversive influences will certain candidates at elections. Actually, spread in Australia as they have in so these open operations are, perhaps, the many other countries.

Winter Experiences of the German Air Force Ground Units

Translated and digested by the MILITARY REVIEW from an article by Lieutenant General H. J. Rieckhoff', formerly of the German Air Force, in "Flugwehr und -Technik" (Switzerland) December 1948.

By DEFINITION, the term "ground or­ the maintenance personnel, auxiliary ganization" of the air force means all technical services, fire departments, tlight forces and installations on the ground control, guard personnel, and the supply which are essential for the activities of and adll1inistrative services. f the aii-' arm. These include: In a broader sense, the grou~d or;.;ani­ 1. The airfield, plus fixed installations zation also includes the following: th,' air such as hangars, machine shops, repair ordnance offices and aviation depots ii' the hangars, depots, and quarters. rear areas, fuel depots, aviation com:tl'UC­ 2. The ground .services, which include tion forces, and a large percentage of the FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 79 air signal service forces available to the snow, since the first and most important air-traffic control service or the sl,lpply problem was to maintain the fields in services. operating condition. The ground organization is an exten­ In November .1941, snuw nearly 3 feet sive structure with many branches. In deep was found in some places, and snow­ addition to the air defense forces, it has drifts reached depths of as much as 5 feet always included the fighting personnel of on the level. Motor-d~iven snowplows were the air force itself. In 1936 in Germany, not available and the native wooden snow­ it was estimated that 25 to 30 men were plows were inadequate for making roads required in the ground service to keep one and runways usable. Efforts were made airplane in operation. During the war, to shovel the snow from narrow strips -for ground personnel requirements underwent take-off and landing. Only moderate suc­ continual increase. In 1940; they amounted cess was attained. A runway 1,100 yards to 50 to 80 men; in 1941, to 100 to 120 men; long and 55 yards wide contains 60,500 in the winter of 1941-1942, to 250 men. cubic yards of snow when the snow is 3 Toward the end of World War II, 1,000 feet deep. If runways were to be used by men per plane were required at the front medium and light aircraft, the snow cover or in the home area. had to be brought down to about 1 foot. A To be sure, this requirement curve peasant's sleigh could carry only slightly varied. For example, in the summer of more than a cubic yard of snow per trip. 1942, it dropped down in comparison with Since the amount of labor performed by the preceding winter. During the autumn one man was small, and the days were of 1942, a rise was the result principally short, 3 days of work by 1,000 men were of increasing technical demands. The required to make a single runway usable great disproportion occurring later was under the most favorable conditions. caused by the marked decrease in strength During the periods of heavy snowfall of the German air units. Ratios also (November-December and March-April), varied from place to place. They were the task became a matter of weeks. Even better on those fronts where the air force then, satisfactory results were not temporarily established points of main achieved. In addition, there was a scarcity effort. They were worse in those sectors of men and sleighs. Other important mat­ where fewer units operated. ters that had to be taken care of' were the combat and occupation forces and the civil The Russian Campaign population. Broad expanses of territory 'rhe early arrival of winter in 1941 im­ lay beyond the airfields and these areas pooed unexpected_ and heavy burdens, on were dominated by partisans. Because of thl' Germali ground organization on the this, or because of the distances which Eaotern Front. First, an attempt was had to be traversed, the inhabitants could mnde to meet th,ese problems by employ­ not be conscripted. As a result, it soon be­ inl" additional personnel. But since the came necessary to resort to other methods rel ,_ ase of considerable ground personnel for keeping the fields clear. to ',e used by the hard-pressed Army was A usable field was obtained most quickly de- ired at the same time, the personnel by packing down the snow until it became re"uirements could be met only by con­ firm. This method was employed by the se' ;pting Russians for labor purposes. Russians. Since tractors were lacking, H -!ldreds of peasants with their horses horses were used. The Russian horse is W'e '-,e put to work on all the flying fields small, poorly fed, and its pulling capacity to i;:eep runways and approaches free from is slight. On the other hand, its endur­ 80 MILITARY REVIEW

,ance is astQnishing. The weight Qf the They even prQfited frQm the icy co,ndition rQllers, which were cQnstructed Qn the Qf the firmly packed runways. In fact, , st>.ot, had t~ be prUPQrtiQned to, the strength they elevated the runways, which made Qf the animals. i?mQQth rQllers prQved un­ them usable in the spring when the sur­ usable. The SnQW stuck to, them and pre­ rQunding earth had becQme sDft. At the vented them from turning. The surfaces Qf end Qf February; they began using slag the rQlle'rs were prQvided with teeth, and on their runways. The slag was rolled the airfields were gQne Qver several times into, the snQW. When the sun shQne, it with these simpie and fairly light devices warmed the, underlying snow, which 'ulltil the snQW was packed SQlidly enQugh thawed cQnsiderably faster than the sur­ to, suppDrt a plan'e. Nevertheless, cautiDn rQunding snQw. While the icy runway was was necessary in taxiing and in take-Dffs still SQlid and usable, the slag" runway had to, keep the planes frDm rDlling beYDnd already begun to, dry Qut. When the ice the limits Qf the runway. runway finally became tQQ sDft, the slag In this way" a landing field cDuld be runway was put 'into use. made ready fDr use in a single day. The The Russians also, cQnstructed ice mDre t,he field was rQlled, the better the 'bridges acrQSS rivers. These cQntinued to, landing area became. When a fresh fall be 'usable even during the periQd when Qf snow began, rDlling was started im­ the snow was melting. The ice bridges mediately. If the snDW was allQwed to,' get proved to, be much mQre SQlid than wQoden deep, mQre time and labDr were required. bridges, which were usually carried away A snDwfall at night CQuid easily annul the by the spring rises. The ice bridges were work Qf an entire day and clDse the field. reinfDrced by laying bundles Df sticks on At such times, patience was required. The them and by drenching them with water, pressure frDm higher cDmmands had to, be which frDze. The bridges were raised more firmly resisted, as premature take-Qffs Qn than 2 yards by this methQd. Such bridges a field cQvered with a deep fall Df fresh cDuld supPQrt the weight Qf tanks even snDW Qften resulted in accidents. Whel1 cDvered by high water. It was d!ffi­ Generally speaking, minDr grDund and' cult to, destrDY the ice bridges by aerial taxiing accidents increased after the first bQmbing Qr artillery fire, as their exact snQwfalls. LDw-wing planes prDved to, be pDsitiDns were hard to,' determine. The Rus­ at a disadvantage under these circum­ sians CDnstructed a supply rDute fDr Lenin­ grad Dn' a similar ice bridge across Lake stances. Semi-high wing and high-wing LadDga. planes w~re far superiDr. As SQDn as thaw­ ing begap, new difficulties arQse. Hard­ The methDds used by the Russians·were rDlled take-Dff and landing strips became simple and practical. They are typical of glazed. Large PDDls Df water fDrmed o,n the inventiveness and natural instincts of the fields. These Po,o,ls frQze during the a peDple familiar with nature. In any night, but the ice was no,t able to, supPQrt case, the majQrity Qf the Russian flying a plane the next mQrning. Planes suffered fields remained intact d~ring the spring co,nsiderable damage to, wing surfaces and Df the year. Meanwhile, the German fields tail structures thrQugh' the impact Qf were WQrse than during the winter s,;a­ water and ice. SQn. Many German air units were idle ~or weeks. Russian Methods When the grQund finally thawed, •',he The Russians evidently had had experi­ German planes sank into, the SQft ea, tho ence in these matters. They prevented The Russians had cQnstructed cQrdwoy flo,Qding by co,nstructing drainage ditches. rQads at the prDper time. The Germans F,OREIGN' MILITARY DIGESTS' 81

In the intense cold and snow of Russia, the Germans encountered many hardships but were slow to profit by Russian. experience. Above,' a German 2·cm AA gun used for ground firing, February 1942. Below, German troops constructing a corduroy road by standard methods which proved too .costly in time and material.-US Army photos. 82 MILlTARY REVIEW

started 'this work too late. Preparation'of mand constantly posted by radio concern­ the necessary timber was postponed dur­ ing genuine and dummy installations. ing the winter. When spring arrived, it was difficult to transport the material ove:r­ Maintenance Difficulties roads covered with wa.ter from melted The main difficulties on the airfields de­ snow. veloped when winter began. The northern The German and Russian methods of and central sectors had the most snow and constructing corduroy roads a.lso differed. the lowest temperatures. In the winter of - The Russians 'laid down only wooden 1941-1942, the German maiIi effort was 'tracks. The Germans constructed regular made in those areas. Consequently, the eorduroy roads. Timbers were laid trunk most formations were stationed there. 1n' to trunk,' crosswise of the direction of the northern sector, there were only five, movement, over heavy timbers extending and in the central sector, only eight air­ lengthwise to the direction of movement. fields equipped with permanent buildings. The disadvantage of the German method More than half of all the formations were was the enormous amount of material and stationed at temporary airfields. Nearly the'greater time required. Because such all the Russian hangars had been damap,'ed during the fighting. Material for Ghe roads were unev~n, taxiing was very slow. necessary repairs was not available. Above The disadvantage of the Russian wooden all, undamaged heating plants could not tracks doubtless lay in their fixed gauge. be found anywhere. And so, nearly all The gauge was chosen with a certain type planes in use were continuously exposed of plane in mind. The German command, to the weather. which alway,s tried to be ready for all possible situations,' insisted that the old Canvas and' improvised hangars were method of construction be continued in used, but the heating problem continued order that medium and light units might to be critical. The mechanics needed fur be used on the same field or be inter­ clothing, but it was not provided for them changed. Before the German corduroy initially and months passed before it was roads were ready, the fields were dry. approved and reached the field. There were' not even eno,ugh fur gloves. The T-he Russian is a master of camouflage. soldiers working on the planes suffered During the winter, the Russian command greatly from frostbite. Work capacity fell attached the greatest importance to de­ off, and the number of planes not in condi­ ception. They used dummy planes and tion to be used increased steadily_ Diffi· motor vehicles, deceptive activity, decep­ culties increa:sed at the beginning' of the tive radio traffic, and other devices. A ware cold season and then slowly, decreased as of this through statements of prisoners, the troops became aicustomed to the cold the Germans also attempted to deceive weather, A certain amount of prepara­ the Russians. Little can, be said with re­ tion can keep such difficulties within lipect to the results achieved by these bearable limits, but the Germans did not efforts. It was hard to deceive the Rus­ prepare, in advance for such conditions . .sian flier. The Germans encountered great Milled lumber was required for the difficulty in furnishing the detachments German barracks, and it was hard to ob­ required to maintain dummy airfields. tain. On the other hand, the R1jl;'sians Because of the danger of partisan attacks, built log structures out of roughly hewn these detachments had to be fairly strong. timbers. The German barracks' stood on At the same time, the partisans acted as piling. Their ventilation was excdlent, informers. They kept the Russian air com­ but they were cold and drafty. The Rus­ FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS R3 sians built into the ground or provided this protection, two men, kept warm by a roofs reaching to the ground. The snow chemical stove, could work ()n the motor formed a cover over these, keeping the ex­ in,comfort. Also practical were the "dog­ treme cold out. The conserv~tive German houses," which were small wooden st~uc­ method of building' caused a great deal of tures that could be heated. 'These were trouble until the troops took matters into built on the principle of the Finnish tents their own hands. They either refused the and mounted on wood runners. They could assistance of the German construction be drawn either by horses or a motor specialists and patterned their buildings vehicle to the place where work was to be after the Russian structures, or they had done. Both men and tools were kept warm, the Russians build the shelters for them, and small technical jobs could be per­ When the higher German technical formed in them. The blowtorch proved to

l

The Germans used the small, rugged Russian horse (left) in maintaining airfield run­ ways. Right, a German sentry on a wreckage-strewn Russian highway, February 1942.-US Army photos.

authorities did not interfere by introduc­ be the simplest and most indispensable ing unpractical methods and devices, the heater, although its use was contrary to ,troops were, often able to help themselves all fire regulations. sati,factorily. They copied the so-called Not every emergency solution by tech­ Finllish tents. These were light, plywood nical personnel could be called good. Such stru('tures which could be quickly con­ expedients as starting plane motors by stru,'ted from standardized sheets. They using compressed air, with the air hose also copied the simple windbreaks of the previously filled with a gasol1ne 'and ether Rus"ians and found means of their own mixture, 'or warming the motors with car­ for protecting themselves and their air­ bide, were dangerous to both equipment eraf, from the cold. A pulpit-like struc­ and personnel and had to be stopped. ture was built which could be shoved on Metal tools wer,e unsuitable for use in rum''')rs over the motor of the plane. The the open at low temperatures. They had side away from the wind was either left to be .redesigned with wooden or' rubber Ooer' or covered with a tarpaulin. Under grips. Larger tools could be heated by an 84 MILITARY REVIEW

electric battery. In emergencies, a blow­ ment lacked capacity and there was not torch or an open fire could also be used enough of it. That portion which was for warming them. horse-drawn was too heayy and there was not enough of it, either. Ground Transportation - The Russians, on the other hand, used Motor vehicles were affected by the cold the proper ratio of heavy to light vehicles, as much as aircraft. In addition to the including many drawn by horses. As a tragic incidents ·caused by vehicle failures result, they were able to have superior .during the winter retreats, reliable trans­ mobility in spite of the terrain and climate. portation and supply of the troops was The critical supply problems of the Ger­ frequently jeopardized by the great num­ man armies and air formathms increased ber of motor failures. At times, deep snow by simuitaneous difficulties on the railway prevented all use of'motor vehicles. Sleighs lines. There were many locomotive fail· were conscripted as a substitute. Later, ures. While the Russian armies were sleighs were constructed expressly for use assembling for the first counteroffensive, by the troops. The' Russian sleighs, which they were constantly supplied. At that were small and light, were superior to same time, problems repeatedly developed those built in Germany. The latter were on the German northern and middle sec­ too heavy. tors. At Klin, an entire fighter group was Motor sleighs driven by a propeller_ grounded because of the lack of gasoline were delivered to the troops by the hun­ and was captured by the Russians. In dreds, but they proved to be a complete other sectors, operations had to be sus· failure. pended because of the lack of' fuel or The failure of heavy tractors with bombs. It had become impossible to ac­ broad treads also was a serious blow. The cumulate emergency stores. Russians were better equipped with trac­ The Russian railway system continued tors capable of operating in snow. Run­ to operate smoothly and was uninterrupted ners should have been provided for the except for very short periods. Russian re­ many small, special vehicles required in pair units worked so rapidly that tem­ the -operation of an airfield. Much effort porary interruptions of traffic eaused by was required to move these narrow­ isolated bombings were corrected in only wheeled vehicles through the snow. Be­ a few hours. This was done rapidly be­ cause of the lack of light tractors, most fore German fighter formations could de­ of the pulling had to be done by men. This stroy the blocked railroad trains. was a very unpleasant task for personnel The Germans 'depended almost e~tirely already overworked. on wire lines for signal communication. Such things showed that little German This proved to be a disadvantage. 'fhese thought had been given to winter mobility lines were not only subject to damage by and that no practical research had been low temperatures, snow, and storms. but ,conducted along this line. Before 1941, they required constant repairs. Many probably no nigh German commander had linemen were lost. Russian partisans thought of ever having to fight in the Rus­ shot the nearly frozen repairmen from the sian interior. The consequences of this line poles. A ISO, partisans frequently cut were now being borne by the troops. Un­ the wires in Isolated locations in whli,h an favorable conditions constantly arose attack on the repairmen could be 'l1ade which interfered with the conduct of later. When pursued, the partisans, asHy operations. It may be said that, on the withdrew into the dense forests. To 'hem, whole, German motorized transport equip­ the snow was a faithful ally. Genl'rally FOREIGN MILITARY DIGEl!lTS 85 speaking, the Russians knew how to erase by assuming that the average German, their trails. In the northern sector; wire especially the German officer and tech­ line cutting was practiced so intensiv~ly nician, looked upon the Russians as an that the lines were often usable for only inferior race. They credited them with 1 or 2 hours daily. Interruptions began having very little ability or mental soon after nightfall and repairs could not capacity. That the Russian should under­ be made lOIntil daylight the following day. stand anything better than· the German, The results of such failures in highly im­ that the Russian· might be even superior portant telephone lines, and the extent to in certain fields, was absolutely not to be which they slowed down command meas­ considered. ures and prevented the units from taking And so, in many respects, the Germans advantage of favorable tactical situations, were insufficiently prepared when they is quite obvious. Radio communication attacked Russia. In spite of this, the Ger­ would have prevented these. difficulties, but mans still considered themselves superior, such equipment was not available. a feeling which increased after the first successful frontier battles. The. thought Conclusions that they could learn anything from the When one looks back today, many of Russians never occurred to them. It was these things appear almost unbelievable. a long time before the Germans began to On the other hand, many of them are so profit from their experiences with the Rus­ simple and obvious that one wonders how sians. Gradually, a certain feeling of re­ such bad mistakes and blunders could spect began to enter into their thinking. ever have been made by the Germans. How The highest commanders of the German can such errors, some of them actually ~Vehrmacht, individuals who had never be­ ridiculous, be explained? When we stop come acquainted with the difficulties on to consider that the German National De­ the fronts, did finally recognize the fense Organization (Reichswehr) con­ superior ability of the Russians in con­ stantly maintained officer groups in Rus­ ducting winter operations. Aside from sia, from 1924 to 1933, the entire matter this, they persisted in their refusal to becomes still more incomprehensible. One learn until they finally went down in is i1nally forced to explain the matter defeat.

Experience teaches us that a war vehicle cannot yet be built that we can say operates in all kinds of terrain. Almost always the full efficiency of a weapon requires a special situation, under favorable circumstances. Wp.en this is achieved, the effects are powerful and devastating, but this is rarely achieved. General Lopez Valencia, Spaili 86 " MILITARY REVIEW Staff Work

Digested by the MILITARY REVIEW frt>m an arHcle by Air MB"rshBI Sir TI\oms5 W. Elmhirst. Commander in Chief, Royal Indi~n Air Foree, in the '''Military DigestU (India) April 1949.

WHAT is good staff work? My own view it. I either go and see the person or ring is that it is "teamwork by competent him up. There are cases where you have .officers" whose only purpose is to serve a busy chief whose office you cannot get the front-line fighting men. How does one into, or he is away on a tour. Then there -get this teamwork? I put loyalty to the is something to be said for minute writing, chief first; without that there will be no but not often. I once found a staff officer teamwork and no confidence either at the writing a long minute to an officer of the headquarters 'or at the units under them. same department and same· rank in the I do not put" too high a value on brilliance next door office with a dividing door in in staff officers; I would much rather between! He did not do it again. choose a competent, hardworking, "loyal On the writing of letters and orders; officer who is a good mixer. If a staff the fewer, the better. The personal visit, officer thinks himself too sUPerior to talk the personal telephone call, confirmed by to his confrerees or juniors, he will not wire if the order is complicated, will fit into any team, and the force will suffer. usually be better. For example, I recall A staff officer who visits a unit with his that within the 6 months between the fall "nose in the air" will neither help that of Tobruk and its retaking, which included unit nor draw out of the unit informa­ a long retreat, the battle of El Alamein, tion (or gossip) that will be of use to the and the advance to Benghazi, I wrote two commander or staff of his own head­ administrative and supply plans and six quarters. Similarly, in a headquarters, if official letters. One of the plans was for G-l and G-4 are not on speaking terms. the retreat and the other for the advance. there will be no teamwork. Lower forma­ Telephoning tions that take their cue from above will likewise be at odds. If an officer is not capable of acting on a telephonic order, he is of no use. I once Responsibility had a case in a crisis of an officer saying Delegate responsibility as much as pos­ he mus~ haNe my telephonic order in writ· sible. The old business! saying, "If you ing. I told him that all he would get in employ a man, trust him-if you don't writing from me was an order for him to trust him, sack him," is good advice. My report to the base as being of no value in wartime chief said, "Give your juniors the field. If in your job it is necessary to full responsibility, but if there is one telephone more than once to a strange de­ failure on the operational side, the man partment or officer, insure that you visit responsible must be sacked, as that means him so that you both know what each other loss of life. Allow a second chance on the looks like at the end of the line. administrative side, but no more!" The Regarding Secrecy success or failure of any force or staff largely depends on the leader's choice of There should not be too much secrecy. his staff and junior commanders. I know of far too many operations and supply arrangements that were a failure "Minutes" because those taking part were not "in I never write a minute to someone in the picture." There are too many people the same building if I can possibly help who say "I cannot discuss this on the FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 87 phone." Too much secrecy in normal day­ get away on visits. My answer is: "Rub­ to-day operations handicaps everything: bish!" A visit wili find out what a unit There is one vital secret that must be really wants, or why it is a good unit or kept at all costs, and that is the" shape a bad one. There are many things that a and date of future operations. unit will want but not request "in writing," for, as they think, the superior head­ The Right Channels quarters is too busy. A visit will also find A good staff officer will find, know, and out whether the commanding officer or his usc the "right channels." One is always staff are good or need changing, also what wanting something; it may be more men, the unit thinks of the superior staff; per­ airplanes, tanks, repairs, cars, food, haps it is they who need changing! A staff whisky, or a cheap trip by air on leave. should have sufficient vehicles to enable You can generally get them, and quickly, officers to visit units when they so wish. if you know the right channels. There is And lastly, a visit should be made to help always someone who deals with your par­ and not to find fault. If faults are found, ticular want. The thing is to find him, and' action can come later. And visits should not his senior or junior (the former will be "two-way." Unit commanders or staffs be offended). of lower formations should be encouraged to visit their senior headquarters staff. Politeness A word on the bullying staff officer. "Please's" and "thank you's" in wires You will always find them and they need or letters from senior to junior forma­ rooting out. They usually bully down the tions cost nothing and always pay in telephone to juniors, who cannot talk back, enhanced good feeling. And never be and they are usually too polite to their frightened, 'of retracting an order, if seniors! But they breed lack of confidence necessary, the same day that it was issued, and the negation of team spirit. if you think the order was wrong. It is only the proud and inefficient officer who A staff officer should never take his thinks his prestige will be lowered if he chief's name in vain and use it as a stick to beat the lower formation or unit, such admits by wire or letter that he has issued as, "The commander in chief is terribly a wrong order. annoyed." If the chief is annoyed, then Confidence it is he alone who should administer the A successful armed force is one where reproof in person, in writing, or on the all formations and units in the force have telephone. There is nothing a command­ confidence in each other and in the com­ ing officer of a lower formation dislikes mander and staffs that run them. It is the more than to be "told off" by a staff officer duty of the superior formation to gain of a senior formation, more especially if the confidence of the lower formation or the "skin" is in writing and signed by an unit. and not vice versa. Such confidence officer of equal or lower rank! can best be obtained by the junior staff Then there is the policy of "the open or unit knowing that the senior staff offi­ door." A staff officer should be approach­ cer, have been selected for outstanding able and encourage visits by other staff wor'; in lower formations, and by officers or unit commanders. He should, if "vi,,; ti'ng." possible, have his ,dOOl~ open and get the T line spent by staff officers on visits to reputation of never being too busy to wel­ uni~, is never wasted. I have heard many come a visitor. And conferences-as long stair officers say that they have so much as they do not happen too often-where in t heir "baskets" they could not possibly junior commanders or staff officers can sit 88 MILITARY REVIEW

around a table and put up their suggestions as not pertaining to the job you are' to' their seniors-wjll always pay high supposed to do. dividends. Here is one other point on the daily work One of the most difficult jobs of staff of the staff officer. Don't let dealing with the officers is to be able to concentrate their "In" basket be the daily sum of your work. attention on the essentials of -their jobs. I always say that 75 percent of an officer's Often, a very great number _of files and time shoqld be spent on current affairs, papers to read arrive in their "In" basket but that 25 percent of his time should, if .and a lot of it possibly is most interesting possible, ]be spent in trying to find out to "browse" through. But we have all only how he can improve the "set up" that he certain hours of daily work, and if we are has to deal with. ; A -newcomer to any job going to keep our efficiency and health, it should have some 'fresh ideas'that can im· is inadvisable to stretch these hours too prove a department or organization. He much. My advice is to concentrate on the' should not be Satisfied with himself, when essentials, "maintenance of the objective," he vacates that job, if he has not got some· and be quite ready to pass a lot of stuff thing new and valuable incorporated into from the "In" to the "Out" basket direct the machine he has been a part of.

,Russian Far East Defense

Digested by the MILITARY REVIEW from an artide in "The Irish Defence Journal" (Ireland) March 1949.

Type, of Country latitudes of Bordeaux and Narvik" it has EAST of the Lena River and Lake Baikal the most severe climate in the world. The 0 in the bleak, mountainous region between temperature varies 120 F. between sum­ latitudes 50 0 and 70° N., one of Russia's mer and winter at Verkhoyansk, the cold· most) thorough-going defense plans, in­ est place on earth, and at least 50° in volving land, sea, and air forces, is being other parts of Siberia. carried out. In winter, the sea is frozen south of The most conspicuous topographic fea­ Vladivostok, about the latitude of Coruna ture of the area is the Stanovoi Mountains. in Spain. Even in August, the Polar Sea This range runs northeast from the Mon­ icecap is still in contact with the no"rthern golian' frontier, south of Lake Baikal, all coast from Cape Shelagskii to Vankarem. the way to the Bering Straits. A parallel Ice-free parts of the coast, though within range extends from the tip of Kamchatka the southern limit of drift ice, are found to the Gulf of Anadyr. Most of the terri­ on the southern half of Kamchatka with tory is 3,000 feet high or over. The prin­ its port of Petropavlovsk, the south and cipal lowlands on the Pacific side are the east coasts of Sakhalin, and the northern valley of the lower Amur, the coastal strip half of the Kurile Islands. The Southern east and southwest of Okhotsk, and the Kuriles, and the Kommander Islands off lowland of the Penzhina and Anadyr. On Kamchatka Bay, are outside evep the the north is the wide tundra of the Kolyma limit of drift ice. The only satisfactory and Indigirka and to the west the extended ice-free ports for the Russian Far p;ast, 'valley of the Lena. however, are the "borrowed" ones of Although the area is mostly between the Dairen and Port Arthur on the Yellow Sea. "FOREIGN' MILITARY DIGESTS 89

Except for the barren tundra of the Lake Baikal, and in the mountains west broad northern coastal belt and of the of Komsomolsk. Iron ore is mined at Ulan mountain heights, the region is practically Ude, Nerchinsk, Nikolayevsk, Vladivostok; covered by forest, the only cultivated and in the Jewisq autonomous region of region being in the Amur and adjacent Birobidzhan. Oil is produced at Khaba­ valleys. rovsk, Northern Sakhalin, and distant Outside the Amur region, consequently, Petropuvlovsk. Associated with the mines the population is very sparse. There are are the blast furnaces and coal and oil­ not more than two persons per square mile, burning electric power stations. Non­ mostly Mongol types in the country and ferrous metals"found in the region include Russians on the coast and in the new in­ gold, lead, zinc, tin, tungsten, molyb­ dustrial centers. The valleys of the Amur denum, and manganese. The potentialities and Upper Lena are, however, mostly in­ of the region are made effective almost en­ habited by Russians. tirely in the belt of industrIal centers from Irkutsk to Nikolayevsk, along the banks Its Development of the Amur and tributary rivers. A marked feature of the Soviet war The change in transport has' been made plan is the industrially self-sufficient army in one stage from dog sled to aircraft. In group. The Russian ground forces are the barren stretches of the north, a profu­ divided into six such groups. None of the sion of airfields and air strips, civil and groups has done more to reach "logistic" military, have been constructed, particu­ , independence than' has the one in the Far 0 larly in the area east of longitude 140 • East Command, in spite of the lack of re­ The airfields have been connected with the sources. west by the scheduled air services of East of the Lena was a wilderness in­ GlavmoJ"put, the Arctic airway. Apart habited by primitive Lamuts, Yakuts, and from this, the more accustomed means of Tungus in camps and scattered settle­ travel are now greatly extended where ment~. The river valleys were thinly col­ roads and extensions of the Trans-Siberian onized by Russians from the time of Peter railway are creeping along the coasts and the Great until the Trans-Siberian Rail­ threading among the forests to connect up way brought colonists to the valleys of the industrial areas and strategic points in Amur and Upper Lena. Even up to 1914, the Soviet Far East. Principal extensions agriculture was confined to these two are the 400-mile line through Khabarovsk­ region~. Among the most conspicuous Komsomolsk-Nikolayevsk, and the 1,400­ achit'vements in subsequent years has been mile Irkutsk-Yakutsk line down the Lena the discovery of a wheat which will grow with its 1,200-mile branch at Vitim to in Arctic land. There has been a conse­ Komsomolsk. Another 250 miles of rail quent pushing back of the limit of agri­ extend from there to Soviet Harbor (for­ culture in this area to include the northern merly Imperial Harbor), the only inlet on side '.If the mountain chain. a thousand miles of coast between Vladi­ Thf' obvious industries in the Far East vostok and Nikolayevsk. are tJ.e preparation of furs and the h!!n­ Perhaps the most spectacular transport dling of timber. The most important saw­ undertaking, however, is the regular long mills 'tre on the lower Arnur and its south­ sea route from Murmansk to Vladivostok. ern tributary, the Ussuri, down to It is kept open by a permanent fleet of ice­ Vlad "lostok. More modern industry is now breakers and operated with the assistance carri 'd on with the discovery and mining of a series of weather stations on the of CG::l in the Lena valley, at Irkutsk near Siberian coast. In this way, units of the 90 MILITARY REVIEW'

Black Sea fleet (via the Volga), the Baltic assumed to be preserved, 7 divisions -are fleet, (through the Stalin Canal), and the armored, 14 are infantry (more than half Northern fleet, can augment the Russian -of them mechanized), 5 are cavalry (3 Pacific naval forces without depending on horse, 2 mechanized), 5 are artillery, and the availability of the Kattegat route and 2 are made up of air force ground troops, the Suez Canal. auxiliaries, antiaircraft, and meteorologi­ Before 1945, the only ice-free port on the cal staffs. Pacific was Petropavlovsk in southern The ,frequent supply and relief of the Kamchatka. Last minute participation in five divisions in the extreme northeast, the war against Japan, has, however, been made necessary by the rigors of the cli­ of incalculable value in adding the Kurile mate, must be the commander's chief ad­ Islands, southern Sakhalin, Northern ministrative difficulty. The ',immense dis­ Korea, and the Dairen-Port Arthur base, tance, poor communications by land, and to Russia's sea outlets. This brings the the frozen sea' for more than half the year Soviet Union prominently into the Pacific create great difficulties. The construction naval picture. of an "Arctic Highway," corresponding to that in North America, is necessary to Defense Measures make the northeast corner an effective ,The headquarters of the Soviet Far, East strategic outpost. Command is at Chita on the plateau east The proportion of armor would be less of Lake Baikal. Here, the commander is here, however, owing to the extreme un­ centrally situated with railway communi­ suitability of the terrain and the prior re­ cations to his forces, which are located quirements of t,he southern and western as follows: ' ' fronts. Again, Russia's usual shortage of 1. Komsomolsk, the lower Amur, and on mechanical transport during the war prob­ Sakhalin. ably will be remedied here last of all the 2. The Vladivostok-Korea area. armies. Therefore, it is safe to assume 3. Port Arthur-Dairen. that the eastern outposts have to depend 4. The advanced far northeastern forces for supplies to some extent on air, mostly in 'i;he Chutovsk-Kamchatka region, ac­ on horse-drawn wheeled and sledded ve­ cessible only by air and road. hicles, and on ships and barges during 5. The Lena valley "rear," reached by the weeks when the temperatur~ allows. rail through Irkutsk or by the trans­ Movement of troops away from the rail­ mountain railway through Vitim-Komso­ head must be on foot. Further, such slow molsk if the latter is now completed. infantry cannot keep pace with' armor, even in the restricted areas where the The ground forces in this army group latter can cooperate. are estimated at 44 divisions, disposed in the above areas as follows: Air Strength 1. '19 divisions (2 on Sakhalin), of Estimates of the air strength in areas which 5 are airborne. 1. 2. and 3., mentioned above, are 2,500 2, and 3. 9 divisions. firstline and other planes. In the other 4. 5 divisions (3 airborne). areas, the figures are 1,750 and 2,250. The 5. 11 divisio'ns (3 Mongolian), including profusion of landing places has =l-li'eady the GHQ Reserve at Chita. ' been mentioned. The World A'ciation Of the 41 Russian divisions, 8 are air­ Manual, however, remarks that fewer than borne. If. the proportions of the different 50 fields are' :properly equipped..{ On the arms of the Soviet Army as a whole 'are other ha~e; Russian ability inlilie main­ FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 91 tenance of aircraft was noted during the over from Japan, plus minesweepers and war. The experience so gained is con­ auxiliaries, are also available. Of the , spicuous in regard to meteorological Union's 250 submarines in commission, 100 services (particularly valuable in this are'believed to be in the Pacific. region)" de-icing, and engine ane! weapon There is also the Amur flotilla, based maintenance. A noteworthy development at Komsomolsk. The figures can be only suited to the defense of the Russian provisional, owing to the possibility of in­ "Alaska" is the construction of helicopters, creases from or decreases to the northern less subject to icing than other ai;rcraft and Baltic fleets by way of the Arctic and ideal for communication in a region passage. However, as submarine construc­ of forests and islands. The north coast tion seems to be the keynote of Russian meteorological stations already referred to, naval policy, it is likely that the Pacific which are more necessary here than any­ fleet would be increased rather than de­ where else in the Union, must be an ex­ creased in that ocean where the US Navy tension of the 37 complete sets of radio­ is master. There is no doubt that the terri­ technical equipment for weather stations, torial gains in this area will be of immense supplied' by the United States as late as benefit to the Soviet Fleet. Submarine 1945. The report center for all the stations bases in deep and ice-free water are doubt­ is at Khabarovsk on the Amur. less being fitted out from the Kommander Islands to Port Arthur. Russian Fleet The Russian Far Eastern Fleet, based Conclusion at Vladivostok, consists of two 8,000-ton , Russia's defenders in the Far East seem cruisers, Kalinan and Kaganovich, built to be a "fending-off" force in the event of during the war' at Komsomolsk. Two more attack by sea or air. The minds of the cruisers of the same class are' under con­ Politburo must be much easier in regard struction there. In addition, a number of to this area now that the conquest of Molnya class destroyers, with six taken North China has been accomplished.

Throughout the late war the plans for the launching and subsequent maintenance of every campaign were conditioned to a large extent by the eapacity of the transportation facilities that existed, or could be developed. Indeed, it is inconceivable that any commander would embark on an opera­ tion without considering transportation and its influence on the military ',ituation. Brigadier R. F. O'D. Gage, Great Britain 92 JI1:ILITARY REVIEW Employment of the Canadian Army Overseas

Reprinted by the MILITARY REVIEW from "The Canadian Army 1939-1945" • by Colonel C. P. Stacey, 1948.

ON 20 August 1941, Prime Minister "All of us in Canada realize that, if you King of, Canada arrived in the United are being kept- here in the British Ishis Kingdom to visit the Canadian forces rather than being sent to some other the­ overseas and to have the benefit of consul­ ater of war, it is because the British tation with the British government. On 23 government itself regards the United August, he attended the Canadian Army Kingdom as the most important of all Sports at Aldershot and spoke to the men centers of liberty in the world. It is the assemb~ed as spectators. During his ad­ citader' of liberty, and you have been given dress, there were some interruptions which the honor of defending that citadel." received perhaps disproportionate atten­ On 4 September, at a Mansion House tion in the press; a Canadian newspaper luncheon in Mr. King's honor, Mr. Churchill correspondent suggested that they were himself spoke of the enforced inactiv· "symptomatic of a certain impatience to ity of the Canadian troops in these terms: get into action." Mr. King spent 26 August "You have seen your gallant Canadian with the 1st Division and spoke four, times Corps and other troops who are here. We to the troops. The gist of these addresses have felt very much for them that they was that, while he realized- how difficult it have not yet had a chance of coming to was for men -who had come overseas to close quarters with the enemy. It is not fight the enemy to find the moment of battle their fault; it is not our fault; but there constantly 'postponed, they were in fact they stand, and there they have stood performing essential service in Britain. through the whole of the critical period -The Prime Minister said on one of these of the last 15 months at the, very point occasions: where they would be the first to be hurled "Only a day or two ago, Mr. Churchill into a: counterstroke against an invader. told me that he hoped I would realize that "No greater service can be rendered to the reason the Canadian forces were being this country: No more important military retained in these Islands was that he and duty can be performed by any troops in his colleagues regarded Britain itself as all the Allies. It seems to me that, although the most important of all parts of the they may have felt envious that Australian, Empire, and that the defense of Britain New Zealand, and South African troops would be, above all else, the most signifi­ have been in action, the part tliey have cant of all the factors that would ultimately played in bringing about the final result determine the outcome of the war. is second to none." "Mr. Churchill understands, and I want The question of the employment of the you all to understand, that so far as the Canadian force had indeed become one of dispositions of the troops arll concerned, burning interest. About its original role the Canadian government places no restric­ there had been no doubt. It was to fight in tion whatever upon any decision that may France with the British Expeditionary be made, other than that the government Force. When France collapsed, it slipped itself shall have the opportunity of know­ naturally into the new role of defynder of ing what is contemplated and an oppor­ Britain. This was the result of compelling tunity of expressing views. circumstances, not of planning:or negotia­ tion. But when the invasion of Britain did • King·s Printer. Ottawa, Canada, Copyright 1948, not materialize, and the Germans turned price $2,50. FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS instead against Russia, the future tasks The possibility of using the Canadians of the increasing Canadian force in Eng­ in the Middle East was mentioned. Burns land inevitably became a matter for dis­ suggested that, in view of the ease with cussion by the public and consideration which troops could be moved from Canada by statesmen and generals. It was quite via Vancouver and Singapore to Suez, if clear that an attempt at the invasion of any such project were contemplated a de­ Britain was still a definite possibility, cision should be made before the 3d Cana­ against which solid insurance was re­ dian Division and the Armored Division quired. But it was equally clear that the were brought to the United Kingdom. The Russian adventure had materially changed same day, Mallaby wrote Burns telling the aspect of the question. him that he had subsequently discussed On 3.0 J:une 1941, very shortly after that this question with the Director of Military adventure began, Brigadier E. L. M. Operations and Plans. The latter was in­ Burns, General A. G. L. McNaughton's * terested in Burns' views on the possibility Brigadier General Staff, discussed the of employing Canadian troops in the Mid­ Canadian role with Brigadier A. W. S. dle East. "He said, however, as I rather Mallaby', a Deputy Director of Military expected," wrote Mallaby, "that it would Operations at the War Office. The latter be premature to raise the issue now be­ indicated that the War Office understood cause our requirements for home defense, "that Canadian troops were not available against the possibility of an invasion in for employment elsewhere than iJl the the autumn preclude our sending further United Kingdom." Brigadier Burns has­ considerable forces overseas, and because, tened to explain that the Canadian govern­ in any case, we could not transport such ment had never taken any such stand; on forces in the l!ear future." the contrary, it would consider any pro­ The Canadian Corps remained in the posals from the British government for the United Kingdom, and the build-up of the commitment of its troops in another thea­ force there went steadily on. General ter. In such a case, he said, General McNaughton's own view, expressed to the McNaughton's advice would presumably be Minister of National Defence during the given great weight; and the General, while latter's visit to the United Kingdom lllter considering that it was not the business of in 1941, was that the best employmentlfor the Canadian Army Overseas to initiate the Canadian Corps during the winter was suggestions for its own employment, was in Britain. In the spring, he thought, it always ready to advise his government in might be practicable to participate in favor of employing its forces at any point ,operations elsewhere "as a Corps." where the need for their services could be While in North America early in 1942, demonstrated by the' British Chiefs of General McNaughton visited Washington. Staff Committee. Brigadier Burns added: On 9 March, he visited President Roosevelt "Lieutenant General McNaughton, how­ in company with the Canadian Ambassador ever, had always considered it a principle and described to him the task of the Cana­ that the bulk of the Canadian military dian force in Britain as he saw it. forces should be employed in one theater, McNaughton's notes of the conversation so that Canadian authority over our troops indicate that he explained that the purpose could be properly maintained, and would of the force was twofold: not favor any course of action that would "First, that in the present period it was invc'V'e splitting the Canadian Army Over­ desired to contribute as well as we could seaE into several packets." to the security of the United Kingdom,

• C:::!nadian COrpl Commander. which we considered to be under-insured, 94 MILITARY REVIEW

and to the maintenance of our foothold for would sooner or later have to be launched an eventual attack on the Continent of from the United Kingdom across the nar­ Europe; secondly, that we never lost sight row seas. This view he had represented to of the fact that we were part of an im· the Canadian government the previous portant strategical reserve, which sooner week and he was glad to be able to say or later there would be an opportunity to that it had been accepted." , employ against Hitler, and even in the President Roosevelt had questioned his meanwhile its 'very presence in England Canadian visitor concerning the problem . would continue to tie down German divi· of morale among the troops in Britain sions perhaps of greater total strength." during their long period of static employ­ The following day, General McNaughton ment. General McNaughton's reply was had 'an interview with the Acting Chief of as follows: the War Plans Division of the War Depart. "... I told him that I had no particular !TIent, Brigadier General Dwight D. Eisen· anxiety on this score at the moment nor hower, who told him that "he had racked would I have for some months to come. his mind to discover how we could present I told him that this was because the force GermanY with a second front, and that the was rapidly growing, there'were' ample more he thought it out the more firmly had outlets for promotion, that we had been he been driven to the conclusion that it working the men very hard, that we were would be possible to do so only by attack· constantly changing the scene of our ac­ ing Western Europe from the British tivities, that we had paid attention to Isles." With this, McNaughton expressed education, and most importantly that I the fullest agreement. His views as put thought our i;;oldiers were a highly intelli­ to Eisenhower were thus recorded by Major gent body of ·men, who recognized that General M. A. Pope, who was present: they were only there for the purpose of !"There could be no question but that the making a definite contribution to ihe de­ wh 'could only be ended by the defeat of feat of the Axis. They were just as well Hitler and the only way of doing so was to aware 'as I was of the wisdom of deferring attack him from the west. He 'had never action until a proper opportunity devel­ lost-Jsight of this obJect and while he had oped for their use, because what we wished had constantly to think in terms of the to do was not to fight for the sake of defense of the United Kingdom, he had fighting, but to bring the maximum'possible always been convinced that an offensive continuing effect against the enemy."

Morale is the intangible spirit of any body of men or women. Like courage, it's a state of mind, a mixture of emotion and reason. High morale means that every individual in a group will work-or fight-and, if needed, will give his last ounce of effort in its service. For a man to feel and act like that, his morale must have certain foundations. These foundations are, I think, first spiritual, then mental, and lastly material. I put them in thai order because that, I believe, is the order of their importance. General Sir William Sliln, Great Britain FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 95 t The First Week in.the Battle of France Translated and digested by the MILITARY REVIEW from an article by General G. Roton in "Informations Militaires" (France)" August 1948.'

'CERTAIN military critics, steeped in the pagne camp area near Sedan and the Gem­ lessons of World War I" have compared bloux Pass into Belgium. The other mobile the slow-paced operations in the battle of forces of the French Army were in the the Marne with the first phase of the Battle northern group of armies facing the Ger­ of France in May 1940. But no comparison mans in Belgium and Holland. These forces is possible. included 6 out of the 7 existing motorized In 1914, the French Army and the Ger­ divisions, 3 light mechanized divisions, 1 of man Army were of eqmil strength. As they the 3 armored divisions, and all the light faced each other, each !fad an unprotected cavalry divisions. Altogether, the reserves flank. Both were able to make an outflank­ of the northeast command represented ing maneuver. As we well know, the Ger­ about a fourth of the French field man maneuvers failed because von Kluck forces. This was a very small propor­ disobeyed the orders of German high com­ tion, considering the defense that would mand. The attack organized by Joffre on be l'equired and the lack of knowl­ the right flank of the German Army was edge on the direction of the German main aided by the initiative of Maunoury. In effort. These strategic reserves were, May 1940, the battle was fought over a moreover, subject to considerable restric­ continuous front which extended to the sea. tions. One group of three divisions, sta­ A decision was possible only by making a tioned in the Haute-Marne and Saone powerful frontal thrust. Only the Germans, areas initially for use by the commander who had created a mechanized force capa­ in chief of the ground forces, also was in­ ble of breaking 'through a front, were able tended as a reserve for service in the Alps to do this. Their breakthroughs were fol-' if needed. Another group of 5 divisions lowed by deep, lightning-like exploitations. was located in Haute Alsace. This group " A brief study of the operations during was to counter a possible German and the first week of the battle will reveal the Ita.1ian attack through Switzerland. The difficulties encountered by the Allied high strong German reserves, in addition to command. To oppose the German armor, the regular units, made it possible for the Allies had only a limited number of them to attack in the Saar, at the weak largoe so-called "mobile" units. These were point of the French fortified position. This not :;elf-contained and frequently had to eventuality was foreseen by the French in­ rely on the, railroads for transportation. telligence service, which had information Con,.tantly bested in time and space, the on the heavy howitzers, aerial torpedoes, AUi,',1 high command was almost power­ and tanks which the Germans were con­ less to plan ahead. structing. But it was not proper lor the command to make all these assumptions Allied Troop Dispositions before tlie battle began. Preceding a bat­ L us examine the situation of the tle, the command must free itself of all AUi :1 strategic reserves on 10 May. Out of preconceived ideas about the enemy and som 20 large units availabie· for the ma­ resist assigning him an intention which neu '1', only 3 were mobile divisions. These may never materialize. The command weI' 2 armored divisions and,,~,motorized must be prepared for eventualii;ies and diy' ;on. ' dismiss them one by one as the' situation l' ,is reserve was stationed jp. 'the Cham- is clarified. 96 MILITARY REVIEW

At first, the strategy in 1940 developed form'to the plan of operatio~s. This plan according to Allied plans. The intention provided for a drive by the Seventh Army was to maintain a defensive position at in the direction of Breda, Holland. the frontiers and to fight in the area The absence of the Seventh Army and supported by the Rhine and .the Maginot other units was seriously felt when the Line. It was planned that only the left Panzer forces drove toward Calais. of the Allied Forces would be moved for­ ward to the middle sector of the ScheIdt The Attack in'the Ghent-Antwerp fortified area. Here The Germans attacked on 10 May 1940. the Belgian Army proposed to make a final By then, the front from Sedan to Namur stand against the Germans. In the face had received substantial reinforcements of of the strong enemy u)1its adapted to Blitz tanks, antitank units, and artillery. The warfare, it was reasonable to adopt this Huntziger army had immediate reserves attitude of strategic waiting. It was also composed of a :group of 2 battalions of expected that the French Army would tanks, 2 light cavalry divisions, and the play the role of an advance guard for an 71st Division and the 1st Colonial Divi­ indefinite period. sion. The Corap army had been reinforced The French plan of operation encoun­ with 2 battalions of modern tanks; the 53d tered many difficulties before reaching its Division was stationed back of its right. final form. On 15 November 1939, instruc­ Before the battle began on 10 May, an tions received from the high command ominous event occurred on the Belgian marked a decisive step in the evolution of front. The Germans seized three bridges in­ the plan. , tact over the Albert Canal in the area The idea of active defense was aban­ southwest of Maastricht. The next day, the doned, and the fighting was now planned Belgian position was broken through on an in, Belgium on the Antwerp-Namur line. army corps front. All day, large columns The organization of this line had just be­ were crossing the Meuse and the Albert gun. At the ~onclusion of the maneuver, Canal. 'On order of General Georges, the the Seventh Army under General Giraud crossings were subjected several times to waS'"'to be in GHQ reserve on the left of the shelling by all the Fr.ench and British artil­ Belgians. Employment of this army was to lery available. This action continued during be limited to the ScheIdt at Antwerp and the night. The situation at the end of the to Zealand. This fundamental decision of day revealed clearly that the Germans were the high command was ratified in the making a serious effort in the direction of meeting of the Supreme Council on 17 No­ the Gembloux Gap. East of the Meuse, in vember in London. the Ardennes, French cavalry was still on During the winter, General' Georges, the Ourthe; beyond the Semoy, there was commander in chief on the northeast front, fighting with German armored advance attempted several times to obtain permis­ guards. sion from GHQ to revise the missions of The Air Force was ordered to attack the the northern armies and to strengthen the German march routes, with priority to the, ! general reserves. It would have been Maastricht-Gembloux ar:ea. The cavalry highly desirable to extend the British corps operating in this zone was to coun­ Army sector to the north. It had become terattack the heads of the German co~umns. too na~row. General Giraud's Army and its On 11 May, it was decided to push' six large units should have been restored to large units of reserves toward t4e rear of the general reserve. The instructions from the Huntziger and Corap armies, which the high command dated 12 November did were engaged in the rapidly developing not contain this suggestion 'but gave final "battle on the Meuse. These reserves in­ FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 97

eluded t.hree mobile units : the ,~d and 3d Allied armies in the north. was becoming , Armored Divisions and the 3d Motorized urgent. General Georges believed that Division. Transportation was held ready General Billotte, who had prepared 'the to move the reserves until 13 May. plan, should be in charge of the approach­ , On: 12 May, at Casteau near Mons, a con­ ing battle. On the initiative of General ference was held during which the com­ Georges, with the full accord of the Allied mand of the Allied Forces in Belgium was high commands, the delicate problem of a organized. Only preliminary study had single command was accordingly solved at been given this matter previously. Casteau on 12 May. General Georges had been given the May 12 was marked by acceleration authority to decide, together with General of the German drive over the whole zone

NORTH SEA HOLLAND

.1'0.".,,; ABBEVILLE ... AM1ENse ~

.aEAUVAIS

eREIMS CHATEAU THIERRY • .EPERNAY PARIS MEAUX Af4oi1'A.-1' ,.. 20 40 60 80 100 MILES ~ ~tf! CHALONS

Gort, all matters relative to the mission from Sedan to the sea. Contact was made of the British Army in Belgium. But the with Allied holding forces, principally in commander in chief had reserved to him­ the Breda area and in front of Gembloux. self the task of giving personal directives South of the Meuse, French light cavalry to the Belgian Army. The Giraud army, divisions were attacked by powerful which was to operate on the left front, was armored forces supported by light bombers. placed ~nder the direct authority of Gen­ The French were forced to retreat to de­ eral Georges and thus could not be used by fensive positions. British planes reacted Gene :al Billotte, commander of the north­ vigorously throughout the afternoon and ern !!l'OUp of armies. Unity of command attacked large concentrations of tanks in to it,sure the close coordination of the the Ardennes., During the day, th~ move­ 98 MILITARY REVIEW I . ment of Allied forces into position was ' failure seriously affected the counter­ continued, and the forward movement of attack which had been planned by the com­ the reserves appeared to be proceeding mand for the following day. well. In the north, the tanks of the 1st During the day, General Georges took Armored Division de-trained in the Char­ the necessary measures to ward off the leroi area. The motor column, however, double menace resulting from the German was delayed on roads that were clogged by movement in force south of Sedan and the civilians and Belgian soldiers. extension of the Dinant pocket. On 14 In the Sedan area, where the German May, he gave orders to counterattack to attack was imminent, the 3d Armored and throw the Germans back across the Meuse. the 3d Motorized Divisions had begun to For the counterattack in the Dinant sector, move toward new positions. General Billotte counted on the 1st Ar­ On 13 May, German armored advanced mored Division and the 4th North African guards reached the Meuse north of Dinant Division_ The 'lst Armored Division re­ and at Sedan. They crossed the river at grouped at Charleroi early in the after­ these points and organized small bridge­ noon of 14 May, and the 4th North African heads on the left bank. These were boldly Division reached the field of battle .. by exploited and widened the following day. forced marches. In the Dinant sector, the local cominand On 14 May, the situation became very attempted to regain the upper hand. An disquieting on the front from Namur to armored counterattack, belatedly executed Sedan. Early in the morning, the Germans toward the end of the day, succeeded in crossed the Meuse, gained a foothold on .forcing the German detachment on the left the left bank, and mounted strong armored bank back to the Meuse. The infantry did attacks. The Allied front lines were over­ not follow the tanks or occupy the terrain, run everywhere. German planes made and the success was not exploited. massed bombing attacks on command At Spdan, the expected battle began on posts, .centers of resistance, and artillery the left of the Huntziger army. In the positions, and created confusion on the mOEping, quderian's tanks emerged from roads which were jammed with civilians. the Ardennes forest and established con­ Destruction of communications made com­ tact with the French position west of mand impossible. By the end of the day, Sedan. Beginning at 1100, the entire de­ the Germans had won a bridgehead 30 fensive position was subjected to 4 hours miles wide and 9 miles deep. General of heavy fire from artillery and aviation. Corap had arrived to organize the counter­ The French artillery, which was very attack, which was to be executed 'by the powerful in this sector, reacted vigorously 1st Armored and the 4th North African while the attack forces were being' as­ Divisions. However, the many difficulties sembled. At 1500, the attack started. After of the situation made it impossible to de­ establishing a foothold on the south side velop a coordinated attack that day. of the river, the Germans filtered through The 1st Armored Division, delayed in the, advanced French resistance groups. its movement as a result of the jammed They did not breach the main line. It was roads, reached the area some 9 miles from not till late· in the afternoon that they Dinant during the night. Its supply of reached the final protective line in the gasoline was nearly gone. General Bhmeau Marfee Woods. At that point, a small de­ intended to attack at dawn b\1.t hi" fuel tachment of German tanks appeared, convoy did not arrive. At dawn on H, May, creating panic among the French forces he lost the initiative when a mass o~ Ger­ and in a few command posts. This local man tanks emerged from the c:ty of FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 99

Dinant. The 4th North African Division, General Huntziger's final report for the which arrived late on the field oi battle in day contained a discreet allusion to "the a state of extreme fatigue, was also unable employment which had been made of the to launch a counteratttack during the day. 3d Division. It revealed the fact, how­ ever, that the shock power of this unit had The Initial Breakthrough not been utilized. In reply, General In the Sedan sector, the situation grew Georges made a new appeal: "Tomorrow worse during the night of 13-14 May. The we must energetically continue the action three divisions of Guderian's Armored begun today. We must vigorously push to­ Corps crossed the Meuse on three ponton ward the Meuse as far as possible and hold bridges. At 0700, they began their attack the terrain won by the tanks with our on the Allied positions. During the morn­ infantry. Only by such means shall we be ing, the Allied defense was breached and able to gain the upper hand of the enemy the troops fell back toward the south. At and block his progress westward and the same time, the Germans widened their southward." pocket toward the northwest. The Germans On the evening of 14 May, the situation by-passed resistance at Mezieres on the on the Meuse front was obviously critical. south and collided with the 53d Division With'the exception of the wooded Ardennes which General Corap had thrown into the sector, where local German attacks had battle on 14 Mayas cover for his right failed, the French hold over the entire flank. The counterattack, for which pow­ length of the river had been broken. Close erful forces were available and on which cooperation between air force bombers and the command had placed great hopes, was armored forces was the basis of the Ger­ not executed. At 0400, the commanding man successes at Dinant and Sedan. The general of the 3d Armored Division re­ new doctrine of employing these forces ceived orders to attack at 1100. But the was a clean break with previous methods. movement of the tanks to the assembly po­ In World War I, attacks were preceded by sition could not begin until around mid­ prolonged artillery preparations which night, after the battalions had been sup­ rendered surprise impossible and gave the plied with gasoline. The movement was defender time to bring up his reserves. In effected over routes cut by deep craters May 1940, the brief bombing attacks per­ and jammed with infantry forces moving mitted a breakthrough within 24 hours. back tqward the south. The armored divi­ General Georges continued to place his sion was not in place until about 1630. reserves to parry the threat whic;h he ex­ In the meantime, the situation had be­ pected would result from the German ad­ come considerably worse on the front, vance between the Corap and Huntziger which by now was completely broken. In armies. He indicated the positions back of this atmosphere of defeat, General Fla_ the threatened front which he hoped his vigny believed it better to abandon the divisions would be able to reach in time idea of a counterattack. He ordered the to restore the situation. The barrier which 3d Annored Division to fend off the enemy _ he was attempting to organize coincided to tJ.,' best of their ability and to employ with the second position west of the Meuse. thei;' tanks as barricades in all the cor­ It was planned to connect it with the rido: ' being used by the Germans. Since organized position on the northern frontier, it \\' ,,' spread out over a broad front, this where the forces engaged in the battle of unit :omid itself unable to carry out the Dinant were expected to halt in their with­ ordc " of the high command to resume the drawal. General Bouchon was in charge atta' " on the following day_ of coordinating the reinforcements being MILITARY REVIEW sent into the junction between the Hunt­ immediately .ordered to guard the bridge ziger and Corap armies. The 14th and 2d of the Oise. To complete the blocking Gi Divisions were placed at his disposal for' the Oise, General Giraud counted on the this purpose. The supply line of the 2d early arrival of two large units which had Division, originally running toward the been recalled from Belgium: the 9th left of the Corap army, was changed to­ Motorized and the 1st Light Mechanized ward Ge.neral Fouchon's sector on 14 May. Divisions. Under these critical circum­ stances, he regretted bitterly that he was Lack of Coordination Costly not able to use·the powerful reserve of On 15 May, alarming reports reached the army which he had previously com­ the command from the entire front. In the manded. Against Giraud's wishes, it had Dinant sector, General Corap had ordered been sent to Holland. his troops to fall back during the night. The reports from the Sedan sector on 15 According to him, his troops had lost most May further disillus,ioned General Georges. of their combat effectiveness. The 1st On the evening of i4 May, he had issued Armored Division, which had spent the the order for a counterattack the follow­ night in its assembly position in contact ing day toward Sedan, using the 3d Ar­ with the enemy, was subjected to strong mored Division and the· 3d Motorized Divi­ armored attacks throughout the mor·ning. sion. "Its execution," he said, "is rendered . A violent 5-hour tank battle took place. urgent by the situation of the adjoining. After passing the immobilized mass of army on the left." French tanks, the Panzerdivisionen con­ In spite of repeated intervention by the tinued to advance at top speed toward the high command, this operation '. had not west. They' encountered fresh forces of taken place. Although scattered, the 3d the 4th North African Division which had Armored Division had succeeded in re­ entered the line the day before. Only these grouping at its assembly position: How­ forces were able to offer effective resist­ ever, General Flavigny had countermanded ance. This division held for a part of the the order for the counterattack at the last day but was finally drawn into the general moment. retreat of the adjoining divisions. Thus, a chance to restore the situation General Giraud arrived at Vervins at at Sedan was definitely lost. We realize this time to replace General Corap. Dur­ today that a determined attack would per­ ing the night, Giraud contacted the com­ haps have changed the course of events. manders of all large units in the front­ General Guderian declared that the Ger­ line. After a thorough examination of the man plan of operations governing the em­ situation, he estimated that it was impos­ ployment of the Panzerdivisionen was very sible to establish his army any place ex­ cautious. They were to reach the Meuse cept on the Franco-Belgian frontier posi­ and the Albert Canal ahead of the French, tion. He gave orders accordingly. In order establish bridgeheads there, and then to be ready for any eventuality, he also mark time until the main bodies of the began organizing an antitank barrier at German forces arrived. Hitler is said to the' Oise. It so happened that the 2d have anticipated a delay of 6 weeks at Armored Division was forced to halt as a that point.' On 14 May, at about 1400, result .of damage to the railroads by aerial General Guderian decided to push ali west bombing. On 15 May, with its units strung with two armored divisions. Or 15 May, out between S:iint-Quentin and Hirson, the General von Kleist, commander 'of t he ar­ Division detrained in the open country; A mored groupment and Guderian's superior, group of tanks, about 2 battalions,. was reminded Guderian of Hitler's formal FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 101

Above, German troops advancing through woods near Zweibriicken, Germany, on 13 May 1940. Below, left, an English antitank g\ln captured by the Germans on the Saar Front, 17 May 1940. Below, right, German troops passing through a French village which the Germans claimed the French had blown up and set on fire, 17 May 1940.-US ,Army photos. 102 MILITARY REVIEW

order to 'limit the action to maintaining a penetrated as' far as his command post bridgehead southwest of Sedan. At General that day. He added that their intervention Guderian's insistence, von Kleist on -16 had no influence on the' forward movement May finally authorized the movement west­ of his divisions. However, at noon on 17 ward. May, the French listening service had in­ The speed of the German tank attack tercepted an SOS in plain language, west of the Meuse on 15 May and the in­ stressing the disturbance the counter­ terference of -German aviation in the attack had produced in the German units. . Allied concentration prevented General' This was the message: "French armored Toucho'n from establishing a barrier at the division attacks from Laon and Monte­ second :position. The only forces at his dis­ ornat. Urgent to counteratt!!,ck." posal were elements of the 14th Division During the evening of 16 May, it ap­ and the remnants of the Corap army in peared that the French forces would be the zone. He was forced to establish his disposed as phinned. On the Aisne, the anny on the Aisne and the Ailette, in con­ Touchon army had not been attacked. It junction with the Oise barrier which Gen­ was digging in imd had established con­ eral Giraud was organizing. tact with the Huntziger army at the second position south of Sedan. Establishing New Defense Lines, In the north, in conjunction with the To gain time for bringing up reserves Allied armies, General Giraud had estab­ to this new position, General Georges in­ lished an orderly disposition on the Franco­ tended to slow the advance of the German Belgian frontier. The left was firmly sup­ tanks by opppsing them with all the mech­ ported by the fortified sector of Maubeuge. anized units available. However, it vias A fresh unit, the 1st North African impossible to assemble them. The coordi­ Division, had ar;rived to reinforce the de­ nated counterattack which Georges ordered fense. Other units, coming back from was to be executed on 17 May. The 1st Ar­ Belgium, were hastening to the battle. The mored Division, whose exact situation was advance guard of the 9th Motorized Divi­ unknown, and the 2d Armored Division sion arrived at the Oise; the 4th Division were to attack from the north from the began unloading in the afternoon; the 1st upper Oise; the recently created 4th Ar­ .Light Mechanized Division was expected mored Division was to counterattack north­ the following day. ward from the Aisne barrier. The northern During the afternoon of 16 May, the counterattack was to be commanded by Germans established contact with the General Giraud and the southern by Gen­ frontier position and attacked at several eral Touchon. places with heavy tanks and armored self­ The reasons why this operation was not propelled guns. A few bunkers ,were lost, entirely executed are well known. The 1st but the situation was reestablished by Armored Division was still disorganized .counterattacks. Only a small detachment as a result of the action on 15 May west of tanks succeeded in filtering into the of I;>inant, an<;l the elements of the 2d French lines. These tanks pushed at top Armored Division were still widely dis­ speed toward the Oise, causing some con­ persed. Only the 4th Armored Division, fusion along the way. They reach"d the setting out from the Laon area, executed bridge at Landrecies on the morn!ng of a successful attack toward the north on 17 17 May. May against the flank of the Panzer­ Indeed, a fairly reassuring imp:ession divisionen then moving westward. General had prevailed at the end of 16 May. The Guderian later declared that French tanks Germans had been contained, and the FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 103

French frontier position had not bllen which was either on the way or to be seriously disturbed. But this impreSSion ordered. ,All possible means {)f transporta­ was short-lived. During the night, the plans tion were being utilized at that time. Three of the command were again upset. It corps transversal railway lines and all the trans­ commander, for reasons which are still not versal highways were being employed to well understood, ordered his troops to fall the maximum, without interruption. back.- This order, the execution of which On the evening of 17 May, the outlook had been begun, jeopardized the situation was extremely dark. Contact had not been at the moment when there was some hope established between the Touchon and that -it could be stabilized. This unex­ Giraud armies near the junction of the pected incident upset General Giraud's Ailette and the Oise. The first 2 divisions' plans. Giraud was forced to consider the sent to General Frere did not arrive in the establishment of his army on the Sambre army concentration zone until 18 May. Re-, and the Oise. infol'cements had been considerably de­ General Billotte approved this decision. layed by aerial bombing. On the Oise front, This new situation presented additional six Panzerdivisionen had made contact and problems to General Georges. He did not were attempting to cross. A small bridge­ think that the Oise barrier, which was head had been formed at Landrecies, which still precarious, could hold long in the had been occupied by an advanced German face of an imminent attack. The arrival detachment on the morning of 17 May. of the German armored advance guards at During the night of 17-18 May, the Ger­ the Oise on the evening of 16 May brought mans continued to infiltrate to the west a very grave threat to the rear of the bank of the Oise. Allied forces engaged in hard fighting in Belgium. Desiring to free these forces as Final Decisive Battle quickly as possible from continuous Ger­ On the morning of 18 May, the German man pressure, he ordered them to with­ efforts were intensified over the entire draw to the southwest. On conclusion of front of Giraud's army. A violent battle, the withdrawal, the right of the northern which was to decide the fate of the French group of armies was to take position on northern forces, was beginning to develop. the upper ScheIdt. 'Up until noon, French troops offered stiff Moreov.er, additional breakthroughs had resistance. General Giraud, stiiI opti­ to he anticipated. If a solid antitank bar­ mistic of the outcome, awaited the com­ rier W8re not established 'in time on the mitting of the 1st Light Mechanized Divi­ Oise-Sambre, a new breach in the French sion. At 0700, it had received the order to front might be expected. A breakthrough counterattack the German forces in the in the Saint-Quentin region would open Landrecies pocket. The division began its the route to Calais and Paris at the same attack about 1630-too late, and under time. 'To ward off such a threat, General adverse conditions. . It finally abandoned Georg'es decided to reinforce hastily the the attack of the German defense, which precarious contact between the Touchon had been considerably reinforced during and Ciraud armies. The Seventh Army, the night. which had been drawn back from Belgium, The reports which arrived at the end of was 1:)' be placed in the threatened sector. the day revealed how grave the situation Gene! al Frere was to assume command. was. On the left, the Germans had forced The :'orces assigned to this army would the Maubeuge defenses. In the center, in be 3 army corps and 11 divisions, which the Landrecies sector, Allied troops had wouL: be brought up by transportation been overrun by tanks. On the right, the 104 MILITARY REViEW

Oise crossings, which were weakly held by to make any long-range plans. Frequently, .isolated tanks, had been lost. A column concentrations of units collapsed before had passed through Saint-Quentin like a they could be employed. In World War I, whirlwind and had pushed a ppint as far , as long as the opposing forces were equal, as Peronne. ' During the night, it was tanks only created bulges' and pockets of learned that three motorized columns were slight depth. The defender blocked the converging on Amiens. The disruption of attacks after they had penetrated short the front had been accomplished. After 19 distances. May, 7 German armored divisions entered In May 1940, however, the Meuse was the wide breaeh between Ma~beuge a~d forced on a wide front of 60 miles, and Saint-Quentin and rushed on toward the a powerful, broad, and deep exploitatil-ln coast. The northern Allied armies, threat­ followed. The Allied command was finally ened with encireiement, were about to be­ forced to establish its forces at an obstacle gin their final struggle. The epilogue of far in the rear of the initial front. The the first drama of the war was to occur at position selected was the Aisne, the Oise, Dunkirk. and the Franco-Belgian frontier. The at­ Conclusion tempt to establish this position nearly The object of this historical sketch has succeeded. been to show the complex problem' that In modern war, the speed of exploitation faced the French forces. The enemy greatly forces the defender to increase the depth outnumbered the Allies and possessed of his positions. In 1944, the German powerful forces for their breakthroughs Army was not able to reestablish itself, and exploitation. The German offensive of after the defeat in France, until it had May 1940 was a wide penetration on the fallen back to the Siegfried Line and the Meuse betv.ceen Dinant and Sedan. It was Rhine. In a war fought with armored accomplished in 2 days. Without a halt, forces, the defense cannot succeed unless the penetration was followed by an unin­ it has strong, mobile reserves and terrain terrupted race to the sea. The lightning­ in depth. The Russians possessed these like advance of the Germans, and the ex­ defensive requirements in World War II. trel:llely unstable situation which resulted It is in the light of these lessons that from it, considerably hampered the actions we should judge the actions of the Allied of the Allied command. It was impossible command during the campaign in' France.

In modern war, every national force must be stirred to life and mobilized. Total mobilization is impossible, therefore, without a transformation of an activities with a view to war. This presupposes adequate organizatiOl; of gov­ ernmental machinery. 'General de Lattre de Tassigny, France FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 1(15 'Military Writing

Digested by the MILITARY REVIEW from an article by Lieutenant Colonel M. C. A. Henniker in ·~The Army Quarterly" (Great Britain) January 1949.

I THIS paper tells us how to write about journalism. It is a sound rule for all writ­ military subjects. It is essential, particu­ ing. Look at the Book of- Genesis. The larly in peacetime, for officers to know first sentence runs thus: "In the beginning, how to wield the pen. You will often have God created the heaven and the earth." to use your pen, but if you cannot use it Now you know what the first chapter is properly you are just a scribbler wasting about. time. Military writings are subject to The remaining sentences of the first rules. Here are some of them. paragraph expand or explain the first. First, you cannot write _anything unless The shorter you can keep the first para­ you have knowledge. Writing betrays a graph the better, for it does not directly man's brain. If his brain is empty, no contribute to the subject. It merely pre­ felicity with words will fill the void. You pares the ground. It is like levelling the must'therefore read up on your subject site before you start to build. You cannot and collect your thoughts before you begin. avoid it, so do it quickly. Then get to You may. have to search letters in a file, work on the main business. or turn up books of reference. You may It -is often convenient to link the first have to rummage in the storehouse of your paragraph to the rest with a short para­ brain. This is where the real work lies. graph of one or two lines. Sentences that It is for this that editors pay good money, form this link are such as these: examiners give good marks, and senior The facts are as follows: officers give good reports. Each writer The history of this dispute is given has his own method. For quick and tidy below: work it is a help to record, as notes, the The two sides to this question are: results of your research. Get all the facts Having forged this link, you write down into one place. Then you can clea'r your the facts, history, or sides of the question. desk of files and references and turn to the This may well be called the discussion. matter of writing. Writing is a mechanical In writing the discussion, also, there are business. It is an art to do it beautifully, certain rules. You must stick to the point. but competence can be achieved by obey­ Irrelevant facts, unwanted dates, or side ing rules. issues must be ignored. You must begin with a heading. This has Recol"d the facts in order of time. You two functions. It directs the reader's may be tempted to record them geograph­ mine! in the- way you want, and it focuses ically. You may think it easier to describe your own on what is relevant. Write a what Napoleon was doing before Waterloo, heading across the top of the paper. Do and then to say what Wellington was doing. not just write "Question 6." In the Bookof This may be easy to write; it is seldom Con'lUon Prayer there are ten rules for easy to follow. It is better to say what the ,_onduct of life. There could be no bet­ both were doing on the first day, then the ter Heading than "The Ten Command­ second. This leads to a good c!i1llax-as, mel :,s." Let your heading be like this. It indeed, the events did. des. 'ibes the nature of the work in the When there are two or more sides to a few ,t possible words. question, there are usually arguments for 'I en write your first paragraph. "Tell and against each side. Then, there are two the ,ews in the first sentence" is a rule of ways of discussing them. You may first '106 MILITARY REVIEW

record all the various sides of the ques­ ever, an illiterate -peasant, if he speaks tion. (You may perhaps tabulate them a, with sincerity, will make his, point, even b, c, "etc.) Then you give all the argu­ though there are faults in his grammar. ments which affect them. The advantage An accomplished speaker with soft accents of this system is that the reader can see will sometimes fill his hearer with such the sides of the question at a glance. If rage that he is shown the door. The art is . these sides of the question are novel, this to combine the sincerity of the peasant with is a good way. The reader approaches the the polish of the accomplislled speaker. . problem with his mind on the wave length To do-this, you must use short1words, short you want. There is one drawback to this sentences, and as few adjectives as pos­ way. If you want to refer back to your sible. Short words are usually from the sides of the question, as you usually have Anglo-Saxon, long ones from nhe Latin. Do to, you must include such idioms as see (a) not say "post-prandial conv~rsations of above and this deflects the I'eader's mind. a bibulous nature"; say "~'runken talk The other method is to record, after_ after dinner." stating one side of the question, all the I t is easier to make your s~nse clear in reasonE) that make you favor or reject it. short sentences than in long ones. 'Short (It is the system I am using now.) The sentences add directness to yoiur style, like advantage of this system is that you, can a straight left in boxi~g. Accomplished give, at the end of your discussion on each writers, however, occasionall:~ use a long side of the question, your opinion of its sentence to relieve the sOIl!\ewhat tele­ va~tJe. There is a drawback here, too. If graphic effect of a series of short ones. the sides of the question are obscure, the But there is a danger of long ~ent~nces be­ reader will not see what you are driving at coming complicated; and theiY often lead until he has nearly finished reading the to mistakes in punctuation. Si) avoid them discussion. until you are sure of yourselfj Having stated the sides of the question and discussed each, it only remains to When you have finished: writing, go finish your writing with some conclusion. through your work and cut out all unneces­ sary words and sentences. You will find You'!) last paragraph should be the com­ that many long sentences hecome short plement of your first. If you follow this ones and are much improved l~hereby. rule, you will avoid two errors. You will not put new matter into your last para­ In some places, it is custonl-ary to avoid graph. If there is a new fact, it is because the first person. When in Roine, do as the the discussion is not finished, and you are Romans do. But, before doing as the -not ready for a conclusion. You will also Romans do, make sure you :ire in Rome. avoid leaving the reader in doubt as to your Avoiding the first person m!ust not lead intention. If you want him to do some­ you to making the sentence~ complkated thing, or decide something, or learn some­ and the sense "wooly." For inEitance: "I ad­ thing, he will see what you want of him. vise you to pay promptly': is a _good He will not say, "Well, what do I do now?" sentence. It is short and th¢ meaning is It will be perfectly clear what is required clear: It would be appropriate in most of him. " " places. If the first person is l\aboo in your So much for the structure: the first situation, you must write: '!It is ff('om­ paragraph, the discussion', and the last mended that you pay promp~ly." Tbis is paragraph. There are a few rules for your still a good sentence withhi the lidta­ style or manner of presentation. The tions impose~ by .avoidin~ th~ ~,rst pe~·son. quality of your English is important. How­ The temptatIOn mto whIch inany ofllcers FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 107 fall is to llay: "It is recommended that pay­ must have a good navy" is simplified by ment should be made with the utmost ex­ saying: "Weare an island race, so we pedition." This is a "wooly" sentence. must have a good navy." The simplifica­ Avoid its use. tion comes at once when you cut out the Some catch-phrases lead yOU' to long offending phrase. ,As follows, on the other sentences. In the case of is one. "In the hand, saves words. Macaulay uses the case of officers, their pay will be halved" phrase, and ,he is a prince of words. These is a l(mg way of saying: "Officers' pay will last, however, are refinements. They make be halved." Whenever you see in the case the difference between a competent work of in official writing (and it is common), and a work of art. The two essentials are': ,consider how much simpler the sentence to found your writing' on sound thinking might be if the phrase were omitted. In and to ~rite your paper along'the lines 'I view of the fact that is another phrase have given. that leads to long sentences. "In view of Such are the rules for military writing. the fact that we are an island race, we Follow them and your pen will be mighty.

Britain's Territorial Army Digested by the MILITARY REVIE'V from an -article by Major General G. W. E. J. Erskine in the "Journal of the Royal United Service InstitutionU (Great Britain) November 1948. GREAT Britain has learned from bitter nual intake of National Service men who experience that when war comes it is then have been thoroughly trained before they too late to commence the training and join the Territorial Army. equipment of land forces. Such forces as The role of the Regular Army has now the government decides are necessary must become: be ready, organized, and trained to take 1. The provision of overseas garrisons the field. The great speed with which the together with small mobile Regular re­ opening phases of a war can be developed serves to meet peacetime emergencies. by an aggressor makes a high degree of 2. The training of the National Service readiness on our part an essential con­ man during his 12 months continuous dition. service. ' The General Staff has advised that the 3. Regular assistance to the Territorial forces we require for war should be based Army. on the Territorial Army. This means that The task of assisting the Territorial th" Territorial Army Order of Battle will Army (TA) includes the provision of in­ have to be 'deployed at once in case of an dividual Regular officers and men in the enwrgency. It follows that this Army must establishment of TA units. It includes the be supplied, and kept supplied, with command and, staff arrangements on a trained men. Its equipment must be the Regular basis above the unit level. It is best we can provide. It must be capable also the intention to provide for some of ' "ing'brought to a full state of mobili- . Regular units in the T A Order of Battle zat' ,n very rapidly. It must be a balanced when the commitments of the Regular an .:' containing the right proportion of Army make this possible. all nus and ad~inistrative services. Order of Battle 1is requirement implies a change from th, purely voluntary status of the Terri­ The Territorial Army Order of Battle to) i.l Army to the acceptance of an an­ has been drawn up to provide the balance 108 MILITARY REVIEW I of- arms and administrative services re­ which we are recruiting now,i we can al­ quired by the General Staff. ways fill up the units in an emergency The Order of -Battle includes 6 infantry from trained men who have left the colors divisi!}ns, 2 armored divisions, 1 airborne under the 1939 Act. division, a number of independent infantry There are over 3 million ~rained men and armored -brigades, and antiaircraft in the country at present. If atl emergency groups for the Antiaircraft Artillery Com­ arose; th~ problem is one of! organizing mand. In addition, there is a substantial the return of these men tol the colors, .backing of army group units such as Royal smoothly and without dislocJtion of in­ Artillery, Royal Engineers, Signal, and dustry. I, Ordnance. We must get accustomed to the fact that These units actually exist. Recruiting we will not find the Army which is going opened for them in 1947 on a voluntary to war stationed at Aldershot, Tidworth, basis. We have appealed, and are still Colchester, and the other well known mili­ appealing, to experienced ex-service offi­ tary stations. Most of these barracks will cers and men to join. These volunteers are be occupied by training es'ablishments the foundation on which we must build tr~ining the National Servicd man. The this Territorial Army. The measure of .Territorial Army which is to ~e ready to success in this phase is the strength ,and take the field will be dispeded all over quality of these voluntarily recruited the country. i cadres. It is from these cadres that we expect to get the command and leadership A Typical Unit element of' each unit. With these cadres Let us look at this Territorial Army as in existence, we ca-n go ahead and build on it will be in a few years time a;nd see what firm foundations. we expect to find in a typical iunit. _We have made our target for the cadre The unit should be strong' in officers. 25 percent. This is perhaps generous, be­ Most of them will be Territi.rial officers cause many people have had to form units with war experience. There will be a Reg­ on a m~ch smaller cadre than that. But ular adjutant and a Regulilr quarter­ the important requirement is the quality. master. There might be a R~gular com­ Experienced officers and NCO's imbued manding officer if a suitable TJ,\ officer has with the right spirit, even in quite small not been forthcoming. If the;re is' a TA numbers, will not find the task of creating commanding officer, I hope we ~hall be able units from trained men too difficult. to provide him with a Regular field officer The National Service Act of 1947 does to help with the training of the' unit. not bear fruit so far as the Territorial Among the younger officers, there will be Army is concerned unti11950. During 1949, some who have recently com,pleted their the first intake under this Act reach the year with the Regular Army and iJeen Regular Army and do their 12 mo~ths trained and commissioned as o!Jicers. continuous training. It is, therefore, not The warrant officers and stegeants. like until 1950 that they reach the Territorial the officers, will probably in ude a good Army. By then, the cadres should be well many experienced men. Most f them will formed and ready to receive these men. be war-experienced NCO's wlo may have It is a fairly slow process, and, from 1950, served in the unit for some 'time op. reo it will take us about 5 years to fill our sponded to our appeal in 1947' and 19-13 to establishment. This does not, however, come back and give the unit a good s-_art. mean that we have no Army during those There will be ~ome Regular Army t'ler­ 5 years. So long as we have the cadres manent staff instructors-fqur or five. FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 109

They are assigned for about 2 yearsand have not. Each month after 1950, the pro­ are part of the establishment and not on portion of National Service men in' the loan as they were before the last war. ranks of .the Territorial Army will in­ There will be some young NCO's serving crease at something like 8,000 a month. in the ranks without war experience. These Every inducement, will be held out to the will be men the commanding officer has best of these men to volunteer. There are picked out from the rank and file for pro­ two very'good reasons for this. First, we motion. They may be men who have want them, particularly the future NCO's joined the unit as volunteers or they may among them, to'put in the extra time re­ be National Service men who have been quired of the volunteers in order to qualify assigned to the unit. I hope very much themselves for the responsibilities of lead­ some of them will be National Service men ership or specialist duties. Second, we who, after being assigned, have turned want to maintain a strong unit esprit de themselves into volunteers and been picked coi·ps based on enthu~iastic volunteers who out by the commanding officer for their are prepared to set a new standard of mili­ keenness and efficiency. A wise command­ tary efficiency. ing officer will be on the lookout for the Military efficiency requires discipline. best of the National Service men and waste One of the problems which will face every no time in encouraging him to become a commanding officer is how to obtain a high volunteer and go in for promotion. In time standard of discipline in a unit composed to come, th~ National .Service man will be of Regular, Volunteer, and National Serv­ the commanding officer's main source for ice men under peacetime conditions. It is recruiting volunteers. It will seldom be a quite certain that we must establish a question of recruiting an untrained civil­ discipline which will hold the unit together ian to become a volunteer but of persuad­ in the test of war. In the old days, many ing a National Service man to change Territorial units were able to establish a from one form of service to another. The discipline based on the esprit de corps of commanding officer will be anxious to get their unit. But there were others where his hest men to put in longer hours and discipline was slack. The system, or lac;k perhaps stay on with the unit when their of system, did not stand up to the strain National SeTVice obligation expires. of rapid expansion and duplication of units. Among the rank and file, we shall find Regular officers and Regular staffs were the same kind of people but in a rather too ready to accept a different standard. difIl'l'cnt proportion. There will be a num­ It was only too common to find orders re­ ber of veterans who volunteered, i.e., ga~ded as suggestions and as a basis for prewar Territorials or men over 20 who discussion and argument. The importance havp done their service under the 1939 of unit administration was often missed, Act "I' are deferred because they are miners and in the early days of mobilization many or agricultural workers. There may be units suffered unnecessarily because of somt' men who have joined as volunteers ignorance of these matters. Whatever else before being called up-in particular ex­ the T A Center may become, it must pri­ cadt ..<. Such men can serve before call-up marily be a military place where things and f hope they will get credit for doing so are done in a military fashion and where aga .51; their liability after call-up. the standard of conduct is in the proper T .m there will be the National Service tradition of the British Army. rna!' who has served his year. These will Administration be . ,vided into those who have turned thel' ,elves into volunteers. and those who The home of the unit is the drill hall.' 110 MILITARY REVIEW I There may be one, if the unit is concen­ 600,000 men will be the pick 6f the man­ trated, or several, if it is scattered in hood of the country, and the TA Center battery, squadron, or company detach­ must be a place of which the .l.nit is proud. ments. The drill hall is intended to pro~ I doubt if even the best buildings we have vi,de _ both training facilities and. social today are good enough. I woqld like to see amenities. You should therefore find more opportunities for' the )~anly sports covered space for training, including facili­ and ,games which the Britislier loves but ties when required for gun drill, tank drill, at which he so often has to be a spectator miniature range, technical training, lee­ because of lack of opportunities. Young, . ture rooms, and a tactical model room. men will want to box, play football, and Nearby there should be garages for train­ improve their skill in the gYl;anasium and ing veh.icles. Also, there should be officers at track events. They will, We hope, have for the CO, Adjutant, and Quartermaster had a taste of these things'iduring their and a clothing and arms and equipment year with the Regular Army~ It is not so store. These, broadly, are the military re­ many years ago that th~gular soldier's quirements of a drill hall. The social place of recreation was the :public house, amenities should iriclude an officers' mess, and sports facilities were \tn unknown a sergeants' mess, canteen, and recreation luxury. It is my belief that HIe TA Center rooms_ of the future will have to pal>' much more At present, there are many drill halls attention to providing natural and healthy which are below standard and not suitable pursuits for the young man. ' for the type of unit in occupation. There The peacetime administration of the Ter­ must be a very considerable building pro­ ritorial Army is carried out by County gram. This i.s bound to take some years to Territorial Associations on behalf of the complete. We shall do our best to provide War Office. It is these Associations which good accommodation and some amenities initiate and carry out the Imilding pro­ in which the unit can develop a social life grams and maintain the bu!ildings when of its own. In some cases, we can allot they are complete. They alsf furnish the Regular barracks, or buy and convert building, provide heat, ligpt, and add buildings. In other cases, we can adapt amenities. The Associations ;llso issue the and-' extend existing accommodations. In equipment and clothing provided by the 'm~ny cases, we can only buy the land and Army in bulk. Units account to Associa­ put up temporary huts. Until the general tions for the equipment and clothing in housing conditions in the country are bet­ their charge. Recruiting and publicity is ter, we are not building permanent drill another function carried out by Associa­ halls. We are, however, building houses tions, and it is being vigorbusly tarried for the permanent staff, including the out today on behalf of our prksent recruit­ Regular officer staff, and I hope it will not ing drive. Some of the funptions of TA Associations have changed al1jd others have be long before we can start on our per­ an increased importance. For: instance, manent construction program for drill commissioning and appointihg officf'l's is halls. no longer a ~unction because'of the ()fficer We have never before had a Territorial Cadet TrainIng Unit system.' On the other Army of anything like the size which we hand, accommodation is a bih'ger joj, than shall h.ave under the National Service Act ever, and with it go the sO'tial amfnities by 1955. It will be necessa.ry to review tbe and welfare which' we hope' to see on a scale and standard of accommodation. Our much improved scale. 1 FOR THE MILITARY READER

THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE AMER­ WAR BETWEEN CONTINENTS. By F. 0, ICAS. Edited by Russell H. Fitzgibbons. Miksche and E. Combaux. 202 Pages. Faber 818 Pages. Bibliography, Index. The Uni­ and Faber, Ltd., London. $3.50. versity of Chicago Press, Chicago. $10.00. In this book, the authors set out to show This volume contains the first complete the outcome of a third world war, a war collection in the English language of the that "must not happen." In an analysis current' constitutions of the 22 American of the post-World War II period, they Nations, as of 1 January i948. A valuable contend that events of our time will prove survey of constitutional development in similar to those following 1918, but will Latin America is provided' in: an introduc­ develop more rapidly. Three world areas tion, and under each country there is a are considered "friction areas": Central condensed account of previous constitu­ and Western Europe; the Mediterranean tions. The section on Canada contains the and areas in Asia Minor and Central Asia; British North America Act of 1867, with and the Far East. These areas figure subsequent amendments, a document that prominently in what the authors call is not widely available. Each document in "planetary strategy." There is an analysis Spanish, Portuguese, and French has been on the techniques and tactics of modern translated from the original with more warfare, which contends that scientific attention to literalness and accuracy than progress will only, increase the ferocity to style. In this way, the original meaning and devastation of a future war, rather is more evident. The 6-page bibliography than shorten it. The attainment of peace, gives a selective list of works on Latin the authors believe, lies in a United States Anwrican constitutions. of Europe, composed of Western Euro­ , pean, German, Scandinavian, Danubian, CASE HISTORY OF JAPAN. By Francis and Balkan federations of nations. LHorner. 252 Pages. Sheed & Ward, New ~ Yorl.. $3.00. ' HOW TO THINK CREATIVELY. By Eliot By tracing back through the history of D. Hutchison. 233 Pages. Abingdon·Cokes­ Japa;l, the author of" this book' prepares bury Press, New York. $2.75. a ca'e history of the Japanese nation in .This book is an analysis of the proc­ muc" the same way that a psychologist goes about tracing the history of an in­ esses, functions, and patterns of creative divi, lal. As a result, that combination of thinking. The author gives various tech­ ruth 'ssness and virtue which has often niques which the reader can adapt to hi;> pel');,,'xed the Western mind about the particular needs, and he also examines the Jap.' ,lese nation is made more under­ experiences, characteristics, and mental star' 'able. habits of various creative thinkers. 112 MILITARY REVIEW , STRATEGIC AIR POWER. The Pattern of PUBLIC OPINION AND! FOREIGN Dynamic Security. By Stefan T. Possony. POLICY. By Lester Markel and ~thers. 227 308 Pages. Infantry J()urnal Press. $5.00. Pages. Harper & Brothers, New York. $3.50. 'While Dr. Possony's Strategic Air American public opinion and its rela­ Power is primarily an examination of the tionship to the foreign policy of the United role that the air arm plays in modern States is the subject of this ;volume pub­ warfare, his book in effect' actually probes lished under the auspices of' the Council the interdependence of the three armed on Foreign Relations. An introductory . services. World War II established the chapter appraises public opinion as an in· rule that superiority in the air is the prime ,. strmpent of foreign policy, shows how the condition for effective application of land United States has failed to :lse it- effec­ and sea power, says Dr. Possony, "Yet air tively, 'and then indicates' how better power alone did not win World War II. This opinion can be built at home and abroad. war was planned to be won by triphibious Five succeeding'chapters, written by prom­ power, and by triphibious power it was inent journalists, evaluate public opinion decided." While the war could not have in this country from the standpoint of been won without air power, precisely 'the ignorance and prejudice, the President, same can be said about land and sea power, Congress, the military services, and the logistics, industrial production, and. nu­ Department of State. Four chapters are merous other military elements, the author devoted to foreign public opinion, includ­ points out. Strategic Air Power' is de· ing communist propaganda activities. Mr. signed to establish the general principles, Markel suggests that the solutions to the possibilities, and limita.tions of strategic problem of getting America's belief across bombing, and it considers air power within to foreign nations lie in education, proper the framework of national defense. "In implementation, and proper coordination. the atomic age," the author states, "na­ The basic element of the problem 'is that tional defense should no.longer be a luxury the United States must have a sound for­ tolerated by the taxpayer. It should become eign policy. the primary concern of statecraft." -0 ARABIAN OIL. America's Stake in the Middle East. By Raymond F. Mikesell and THE REGIONAL ATLAS OF THE WORLD. Hollis B. Chenery. 142 Pages. 3 Ap­ By John Bartholomew. 160 Pages. 96-page pendices. Index. The University of North General Index. The Geographical Institute, Carolina Press" Chapel Hill. $3.50. Edinburg. $9.00. Arabian Oil tells the story of American This single volume packs into a con­ petroleum interests in the Middle East venient. size maps of every region of the since the 1930s. It is a study of America's world. The maps are grouped by areas or foreign oil policy and the development of regions, each of which includes a general petroleum concessions in all countries of map. Two projections are included to help the Middle East. Major emphasis, how­ plot- flying distances and show the rela­ ever, is, given to the Arabian-American tionship of varioqs 'countries. An intro­ Oil Company in Saudi Arabia. The book duction by A. G. Ogilvie includes maps deals with United States foreign oil,llolicy on human distribution, population density, and reviews efforJ;s of the United States race~, and occupations. The accompanying government to 'participate direct>! in index is in considerable detail. Middle, East oil operations.