- . COMBINED ARMS RESEARCH LIBRARY I ' . 1 II I IIII II IIi ~~~I~~ ~iill~~ll j~ 1 1I1Irlll lll ll lll li 3 1695 00425 8091 , . ILITARY REVIEW VOLUME XXIX OCTOBER 1949 NUMBER 7 EditoT in Chief COLONEL H. R. EMERY North American Edition Editor: LT. COL. M. N. SQUIRES: Assistant Editor: CAPT. K. SHERMAN Spanish-American Edition .. Editor: LT. COL. A. F. BRUNO; AS8i~tant Edit()T8! MA.J. J. A. ANDINO, MAJ. W. MARTORANI. LT. L. A. MONSERRATE. Brazilian Edition Editor: MAJ. H. A. HERRERA, Brazilian Army. Assistant Editors: MAJ. V. P. D. COl1TINHO, Brazilian. Army. CAPT. E. C. SANeTos, Brazilian Air Force Administrative Officer Production Managm' LT. M. M. SUSYNNA CAPT. R. B. WINNINGHAM CONTENTS TUB INVASION OF NORWAy-AN EXAMPI.E OF EXTENDED STRATEGY ________________________ .. _________________________Lt. Col. J. A. Bassett, In! TIlE 11TH AmnORNE DIVISION IN THE LEYTE MOUNTAIN OPERATION ______________________________________________________Maj. J. B., Seay. In! 17 AN IN'fIWDUCTION TO TUE ECONOMICS QIo' MOBILIZATION ______________________ Lt. Col. C. T. Schmidt. Inf 25 A PROGHESS REPORT ON TUE UNITED 'STATES CONSTABULARY ______________________Capt. H. P. Rand, FA 30 THi'~ USE OF PSYCHOLOGY BY LEADERS__________________________________ Lt. Col. H. E. Townsend, In! 39 THE REGULA:rING STATION IN WORLD """AU II ____________________________Lt. Col. P. H. Slaughte~·. TC 48 CO:\Ii'tIAND POST EXERCISES __________________________________________ Lt. Col. H. P. Persons, Jr., CLtC 56 Mll,ITARY NOTES AROUND THE WORLD ___________________________________ ~ __________________________ 63 F(IJU;WN MILITARY DIGESTS _______________________._~ __ __________ _ ____ ___ ___ _ _____ __ __ ____ ____ ___ __ _ 73 Psychological Warfare and the Soldier_________ _______ __ ________ _ __________ ____________ ___ 73 lVintcr Experiences of the GeTman 11.1"1' P'orce Grou.nd Units_____________________ I!. __________ 78 Staff Work _________________ .. ___________________________________________________ -- ___ . _ __ 86 Russian Far East Defense ____________________________________________________ _ 88 Employment of the Canadtan Army Ot'crscas _______ . _____________________________________ 92 The First Weelc in the Battle of France __________________________________________________ 95 Military Writing ______________________________________________________________________ 105 Britain's Territorial Armu __________' ____________________________________________________ 107 B ',KS Fon THE MILITARY READER __________________________________________________________________ III 1 'LI'l'ARY ltEVIEW-Publish~d monthly by the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth. Kan~, . in the English~ Spanish. and Portuguese languages: Entered as second-class matter August 31, 1934, at the Post \ tfice a:t Fort Leavenworth. Kansas, under the Act of March 3, 1879. Subscription rates: $3.50 (U.S. cur.. rency· per year in the United States and other countries of the \Vestern Hemisphere: $4.50 a year in aU other·· count '25. Reprints are authorized. provided credit is given the uMILITARY REVIEW," C&GSC, Fort I.teaven­ worth Kansas.. O,U'R AUTHORS Lieutenant Colonel James A. Bassett Captain H. P. Rand has just completed was US liaison officer to British Airborne a 3-year tour in Germany as Assistant Headquarters' during the Normandy in­ S-3 of the 1st Constabulary Brigade and vasion 'and later served as G-4 of the First is now attending the Advance Field Artil. Airborne 'rask Force in the invasion of lery Course at Fort Sill. He has been an Southern France. He then served in the instructor at the Field Artillery School Strategy Section, Operations Division, and has served as battery commander in WDGS,oand on the Joint War Plans Com­ the 13th Armored Division. mittee, JCS, in Washington. He was a graduate student at Georgetown t,Tniver­ Lieutenant Colonel Horace E. Townsend sity for 2 years, where he obtained a MA joined the 5th Infantry Division in 1940 degree in international relations in 1948. and served with that unit in the European He has been an instructor at the C&GSC Theater throughout World War II as an since that time. infantry commander and Assistant G-4. He was a student at the C&GSC in 1946­ Major Joseph B. Seay was on duty con­ 1947 and has been an instructor since structing camps and airfields in the US that time. and Brazil early in the war, and he joined the 11th Airborne Division in 1943 shortly Lieutenant Colonel P. H. Slaughter was' after its activation, He served in various Transportation Officer, Western Base Sec· capacities wlith the Division from New tion (England) in 1943-1944, and Com· Guinea to Jaban, and was onc of thc staff manding Officer, 42d Regulating Station, officers who ~arachuted onto the Manar­ in the ETO in 1944-1945. Later, he served awat positioh on G December 1944 dur­ as Assistant Chief of Transportation of ing the Leytc operation described in his the European Theater, Deputy Port Trans· article. He has· been an instructor at the portation Officer at San Francisco, and C&GSC since 1948. Transportation Officer at Fort Leaven· worth. He graduated from the C&GSC in Lieutenant Colonel Carl T. Schmidt has 1948 and has been an instructor since written several articles for the MILITARY that time.' REVIEW, the most recent ofwhich was "The Limitation of Total War" (September ,Lieutenant Colonel H. P. Persons. Jr., 1949). He i'i the author of several books is now serving with the 82d Airborne Divi· and articles on economic, political, and sion. During World War .II, he serwd as military subjec~s and holds a doctor's de­ S-3 and Executive Officer of the 31th f\AA gree in economics from -the University of Brigade in North Africa, the Mediter· California. He was a C&GSC instructor ranean Theater, and the European Th,·ater. froin' 1946 to 1949 and is now assigned to He was an instructor at the C&GSC from th~ 3d Armored Division. 1945 to 1949. , \ THE, INVASION OF NORWAY An Example of Extended Strategy Lieutenant Colonel James A. Bassett, Infantry Instructor, Command and General Staff College PART I that these were caused by other than un­ THE INVASION favorable weather. In fact, an entry in the Introduction JodI Diary, dated 28 February 1940, shows ON 9 April 1940, all the important these two operations were to be inde­ strategic centers of Norway were simul­ pendent of each other-the decision to. taneously ~ttacked by German forces launch Exe1'cise Weser (DEmmark and Nor­ totaling less than 20 thousand men, plus way) first being due to political reasons. air and naval elements. By 5 May 1940, That the invasion of Norway 'was out­ southern Norway, which contains 85 per­ right German aggression is undeniable. cent of the total population, had been However, the importance of this campaign occupied, and by 9 June 1940 all of Norway fer future historical study lies not in its had been cleared of organized resistance. testimony of German guilt but in the Thus, the seizure of a modern state of methods enabling its success. The campaign almost 3 million people, and an area of demonstrated the almost perfect integra­ strateg'ic importance in the war against tion of all military and non-military means Allic,d sea power, required less than 2 of warfare-a modern example of extended months and the total employment of not strategy. marc than six divisions, plus naval and air Initial Actions fOl'tt's. Of course, the Norwegian cam­ paign would have been much more difficult, TC1'rain.-Norway is an elongated, ex­ if not impossible, without the simultaneous tremely rugged country, whose major popu­ seizure of Denmark, which required two lation centers are located on its deeply in­ mol'" Ilivisions. df'nted coastline. This ruggedness would 'rh;, was a small portion of the total highly favor the defense if properly or­ Gel'l'lan war potential as is evidenced by ganized. But this same feature lays the the c' ncurrent preparation and .launching defense open to defeat in detail, due to the of tJ, major campaign in the West. AI­ sparsity of communications between the tholJ :, the launching of the offensive in the separated and exposed popUlation centers, We,. had a number of successive post­ particularly if surprise is gained in the pon,· ''''nts, there is no evidenae to show attack. In hI' bold invasidn of Norway in J940, Germany made extensive use of :'sychological and pol~tical factors, but she integrated these non 'nilitary means with a plan based on sound military principles 4 MILITARY REVIEW ~ The Gennal! plan.-The German mili­ n;ls from sho~e to cease firJng. However, tary plan called for the simultaneous this probably occurred afte~ the surrender seizure of the six major strategic centers of ultimatum was accepted. i Norway-Oslo, Kristiansand, Stavanger, Meanwhile, the second p~rt of the Ger­ Bergen, Trondheim, and Narvik-by sea­ man force, led by the heavy cruiser borne and ah'borne landings. Employing Bliiche1', moved straight up the fjord on limited forces, the operation was depend­ the inner defenses of Oslo !ft Fort Oscars­ ent for success upon surprise and audacity borg. ,These defenses, hol(iin~ their fire,­ in the attack, enhanced both by previous sank the Bliicher at close ~ange. Ft. Os­ psychological and political preparations carsborg was later taken by{ a combination and by maximum utilization of all non­ of bombing _and ground alltack from the military means of warfare. In order to rear 'by troops which had fleen landed at analyze properly the application of tl~e points farther down the fJ,ord. Captured - latter elements, their effect upon the for­ German plans show that th;lse two actions mer, a~d the integration of all efforts in in Oslofjord were to be! simultaneous, the total offensive, it is first necessary to However, if repulsed at Clscarsborg, the review the action from 'the Norwegian forces allotted. thereto, iincluding the viewpoint. , pocket-battleshIp Luetzo'U/. ex-Deutsch­ Oslo.-At about midnight 8-9 April 1940, land, were to assist at l!Iorten and to the air-raid alarm sounded in Oslo, the seize additional facilities dn the opposite capital and largest city in NOI'way, caused side at the fjord near M~ss.