Close Air Support on D-Day Why Did It Go Wrong? 6 June 1944 D-Day
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Close Air Support on D-Day Why did it go wrong? 6 June 1944 D-Day 150,000 troops 7,000 vessels 10,000 tons of bombs Total sorties? 14,000 Close air support ? 100 sorties Major Leigh Mallory Central Information Bureau CIB AM Coningham ACM Tedder 1,950 fighter sorties 322 light bomber, strafing, ground attack ACM Leigh Mallory General Montgomery AVM Broadhurst 26 squadrons 2 ½ squadrons at 15 minute intervals 2 ¼ hours Forward Observation Post ACM Tedder Medanine AM Coningham FM 31-35 , FM 100-20. Slow flying assault plane to fill gap between troops landing on beaches and landing of heavy artillery slow speed desirable, under 100 mph low ceiling fly close to and over enemy forward troops, operate from improvised airstrips near front protection against up to 20 mm fire accurate offensive weapons to hit small battlefield targets “flying vehicle… no more part of the Air Force than the submersible tank is part of the Navy” WO 232/56 (May August 1943) War Office Expectations Aircraft permanently within range of HQ ship Squadrons on standby at airfields in UK Special ‘Assault tentacles’ go ashore with initial assault Visual Control Posts ‘Landmark parties’ to guide incoming planes Aircraft on other missions could be redirected (WO 205/182, Feb 1944) 'If the Air Force think they can do it, we shouldn’t look a gift horse in the mouth ...a great advance on anything offered in the past’ (WO 205/553, 24th March 1944)) ‘restricted scale and limited periods’ March 1944 24 of available 38 squadrons attack gun positions as troops land April 1944 Army expecting each of 8 brigades to have a squadron on call 16th May 1944 - ‘ Misunderstanding.... only one squadron per beach’ No Visual Control Posts (WO 205/182, 16th May 1944) Landmark parties ? 10 squadrons (1 aborted) 3 over beaches, 4 guns (1 not found) 2 HQ Hillman Lebissy La Meauffe Wood ' Overlord would be a culmination and intensification of our efforts rather than a new campaign ‘ ('Victory in the West‘ p.72 ) ‘An anticlimax...the day proved to be, in one sense, particularly uneventful’ ‘There were no great air battles...’ ‘The record of air operations in its most significant aspects points chiefly, therefore to impressive evidence of a victory already won.’ ‘The record speaks too of adherence to sound principles of air warfare.’ (Craven, Cate Vol. 3 p 185) Full Circle sqd 7-9 9-11 11-13 13-15 15-17 17-19 19-21 164 11,10 inland 17.30 Bayeux 21.15 Lisieux from Falaise beachhead 174 7.25 gun 17.30 armed recce 20.20 armed recce position south west of Caen Balleroy- Revier Bretteeville- mezidon 175 15.40 west of 20.00 Caen Fa;aise Cabourg guns on coast (12 a/c) 181 7.10 12 a/c 16.00 Caen armed aborted recce 182 16.45 armed recce 19.20 armed recce s of deserted caen 183 11.00 south 18.30 south of bayeux 21.30 south of east of Caen bayeux 184 Cabourg armed Roads east-west into recce Caen 193 Caen Caen nothing seen Mondeville*east suburb of caen) 197 7.10 HQ SE 17.50 Caen area 21.05 Caen Bayeux Bayeux 198 8.2 5 Chateau 17.15 Failaise Caen 20.50 sw of Caen le Meauffe 15 miles inland 245 7.15 Tailleville 17.30 Caen 20.30 Caen gun position not found 8 a/c 247 7.15 gun nort 18.50 armed recce of Caen south of Caen 13 a/c 257 17.05 Baldwin request 19.45 village st 4 miles NE Caen but leger also SE Caen 266 Over beaches 438 6.55 strong 17.15 armed recce 20.50 armed recce points 12/a/c south of caen south of Caen 439 7.00 gun 16.40 armed recce 19.45 south of positions Caen area not much Caean tanks 21st behind seen Panzer beachhead Courseulles 12/ac 440 6.45 supports 16.45 roads south 19.10 south of landings 14 of Caen Caen a/c 609 12.05 radar 17.10 east of Lisieux 20.40 south west station le of caen Havre Sikorski R-4 Miles 39a General Momtgomery ACM Tedder AM Coningham ACM Leigh Mallory Sopwith Camel Sopwith Salamander.