Tropic Moon Rr Equipment in Three B-57 Aircraft to Be Sent to Southeast Asia As Soon As Possible
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qqfL{sslFlED By AF/t|0f| tAil E.0. 13526 DAT[, 20oA APPROt,EO FOT P|JBL IC NEIEASE THE AIR FORCE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA --.+.%-q.rl -_L THE B.57G -- TROPTC MOON ill I 9 67 -197 2 by Richord A. Pfou ond Williom H. Greenholgh, Jr. OFFICE OF AIR FORCE HISTORY Heodquorfers USAF, 1978 u1{cLASStFtED FOREWORD (U) As in l^Iorld 'lrlar II and the Korea police action, Lhe enerny in Southeast "Asia sought the protective concealment of darkness to move his troops and supplies. Although U.S. tactical aircrews cut roads and destroyed moving vehicles during daylight hours, they were ineffective at night. Jungle vegetation and mountainous terrain arnplified their difficulties in finding and attacking the trucks, watercraft, and troops that poured southward each night through the naze of roads, footpaths, and streams that constituted the so-called Ho Chi Minh Trail in eastern Laos. Casting about for an aircraft capable of interdicting the infiltration flow at night, the Air Force finally settled on a modified B-57 as the most suitable vehi- c1e on which to mount and test new sensors and weapons in a night attack role. (U) Conceived Ln 1967 as project Tropie )loon III, the B-57G was the first jet boraber speuifically configured for self-contained night aEtack sorties in Southeast Asia. Within a relatively short time, the Air Force rnodified, tested; and flew the B-57G against hostile targets. When the Air Force decided that the time had come to wiEhdraw the B-57Gs fron South- east Asia, Secretary of the Air Force Robert C. Seamans , Jr. r wrote to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force thaE "it seeins to me appro- priate that we record and evaluaEe our experiences with the B-57Gs from concept formulation through redeployment to highlight those lessons which would be valuable in developing and employing similar systems in the future." That task was assigned to the Director of laa UNCLASSIFIED UI{CLASSIFIEll Operations in the office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations at HQ USAF. l{aj. ?en. Clifford ltr. Uargrove, the Deputy Director of Operations, asked the Chief of Air Force HisEory for "assistance in preparing a historical study of the B-57G pro- gram . tt (U) Mr. Richard A. Pfau a tenporary staff raenber of the of- fice of the Chief of Air Force History, undertook the task of pre- paring the desired rnonograph. Although he found most of his nate- rial in the files of the Albert F. Sinpson Historical Research Center at llaxwell Air Force Base, he exploited other repositories wherever possible, Before he reLurned to his university studies, I{r. Pfau prepared a first draft of the desired study. That nanu- script and his notes remained inactive until early L977, when they r'7ere sent to the Albert F. Sirnpson Historical Research Center for historical review. I'{r. Willian H. Greenhalgh, Jr., a staff hist- rian at the center, conducted additional research, edited Mr. Pfau's work, and added naterial ryhere necessary. The result is this study of the B-57G prograin from inception to terrnination. av UNcLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED CONTENTS Page iii FOREWORD thapter I NIGHT ATTACK AIRCRAFT SYSTEI'IS 1 Background 1 AdvocaEes of ltright Interiiction 5 0peration Shed Light 6 t2 II TROPIC I'{OON III Concept and Definition I2 The Statement of I"lork 16 Funding Problems 19 z3 iII TliE B-57 G The B-57B 23 figfrteen Months ot Delays, 25 Testing, Training, and Problems 31 Deploynent PreParations 38 4T IV I},IPP.OVEI{E}TI EFFORT S Forward Looking Radar A1 Pave Gat 45 Video Recorder 50 Long-Range Navigation (LCRAN) 52 OthEr Lmprovement Efforts 53 .- . CO},IBAT OPERAT]ONS Tact i ca 1 The 13th Bombardment Squadron ' 55 The DeploY,nent 61 64 Corrrmando Hunt V Equipnent Problems RainY Season 79 The 85 Commando llunt VII 90 VI TET,'1{IItrATION OF TROPIC IIOOTI III AND SUI'[{AII.Y Return to the United States 90 Guard 91 The Air lJaEional v5 Sunrnary UNCLASSIFIED ut{cLAsstFtED Page NOTES 95 ABSTRACT 111 ACRONYMS AND ABBR.EVIATIONS 113 APPENDIX I 717 APPENDIX I] I LLUSTRATIONS MAPS B-57G Deploynent Pnrrfa 6') Steel Tiger Recon nai-ss ance Sectors 65 Steel Tiger East 68 Road Network, Central Laos 80 CHARTS B-57G Equipment Layout 77 N{e an Time Between Equipment Failure 36 B-57G Confi guration 55 B-57G Contract Progress 59 PI]OTOGRAPiJS B-57c (four views) J+ B-57G Modified with Pave Gat Systen 46 B- 5 7G with Two ExternaMk- 84 : aser Guided Bombs and Four Y|- 36E2s in Internal Bornb Bay 7I B-57 External Carriage of IUk-82 Laser Guided Bornb (500 lb) 7I M- 36 Incendiary Bomb 7L vi UI{CLASSIFIED CHAPTER I -- NIGHT ATTACK AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS Bockground (U) Military forces traditionally have felt nore secure when hidden by the blackness of night while shifting forces, moving sup- p1ies, building defensive works, or otherwise preparing to attack enemy forces or withstand an assault. Even though possessing cer- tain disadvantages, night moverirent has been used widery Ehroughout recorded history as parE of military operations. with the advenE of the military aircraft, night movement became even more essen- tial, particularly in the earlier years before night flying was practical. observers in balloons and observation aircraft during world war r directed accurate artirlery fire and an occasional air sErike on enemy troops and vehicles during the daylight hours, forcing both sides to confine most of their troop and suppry move- ments to the hours of darkness. (u) Between the end of world war r and the ourbreak of worrd lJar rr, most air forces placed little emphasis on night aerial reconnaissance or night tactical air strikes. Tactical aviation became highly effective during Ehe early months of world war rr, forcing both sides to limit their surface movement to the night hours once more. Each side then sought aircraft that could prevent night movement. The British Beaufighter, although used primariry as a night interceptor aircraft, also performed well as a night intruder to harass enemy night movement. The united states tried Ehe P-70 and the p-6r Black widow in thar ro1e, r^zirh little UNCLASSIFIEII success, and conventional bombers such as the B-17 and B-25 unsuc- cessfully aEtenpted night iaissions against motor transporL and other logistic targets. Nevertheless, soiile form of night interdiction was essential to nrilitary success. trr'hen the Germans below Rone were cut off frorn northern Italy by effective day interdiction, for example, they conEinued to supply their forces, and even to shift divisions, by moving only at night.l/ (U) Similarly, the Japanese forces in the Pacific made good use of darkness Lo carry out movements largely denied them during the day by U.S. Army and Navy aircraft. The Army successfully used a few B-24 bombers, reconfigured for night snooper operations and redesignated SB-24s, against shipping and well-defined island tar- gets, although the inflated cl-aims of their crews cast some doubt on their true effectiveness. Experiinents with P-38s and other single-piace aircraft denonsErated the inability of a pilot alone to cope with the myriad actions required on a night intruder nis- sion. To illuminate their t.argets, some squadrons rried dropping flares, rvhich not only proved undependable, but also were more of a hindrance than a help since they alerted enemy defenses, thus increasing the threat to the strike aircraft. The variety of weapons, ilL.uninants, procedures, and aircraft tested in the Pacif- ic failed to improve the night tactical interdiction capabLLixy.U (U) :{t the start of the Korean war, the Air Force again did not have a single unit trained for night intruder operations or an aircraft suitable for such a mission. The F-82, an escort fighter nodified for night intercept operations, proved a failure, even though iE did shoot down the first enemy aircraft of the war--in daylight. Its successor, the jet-powered F-94, was alnost as UNCLASSIFIED unsuccessful,unsuitedforeitherniglrtstrikeornightinEruiler nissions. okinawa-based B-29s flew nar:y night bombing nissions againstthegrowingNorthKoreanfighteropposition,buttheirtar- in- gets were fixed and rather easily located. The entire night truder rnission becane the responsibirity of rhe 8-26, an obsolete world l,/ar II Iighr atrack bomber formerly designated the L-26 'y Onceagainthefightingendedwithoutanysignificantinrprovement in the ability of the U.S. Air Force to stop enemy movement at night. (S) WeIl before the fighting ended in Korean' combat flared in Southeast Asia. The insurgent communists (the Viet Minh) al- ready had learned to conceal their iflovements from rheir opPonents-- the French military forces--by moving only at night or during bad weather. Once the Viet )Iinh defeated the French and launched their campaign against South Vietnam and Laos, they achieved maxirnum speed and efficiency by moving largely by day because their oPPo- nents lacked airpower. As South Vietnarnese aircraft became more nunerous and u.s. aircraft appeared on the scene in the mid-1960s, the North vietnamese moved nore than 80 percent of their vehicles at night. Because both the South Vietnamese and U'S' aircraft were ill-equipped for low altitude night oPerations in the mounEainous terrain of Southeast Asia, the North Vietnamese succeeded in main- taining the flow of troops and supplies Eo South VieEnam' even though darkness slowed their convoys. Early Ln L964 the U.s. Air Force ?a U.rry concengrated their attacks against cargets in North Vietnam, greatLy reducing the number of night attacks against in- filtration Largets in Laos. U.S. Navy air cre$7s used A6A aircraft \^/ith aoving indicator radar features to locaEe vehicles and deliver ordnance, but with less than satisfacEory results.