Idealism New Essays in Metaphysics by Tyron Goldschmidt, Kenneth L
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OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 11/16/2017, SPi Idealism OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 11/16/2017, SPi OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 11/16/2017, SPi Idealism New Essays in Metaphysics edited by Tyron Goldschmidt and Kenneth L. Pearce 1 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 11/16/2017, SPi 3 Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6D P, United Kingdom Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries © the several contributors 2017 The moral rights of the authors have been asserted First Edition published in 2017 Impression: 1 All rights reserved. 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Oxford disclaims any responsibility for the materials contained in any third party website referenced in this work. OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 11/16/2017, SPi Contents List of Contributors vii Introduction ix Tyron Goldschmidt and Kenneth L. Pearce 1. Parrying Parity: A Reply to a Reidian Critique of Idealism 1 Todd Buras and Trent Dougherty 2. A New Epistemic Argument for Idealism 17 Robert Smithson 3. The Necessity of Idealism 34 Aaron Segal and Tyron Goldschmidt 4. Against Idealism 50 Graham Oppy 5. Idealism Without God 66 Helen Yetter-Chappell 6. Transcendental Idealism Without Tears 82 Nicholas F. Stang 7. Signaling Systems and the Transcendental Deduction 104 Arif Ahmed 8. Conceptual Idealism Without Ontological Idealism: Why Idealism Is True After All 124 Thomas Hofweber 9. The Idealism of Mary Whiton Calkins 142 Kris McDaniel 10. Hassidic Idealism: Kurt Vonnegut and the Creator of the Universe 158 Samuel Lebens 11. Buddhist Idealism 178 Bronwyn Finnigan 12. Mereological Idealism 200 Kenneth L. Pearce 13. Causal Idealism 217 Sara Bernstein OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 11/16/2017, SPi vi Contents 14. Explanation, Idealism, and Design 231 Daniel Greco 15. Idealism and Fine-Tuning 246 Jacob Ross 16. Idealism and Incommensurability 259 Marc Lange 17. Idealism, or Something Near Enough 275 Susan Schneider Index 291 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 11/16/2017, SPi List of Contributors Arif Ahmed, Cambridge University Sara Bernstein, University of Notre Dame Todd Buras, Baylor University Trent Dougherty, Baylor University Bronwyn Finnigan, Australian National University Tyron Goldschmidt, Wake Forest University Daniel Greco, Yale University Thomas Hofweber, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Marc Lange, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Samuel Lebens, University of Haifa Kris McDaniel, Syracuse University Graham Oppy, Monash University Kenneth L. Pearce, Trinity College Dublin Jacob Ross, University of Southern California Susan Schneider, University of Connecticut Aaron Segal, Hebrew University of Jerusalem Robert Smithson, Rollins College Nicholas F. Stang, University of Toronto Helen Yetter-Chappell, University of York OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 11/16/2017, SPi OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 11/16/2017, SPi Introduction Tyron Goldschmidt and Kenneth L. Pearce Idealism is difficult to define precisely. In this it is similar to other general and rival approaches to metaphysics, including materialism and dualism. Roughly speaking, we may say that idealists endorse the priority of the mental. This definition needs some unpacking and different versions of idealism will unpack it differently. As we will see, different idealistic theories attribute very different sorts of priority to the mental. George Berkeley’s view that minds and their ideas are all the beings there are is the most famous version of idealism. According to Berkeley, minds enjoy ontological priority: minds alone are fundamental and everything else depends on them. Berkeley particularly emphasizes the ontological priority of minds over bodies. However, there are many other versions of idealism. Leibniz, Kant, Hegel, and Bradley, for instance, each espoused a different version. While many of these philosophical views are plausibly interpreted as attributing some kind of ontological priority to minds over bodies, they also often include other idealistic theses. For instance, Kantian transcendental idealism attributes a distinctive kind of explanatory priority to the mental: Kant argues that the structure of the under- standing explains the structure of the empirical world. Idealism, in one or another of these versions, was the dominant philosophical view in Western philosophy through- out the nineteenth century. But then idealism was given up. In the contemporary metaphysical debate about the contents of concrete reality, the two opposing camps are materialism and dualism. Materialism takes the world to be fundamentally material (or physical). Dualism takes a part of the world to be fundamentally mental and another part to be fundamentally material. In each case, the assumption is usually that the world or a part of it cannot at once be fundamentally mental and fundamentally material. These views then reject Berkeley’s claim of the ontological priority of the mental. Typically, they also reject other idealistic claims, holding that the mental is either posterior to or coordinate with the physical in any metaphysically interesting priority ordering. In recent years, many books on materialism and dualism have been written, but hardly any on idealism. We regard this situation as unfortunate because we do not know of any serious reason for regarding idealism as less viable than dualism or materialism. While different versions of idealism may face certain specific problems or be counterintuitive in various ways, the same is true for both materialism and dualism. This volume aims to correct the unjustified neglect of idealism by presenting a variety of arguments for and against various versions of idealism. OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 11/16/2017, SPi x Introduction Most of the arguments are for idealism, since the volume tries to show that idealism is indeed a serious contender. But there are also essays against idealism (Chapters 4 and 16). Since idealism was taken more seriously historically, some of the essays draw on historical material (especially Chapters 6, 9, 10, and 11). However, the main point in each case is to contribute to contemporary debate. Each chapter is self-standing, and they can be read in any order. There are a number of natural orders, but we have organized the chapters as follows. The volume begins with three chapters defending broadly Berkeleyan versions of idealism: Chapter 1: ‘Parrying Parity’ by Todd Buras and Trent Dougherty argues for idealism from the nature of the qualitative features of things. The argument updates a line of reasoning from Robert Adams so as to avoid historically influential objections. Chapter 2: ‘A New Epistemic Argument for Idealism’ by Robert Smithson argues for idealism from our verdicts about skeptical scenarios, updating a traditional epis- temological argument. The version of idealism the argument motivates is then care- fully framed. Chapter 3: ‘The Necessity of Idealism’ by Aaron Segal and Tyron Goldschmidt argues for idealism by eliminating physicalist and dualist alternatives, drawing from problems levelled against physicalism and dualism in the contemporary debate about consciousness. The next two chapters explore the relation between idealism, theism, and atheism: Chapter 4: ‘Against Idealism’ by Graham Oppy argues against idealism on the grounds that naturalism is a better because more parsimonious theory: idealism needs to posit a God to make sense of the order of the universe whereas naturalism does not. Chapter 5: ‘Idealism Without God’ by Helen Yetter-Chappell argues for an ideal- ism that does not posit a God. She updates Berkeley’s theory in a more naturalistic way, and points out its various metaphysical and epistemological advantages. The versions of idealism argued for and against in the chapters listed above all resem- ble the form of idealism advocated by Berkeley. The next four chapters are concerned with versions of idealism similar to those that are associated with Kantian and post- Kantian philosophy: Chapter 6: ‘Transcendental Idealism Without Tears’ by Nicholas Stang frames Kantian idealism in contemporary idiom and shows its bearing on contemporary debates about metaphysics. Chapter 7: ‘Signaling Systems and the Transcendental Deduction’ by Arif Ahmed argues for the Kantian thesis that the unity of the self entails the objectivity of experience. This is explained in terms of abstract signaling devices, and shown to cause difficulties