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A Defense of Two Classical Divine Attributes Philip R Claremont Colleges Scholarship @ Claremont CGU Theses & Dissertations CGU Student Scholarship 2012 Timelessly Present, Compassionately Impassible: A Defense of Two Classical Divine Attributes Philip R. Olsson Claremont Graduate University Recommended Citation Olsson, Philip R., "Timelessly Present, Compassionately Impassible: A Defense of Two Classical Divine Attributes" (2012). CGU Theses & Dissertations. Paper 38. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cgu_etd/38 DOI: 10.5642/cguetd/38 This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the CGU Student Scholarship at Scholarship @ Claremont. It has been accepted for inclusion in CGU Theses & Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Scholarship @ Claremont. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Timelessly Present, Compassionately Impassible: A Defense of Two Classical Divine Attributes by Philip R. Olsson Claremont Graduate University 2012 © Copyright Philip R. Olsson, 2012 All rights reserved. Approval of the Review of Committee This dissertation has been duly read, reviewed, and critiqued by the Committee listed below, which hereby approves the manuscript of Philip Robert Olsson as fulfilling the scope and quality requirements for meriting the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Religion. Stephen T. Davis, Chair Claremont McKenna College Russell K. Pitzer Professor of Philosophy Anselm Kyongsuk Min School of Religion, Claremont Graduate University Maguire Distinguished Professor of Religion Philip Clayton Claremont School of Theology Ingraham Professor of Theology Paul Helm Visiting Examiner Regent College Teaching Fellow Abstract Timelessly Present, Compassionately Impassible: A Defense of Two Classical Divine Attributes by Philip R. Olsson Claremont Graduate University: 2012 This study articulates a God-concept in the tradition of classical Christian theism, contending with calls to modify significantly or revise classical constructions. Attention falls upon two closely related divine attributes that have, especially in recent decades, come under philosophical and theological attack – God’s timelessness and impassibility (inability to suffer). Is the “classical” Lord truly Immanuel, i.e. with us? This general question motivates the study. The opening three chapters analyze aspects of the God-concepts put forth by Augustine, Aquinas, and Calvin. Apparent tensions between a timeless transcendence and an affirming union of the Trinity with creation are countenanced, with an eye to doing justice to both doctrines. Chapter One examines the idea of divine timelessness and corresponding thoughts about temporal reality found in the Confessions , supplementing Augustinian transcendence with the creational and eschatological insights of two other Church Fathers. Chapter Two documents Aquinas’s affirmation of both God’s strong immutability and the non-necessity of creation, while questioning whether he affirms these in a logically consistent way. Chapter Three then follows the contours of Calvin’s Trinitarianism and Christology, reflecting on the Triune Creator’s gracious “wedding” of himself to the whole work of creation. The final three chapters operate within the fields of philosophy and philosophical theology. Chapter Four commends a tenseless (or B) theory of time, highlighting several problems surrounding tensed (or A) theories of time. But this former view implies that there is no “official present,” leaving no apparent room for the presence of the timeless God with times and temporally located agents. Thus Chapter Five seeks to address classical eternalism’s “present problem.” The conclusion is reached that the temporally absent God’s “present problem” can be resolved by embracing a “risk-free” understanding of divine providence, best understood in terms of a “Reformed decree” that strongly actualizes all non-divine entities and events. Chapter Six begins by wrestling with what implications the timelessness doctrine might have for “responsive” divine compassion and ends by proposing that the infinite God “embraces” the finite world not by way of a panentheistic inclusion but in some ways more akin to a husband’s attentive care for his wife. To my lovely wife, Heather, for her kind, patient encouragement. Acknowledgements I am grateful to my Committee Chair, Stephen T. Davis, who reviewed each of the chapters and offered constructive feedback. I also owe special thanks to Genevieve Beenen. Her scrupulous editing led to a multitude of little changes, greatly enhancing the quality of the finished product. For any defects still residing within the text I take full credit. vi Table of Contents INTRODUCTION I. Challenge One: Think of the Timeless God’s Presence with “Timely Others” II. Challenge Two: Think of the Impassible God as Gracious in Creation III. Setting the Stage: Augustine, Aquinas, and Calvin CHAPTER 1 ST. AUGUSTINE ON THE GOD-WORLD RELATIONSHIP I. An Eternal God Who is Intimately Acquainted with Creation a. On the Analogy Between Space and Time b. Augustinian Foreknowledge: vertical-hierarchical, not horizontal- diachronic II. Augustine’s Understanding of Temporal Reality III. A Sprinkle of St. Basil: Removing Neo-Platonic Inhibitors to Divine Presence IV. Add a Dash of Irenaeus: Trinity, Incarnation, and Eschatology CHAPTER 2 THOMAS AQUINAS ON DIVINE IMMUTABILITY AND A CONTINGENT CREATION I. The Case for an Un-attenuated Divine Immutability II. Thomas’s God and World: Are they Divided? Are they Conflated? III. A Sympathetic but Critical Diagnosis, Prescription CHAPTER 3 ACCORDING TO CALVIN: THE HIDDEN TRINITY REVEALED I. John Calvin, Reformed Heir of the “God Eternal” Tradition II. Mediating God and World: The Economic Trinity and the “Extra Calvinisticum” CHAPTER 4 TOWARD A TENSELESS CONCEPTION OF TIME I. Opening Remarks on Time and Time’s God vii II. McTaggart’s Untimely Argument III. Tooley’s A/B Hyrbrid Theory and Its Critics IV. Presentism and the Need for Change a. The “Triviality” Objection to Presentism b. Presentism, Cross-Temporal Relations, the Truthmaker Problem, and God V. Commending Tenseless Time VI. Classical Christian Theism’s Problem of Timeless Presence CHAPTER 5 ADDRESSING CLASSICAL CHRISTIAN THEISM’S “PRESENT” PROBLEM I. Unity-in-Difference: Trinity, Incarnation, and the God-World Relationship II. God’s Presence as a Presence-in-Absence III. The Timely Presence of the Timeless God IV. Two Objections Considered (Regarding History and Human Freedom) CHAPTER 6 IN DEFENSE OF AN IMPASSIBLE DIVINE COMPASSION I. The Timeless Trinity is Impassible II. The Triune Creator is Committed to a Creation “of Little Consequence” III. An Unresponsive Lord Who Demonstrates Compassion? IV. The Divine Encompassing: Critical Interaction with a Panentheistic Worldview a. Clayton’s “Theology from Below” b. Craig’s Case Against Clayton’s Panentheistic Metaphysics V. Moving Toward an “Absolutely Unlimited” Classical Theism VI. “Reforming” the Infinite CONCLUSION I. Summary II. Commending the Thesis viii INTRODUCTION This dissertation looks to perform a work of theological re-affirmation and re-articulation. At a quite general level, my purpose is to re-affirm two “divine attributes” conveyed to us from within the tradition of classical Christian theism. The first of these is the timeless eternality of the Triune Creator. The second is the Triune Creator’s impassibility or inability to suffer, an important by-product of His “strong immutability.” 1 Deep Christian reflection about what sort of lord the Lord is has led thinkers from “Late Antiquity” to “Late Modernity” to conclude that He whom believers worship is one who enjoys an exalted life. What this means, at the least, is that His life cannot be characterized in a fashion that merely “inflates” human (or even super-human) actions, attitudes, faculties, emotions, dispositions, or qualities. Admittedly, this tendency away from speaking univocally (i.e., with one voice) when moving from predication about “earthly” realities to predication about “heavenly” realities has had what I would call its more mystical and agnostic 1 My case for impassibility will not presuppose that this “attribute” itself entails a form of strong immutability. Indeed, there appear to be decent arguments to the effect that God could be unaffected by created entities or events but still experience changes within Himself more consistent with a “weak” immutability; see Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy , s.v. “Immutability,” (by Brian Leftow), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/immutability/ (accessed December 7, 2010). I trust, however, that there is far less controversy involved in stating that God’s inability to experience (at least “real” if not all “Cambridge”) changes within Himself entails His inability to undergo such changes as a causal consequence of the existence of a creation and the events and actions that take place in it. Furthermore, it does bear mentioning at this early point that I am convinced that divine timelessness entails such a version of strong immutability. Because of these perceived entailments, my case for divine impassibility will significantly rest on a version of strong immutability that I find to be consistent with the doctrine of the timelessly eternal creator I will present. That being said, let it be understood from the outset that I am not convinced that the kind of approach I am taking is the only kind that could be taken in defense of the impassible divine essence. 1 proponents and pitfalls. Clearly, however, this observation provides no warrant for
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