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Overview of Corruption and Anti-Corruption in Bolivia

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Overview of Corruption and Anti-Corruption in Bolivia www.transparency.org www.cmi.no Overview of corruption and anti-corruption in Bolivia Query Please provide an overview of corruption and anti-corruption in Bolivia Purpose Summary The report will be used in the creation of the Swedish Corruption in Bolivia is present at all levels of society. Development Co-operation’s anti-corruption plan for The judiciary, the police and the public administration Bolivia. more broadly are perceived as the most corrupt institutions of the country. Bolivia is dependent on its Content natural resources and this sector, worldwide, is notoriously prone to corruption. With the development 1. Introduction/Context of the country’s lithium plan, it is crucial for Bolivia to 2. Overview of corruption in Bolivia create the necessary safeguards to ensure maximum 3. Governance structure and anti-corruption social benefits. efforts in Bolivia Bolivia has undertaken significant efforts to enhance 4. References transparency. Evo Morales declared ‘zero tolerance’ against corruption and his government has created an Caveat institutional and legal framework that appears robust,. Yet, despite these positive initiatives, Bolivia still Bolivia has undergone profound political changes and performs below global and regional averages in most institutional reforms in recent year, with a new governance areas, including corruption. The lack of constitution adopted in 2009 and an anti-corruption law capacity and resources undermine new institutions, in 2010. It is thus a very early stage to assess the while low salaries, lack of training and a burdensome relevance of the new anti-corruption framework and its bureaucracy continue to create opportunities and impact on the level of corruption in the country. incentives for corruption. Author(s): Sofia Wickberg, Transparency International, [email protected] Reviewed by: Marie Chene, Transparency International, [email protected]; Viviana Esprella, Transparencia Bolivia, [email protected]; Robin Hodess, Transparency International, [email protected] Date: 27 September 2012 Number: 346 U4 is a web-based resource centre for development practitioners who wish to effectively address corruption challenges in their work. Expert Answers are produced by the U4 Helpdesk – operated by Transparency International – as quick responses to operational and policy questions from U4 Partner Agency staff. Overview of corruption and anti-corruption in Bolivia recognizing indigenous forms of self-government and 1. Introduction/Context granting new powers to municipal, departmental and regional administrations. The new Constitution has Bolivia’s macro-economic performance has improved in the last decade, largely due to natural resources strengthened the power of the executive branch of revenues. Bolivia is a resource rich country (forests, government, although some observers believe that hydrocarbons and rare earth minerals) but remains one horizontal control of government is insufficient in of Latin America’s poorest countries with an annual per Bolivia’s institutional structure (Schilling-Vacaflor, capita income of USD2,283 (US Department of State, 2012). 2012). The informal economy plays a significant role in According to the ‘Latinobarometer’ in 2010 Bolivians the Bolivian society (up to 80% of the workforce in 2008 were the most disgruntled with democracy on the entire according to the World Bank) and one of the continent. The support for democracy has decreased consequences is unequal access to social security and since 2010 and nearly half the population think that high poverty levels for certain groups (World Bank, improvements to democracy require reducing 2008). According to some reports, it is high levels of corruption (Latinobarometer 2011). corruption within the elite and the administration that cement social inequalities and impede efforts made to reduce poverty (Business Anti-Corruption Portal, 2012). 2. Overview of corruption in Drug production and drug, arms and human trafficking, Bolivia as well as smuggling of migrants are serious problems Despite the government’s recent efforts to fight in Bolivia (UNODC, 2010). The government abandoned corruption, it exists at all levels of society. Facilitation the US-driven war on drugs and officially recognized payments are so widely used that experts describe the coca leaf’s role in indigenous cultures. The corruption as an “institutionalised and socially accepted cultivation of coca leafs exceeds the demand for norm” (Business Anti-Corruption Portal, 2012). The traditional legal use and has led to a rise in drug World Justice Project reports that Bolivia faces serious production and trafficking (US Department of State, transparency and accountability challenges in its 2011). This situation coupled with the corruptibility of administration, embedded in an environment marred by the police and customs has led to increased insecurity impunity and corruption. and a rise of criminality. It is important to note that even though organised crime is a significant issue in Bolivia, the problem has not taken the same proportions as in Extent of corruption some of its neighbouring countries (UNODC, 2010). Transparency International’s 2011 Corruption Perception Index ranks Bolivia 118th out of the 183 th During the second half of the 20 century, Bolivia was countries and territories assessed, with a score of 2,8 the scene of a constant alternation between civilian and on a scale from 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (very clean). TI military governments, some of which being notorious for ranks Bolivia better than Venezuela or Haiti, but worse human rights abuses and drug trafficking. In 1985, Paz than Chile, Brazil or Argentina. Estenssoro’s government managed to bring stability back to Bolivia, ended the sequence of military coups Similarly, the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance and, for the first time, all political actors committed Indicators (WGI) place Bolivia in the lowest half of the themselves to democracy (US Department of State, percentile ranks, with a score of 38,9, on a scale from 0 2012). to 10, in terms of control of corruption. Bolivia’s score has declined in comparison to 2007 (43,7) but improved Bolivia has gone through deep political and economic since 2009 (29,2). This shift could be a consequence of changes and taken notable steps towards increased the political unrest the country underwent in 2008. transparency in the last decade. Evo Morales, elected Bolivia’s score on rule of law constantly fell between president in 2005, started what some have termed a 2003 and 2010, when the confidence in and respect of “cultural and democratic revolution” (France Diplomatie, the rule of law improved slightly according to the WGI. 2012), nationalizing the country’s natural resources and This change in trend may be due to the adoption of a empowering Bolivia’s indigenous people. Still, Bolivia is new Constitution and the creation of new integrity highly fragmented along ethnic lines (Svending, 2011). structures. The Constitution adopted in 2009 declares Bolivia a plurinational State with autonomies, explicitly www.U4.no 2 Overview of corruption and anti-corruption in Bolivia The citizens’ pessimism regarding corruption has states that regulating political party financing and increased slightly since 2007: in 2011, 80% of the financial support to candidates is not on the surveyed citizens thought that corruption had increased government’s political agenda and that nothing or stayed the same in the last three years, whereas, in concrete has come out of the few discussions on the 2007, 65% expected corruption to increase or stay the topic. It is important to note that 2013 will be an election same in the near future. A 2010 report from LAPOP year in Bolivia and that the presidential election will interestingly shows that Bolivia is situated in the middle happen in 2014. group of surveyed American countries when it comes to citizens’ perception of public sector corruption but is Moreover, despite the criminalization of illicit placed second on the scale of the number of citizens enrichment in the Marcelo Quiroga Santa Cruz Law of having paid a bribe. According to this report, citizens’ 2010, there is evidence of illicit enrichment by local experience of corruption is more significant than the government officials (Bertelsmann Foundation, 2012). perception they have of corruption in their country. Petty and bureaucratic corruption Business executives, on the other hand, perceive Corruption has been identified by companies as one of corruption as a less significant obstacle to doing the primary obstacles for doing business in Bolivia for business in Bolivia today (3% of respondents) than in years (WEF, 2012, 2011, 2010) and almost a fifth of the 2009 (12% of respondents) according to the WEF companies surveyed by the World Bank/IFC Enterprise Global Competitiveness Index. Survey in 2010 expect to have to offer gifts to civil servants to “get things done”. The Bolivian Forms of corruption administrative system is burdensome and complicated, and interactions with certain public bodies such as the Political corruption tax authority, the customs or the judiciary are often associated with facilitation payments to accelerate The electoral process in Bolivia is generally seen as bureaucratic procedures (Business Anti-Corruption free and fair. The government has taken numerous Portal, 2010). Despite the constitutional guarantee of steps to reach the highest possible number of citizens the right of private property,
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