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First Edition

Contributing Editors: Jonathan Pickworth & Deborah Williams Published by Global Legal Group CONTENTS

Preface Jonathan Pickworth & Deborah Williams, Dechert LLP

Albania Silva Velaj & Sabina Lalaj, Boga & Associates 1

Argentina Marcelo den Toom & Mercedes de Artaza, M. & M. Bomchil 7

Australia Justin McDonnell, David Eliakim & Natalie Caton, King & Wood Mallesons 15

Bangladesh Dr. Kamal Hossain, Dr. Kamal Hossain and Associates 25

Belgium Joost Everaert, Nanyi Kaluma & Anthony Verhaegen, Allen & Overy LLP 30

Brazil Maurício Zanoide de Moraes, Caroline Braun & Daniel Diez Castilho,

Zanoide de Moraes, Peresi & Braun Advogados Associados 36

Canada Mark Morrison, Paul Schabas & Michael Dixon, Blake, Cassels & Graydon LLP 44

Cayman Islands Martin Livingston & Brett Basdeo, Maples and Calder 52

China David Tiang, King & Wood Mallesons 60

Czech Republic Helena Hailichová & Eva Haisová,

Johnson Šťastný Kramařík, advokátní kancelář, s.r.o. 70

France Julia Minkowski & Romain Fournier, Temime & Associés 78

Germany Sascha Kuhn, Simmons & Simmons LLP 87

Hong Kong Kyle Wombolt, Robert Hunt & Janice Tsang, Herbert Smith Freehills 95

India Siddharth Thacker, Mulla & Mulla & Craigie Blunt & Caroe 105

Indonesia Kyle Wombolt, Charles Ball & Narendra Adiyasa,

Hiswara Bunjamin & Tandjung (HBT) in association with Herbert Smith Freehills 113

Ireland Megan Hooper & Heather Mahon, McCann FitzGerald 121

Italy Roberta Guaineri & Francesca Federici, Moro Visconti de Castiglione Guaineri 131

Japan Daiske Yoshida & Junyeon Park, Latham & Watkins 142

Mexico Edgar M. Anaya & Paula Nava González, Anaya Abogados Asociados, S.C. 151

Singapore Ing Loong Yang & Tina Wang, Latham & Watkins 160

South Africa Dave Loxton, Werksmans Attorneys 168

Spain Esteban Astarloa & Patricia Leandro, Uría Menéndez Abogados 176

Switzerland Grégoire Mangeat & Fanny Margairaz, Eversheds Ltd 186

Thailand Kyle Wombolt, Chinnawat Thongpakdee & Michelle Yu,

Herbert Smith Freehills (Thailand) Ltd 197

Turkey Gönenç Gürkaynak & Ç. Olgu Kama, ELIG, Attorneys-at-Law 206

United Kingdom Jonathan Pickworth & Deborah Williams, Dechert LLP 211

USA Cheryl A. Krause & Elisa T. Wiygul, Dechert LLP 220

Ing Loong Yang & Tina Wang Latham & Watkins

Recognised as one of the least corrupt countries in the world, Singapore is renowned for its Government’s strong will to keep corruption at bay. Singapore’s rigorous and effective corruption control system is borne out by its consistently-high ranking in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index.

Overview of Singapore’s anti-corruption legal framework Anti-corruption laws of Singapore The history of Singapore’s battle against corruption can be traced back to its pre-Independence era.1 The primary anti-bribery statute, the Prevention of Corruption Act (Cap. 241) (“PCA”), was enacted in 1960, right after Singapore attained self-government in 1959 and even before Singapore’s declaration of independence in 1965. Since then, the PCA has undergone numerous amendments to reinforce the investigative powers of the investigation offi cers, and enhance punishments for corruption. At the heart of the PCA is a general prohibition on giving, promising or offering, or soliciting, accepting or agreeing to receive a gratifi cation in either the public or private sector.2 Both the demand (the recipient) and supply (the giver) sides of bribery, as well as the intermediaries arranging the same, are caught by the PCA. The word “gratifi cation” is statutorily given a very broad defi nition to include money or any gift, loan, fee, reward, commission, valuable security or other property or interest in property; any offi ce, employment or contract; any part or full payment, release or discharge from any obligation or other liability; any other service, favour or advantage of any description whatsoever; and any offer, undertaking or promise of any such gratifi cation. No particular type of payment or benefi t receives any special treatment under the PCA. Technically, any gift, travel expenses, meal or hospitality payments provided with the requisite corrupt intent will arguably fall within the defi nition of “gratifi cation”, and provision or acceptance of the same could constitute an offence under the PCA. As illustrated in a recent high-profi le corruption case involving a former senior Government offi cial of Singapore, a sexual favour is considered “gratifi cation” for the purpose of the PCA.3 Both individuals and companies can be held liable for bribery offences. The term “person” is defi ned in the Singapore Interpretation Act to include “any company or association or body of persons, corporate or unincorporated”. A special tool has been introduced in the fi ght against public sector corruption, in the form of a statutory presumption. In cases where bribes are paid to a person employed by the Government or a public body, by any person who has or seeks to have dealings with the Government or any public body, the accused public offi cer would be presumed to have received the gratifi cation corruptly as an inducement or reward, unless the contrary could be proved by him.4 This presumption of corruption provides further ammunition for the armoury of the Public Prosecutor. Not surprisingly, for the purpose of charges under the PCA against public servants, the term “public body” is defi ned broadly to include any corporation, board, council, commissioners or other body which has power to act under and for the purposes of any written law relating to public health, or to undertakings or public utility, or otherwise to administer money levied or raised by rates or charges in

GLI - Bribery & Corruption First Edition 160 www.globallegalinsights.com © Published and reproduced with kind permission by Global Legal Group Ltd, Latham & Watkins Singapore pursuance of any written law. It was found by the Singapore High Court in a recent corruption case that the National University of Singapore (NUS) is a “public body” under the PCA, and the provision relating to presumption of corruption in the PCA applies to the professor employed by NUS, who was charged with corruption offences in Court.5 Unlike the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”), facilitation payments are not expressly permitted or dealt with under the PCA. Such payments, if made or accepted with the requisite corrupt intent, would be considered to fall within the scope of “gratifi cation” under the PCA. The PCA itself, with only 37 sections, is a relatively short statute drafted in simple language. Yet, the PCA is considered by the enforcement agencies to be effective and have provided them with suffi cient teeth and cutting edge for investigation, adjudication and conviction of corruption crimes. There are a number of distinctive features of the PCA, which may differ from anti-corruption laws in other countries. For example, under the PCA, an acceptor of gratifi cation can be considered guilty even if he does not intend to, or does not in fact, return the favour, or even if he does not have the power, right or opportunity to return the favour.6 The PCA expressly disallows admission of evidence to show that any alleged gratifi cation is customary in any profession or trade.7 An example is that of giving “red packets”8 during the Chinese New Year festival − a customary practice and very widely practised by Singaporean Chinese − is not a valid defence per se in a corruption trial. The Court would examine the relevant factors, such as the amount contained in the “red packet”, the timing when the “red packet” was given, the dealings between the giver and recipient of the “red packet”, etc. to ascertain whether such “red packet” is corruptly given or accepted.9 Further, the PCA allows pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to known sources of income, which cannot be satisfactorily accounted for by an accused person, to be admissible as corroborative evidence of corruption in Court.10 It is a statutory liability for every person under investigation to give information. The PCA makes it a seizable offence for any person who knowingly provides any false or misleading information in this regard.11 Extra-territorial jurisdiction can be exercised against Singapore citizens committing corruption offences outside Singapore. Where any Singapore citizen commits a corruption offence outside Singapore, he may be dealt with in respect of that offence as if it had been committed within Singapore.12 Besides the PCA, the Penal Code (Cap. 224) contains provisions relating to bribery of public servants. However, the Penal Code is a much older statute compared with the PCA, and is nowadays rarely used as a basis for prosecuting bribery offences. Scenarios that are covered by the Penal Code include a public servant (including any person expecting to be a public servant) taking a gratifi cation, other than legal remuneration, in respect of an offi cial act; a person taking a gratifi cation in order to infl uence a public servant by corrupt or illegal means; and a person taking a gratifi cation for the exercise of personal infl uence with a public servant.13 One illustration provided under the Penal Code in respect of these anti-bribery provisions is that: “A is a public servant. B, A’s wife, receives a present as a motive for soliciting A to give an offi ce to a particular person. A abets her doing so. B is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year, or with fi ne, or with both. A is punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 3 years, or with fi ne, or with both.” Whilst not defi ned in the Penal Code, the explanation provided in the Penal Code makes it clear that the word “gratifi cation” should not be restricted to pecuniary gratifi cations, or to gratifi cations estimable in money. To further ensure the integrity of members of Parliament and Government offi cials in the course of performing their offi ce duties, provisions to such effect have been expressly included in the relevant legislation. For example, the Parliament (Privileges, Immunities and Powers) Act (Cap. 217) prohibits Members of Parliament from benefi ting from a debate in the House in which they have a pecuniary

GLI - Bribery & Corruption First Edition 161 www.globallegalinsights.com © Published and reproduced with kind permission by Global Legal Group Ltd, London Latham & Watkins Singapore interest.14 The Political Donations Act (Cap. 236) requires candidates standing for political elections to declare the donations they received. The Customs Act (Cap. 70) specifi cally provides for penalties for receiving bribes, and presumes any monies in the possession of a Customs offi cer which cannot be accounted for to be corruptly obtained.15 Penalties As for criminal penalty, any person found guilty of an offence by the PCA shall be liable on conviction to a fi ne or to imprisonment, or to both. Where a corrupt offender is convicted of an offence for accepting any gratifi cation, and if the value of such gratifi cation is assessable, under Section 13 of the PCA, the Court shall also order him to pay a penalty equivalent to the amount of bribes he received. To further ensure that corruption does not pay, the Corruption, Drug Traffi cking and Other Serious Crimes (Confi scation of Benefi ts) Act (Cap. 65A) was enacted in 1999 to allow the Court to confi scate properties and pecuniary resources from convicted corrupt offenders, if the said properties are found to be benefi ts of corruption offences. In the public sector, it has been made clear by the Singapore judiciary that a stern approach is justifi ed in determining the penalty against the corrupted. As former Chief Justice Yong Pung How said in a Court of Appeal decision: “I had no doubt that a more severe punishment was warranted to emphasise the court’s as well as society’s disapproval and abhorrence of his actions, which not only had the effect of bringing the public service of which he was an integral part into disrepute, but also gravely injures the impartial workings of our criminal justice system. To lightly condone the offence in the present case would no doubt undermine the effi cacy of our public service as a whole, not only diminishing the public’s trust in the country’s law-enforcement agencies but also setting back the government’s efforts at establishing Singapore in the international community as a safe and corruption-free city state.” Besides punishments made by the Court, a corrupt public offi cer who is not charged in Court due to insuffi cient evidence, may nevertheless face departmental disciplinary actions including dismissal from service, reduction in rank, stoppage or deferral of salary increment, fi ne or reprimand or loss of social benefi ts. In the private sector, where a director has been convicted of a bribery offence in connection with the formation or management of a corporation, a disqualifi cation order may be imposed on him by the Court, in addition to any other sentence imposed.16 Case law shows that the disqualifi cation regime in Singapore is “protective in nature”, in that it is meant to protect the public from both the individual director in question as well as errant directors in general.17 Enforcement agencies In Singapore, the anti-corruption laws are enforced by a number of enforcement agencies, including: • The Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (“CPIB”). • Attorney-General’s Chambers (“AGC”). • Commercial Affairs Department (“CAD”). • Monetary Authority of Singapore (“MAS”). • The Singapore Exchange Limited (“SGX”). The CPIB is the primary anti-bribery watchdog in Singapore. Established in 1952, the CPIB is responsible for investigating corruption in the public sector, as well as payment or acceptance of illegal commissions or kickbacks in the private sector. The CPIB is under the aegis of the Prime Minister’s Offi ce (“PMO”) and it reports directly to the Prime Minister of Singapore. Such functional independence enables the CPIB to carry out its investigations free from infl uence from any Ministry or department of the Government. Under the of Singapore, the CPIB enjoys an additional source of authority to back up its action. In case the Prime Minister refuses to give the green light to any corruption investigation, the President of Singapore, who is elected, may, under the Constitution of Singapore, order such investigation to proceed.18

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Under the PCA, the CPIB has extensive powers of investigation, including powers to require attendance of interview and to investigate a suspect’s fi nancial and other records. The CPIB is also empowered to investigate other offences relating to, for example, cheating and commercial crimes, besides corruption. Special investigation powers may be granted by the Public Prosecutor, such as the power to investigate any bank account, share account, etc. or any other form of account, and to require disclosure of all information, documents or articles required by the offi cers. In cases where bribes are paid to facilitate, or in connection with fraudulent schemes or money laundering, the Commercial Affairs Department (“CAD”) may step in and investigate other unlawful activities. CAD is the principal white-collar crime investigative agency in Singapore that investigates complex fraud, white collar crime, money laundering and terrorism fi nancing. The CAD’s Financial Investigation Division is specially empowered to combat money laundering in Singapore, and works closely with fi nancial institutions and Government agencies both at home and overseas. The CPIB or CAD, however, do not prosecute cases themselves. After investigations, they would, where appropriate, refer the case to the AGC for prosecution. The Economic Crimes and Governance Division (“EGD”) of the AGC is responsible for prosecutions and all related appeals in respect of white-collar and other general commercial crimes, as well as corruption cases. The work of prosecutors of the EGD includes: evaluating evidence disclosed during the course of investigations carried out by CAD and CPIB; rendering legal advice to these enforcement agencies; and where necessary, directing further investigations to be carried out. In particular, the Corruption Directorate is responsible for the prosecution of offences under the PCA and any written law arising from investigations carried out by the CPIB. MAS acts as the central bank of Singapore and is the principal supervisor and regulator of fi nancial services in Singapore. SGX supervises compliance of listed companies with the Listing Rules. Financial institutions and Singapore-listed companies may face separate questioning and enforcement actions from MAS and/or SGX concerning unlawful or irregular activity involving bribery.

Enforcement activities for the past two years Recent investigations and charges In the last couple of years, there have been a few high-profi le corruption investigations and prosecutions in Singapore. In June 2012, the former chief of the Central Narcotics Bureau (“CNB”) Ng Boon Gay (“Ng”) was charged with four counts of corruption for obtaining sexual gratifi cation from a sales manager of an IT company. Ng was alleged to have obtained the sexual gratifi cation from the sales manager in return for helping further the interests of her employer in relation to its dealings with the CNB. Ng was ultimately acquitted of all counts of corruption charges, as the Judge found that the prosecution had not proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Another corruption case making the headlines involved the former Commissioner of the Singapore Civil Defence Force (“SCDF”), Peter Lim. In June 2012, Lim claimed trial to one charge under the PCA for engaging in sexual trysts with one female general manager, Pang, of an IT company that had business dealings with the SCDF. After trial, Lim was found guilty of the offence charged. In determining the punishment, the Judge reassured the public that an uncompromising stance would be taken against all corruption offenders regardless of their standing. Lim was sentenced to six months’ imprisonment and his appeal against sentence was dismissed. Former National University of Singapore (“NUS”) law professor, Tey Tsun Hang (“Tey”) was fi rst charged in July 2012 with six counts of corruptly obtaining gratifi cation from his former student. These six charges consisted of receiving sexual favours and gifts, as an inducement for Tey to show favour in his assessment of his student’s academic grades. After a highly publicised 28-day trial, Tey was found guilty on all six counts of corruption and sentenced to fi ve months’ imprisonment. Despite the ripples caused by the aforesaid cases, the records show that the percentage of cases involving public offi cers remains low. It is stated in the CPIB 2012 Report that the main bulk of investigation cases concern in the private sector.19

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According to the CPIB Report 2012, 166 persons were charged by CPIB in 2012 for corruption- related offences. For ease of reference, the table in which a breakdown of the type of offences committed by the persons charged, and whether the offenders were from the public or private sector, is reproduced below:20

Employees of: OFFENCES COMMITTED PCA Penal code Other acts Sub-total (%) Government 3025 Departments Statutory Boards 4004 Government- 6107 Linked Companies (GLCs) Private sector 131 18 1 150 Total (%) 144 (87%) 19 (11%) 3 (2%) 166 Current trends of enforcement action The recent active investigations and prosecutions of sex-for-benefi t in Singapore suggest the enforcement agencies’ readiness to deal with corruption in all forms. That said, it does not mean that the CPIB would only be interested in investigating “big” cases involving public offi cials or substantial amounts. As consistently emphasised by the CPIB, “no case is too small to investigate”, and it is expected that the CPIB will continue to watch closely both the demand (the recipients) and supply (the givers) sides of bribery, regardless of the amount of bribery or the stance of the corrupted.

Overview of cross-border issues As corruption-related crimes have become more and more globalised, international and cross-border cooperation is highly valued by the enforcement agencies in Singapore. Singapore has been a member of the Financial Action Task Force since 1992. It was one of the founding members of the Asia-Pacifi c Group on Money-Laundering in 1997. Further, Singapore is an active member of the Convention Against Corruption (“UNCAC”), and ratifi ed UNCAC on 6 November 2009. CPIB is also a regular participant at initiatives such as the Asia-Pacifi c Economic Cooperation (“APEC”) Anti-Corruption and Transparency Experts’ Working Group (known for short as “ACT Task Force”); the G20 Anti-Corruption Working Group; the Asian Development Bank (“ADB”) – Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”) Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia and the Pacifi c; the South East Asia – Parties Against Corruption (“SEA-PAC”) meetings between parties of a regional Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”); and the International Association of Anti-Corruption Authorities (“IAACA”).

Key issues relating to investigation, decision making and enforcement procedures Investigation As regards corruption involving civil servants, there is a reporting framework in place where offi cers can report wrongful practices or behaviour they have observed in the service. Such reporting of wrongdoing or irregularities can be made internally within the reporter’s own departments or agencies, or to their Permanent Secretary and the Head of Civil Service. In addition, wrongdoings can also be reported to the Public Service Commission (“PSC”), which is an independent body, vested with the authority to dismiss and exercise disciplinary control over civil servants. In addition, complaints of corruption may be raised with the CPIB, and non-compliance with accounting procedures and accounting frauds may be raised with the Auditor-General’s Offi ce. The public may lodge complaints or provide information relating to corruption offences through the website of the CPIB. The CPIB will decide on the action to be taken for any corruption complaint

GLI - Bribery & Corruption First Edition 164 www.globallegalinsights.com © Published and reproduced with kind permission by Global Legal Group Ltd, London Latham & Watkins Singapore received within 14 days. If the corruption complaint relates to corruption offences in progress, the CPIB will take immediate action to apprehend the offenders. Under the PCA, the identity of informers is protected in both civil and criminal proceedings.21 The Intelligence Division of the Operations Department of the CPIB is in charge of collation and processing of information, and it supports the Operations Department in investigations, providing information such as establishing identities, relationships, housing target, during the pre-operation and operation phases. The Intelligence Division is also in close liaison with its overseas counterparts, such as the Hong Kong Independent Commission Against Corruption, as well as local intelligence agencies from the Singapore Police Force and Immigration & Checkpoints Authority, etc. Furthermore, the CPIB pays great attention to the skills of interviewing the alleged corrupted person(s), as well as computer forensics, which is deemed indispensable in the investigations. For this purpose, a Computer Forensics Branch has been set up within the CPIB, with offi cers coming from the Operations Division, trained to handle the collection, preservation, analysis and court presentation of computer-related evidence. Enforcement Singapore’s criminal legal process actively encourages plea bargaining to enhance the effi ciency of the administration of criminal justice. Lawyers representing accused persons routinely make written (or sometimes oral) representations to the AGC with a view to having the charges against their client withdrawn, reduced in severity (for example, charging under a different section of the law), or persuading the prosecution to proceed with fewer charges (with remaining charges taken into consideration for the purpose of sentencing). The AGC will review all representations from defence counsel and decide on them carefully. If the representations are successful and acceded to, this will result in the accused pleading guilty to a lesser charge, or pleading guilty to fewer charges, or (in cases where the charge(s) is withdrawn), an acquittal. There are also certain instances where the prosecution applies to the Court for a discharge not amounting to an acquittal against an accused. If the Court allows the prosecution’s application, the prosecution will be stayed. Apart from criminal proceedings, when a person is found to have committed a corruption offence, the principal could recover the amount of the bribe as a civil debt. For example, in a case involving the manager of a multi-national company, who was convicted of a corruption offence for receiving bribes in return for awarding contracts to other companies which provided services to his employer, the manager was sentenced to 10 months’ imprisonment and ordered to pay a penalty of about SG$300,000, being the total bribes received by him. After the criminal trial, the manager’s employer commenced civil action under the PCA to recover the bribes from the manager. The Singapore Court of Appeal upheld the employer’s claim and dismissed the manager’s appeal that there was double jeopardy or double payment. Accordingly, notwithstanding the criminal penalty, the manager was found civilly liable to his employer for a sum equal to the kickback received by him.22

Proposed reforms A recent case which put the CPIB under the spotlight involved the investigation and charging of the former assistant director of the CPIB, Edwin Yeo Seow Hiong, for misappropriation of funds of SG$1.7m, allegedly between 2008 and September 2012. It was admitted by the accused that part of the embezzled funds was used for gambling at the Marina Bay Sands casino in Singapore. In view of this case, and the potential impact on the public’s trust in the civil service, the Public Service Division of the Singapore Government is now reviewing the rules relating to public offi cers in general visiting casinos, and intends to require those who visit the casinos frequently, or who purchase the annual casino entry levy, to declare these actions. In particular, new rules are being drawn up requiring that law enforcement offi cers, including the Police and CPIB offi cers, declare their casino visits within seven days of each such visit.

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Endnotes 1. Singapore became independent on 9 August 1965. 2. Sections 5 and 6, PCA. 3. See Public Prosecutor v Peter Benedict Lim Sin Lang [2013] SGDC 192. 4. Section 8 of the PCA provides that “[w]here in any proceedings against a person for an offence under section 5 or 6, it is proved that any gratifi cation has been paid or given to or received by a person in the employment of the Government or any department thereof or of a public body by or from a person or agent of a person who has or seeks to have any dealing with the Government or any department thereof or any public body, that gratifi cation shall be deemed to have been paid or given and received corruptly as an inducement or reward as hereinbefore mentioned unless the contrary is proved”. 5. See Public Prosecutor v Tey Tsun Hang [2013] SGDC 165, [511]-[527]. 6. Section 9, PCA. 7. Section 23, PCA. 8. These are small red envelopes that contain cash, usually given out as a token of appreciation or good luck on auspicious occasions. 9. See, for example, Public Prosecutor v Tan Liang Ann [1998] 1 SLR(R) 684 and Kwang Boon Keong Peter v Public Prosecutor [1998] 2 SLR(R) 211. 10. Section 24, PCA. 11. Sections 27 and 28, PCA. 12. Section 37, PCA. 13. Sections 161 to 165, the Penal Code. 14. Section 32 provides that “[a] Member shall not in or before Parliament or any committee take part in the discussion of any matter in which he has a direct personal pecuniary interest without disclosing the extent of that interest and shall not in any circumstances vote upon any such matter”. 15. Section 138 of the Customs Act provides that any Customs offi cer who has accepted or attempted to obtain any bribe shall be guilty of an offence and shall be liable to a fi ne not exceeding $5,000 or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 3 years or to both, and shall be interdicted from holding offi ce in the public service of the Government. 16. According to section 154 (1) and (2) of the Companies Act (Chapter 50), a director shall be subject to the disqualifi cation where he is convicted (whether in Singapore or elsewhere) of any offence involving fraud or dishonesty punishable with imprisonment for 3 months or more, or where he is convicted in Singapore of: (a) any offence in connection with the formation or management of a corporation; or (b) any offence by failure to use reasonable diligence in the discharge of the duties of his offi ce, etc. 17. See Madhavan Peter v Public Prosecutor and other appeals [2012] SGHC 153, [189]. See also Ong Chow Hong (alias Ong Chaw Ping) v Public Prosecutor and another appeal [2011] SGHC 93, [21]-[24]. 18. Section 22G of the Constitution of Singapore provides that: “Notwithstanding that the Prime Minister has refused to give his consent to the Director of the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau to make any inquiries or to carry out any investigations into any information received by the Director touching upon the conduct of any person or any allegation or complaint made against any person, the Director may make such inquiries or carry out investigations into such information, allegation or complaint if the President, acting in his discretion, concurs therewith.” 19. The CPIB Report 2012 is available at: http://app.cpib.gov.sg/data/website/doc/ManagePage/172/ CPIB%20Report%202012%20-Approved_Final.pdf. 20. Ibid, page 7. 21. Section 36, PCA. 22. Carrefour Singapore Pte Ltd v Leong Wai Kay [2006] SGHC 160.

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Ing Loong Yang Tel: +852 2912 2500 / Email: [email protected] Ing Loong Yang focuses on international and complex commercial litigation in Asia, particularly on cross-border disputes involving Greater . He has more than 25 years’ experience, with particular depth in Singapore, Mainland China and Hong Kong. He advises on international , complex commercial litigation, fraud and corruption investigations and compliance and regulatory issues. Mr. Yang has represented clients in international arbitrations under the rules of SIAC, CIETAC, ICC, HKIAC and UNCITRAL, as well as in Hong Kong Courts. He also advises multi-national companies on FCPA and anti-bribery compliance. Mr. Yang is among the fi rst Hong Kong solicitors to be appointed Solicitor-Advocate, giving him full rights of audience in Hong Kong Courts. He also regularly sits as Arbitrator in arbitrations in Singapore, the PRC, Hong Kong, and . Previously, he was Deputy Public Prosecutor with the Singapore Attorney-General’s Chambers and a Member of the Disciplinary Committee of the Singapore Exchange.

Tina Wang Tel: +852 2912 2791 / Email: [email protected] Tina Wang’s practice focuses on international commercial arbitration matters. Ms. Wang advises local and multinational corporations in connection with a range of multi-jurisdictional and cross-border litigation and arbitration matters. She has experience representing clients in international arbitrations under the rules of SIAC, HKIAC and ICC. Ms. Wang also has particular experience advising clients in the life sciences, automotive, fi nancial, industrial, technology and mining sectors throughout Hong Kong, the PRC, Singapore, Malaysia and beyond.

Latham & Watkins 9 Raffl es Place, #42-02 Republic Plaza, Singapore 048619 Tel: +65 6536 1161 / Fax: +65 6536 1171 / URL: http://www.lw.com

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