Spontaneous Or Premeditated?

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Spontaneous Or Premeditated? Spontaneous or Premeditated? DISCUSSION PAPER 57 SPONTANEOUS OR PREMEDITATED? Post-Election Violence in Kenya GODWIN R. MURUNGA NORDISKA AFRIKAINSTITUTET, UppSALA 2011 Indexing terms: Elections Violence Political violence Political crisis Ethnicity Democratization Kenya The opinions expressed in this volume are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Nordiska Afrikainstitutet. Language checking: Peter Colenbrander ISSN 1104-8417 ISBN 978-91-7106-694-7 © The author and Nordiska Afrikainstitutet 2011 Production: Byrå4 Print on demand, Lightning Source UK Ltd. Spontaneous or Premeditated? Contents Contents ..............................................................................................................................................................3 Foreword .............................................................................................................................................................5 Introduction .......................................................................................................................................................7 Post-Election Violence: Overview of the Literature .............................................................................8 A Note on the Kenyan Democratisation Processes ............................................................................13 Clash of Interpretations ................................................................................................................................17 The Ballot Box and the Street.................................................................................................................... 20 Box I: Protest and the Example of the Orange Revolution ............................................................. 23 Forms of Post-Election Violence ...............................................................................................................24 Spontaneous Protest and Violence .........................................................................................................24 Premeditated or Planned Violence ......................................................................................................... 29 Premeditated Violence .................................................................................................................................32 The Case of Violence in the Rift Valley ................................................................................................... 34 Box II: ‘Forty-One Tribes Against One’ ................................................................................................... 38 The Police and State-Directed Violence.................................................................................................39 Antecedents of Police Violence ................................................................................................................ 40 Back to PEV .......................................................................................................................................................43 Police and Sexual Violence .........................................................................................................................45 Conclusion ....................................................................................................................................................... 48 References.........................................................................................................................................................51 Godwin R. Murunga 4 Spontaneous or Premeditated? Foreword This Discussion Paper is based on a critical examination of the unprecedented levels of political violence that occurred in the aftermath of the Kenyan general elections in 2007. It focuses on post-election violence in Kenya by primarily addressing the roots, complex dynamics and ramifications of political violence in the country and its implications for governance, nation-building and democ- ratisation. The paper analyses two critical issues: the ways in which the lack of consensus among competing factions of the political elite provided the context for violence, and the complicity of some international actors and powers in the outbreak of violence. Although the fundamental issue is framed around the question of whether post-election violence in Kenya’s case was planned or spontaneous, the author carefully transcends this binary, drawing upon Kenya’s history, its weak institu- tions, the nature of its ethnically fractured political elite and political parties, and the complicity of international actors. It also explores in great detail the interface between planned and unplanned violence in the post-election period. The paper also interrogates the various explanations of post-election violence in Kenya as being impelled by: protests against electoral rigging and the use of state power to perpetrate electoral fraud; politicised inter-ethnic conflict be- tween the Party of National Unity and Orange Democratic Movement support- ers; and orchestrated acts of revenge between the opposing sides to the conflict. Also important is the analysis of the political geography of post-electoral vio- lence in Kenya as reflected in the patterns, intensity and spread of the violence and its consequences. The nature and pattern of the violence, including state- sanctioned violence involving the use of the police by the ruling party, are care- fully unpacked to unravel the spatial dimensions of planned and unplanned violent political behaviour. In conclusion, the paper demonstrates how fractures within Kenyan soci- ety – a divided political elite and an alienated and angry populace, in a context marked by weak political institutions and the ethnicisation of political parties by an elite locked in a grim struggle for power-at-any cost – plunged the coun- try into unprecedented levels of violence that only ended with the reaching of a political pact between factions of the feuding elite with the aid of regional and international mediators. As such, it goes beyond simplistic explanations of political violence in Africa, and will be of interest to scholars, policymakers and civil society activists seeking a better understanding of the complex challenges facing democratisation, development, peace and security in Kenya. Cyril Obi Senior Researcher The Nordic Africa Institute 5 Godwin R. Murunga ‘[President] Kibaki is aware that it is bad manners for a sitting President to lose [an election].’ Prof. Macharia Munene, USIU, Nairobi, East African Standard, 12 July 2007 An electoral process is an alternative to violence as it is a means of achieving governance. It is when an electoral process is perceived as unfair, unrespon- sive, or corrupt, that its political legitimacy is compromised and stakeholders are motivated to go outside the established norms to achieve their objectives. Electoral conflict and violence become tactics [of equal importance] in po- litical competition.1 1. Jeff Fischer,Electoral Conflict and Violence: A Strategy for Study and Prevention, IFES White Paper, 2002-01, 5 February 2002, p. 2. 6 Spontaneous or Premeditated? Introduction Most Kenyans invested their faith in the electoral process prior to the 2007 general elections. They not only expected a transparent process and fair out- come, but also assumed the incumbent would, at the very least, respect their choice. Of course, there were some, like Macharia Munene, who held that it is ‘bad manners’ for an incumbent president to lose an election, but the majority understood that change or continuity in governance would be decided through the ballot box. They registered to vote in record numbers, braved long voting queues, the hot sun or rainy conditions, and cast their votes in a relatively peace- ful process. In spite of the flaws identified by the Kriegler Commission,2 voting was smooth in most parts of the country, with isolated reports of the tension common to such contests. Trouble started after voting. It was centred on the na- tional tallying centre at the Kenyatta International Conference Centre (KICC) in Nairobi. This paper attempts to provide some explanations of the nature of the elector- al troubles and the subsequent crisis that brought Kenya to near collapse, lead- ing to the deaths of at least 1,133 people and the displacement of over 350,000.3 The paper is of the view that Kenya’s electoral violence was a consequence of the abuse of the electoral process, even though we acknowledge this abuse and sub- sequent violence was linked to longer-term historical grievances that had been simmering in the country. The paper identifies and maps the main forms of violence, seeking thereby to analyse their manifestations in different regions and provide preliminary ex- planations for any divergences between regions. It concludes with a brief dis- cussion of the debates on peace, truth and justice. The analysis illustrates the inconsistency of the political class in Kenya in relation to political violence. It is notable that on the critical issue of punishment of those who organised and funded violence, erstwhile political protagonists have found common ground in opposing punishment and consequently denied justice to those who were killed, displaced or whose property was destroyed. It is on this basis that the issue of impunity runs through election politics and remains at the centre of discussions of election violence in Kenya. This paper posits a relationship between abuse
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