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Introduction Notes Introduction 1. Bush 2001f. The enormity of the task confronting us was succinctly stated in the National Security Council’s September 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States: “The United States of America is fighting a war against terrorists of global reach. The enemy is not a single political regime or person or religion or ideology. The enemy is terrorism—premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against innocents.” 2. Bush 2001f. 3. Bush 2003l. 4. Among the earlier works by ex-officials in the Bush administration are O’Neill (as told to Suskind 2004), Clarke 2004, and Wilson 2004. By the fall of 2004, Bob Woodward had written two best-selling accounts of President Bush, the war on terror, and the Iraq War (B. Woodward 2002, 2004). 5. See, for example, Massing 2004, Packer 2005. Other accounts of the many problems we faced in Iraq would quickly follow. See, among numerous oth- ers, Isikoff and Corn 2006, Rich 2006, Ricks 2006, Suskind 2006, Chan- drasekaran 2007. 6. Political scientist Ian Lustick (2006, 2007) cogently argues that the war on terror has achieved the status of a “background narrative” (2006, 17). Its pre- cepts are accepted without question and form the basis of this country’s post- 9/11 belief systems; thus, there is no public debate over the assumption that the problem of terrorism must be addressed by a “war” and that its rationale and global scale are appropriate. Also see Lemann 2002; Krebs and Lobasz 2007, 423; Western 2005a, chap. 6; Western 2005b; Kuypers 2006, chap. 2 and 8. 7. Anker 2005; Coe et al. 2004; Domke 2004; Hutcheson et al. 2004; Karim 2002; Silberstein 2002; Waisbord 2002; Lule 2002; Jackson 2005; Norris, Kern, and Just 2003; McChesney 2002; Gershkoff and Kushner 2005. 8. McClellan 2008 and Feith 2008 are two recent examples of the behind-the- scenes insider genre. Also see Draper 2007, Greenwald 2007, and Weisberg 2008 for examples of recent works that deconstruct Bush’s psychology. 9. Jackson 2005, 18; Jorgensen and Phillips 2002, 66, 157. 10. Jackson 2005, 16–19. 11. Gamson and Modigliani 1987, 143. Also see Iyengar 1991; Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Entman 2003, 417; Entman 2004, 5–6; Bennett, 2009, 37–38. 12. Bennett 2009, 38 and 124; Pan and Kosicki 1993. 218 Notes 13. Entman 2003, 417–18. 14. Ibid., 417. 15. Ibid., 417–18; Entman 2004, 14–18. 16. Lule 2002; Karim 2002; Silberstein 2002; Waisbord 2002; Anker 2005; Jack- son 2005; Krebs and Lobasz 2007, 421–32. 17. Jackson 2005, 19. 18. Ibid., 19–20; Entman 2003, 418–419; Entman 2004, 13–17. 19. Graber 2006, 340–41; Entman 2004; Western 2005a, 2005b; Iyengar and McGrady 2007, 90–102. 20. Krebs and Lobasz 2007, 412; Krebs and Jackson 2007. 21. Krebs and Lobasz 2007, 412; Krebs and Jackson 2007. 22. Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Iyengar 1991. See Kernell 2007, chap. 5, for a discussion of the growth of “going public” to promote the president’s agenda. 23. Johnson-Cartee 2005, chap. 5. Jamieson and Waldman 2003, xiii, write, “the metaphor of a frame—a fixed border that includes some things and excludes others—describes the way information is arranged and packaged in news sto- ries. The story’s frame describes what information is included and what is excluded.” See also Edwards 2003, chap. 7, for a discussion of the problems that contemporary presidents face in getting their desired frame through an interpretive media to the public. 24. B. Cohen 1963, 13. Also see McCombs and Shaw 1993; Iyengar 1991; Iyen- gar and Kinder 1987. 25. Gamson 1989; Iyengar 1991; Iyengar and Simon 1994, 170–72; Iyengar and McGrady 2007, 219–23. 26. Bennett, Lawrence, and Livingston 2006 and 2007, 57–59. 27. West 2001, chap. 4; Bennett 2009, chap. 6; Cook 2005, chap. 4 and 5. 28. West 2001, chap. 4; Bennett 2009, chap. 5; Cook 2005, chap. 4 and 5. 29. West 2001, chap. 4; Bennett 2009, chap. 5; Cook 2005, chap. 4 and 5. 30. Hallin 1989, chap. 3. 31. Ibid. 32. Ibid., chap. 5. 33. West, 2001, chap. 5. 34. Ibid.; Bennett 2009 chap. 5 and 6; Edwards 2003, chap. 7; Patterson 1993. 35. West, 2001, chap. 5; Bennett 2009, chap. 5 and 6; Bennett, Lawrence, and Livingston 2007, chap. 1 and 2. 36. Mermin 1999. See also Zaller and Chiu 1996. 37. Mermin 1999. 38. Mermin 1999, chap. 4; Hallin and Gitlin 1994; Entman and Page 1994; Ben- nett 1994; Entman 2004, chap. 4. 39. Entman and Page 1994; Hallin and Gitlin 1994. 40. Althaus 2003, 282; Cook 2005. 41. West 2001, chap. 6. 42. Bennett, Lawrence, and Livingston 2007, chap. 5; Bennett 2009, chap. 1. 43. Bennett, Lawrence, and Livingston 2007, 56–57. 44. Ibid., chap. 2; Cook 2005, afterword. 45. Cook 2005, chap. 4 and 5. Notes 219 46. Carragee and Roefs 2004, 221–22; Gramsci 1971; Herman and Chomsky 2002; McChesney 2002. 47. Artz and Murphy 2000; Condit 1994; Gitlin 2003; Hall et al. 1978. 48. Bennett 1991; Bennett, Lawrence, and Livingston 2007, 49–51; Graber 2006, 341–43. 49. Althaus 2003; Cook 2005; Bennett 2009; Entman 2006. 50. Livingston and Bennett 2003; Entman 2006. 51. Entman 2003; Entman 2004. 52. Entman 2004, chap. 1. 53. Entman 2006. 54. Edwards 2007, chap. 1 and 2; Kumar 2007. Chapter 1 1. Bush 2001b. 2. Ibid. 3. Bush 2001c. 4. As ethicist Peter Singer (2004, 1–2) and Krebs and Lobasz (2007, 426) note, the “language of evil” in Bush’s post-9/11 speech has been ubiquitous and “no other president in living memory has spoken so often about good and evil, right and wrong.” Also see Coe et al. 2004 and Domke 2004, chap. 2. 5. Bush 2001j. 6. Bush 2001h. 7. Bush 2001e. See Rojecki 2008 for an excellent analysis of American excep- tionalism and the war on terror. 8. Bush 2001k. 9. Domke 2004, chap. 2–4; Jackson 2005, 143–46. 10. Bush 2001a, 2001b, 2001e. 11. Domke 2004, chap. 2–4; Jackson 2005, chap. 5. 12. Bush, 2001a, 2001b, 2001c, 2001d, 2001e, 2001f, 2001g, 2001h. 13. Anker 2005, 25. 14. Bush 2001e. 15. Jackson 2005, 35–36. 16. Bush 2001h. 17. Ibid. 18. Ibid. 19. Ibid. 20. Bush 2001k. 21. Bush 2001h. 22. Bush 2001i. 23. Bush 2002a. 24. Bush 2002b. 25. Nacos 2007, 160–61. 26. Domke 2004, 19. 27. Kernell 2007, 185–86. 28. Manheim 1991. 220 Notes 29. Gershkoff and Kushner 2005. 30. Western 2005a, chap. 6, and Western 2005b. 31. Domke et al. 2006, 299–300. 32. See Huddy, Khatib, and Capelos 2002. 33. Cited in Nacos 2007, 161–62. 34. Lustick 2006, chap. 2; Lustick 2007, 3. 35. Kennedy 2001a. 36. Kennedy 2001b. 37. Pelosi 2001. 38. Pelosi 2002. 39. Krebs and Lobasz 2005. 40. Quoted in Domke et al. 2006, 305. 41. Lemann 2002, 2. 42. Ibid., 1. 43. Krebs and Lobasz 2005; Krebs and Jackson 2007. 44. Graber 2006, chap. 5. 45. Ibid., 130–31. 46. Carey 2002, 73. 47. Zelizer and Allan 2002, introduction. 48. Ibid., 8–9. 49. See, for example, Domke 2004; Coe et al. 2004; Hutcheson et al. 2004; Domke et al. 2006; Jackson 2005; McChesney 2002; Entman 2003, 2004; Kellner 2002; Norris, Kern, and Just 2003; Gershkoff and Kushner 2005; Nacos 2007; DiMaggio 2008. 50. Jackson 2005, 166–68. 51. Rojecki 2008, 75–82. 52. Domke et al. 2004, 237–38. 53. DiMaggio 2008, 267–68. 54. Nacos 2007, 159. 55. See, for example, Domke 2004; Coe et al. 2004; Hutcheson et al. 2004; Gershkoff and Kushner 2005; DiMaggio 2008, 267–68. 56. See, for example, Entman 2004, 107–22; Bennett 2009, 112–14, 159–63; Bennett, Lawrence, and Livingston 2007, chap. 5. 57. Nacos 2007, 164–66. 58. Ibid., 167–68. 59. Sontag 2001. 60. See Hertsgaard 2002, 46; Bennett 2009, 15; Domke 2004, 118; Entman 2004, 174n50. 61. Domke et al. 2006, 302. 62. Ibid., 309. 63. Sontag 2001, 6. 64. Jackson 2005, chap. 4. 65. Bush 2002a. 66. Gershkoff and Kushner 2005. 67. Bush 2003a. Notes 221 68. Gershkoff and Kushner 2005, 527. 69. Cheney 2002. 70. Quoted in Blitzer 2003; Rice 2003. 71. Powell 2003. 72. Althaus and Largio 2004. 73. Western 2005b, 197–98. 74. Ibid., 198–99. 75. Cheney 2002. 76. Rumsfeld 2002. 77. Bush 2002c. 78. Bush 2002d. 79. Western 2005b, 204. 80. Bush 2002e. 81. See Jackson 2005, chap. 6; Domke 2004; Gershkoff and Kushner 2005; Coe et al. 2004; Bennett, Lawrence, and Livingston 2007; Krebs and Lobasz 2007; Krebs and Jackson 2007; Massing 2004. 82. Rojecki 2008, 75–82. 83. Massing 2004, 28. 84. DiMaggio 2008, 69–70. 85. Gershkoff and Kushner 2005. 86. Cited in Cunningham 2003/4. 87. Entman 2003; 2004, chap. 5. Chapter 2 1. Bush 2003a. 2. Ibid. 3. Ibid. 4. Bush 2003d. 5. Bush 2003e. 6. Bush 2003f, 2003g. 7. Bush 2003h. 8. Bush 2003k. 9. Bush 2003l. 10. DiMaggio 2008, chap. 3. 11. Farnsworth and Lichter 2006, 91. 12. Pew Research Center 2003b. 13. Pew Research Center 2003a; Graber 2006, 334–35; Farnsworth and Lichter 2006, 95–96. 14. Rendall and Broughel 2003; see also DiMaggio 2008, 142. 15. Chinni 2006. 16. Aday, Cluverius, and Livingston 2005, 319. 17. Ibid., 325–27. 18. Entman 2004, 117. 222 Notes 19. See, for example, the New York Times editorial, “The Times and Iraq.”20 Ben- nett, Lawrence, and Livingston 2007, 29. 20. Bennett, Lawrence, and Livingston 2007, 29. 21. Byrd 2003. 22. See, for example, DeYoung 2003. See also Bennett, Lawrence, and Livingston 2007, 16–17. 23. Bush 2003m. 24. Ibid. 25. Bush 2003n.
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