A Worm Misuse Pattern
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Synthesizing Near-Optimal Malware Specifications from Suspicious
Synthesizing Near-Optimal Malware Specifications from Suspicious Behaviors Somesh Jha∗, Matthew Fredrikson∗, Mihai Christodoresu†, Reiner Sailer‡, Xifeng Yan§ ∗University of Wisconsin–Madison, †Qualcomm Research Silicon Valley, ‡IBM T.J Watson Research Center, §University of California–Santa Barbara Abstract—Behavior-based detection techniques are a promis- and errors. ing solution to the problem of malware proliferation. However, We make the observation that behavioral specifications they require precise specifications of malicious behavior that do not result in an excessive number of false alarms, while still are best viewed as a form of discriminative specification.A remaining general enough to detect new variants before tradi- discriminative specification describes the unique properties tional signatures can be created and distributed. In this paper, of a given class, in contrast to the properties exhibited by we present an automatic technique for extracting optimally discriminative specifications a second mutually-exclusive class. This paper presents an , which uniquely identify a class automated technique that combines program analysis, graph of programs. Such a discriminative specification can be used by a behavior-based malware detector. Our technique, based mining, and stochastic optimization to synthesize malware on graph mining and stochastic optimization, scales to large behavior specifications. We represent program behaviors as classes of programs. When this work was originally published, graphs that are mined for discriminative patterns. As there the technique yielded favorable results on malware targeted are many ways in which malware can accomplish the same towards workstations (~86% detection rates on new malware). goal, we use these patterns as building blocks for construct- We believe that it can be brought to bear on emerging malware- based threats for new platforms, and discuss several promising ing discriminative specifications that are general across vari- avenues for future work in this direction. -
Cyber Warfare a “Nuclear Option”?
CYBER WARFARE A “NUCLEAR OPTION”? ANDREW F. KREPINEVICH CYBER WARFARE: A “NUCLEAR OPTION”? BY ANDREW KREPINEVICH 2012 © 2012 Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. All rights reserved. About the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) is an independent, nonpartisan policy research institute established to promote innovative thinking and debate about national security strategy and investment options. CSBA’s goal is to enable policymakers to make informed decisions on matters of strategy, secu- rity policy and resource allocation. CSBA provides timely, impartial, and insight- ful analyses to senior decision makers in the executive and legislative branches, as well as to the media and the broader national security community. CSBA encour- ages thoughtful participation in the development of national security strategy and policy, and in the allocation of scarce human and capital resources. CSBA’s analysis and outreach focus on key questions related to existing and emerging threats to US national security. Meeting these challenges will require transforming the national security establishment, and we are devoted to helping achieve this end. About the Author Dr. Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr. is the President of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, which he joined following a 21-year career in the U.S. Army. He has served in the Department of Defense’s Office of Net Assessment, on the personal staff of three secretaries of defense, the National Defense Panel, the Defense Science Board Task Force on Joint Experimentation, and the Defense Policy Board. He is the author of 7 Deadly Scenarios: A Military Futurist Explores War in the 21st Century and The Army and Vietnam. -
The Botnet Chronicles a Journey to Infamy
The Botnet Chronicles A Journey to Infamy Trend Micro, Incorporated Rik Ferguson Senior Security Advisor A Trend Micro White Paper I November 2010 The Botnet Chronicles A Journey to Infamy CONTENTS A Prelude to Evolution ....................................................................................................................4 The Botnet Saga Begins .................................................................................................................5 The Birth of Organized Crime .........................................................................................................7 The Security War Rages On ........................................................................................................... 8 Lost in the White Noise................................................................................................................. 10 Where Do We Go from Here? .......................................................................................................... 11 References ...................................................................................................................................... 12 2 WHITE PAPER I THE BOTNET CHRONICLES: A JOURNEY TO INFAMY The Botnet Chronicles A Journey to Infamy The botnet time line below shows a rundown of the botnets discussed in this white paper. Clicking each botnet’s name in blue will bring you to the page where it is described in more detail. To go back to the time line below from each page, click the ~ at the end of the section. 3 WHITE -
Computer Security CS 426 Lecture 15
Computer Security CS 426 Lecture 15 Malwares CS426 Fall 2010/Lecture 15 1 Trapdoor • SttitittSecret entry point into a system – Specific user identifier or password that circumvents normal security procedures. • Commonlyyy used by developers – Could be included in a compiler. CS426 Fall 2010/Lecture 15 2 Logic Bomb • Embedded in legitimate programs • Activated when specified conditions met – E.g., presence/absence of some file; Particular date/time or particular user • When triggered, typically damages system – Modify/delete files/disks CS426 Fall 2010/Lecture 15 3 Examppgle of Logic Bomb • In 1982 , the Trans-Siber ian Pipe line inc iden t occurred. A KGB operative was to steal the plans fhititdtltditfor a sophisticated control system and its software from a Canadian firm, for use on their Siberi an pi peli ne. The CIA was tippe d o ff by documents in the Farewell Dossier and had the company itlibbithinsert a logic bomb in the program for sabotage purposes. This eventually resulted in "the most monu mental non-nu clear ex plosion and fire ever seen from space“. CS426 Fall 2010/Lecture 15 4 Trojan Horse • Program with an overt Example: Attacker: (expected) and covert effect Place the following file cp /bin/sh /tmp/.xxsh – Appears normal/expected chmod u+s,o+x /tmp/.xxsh – Covert effect violates security policy rm ./ls • User tricked into executing ls $* Trojan horse as /homes/victim/ls – Expects (and sees) overt behavior – Covert effect performed with • Victim user’s authorization ls CS426 Fall 2010/Lecture 15 5 Virus • Self-replicating -
Iptrust Botnet / Malware Dictionary This List Shows the Most Common Botnet and Malware Variants Tracked by Iptrust
ipTrust Botnet / Malware Dictionary This list shows the most common botnet and malware variants tracked by ipTrust. This is not intended to be an exhaustive list, since new threat intelligence is always being added into our global Reputation Engine. NAME DESCRIPTION Conficker A/B Conficker A/B is a downloader worm that is used to propagate additional malware. The original malware it was after was rogue AV - but the army's current focus is undefined. At this point it has no other purpose but to spread. Propagation methods include a Microsoft server service vulnerability (MS08-067) - weakly protected network shares - and removable devices like USB keys. Once on a machine, it will attach itself to current processes such as explorer.exe and search for other vulnerable machines across the network. Using a list of passwords and actively searching for legitimate usernames - the ... Mariposa Mariposa was first observed in May 2009 as an emerging botnet. Since then it has infected an ever- growing number of systems; currently, in the millions. Mariposa works by installing itself in a hidden location on the compromised system and injecting code into the critical process ͞ĞdžƉůŽƌĞƌ͘ĞdžĞ͘͟/ƚŝƐknown to affect all modern Windows versions, editing the registry to allow it to automatically start upon login. Additionally, there is a guard that prevents deletion while running, and it automatically restarts upon crash/restart of explorer.exe. In essence, Mariposa opens a backdoor on the compromised computer, which grants full shell access to ... Unknown A botnet is designated 'unknown' when it is first being tracked, or before it is given a publicly- known common name. -
Computer Security Fundamentals Third Edition
Computer Security Fundamentals Third Edition Chuck Easttom 800 East 96th Street, Indianapolis, Indiana 46240 USA Computer Security Fundamentals, Third Edition Executive Editor Brett Bartow Copyright © 2016 by Pearson Education, Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this book shall be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or Acquisitions Editor transmitted by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, Betsy Brown without written permission from the publisher. No patent liability is assumed with respect Development Editor to the use of the information contained herein. Although every precaution has been taken in Christopher Cleveland the preparation of this book, the publisher and author assume no responsibility for errors or omissions. Nor is any liability assumed for damages resulting from the use of the information Managing Editor contained herein. Sandra Schroeder ISBN-13: 978-0-7897-5746-3 ISBN-10: 0-7897-5746-X Senior Project Editor Tonya Simpson Library of Congress control number: 2016940227 Copy Editor Printed in the United States of America Gill Editorial Services First Printing: May 2016 Indexer Brad Herriman Trademarks All terms mentioned in this book that are known to be trademarks or service marks have Proofreader been appropriately capitalized. Pearson IT Certification cannot attest to the accuracy of this Paula Lowell information. Use of a term in this book should not be regarded as affecting the validity of any trademark or service mark. Technical Editor Dr. Louay Karadsheh Warning and Disclaimer Publishing Coordinator Every effort has been made to make this book as complete and as accurate as possible, but Vanessa Evans no warranty or fitness is implied. -
Emerging Threats and Attack Trends
Emerging Threats and Attack Trends Paul Oxman Cisco Security Research and Operations PSIRT_2009 © 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 1 Agenda What? Where? Why? Trends 2008/2009 - Year in Review Case Studies Threats on the Horizon Threat Containment PSIRT_2009 © 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 2 What? Where? Why? PSIRT_2009 © 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 3 What? Where? Why? What is a Threat? A warning sign of possible trouble Where are Threats? Everywhere you can, and more importantly cannot, think of Why are there Threats? The almighty dollar (or euro, etc.), the underground cyber crime industry is growing with each year PSIRT_2009 © 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 4 Examples of Threats Targeted Hacking Vulnerability Exploitation Malware Outbreaks Economic Espionage Intellectual Property Theft or Loss Network Access Abuse Theft of IT Resources PSIRT_2009 © 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 5 Areas of Opportunity Users Applications Network Services Operating Systems PSIRT_2009 © 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 6 Why? Fame Not so much anymore (more on this with Trends) Money The root of all evil… (more on this with the Year in Review) War A battlefront just as real as the air, land, and sea PSIRT_2009 © 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 7 Operational Evolution of Threats Emerging Threat Nuisance Threat Threat Evolution Unresolved Threat Policy and Process Reactive Process Socialized Process Formalized Process Definition Reaction Mitigation Technology Manual Process Human “In the Automated Loop” Response Evolution Burden Operational End-User “Help-Desk” Aware—Know End-User No End-User Increasingly Self- Awareness Knowledge Enough to Call Burden Reliant Support PSIRT_2009 © 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. -
ILOVEYOU” Computer Virus Emphasizes Critical Need for Agency and Governmentwide Improvements
United States General Accounting Office GAO Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Technology, Committee on Science, House of Representatives For Release on Delivery Expected at 10 a.m. INFORMATION Wednesday, May 10, 2000 SECURITY “ILOVEYOU” Computer Virus Emphasizes Critical Need for Agency and Governmentwide Improvements Statement of Keith A. Rhodes Director, Office of Computer and Information Technology Assessment Accounting and Information Management Division GAO/T-AIMD-00-171 Madam Chairwoman and Members of the Subcommittee: Thank you for inviting me to participate in today’s hearing on the “ILOVEYOU” computer virus. About this time last year, I testified before this Subcommittee on the “Melissa” virus, which temporarily disrupted the operations of some agencies by forcing them to shut down their e- mail systems.1 At that hearing, I stressed that the next virus would likely propagate faster, do more damage, and be more difficult to detect and counter. This is just what we have experienced with ILOVEYOU. While it looked a lot like Melissa in its operation, it moved much more swiftly, and it appears to have caused as much, if not more, disruption. Nevertheless, the lessons to be gleaned from both attacks are the same. Federal agencies must implement vigorous security programs to enable them to closely watch their information resources for signs of attack or intrusion and to quickly react to such events when detected. Moreover, the government as a whole must promptly implement long-term solutions that will ensure that agencies focus on security from an organizationwide perspective and implement a comprehensive set of security controls. It must also establish central tracking and reporting mechanisms to facilitate analyses of these and other forms of attacks and their impact. -
IBM X-Force Threat Insight Quarterly 2 X-Force Threat Insight Quarterly IBM Security Solutions
IBM Security Solutions May 2011 IBM X-Force Threat Insight Quarterly 2 X-Force Threat Insight Quarterly IBM Security Solutions Contents About the report 2 About the Report The IBM X-Force® Threat Insight Quarterly is designed to highlight some of the most significant threats and challenges 3 Evolution: From Nuisance to Weapon facing security professionals today. This report is a product of IBM Managed Security Services and the IBM X-Force 8 Prolific and Impacting Issues of Q1 2011 research and development team. Each issue focuses on specific challenges and provides a recap of the most significant recent 16 References online threats. IBM Managed Security Services are designed to help an organization improve its information security, by outsourcing security operations or supplementing your existing security teams. The IBM protection on-demand platform helps deliver Managed Security Services and the expertise, knowledge and infrastructure an organization needs to secure its information assets from Internet attacks. The X-Force team provides the foundation for a preemptive approach to Internet security. The X-Force team is one of the best-known commercial security research groups in the world. This group of security experts researches and evaluates vulnerabilities and security issues, develops assessment and countermeasure technology for IBM security products, and educates the public about emerging Internet threats. We welcome your feedback. Questions or comments regarding the content of this report should be addressed to [email protected]. 3 X-Force Threat Insight Quarterly IBM Security Solutions Evolution: From Nuisance to Weapon One of the more notable examples here is Brain3, a boot sector infector which originated in Pakistan and released in 1986, was Creeper, Wabbit, Animal, Elk Cloner, Brain, Vienna, Lehigh, one of the first examples of malware that infected PC’s running Stoned, Jerusalem. -
Computer Viruses and Malware Advances in Information Security
Computer Viruses and Malware Advances in Information Security Sushil Jajodia Consulting Editor Center for Secure Information Systems George Mason University Fairfax, VA 22030-4444 email: [email protected] The goals of the Springer International Series on ADVANCES IN INFORMATION SECURITY are, one, to establish the state of the art of, and set the course for future research in information security and, two, to serve as a central reference source for advanced and timely topics in information security research and development. The scope of this series includes all aspects of computer and network security and related areas such as fault tolerance and software assurance. ADVANCES IN INFORMATION SECURITY aims to publish thorough and cohesive overviews of specific topics in information security, as well as works that are larger in scope or that contain more detailed background information than can be accommodated in shorter survey articles. The series also serves as a forum for topics that may not have reached a level of maturity to warrant a comprehensive textbook treatment. Researchers, as well as developers, are encouraged to contact Professor Sushil Jajodia with ideas for books under this series. Additional tities in the series: HOP INTEGRITY IN THE INTERNET by Chin-Tser Huang and Mohamed G. Gouda; ISBN-10: 0-387-22426-3 PRIVACY PRESERVING DATA MINING by Jaideep Vaidya, Chris Clifton and Michael Zhu; ISBN-10: 0-387- 25886-8 BIOMETRIC USER AUTHENTICATION FOR IT SECURITY: From Fundamentals to Handwriting by Claus Vielhauer; ISBN-10: 0-387-26194-X IMPACTS AND RISK ASSESSMENT OF TECHNOLOGY FOR INTERNET SECURITY.'Enabled Information Small-Medium Enterprises (TEISMES) by Charles A. -
T-AIMD-00-171 Information Security: 'ILOVEYOU'
United States General Accounting Office GAO Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Technology, Committee on Science, House of Representatives For Release on Delivery Expected at 10 a.m. INFORMATION Wednesday, May 10, 2000 SECURITY “ILOVEYOU” Computer Virus Emphasizes Critical Need for Agency and Governmentwide Improvements Statement of Keith A. Rhodes Director, Office of Computer and Information Technology Assessment Accounting and Information Management Division GAO/T-AIMD-00-171 Madam Chairwoman and Members of the Subcommittee: Thank you for inviting me to participate in today’s hearing on the “ILOVEYOU” computer virus. About this time last year, I testified before this Subcommittee on the “Melissa” virus, which temporarily disrupted the operations of some agencies by forcing them to shut down their e- mail systems.1 At that hearing, I stressed that the next virus would likely propagate faster, do more damage, and be more difficult to detect and counter. This is just what we have experienced with ILOVEYOU. While it looked a lot like Melissa in its operation, it moved much more swiftly, and it appears to have caused as much, if not more, disruption. Nevertheless, the lessons to be gleaned from both attacks are the same. Federal agencies must implement vigorous security programs to enable them to closely watch their information resources for signs of attack or intrusion and to quickly react to such events when detected. Moreover, the government as a whole must promptly implement long-term solutions that will ensure that agencies focus on security from an organizationwide perspective and implement a comprehensive set of security controls. It must also establish central tracking and reporting mechanisms to facilitate analyses of these and other forms of attacks and their impact. -
Executive Summary a High-Performance Preventive Security System Protects Your Network from Infections
A Multi-Layered Approach W H I T E P A P ER to Preventing Viruses Executive Summary A high-performance preventive security system protects your network from infections. As virus writers create increasingly sophisticated malicious code and find TABLE OF CONTENTS ever more effective methods to propagate, enterprises find themselves 1 Executive Summary scrambling to keep their networks, servers, and end-user computers safe from new threats. 2 Emerging Anti-Virus Strategies 3 A Comprehensive Approach Traditional anti-virus applications work by searching the contents of files Global Traffic Data 3 and looking for a recognized pattern of data (a “signature”) that is the virus Threat Operations Center 4 Dynamic Quarantining 4 program itself. However, virus writers have come up with various methods The Essence of Time 5 to escape detection by changing their programs, making it harder for virus 6 IronPort Systems Email Security scanners to recognize them as viruses. Today’s viruses are either polymor- Solutions phic or metamorphic and can actually change themselves as they propagate. 7 Appendix: The Sober Virus/ The increasing sophistication of malicious code is therefore making pattern Worm/Trojan recognition technologies less and less effective. This decline in effective virus defense is taking a toll on businesses. The often long delay between the time when a virus attack is launched and when a signature is available can result in hundreds of thousands of infected mes- sages being delivered to enterprise networks and communities of ISP users. Even when the end effects of the virus are minimal, such widespread infec- tion results in major costs.