Copyright hy Sudershan Chawla 1959 INDIA, RUSSIA, AND CHINA, 1947-1955: AN INTERPRETATION OP THE INDIAN CONCEPT OF NATIONAL INTEREST DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By SUDERSHAN CHAWLA, B.SC., M.A. The Ohio State University 1959 Approved "by \ AdXrT^er (y Department of Political Science INDIA, RUSSIA, AND CHINA, 19k7-1955'- AN INTERPRETATION OF THE INDIAN CONCEPT OF NATIONAL INTEREST ii ACKNOWLEDGMENT S This study was made under the supervision of Dr. Louis Nemzer, Associate Professor of Political Science, The Ohio State University. The writer is extremely grateful for the critical and constructive advice and assistance of the members of the Supervisory Committee at The Ohio State University and of his friends at the Indian Council of World Affairs, Hew Delhi, India. Special thanks and appreciation should go to the following per­ sons : Dr. Louis Nemzer Associate Professor of Political Science The Ohio State University Dr. Kazuo Kawai Associate Professor of Political Science The Ohio State University Dr. E. Allen Helms Professor of Political Science The Ohio State University Dr. J. C. Kundra Indian Council of World Affairs Hew Delhi, India The writer would also like to acknowledge a debt of grati­ tude to Mr. Chunilal Sharma of the All India Congress Committee's press department, without whose help much of the materials on the Indian press might not have been secured. Special thanks are due to Mr. Sisir Gupta of the Indian Council of World Affairs, who was not only instrumental in pro­ curing some of the important documents for the writer but whose advice in search of source-materials proved invaluable. The writer owes the greatest debt of gratitude to his wife, and the families on both sides, for without their continuous moral, support and encouragement this task would never have been completed. CONTENTS CHAPTER PAGE I. A STATEMENT OF THE P R O B L E M .................... 1 II. INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY AIMS AND "NATIONAL INTEREST" ..................... 6 Pea.ce and Non-Involvement in a Major War. 7 Opposition to Colonialism and Racialism . 25 Securing India's Interests in Kashmir and G o a ........................... 30 III. INDIA'S NATIONAL INTEREST AND HER ROLE IN A S I A ................................. 42 IV. INDIAN NATIONAL INTEREST AND COMMUNISM........ 59 Nehru and Communism....................... 59 The Indian National Congress and Communism............................. 64 The Communist Party of I n d i a .............. 72 V. INDO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS AND INDIA' S NATIONAL INTEREST ........................... 89 General Relations Prior to Indian Independence ....................... 89 General Relations 1947-1953 ............... 97 General Relations 1953-1955 ............... 115 VI. KOREA IN INDO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS .............. 139 VII. COLONIALISM AND RACIALISM IN INDO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS....................... 152 VIII. KASHMIR AND GOA IN INDO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS ................................... 164 v CONTENTS (Continued) CHAPTER PAGE IX. INDO-CHINESE RELATIONS AND INDIA*S NATIONAL INTEREST............................. 177 Contacts Prior to 19^+9..................... L77 India and the Question of Recognizing New C h i n a . ................................. 181 India and China 19^9-1955 190 X. KOREA IN INDO-CHINESE RELATIONS................ 205 XI. TIBET IN INDO-CHINESE RELATIONS................ 236 XII. CONCLUSIONS.................................... 26? BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................ 273 National interest’, as a pivot of diplomacy, is now almost universally employed in international relations. Indeed, it may "be said that national interest— its maintenance, advancement, and defense by the various means and instru­ mentalities of political power— is the prime consideration of diplomacy. CHAPTER I A STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM When India emerged as an independent nation after 19^7. Ner leaders were immediately faced with many serious problems, and one of these problems was the formulation of a suitable foreign policy for the new country. It was a difficult task because India was not only an infant nation compared to the other powers of the world, but it was a country which lacked the many essential ingredients that enable a nation to wield a positive and forceful foreign policy. While her armed forces were modernized as compared to the armed forces of most Asian or African countries, India was, militarily speaking, a very weak nation. Moreover, in so far as her economy was concerned, India was mainly dependent upon outside sources to sustain her living standard, poor as that was. India's partition into two separate ■^Charles A. Beard, The Idea of National Interest (New York! The Macmillan Company, 193^), p. 21. - 1 - nations on the eve of independence had also created a turmoil within the country which made national cohesion completely absent from the scene; in fact to create national unity became the most pressing immediate task. While these factors could hardly be ignored by the Indian foreign-policy makers, the world outside was in the grip of the cold war. The Western nations sought to encourage all non-Communist countries to join in an anti-Communist alliance to escape Soviet domination. Soviet Russia made it known that any country having close ties with the West would be considered an unfriendly country. Here was India, weak and hungry, dependent upon the West for her economic life, yet antagonistic toward the West due to the past colonial relationship; democratic and anti-Communist in her outlook, yet warm toward the anti-colonial and anti-imperialistic past of Soviet Russia, and she had no record of conflict with Russia in the past. How was India to act— especially when she took into account the fact that Soviet Russia and China were countries on her borders, countries with far more powerful military machines than India1s? India's leaders were also faced with other questions. Were they to pursue policies with India's immediate needs in mind, or were they to give priority to the future setting and create a strong foundation so that India could find her rightful place in the family of nations? While solving the immediate economic crisis, could they ignore the fact that for a lasting solution of India's economic ailments it was necessary to build a strong industrial base at home? While dealing with the cold war dilemma, could they fail to see that India's future was far more closely tied with Asian countries surrounding India than any other part of the world? And if that was true, did they not have to allow for the fact that China with her vast population and vast resources would always remain a part of the Asian picture? It was in this context that the leaders of India faced the problem of dealing with Russia and China over the crucial years of 1 9 4 7 -1 9 5 5 . What were the guiding principles of India's policies toward these countries? Indeed, where shall we look to find these principles? Some Indian scholars have maintained that the motivations and concepts which lie behind Indian foreign policy can be found only in India's heritage from her past, in the moralist outlook which can only be understood against this background. One author puts it thus I In consonance with the traditions of this ancient people, who never coveted the possessions of their neighbours nor cherished feelings save of friendship and goodwill for all, Nehru announced that India would embark on her foreign relations with goodwill for every country and malice towards none.^ Many Western students of India have apparently decided that in the complex network of factors determining Indian foreign policy, the most important are to be found in the unpredictable whims and ^B. S. N. Murti, Nehru's Foreign Policy (New Delhi: Beacon Information and Publications, 1953)> P- 8 . fancies of India's Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru. An American writer has stated it as follows! To conclude: the principal source of Indian thinking on the subject of foreign affairs is neither Hinduism, Buddhism, Gandhianism, the Western European tradition, nor a rational analysis of reality in terms of India's long-range national interest, but the complex biography of the Prime Minister.3 Nehru himself, speaking at Columbia University in October 1949, said about India that "inevitably she had to consider her foreign policy in terms of enlightened self-interest."^ Unfortun­ ately, however, he has not gone beyond the familiar phrase, either to explain his interpretation or to apply it to -the great problems and choices which exist before the Indian Government. One interpretation of the phrase has been given by Hans Morgenthau, who believes that "the national interest of a peace- loving nation can only be defined in terms of national security, and national security must be defined as integrity of the national territory and its°'xnstitutions.,,5 According to another interpreta­ tion: "Towering above all other interests is that of national 3Adda B. Bozeman, "India's Foreign Policy Today," World Politics. Vol. 10, No. 2, January 1958» P* 273- ^Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches 1949-1953 (Delhi: Government of India Publications Division, 1954), p* 398. 5Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1958) , p. 528 . defense. By general consent this is the supreme consideration of every government."6 In this study, we shall seek to understand how the Indian leaders have conceived "enlightened self-interest11 for their new nation, especially as this concept is revealed in India's relation­ ships with Soviet Russia and Communist China from 19^7 to 1955* If they take Morganthau's or Beard's approach, it still remains to be seen how the Indian foreign-policy makers, especially Nehru, visual­ ize the process of protecting India's security, protecting her national territory and her institutions, providing for national defense, and obtaining for India her rightful place in the world. We shall search for the Indian meaning and interpretation in many places, especially in the national policy-makers' discussion of India's aims and objectives.