Islamophobia Monitoring Month: March 2021
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KEY QUESTIONS the Big Six
The Netherlands Donor Profile KEY QUESTIONS the big six Who are the main actors in the Netherlands' development cooperation? Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Coop- advocating for shorter public versions of these strategies eration leads on strategy; embassies administer bi- to be openly available, when finalized. lateral ODA The role of Parliament is to scrutinize development poli- Prime Minister Mark Rutte (People’s Party for Freedom cy and budget allocations. Parliament can annually and Democracy, VVD), currently in his third term of of- amend the government’s draft budget bill. Parliamenta- fice, has led a coalition government with the social-liber- ry debates in November/December can lead to significant al Democrats 66 (D66), the Christian Democratic Appeal changes to the ODA budget. (CDA), and the Christian Union (CU) since 2017. The Min- istry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) defines priorities for Dutch Dutch civil society organizations (CSOs) play an active development policy, currently under the leadership of role in Dutch development cooperation. The develop- Stef Blok (VVD). Minister for Foreign Trade and Develop- ment CSO umbrella association, Partos, represents over ment Cooperation (MFTDC) Sigrid Kaag (D66) leads the 100 organizations. They engage with the Parliament and MFA’s work on development cooperation. Within the the MFA to influence policy and funding decisions. Many MFA, the Directorate-General for International Coopera- CSOs implement their own programs in developing coun- tion (DGIS) is responsible for designing and coordinating tries and are funded by the Dutch government and the implementation of development policy. through private donations. In 2015, program funding for CSOs was sharply cut, and since then, a larger focus has Unlike many other donors, the Netherlands does not been placed on strategic partnerships and advocacy. -
Broadcast Bulletin Issue Number 59
* Ofcom broadcast bulletin Issue number 59 2 May 2006 Ofcom broadcast bulletin 59 2 May 2006 Contents Introduction 3 Standards cases In Breach 4 Resolved 8 Not in Breach 13 Fairness and Privacy cases Upheld in Part 16 Other programmes not in breach/outside remit 33 2 Ofcom broadcast bulletin 59 2 May 2006 Introduction Ofcom’s Broadcasting Code took effect on 25 July 2005 (with the exception of Rule 10.17 which came into effect on 1 July 2005). This Code is used to assess the compliance of all programmes broadcast on or after 25 July 2005. The Broadcasting Code can be found at http://www.ofcom.org.uk/tv/ifi/codes/bcode/ The Rules on the Amount and Distribution of Advertising (RADA) apply to advertising issues within Ofcom’s remit from 25 July 2005. The Rules can be found at http://www.ofcom.org.uk/tv/ifi/codes/advertising/#content The Communications Act 2003 allowed for the codes of the legacy regulators to remain in force until such time as Ofcom developed its own Code. While Ofcom has now published its Broadcasting Code, the following legacy Codes apply to content broadcast before 25 July 2005. • Advertising and Sponsorship Code (Radio Authority) • News & Current Affairs Code and Programme Code (Radio Authority) • Code on Standards (Broadcasting Standards Commission) • Code on Fairness and Privacy (Broadcasting Standards Commission) • Programme Code (Independent Television Commission) • Programme Sponsorship Code (Independent Television Commission) • Rules on the Amount and Distribution of Advertising From time to time adjudications relating to advertising content may appear in the bulletin in relation to areas of advertising regulation which remain with Ofcom (including the application of statutory sanctions by Ofcom). -
Islamophobia Monitoring Month: December 2020
ORGANIZATION OF ISLAMIC COOPERATION Political Affairs Department Islamophobia Observatory Islamophobia Monitoring Month: December 2020 OIC Islamophobia Observatory Issue: December 2020 Islamophobia Status (DEC 20) Manifestation Positive Developments 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 Asia Australia Europe International North America Organizations Manifestations Per Type/Continent (DEC 20) 9 8 7 Count of Discrimination 6 Count of Verbal & Physical Assault 5 Count of Hate Speech Count of Online Hate 4 Count of Hijab Incidents 3 Count of Mosque Incidents 2 Count of Policy Related 1 0 Asia Australia Europe North America 1 MANIFESTATION (DEC 20) Count of Discrimination 20% Count of Policy Related 44% Count of Verbal & Physical Assault 10% Count of Hate Speech 3% Count of Online Hate Count of Mosque Count of Hijab 7% Incidents Incidents 13% 3% Count of Positive Development on Count of Positive POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT Inter-Faiths Development on (DEC 20) 6% Hijab 3% Count of Public Policy 27% Count of Counter- balances on Far- Rights 27% Count of Police Arrests 10% Count of Positive Count of Court Views on Islam Decisions and Trials 10% 17% 2 MANIFESTATIONS OF ISLAMOPHOBIA NORTH AMERICA IsP140001-USA: New FBI Hate Crimes Report Spurs U.S. Muslims, Jews to Press for NO HATE Act Passage — On November 16, the USA’s Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), released its annual report on hate crime statistics for 2019. According to the Muslim-Jewish Advisory Council (MJAC), the report grossly underestimated the number of hate crimes, as participation by local law enforcement agencies in the FBI's hate crime data collection system was not mandatory. -
AP-February-2021
FEBRUARY ISSUE 2021 Puradsi Media. Phoenix - the Next Generation © All Rights Reserved Puradsi Media – Phoenix the Next Generation 1 a FEBRUARY ISSUE 2021 Puradsi Media. Phoenix - the Next Generation P2P - A Rebirth: Perception and consequences from AP Journalists’ point of view A combined editorial piece by key members of our Akkinip Paravaikal team to cross-examine the effects upon the Tamils’ struggle for liberation. Proceed to page 03 for more. “Today we are faced with a critical and complex situation, unprecedented in the history of our liberation struggle. We are living in a political void, without war, without a stable peace, without the conditions of normalcy, without an interim or permanent solution to the ethnic conflict. Our liberation struggle will be seriously undermined if this political vacuum continues indefinitely.” (2004) National Leader of Tamil Eelam © All Rights Reserved Puradsi Media – Phoenix the Next Generation 2 a FEBRUARY ISSUE 2021 Puradsi Media. Phoenix - the Next Generation P2P - A Rebirth: Perception and consequences from AP Journalists’ point of view Akkinip Paravaikal Editors’ note: All opinions presented are those of the AP team members. Resistance has become an undeniable component of the Eelam Tamils’ livelihood for decades. However, moments of mass uprising have periodically emerged in reinvigorating their collective psyche. In that regard, ‘Pottuvil to Polikandy’ or ‘P2P’ emerged as a march conducted by Tamils between the 2 furthermost points of the occupied Tamil homeland between 03.02.2021 - 07.02.2021, thus rejecting the SL state and asserting Tamil sovereignty through physically portraying the continuity of the Eelam Tamils’ territorial integrity. Through demanding issues pertaining to Tamils’ grievances, the campaign gained momentum on an unprecedented scale. -
ESS9 Appendix A3 Political Parties Ed
APPENDIX A3 POLITICAL PARTIES, ESS9 - 2018 ed. 3.0 Austria 2 Belgium 4 Bulgaria 7 Croatia 8 Cyprus 10 Czechia 12 Denmark 14 Estonia 15 Finland 17 France 19 Germany 20 Hungary 21 Iceland 23 Ireland 25 Italy 26 Latvia 28 Lithuania 31 Montenegro 34 Netherlands 36 Norway 38 Poland 40 Portugal 44 Serbia 47 Slovakia 52 Slovenia 53 Spain 54 Sweden 57 Switzerland 58 United Kingdom 61 Version Notes, ESS9 Appendix A3 POLITICAL PARTIES ESS9 edition 3.0 (published 10.12.20): Changes from previous edition: Additional countries: Denmark, Iceland. ESS9 edition 2.0 (published 15.06.20): Changes from previous edition: Additional countries: Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Montenegro, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden. Austria 1. Political parties Language used in data file: German Year of last election: 2017 Official party names, English 1. Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs (SPÖ) - Social Democratic Party of Austria - 26.9 % names/translation, and size in last 2. Österreichische Volkspartei (ÖVP) - Austrian People's Party - 31.5 % election: 3. Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ) - Freedom Party of Austria - 26.0 % 4. Liste Peter Pilz (PILZ) - PILZ - 4.4 % 5. Die Grünen – Die Grüne Alternative (Grüne) - The Greens – The Green Alternative - 3.8 % 6. Kommunistische Partei Österreichs (KPÖ) - Communist Party of Austria - 0.8 % 7. NEOS – Das Neue Österreich und Liberales Forum (NEOS) - NEOS – The New Austria and Liberal Forum - 5.3 % 8. G!LT - Verein zur Förderung der Offenen Demokratie (GILT) - My Vote Counts! - 1.0 % Description of political parties listed 1. The Social Democratic Party (Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs, or SPÖ) is a social above democratic/center-left political party that was founded in 1888 as the Social Democratic Worker's Party (Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei, or SDAP), when Victor Adler managed to unite the various opposing factions. -
Professionalization of Green Parties?
Professionalization of Green parties? Analyzing and explaining changes in the external political approach of the Dutch political party GroenLinks Lotte Melenhorst (0712019) Supervisor: Dr. A. S. Zaslove 5 September 2012 Abstract There is a relatively small body of research regarding the ideological and organizational changes of Green parties. What has been lacking so far is an analysis of the way Green parties present them- selves to the outside world, which is especially interesting because it can be expected to strongly influence the image of these parties. The project shows that the Dutch Green party ‘GroenLinks’ has become more professional regarding their ‘external political approach’ – regarding ideological, or- ganizational as well as strategic presentation – during their 20 years of existence. This research pro- ject challenges the core idea of the so-called ‘threshold-approach’, that major organizational changes appear when a party is getting into government. What turns out to be at least as interesting is the ‘anticipatory’ adaptations parties go through once they have formulated government participation as an important party goal. Until now, scholars have felt that Green parties are transforming, but they have not been able to point at the core of the changes that have taken place. Organizational and ideological changes have been investigated separately, whereas in the case of Green parties organi- zation and ideology are closely interrelated. In this thesis it is argued that the external political ap- proach of GroenLinks, which used to be a typical New Left Green party but that lacks governmental experience, has become more professional, due to initiatives of various within-party actors who of- ten responded to developments outside the party. -
Equivocal Euroscepticism: How Some Radical Right Parties Play Between ‘Reform’ and ‘Rejection’ Lines
Equivocal Euroscepticism: How some radical right parties play between ‘reform’ and ‘rejection’ lines Reinhard Heinisch, Duncan McDonnell and Annika Werner University of Salzburg and Griffith University, Brisbane Paper prepared for the EUSA Conference, Miami 4-6 May 2017 FIRST DRAFT – PLEASE DO NOT CITE WITHOUT PERMISSION While the main Western European radical right parties have all espoused Eurosceptic positions since the turn of the twenty-first century, their Euroscepticism has come in varying degrees of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ opposition at different moments in time (Taggart and Sczcerbiak 2008). As Mudde (2007) noted in the middle of the 2000-2010 decade, few radical right parties were openly ‘Eurorejectionist’ and advocated that their countries should leave the EU. Instead, as he put it, ‘the majority of populist radical right parties believe in the basic tenets of European integration, but are sceptical about the current direction of the EU’ (Mudde 2007, 164). Although highly critical of Brussels bureaucracy and the idea of ‘ever greater Union’, these parties were largely what we could call ‘Euro-reformist’ rather than ‘Euro-rejectionist’. This has changed however over the past decade. Most notably, if we take the principal radical right party group in the European Parliament, Europe of Nations and Freedom (ENF), we find that two members – the French National Front (FN) and the Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV) – now present an unequivocal ‘rejection’ stance and call for their countries to withdraw from the EU. At the same time, the FN and PVV’s three main partners, the Flemish Vlaams Belang (VB), the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) and the Italian Northern League (LN) have never explicitly advocated withdrawal. -
Information Guide Euroscepticism
Information Guide Euroscepticism A guide to information sources on Euroscepticism, with hyperlinks to further sources of information within European Sources Online and on external websites Contents Introduction .................................................................................................. 2 Brief Historical Overview................................................................................. 2 Euro Crisis 2008 ............................................................................................ 3 European Elections 2014 ................................................................................ 5 Euroscepticism in Europe ................................................................................ 8 Eurosceptic organisations ......................................................................... 10 Eurosceptic thinktanks ............................................................................. 10 Transnational Eurosceptic parties and political groups .................................. 11 Eurocritical media ................................................................................... 12 EU Reaction ................................................................................................. 13 Information sources in the ESO database ........................................................ 14 Further information sources on the internet ..................................................... 14 Copyright © 2016 Cardiff EDC. All rights reserved. 1 Cardiff EDC is part of the University Library -
NIGEL FARAGE Long Serving UKIP Leader and Brexit Campaigner
NIGEL FARAGE Long serving UKIP Leader and Brexit Campaigner Nigel Farage adalah pendiri dan pemimpin lama Partai Kemerdekaan Inggris (UKIP). Dia adalah wajah dari kampanye yang sukses untuk membawa Inggris keluar dari Uni Eropa dalam referendum Brexit 2016, memposisikan referendum sebagai awal dari gelombang populis global melawan pendirian politik. Farage telah menjadi Anggota Parlemen Eropa untuk Inggris Tenggara sejak 1999 dan menjadi ketua bersama Kelompok Kebebasan dan Demokrasi Langsung Eropa. Dia terkenal karena pidato-pidatonya yang terkadang kontroversial di Parlemen Eropa dan kritiknya yang kuat terhadap mata uang euro. Dia melakukan 7 upaya untuk menjadi Anggota Parlemen Inggris tetapi tidak pernah terpilih. Dalam Topics Pemilihan Umum pertamanya pada tahun 1995 ia menerima 1,5% suara, dalam upayanya yang terbaru dalam Pemilu 2015, ia menerima 32,4% suara. Brexit Europe Pada bulan September 2016, Farage mengundurkan diri sebagai pemimpin UKIP Government setelah 15 tahun. Menulis di The Spectator, jurnalis Rod Liddle menggambarkan Leadership Farage sebagai 'politisi Inggris paling penting dalam dekade terakhir dan paling sukses'. Farage telah menjadi "pengganggu" besar politik Inggris dan Eropa dan Motivation secara luas dikonsultasikan untuk pandangannya tentang perubahan sifat politik Politics barat. Dia terpilih untuk Person of the Year 2016 TIME Magazine, tetapi dikalahkan oleh Donald Trump. Dia memenangkan Lifetime Achievement Award di Spectator's Awards Awards 2016. Dia telah membentuk hubungan pribadi yang dekat dengan Presiden Trump setelah berbicara di rapat umum pemilihannya di Mississippi. Dia berada di peringkat kedua dalam jajak pendapat sayap kanan The Daily Telegraph Top 100 paling berpengaruh pada 2013, di belakang Perdana Menteri David Cameron, ia juga dinobatkan sebagai "Orang Inggris Tahun Ini" oleh The Times pada 2014. -
What Does a Satellite Campaign Do? the Use of Momentum in Labour’S 2017 General Election Facebook Campaign
What does a satellite campaign do? The use of Momentum in Labour’s 2017 General Election Facebook campaign Tristan Hothama aDepartment of Politics, Languages and International Studies, University of Bath, Bath, United Kingdom Correspondence address - Mr. Tristan Hotham, Department of Politics, Languages and International Studies, University of Bath, Claverton Down, Bath, Somerset, BA2 7AY Tristan Hotham is a PhD candidate at the University of Bath. ***Working Paper*** Word Count: 15919 What does a satellite campaign do? The use of Momentum in Labour’s 2017 General Election Facebook campaign Abstract Satellite campaigns have been discussed as core parts of parties online campaigns. However, study is needed to understand the specifics of what satellite campaigns are, where they fit and how they are used as part of parties’ social media election campaigns. This article comparatively examines Facebook pages across the 2017 general election; Momentum, Labour Party page and Labour leader page information and participation content is comparatively investigated to understand what sets satellite campaigning apart. Findings show that Labour had generated a Facebook approach termed ‘Janus-faced campaigning’. Labour was using leader, party and satellite pages with diverse approaches to speak to different audiences, thus presenting different faces of the same party to the public. The party engaged in two core forms of approach. The 'traditional Facebook campaign' via the leader and party page, saw the party using core policy messages, open inclusive rhetoric and a focus on information over participation to campaign to the mass public. This approach was supported by what is termed the 'new methods Facebook campaign'. Here, satellite page Momentum focused equally on participation and information, using novel, partisan and divisive content, large amounts of leadership personalisation and humour, to activate a younger more partisan audience and get them campaigning online and offline. -
Centre for Media Monitoring (Cfmm) Was Set up in 2018 by the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB)
Promoting Fair And Responsible Reporting Of Muslims And Islam Submission to the IMPRESS Standards Code Review Call for Evidence March 2021 The Centre for Media Monitoring (CfMM) was set up in 2018 by the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB). Our aims are to: . Create an evidence base on how Islam and Muslims are reported in national print and broadcast media. Develop insights on potential areas of improvement through evidence-based analyses, reports, and guidelines. Advocate change through constructive engagement with key stakeholders. Empower Muslim communities to proactively engage with the media and help change the narrative. CfMM monitors and analyses thousands of articles and broadcast clips daily. Our monitoring methodology has been developed and approved by leading academics and experts in the field of corpus linguistics. CfMM is recognised as an authority in this field and a valuable resource by all stakeholders, including the media, regulators, politicians, and community organisations. CfMM works closely with editors and journalists from the national print and broadcast media to highlight inaccuracies, generalisations and misrepresentations of Muslims and Islam in the media as well as promote good practice and increase Religious Literacy. We hold roundtable discussions and ‘Meet the Media’ events between media executives and community organisations. We deliver media skills training, publish evidenced-based reports, sit on advisory boards, and make submissions to inquiries and consultations such as OFCOM’s Thematic Review of Representation and Portrayal on the BBC, the BBC’s Editorial Guidelines Consultation, the Editor’s Code Review, and the Lords Select Committee Inquiry on the Future of Journalism. CfMM was also part of IPSO’s working committee, inputting into developing guidelines for journalists on the reporting of Islam and Muslims. -
Jamie Stern-Weiner Tis Ebook Edition Published by Verso 2019
anti-semitism and the labour party Anti-Semitism and the Labour Party Edited by Jamie Stern-Weiner Tis ebook edition published by Verso 2019 All rights reserved Te moral rights of the authors have been asserted Verso UK: 6 Meard St, London, W1F 0EG US: 20 Jay St, Suite 1010, Brooklyn, NY 11201 versobooks.com Verso is the imprint of New Lef Books ISBN-13: 978-1-78960-671-3 ‘Corbyn Under Fire’ and ‘Te Never Ending Story’, © Daniel Finn 2018, frst appeared in Jacobin. ‘Jeremy Corbyn is an Anti-Racist, Not an Anti-Semite’ © Jospehn Finlay, 2019, frst appeared in Times of Israel. 'Smoke Without Fire: Te Myth of the 'Labour Antisemitism Crisis’ © Jamie Stern-Weiner and Alan Maddison, 2019. ‘Te Chimera of British Anti-Semitism (and How Not to Fight It if it Were Real)’, frst appeared on Verso Blog © Norman Finkelstein, 2019; ’60 Times Jeremy Corbyn Stood with Jewish People’ © @ToryFibs; ‘Briefng for Canvassers: Challenging false allegations of antisemitism’ and ‘Te Riverside Scandal’ with permission from Jewish Voice for Labour; ‘A Disinformation Campaign’ © Media Reform Coalition, 2019; ‘Te Fake News Nazi: Corbyn, Williamson and the Anti-Semitism Scandal’ from Medians © David Edwards, 2019; ‘Is the Guardian Institutionally Antisemitic?’ and ‘Labour Party Conference or Nuremberg Rally? Assessing the Evidence’ from author’s blog, © Jamie Stern-Weiner 2019; ‘Hue and Cry over the UCU’ © Richard Kuper 2019; with permission of OpenDemocracy; ‘Why the Labour Party Should Not Adopt the IHRA Defnition or Any Other Defnition of Antisemitism’ from author’s