cabar.asia: Will there be a new era in Tajik-Uzbek relations? What issues exist between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan? Which of them are real, slightly exaggerated, or overtly fictitious? Whether the two similarly minded leaders can or are even willing to resolve problems between the two nations is discussed in this special cabar.asia article. Since late last year, in Central Asia there has been a trend towards a marked improvement in relations between states, in part due to events in Uzbekistan. In an effort to garner the support of the masses before the presidential election, then acting President Shavkat Mirziyaev demonstrated the desire to considerably soften the country’s stance towards its neighbors, especially with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The Uzbekistani representative delegation visited the neighboring republics, and, for the first time in many years, fairly willing parties had the opportunity to discuss pressing problems such as disputed borders and the visa regime. After officially assuming the presidency, Shavkat Mirziyaev slowed the pace of Uzbekistan’s thaw. Nevertheless, the change in leadership is taking the second most closed country in the region (after neutral Turkmenistan) away from personal competition with Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, which was a hallmark of the previous president. This makes it possible to begin the process of rapprochement for these regional states without moderation from external entities. What do we have? Objectively speaking, the intractable problems between Tashkent and Dushanbe are greater than constructive factors. The conflicts between the states really do exist. However, along with the real issues inherent in Tajik-Uzbek relations is the characteristic presence of myths. These are actively ascribed to Central Asia by outside players and are designed under the notion of “divide and rule”, which has gradually but firmly taken root. As a consequence, the almost mythical problem of competition for leadership of the region became real. According to Tajik expert Parviz Mullojanov, “the basic and long-term problem of Tajik-Uzbek relations is essentially as follows: whether Dushanbe will accept Tashkent’s claims to leadership and dominance in bilateral relations”.[1] But, in fact, this problem of competition for leadership is largely far-fetched and is associated with the subjective factor. Simply it is the personal desire of the country’s leaders to not yield to their neighbor. Today the situation is changing, and the new leader of Uzbekistan does not have a ideological goal to restrain Tajikistan by any means necessary. Prominent Uzbek analyst Rafael Sattorov noted in an interview with the author that, “Shavkat Mirziyaev is different from Islam Karimov in that he does not place maximalist objectives in the international cabar.asia: Will there be a new era in Tajik-Uzbek relations? arena such as zero-sum games”. Moreover, the Foreign Ministry of Uzbekistan recently outlined the neighboring Central Asian republics as a foreign policy top priority. Therefore, the problem of classifying Uzbekistan’s relations with its neighbor as an “ideological struggle” seems to gradually come to naught. Countries’ positions on hydropower Built in Soviet times, the unified energy system (UESCA) involved close cooperation between the region’s countries. From 1st December 2009, Tashkent, rightly referring to its ineffectiveness, pulled out of the “electricity ring”, thus destroying the system providing power to four countries in the region, as Turkmenistan had left earlier in 2003. Some countries have managed to establish and build a new system providing power to their cities. Uzbekistan is not among them. They have not managed to achieve 100% annual electrical coverage for their citizens. The same goes for Tajikistan. Tajik leaders saw the solution in the construction of a giant hydroelectric power station, Rogun. Today, after much debate and discussion, Tajikistan is actually beginning construction of the hydroelectric power station designed during the Soviet era, which according to plans was to provide the necessary amount of energy for Tajikistan, as well as for exporting energy abroad. However, Tajik-Uzbek parties have not reached an agreement concerning water use. Tashkent believes that construction of the giant hydropower plant in Tajikistan needs further elaboration in terms of their security. At the expert level, specialists are stressing the inadvisability of constructing Rogun. Sattorov notes that, “There are three mythical Central Asia projects: TAPI, CASA1000, and Rogun. Unfortunately, the Tajik authorities consider Rogun not only as an infrastructure project but as a political tool as well. Uzbekistan’s main message is that upstream countries should take into account downstream ones and that large building projects designed during the Soviet era should be reviewed. Uzbekistan is offering to move away from megalomania and switch to the construction of small and medium hydropower plants, which meet the needs of their neighbors”. However, Dushanbe claims that the construction of the hydropower plant will not affect the quantity and quality of water of transboundary rivers. In the long-term dispute between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, one thing is clear. The construction of Rogun is turning into a question of national prestige, and the Uzbek and cabar.asia: Will there be a new era in Tajik-Uzbek relations? Tajik sides have painted themselves into a corner. This is despite the fact that international experts have noted that the construction of the Rogun hydroelectric power station, with the adjustment of its scope, would effectively restore a mini version of the UESCA. To do this, analysts have offered ready-made plans. Moreover, most experts believe that the problem of Rogun is only political in context and can only be solved by establishing a political dialogue at the highest level. According to Tajik expert A. Mamadazimov, “In the near future, Tajikistan will also have a good opportunity to convey to Tashkent the important construction details of Rogun, which are that the construction will not block the Vakhsh River but only alter its course by sending it through a bypass tunnel. This would be a major signal from Tajikistan to Uzbekistan and this will mean that we are ready to cooperate. In this vein, we can expect a thaw in Tajik-Uzbek relations “.[2] Farhod Aminzhonov, an Uzbek energy expert, stated in an interview with the author that, “stable, neighborly relations can be expected under the condition that the two countries reach a relative symmetry of interdependence. This being a condition in which both countries either mutually benefit or suffer. Talking about such a relationship is too early though. Implementing joint regional projects, i.e. the Uzbek side actively participating in the implementation of large hydropower projects in Tajikistan, is one of the ways to achieve such interdependence”. Meanwhile, judging by Tashkent’s reaction, the actual start of Rogun’s construction shows that the parties have already reached certain agreements. The main thing now is whether the two countries’ leaders have enough political will to put the peoples’ interests above their own personal ambition and are able to agree on the most significant projects. However, this task is extremely difficult. One cannot ignore that there are external forces not interested in the fact that Tashkent and Dushanbe agreed on hydropower projects. According to political scientist Khairullo Mirsaidov, “the impression is that someone is clearly not satisfied with the rapprochement between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan and the decision on Rogun. And today, when there is a new man at Uzbekistan’s helm, who, as we have seen, seeks to establish and strengthen friendly relations with its neighbors, something is artificially egging on the dispute and trying to pit the two fraternal peoples against each other”.[3] While the sides cannot reach an agreement, thousands of people live without electricity in the 21st century. According to eyewitnesses in many regions of Uzbekistan and in some regions of Tajikistan, the authorities have implemented rolling blackouts. The electricity supply situation in Samarkand is getting worse each year. According to Ferghana News, cabar.asia: Will there be a new era in Tajik-Uzbek relations? “some areas of Uzbekistan began to resemble war zones where there is no electricity for days”.[4] Visa regime The visa regime between the two countries was introduced 14 years ago at Uzbekistan’s behest. Then, just like now, the Uzbek authorities have justified this decision based on the threat of radical elements from Afghanistan penetrating its territory via Tajikistan. Of course, the Tajik authorities have also introduced their own visa system in response. For decades, people on both sides of the border have been affected by complex procedures for obtaining permission to cross. The reality is that only 2 of 18 checkpoints are working today. Tajik expert Negmatullo Mirsaidov posits that, “one of the most effective steps to establish relations with Tajikistan could be a change in the border crossing procedures, i.e. at least bringing them in line with the visa regime, open more checkpoints, and allow the population in border areas to move across freely”.[5] Fortunately for the people of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, the question of relaxing the registration code is now on the agenda of bilateral talks at the highest level. In the near future we can expect a significant breakthrough in this direction. Has the blockade