NON-STATE POLITICAL THEORY:

FROM A TRIBAL GOOD LIFE TO INCREASED WELL-BEING

ADAM WALDIE

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS

FOR THE DEGREE OF

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

GRADUATE PROGRAM IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

YORK UNIVERSITY

TORONTO, ONTARIO

JUNE 2010 Library and Archives Bibliothgque et 1*1 Canada Archives Canada Published Heritage Direction du Branch Patrimoine de l'6dition

395 Wellington Street 395, rue Wellington Ottawa ON K1A 0N4 Ottawa ON K1A 0N4 Canada Canada

Your file Votre reference ISBN: 978-0-494-68584-6 Our file Notre r6f6rence ISBN: 978-0-494-68584-6

NOTICE: AVIS:

The author has granted a non- L'auteur a accorde une licence non exclusive exclusive license allowing Library and permettant a la Bibliotheque et Archives Archives Canada to reproduce, Canada de reproduire, publier, archiver, publish, archive, preserve, conserve, sauvegarder, conserver, transmettre au public communicate to the public by par telecommunication ou par I'lnternet, preter, telecommunication or on the Internet, distribuer et vendre des theses partout dans le loan, distribute and sell theses monde, a des fins commerciales ou autres, sur worldwide, for commercial or non- support microforme, papier, electronique et/ou commercial purposes, in microform, autres formats. paper, electronic and/or any other formats.

The author retains copyright L'auteur conserve la propriete du droit d'auteur ownership and moral rights in this et des droits moraux qui protege cette these. Ni thesis. Neither the thesis nor la these ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci substantial extracts from it may be ne doivent etre imprimes ou autrement printed or otherwise reproduced reproduits sans son autorisation. without the author's permission.

In compliance with the Canadian Conformement a la loi canadienne sur la Privacy Act some supporting forms protection de la vie privee, quelques may have been removed from this formulaires secondaires ont ete enleves de thesis. cette these.

While these forms may be included Bien que ces formulaires aient inclus dans in the document page count, their la pagination, il n'y aura aucun contenu removal does not represent any loss manquant. of content from the thesis.

••a Canada NON-STATE POLITICAL THEORY: FROM A TRIBAL GOOD LIFE TO INCREASED WELL-BEING

By Adam Waldie

a dissertation submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies of York University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

© 2010

Permission has been granted to: a) YORK UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES to lend or sell copies of this dissertation in paper, microform or electronic formats, and b) LIBRARY AND ARCHIVES CANADA to reproduce, lend, distribute, or sell copies of this dissertation anywhere in the world in microform, paper or electronic formats and to authorize or procure the reproduction, loan, distribution or sale of copies of this dissertation anywhere in the world in micro- form, paper or electronic formats.

The author reserves other publication rights, and neither the dissertation nor extensive extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without the author's written permission. IV ABSTRACT

This dissertation examines how non-state societies can contribute to and help shape

debates around how society can be organized politically and economically to increase

human happiness or subjective well-being. Drawing upon anthropological literature on

non-state social formations, psychological literature on well-being and persuasion, as

well as post-capitalist and post-state political economy, several conclusions are drawn:

tribal societies are qualitatively different from capitalist state societies; tribes can be

centrally committed to enabling the autonomy and relatedness of their members; autonomy and relatedness have both been demonstrated to be the strongest determinants

and predictors of subjective well-being; autonomy and relatedness can be increased

through participatory economics and politics, providing larger and more complex

societies with the meaningful engagement and responsiveness similar to that of tribes; and a transition to a post-state and post-capitalist society can be achieved, at least in part,

using means that respect a tribe-like commitment to autonomy and relatedness. v ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This dissertation would not be possible without the hard work and support of several

people. First, I would like to thank my supervisory committee: George C. Comninel,

Stephen Newman and J. Marshall Beier. Without the time and energy of these three people this dissertation would not be where it is today. I would also like to thank the three people who took the time and effort to join George, Stephen and Marshall to make up my

examining committee: Shannon Bell, Heather MacRae and Frances Abele. Their critical

and insightful questions challenged me to think about my work in new and interesting

ways.

Finally, and of the utmost importance, I want to thank my wife Marina Djokic. Her love,

support, patience and belief in me made the time I spent on and away from this project

the best in my life. vi TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract iv

Acknowledgements v

Introduction: Blind Spots, Successes, and a Plan 1

Chapter One: Non-State Social Organizational Formations 19

Chapter Two: A Tribal Conception and Enactment of a Good Life Ill

Chapter Three: Autonomy, Relatedness and Subjective Well-being 161

Chapter 4: Adapting Tribalism for Stateless Economics and Politics 204

Conclusion: Transitioning Through Small Changes and Sticking to the Upside 265 1 Introduction: Blind Spots, Successes, and a Plan

This thesis will argue that a tribal social organizational form and its underlying conception of a good life, if taken seriously by political theory and if thoroughly examined, can provide a justification for establishing a post-state and post-capitalist society, and provide lessons for how to do so. A tribal social organizational form is distinct from that of a capitalist state society (Chapter One and Four). A tribal conception of the good life, made possible by its social organizational form, is centrally committed to individual autonomy and relatedness (Chapter Two), which have both been demonstrated to be the strongest determinants and predictors of human happiness (and not only in

Western and/or individualist societies) (Chapter Three). Given the longevity and stability of a tribal organizational form and conception of a good life, the contribution of these to human happiness, and the relatively more significant denials of individual autonomy in state society politics and capitalist economics, an examination of the ways in which tribal lessons can justify and shape a conception of a society that better enables autonomy and relatedness through participatory planning of politics and economics (Chapter Four) is warranted.

Once, not too long ago, a professor suggested to me that political theory is, among other things, concerned with how we ought to live, with living a good life. In this sense, he continued, political theory is a branch of moral philosophy, wherein debates about how humans ought to live typically take the form of debates about morally appropriate ways of living. A second philosophical thinker, Mark Kingwell, has written, "[i]n search of viable models, we rightly look to what works, even if it doesn't work perfectly." An important part of political theory is that "abstraction must meet reality at some point."1

With thoughts such as these in my mind, I have always found the absence of a meaningful discussion of non-state societies from the canon of disciplinary political theory curious, if not troubling. To a certain extent, this phenomenon is understandable.

Disciplinary political theory has its roots in state societies, and has predominantly been concerned with living a good life within those state societies, including conceptions of who should rule and how. This makes sense to the extent that the political theory developed within state societies is in important ways shaped by their lived reality, following from and expressing that reality. However, historically, conceptions of a good life have not merely existed and been lived out within state societies. State societies represent a qualitative transition in social organizational forms when compared to non- state societies, such as bands and tribes, and the political theory that developed within state societies is qualitatively different from the conceptions and enactments of a good life found in non-state societies. This is due, at least in part, to the fact that non-state societies are qualitatively different from state societies in terms of how they are organized, the sorts of life they make possible, and the conceptions of a good life that are therefore possible to enact. In this sense, non-state societies have ways of life that are morally distinct in comparison with their state counterparts, making it worthwhile that political theory, as a branch of moral philosophy, thoroughly examine the specificity of

1 Mark Kingwell, The World We Want: Virtue, Vice, and the Good Citizen (Toronto: Penguin, 2001), 7-8. 3 non-state societies, and see if lessons applicable to those currently living in state societies can be learned from them.

This thesis will argue that there are lessons to be learned and that, if applied, they can improve the quality of life of those currently living in state societies. More specifically I will argue that: (1) tribal society is qualitatively different in terms of both its social organizational form and its conception of the good life, which both express ideas of autonomy and relatedness, demanding the significance and dignity of all; (2) decades of psychological and psychiatric research have resulted in a consensus that autonomy and relatedness, the central aspects of a tribal life, are seemingly the two greatest predictors of human happiness; (3) given these findings, state society and capitalism limit human happiness, while lessons learned from tribal society can be applied to a capitalist state society, moving it towards a post-state and post-capitalist society.

To make this argument, this thesis will do four things: (1) provide an original synthetic system of classification for different social organizational forms (i.e., both non- state and state societies), which will contain the material needed to theorize a tribal good life; (2) focus in on tribal societies to understand their conception of a good life and its enactments; (3) draw on the consensus produced by decades of psychological and psychiatric research to demonstrate why these conceptions and enactments should be valued today; and (4) propose a way of thinking about the lessons of tribal society that will be meaningful to people living in state societies. I will discuss what we, in state societies, can learn from how they live. What can be adapted and how? How can we, in 4 large and complex societies, have happiness that corresponds to tribalism without reverting to tribalism? I will examine tribal societies to learn more about implementing a future society that is similar to, but different from, tribes. I will provide a program to implement practices drawn from tribalism, discuss the limits to implementing them, and how these limits can be overcome. This will involve a discussion of the reality of state society and capitalist society and how these will act as barriers to enacting a tribe-like ethic. The limits to moving from state society to a post-state society are real, but these limits can be overcome.

A hole in disciplinary political theory

It should be fairly obvious to those familiar with the canon that no disciplinary political theorist has theorized non-state societies. Jean-Jacques Rousseau rightly tells us that previous thinkers, such as Hobbes and Locke, have failed to adequately grasp non-state humans, for when "[t]hey spoke about savage man.. .it was civil man they depicted."2 But we can go further and say, with Asher Horowitz and Gad Horowitz, that the whole canon of Western political theory has similarly failed: "Western political thought has simply dismissed the classless, stateless hunter-gatherer societies as, if not subhuman, then too crude and traditional to have anything to teach us; tens of thousands of years of the history and experience of the species has been dismissed as irrelevant." In fact, our

2 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Basic Political Writings, trans. Donald A. Cress (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987), 38. 3 Asher Horowitz and Gad Horowitz, Everywhere They are in Chains: Political Theory from Rousseau to Marx (Scarborough: Nelson Canada, 1988), 3. 5 species lived in band society for around a hundred thousand years. The longevity of bands and tribes testifies to their success.

Some might be inclined to look to Rousseau as well as Karl Marx and Friedrich

Engels as thinkers who have theorized non-state societies adequately. The truth, however, is that they did not. With Rousseau, as Asher Horowitz notes, "the entire description and analysis of world history is subordinated to the polemical purposes of contrasting unfavourably the life of civilized man with that of primitive man and savage man and to the negative task of invalidating the equation between nature and equality."4 When discussing social organization, Rousseau "seems to place a low priority on the empirical investigation of the substantial differences between specific historical forms."5 Moreover, he was without the information and analytical tools of modern anthropologists.6 In the end, Rousseau only "sketchily grasped" "primitive society,"7 and he only "implicitly

o develops a typology of social forms" rather than a "full-blown theory."

Marx and Engels suffer similarly from the limitations of their project.9 As Stanley

Diamond notes, Marx and Engels' project was "a critical and revolutionary analysis of civilization, particularly of modern capitalism, based on the fundamental questions asked of their own time and place." Their work did not approach non-state societies on their own terms, but rather with a view to charting "the prehistoric evolution of society toward

4 Asher Horowitz, Rousseau, Nature, and History (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987), 87. 5 Ibid. 6 Ibid., 98. 7 Ibid., 99. 8 Ibid., 90. 9 It was only Engels who commented on non-state societies at length. Marx never repudiated Engels, but the work was never really his own. 6 the state," to capitalism and ultimately beyond to a socialist state. "Primitive cultures were for them the ground of all future historical movement." Moreover, they were discussed in a way that highlighted how they "served as the paradigm for the idea of socialism," but, again, not in an attempt to give a holistic account on their own terms.10

In addition to the limitations set by their project, Marx and Engels' ability to thoroughly theorize non-state societies was limited by the problems associated with the anthropological material they were drawing from. As J. Marshal Beier notes, "[t]he foundation of Engels' 'primitive communism' was, through Marx, derived from propositions by Lewis Henry Morgan generalized from his studies of the Iroquois."11 But

Morgan's account of "savage society" is problematic. All but universally criticized for its social evolutionism - unilinear cultural evolution from "savagery" to "barbarism" to

"civilization"12 - he has generalized his position from an investigation into one indigenous people (the Iroquois), from only one society therein (in the New York State area), and that was not based on living among the people for any significant period of

1 time, but rather on brief field trips to Iroquois settlements. Although important insights into Iroquois life were made and recorded in Morgan's The League of the Iroquois, a single group of indigenous people is not sufficient to make generalized comments about

10 Stanley Diamond, In Search of the Primitive: A Critique of Civilization (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1974), 106-107. 11 J. Marshall Beier, International Relations in Uncommon Places: Indigeneity, Cosmology, and the Limits of International Relations Theory (New York: Palgrave, 2005), 210-211. 12 See Lewis Henry Morgan, Ancient Society: Or Researches in the Lines of Human Progress From Savagery Through Barbarism to Civilization (Chicago: C.H. Kerr, 1877). 131 am not saying that participant observation is the way to get to the truth about a given people, and participant observation has been called into question since Morgan's time, but in his time it had not, and he did not even do that. 7 ancient or "savage" society. And any account of 'primitive' society derived from this is necessarily problematic and insufficient.

Now, one might ask why this failure matters. Why does it matter if political theory has failed to take seriously and investigate non-state societies? If political theory is just descriptive, then it can be criticized for failing to give an adequate account of non- state societies and their conceptions of a good life. But if, as said above, political theory is more than that, if it is about discussing viable (at least to some degree) and morally appropriate ways of living, are there still grounds for criticism? The answer, as it will be shown throughout the remainder of this thesis, is surely 'yes.'

The successes of non-state societies

Without pre-empting too much of what is to come, I would like to make two points here, both of which will be discussed in greater detail later on. These two points are just two preliminary observations that will combine to give us an entry point into the forthcoming theorizing of non-state societies, by showing that prior to a full blown account, there are good reasons to give non-state societies serious attention. First, non-state societies, specifically bands and tribes, are very successful in evolutionary terms. They are the longest-lasting human social organizational formations, with bands existing for over

100,000 years, and tribes for over 13,000 years, both into contemporary times.14

14 Jared Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1999), 270; Peter Bogucki, The Origins of Human Society (Massachusetts: Blackwell, 1999), 30, 69. 8 The fact that such long histories exist suggests that they "worked for people" and are "viable." The fact that they are being destroyed does nothing to impeach their viability, anymore than the fact that a burrow or nest's susceptibility to destruction makes them unworkable and unsuccessful for their respective animal creators and inhabitants.15

Non-state organization in bands and tribes has been labelled "evolutionarily stable, meaning not that it was perfect, but that hundreds of thousands of years of natural selection - on a social level - was unable to produce an organization that worked better."16

Now, of course, this assumes that the bands and tribes described by early and contemporary ethnographies are to a significant degree representative of pre-historical

(pre-recorded) societal forms. Richard Dawkins, for example, writes that "[hjunter-gather peoples such as Australian aboriginal tribes presumably live in something like the way our distant ancestors did."17 Can such a statement be supported? The answer seems to be

'yes.'

Elman R. Service tells us that non-state societies known historically and through ethnographies can be helpful when interpreting non-state societies only known through

1 X archaeology, as long as care is taken. What does 'care' mean? Well, as Allen W.

Johnson and Timothy Earle tell us, although contemporary non-state societies do not directly show us pre-historic ones, "we may accept a universalistic assumption about 15 Daniel Quinn, The Story ofB, (Toronto: Bantam, 1996), 320. 16 Daniel Quinn, If They Give You Lined Paper Write Sideways (Hanover: Steerforth, 2007), 119; Daniel Quinn, My Ishmael (Toronto: Bantam, 1997), 94. 17 Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2006), 165. 18 Elman R. Service, Origins of the State and Civilization: The Process of Cultural Evolution (U.S.: W.W. Norton and Co., 1975), 18. 9 humans that allows us to understand the past in conjunction with available archaeological evidence, namely that the processes operating in the present apply also to the past to the degree that conditions were the same then as now." They continue to note that where "aspects of the modern world.. .have a limited presence and conditions of environment, technology, and economy are similar to those that held in the past, we can expect to observe similar challenges and similar solutions."19 The very "flexibility and adaptability of humans to organize for survival and prosperity under divergent conditions" allows non-state societies like the Khoisan or the Shoshone to "provide analogies of earlier forms, because the economic and demographic conditions under which they existed are similar."20 Service makes the same point, and finishes it by saying that, despite some changes, "relative isolation" and a relatively stable environment allows for "a relatively stable adaptation," and a non-state society in such a condition represents

9 1 "a culture that is primitive, ancient, and preliterate.. .[having] a very long history."

It should be clear, then, how important it is to use only relevant data from non- state societies. As Service notes, "many contemporary primitive cultures began adapting to civilization in one way or another long before they were studied by trained anthropologists." Keeping in mind that adaptation is a matter of degree, it is important to 22 focus one's attention on those cultures that remained relatively more isolated. And for further assurance, in both this specific matter and in dealing with anthropological 19 Allen W. Johnson and Timothy Earle, The Evolution of Human Societies: From Foraging Group to Agrarian State, 2nd ed. (California: Stanford University Press, 2000), 45. 20 Ibid., 82. 21 Elman R. Service, Primitive Social Organization: And Evolutionary Perspective, 2nd ed. (New York: Random House, 1971), 7. 22 Ibid., 8. 10 material generally, the use of comparative cases, as well as the critical evaluations of

"expert historians and ethnohistorical anthropologists" can and should be employed.23

Non-state societies, such as bands and tribes, have a long history testifying to their viability and success. But success at what exactly? This leads into the second point I would like to make. Band and tribe societies seem to be good for people. By 'good' I basically mean healthy. What I mean by 'healthy' I will explain through typical accounts given of band and tribe society. For example, Quinn notes that mental illness, suicide and drug addictions are rare, and they do not all engage in conquest and rule.24 He continues to note that

[tjhey're not seething with discontent and rebellion, not incessantly wrangling over what should be allowed and what forbidden, not forever accusing each other of not living the right way, not living in terror of each other, not going crazy because their lives seem empty and pointless, not having to stupefy themselves with drugs to get through the days, not inventing a new religion every week to give them something to hold onto, not forever searching for something to do or something to believe in that will make their lives worth living.25

These people seem content with their way of life. There are not wars between generations or classes. There are no systematic complaints about oppression and injustice.26 Other

97 anthropologists, such as Stanley Diamond, concur with these general impressions, and

Paul Radin has noted that the societies of "aboriginal peoples.. .were fundamentally

23 Service, Origins, 19. 24 Daniel Quinn, Ishmael (Toronto: Bantam, 1992), 146-147. 25 Quinn, Ishmael, 148; Quinn, My Ishmael, 95. 26 Quinn, My Ishmael, 114-115 27 Diamond, In Search of the Primitive, 166-172 11 stable, where no basic internal social-economic crises occurred, where there was no

28 devaluation of life on earth."

Moreover, as will be discussed at length in Chapter One, these people are well adjusted in the sense of being in full possession of what is needed for living an existence comparable to all their fellow members, with full opportunity within the limits of the cultural resources being afforded to all the members of the society. And, as will be supported and elaborated in Chapter Two, there is both group cohesion and a respect for individual integrity, autonomy and difference. These features exist due to an ethic of respect that is itself based on a notion of unity, interrelatedness and interdependence that sees every constituent element as significant and worthy of respect. This ethic of respect extends into external relations so that they are not perpetually at war, in the sense of attempting to conquer others to impose their will on others. They are without rulers, stratification, class conflict and other such systemic inequalities (exceptions to this being differentiations that may be made on the basis of age and gender).

This is not to say that these societies are without their pathologies (e.g., murder, self-aggrandizing individuals). And none of the above is meant to say that bands and tribes are perfect, ideal, noble, or the like. These people are not especially noble, sweet, or wise, and "are as capable as we are of being mean, unkind, short-sighted, selfish, 9Q insensitive, stubborn, and short-tempered." The difference is not so much in the people

28 Paul Radin, The World of Primitive Man (New York: Henry Schuman, 1953), 7. 29 Daniel Quinn, Beyond Civilization: Humanity's Next Great Adventure (New York: Three Rivers Press, 1999), 61. as in their "different way of handling these things than we do."30 True, they have their problems, but they also have the means to address such problems, and these are just as, if not in some cases more, successful than attempts to deal with pathologies in state societies.

The viability and healthiness of band and tribe life suggest that these societies work well for humans, that they give things to their members that are considered very important, so much so that many of them have fought to their cultural extinction to preserve their way of life. Thus, these should also all be indicators that these organizational forms are worth being studied by political theorists, people concerned with how people ought to live.

The plan

I have stated above that my argument in this thesis is that tribal society is qualitatively distinct in its social organizational form and in its conception of a good life; that this organizational form and ethic can be proven conducive to human happiness in ways state society and capitalism are not; and that lessons learned from tribal society can be implemented by people currently living in state societies to improve their quality of life.

This argument will span four chapters and a conclusion. Chapter One will provide an original synthesis of existing anthropological material to provide a typology of human social organizational forms, using four categories - band, tribe, chiefdom, and state society. Chapter Two will focus on and flesh out a tribal conception of a good life,

30 Quinn, If They Give You Lined Paper, 28. 13 defining it as an ethic of respect for autonomy predicated upon an idea of unity, interrelatedness and interdependence that demands the significance and dignity of all.

Following this, I will offer a tribal model of a good life that has been further abstracted from the information previously given in Chapters One and Two, which will come into play in subsequent chapters. Chapter Three will attempt to make a case for taking seriously central components of a tribal life by drawing on decades of psychological and psychiatric research demonstrating that the organizational and ethical enabling of a life of autonomy and relatedness are the best predictors of human happiness. Chapter Four will build upon the tribal model from Chapter Two, and the findings of what is most conducive to happiness in Chapter Three, to discuss how state society and capitalism are barriers to happiness, and how a tribal model could be applied to state societies. Finally, the Conclusion will take an understanding of the limits to implementing tribal lessons and discuss how these can be overcome.

In developing my typology in Chapter One, my methodology will involve a comparative analysis of case studies, creating an original synthesis of existing anthropological materials, in order to draw out the crucial elements of non-state societies without precluding the possibility that other crucial elements exist. The views I present are representative of a veritable consensus among anthropologists. That said, as general or ideal types, these characterizations will fail to capture relatively rare but real situations that are exceptions to virtually universal characteristics. But as long as we keep this caveat in mind - that these general types only claim to be virtually universally applicable

- rare differences between general types and real experiences should not be seen to 14 invalidate this general typology that is, as Jared Diamond says, "useful shorthand" for

31 discussing the diversity of human social organization forms.

When it comes to discussing a tribal conception of the good life in Chapter Two, I will again draw on a comparative analysis of participant-observation ethnographies.

However, unlike my typology, my discussion of a tribal conception and enactment of a good life and its enactment will rely on selective examples. My goal is not to present an exhaustive account of all the various conceptions and enactments of a good life in tribal societies because in the end this is outside the scope of my argument. I will be selective in my choice of tribal societies because my goal is to describe a tribal conception and enactment of a good life, not the tribal conception and enactment of a good life, which given the extensive diversity of tribal cultures would be impossible in any case. I will be giving an account and analysis of a tribal conception and enactment of a good life based on non-hegemonic, counter-status quo examples, because my goal is to highlight an organizational form and ethic that is distinct from hegemonic and status-quo capitalist state societies. In short, I will present an alternative social organizational form and conception of a good life. I am not saying the examples I discuss are ubiquitous; in fact, examples of tribal societies with ethics that are in varying degrees different can be found.

Rather, I am seeking to demonstrate that societies with the particular ethic and way of life

I am describing are possible, that they are part of the human experience. They are not idealist, pie-in-the-sky hopes. These examples are part of the human experience and disprove hegemonic notions of what is possible when they claim them as impossible. To

31 Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel, 267. the potential criticism that the examples I chose are aberrations, not exemplifying the human experience, I must point out that they are examples of whole societies that existed, functioned, and functioned until colonialism and the violence of state societies disrupted them. This makes them part of the human experience. To the criticism that they are small in scale, relatively simple in social organizational form, and the underlying ethic cannot function in a large society, I would argue that their achieved size and level of complexity does not necessarily mean aspects of their ethic and its enactment are not workable on a larger scale. This is something that cannot be known due to colonialism and the violence of state societies that disrupted them; to say they are unworkable is an unverifiable statement. At the outset of Chapter One I will deal with the potential criticism that they are merely an earlier stage of human development, an early stage of a natural process that has necessarily moved from simpler to more complex and stratified societies, and any attempt to learn from them, to bring their knowledge and apply it to state societies is unnatural, running contrary to necessity, inevitability, and teleology. For now, I will briefly say that this also is an unverifiable statement and the available facts disprove it.

While trends exist, there is no single direction of human development, as will be demonstrated in Chapter One.

With all that now said, I also want to make it clear that while I am consciously selective in my chosen examples, when it comes to describing these examples, the views

I present are representative of a veritable consensus among anthropologists, and what I present is supported by numerous scholars and, when not the same, Indigenous peoples' accounts of themselves. I will include, as Beier puts it, "autoenthnographic accounts and narratives," or Indigenous people's own texts about themselves. For example, in order to understand pre-reservation Lakota cosmologies and ways of life I have made sure to draw upon sources derived from persons who reached adulthood as members of pre- reservation non-state societies, and who "are quite widely recognized as authoritative within their own ethno-cultural context." Finally, I will also draw upon the writings of contemporary indigenous writers. These three independent accounts - from anthropologists, historical indigenous peoples, and contemporary indigenous writers - reinforce each other since they map on top of one another with almost complete fidelity.

My aim is to listen respectfully to what these other cultures have to say about themselves. They are authorities when speaking on the matter of their knowledge and practices and their voices need to be heard and respected. I attempt to speak alongside them by citing them when possible, rather than merely about them. That said, at times, I do listen to others who could be seen as speaking for them to the extent that I draw upon ethnographic and academic accounts when they are the only sources available on societies (or aspects of societies) irrevocably altered or destroyed by colonialism or the violence of state societies. I take Indigenous people's own accounts seriously, listening respectfully, because I recognize the desirability of investigating non-state social organizational forms.

The final component of my method is admittedly unconventional. As mentioned above, living a good life is at the core of political theory. Anthropology demonstrates the dramatic differences between tribe societies and state societies, with tribe societies

32 Beier, 97. having different ways of life, and different conceptions of a good life constituted with intent and maintained over time, and sometimes reverted to after other ways of living have been discarded. An examination of a tribal good life will bring to the fore many important discussions and debates existing in political theory. However, I will not take up what has been said hitherto by political theorists.

This work will consider what the good life has been, deriving an analysis and argument from human experience, and will not, therefore, be grounded in, but rather in a sense autonomous from, longstanding debates in disciplinary political theory. I am consciously not considering canonical ideas of a good life found in the work of previous political theorists, but rather experiences of a good life, drawn from anthropology, psychology and psychiatry. I intent for this work to parallel the longstanding history of political theory, but not immediately be within or entering into debate with the canon of political theory. What I am writing has salience to many aspects of political theory that I will consciously not confront on its own terms. I understand that on certain points to be discussed below political theorists have had much to say, but I will not follow them through their discourses (which would be another dissertation in itself). Rather than taking up the ideas of, for example, Aristotle, Rousseau or any other number of political theorists whose work has spoken to issues addressed in this work, I will make arguments that resonate with all of them. The aim of this project is to write a dissertation based on a different tradition of political thought (i.e., grounded in the ideas and practices of non-

33 Throughout the dissertation I will acknowledge ways in which the subject matter touches on political theory, mentioning the fact that thinkers have taken up these issues. state societies) and, therefore, a thorough discussion of the dominant discourses in political theory is not necessary.

Rather than projecting 'human nature' on the basis of my immediate social reality or preferred political program, I will investigate what a variety of human experiences found in tribal social examples, along with psychological and psychiatric literatures, illustrate about how to live a good life. I will develop an analysis on the basis of what the forms of social life characteristic of most of human experience have to tell us about the potential for and means of realizing a good life. I will end up presenting a comprehensive vision of how human needs might be realized through novel social forms that reproduce the benefits of tribal societies rather than their exact practices. In this way, I will make a consummately political argument, clearly contributing to political theory, and yet consciously not referring to political theory. This approach, grounded as it is in experiences of a good life, will begin with an investigation of non-state organizational forms, and it is to this I will now turn. 19 Chapter One: Non-State Social Organizational Formations

As Pierre Clastres rightly tells us, "[t]he extraordinary diversity of types of social organization, the perfusion, in time and space, of dissimilar societies, do not, however, prevent the possibility of discovering an order within the discontinuous, the possibility of a reduction of that infinite multiplicity of differences."34 As can be seen by looking at almost every introductory anthropology textbook, there is a broad consensus that the different human social organizational forms that have hitherto existed can be classified in a four-fold typology: band, tribe, chiefdom, and state society. These terms are merely labels that highlight cross-cultural similarities and differences in socio-political organizational forms. Some will use a related classification and call these by different names (e.g., Morton H. Fried does not use the term tribe, preferring to use "rank society"), but a very broad consensus exists nonetheless. However, introductory texts do not go into sufficient detail for the present project. Although more detailed studies have been done, none alone covers all that is germane to this discussion. It is for this reason that I have drawn upon a range of scholarly material to create an original synthetic system of classification that will contain the material needed to theorize a tribal good life.

Later in Chapter Four I will be theorizing how a tribal notion and enactment of a good life can be adapted and applied to larger and more complex social organizational forms to modify state societies. I want to pre-empt the criticism that tribes are merely an

34 Pierre Clastres, Society Against the State: Essays in Political Anthropology, Robert Hurley and Abe Stein, trans. (New York: Zone Books, 1987), 169. earlier stage of human development that has been left behind in a natural, even necessary and inevitable, evolution from less to more complex and stratified societies, currently to societies with states, and that adopting practices would be an unnatural contradiction of this teleological process. I want to address this now, because it directly relates to the typology for social organizational forms I will presently discuss. While there is a general trend when it comes to the evolution of human social organizational forms of ever-increasing complexity and stratification, with people moving from bands to tribes to chiefdoms and then to state societies, there is not one natural (or necessary and inevitable) path of historical human development that sees humanity's movement through successive, unilinear stages. A contemporary thinker who posits such a progressivist thesis is Robert Wright, who has applied game theory to evolutionary processes as a whole and to human social formations specifically. In game theory, as Wright describes it, zero-sum games exist when "the fortunes of the players are inversely related;" non- zero-sum games exist when "one player's gain needn't be bad news for the other(s).

Of

Indeed, in highly non-zero-sum games the players' interests overlap entirely." Wright applies these aspects of game theory to the evolution of human social formations and comes to the following conclusion: if you start the survey back when the most complex society on earth was a hunter-gatherer village, and follow it up to the present, you can capture history's basic trajectory by reference to a core pattern: New technologies arise that permit or encourage new, richer forms of non-zero-sum interaction; then (for intelligible reasons grounded ultimately in human nature) social structures evolve that realize this rich potential - that convert non-zero-sum situations into positive sums. Thus does social complexity

35 Robert Wright, Nonzero: The Logic of Human Destiny (New York: Vintage Books, 2000), 5. grow in scope and depth.. .[0]ver the long run, non-zero-sum situations produce more positive sums than negative sums, and more mutual benefit than parasitism. As a result, people become embedded in larger and richer webs of interdependence.36

The aspect of human nature referred to above is "unconscious sawiness.. .rooted ultimately in genes;.. .natural selection, via the evolution of 'reciprocal altruism,' has built into us various impulses which.. .are designed for the cool, practical purpose of bringing beneficial exchange."37 Leaving aside the debateable nature of this statement, which may not stand up to either cross-cultural or historical scrutiny, Wright considers the above mentioned process inevitable, in his own words a matter of "human destiny."

He uses the growth of a poppy seed as an analogy for the way in which human social evolution was destined to reach the state and beyond:

the destiny of a poppy seed is to become a poppy.. .Obviously, a given poppy seed may not become a poppy. Indeed, the destiny of some poppy seeds seems - in retrospect, at least - to have been getting baked into a bagel. And even poppy seeds that have escaped this fate, and landed on soil, may still get eaten (though not at brunch) and thus never become flowers.. .[F]rom the seed's point of view, the only alternative to this happening is catastrophe - death, to put a finger on it.38

Wright uses game theory to move from simple egalitarian societies in existence thousands of years ago right up to the state and then beyond to international organizations like the World Trade Organization and the European Union. All along the way he posits new situations and technologies that created potential for more complex levels of interaction, which were harnessed and eventually institutionalized creating more complex

36 Ibid., 5-6. 37 Ibid., 22-23. 38 Ibid., 8. 22 levels of social organization, and the process repeated itself again and again. But what is to be said of the various societies and cultures that have fragmented or disintegrated into less complex organizational forms? Wright answers by saying that

[t]he moral of the story is simple: When thinking about cultural evolution, don't get wrapped up in the particular people and peoples. Instead, keep your eye on the memes [the knowledge that comprises a given culture]. People and peoples come and go, live and die. But their memes, like their genes, persist. When all the trading and plundering and warring is done, bodies may be lying everywhere, and social structure may be in disarray. Yet in the process, culture, the aggregate menu of memes on which society can draw, may well have evolved. Eventually, social structure will follow, coalescing around the newly available technological base.

This model allows Wright to ignore whole cultures that diverge from his chosen pattern of linear evolution simply on the basis that somewhere, anywhere, in the world a pattern of social formation comparable in complexity to the one that has fragmented or disintegrated continues to exist. "[C]ultures can hop from person to person and place to place, leaving ruin behind yet staying healthy themselves. Well before the sacking of

Rome, the Roman Empire's headquarters had been officially moved to Constantinople.

There, in the eastern empire, in Byzantium, much of the classical culture remained alive and well - in books, in minds, in practice - until Europe's 'Dark Ages' had passed."40 In this light, any given historical event, no matter how great a deviation from a supposed historically inevitable pattern, can be ignored so long as somewhere cultural complexity of a comparable degree continues on. But deviations cannot be ignored, especially if they

39 Ibid., 127-8. 40 Ibid., 140. 23 are organic in nature, or the result of a people's conscious and intentional choices and actions.

And there have been peoples who have consciously and of their own volition countered this tendency. The Kachin of Highland Burma provide several examples of peoples that returned to simple tribal societies after breaking up their complex and stratified chiefdom-like societies into individual autonomous villages. And it does not seem that the Kachin are alone. The available evidence suggests that the people of

Teotihuacan in the Mexico Valley also attacked and overthrew their state society in favour of several simpler and perhaps more egalitarian ones. These two peoples have consciously and of their own volition countered an evolutionary trend.41

With the Kachin of Highland Burma, as Jonathan Friedman has pointed out, there are three main levels of local organization: villages, village clusters, and domains. The village is a very small settlement of between ten and thirty at most. It is a self-contained unit and also the largest political unit in gumlao organization 42 E.R. Leach notes that the

"Kachin political theory denoted by the term gumlao is, in its extreme form, one of anarchic republicanism. Each man is as good as his neighbour, there are no class differences, no chiefs."43 He further observes that gumlao is "a 'democratic' species of organisation in which the political entity is a single village and there is not class

41 As will be discussed later on, it should be noted that there seem to be limiting conditions facing those wishing to make such a societal change. 42 Jonathan Friedman, System, Structure, and Contradiction: the Evolution of Asiatic Social Formations, 2nd ed. (California: AltaMira Press, 1998), 115-116. 43 E.R. Leach, Political Systems of the Highland Burma: A Study of Kachin Social Structure (London: G. Bell and Sons, Ltd., 1954), 51. difference."44 Gumlao organizations are composed of a single village wherein all lineages are of one rank. Villagers do not owe tributary dues of any kind towards the village headman. Rank differences and stratification are avoided by keeping bride prices low (which helps to prevent the incurring of debt), and developing local patterns in which three or more lineages marry in a circle on an exclusive basis (with each lineage thereby having equal rights because each both owes and is owed considerations).45

Friedman notes that village clusters (several villages) and domains (several village clusters) are larger-scale organizations that emerge in gumsa development.46 As

Leach notes "Gumsa ideology, very roughly, represents a society as a large-scale feudal state. It is a system which implies a ranked hierarchy of the social world; it also implies large-scale political integration."47 He continues to define it as "an 'aristocratic' species of organisation. The political identity here is called a mung.. .which has as its head a

AO prince of aristocratic blood." Gumsa political organizations comprise a number of villages aggregated under one chief. The lineages are ranked in descending order from chief, aristocrat, and commoner, to slave. Those who are neither of favoured status nor of chiefs lineage must contribute a thigh (a tribute to the chief, usually in the form of foodstuffs) and free labour.49

As Leach points out, not all gumsa societies have survived. "Where today we find communities of gumlao type - i.e. no chiefs, each village a politically independent 44 Ibid. 45 Ibid., 204-205. 46 Friedman, System, Structure, and Contradiction, 115-116. 47 Leach, Political Systems of the Highland Burma, 50. 48 Ibid., 57. 49 Ibid., 204-205. 25 unit...- we find a tradition that 'formerly, x generations ago, we had chiefs', and then there was a rebellion in which the chiefs either got killed or driven out."50 Two accounts from British Colonial Administrators attest to this pattern. The first notes that

[fjormerly every Kachin village was ruled by an hereditary official called a Sawbwa.. .the villagers were obliged to cultivate his land without compensation and were subject to many other imposts. These taxes having become very onerous, a revolution was started about 20 years ago [i.e., about 1870] and spread very rapidly, chiefly in the tract between the Mali Hka and the N'mai Hka rivers, which led to the murder and disposition of a large number of Sawbwas and the appointment of certain headmen called Akyis or Salangs in their places. The villages which are now without Sawbwas are called Kamlao [gumlao] or rebel villages in contradistinction to the others which are Kamsa [gumsa] or Sawa-owning villages.51

The second attests to a revolt against an aristocratic chief of a Kachin domain (Duwa) and the subsequent formation of independent simple egalitarian villages, saying that

[m]ore than half a century ago, a spirit of republicanism manifested itself in the unadministered territory known as the Triangle and thence found its way to the west of the Mali Hka. Certain tribesmen who found the yoke of the Duwa irksome and were impatient of control, declared themselves Kumlaos or rebels, threw off their hereditary connection with the Duwa, and settled themselves in solitary villages of their own.52

Leach provides three more accounts of gumlao revolt. The first, with the precise date unknown but occurring sometime during the 1800's, took place in the Hukawng

Valley area and "originated in a revolt by the N'Dup-Dumsa ('blacksmith-priest') lineage

ci of the Tsasen clan against their traditional chiefs." The result was a reversion to simpler and more egalitarian societies.

50 Ibid., 210. 51 Ibid., 198. 52 Ibid., 198-199. 53 Ibid., 207-208. A second account, beginning either in 1858 or 1870, is actually of two gumlao revolts that prompted several other neighbouring societies to adopt egalitarian reform.

Simultaneously, the chief of N'Gum La and the chief of Sumpawng Bum were killed and these societies adopted gumlao relations. After this, the chief of "Sagribum.. .and other neighbouring chiefs thereupon agreed to abandon all their chiefly privileges." As of 1915, these areas were still gumlao.54

The third account tells of the Duleng who inhabit an area east of the Mail Hka and north of the Shang Hka. According to reports by Duleng elders, up until about six generations prior to Leach's writing, chiefs ruled them. At that point, the people revolted and their chiefs were subsequently driven out of the area. It is said that since then all

Duleng villages have been gumlao. There is, however, historical evidence that the Duleng had stratified societies with chiefs much more recently. In 1893, Errol Gray reported that he was frustrated from proceeding further east by the alleged objections of a powerful

Kachin chief named Alang Chow Tong who lived at Alang Ga in the heart of the Duleng country. But there is no doubt that the gumsa societies were replaced by simple egalitarian societies, as the whole Duleng tract was gumlao at the time of Leach's writing, and therefore at least until World War Two, and arguably therefore into the modern age. There existed no Duleng chiefs and each small Duleng village was strictly independent and autonomous. Duleng lineages were small and very numerous and devoid of any segmentary systems or ranking.55

54 Ibid., 208-209. 55 Ibid., 209-210 and 274. 27 The Kachin can therefore be used to provide several examples of peoples revolting against their complex, ranked, and stratified societies in favour of several more simply organized and more egalitarian ones. But it seems that they are not alone.

Teotihuacan was a state society whose people, it seems, also consciously revolted against their leaders. They were located in the Valley of Teotihuacan, a sub-valley of the

Valley of Mexico, twenty-five miles northeast of Mexico City, in the central Mexican highlands. As Rene Millon notes, relative to the other areas in the region, the Valley of

Teotihuacan is an area "where agricultural production and resource exploitation could be maximized."56 And Jeremy A. Sabloff points out it was a semiarid region of temperate

57 climate with "much potential for intensive agriculture through the use of irrigation."

The vast irrigation works constructed following Teotihuacan settlement, and the intensive dryland agriculture they attest to, show that the people made use of the area's 'potential.'

Within five hundred years of settlement, by about 500 CE, the population had quadrupled CO reaching an estimated 120,000 people (some postulate as high as 250,000). 0 At about

600 CE, as Richard E.W. Adams notes, Teotihuacan was an irregular area of about twenty square kilometres with "avenues, markets, plazas, temples, palaces, apartment compounds, a grid system of streets, slums, waterways, reservoirs, and drainage systems."59

56 Rene Millon, "The Last Years of Teotihuacan Dominance," in Norman Yoffee and George L. Cowgill, eds., The Collapse of Ancient States and Civilizations (Tuscan: University of Arizona Press, 1988), 110. 57 Jeremy A. Sabloff, The Cities of Ancient Mexico: Reconstructing a Lost World (Spain: Thames and Hudson, Inc., 1989), 66 58 Ibid., 61-62. 59 Richard E.W. Adams, Prehistoric Mesoamerica (Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 203. There are several signs of status differences between the Teotihuacanos. First, the art attests to it. There are, as George L. Cowgill observes, artistic representations that, for example, distinguish what most likely are "high-ranking military men (generals)."60 And

Millon observes that in "various murals the placement or size of figures in relation to each other implies subordination of some to others, whether supernatural or human." He also notes "major differences in status are implied by differences in dress. Sumptuously dressed figures engaging in ritual activities, often in procession, are believed, with reason, to be priests. Other figures are dressed modestly, often only in loincloths."61

There are also materials gathered from burial sites that, as Cowgill argues, suggest the existence of several levels of richness.62 And there are differences in housing conditions that also suggest social differentiation and stratification. First, as Cowgill notes, there is existence the Ciudaldela palaces,63 which attest to the likely existence of a class of lords and, perhaps, even a supreme ruler of Teotihuacan. Then there are the apartment compounds that can be divided into two significantly different sizes. There are those that are smaller than about two thousand square meters, and those that are larger than 4,500 square meters.64 Finally, there are "small insubstantial abode structures."65

Based on considering variables such as size of rooms, use of space, decoration,

60 George L. Cowgill, "Social Differentiation at Teotihuacan," in Diane Z. Chase and Arlen F. Chase, eds., Mesoamerican Elites: An Archaeological Assessment (Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1992), 208. 61 Rene Millon, "Teotihuacan: City, State, and Civilization," in Jeremy Sabloff, ed. Supplement to the handbook of Middle American Indians (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981), 212-213. 62Cowgill, "Social Differentiation at Teotihuacan," 211. 63 Ibid., 215. 64 Ibid. 65 Ibid. construction techniques, burials, offerings, and other relevant data, Cowgill argues for a seven-tiered division of society, but someone like Richard E.W. Adams, who argues for a five-tiered society, disputes this.66 What is known for sure is that there were considerable contrasts between Teotihuacanos and it is likely that they varied considerably in wealth, status, and social roles.

Monumental architecture also suggests stratification. As Michael D. Coe notes, the existence of the Pyramid of the Sun, standing about seven hundred feet long and a little over two hundred feet high, and the Pyramid of the Moon, which is broadly similar but smaller, "are testimony to the immense power of the Teotihuacan hierarchy to call up corvee labour from the villages of the territory over which it ruled."67 And Millon buttresses this statement, observing that "[t]he bold self-confidence manifest in the planning and execution of this grand design points to an authority, be it individual or collective, that had unchallenged prestige, with an ability to motivate masses of people and the power to mobilize and direct workers and resources on a scale that until then was

z: o without precedent in Middle America." In the end, when it comes to social differentiation and stratification in Teotihuacan, it seems like Cowgill is right to state that

[f]or Teotihuacan, there is ample evidence.. .that a simple dichotomy between elite and commoner is over simple. However, vast amounts need to be learned about the relative numbers of persons or households of different status, their spatial distributions, rates of mobility, how different offices were conceived and related to one another, and just how and to what extent

66 Adams, Prehistoric Mesoamerica, 212-223. 67 Michael D. Coe, Ancient Peoples and Places of Mexico (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1962), 105-106. 68 Millon, "Teotihuacan," 212. 30 the diverse dimensions of class and office.. .and wealth and power.. .interacted with one another.69

But this complex and stratified state society did not last.

Adams argues (along with others) that at the final point of supreme crisis,

Teotihuacan looked increasingly like a "gigantic regional state expanded to an empire, with other regional states bound to it by tribute and alliance systems." Teotihuacan's social and political structure "seems to have been a somewhat secularized form of divine kingship bolstered by a considerable military power."70 It is most likely that a "noble administrative class controlled highly organized kinship groups living in wards, which were the basis of society. These kinship units were probably occupationally specialized, with most of them including farmers." The power of Teotihuacan "was largely derived from this highly organized and large mass of about two hundred thousand people and

71 from the control they exerted over various economic resources outside the heartland."

And then somewhere within the seventh or eighth centuries of the Common Era,

Teotihuacan was violently destroyed through burning. As Coe notes, it "was mainly the heart of the city that suffered the torch, especially the palaces and temples on each side of the Avenue of the Dead, from the Pyramid of the Moon to the Ciudaldela." The luxurious palaces were now in ruins and the major temples were all abandoned. 72

69 Cowgill, "Social Differentiation," 219. 70 Adams, Prehistoric Mesoamerica, 255; Muriel Porter Weaver, The Aztecs, Maya, and Their Predecessors: Archaeology of Mesoamerica, 4 ed. (New York: Academic Press, 1981), 207-208; Millon, "The Last Years," 109. 71 Adams, Prehistoric Mesoamerica, 255. 72 Michael D. Coe, Mexico: From the Olmecs to the Aztecs, 4 ed. (New York: Thames and Hudson, Inc., 1994) 105-106. Muriel Porter Weaver notes that thereafter any seat of authority is absent.

"Politically the scene was in shambles and we have to look outside the Basin proper for leadership."73 As Richard E. Blanton, Gary M. Feinman, Laura M. Finsten, and Stephen

A. Kowalewski note, for about two hundred years after the collapse, the Valley of

Mexico was not the dominant centre of political or economic power in the central highlands and beyond. Post-collapse, no single valley community rose to prominence nor took a domineering role. These two centuries were most likely a phase "of political fragmentation in the Valley of Mexico, with no overarching political authority to integrate the region. Instead, the valley had perhaps six independent.. .political units.. .each consisting of clusters of sites ranging in total population from 5,000 to over

60,000 people." It is interesting to note that although "[e]ach cluster focused on one or more central places with civic-ceremonial architecture.. ,[n]one of the centers had mounded buildings that even approached the scale of antecedent Teotihuacan." What happened here is that Teotihuacan, a large-scale city-state that "had integrated whole behavioral regions broke up." And given that there is no evidence suggesting the subsequent smaller societies were ranked or stratified, the conclusion is that the

Teotihuacan state was replaced by "centers among a number of equals."74

It has to be answered who or what was responsible for the destruction of

Teotihuacan as a stratified state society. There are several contending theories, though given the evidence available, it seems that it was the Teotihuacanos themselves who laid

73 Weaver, The Aztecs, 198-199. 74 Richard E. Blanton, Gary M. Feinman, Laura M. Finsten, and Stephen A. Kowalewski, Ancient Mesoamerica: A comparison of change in three regions, 2 ed. (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1993), 136-138. their society to waste. Coe notes that one contrary hypothesis is that the city was burned and destroyed by "unknown invaders." One possible candidate is the Otomi- speaking nomads.75 But the available evidence does not support this hypothesis.

First, as Millon points out, "it is important to realize that Teotihuacan was defensible" when "considering the evidence for the total and deliberate destruction of the

7 ft center of Teotihuacan." However, since defensible societies have fallen victim to attack before, and after, this by itself is not sufficient to discount the idea of an external attack.

But he then notes the larger problem with this theory: "there is no evidence that the city's inhabitants were slaughtered. The data available implies that the destruction was relatively bloodless." Moreover, "the evidence seems to show that the city was not destroyed in bitterly contested combat. In fact, it appears that most of the city was not destroyed at all. It was principally the center [the home of political and religious authority] that was destroyed."77 And Weaver supports Millon on this point, noting that that "[t]here are no signs of warfare within the city, no evidence of outside intruders or 78 invasion." Moreover, as Millon notes, although the Teotihuacan rulers must have been the major target of the assault, given that the temples and palaces constituting the political centre of Teotihuacan were treated especially violent, "this was not a case of 7Q usurpation; after the Ciudaldela was laid waste, it never again served as temple-palace."

And more than a lack of evidence for warfare with unknown invaders, "[n]o exotic or

75 Coz, Ancient Peoples, 116-117. 76 Millon, "Teotihuacan," 236 77 Ibid. 78 Weaver, The Aztecs, 224-225. 79 Millon, "The Last Years," 156. 33 orj foreign persons or artifacts have been associated with it [the fall of Teotihuacan]."

Given the evidence, or the lack thereof, the theory of Teotihuacan being destroyed by an external attack by unknown invaders is hardly tenable.

Another hypothesis, other than the Teotihuacanos' conscious and wilful destruction of their society, is their societal decline was due to environmental collapse.

For example, Coe mentions the possibility that in building Teotihuacan there was so much lime burned that the surrounding forests were destroyed, resulting "in a precocious erosion and desiccation of the region." It has also been suggested that the area was increasingly lacking in moisture, having insufficient rainfall to support trees or woody plants of the climate. "The whole edifice of the Teotihuacan state may have perished O 1 through the ensuing agricultural debacle." And Weaver makes a similar suggestion. It is possible that there was an "abrupt alteration in the ecology affecting water resources and distribution or food production, which would disturb the delicate balance between the 89 demands of man and nature's resources." But again, the available evidence seems to contradict this hypothesis.

First, as Millon points out, when looking at archaeological evidence attesting to

Teotihuacan's economic conditions at the point of destruction, "it was not in an obvious state of decline." With environmental collapse, one would expect to see evidence of a serious decline in standards of living, resulting often in starvation, as people suffer from losses of raw materials, losses of wild-caught food, and decreased crop yields. And this 80 Ibid. 81 Coe, Ancient Peoples, 116-117. 82 Weaver, The Aztecs, 225-226. 83 Millon, "Teotihuacan," 236. 34 will often be combined with decreased amounts of everything made from both native and produced plants and wildlife, such as fuel and clothing. But the evidence does not suggest a major economic decline as has happened in other societies that have suffered environmental collapse.84

But more than a lack of serious decline, Teotihuacan continued to live for another two centuries away from the immediate city centre that was formerly home to political and religious authority. Weaver is quick to point out that some people continued to prosper in Teotihuacan, which remained the largest settlement in the Basin. Moreover, during the following two centuries, some of the finest murals of the era were painted and a variety of trade goods were still brought in.85 These are not the typical signs of an area that has suffered environmental collapse.86

Some people have also suggested that Teotihuacan fell because it was cut off from its trade and tribute routes, which resulted in severe economic decline. Coe, for example, notes the hypothesis that a new polity, such as the rising Xochicalco state, may

87 have disrupted its trade and tribute routes, causing political and/or economic malaise.

Weaver suggests that although "Teotihuacan has been successfully exploiting them for years.. .in the process, rival centers at Tajin, Xochicalco, and Cholula grew wealthy, learned the trade, and cut into the competition, perhaps blocking access to the

Teotihuacan Corridor." According to Weaver, circa 650 CE, the Olmeca-Xicalanca took

84 For discussions of several societies that have suffered environmental collapse see Jared Diamond, Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed (New York: Viking, 2005). 85 Weaver, The Aztecs, 198-199. 86 Again, see Diamond, Collapse. 87 Coe, Mexico, 105-106. Cholula in the Puebla Valley and established their capital at Cacaxtla. And at around the same time the people of Mixtec and Tajin, in addition to other local groups, were engaging in a struggle to dominate and control the region. "It is possible that they collaborated in closing the Teotihuacan Corridor [the major commercial route to the gulf and to the south].. .Evidence of this conflict would not leave traces at Teotihuacan, which was simply cut off from a distance. Very likely the Toltecs too can share the blame. They had settled at Tula by the eighth century and may have encroached on Teotihuacan's arable land."88

But, again, the available evidence disputes this hypothesis as well. Adams acknowledges that recent work at Cholula, around Monte Alban, shows Teotihuacan

"was not entirely alone in its sophistication during its terminal phase of A.D 500-650."

However, the idea that the Toltec had anything to do with the demise of Teotihuacan must be discarded since "Tula, the later capital of the Toltec, was not in existence, even as a small town, until about A.D. 800." And the suggestion that Xochicalco to the southwest had the requisite strength and hostility to block Teotihuacan's access to western Morelos, and to the Balsas River area beyond, is not a viable position either.

Xochicalco was not even an urban centre before 650 CE, and therefore was not capable of destroying Teotihuacan. And since Tula was not yet in existence, and Xochicalco was as of yet, not a developed society, Weaver's suggestion that an 'early triple alliance' among Tula, Xochicalco, and Cholula may have cut off Teotihuacan's trade and tribute

88 Weaver, The Aztecs, 225-226. 36 OQ routes, must also be discarded. The most important point, however, is Millon's aforementioned conclusion that Teotihuacan was not in an obvious state of economic decline.90 Lacking any such signs of a fall precipitated by economic disruption, it is hardly tenable that Teotihuacan fell due to interference with its trade and tribute routes.

There is one theory that the evidence seemingly supports: it was the

Teotihuacanos who consciously and of their own volition destroyed their complex and stratified state society in favour of simpler and perhaps more egalitarian ones. This is suggested, firstly, by the evidence that the target of the attack was the political and religious centre and yet political usurpation did not follow. Blanton, Feinman, Finsten, and Kowalewski suggest that Teotihuacanos carried out the destruction of Teotihuacan with "a desire to overthrow the state and its cults."91 Weaver notes that, "[although the fire marks the catastrophe, Teotihuacan declined over decades and was not immediately abandoned. What seemed to collapse rapidly were the political system, power, prestige, Q9 and control." An initial sign that the threat was against the Teotihuacan religious and political structures is the fact that, as Weaver observes, during the "waning Classic days.. .[i]t is surely significant that defensive walls were added to the upper part of the 93

Ciudaldela, the city's political center." Blanton, Feinman, Finsten, and Kowalewski note that there were major fires and the destruction of buildings and religious effigies, and slaughtered persons among the civic-ceremonial buildings along the Street of the

89 Adams, Prehistoric Mesoamerica, 255-256. 90 Millon, "Teotihuacan," 236. 91 Blanton, Feinman, Finsten, and Kowalewski, Ancient Mesoamerica, 135. 92 Weaver, The Aztecs, 224-225. 93 Ibid., 225. 37 Dead.94 And Millon argues that "[t]he location and intensity of the fires along the

'Street of the Dead' point to an organized, planned campaign of ritual destruction." In the

North Palace of the Ciudaldela the "[ajrticulated limbs and other skeletal parts of an individual [were found].. .The person cut down evidently had been richly adorned.

Associated with the dismembered body were many plaques of jade, possibly from a mosaic, and beads of jade, black stone, and shell." Other individuals in the North and

South Palaces were found with "their skulls shattered and the bodies cut to pieces." These bodies, those richly adorned and/or associated with the palaces, are the only discovered bodies that are related to the acts of devastation. And there is more evidence that the nature of the destruction was ritual. A variety of depictions of Teotihuacan gods were

"smashed" along with standard Teotihuacan roof decorations for temples, shrines, and public buildings, some burned bright orange. And in the Temple of Quetzalcoatl, "great stone heads adorning the temple facades were dismantled and sent crashing down to the north and south, where they fell into the passageways separating the palaces from the temple and onto the palaces themselves."95

The fires that destroyed Teotihuacan were set very selectively. As Millon notes, destruction and burning was "confined largely to monumental architecture on the 'Street of the Dead' and to temples and associated buildings in the rest of the city.. .This includes virtually all the buildings on the 'Street of the Dead' on which judgement was possible, excluding only those so completely reconstructed or otherwise altered that no basis for

94 Blanton, Feinman, Finsten, and Kowalewski, Ancient Mesoamerica, 135. 95 Millon, "The Last Years," 150-152. 38 judgement existed." In the remaining areas of the city, of the sixty-eight temples that could be examined specifically for evidence of burning, twenty-eight were burned and eight were possibly burned for a total of fifty-three percent. Twenty-two temples, or thirty-two percent, showed no sign of burning, and ten were so altered that no judgement was possible. A total of 965 apartment compounds were also examined for signs of burning, of which forty-five showed clear evidence of burning (five percent), and eighty- five were possibly burned (nine percent). This makes a total of fourteen percent of apartments that were burned as opposed to the fifty-three percent of temples. "It is clear that the principal targets of burning were temples, pyramids, and public buildings."96

But more than selectively set, the fires seem to have been systematically set. Millon notes the "excessive thoroughness with which the center of the city was destroyed.

Temples, public buildings, and palaces were not merely destroyed - they were knocked down, torn apart, burned, reduced to rubble, time after time, building after building, for more than two kilometres." Millon argues that "[m]ore than an explosive flash of fury is represented in these ruins:"Q 7

[t]he process of overkill was carried out not only in the Ciudaldela, the seat of power, but in structure after structure along the full length of the "Street of the Dead" to the Moon Plaza and Moon Pyramid. Clearly, those who carried out this process of systematic destruction were well enough organized and motivated, possessed of objectives clearly enough defined, and passionately enough involved to persist for however long it took to carry through those objectives.98

96 Ibid., 149-150. 97 Ibid., 153. 98 Ibid. 39 Moreover, all the temples that were demolished on the Avenue of the Dead were never rebuilt and most were never used again as temples.

Following the ritual destruction of Teotihuacan the site was abandoned for an estimated period of fifty years. "Thereafter a much diminished city grew up again on the site of the former metropolis.. .Moreover, the center of the former city was never again re-occupied intensively, and the once-sacred places in the center of the former metropolis were the foci of no more than sporadic religious activity."99 Blanton, Feinman, Finsten, and Kowalewski note that "[t]he fact that the subsequent occupants of the city carefully avoided reusing the major civic-ceremonial buildings does suggest an internal revolt by groups who wanted to disassociate themselves from these buildings and their political and religious symbols. Whoever was responsible carried out the task in the form of a giant ritual of political destruction."100 As Millon argues, the final purpose of the devastation at Teotihuacan must have been its political destruction.

The extent, intensity, and excessiveness of the destruction argue that, although its form was ritual, its purpose was political.. .The ultimate purpose must have been the destruction of Teotihuacan as a dominant political power. To accomplish this political end must have appeared to require more than the destruction of the palaces and temples in its political center. It must also have appeared necessary to destroy Teotihuacan as a religious center.. .Those who carried out the destruction were so successful that the new Teotihuacan that later grew up around the ruins of the old never again approached the greatness of its predecessor.101

However, although the Teotihuacan rulers must have been the major target of the assault, given that the temples and palaces constituting the political centre of Teotihuacan were

"ibid., 153-154. 100 Blanton, Feinman, Finsten, and Kowalewski, Ancient Mesoamerica, 135. 101 Millon, "The Last Years," 155. 40 treated especially violent, it is important to remember that 'this was not a case of usurpation; after the Ciudaldela was laid waste, it never again served as temple-palace.'

More than the fact that the political and religious centres were the focus, yet it was seemingly not done by outsiders or by insiders seeking political power, there are significant aspects of the destruction which have the characteristics of an 'inside' job.

Weaver notes that "[s]elective burning and looting looks like it could have been the work

109 of well-informed malcontents." Adams points out that "[c]aches of sacred and valuable items were dug from their hiding places, and tombs were systematically looted. Both of these hidden depositories yielded luxury pottery, perhaps textiles, and certainly the carved jade jewels which were the highest form of Mesoamerican wealth."103 This is another sign that it was Teotihuacanos who brought down the city-centre.

In summation, the evidence does not support the theory that foreign invaders, environmental collapse, or economic disruption, was the reason for the fall of

Teotihuacan. Rather, the evidence suggests that the Teotihuacanos systematically attacked and destroyed the seats of political and religious authority to bring about their end and not to usurp political power. Following this, they formed several smaller and independent political units that were seemingly 'centers among a number of equals'. The

Teotihuacan consciously and of their own volition revolted against their complex and stratified state society, ushering in an era of statelessness that lasted for hundreds of

102 Weaver, The Aztecs, 224-225. 103 Adams, Prehistoric Mesoamerica, 256-257. 41 years. Thus, it is important to note that the development of state forms is not unilinear or irreversible, which clearly poses a major challenge to stages theory.

Rather, what we have when we talk about bands, tribes, chiefdoms and state societies are labels that allow for a non-linear and non-progressivist system of classification. As mentioned above, these labels are imperfect because as general or ideal types they will fail to capture relatively rare but real situations that are exceptions to virtually universal characteristics. Keeping in mind the caveat that these ideal types only claim to be virtually universally applicable, rare differences between general types and real experiences should not be seen to invalidate this general typology that is a useful shorthand for discussing the diversity of human social organization forms.

Band society

As Diamond and Peter Bogucki note, since our closest animal relatives, the gorillas, chimpanzees, and bonobos of Africa live in bands, it is probable that humans evolved into their anatomically modern form, about 100,000 years ago, organized in band society, making it likely that the band is a product of millions of years of evolutionary history.104

And it is a reasonable assumption that all humans lived in bands until about 40,000 years ago, and that most did even up to 10,000 to 11,000 years ago.105

As Marvin Harris, Hugh Brody, Allen W. Johnson and Timothy Earle, Elman R.

Service, Morton H. Fried, and Diamond describe it, a band is a small group of

104 Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel, 270; Peter Bogucki, The Origins of Human Society (Massachusetts: Blackwell, 1999), 30, 69. 105 Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel, 268, 270; Bogucki, 74. 42 households, between twenty and a few hundred people at most, with members related through kinship or marriage.106 As Elanor Leacock and Richard Lee, Brody, Bogucki,

Service and Diamond tell us, typically bands are foragers, or hunters and gatherers of wild food stuffs.107 The form of production uses large areas of land temporarily and requires significant space in which to move as immediately available resources dwindle.

This makes bands highly flexible and mobile. A band is essentially without fixed socio- political boundaries. As Johnson and Earle, as well as Service, maintain, band size may remain relatively constant all year, or it may split up for part of the year as families leave to better exploit resources alone, which demonstrates family self-sufficiency and autonomy. The band will reform at certain times of the year as problems or opportunities arise. The timing may depend on such things as their foraging pattern, the need for cooperative work, and ritual schedule. Basically, when food procurement is competitive there is dispersion and when it is cooperative there is aggregation, with the size of the gathering typically depending on its purpose. A band's size can vary from one season to

106 Marvin Harris, Our Kind: Who We Are, Where We Came From, Where We Are Going (New York: Harper and Row, 1989), 344; Hugh Brody, The Other Side of Eden: Hunters, Farmers, and the Shaping of the World (Vancouver: Douglas and Mclntyre, 2000), 118; Morton H. Fried, The Evolution of Political Society: An Essay in Political Anthropology (U.S.: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1967), 68; Allen W. Johnson and Timothy Earle, The Evolution of Human Societies: From Foraging Group to Agrarian State, 2nd ed. (California: Stanford University Press, 2000), 32,41; Elman R. Service, Primitive Social Organization: And Evolutionary Perspective, 2nd ed. (New York: Random House, 1971), 58, 100; Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel, 268. 107 Elanor Leacock and Richard Lee, "Introduction," in Elanor Leacock and Richard Lee, eds., Politics and History in Band Societies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 1, 7; Elanor Leacock, "Relations of production in band society," in Elanor Leacock and Richard Lee, eds., Politics and History in Band Societies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 159; Bogucki, 115; Brody, 117; Service, Primitive, 57; Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel, 268. 43 the next, as some families may opt to continue their individual efforts or join another band.108

Leacock and Lee, Bogucki, Johnson and Earle, Service and Fried find that band membership is not clearly defined. Contributing further to its fluidity and flexibility is the fact that disagreements between members may lead to an individual or family leaving and joining another band. Moreover, individuals will often move between bands in which they have close relatives. Marriage often provides ties between a few bands, and individuals can and do separate and form new bands. With band organization there is not yet significant and sustained political integration, although there is some group identity.109

As Fried, Service, and Johnson and Earle have observed, in every known society, there are positions of status, or social standing (e.g., father, husband, son-in-law, member of this or that clan, shaman), and there are roles, or the activity counterpart of statuses

(e.g., comforter, entertainer, educator, fighter). All known societies create status hierarchies, such as those based on age differences; however, differing levels of prestige that accompany differing places in the hierarchy have no necessary connection with power, although there is a necessary connection with authority.110

108 Elman R. Service, Origins of the State and Civilization: The Process of Cultural Evolution (U.S.: W.W. Norton and Co., 1975), 101; Johnson and Earle, 32, 33, 44, 50, 51, 91. 109 Leacock and Lee, 7; Leacock, 159; Bogucki, 73, 74, 124; Johnson and Earle, 41,44; Service, Primitive, 100; Service, Origins, 65, 66; Fried, 68. 110 Fried, 29, 33; Service, Origins, 48,49, 50; Service, Primitive, 15,40, 65, 103; Johnson and Earle, 41. 44 As Fried and Service point out, in anthropology the distinction between

experiences of power and authority is important.111 Power is the ability to channel the

behaviour of others, often through the possession or use of threats or sanctions.

Authority, on the other hand, is the ability to channel the behaviour of others in the

absence of threats or use of sanctions. It is usually based on a person's achieved status

(i.e., based on qualities of the person gained through action) or a person's ascribed status

(i.e., based on qualities of a person gained through birth - race, ethnicity, gender, age,

and physical ability), and other such bases for personal respect. Authority typically

induces compliance through people's usual obedience to custom, habit, ideas of

119 propriety, benefits, or other such considerations.

As Fried, Service, and Johnson and Earle have shown us, bands have statuses hierarchically arranged according to prestige, and the most usual hierarchical statuses

found in the domestic family, such as parent-child, older-younger, male-female,113 etc.

111 Theorists within political science have discussed the issue of power and authority. One could, for example, look at the work of Max Weber, who argues that power exists when "one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance," whereas authority entails "a certain minimum of voluntary submission" [see Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, A.M Henderson and Talcott Parsons, trans. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), 152, 324]. It is important to note that the distinction made by anthropologists is not always adopted by political scientists. 112 Fried, 33; Service, Origins, 11. 113 It should be noted that there are examples of female leadership if one looks, for example, at the tribal society on the Pacific island of Vanatinai. Here, women can gain authority from sponsoring redistributive feats, displaying public generosity through acquiring and giving away public valuables. On the basis of this garnered respect these women may "lead expeditions by sailing canoes to distant islands to visit their exchange partners...[and] host mortuary feasts, mobilizing kin, affines, and exchange partners to plant extra large yam gardens to feed guests sumptuously." Women may also be successful gardeners, healers and sorcerers, and thereby gain authority and lead. Granted, more men than women garner authority in this way, but the existence of women leaders, for example, "women who are far more active in exchange and feasting than the majority of men," cannot be denied. For this, see Maria Lepowsky, "Big Men, Big Women, and Cultural Autonomy," Ethnology 29:10 (1990), 41-42; and also Maria Lepowsky, Fruit of the Motherland: Gender in an Egalitarian Society (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). 45 That said, these statuses, although unequal by their nature, remain devoid of any claim to power. There is no true hierarchy of power outside of kinship statuses. Outside of the age and sex hierarchy, band society is profoundly egalitarian. There are no non-familial power positions, and typically band members will not tolerate anyone who seems to desire dominance over others.114

Bands also lack ranking. Fried and Leacock argue that one can identify ranking by the existence of fewer positions of vaunted status than people capable of filling them.

Ranking occurs when a society exercises its ability to limit its members' access to status positions that they would otherwise hold on the basis of personal attributes such as sex and age. In a band there are as many positions of prestige as there are persons capable of filling them. The band adjusts the number of valued statuses to the number of people able to fill them, and it does not have the means of limiting the number of persons capable of exerting authority. Those who can wield authority do so, yet there is no perceived necessity for or tolerance of these people coming together to establish dominion over the group. Bands do have powerful levelling mechanisms aimed at preventing the appearance of significantly wide gaps in the ability and prestige of their members. One example of such a mechanism is the way in which some egalitarian societies employ a variety of means to identify the successful hunter on a given day so that the credit for bringing

114 Fried, 13, 29, 33; Service, Origins, 11,48,49, 50, 51; Service, Primitive, 16, 40, 65, 103; Johnson and Earle, 41. 46 home game is randomized and therefore spread among all the eligible men in the society.115

None of this is to say there is no leadership in a band. According to Fried, no human society has completely lacked leadership, or situations in which a course of action is set by someone and followed by others.116 But, as Fried, Service, and Johnson and

Earle observe, beyond the modest and informal authority of family heads and transient leaders in a band, there is no separate political life, government, or legal system.

Leadership is informal and transient. Leadership is not an office in that it is not a permanent position that must be refilled if vacated. No one person is named as a permanent leader for the whole group at all times. Rather, leadership depends on the activity, and the person possessing the relevant particular talent(s) is given special respect, will be listened to, and likely followed. Leadership moves from one competent person to another depending on whose advice and knowledge about the specific task are especially respected. Thus, leadership is based on the quality of the individual's advice and personality. If a leader gives bad advice that does not produce beneficial results, people will not continue to listen. If a leader makes bad decisions, people will stop following. But even if a person is an excellent leader for a particular endeavour, the rest of the band will only defer to him/her in the context where he/she has expertise and not outside.117

115 Fried, 33-34, 58-59; Leacock, 159. 116 Fried, 83. 117 Fried, 83; Service, Origins, 11, 50, 52; Service, Primitive, 98. As Fried, Service, Johnson and Earle, Brody, Leacock and Lee, Diamond, and

Harris suggest, leaders are essentially advisers and spokespersons, not executives. For the most part, they have the ability to sense the prevailing opinion and base their decisions on that, thereby, in effect, assenting to decisions or viewpoints arrived at by the group as a whole, or at least the male peers. It is in this sense that the leader is more a spokesman for public opinion rather than someone moulding it. In this advisory role, leaders will make suggestions about coordinating, initiating, and directing some activity, such as a collective hunt, but they must convince others to their way of thinking or change direction. Leaders have authority, not power, since they have no physical resource to impose their will and compel the others to undertake their idea(s). Ethnographies of bands are replete with examples of individuals stating that if a given course of action is followed, then beneficial results will occur, with no guarantee that people will do it. It is difficult to find examples where one individual simply commands one or more individuals to do this or that. Usually the person who initiates the idea also performs the activity. If something needs to be done, someone will take a leading role and start doing it, work harder at it than anyone else, and thereby set an example for hard work. There is a deep respect for individual decisions in band society. In most matters, the decision to follow a leader's advice or example is a matter of individual choice. Leaders make their opinion known, and others follow or not as they prefer. 118

118 Fried, 83; Service, Origins, 50, 51, 52, 53; Service, Primitive, 98; Johnson and Earle, 32, 33, 44; Brody, 118; Leacock and Lee, 1, 10-11; Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel, 268, 269; Harris, 347, 350, 351. 48 As Fried observes, there is no social stratification between leaders and followers.119 The band leader is simply a 'first among equals.' And there exist social levelling mechanisms to prevent anyone from accumulating much authority or influence.

Another example, as Service, Harris, and Lee and Leacock point out, in addition to the previously mentioned hunting example, is the widely and deeply entrenched value of self-effacement that is combined with open hostility towards self-aggrandizement.

Leaders are therefore only respected and followed if they are, in addition to being able, humble, do not draw attention to themselves, and are very modest. Leaders avoid prominence by having almost no possessions. They give away almost everything that comes their way. A leader gives away more than anyone else and in trading with other groups he is careful not to keep the best items for himself. He thereby wins the respect and following of all the people. Moreover, this is another example of a person leading by example so as to encourage generosity amongst band members. Members of band society, being strongly anti-authoritarian, do not tolerate even the suggestion of a permanent leader or chief. It is due to these aspects of leadership - informality,

120 transience, lack of power and stratification - that bands are called egalitarian.

Decision-making is the main 'political' activity in bands, and it concerns such things as migration, food distribution, hunting, and interpersonal conflict resolution.

Although external conflict between bands, or more likely specific members of bands, is a concern, it is rare, since territories of different bands are widely separated and the

119 Fried, 11. 120 Fried, 83; Service, Origins, 52, 55; Harris, 350; Leacock and Lee, 7; Johnson and Earle, 46. 49 population density is low. In general, according to Harris, Diamond, Leacock and Lee,

Bogucki, as well as Johnson and Earle, decision-making is egalitarian. First, the leader has no monopoly on information. And insofar as the band leader is a spokesperson for,

and advisor to, public opinion wherein individual members decide for themselves, and remembering the strong anti-authoritarianism of band members, many decisions are in

effect made collectively. Given the aforementioned family self-sufficiency and

autonomy, the family is the basic unit in which final decisions about most daily activities

are made. As long as it is not an issue involving fundamental conflicts of interest,

consensus decision-making is typical. And consensus is arrived at without resort to power or force. Aside from a consensus reached due to sheer respect for a person's expertise, people may use a variety of techniques that range from discussion, through rough humour and put downs to achieve agreement. And if a few members do not agree with the majority opinion, they are free and able to leave the band and either go it alone or join another.121

This discussion is obviously closely related to social regulation. By that I mean mediation, order and conflict resolution, maintenance of society, reinforcement, and other related practices. As characterized by Leacock and Lee, typically, members of a band society highly value sharing, reciprocity, hard work, political equality, sociability, and an even temper, among other qualities. Conflicts arise when individuals want to hoard rather than share, attempt to dominate others, be lazy and freeload, be sullen and isolate

121 Harris, 350, 351; Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel, 268; Leacock and Lee, 1, 10-11; Bogucki, 124; Johnson and Earle, 41,51. 50 themselves, or be quick to argue and fight. In fact, a significant part of the social life of

199 band members is the recurrent avoidance or settling of disturbing conflicts.

The very nature of band society can militate against certain types of conflicts. For example, thefts were not a problem for most bands since each member had access to the resources needed to sustain life. Harris, Diamond, Lee and Leacock, Leacock, Johnson and Earle, Fried, and Bogucki argue that depending on their social responsibilities, all could hunt, gather, make the tools necessary for subsistence, obtain necessities for clothing, food preparation, and domestic work. There was no notion of private ownership of territory. Only personal items, such as arrows and clothing, were owned privately. And if you want to use another's private possession, you would ask for it, and it was usually given. Moreover, band members could even make use of the territories of other bands if, for example, they were allied by kinship or marriage.

However, as Harris and Service put it, every society has its deviants in that there are individuals who, for example, do not fulfill status and role expectations or who find themselves in a situation that socialization does not cover.124 These people can cause problems for other individuals and/or society at large. As Diamond, Brody, and Service maintain, in band societies, there are no formal or governmental institutions, such as I ^f laws, police, and treaties, to resolve conflicts. According to Fried, without the existence of power, and thus no recourse to sanction, leaders cannot create or enforce

122 Leacock and Lee, 9. 123 Harris, 354; Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel, 269 Lee and Leacock, 1, 8-9; Leacock, 159; Johnson and Earle, 43,44, 56, 89; Fried, 63; Bogucki, 124. 124 Harris, 355; Service, Origins, 49. 125 Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel, 268; Brody, 118; Service, Origins, 54. laws, or rules of conduct they can use power to administer and enforce by sanctions.

The means of ensuring conformity with norms in simple egalitarian societies is through custom, or established and habitual practices. A departure from a custom is a deviation, whereas a departure from a law is a crime.126 But the absence of law does not mean total anarchy. As Service as well as Johnson and Earle describe it, there are structures, such as custom, kinship, authority-based leadership, and reciprocal exchange, that regulate such things as access to resources, patterns of production, the distribution of food, and economic relationships. These are not so much formal principles as common understandings of what is proper activity. As flexible and individualistic as band society is, custom guides behaviour by delineating what is proper and improper.127 As Service tells us, there are three elements to custom: etiquette; teaching of morality, which is internalized as conscience; and informal social sanctions, where society punishes and rewards, usually simply by adding and subtracting prestige, depending on whether a person obeys or ignores social expectations. The expectations and habits related to these

1 aspects of custom smoothly regulate much of social life in band society.

As Service maintains, most of this enculturation is accomplished within the domestic family. A combination of unconscious internalization with positive and negative sanctions is what generally accounts for reinforcement. Highly respected people, such as a leader, will often take proactive steps to maintain social harmony, such as exhorting people to treat others with respect, to work hard, and other such social

126 Fried, 20. 127 Service, Origins, 53-54; Johnson and Earle, 42-43. 128 Service, Origins, 11,48. 52 expectations. However, again, typically there is no public power that monopolizes the right to use of physical force to suppress internal conflict and/or enforce sanctions by legal means.129 Usually, a violation of custom is not a crime, but an embarrassment.

Service as well as Lee and Leacock find that the violator is less likely to be physically punished than teased and ridiculed, and this general disapproval or withdrawal from the

I 1A offender deprives him of the benefits of reciprocity. As Service describes, since bands are small, close-knit groups, disputes tend to be handled at the interpersonal level through endless group discussion, merciless shaming and ridicule, which allows people to vent their feelings and shows the trend of public opinion, and thereby may be of assistance in settling disputes. There may even be one-on-one fights between disputants. When a conflict is irresolvable, forcing an offending member to leave the group is a common means of punishment, and if severe enough, band fission is another mechanism.131

Service has observed that it is often society at large that determines right from wrong and cooperatively punishes offenders, with sanctions often administered by no particular person at all. Sometimes, elders and other influential persons may have special authority and be called upon for advice. And since it is a small society, conflicts are typically between kinsmen, which make it likely that elders can intervene and end disputes. And when one person is clearly in the right, and the other clearly in the wrong, the unanimity of public opinion is itself the mediator, usually ending any dispute over guilt and the appropriate sanction. When the issue is not so clear, a public contest, such as

129 Service, OriginsA9, 53-56; 130 Service, Origins, 54; Lee and Leacock, 7. 131 Service, Origins, 54, 57-58. 53 a song or dance competition, can be used to settle the dispute, since as the contest continues the undecided public gradually realizes a majority opinion, which then quickly turns to unanimity.132 As Lee and Leacock as well as Brody point out, before, during, and after conflict, the emphasis is on maintaining social order and restoring social equilibrium and harmony, not hurtfully punishing an offender. The means of social regulation in band society are functional as much as moral in that they are ways that have proven successful at maintaining and restoring harmonious interpersonal life and thereby contributing to the success of the band.

As previously mentioned, the property relations in band society are non-stratified.

As Fried has shown us, stratification exists when adult members of a given society possess differential rights of access to basic resources, or the physical things needed to sustain life. Bands do not restrict access to the materials necessary to make tools and weapons for obtaining food and preparing it for consumption, and virtually everyone possess the skills to do so. There exist no exclusive rights to land, or hunting and fishing territories, or areas that collect rainwater. These are free to all. The land used by the band belongs to the whole group, instead of being partitioned among and privately and exclusively held by subgroups or individuals.134 And, in actuality, it is not truly proper to even call it the band's land since their hold on it is typically temporary. Bogucki argues that even when bands returned to particular areas, their composition may have been

132 Service, Origins, 54-58. 133 Leacock and Lee, 9; Brody, 147. 134 Fried, 52, 58-59. 54 different each time, as discussed above, and it is likely that other families or bands had used the area in the meantime.135

According to Fried, Harris, Diamond, Leacock and Lee, Brody, Leacock, Johnson and Earle, and Bogucki, rather than private property rights in strategic resources, band members have use

rights. This means that a person or family has socially recognized priority in access to gathering regions, hunting and fishing areas, watering holes, and the like. Typically, use rights are invested in the family and passed down equally to all children. However, as Harris as well as Leacock and Lee suggest, access is willingly shared with other band members by permission, which is virtually always given since all are related in some way. And, usually, visiting groups are welcome as well, and will be given food and water, and these visitors will, in turn, play host when people come to their camp. Permission-based sharing is a common practice. That said, encroaching on an area without permission could lead to violence. Thus, as Johnson and Earle observe, the primary way people are excluded from strategic resources is social insofar as a person or group must be related by kin, marriage, or other ties to members of the band, and usually neighbouring bands are related in such ways. Although some instances of conflict between bands over strategic resources have been documented, the conflict is less intense and less likely to be lethal than in settled groups with rules of private property, for reasons discussed below. 138

135 Bogucki, 74. 136 Fried, 52, 58-59; Harris, 354; Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel, 268, 269; Leacock and Lee, 8; Leacock, 159; Brody, 118; Johnson and Earle, 33, 43,44, 56, 89; Bogucki, 74. 137 Harris, 354; Leacock and Lee, 8. 138 Johnson and Earle, 43. 55 As Harris, Leacock and Lee, Johnson and Earle, and Fried point out, despite the absence of private possession in land or other vital resources, bands, like all known societies, do have institutionalized private property in non-strategic objects, such as hand- made arrows, weapons, clothing, containers, ornaments, and tools, which cannot be removed from the user without social disruption. These personal effects form the basis of intra-band gift-giving and inter-band exchange, which make possible far-flung networks of reciprocity by creating some kind of obligation for a return of some kind, and can also enhance the giver's prestige. That said, it is important to note that accumulated prestige, whether through gifts or hunting excellence or something else entirely, is not transferable

1 ^Q to other areas of society and does not constitute a firm basis for political power.

The intimate connection between resources and social relations, both internal and external to the band, should be noticeable, and both of these are related to 'production.'

In band society, according to Service, Leacock, Diamond, Leacock and Lee, and Johnson and Earle, there is no regular economic specialization, except by age and sex. All able- bodied individuals forage for food, make tools and utensils, build shelters, and obtain and work materials for clothing in climates where it is needed.140 As characterized by Johnson and Earle, each family may forage more or less alone within the band's range since, supported by a few close relatives, they could be largely self-sufficient and therefore need not be permanently subordinate to the band. As previously mentioned, when food procurement becomes competitive because what is immediately available is insufficient,

139 Harris, 354; Leacock and Lee, 8-9; Johnson and Earle, 43; Fried, 63. 140 Service, Primitive, 57; Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel, 268, 269; Leacock and Lee, 1; Leacock, 160; Johnson and Earle, 42-3. there is dispersion.141 Jeanne E. Arnole as well as Johnson and Earle argue that families, in consultation with close kin and friends, make most of the daily decisions about productive activities. It is elders or heads of households that call regularly upon labour from spouses and offspring. Generally, labour is exclusively under kin group control.142 In band society, as Johnson and Earle put it, families must allocate a good portion of their total resources to subsistence (e.g., basic needs for nourishment, shelter, clothing, and whatever else is needed for production and consumption), which may be partially acquired through trade, and use the surplus for ceremonial concerns (e.g., expenditures to host small and occasional ad hoc feasting and gift giving used to build and maintain social relations to reciprocity). The labour required for any productive activity rarely extends beyond the family.143

There is an intimate connection between production and social relations within the band. As Harris, Diamond, Leacock and Lee, Bogucki, Leacock, and Johnson and

Earle describes, there is institutionalized interpersonal sharing. For example, people share food and no one goes hungry if there is food in the camp. Chance played a great role in hunting and gathering, and an individual who was lucky one day could easily be in need the next. In order to provide for themselves and their family in precarious times, they were generous with others. This distributes risk throughout the band because of

141 Johnson and Earle, 41,42,43, 50, 51, 52, 56. 142 Jeanne E. Arnole, "Organizational Transformations: Power and Labor Among Complex Hunter- Gatherers and Other Intermediate Societies," in Jeanne E. Arnold, ed., Emergent Complexity: The Evolution of Intermediate Societies (Ann Arbor, Michigan: International Monographs in Prehistory, 1996), 59; Johnson and Earle, 42. 143 Johnson and Earle, 51, 52, 56. reciprocity, a give-and-take of equivalent value over time.144 For Johnson and Earle, between family members and friends there exist what is called generalized reciprocity.

People give to each other, expecting nothing concrete or immediate in return. An individual does not keep strict accounting of repayment, and sharing occurs to emphasize their sociability, help out the needy, and bank against risk and uncertainty. Typically, with the rest of the band relationships tend to be structured by balanced reciprocity. This is predicated on fair exchange, with people paying attention to equality of exchanges, and complaints about unfairness and one-sidedness. Such reciprocity, through gift-giving and exchange, creates warm familial and friendly ties that bond and hold band members together. More than that, reciprocity is a form of social insurance. It creates a pool of exchange partners who can be turned to in times of need.145

Reciprocity, as Johnson and Earle maintain, is not so much a set of formal principles as a common understanding of what is proper treatment towards and from one's kin, friends, and fellow-band members. To not reciprocate is not a crime but an embarrassment. Again, violation is not likely to be physically punished but rather ridiculed. Thus, social pressure reinforces reciprocity.146 And, according to Bogucki, reciprocity reinforces significant equality among band members. It prevents any single member of the band, no matter how successful, from accumulating wildly disproportionate amounts of goods or food. Although every band member has equal access to strategic resources, some are going to be more successful than others due to

144 Harris, 344-345; Leacock and Lee, 1, 8, 11; Bogucki, 75, 76, 77. 124; Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel, 269; Johnson and Earle, 17, 47,49, 50. 145 Johnson and Earle, 49. 146 Ibid., 42-43. superior skill. Sharing helps to maintain significant material equality, although social differences through age and sex may persist.147 As Johnson and Earle describe it, generally, there is a strong ethos of equality and sharing, and the goal of band organization in this respect is the subsistence of everyone as opposed to the differential

148 advantage of an individual or family. In fact, as Brody tells us, food, for example, is usually never consumed alone by a family, but rather shared out with band members.

Often, a segment of the able-bodied goes out to procure sustenance and what is brought back is divided equitably amongst band members. In the end, to possess significantly more than others is to be expected to share more with others.149

Reciprocity, as Leacock notes, also extends to external relations.150 Two neighbouring bands will typically engage in balanced reciprocity in several ways. As

Service maintains, first there is reciprocal inter-marrying between the two bands. This re- establishes and cements relations between the kin of those married. Aside from each member of the married couple having relations with a new band, their children will have parents and grandparents from, and therefore potential if not actual relations with, these different bands.151 Johnson and Earle as well as Leacock and Lee find that these relations accomplish several things: they open up the territory of the other band and allow peaceful movement within it; they allow for sharing with those who are visiting; they provide risk sharing, by creating a pool of exchange partners who can be turned to in times of

147 Bogucki, 75. 148 Johnson and Earle, 89. 149 Brody, 118. 150 Leacock, 160. 151 Service, Origins, 60, 62. resource shortages or other need; they provide access to information about food that may be found in the other band's home ranges; also they allow people to take advantage of any large temporary variations in food resources; they allow the bands to organize together to handle problems of security and defence; they allow trade for locally valued

1 materials; and they also allow for people simply to have fun in larger social gatherings.

Johnson and Earle have observed that the openness of band territory to specified others is typical, and should make it apparent that although a band may have a home area at a given point in time, it rarely claims exclusive access to this territory or strictly defends it against all outsiders. As Service points out, territory should largely be seen as a way of delineating members in a band, a social as opposed to a strictly economic matter.154

As Service has shown us, other links between bands include fictive kinship, such as the relationship between 'godparents' and 'godchildren' of the San ('Bushmen') of the

Kalahari Desert of southern Africa. Between people unrelated by kinship, either true or fictive, mutual exchanges and visiting also link bands. And gift giving is used as a way to build and cement ties with other bands. Aside from showing generosity and friendliness, freely giving a valuable gift to people in another band typically obligates a person to respond appropriately as though personal ties actually existed.155

External relations between bands can also be problematic. Service argues that when there is distance between groups and not a lot known about each other it can be

152 Johnson and Earle, 41,43, 50, 57, 88; Leacock and Lee, 8,11. 153 Johnson and Earle, 32-33. 154 Service, Primitive, 60, 63; Leacock and Lee, 8, 11; Leacock, 159, 160. 155 Service, Origins, 61. difficult to mediate disputes.156 That said, conflicts between different bands are relatively rare. According to Johnson and Earle, when conflicts do occur, they often are between individuals of different bands, as opposed to the bands as a whole, and usually over women and other such issues. With such individual conflicts, they are typically fought person-to-person, using either harsh words or fists, but can result in impulsive homicides when tempers flare out of control. However, as Johnson and Earle suggest, aggression is discouraged so as to maintain an extensive network of relationships, or at

1 CQ least the potential for them. As Service observes, if aggression becomes too severe, a kin group will likely respond as a whole to an injury to one of its members, and will take an injury to any member of the offender's group as satisfactory retribution. This situation could develop into a full-scale feud, especially since the opposing groups are unlikely to similarly view the original injury, and therefore disagree as to what is an equivalent retaliation. Extensive aggression is also discouraged by the nature of band society. The informal and non-hierarchical character of band society is not conducive to waging organized aggression. Bands do not have specialized military forces or leaders.159

Moreover, as Johnson and Earle point out, since the home areas of bands are large relative to the number of members, two bands fighting over access is uncommon, and an attempt to systematically defend the territory would be difficult if not wholly impractical.160 Larger-scale conflicts do erupt between bands, as characterized by

156 Ibid., 58. 157 Johnson and Earle, 43. 158 Ibid., 43. 159 Service, Origins, 58-9. 160 Johnson and Earle, 43. 61 Service, although they are not usually bloody. Such a small-scale society cannot

sustain very many combatants, and this ensures the fights are not large or long lasting.

Also, the egalitarian nature of society and the transient character of leadership ensures that no one has the ability to conscript or force people to go to war. And the members of a band, left to their own devices will usually not significantly risk their lives. This all leads

to a situation where fights are typically surprise raids or ambushes. What battles occur are more noisy than bloody, with much of the time being taken up with violent talk, and the remaining time left for duels that typically end when one person suffers even a non-fatal wound.161

Like internal and external social relations, leisure in band society as also linked with production. As Brody argues, given low levels of need, expertise in their territory, and small populations, band members worked hard but enjoyed significant leisure

1 AO time. As Bogucki puts it, they decorated their homes and created portable figurines, engravings, and ornaments.163 According to Leacock and Lee, during leisure time they engaged in activities such as painting, carving, and decorating tools and utensils, clothes, their bodies, and sacred objects. They also composed stories and songs, and developed commemorative rituals. At other points in time, they rested and lazed about.164

As Johnson and Earle describe it, the ritualism and ceremonialism of band societies are typically ad hoc and little developed. They usually support band cohesion

161 Service, Origins, 59. 162 Brody, 123. 163 Bogucki, 89, 92, 99, 118,124. 164 Leacock and Lee, 1. 62 and enhance the health and well being of members.165 There are shamanistic practices such as curative rituals, hunting magic, and the like. A particular shaman would likely be viewed ambivalently, as both beneficial and threatening, and his reputation would consequently wax and wane over time. Their rituals are not elaborate and are typically occasional, ad hoc ceremonies accompanying uncommonly good gains in resources, and are therefore not distinctively ritualistic or sacred occasions. Finally, ceremonialism helped offset tendencies within the group to fragment from internal disputes by creating and sustaining group identity and mutual feelings of good will.166

Examples of band societies are many. Some of the best known are: the Australian bands and the natives of Tasmania; aboriginal Eskimos or Inuit of Canada; the Shoshone of the American Great Basin; the IKung of the Kalahari, South Africa; the Machiguenga of the Peruvian Amazon; the Nganasan of Northern Siberia; the band societies of

Amazonian; and the Fayu of the Lakes Plains region of New Guinea.167

Tribe society

As Diamond tells us, archaeological evidence suggests that tribal societies emerged i c o between 40,000 and 13,000 years ago in the Fertile Crescent. Following Diamond,

165 None of this is to deny autonomous religious belief in a band, or a tribe, chiefdom or state society for that matter. Whether or not societal leaders engage in religious acts because religion is valued by believers because it, for example, connects them with the divine, rather than with the conscious intention of bolstering communal solidarity, or fostering a sense of religious or political obligation, that fact remains that the latter is an observed result of the religious acts themselves. 166 Johnson and Earle, 32, 33,44, 58, 89. 167 Service, Primitive, 60; Johnson and Earle, 61-64, 75-81, 106-110, 116; Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel, 267-268. 168 Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel, 271. 63 Bogucki, Service, Fried, as well as Johnson and Earle, kinship is the primary basis of membership, as in band society. Tribal society is composed of several kinship segments, each of which is composed of families. Tribe members typically live in a permanent fixed settlement, unlike bands, although some tribes and even chiefdoms consist of herders who move seasonally.169 As Diamond, Service, and Johnson and Earle maintain, typically, tribes, depending on their size, practice horticulture or pastoralism, but sometimes foraging if they exist in an extremely productive environment with especially concentrated resources.170 Horticulture involves growing domesticated crops in gardens with simple tools, and is often supplemented by foraging and/or trade. This contrasts with intensive agriculture, with the latter involving techniques (e.g., weeding; fertilizing; irrigation and the control of water supply; domesticated animals for ploughing, transportation and supplying fertilizers) that allow the same land to be used repeatedly without losing fertility. Horticulture, although casual and non-intensive food production, usually yields significant crops. With horticulture, or shifting agriculture, people do not make intensive use of any of the factors of production, such as land or labour. Such agriculture uses simple tools on fields that are not permanent property, but that lie fallow for varying lengths of time. Crops are sown, tended, and harvested, with rain being the only source of moisture, but use of the plot is not continuous. It is abandoned when the soil is exhausted or thick with weeds. Another piece of land is cleared and the previous plot is left to revert to forest. After several years of leaving the plot fallow it is used again

169 Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel, 268, 270-271; Bogucki, 216; Service, Primitive, 100; Fried, 118-119; Johnson and Earle, 33. 170 Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel, 271, 272; Johnson and Earle, 34, 125; Service, Origins, 101; Service, Primitive, 107, 135-136. 64 for cultivation. Although horticulture can support permanent villages consisting of upwards of 200 to 250 people, overall population density is low because horticulture is a land-extensive strategy.171

So, Fried finds that horticulture allows for settlement,172 with settled villages only existing in conditions of agriculture (or very abundant ecological niches, such as the existence of plentiful fish stocks), and as Johnson and Earle point out, this allows them to support denser populations (anywhere from seven to thirty times greater) than foragers or pastoralists. That said, with horticulture requiring fields to be rotated so they can regenerate, the need for land to be held in reserve does limit population size in ways that intensive agriculture does not. Similarly, pastoralists' need for fresh pasture for their domesticated animals also limits population density, but, as Johnson and Earle describe, they still can support larger populations than foragers.174 It is important here to note that an essential feature of tribes is settlement in villages.

A tribe can number in the hundreds to several thousands of people, depending on its level of complexity. A tribe is a well-integrated political group that may be contained in a single village, but there may be small and large villages with the former led by a headman while the latter also have descent group leaders. Johnson and Earle have observed that there is also a more complex form of tribal society, the bigman-managed

171 Barbara D. Miller, Penny Van Esterik, and John Van Esterik, Cultural Anthropology (Toronto: Pearson Education Canada Inc., 2001), 63-65; Conrad Phillip Kottak, Cultural Anthropology, 6th ed. (U.S.: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1994), 105. 172 Fried, 111-113. 173 Johnson and Earle, 125. 174 Ibid., 125. 65 ITf inter-group collectivity. This exists when several villages, roughly the size and makeup of single village tribes, are connected, usually through a clan structure that is dispersed throughout the area, and which will be discussed in more detail later. However, although several tribes are linked into a regional polity, the single tribal villages that constitute it each maintain substantial independence and autonomy, and the inter-village associations are occasional and impermanent. The flexibility and transience of band society discussed above is nicely paralleled here. Multiple single tribal villages meet together occasionally, usually at an annual festival, a cooperative venture, or in case of an external threat. And once the festival is over, or the threat removed, the single villages resume their autonomy. There is therefore no permanent political unity whatsoever among villages, as would be in the case of even the simplest chiefdom.

With tribes we see the emergence of ranking. As Fried points out, one can identify ranking by the existence of fewer positions of vaunted status than people capable of filling them. Ranking occurs when a society exercises its ability to limit its members' access to status positions that they would otherwise hold on the basis of personal attributes such as sex and age. Thus, societies with ranking are characterized by a limited number of positions of valued status such that not all those who have the ability to fulfill such statuses actually achieve them. Although it is possible that a society with ranking may be stratified (when adult members of a given society possess differential rights of access to basic resources), it is possible to have ranking without stratification since it is possible to limit the available positions of prestige without changing the ability of any of

175 Ibid., 33, 34. 1 7 ft the society members to access the basic resources necessary for sustaining life. As

Johnson and Earle have shown us, in tribes, like bands, there is no stratification, as the accumulation of prestige does not give a person any privileged claim to basic resources.177 One example of ranking is descent group leadership, as discussed by Conrad

Phillip Kottak. In band society that is smaller scale a person's position depends on age, gender, and personality traits. But when a society, like a tribal village, has several lineage groups, or clans, another basis for status develops, descent group head - the leader of a 1 78 particular lineage group or clan - and this is closed to non-group members. But before elaborating on this further, a few things about leadership in tribal societies need to be addressed.

Bogucki, Fried, and Service argue that in tribes, like bands, there is no government or centralized rule. However, unlike the transient nature of authority in band society, authority is in this case regular, repetitive, and extends into various aspects of social life. There is no way to coerce others in following the advice or example of 179 leaders, who have only authority on which to rely. In simple single villages leadership takes the form of village heads. In larger single villages there will also be descent group leaders. And in a complex, multi-village tribe there is, additionally, a bigman who leads the regional association. Although descent group leadership is closed to non-group members, when it comes to village heads and bigmen it is still the case that those who can wield authority do so, and there is still no perceived necessity for or tolerance of 176 Fried, 109-110. 177 Johnson and Earle, 126. 178 Conrad Phillip Kottak, Cultural Anthropology (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1994), 125. 179 Bogucki, 209, 257; Service, Primitive, 102-103, 131-2; Fried, 133-134. these people to establish dominion over the group. Leadership still depends on the activity and the character of the person (and, as mentioned above, there have been female tribe leaders, such as those on Vanatinai), who needs to garner respect to give authority to his or her opinions. However, there is still only authority, no power, with leaders having no physical recourse to impose their will and compel others to follow their ideas, but rather relying on leading by example of persuasion. There still exists among the members of the tribe open hostility towards self-aggrandizers. According to Harris,

Diamond, Fried, Service, Johnson and Earle, the headman of the simple single village is, like the band leader, a first among equals, although he/she is a more formal and effective leader than those in a band.181 As Fried and Service suggest, the headman needs to be

182 hard working and generous, and in possession of good personal skills. Headmen, as

Diamond and Fried observe, are only part-time political leaders insofar as they are still primarily involved in production like others.183 However, the role is more involved and demanding than being a band leader since he is the leader of a well-delineated and permanent political community. Although it depends on the form of production, a headman will typically be in charge of determining the times for hunting, moving herds, planting and harvesting, and setting the time for seasonal feasts and celebrations, and

180 It should be noted, however, that while this position is strictly speaking based on achieved status, there are examples of sons of leaders becoming leaders themselves. For example, looking at a tribe in Mount Hagen, Papua New Guinea, we see that 39/97 leaders had fathers that were not leaders, while the remaining 58 did. See Andrew Strathern, Big-Men and Ceremonial Exchange in Mount Hagen New Guinea (London: Cambridge University, 1971), 209. 181 Harris, 360; Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel, 268, 272; Service, Primitive, 102-103; Johnson and Earle, 126; Fried, 114-115, 133-134. 182 Fried, 134-137; Service, 103. 183 Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel, 272; Fried, 114-115. 68 therefore involved in redistribution, as well as representing the village in its dealings with outsiders, or visiting other villages to invite people to a feast.184

The headman will also be responsible for internal and external conflict resolution.

As Kottak points out, when a conflict occurs, the headman will likely be called on as a mediator, listen to both sides, and then give an opinion and advice. However, if either or

1 RS both of the parties are unsatisfied there is nothing the headman can do. According to

Harris, Fried, and Arnole, headmen have no power to enforce their decisions and/or impose punishments.186 As characterized by Diamond, Service, and Fried, all headmen can do is hope that their authority and persuasiveness, combined with the pressures of public opinion, are sufficient to resolve the dispute.187 Johnson and Earle argue that the i oo headman may also lead by example to get things done. As Kottak puts it, headmen may also harangue others, and try to influence public opinion so that it motivates people in the direction they wish.189 Fried maintains that headmen may also draw on the kin- based loyalty tribe members have towards each other to make their desires effective.190

But they cannot give orders and there is still profound respect for individuality and letting people make their own decisions.

Finally, as Harris and Diamond maintain, the headmen, like other individuals, usually cannot become disproportionately wealthy because each individual has debts and

184 Johnson and Earle, 126, 137; Harris, 358; Fried, 114-115, 134-137; Arnole, "Organizational," 60; Kottak, 121. 185 Kottak, 121. 186 Harris, 360; Fried, 114-115,133-134; Arnole, "Organizational," 60. 187 Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel, 268, 272; Service, Primitive, 103; Fried, 133-134. 188 Johnson and Earle, 126. 189 Kottak, 120. 190 Fried, 134-137. 69 obligations to many others.191 As Fried describes it, the headman must be more

1 Q? generous than others, and, as Kottak tells us, this is a way to gain and buttress prestige, appreciation, and support, and therefore authority. They must please their followers or lose their support. When people are dissatisfied with the headman they may leave and i cn found a new village. If enough people are unhappy, headmen will be deposed and a new headman will be chosen. Thus, according to Diamond, consensus is still very important, and in this sense decision making still has significant communal aspects to it.194

Larger single village tribes still have a headman, but, as Kottak notes, also have descent group or clan leaders who work with him on a village council. The village headmen have all the same responsibilities as small village heads, but differences in degree are sure to appear. For example, a larger village means a larger number of people living together and usually an increased population. This raises the potential for interpersonal conflict, with the result that the headman is often arbitrating more disputes.

Anyone can still be a headman, since usually the role does not belong to any single lineage, and may even be designed to rotate amongst the different descent groups.195

Following Kottak, in addition to the village headman, each of the multiple descent groups has a leader, usually the eldest member. These heads often form a council to advise and work with the village headman. The council also backs up the village

191 Harris, 358, 360; Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel, 272. 192 Fried, 114-115. 193 Kottak, 121. 194 Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel, 268, 272. 195 Kottak, 123, 125. headman's authority, ensuring that the members of the descent groups they represent enact decisions. Usually, the village headman must get council support for decisions pertaining to the whole village, and descent group leaders typically must establish a consensus among those they represent.196 This is another sense in which decision making is still communal. Moreover, as Diamond maintains, village meetings can occur where all adults in the village are present, sitting on the ground as equals, and anyone who wishes can speak, and all of this without any appearance of one person controlling the discussion.197 Kottak finds that sometimes it is difficult to reach consensus because a decision that is good for the tribe may harm the interests of a specific descent group.

When this occurs, decisions are not usually forced through physical means, but rather through persuasion and public opinion. Depending on the issue, a descent group may opt out of the action. If the issue is divisive enough a group may leave and form another village. If a member of a particular descent group is the problem, the same techniques are used, but if he or she consistently refuses to follow the advice of their elders, they may choose or be asked to leave the village. Typically, however, public opinion and

198 persuasion are sufficient to gain a consensus.

Johnson and Earle as well as Kottak observe that descent group leaders and the village headman are still required to be generous. Their lifestyles are not noticeably superior to others in the tribe. If they, for example, cultivate more land, they are expected to be generous with more people, such as by giving more feasts. Due to reciprocal debts

196 Ibid., 125. 197 Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel, 268, 272. 198 Kottak, 125. and obligations, it is still the case that individuals do not become disproportionately wealthy. These leaders are still only leaders part time, also being involved in subsistence work.'99

In the multi-village tribe, each constituent tribal village still has descent group leaders, a village council, and village head. But these village headmen occasionally come together to make up a regional council, and a bigman leads the regional organization, although this unity is not permanent as in a chiefdom. As Harris, Diamond and Johnson and Earle point out, the bigman, like the village heads, is still without power, having only authority. It is proper to think of the bigman as a temporary regional regulator.200

Typically, anyone can in principle be a bigman, since usually the role does not belong to any single lineage. And, as Diamond has shown us, like a band leader and village head,

'bigman' is not a political office apart from the individual, requiring refilling upon vacancy. 901 Bigman is an earned position. Harris argues that becoming a bigman first

909 requires good judgement so that one can, in the first instance, produce wealth. This is created through the hard work of the individual and his or her family. Most of the wealth that is produced by bigmen's houses quickly goes out again to, for example, meet their followers' expenses, pay debts, make loans, etc. According to Harris, Diamond, and

Johnson and Earle, it also allows the bigman to sponsor feasts, as well as exchange gifts and favours, which leads to growing prestige and gratitude, and this attracts supporters.203

199 Kottak, 125; Johnson and Earle, 126. 200 Harris, 358, 360; Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel, 272; Johnson and Earle, 34, 126. 201 Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel, 272. 202 Harris, 358. 203 Harris, 358; Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel, 272; Johnson and Earle, 34. 72 In this way, they expand their relationships, first with kin and then with non-kin, and through expanding his exchange network they develops his prestige further, and the result is that their opinions and advice carry more weight than those of others. As Kottak suggests, bigmen who are stingy suffer a declining reputation and will lose supporters.

And bigmen who hoard may even be murdered by their fellows.204 Thus, as Diamond observes, it is still the case that obligations foreclose upon individuals becoming disproportionately wealthy.205 Moreover, as Kottak points out, beyond generous distribution of acquired goods, bigmen are distinguished by traits such as "eloquence,

906 physical fitness, bravery, and supernatural powers."

In the above way bigmen become the headman of their own village, but, as characterized by Kottak, they also have a following of people in several other villages.207

These core supporters tend to be related by descent reckoning or marriage, but they use extended networks of reciprocity to include others. When the different villages with whom they are allied come together for a cooperative venture, the prestige, respect, and support bigmen have acquired within their own and other villages will give them authority beyond the other village heads, and, therefore, their opinions and advice will be sought in areas such as food production, inter-group feasts, exchange of goods, and war.

Harris argues that inter-group feasts allow for the pooling and distribution of goods and 908 valuables, which are given to the bigmen and redistributed to village heads.

204 Kottak, 126. 205 Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel, 272. 206 Kottak, 126. 207 Ibid., 125. 208 Harris, 358. Redistribution is a particular form of exchange that typically makes its first appearance with bigman collectivities. As Fried as well as Johnson and Earle put it, generally, redistribution refers to a process characterized by the flow of goods, services, and/or their equivalent into and out from a finite centre. Resources move from the local level to the centre and once there a portion of them are consumed by the person or persons leading the process. But the main principle is redistributing the goods, and so their movement eventually reverses direction, flowing from the centre back to the people.209 Aside from ensuring that goods are distributed widely, redistribution in the bigman collectivity also allows for sharing of information. Moreover, as Johnson and Earle maintain, such feasting establishes reciprocal exchange networks that facilitate marriage, trade, alliance, and also generally distribute risk as in band society, but in this case over the entire region.210 Finally, the village heads that constitute the regional council will, like the

911 village council, assist the bigman in carrying out his responsibilities. For Diamond,

919 information and decision making are still both communal in significant ways. Village heads are ultimately responsible to, or at least are bound by, the villages they represent insofar as they must obtain the agreement and support of the people whose interests they are to be advocating. Without support, gained through persuasion and public opinion, the head's authority will not be backed and there will not be cooperation on the part of the

209 Johnson and Earle, 17; Fried, 117. 210 Johnson and Earle, 34, 203, 241. 211 Ibid., 203. 212 Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel, 268, 272. 74 rest of the tribe, who can opt out of any actions deemed not in their interests, or risk losing the support of the village members they represent.

As should be obvious by now, descent groups are an important aspect of tribal society. Aside from the previously mentioned differences, a tribe also differs from a band in that it typically consists of more than one formally recognized kinship group or clan. In a given region there would exist several clans. A clan is united by a single ancestor (real or fictional) whose several offspring marry and form other, though related, lineages or descent groups. The products of these lineages also spawn new and related lineages, and so on. In this way, over time, several different lineages come to exist that can be related to a common ancestor, and therefore to each other. A clan would therefore be a pyramidal structure consisting of all those lineages claiming descent from the founding ancestor. At the apex is the founding ancestor, and as one travels down the pyramid, the related lineages expand in number.

As Service describes it, although a clan can be conceived as a pyramid it is not hierarchical in the sense of being politically stratified. Members of a clan typically do not think of one main line of descent predominating over subsidiary lines. In a given tribal village one could expect to find several descent groups from the same clan, their number depending on the size of the village. Typically, all lineages in the clan are equally related to the ancestral figure, and this contributes to the egalitarian nature of tribe society.214

Moreover, it is likely that there will be descent groups from other clans as well. And like

213 Kottak, Cultural Anthropology, 125. 214 Service, Primitive, 112, 113, 117. 75 lineages within a clan, different descent groups from different clans living together in a

91 S single village are considered equal in tribal society. Although, according to Johnson and Earle, there are many other kinds of socio-political linkages between descent groups 91 f\ in a region, such as ceremonies and marriage ties, descent reckoning through clans plays a major role both between and within tribal villages.

Within a particular tribal village, clans play a significant role in access to and usage of strategic goods, production, and distribution. As Service tells us, the economy is still primarily based on reciprocal exchanges, although there is also redistribution, but this is as occasional, un-systematized, un-institutionalized, and impermanent as the bigman-led multi-village tribal formation in which it occurs.217 Following Johnson and

Earle, as in band society, tribe members still make subsistence decisions with a view to meeting subsistence and ceremonial concerns, but using surplus for ceremonial functions 918 becomes a much more important household expense. They continue to observe that the surplus is mobilized by local leaders to sponsor feasts, gift-giving, and other displays of various goods, to, among other things, demonstrate the attractiveness of clan and tribe members for marriage, trade, and alliance.219 As Diamond, Service, and Johnson and

Earle maintain, like bands, there is still no stratification, but land and perhaps other strategic resources belong to a particular clan in common, not to the whole tribe. A clan will control access to resources, collaborate in labour, as well as sharing and storing

215 Ibid., 132. 216 Johnson and Earle, 133. 217 Service, Primitive, 134, 136. 218 Johnson and Earle, 124. 219 Ibid., 137. food.220 In this sense, an individual's survival depends on clan membership, but since everyone is a member of a clan everyone still has undifferentiated access to strategic goods. It is through clan membership that one has a legitimate claim to strategic goods. It is also through clan membership that one gains the most assistance when it is needed.

Johnson and Earle find that the clan delineates specific duties to participate in and materially support ceremonial events. Reciprocities such as gift giving and payments for marriage or conflict resolution are expected if the individual is to maintain good standing

991 in the clan. Arnole as well as Johnson and Earle observe that typically, it is the heads of these descent groups that regularly call upon labour from members.222

As Diamond and Fried point out, conflict resolution is informal, as in band society, reliant upon elements like indoctrination, informal sanctions, and public 99 "K ridicule. As Diamond has shown us, even in a large tribal village the number of members is still low enough that everyone knows each other by name and relationships.

Moreover, almost everyone is related to everyone else, by blood and/or marriage, as well as through the ties of reciprocity. It is likely that any two villagers that get into a dispute will share some kin. If a fight occurs between two people with a living relative, he can 994 intervene to settle it. And if it is between people who are not kin in some way, as aforementioned, the village headman will mediate. But, as Service argues, if the headman is not able to settle the dispute, the individuals involved, likely supported by their clan,

220 Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel, 271; Service, Primitive, 113, 116; Johnson and Earle, 124, 131. 221 Johnson and Earle, 124, 131. 222 Johnson and Earle, 137; Arnole, "Organizational," 59, 60. 223 Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel, 268, 271, 272; Fried, 146. 224 Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel, 272. will seek redress, which can turn into a feud. 99 ^ However, preventing a feud is a major reason for ending hostilities quickly and amicably. In fact, as noted above, to avoid such feuding, an individual's own clan may pre-emptively intervene to the satisfaction of another group by, for example, publicly embarrassing their member through ridicule or ensuring reparations are made. In such ways, a clan acts to preserve peaceful relations among its members, as well as adjudicate or end disputes, and punish wrongs in relations with other clans.

Clans also help to shape external relations between villages. Although village headmen are involved in inter-societal relations, there are relations conducted through the clan system, with clans conducting their own business. Moreover, according to Service,

Bogucki, and Johnson and Earle, clan structures guide who an individual will marry, with marrying into another lineage or clan a general rule. And although many marriages are between members of different clans within a village, numbers of marriages occur between people from different clans located in different villages. Such marriages help to establish relations between villages that open up territory and other resources between members of different tribes, promote the sharing of food and information, reinforce or establish exchange networks, create peace and defence alliances, as well as establish duties to materially support and participate in hostilities against other societies.226 Like bands, many tribes are involved in small-scale conflict, often in the form of ambush and hit-and-run inter-village raiding. In fact, many are in more or less constant low-level

225 Service, Primitive, 103-104,113, 116. 226 Service, Primitive, 106, 116, 117; Johnson and Earle, 124,131, 200-201; Bogucki, 219. 78 conflict with neighbours. As Service suggests, they maintain a state of perpetual readiness against those close by.227 Occasionally, perhaps a couple of times a year, they will even initiate an unprovoked raid against a neighbour, just to ensure that they are not taken for granted, that they are to still be respected, to reiterate that they can be peaceable or violent depending on how the neighbour acts. Such raiding may also be reactive if one's own resources have been intruded upon without permission. Either way, this is not warfare in the sense of conquering another society. In fact, by establishing a tribe's ability and readiness to fight, proactive raiding can actually prevent high-level conflict from erupting at all. It is essential to note that, as with bands, there is a very limited scale of injury associated with these regular raids. In part, because these events do more to establish the comparability between different tribes (e.g., roughly equal ability and readiness to fight), they help to reduce the likelihood of large-scale violence. Moreover, as Johnson and Earle observe, clan organization works to delimit group territories, as well as to form cooperative groups from members both within one's own village and

228 from others when strategic resources need to be defended.

Sanctity in tribes is very similar to sanctity in bands. As Service points out, there are no institutionalized bodies of religious professionals. There are shamans, but they still achieve their status by personal qualifications as opposed to taking up a pre-existing

'office' position.229 According to Johnson and Earle, sanctity generally involves invoking, honouring, and placating deceased ancestors, so that they continue to support

227 Service, Primitive, 104. 228 Johnson and Earle, 131. 229 Service, Primitive, 131-132,162. the tribe in matters such as fertility, food production, and success in battle. Sanctified ceremonies also helped to create and maintain relations within bands by, for example,

9 3D reinforcing group identity and cohesion. Emile Durkheim similarly points out that collective beliefs function to hold society together and maintain its integrity. "The unity of these first logical systems [religious beliefs] merely reproduces the unity of society."231 In common ceremonies a "collective sentiment" is expressing itself collectively by, for example, the group "observing a certain order permitting co-operation 9^9 Oil and movements in unison." Shared beliefs raises the individual "above himself;" it

"really strengthens] the bonds attaching the individual to society of which he is a member" since the gods are those of the society as a whole.234 It should also be pointed out, as Johnson and Earle do, that sanctified ceremonies also support inter-tribe relations, which in turn support trade, alliances, marriages, regulate conflicts, and help with all other important affairs.235

Examples of a single village tribe are the gumlao Kachin of highland Burma and the tribes on Pacific island of Vanatinai, and examples of complex multi-village tribe are the tribes of the Melanesian Islands, the Central Enga of Highland New Guinea, the

Kirghiz of north-eastern Afghanistan, and the Indian fishermen of the Northwest coast of

230 Johnson and Earle, 126. 231 Emile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (New York: The Free Press, 1965), 170. 232 Ibid., 247. 233 Ibid., 252. 234 Ibid., 258. 235 Johnson and Earle, 126. North America. Additional tribes include the Tsembaga Maring of New Guinea and the Turkana of Kenya. And tribes still occupy much of Amazonia.236

Chiefdom society

As Diamond tells us, chiefdoms first emerged between 7,500 and 6,500 years ago. As

Harris, Diamond, and Johnson and Earle describe it, they were regional political groupings of permanently (as opposed to opportunistically, like complex tribal societies) allied villages under one recognized leader. According to Service, Harris, Diamond, and Johnson and Earle, chiefdoms typically had larger populations than tribes, typically several thousand to several tens of thousands of people.239 Following Diamond, Service, and Johnson and Earle, chiefdoms typically engage in intensive agriculture.240 Diamond finds that the settled, dense, and large population of chiefdoms requires plenty of food.241

Johnson and Earle have observed that intensive food growing uses, for example, more

949 labour, fertilizers, irrigation, terracing, and careful management. This allows the same plot to be used repeatedly without losing its fertility and yields are increased significantly. And since a single field can sustain users year after year, there is no need

236 Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel, 270; Johnson and Earle, 143-178, 180-188, 211-216. 237 Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel, 273. 238 Harris, 378; Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel, 268; Johnson and Earle, 250, 266, 276. 239 Service, Primitive, 133, 156; Harris, 378; Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel, 268, 273; Johnson and Earle, 245, 246. 240 Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel, 269, 274; Service, Origins, 101; Johnson and Earle, 246, 261. 241 Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel, 21 A. 242 Johnson and Earle, 246, 261. 243 Ibid., 261. 81 to maintain a reserve of uncultivated land as with horticulturalists. This can support more densely populated areas.

The issue of intensive agriculture versus horticulture and their impact on social formation is important. The type of agriculture a society engages in is, on the one hand, determined significantly by the environment they find themselves in, and, on the other hand, imposes limiting conditions on the type of society a people can form. A further look at the above mentioned Kachin people and the people of Teotihuacan will make all this evident.

The Kachin who engaged in gumlao revolts were typically horticulturalists. It was possible for them to practice shifting agriculture due the monsoon rainforest regions they called home. Therein, as Leach notes, "the temperatures and rainfall are such that abandoned forest clearings, unless grossly abused, will very rapidly become covered with a strong growth of secondary jungle."244 This is what made shifting agriculture possible for them. And since this form of agriculture leaves extensive areas of cultivatable land unused, there was sections of the monsoon rainforest available into which they could retreat, and in so doing avoid the move to or flee from stratification. "[E]ven very isolated communities have no real difficulty in maintaining a living.. .[and] can, if they choose, cut themselves off altogether from the valley-dwelling wet-rice cultivators and survive."245 The people in these areas "have a choice between remaining independent in a small impoverished community or moving into a dependent situation in some more

244 Leach, Political Systems of the Highland Burma, 24. 245 Ibid., 231. 82 prosperous area."246 If they felt it was necessary, they could retreat further into the forest regions and continue to subsist, and avoid or flee from stratification.

However, this option is not open to all. The areas completely dominated by gumsa organizational forms, are "more or less outside the monsoon area. Temperature and rainfall here are much lower. Pine and scrub and grass replace the wet forest. Here a clearing once made and abandoned recovers to jungle only very slowly if at all."247 With unreliable rainfall, altitudes that are too high and summer temperatures that are too low,

"cereal crops are normally poor and unrewarding," therefore providing an "incentive to resort to a cash crop economy." Often crops are grown for trade purposes in preference to foodstuffs.

And insofar as these areas can seldom be self-sufficient in food, "[t]here is consequently a much more marked tendency.. .for the hill villages and the valley villages to be interlocked in some sort of more or less permanent economic and political interdependence."248 The hill villages are dependent on the valley-dwelling chiefdoms for at least part of their rice supply, allowing chiefs to exert pressure by denying them access to their valley rice.

Political organization in this area involves "close cooperation" between the valley and hill areas, with the hill villages "always, or nearly always, attaching] themselves to the domain of a leader who styles himself chief." The gumsa communities can and have become "politically unstable, but they cannot cease to be gumsa; if a Kachin community

246 Ibid., 234. 247 Ibid., 26. 248 Ibid. breaks off its relations with one set of Shans [valley-dwelling chiefdoms] it will have to establish relations with another."249 One can see, then, that there are agricultural practices and the environments they rely on - low-intensity agriculture in areas with extensive unused or fast-regenerating cultivatable land - that are conducive to gumlao revolts. But when the environment motivates people to practice intensive food production, reversion to non-stratified social forms for prolonged periods of time becomes much more difficult.

This is because intensive agriculture, a second type of food production, tends to fix a society with a chiefdom or a state over the long-term. This form of agriculture intensively and continuously uses an area of land, which makes larger demands on labour, as can be seen with the use of domesticated animals, terracing, or irrigation. With greater exertions of labour, people increase their control over nature, and this opens a greater range of environments that humans can use. This allows for human settlement in areas that are, for example, too arid for agriculture without irrigation.

Intensive agriculture can aid in inducing chiefdom or state formation because of its tendency to lead to increased population density and the regulatory problems this can cause. First, since a single field sustains the cultivator(s) year after year, no additional uncultivated land is needed, as is the case with horticulturalists. This allows for more densely populated areas. Second, it can yield greater surpluses and often leads to population increases. For example, irrigation increases production in arid lands and fuels

249 Ibid., 235-236 250 Miller, Van Esterik, Van Esterik, Cultural Anthropology, 69-70; Kottak, Cultural Anthropology, 105- 107. population growth because of its labour demands and its ability to feed more people.

This can lead to the system enlarging, which in turn allows the support of a larger and denser population. Thereafter, interpersonal problems may increase, and conflicts over access to land and water may become more frequent. And because of their permanent fields, intensive cultivators are sedentary, with people living in larger and more permanent communities located closer to other settlements. Contact between individuals and communities is increased by growth in population size and density. However, this means bringing together groups of people who are non-relatives, which tends to usher in a decline in the pervasive socializing influence of kin-relations that can be observed in less-complex societies. This can lead to a decline in public order and thereby increase the need to regulate interpersonal relations, including conflicts of interest, which are no longer under the exclusive control of kin-relations, if under it at all. Political systems such as chiefdoms or fledgling states may arise to regulate relations and production to stem social problems. In this way, regulatory problems tend to emerge with the adoption

c 1 of agriculture, and a society can develop a state to administer over the territory.

And since these settlements tend to support more people, they usually require more coordination in the use of resources, such as land and labour. For example, chiefdoms and state institutions can form due to the perceived need to regulate water- based agricultural economies. Although there are several instances where this did not occur, chiefdoms or states may, for example, emerge to manage systems of irrigation,

251 Miller, Van Esterik, Van Esterik, Cultural Anthropology, 70 and 275; Kottak, Cultural Anthropology, 107-108, 144 and 150. 85 drainage, and flood control. When some people are allowed to withdraw from subsistence work to become managers, difference in wealth, prestige, and power can appear. Moreover, as population density increases urban centres of thousands of people can develop, which usually is followed by occupational specialization.252

As Diamond argues, the potential for occupational specialization partially lies in the previously mentioned tendency of intensive agriculture to produce crop surpluses, which allow some people to withdraw from subsistence work and still be fed. For the first time in human experience, settled agriculture provides regularized potential for producing a large surplus, year in and year out. Even with famine, which adds to the logic of accumulating more surpluses, the capacity to produce surplus systematically has the potential to transform human society. Of course, this is not a teleological necessity, but without countervailing factors it can become likely over time. Only settled agriculture makes it possible to maintain a full-time complement of administrators, adjudicators, enforcers, and military forces. While none of this is immediately necessary, it is not possible with horticulture alone, although horticulture could, for example, maintain a chief with a high standard of living. In this way, intensive agriculture is a turning point in human experience, not in the sense of stages theory, but rather in highlighting the often unintended consequences of the accumulation of technical advances over long periods of time.253

252 Miller, Van Esterik, Van Esterik, Cultural Anthropology, 70; Kottak, Cultural Anthropology, 148 and 150. 253 Diamond, Guns Germs, and Steel, 277. These connections between intensive agriculture and chiefdom or state formation could stand as the limiting conditions for a people in an (semi)arid region that want to break off from or destroy their chiefdom or state society. As factors contributing to chiefdom or state formation they will also by their very nature contribute to chiefdom or state re-formation. The fact that the area is (semi)arid means that the people leaving these social formations will likely still have to engage in the very agricultural practices that support chiefdom or state formation in the first place. This is one way their condition without a chiefdom or state could come to a halt. But while this is going on, there could be a secondary, but related occurrence.

Existent state societies have historically led to the development of secondary state societies, either as satellite extensions of the primary state or as a reactionary response to it. The latter occurs, generally speaking, because developed societies with states often interact with, and possibly exploit, their less developed neighbours, who may in the process become rivals as they grow wealthy and they learn the business of statecraft. It can also be the case that non-state societies nearby state societies attempt to exploit surplus stores in neighbouring states, with, for example, war-like chiefdoms being prompted to become rivals by regular violent interaction with states.

As they develop into larger state societies themselves they make moves toward autonomy, with the end result being that the original state society, through its development and spreading its version of complex society and politics, helped to create its own rivals. A secondary state society that developed either out of or as a response to a primary state society that has subsequently become a stateless society may later 87 incorporate those newly stateless peoples into its state society. When looking at the semiarid region of the Teotihuacan Valley, an area where intensive dryland agriculture was practiced, the statelessness of the former-Teotihuacanos did not last. Remembering that Teotihuacan was not entirely alone in its sophistication during the time of its fall, it is telling that the period of statelessness lasted for about two hundred years, ending around

800 CE, around the time the Toltec and Xochicalco societies had established states.

In summation, intensive agriculture used in (semi)arid regions helps to support chiefdom and/or state formation. People in these societies may face two problems if they seek to leave such societies indefinitely. First, insofar as they continue to inhabit an

(semi)arid region they will be drawn toward intensive agriculture, and thereby towards chiefdom or state re-formation. Secondly, there is the threat of incorporation into a state society that was spawned from their previous state-based existence. These two factors tend to make it possible, if not likely, that a people in a chiefdom or state society will be fixed with a chiefdom or state over the long term, although periods without these could occur. In fact, the practice of intensive agriculture may go part of the way in explaining the unbroken chain of statehood almost worldwide, where the legacy of societies with states coming out of Mesopotamia, China, and Egypt, may have seen states come and go, but have never reverted to a condition of statelessness.

With that understanding of the connection between chiefdoms, states, and intensive agriculture noted, the discussion of the defining characteristics of chiefdoms can resume. As Johnson and Earle point out, this larger number of people settling together meant bringing together people who may have known little of each other and had little fellowship.254 As Service, Bogucki, and Johnson and Earle has shown us, a chiefdom was still kin-based society, and ranking took the form of statuses that were open or closed to an individual based on his or her genealogy. In this way, chiefdoms cc were hereditary hierarchies that were deeply aristocratic, being stratified, with genealogically determined differences in access to strategic resources between commoners and chiefs as well as their lineages.256 According to Service, obviously, there was social differentiation in terms of clearly non-egalitarian social groupings composed of elites and commoners whose status was largely determined at birth.257 He, along with

Johnson and Earle, suggest that 'chief was now a permanent office of leadership, and this worked to integrate the society on a relatively permanent basis. Control was centralized in the permanent political structure, and there was institutionalized coordination and direction of economic, social, and religious activities. Like tribal society there were different levels of complexity. As Bogucki observes, there were simple chiefdoms with one decision-making level; there were also complex chiefdoms with two decision-making levels; and there were also paramount chiefdoms, with multiple decision-making levels. Moreover, as Service as well as Johnson and Earle point out, no matter the level of complexity, chiefdoms could often be theocratic in the sense of

254 Johnson and Earle, 250. 255 Service, Primitive, 164; Service, Origins, 16; Bogucki, 261, 262; Johnson and Earle, 276. 256 Bogucki, 261,262. 257 Service, Origins, 16. 258 Service, Primitive, 133; Service, Origins, 102; Johnson and Earle, 276. 259 Bogucki, 264. 89 political submission to a divine priest-chief and communities that were ritually focused on a plaza, shrine, or graveyard.

According to Service, Harris, Diamond, and Bogucki, aside from age and gender, kinship, marriage, and descent, were the fundamental regulators of social relations.

Chiefdoms were based on hereditary social ranking. Like a tribe, a chiefdom was composed of multiple lineages living together. However, unlike tribes, these lineages were not equally ranked. The several lineages could be grouped into a chiefly lineage or lineages and non-chiefly groups, with chiefs and their lineages considered superior to commoners. The system of social ranking, as characterized by Arnole as well as

Johnson and Earle, was heritable and one's social position, prestige, and access to resources, were all determined by one's descent. We now see the existence of stratification.262 As Service argues, degrees of social distinction were typically supported by customs such as reserving, for example, certain items of dress, ornamentation, kinds of food, and sometimes even vocabulary, for the chiefly lineage and declaring it taboo for commoners. Further perpetuating this socio-political ordering were rules of first-born or eldest succession.264 For example, the third son would rank below the second son, who in turn would rank below the first, who would be the highest. And in the same way, the children of an eldest brother, would all rank above the children of the next brother, and so on. In all cases, chiefs had seniority of descent, and it was from this point that all other

260 Service, Origins, 16; Johnson and Earle, 247. 261 Service, Primitive, 148, 160, 163; Service, Origins, 72; Harris, 378; Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel, 274; Bogucki, 257, 258, 265. 262 Arnole, "Organizational," 60; Johnson and Earle, 250, 252, 302. 263 Service, Primitive, 145-146, 147, 149, 151, 163. 264 Ibid, 147. 90 genealogical calculations were made, with persons being ranked above others

265 according to their genealogical nearness to him. As Diamond puts it, there were even rankings within the chiefly lineage itself. However, as Service notes, when talking about the chiefly lineage, even the lowest ranking person in a chiefdom was still the chiefs relative, and in such a kin-based society, everyone, even the chief had to share with relatives. A chiefs high status raised the status of his both his immediate family and his local kin group above ordinary families. In this sense, a chief created a sort of nobility.267

Leadership in chiefdoms was therefore unlike tribal society, in which it is based solely on an individual's personal demonstration of various abilities and the subsequent respect and support he gets from his followers. Moreover, in tribal society 'leader' was not an 'office' in the sense of being institutionalized, existing apart from the individuals who fill them, and needing to be refilled. The death of a band or tribal leader does not require that someone else be chosen as replacement to fill a pre-existing position.

Chiefdoms were different. A chief, with or without the aid of subsidiaries, was a full-time political specialist in charge of regulating the regional polity. As Service, Harris, Arnole,

Diamond, Bogucki, Johnson and Earle, and Robert W. Chapman describe it, the chief and any existing subsidiaries occupied political offices, permanent, pre-existing positions that must be refilled when left empty due to death or retirement. Hierarchy and inequality were institutionalized in the sense that access to both chiefly and subsidiary offices was

265 Servict, Primitive, 145-146; Service, Origins, 79. 266 Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel, 274. 267 Service, Primitive, 139-140. 91 restricted in that they were hereditary. This systematic refilling of offices allowed the 'JfLQ chiefdom, and therefore permanent political regulation, to endure across generations.

Although the necessary conditions for being a chief were ascribed criteria (birth in a chiefly lineage; being the first son or daughter of the chief; being the eldest in the lineage), according to Bogucki, personal skills such as intelligence, leadership skills, 96Q charisma, and accumulated wealth, were still important. In many chiefdoms, there was always the possibility of a child or other relative deposing the chief, or even the chance of a popular uprising. As Service and Bogucki tells us, in addition to bribing relatives with valued positions, possessing qualities that followers admire supported and enlarged the authority of chiefs.270 For example, usually chiefs were still expected to be generous, although they still had a more luxurious lifestyle than others. Such significant distinctions in wealth, such as the bigger and better houses, better food and clothing that Harris notes,271 should demonstrate that chiefs were no longer leaders that could be considered 979 first among equals, as in bands and tribes.

Diamond finds that inequality was further demonstrated by the replacing of the anarchic village meeting of the tribe with a chief who was a permanent, centralized authority, making all significant decisions, and having a monopoly on relevant 268 Service, Primitive, 140; Service, Origins, 72, 73; Harris, 378; Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel, 268, 273-274; Bogucki, 263; Johnson and Earle, 34,256, 276; Jeanne E. Arnold, "Understanding the Evolution of Intermediate Societies," in Jeanne E. Arnold, ed. Emergent Complexity: The Evolution of Intermediate Societies (Ann Arbor, Michigan: International Monographs in Prehistory, 1996), 1, 2; Robert W. Chapman, "Problems of Scale in the Emergence of Complexity," in Jeanne E. Arnold, ed. Emergent Complexity: The Evolution of Intermediate Societies (Ann Arbor, Michigan: International Monographs in Prehistory, 1996), 37. 269 Bogucki, 263. 270 Service, Origins, 72-73; Bogucki, 268. 271 Harris, 380. 272 Service, Origins, 72-73; Harris, 380; Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel, 268; Bogucki, 263. 92 information, such as what neighbouring societal leaders were privately threatening.

Typically, as Bogucki, Service, and Johnson and Earle observe, the family was no longer the autonomous entity it is in band and tribal society. There was significant institutionalized distance between households and the highest levels of leadership, such that much of their social, economic, and cultural experience was created and determined

974 far away by the chiefly lineage. However, as Johnson and Earle point out, families or related groups of families still made many decisions when it came to the specificities of local subsistence practices, such as organizing the details of work in the gardens. That said, there is no denying that the family options were increasingly constrained by broader social, political, and economic realities,275 which will be further discussed below.

Aside from decision-making, chiefs had other responsibilities, demonstrating the fact that they still had generalized roles in their society. As Johnson and Earle have 976 shown us, they were managers, judges, warriors (war leaders), and priests. Harris,

Service, and Arnole argue that chiefs planned, organized, and deployed public labour for projects such as terracing and irrigation works.277 According to Johnson and Earle, although by doing so they were providing public goods, the investments also provided 978 further opportunities for chiefly control. Also, these society-wide efforts contributed to social solidarity. As Arnole suggests, chiefs also stored food and wealth objects 279 They

273 Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel, 268, 273-273. 274 Bogucki, 263; Service, Primitive, 156; Johnson and Earle, 251. 275 Johnson and Earle, 247, 251. 276 Ibid., 248. 277 Harris, 380; Service, Primitive, 162; Arnole, "Organizational," 61. 278 Johnson and Earle, 34. 279 Arnole, "Organizational," 61. conducted long-distance trade, as Service observes, which encouraged peace insofar as partners established trade networks that fostered solidarity; engaged in alliance making, which was typically maintained by reciprocal exchanges of presents, marriage, and hospitality; solved internal and external conflicts; planned and led raids and warfare on neighbouring societies. Warfare in chiefdoms was large-scale and systematic. There was an increased capacity for war due to surplus food; as Johnson and Earle point out

981 there could be specialist warriors, or the chief could call on able-bodied members of the society who would act as part-time warriors required to give occasional service.

According to Service and Harris, increased chiefly leadership and discipline could make 989 war more effective. As characterized by Johnson and Earle, warfare was now generally for defence when attacked as well as for conquest to capture and control both land and labour, which were needed due to the typically intense agriculture and increased population densities of chiefdoms. The reasons for this conquest warfare were vastly different from the aforementioned purposes of band and tribal hostility.

Chiefs also regulated production and redistribution, although reciprocal exchanges still existed as well. As Service argues, although institutionalized and extended redistribution allowed a leader to become a permanent feature in society, chiefs were still expected to do their jobs well. They had to effectively command labour in agriculture and craft production, as well as be relatively equitable and wise in deciding

280 Service, Origins, 100. 281 Johnson and Earle, 252, 259. 282 Service, Origins, 100; Harris, 383. 283 Johnson and Earle, 34,249. how the goods were to be allocated, 284 or else, as Diamond puts it, risk a popular uprising.285 As Service maintains, redistribution created a society with specialized sub- parts that depended on the whole, making society more organically united, and this could have enhanced loyalties to the chief. 987 Even if not, redistribution still stabilized leadership insofar as people came to depend on the leader for many goods and services. 288

9RQ

According to Service and Bogucki, aside from financing public works, redistribution allowed chiefs to manage risk by stimulating production beyond the immediate subsistence level and storing surpluses in abundant years that could be given out during lean years.290 And, as Service describes it, when different areas specialized in particular goods or services, redistribution made those products available to the whole society.291 As Diamond and Bogucki tells us, on the one hand, chiefs provided public services that individual families could not have done alone. On the other, they extracted wealth from commoners for elite consumption as tribute, much like a protection racket.

In fact, these actions were intricately linked, typically both happening in a given chiefdom. Differences tend to be in degree, with specific chiefdoms simply taking more or less tribute from commoners and redistributing more or less back to them. Depending on the chiefdom, there may have been more or less lavish displays of elite wealth, and

284 Service, Origins, 94. 285 Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel, 276. 286 Service, Primitive, 134, 135, 138,156; Service, Origins, 96. 287 Service, Origins, 95. 288 Ibid, 75. 289 Service, Primitive, 140. 290 Bogucki, 265. 291 Service, Primitive, 134, 135, 138, 156. 95 more or less publicly financed communal activities, more or less emphasis on personal

292 status and prestige, and more or less obvious disparity between chiefs and commoners.

The chiefs rule and right to tribute was often supported by religion. As Service,

Harris, and Johnson and Earle maintain, the chiefly line was often the priestly line, validating their rule by claiming to have the ability to contact and court the favour of ancestral gods, or by claiming to be descendents of the gods, or by claiming to be divine themselves.293 This also helped to support the right to hereditary succession insofar as the offspring of chiefs were thought to inherit the abilities of their fathers. Diamond argues that it also helped to maintain peace between people by providing them with a bond beyond kinship, and gave people a motive beyond kinship to sacrifice their lives on behalf of others, which increased the efficacy of warriors.294 Service has observed that, whether in contact with, descended from, or actually being a god, chiefs typically were religious leaders. And their subsidiaries or lower-level chiefs in a complex chiefdom, became, among other things, a priesthood, occupying permanent, pre-existing religious offices in society that needed to be refilled upon vacancy.295 In band and tribal society, the death of a shaman would not necessitate another shaman being declared. As Diamond points out, due to all the benefits derived from religion it is no wonder that chiefs spent so

292 Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel, 268, 273-4, 276; Bogucki, 265, 266, 267. 293 Service, Origins, 78, 92; Service, Primitive, 162; Harris, 370; Bogucki, 265, 327; Johnson and Earle, 266. 294 Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel, 277-278. 295 Service, Primitive, 162. 96 much tribute on temples and other public works that served both as religious centres and symbols of chiefly power.296

Different from authority-based leadership in bands and tribes, chiefly rule was supported by power. Although some simple chiefdoms relied solely on authority, in complex and paramount chiefdoms chiefs had institutionalized power. These chiefs still relied on their authority, which, as Service has shown us, was based on respect, custom,

9Q7 habit, ideas of propriety, benefits, or other such considerations. And as redistributors they could punish dissidents by withholding goods.298 But they also had the ability to channel the behaviour of others through the possession or use of threat or sanctions.

Harris, Diamond, and Johnson and Earle argue that, typically, such chiefs possessed a monopoly of force, backed up by a force of specialist warriors that, aside from military actions, were used for enforcement against a sometimes relatively disarmed population.

Specialist warriors could be supported by some of the tribute chiefs collected. Those who failed to fulfill their tribute, production, or labour quotas to chiefs could have found themselves threatened with physical harm.299 And the fact that chiefs had the ability to be repressive, as in some historical Hawaiian chiefdoms noted by Diamond, testified to the existence of chiefly power.300

As just mentioned, there were three types of chiefdoms: simple, complex, and paramount. According to Bogucki and Diamond, simple chiefdoms had one decision-

296 Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel, 278. 297 Service, Origins, 83-91. 298 Ibid., 92. 299 Harris, 383; Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel, 268, 277; Johnson and Earle, 259. 300 Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel, 276. 97 making level. A chief directly controlled a few local communities, relying on power if need be. As Diamond suggests, these were in some ways similar to complex tribal

societies with a bigman. There were not incredible distinctions in wealth. The chiefs hut looked like any other, the chief redistributed most goods he received back to the commoners, and in some cases the chief did not hold differential access to strategic resources. There were, therefore, not many public works. Finally, there were no chiefly subsidiaries.301

As Bogucki and Service observe, there were also complex chiefdoms that had two decision-making levels. First, a head chief directly controlled a few local sections of society (like a chief in a simple chiefdom). The same head chief also had direct control over a few other sections, that are themselves similar to simple chiefdoms, through chiefly subsidiaries, each of whom led one of the sections as a local, though lower ranking, chief. The head chiefs orders are transmitted through the lower rank chiefs,302 and would be backed up with power if need be. As Diamond as well as Johnson and Earle put it, these subsidiaries had generalized rather than specialized roles. For example, the same subsidiary could be in charge of extracting tribute, overseeing irrigation and local ceremonies, and organizing labour for the regional projects of the head chief. And these

•jrv-j lower rank chiefs reported directly to the head chief. Diamond continues to note that there usually existed significant wealth differentials between chiefs and commoners, land

301 Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel, 268, 275-276; Bogucki, 264. 302 Bogucki, 264; Service, Primitive, 142. 303 Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel, 268, 273-274; Johnson and Earle, 248, 266. 98 and other strategic goods were owned by the head chief and controlled by the head chief and the local chiefs, and significant public works were erected.304

Finally, according to Bogucki and Harris, there were paramount chiefdoms that had multiple decision-making levels. First, there was a paramount chief that directly controlled a few local sections of the society (like a chief in a simple chiefdom). The paramount chief also directly controlled a few sections of society, themselves similar to simple chiefdoms, through head chief subsidiaries (as occurs in a complex chiefdom).

The paramount chief also had indirect, informal control over a few other sections of society, where he or she did not issue commands to subsidiaries that could be backed up by power. Leadership over these sections of society was authority-based. Finally, the paramount chief also had indirect, informal control over other sections of societies that were themselves similar to complex chiefdoms, with all their typical subsidiary decision making centres.305 We know that all of these sections of were united into a single society due to, for example, shared cultural artefacts, the total integration of productive activities, and shared cultural practices (e.g., seeing the same chief as divine). As Diamond describes it, in a paramount chiefdom, the paramount chief was immediately recognizable by his ornamentation, significant public works were erected by large labour forces, most tribute was retained for elite consumption and relatively little redistributed, and all land was owned by the paramount chief.

304 Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel, 275. 305 Bogucki, 264; Harris, 380. 306 Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel, 268, 275-275. 99 Thus, as Arnole, Diamond, Bogucki and Johnson and Earle tell us, there existed differential access to strategic resources between chiefly and non-chiefly lineages and this made chiefdoms stratified societies.307 Following Fried, strategic resources are those that sustain life, the things to which people must have access in order for them to subsist.

In stratified societies, there are impairments to such access. Such impairments can be diverse, but they can be reduced to two very broad categories. The first is total exclusion as a result of assigning all available rights to use and enjoy the profits and advantages of basic resources to specific individuals or groups of a number less than the total population of society. This means that some in society face different problems of subsistence than those with direct access to strategic resources. The second category of impairment is not that of total exclusion from access to basic resources, but where access payments or the performance of unremunerated labour exist in excess of those required of people in possession of direct access rights.308 It is the latter form of exclusion that typically existed in chiefdoms. Stratification therefore becomes a crucial criterion in distinguishing between different types of societies.

Chiefs were exempt from ordinary work and, as Arnole and Chapman maintain, had control over some of the labour and produce of others. But this management of others was no longer informal, transient, and solely due to the leader's expertise. Control over others was now a permanent fixture in society. Aside from subsidizing people through providing, for example, housing and food, so that a chief can control their labour and

307 Arnole, "Organizational," 60; Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel, 269; Bogucki, 263; Johnson and Earle, 267. 308 Fried, 186-189. 100 produce, the chief also controlled and appropriated labour and produce through exacting a tribute in return for providing services such as protection, sharing of information, and access to strategic resources.309 Thus, as Johnson and Earle find, chiefs owned and controlled access to land and other strategic resources.310 Johnson and Earle have observed that household production was expanded within chiefdoms. Although providing for subsistence and ceremonial concerns were still very important, households also had to have additional surplus that could be given to chiefs as rent in order to gain

311 access to the land and productive technology they owned. For example, chiefly investment in and 'improvement' of strategic resources, such irrigation systems or the construction of large ships, provided the basis for chiefly property claims, as Johnson and

Earle as well as Chapman point out. Chiefs could then extract some form of rent from those who needed access to survive. As Diamond as well as Johnson and Earle have shown us, rent could have been, for example, shares of produce, often a quarter to a third of all that is produced, or corvee labour.313

Although, as Diamond observes, chiefs also controlled the labour of slaves that were typically captured in raids,314 as Arnole points out, it was their control over strategic resources that allowed them to control the labour of their kin, subsidiaries, and commoners.315 As noted by Arnole as well as Johnson and Earle, most daily production

309 Arnole, "Organizational," 59, 60; Chapman, 37. 310 Johnson and Earle, 266. 311 Ibid, 256. 312 Johnson and Earle, 34, 249, 262; Chapman, 37. 313 Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel, 275; Johnson and Earle, 256. 314 Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel, 275. 315 Arnole, "Organizational," 60. 101 and provisioning remained under household control, and the degree to which chiefs actively managed the labour of others varied; but there were now regular circumstances when people were expected to commit labour or tribute under chiefly control. Arnole argues that this occurred when large-scale cooperative production was needed, such as when harvesting an abundant, seasonally concentrated resource or when developing and using special technologies that require a local aggregation of people. Labour may also have been commanded for the creation of storage facilities, as well as for large-scale processing, storing, and maintenance of surplus resources. People were also commanded to participate in raiding or fighting to acquire things such as goods or territory, marriage

•y i ~j partners, or slaves. Leaders could call upon labour at any time according to their discretion.318 Generally, labour and produce were controlled by chiefs to finance chiefdom institutions, which, according to Johnson and Earle as well as Chapman, could actually increase forms of dependence as new investments created new opportunities for chiefly control,319 as well as for consumption. As Arnole and Diamond suggest, consumption of tribute took the form of feasts and ceremonies, as well as consumption by the chief and his family, which included elaborate dress and burials, and sometimes large residences or temples.320 Johnson and Earle observe that the emergence of truly large-

316 Arnole, "Organizational," 59, 60, 61; Arnole, "Understanding," 2, 7; Johnson and Earle, 249, 251. 317 Arnole, "Organizational," 61. 318 Ibid., 61. 319 Johnson and Earle, 34, 249; Chapman, 37. 320 Arnole, "Organizational," 61; Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel, 275. 102 scale constructions, such as temples, testified to chiefly control over both labour and the produce to subsidize it.321

As Johnson and Earle point out, given the highly competitive nature of inter- chiefdom relations - due, for example, to expansionary tendencies resulting from demands made by intensive agriculture and increasingly dense populations - leaders were highly motivated to intensify production and surplus extraction, although with limits.322

But, according to Johnson and Earle, it was essential that they not risk the overall productive process by, for example, not leaving enough resources to supply the commoner's subsistence needs, and perhaps setting off a commoner rebellion, as happened multiple times throughout Hawaiian chiefly history. However, chiefly control over labour and goods was enforced. Although chiefs would rely on adherence to custom for compliance, as characterized by Arnole, non-participation could also result in being ostracized, in economic sanctions such as withholding of goods during redistribution, reduced privileges, such as decreased or denied access to strategic goods, or the withdrawal of protection.324 Finally, as Johnson and Earle put it, chiefs could also use power in the form of physical force to back their commands, usually through reliance on the chiefly subsidized warrior specialists. And the fact that this policing force were subsidized should indicate the way in which the chiefly ability to control some of the

321 Johnson and Earle, 266. 322 Ibid., 34,267. 323 Ibid., 260. 324 Arnole, "Organizational," 61. 325 Johnson and Earle, 252. 103 labour and products of others is both supported by and also supports the creation and maintenance of centres of power and control.

Although not a state society (which will be shown in the discussion below), stratification did not necessarily mean that chiefdoms were unstable and necessarily transitory societies, although there were contradictions and sources of instability.

According to Bogucki, there was typically competition within chiefdoms for political office and there was also, as mentioned above, competition between chiefdoms for control of strategic resources. Within a chiefdom, the chiefs kin were also his potential successors, and to avoid being deposed a chief had to reward their patience with, for example, subsidiary political offices. But placing potential rivals in such positions also gave them resources to challenge the chief, although this potential need not be actualized.

There could also be trouble during times of leadership transition when, for example, an effective chief was succeeded by an incompetent heir. And although the chief had both authority and power, the commoner population, if not sufficiently placated, could cause instability due to their significantly larger demographic size. If significant enough, instability can cause chiefdoms to dissolve, perhaps into simpler chiefdoms or even tribal societies, or they may become subordinated to a stronger neighbour. Such changes could take place within the span of a generation or a few decades. And it was even possible that, rather than dissolving or being conquered, a chiefdom could increase in complexity, moving towards statehood. That said, chiefdoms did persist in areas over the long term, 104 even if they did increase and decrease in their level of complexity. There is no reason to presume that, if the prime territory chiefdoms came to occupy was not so coveted by state societies for its productive value with the result that chiefdoms were eradicated, as noted by Diamond, they could not have persisted as well as bands and tribes have.

Examples of simpler chiefdoms were those of the smaller Polynesian islands, while examples of paramount chiefdoms had been found on the largest Polynesian islands, such as Hawaii, Tahiti, and Tonga. There were also the so-called "Circum-

Caribbean" chiefdoms of the northern Andes, Central America, Venezuelan coast, larger islands of the West Indies, and the chiefdoms of south-eastern United States.328

State society

There is much continuity between chiefdoms and state societies, making the most noticeable division between the four social organizational forms between bands and tribes on the one hand, and chiefdoms and state societies on the other. That said, there are some distinct characteristics that define state organization.

According to Diamond, state societies first emerged between 5,000 and 6,000 years ago. State societies virtually universally have larger populations than band, tribe and chiefdoms societies. Diamond as well as Johnson and Earle tell us that state societies have populations numbering anywhere from hundreds of thousands to over a billion like

326 Bogucki, 268-270, 327. 327 Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel, 273. 328 Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel, 275-276; Service, Primitive, 145; Johnson and Earle, 284-291. 329 Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel, 278. 105 China. As Diamond as well as Johnson and Earle describe it, state societies engage in intensive agriculture. In fact, it is fair to say that state require intensive agriculture.

As with chiefdoms, there is a need to feed and accommodate settled, dense, and large populations, and for the same reasons as discussed above, intensive agriculture, with its ability to produce greater yields using less land than other forms of production, is employed. Organization is along political and territorial lines, as Diamond as well as

Johnson and Earle maintain, as opposed to the kinship lines that defined bands, tribes, and simple chiefdoms. Bands, tribes, and usually chiefdoms, consist of a single ethno- linguistic group, whereas states are often multiethnic and multilingual.

Max Weber has famously defined the state as "an institutional enterprise of a political character, when and insofar as its executive staff successfully claims a monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in order to impose its regulations." He elaborates this by writing that the state "is a system of administration and law" with an executive that "claims authority not only over the members of the association.. .but within a broader scope over all activity taking place in the territory over which it exercises domination."333

This universalization of power, also observed by Service,334 with all sections of society at least potentially subject to power-based relations, is one of the essential differences between state societies and even the largest chiefdom (which still relied on indirect, authority-based control over some sections of society). To be clear, this is not to say that

330 Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel, 268; Johnson and Earle, 35, 304. 331 Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel, 269, 279; Johnson and Earle, 261. 332 Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel, 268, 280; Johnson and Earle, 35. 333 Max Weber, "Basic Categories of Social Organisation," in W.G. Runciman, ed., E. Matthews, trans., Max Weber: Selections in Translation (London: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 39,41. 334 Service, Origins, 14; Service, Primitive, 163. 106 states never have indirect, authority-based control over other societies (e.g., 'puppet regimes'), but in such cases these are other distinct societies, which is not the case with

iir complex chiefdoms, as mentioned above.

Fried, Bogucki, Service, as well as Johnson and Earle point out that state societies have centralized government336 and socio-economic stratification,337 both of which are backed up by authority and power, such as police forces.338 As Diamond, Bogucki, and

Johnson and Earle have shown us, state societies are virtually universally hierarchical in the sense of being structured in a way that different members of society participate unequally in political, social, and economic decisions.339 Although leaders in early states usually had a hereditary leader like a chief who may have chose relatives for political positions, modern states are not regulated by kinship, descent, and marriage, as in bands, tribes, and chiefdoms. In modern states the elite are not as a general rule kin, and they do not have power on the base of heredity, but rather it is due solely to their political and economic control, which is often displayed by luxury goods and magnificent monuments. 340

335 There are exceptional cases of formally sovereign states that are not in any meaningful sense independent from larger states to which they are closely associated. For example, the Republic of San Marino, the last remaining independent Italian city state - dating back to the Middle Ages - has been entirely surrounded by the Republic (formerly Kingdom) of Italy since Italian unification in 1870. It can hardly be said to have a separate society from that of Italy. 336 Fried, 235; Bogucki, 334; Service, Origins, 14. 337 Fried, 235; Bogucki, 334; Johnson and Earle, 35, 304. 338 Fried, 235; Johnson and Earle, 35, 304; Service, Origins, 14; Service, Primitive, 163. 339 Again, it is important here to note differences between the ideal-type of state and the real experiences that have existed historically and may exist in future. In ancient Athens, for example, there was no hierarchy among citizens; however, women and slaves were excluded politically. One can look to the Swiss cantons to see large assemblies that in at least some cases include all citizens (now that women participate). And there is also the Paris Commune as a revolutionary state (although it did not endure). 340 Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel, 268, 279, 280-281; Bogucki, 235; Johnson and Earle, 304. 107 The second distinguishing feature of state societies is, as Diamond, Service, as

well as Johnson and Earle argue, that state societies virtually universally have complex

institutions of decision making and administration, with, unlike the generalized roles of

chiefs and their subsidiaries, specialized roles for rulers, bureaucrats, the military, law

enforcement, and the like.341 And, as Diamond, Bogucki, and Johnson and Earle suggest,

there is an incredible proliferation of people in decision making and administrative

positions, seen in both an increase in the number of levels and people within those levels,

demonstrating the increased specialization of state bureaucrats. Instead of a chiefly

subsidiary carrying out every aspect of local administration, there are different

departments, usually each having its own hierarchy, to handle separate administrative

concerns.342 Specialized departments are involved with decision making and

administration, with some functions similar to chiefdoms, while others are novel.

Specialized military is still involved in defence and conquest, as Bogucki, Fried, as well as Johnson and Earle point out, although this is now itself larger, more complex, and more specialized than in chiefdoms, as well as usually being distinguished from a

specialized internally-oriented police force in more modern states.343 According to

Diamond as well as Johnson and Earle, there are other bureaucrats involved in collecting taxes, which are either spent on supporting state institutions or redistributed to the people

341 Johnson and Earle, 35, 304; Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel, 280; Service, Primitive, 164. It should be noted, however, that many states have not had these modern characteristics. For example, there were no bureaucracies to be found in Athens or Sparta, or in Republican Rome, with the state having the form of a republic of citizens. 34 Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel, 268, 280; Bogucki, 235; Johnson and Earle, 304. 343 Bogucki, 335; Johnson and Earle, 35, 259, 304; Fried, 237-238. 108 in various ways.344 As Bogucki as well as Johnson and Earle note, different bureaucrats also deal with information flow, which is usually linked to protecting state and leader interests. And still others are involved in other management responsibilities, some on a large-scale, like city planning.345

As mentioned above, there is state monopoly on force. Diamond, Service, Fried, as well as Johnson and Earle argue that, typically (in addition to relying on custom) property, specifically, and social order, generally, are maintained through a legal system and specialized judiciary system comprising codified laws and legal procedure.346 As discussed above, laws exist because state leaders have power or the recourse to sanctions, and they can therefore create and enforce rules of conduct or laws.347 A crime is a violation of the law and it entails a specialized punishment. There exist courts, or something like them, judge-like figures who adjudicate cases, those who enforce punishment, along with others such as, for example, record keepers.

As Bogucki and Diamond describe it, compared to chiefdoms, societies with states have far more developed specialization in production and increased levels of trade.348 In all state societies there are still exchanges based on reciprocity. And there is still redistribution, which is now typically the extraction of resources through legally

344 Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel, 279; Johnson and Earle, 35, 304. 345 Bogucki, 335; Johnson and Earle, 304. 346 Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel, 268, 280; Johnson and Earle, 35, 304; Service, Origins, 14; Service, Primitive, 165; Fried, 236-237. 347 The fact that the appearance of law comes as a consequence of power is not to say that there were no other necessary conditions to its existence. For example, this account in no way denies that an additional condition is the ability to think about human relationships abstractly because law aims at conceiving of justice in terms of abstract and impersonal categories, in order to do justice in cases where particular parties and their circumstances are not known to us. 348 Bogucki, 334; Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel, 279. 109 enforced taxation, a function controlled by a specialized bureaucratic apparatus.

Taxes may take the form of corvee labour, which may be used to build public works or temples, or they may be agriculturalists giving a portion of their crops, or there are also cash taxes, such as income tax. As Bogucki, Diamond, Fried, as well as Johnson and

Earle tell us, taxes will provide support to such various people as elite leaders, police, judges, and military personnel, among many other state-subsidized specialists. There usually is some form of direct elite management of production and/or other wider economic functions to promote maximum surplus production, which in turn maintains and increases their power base. In some state societies, the state personnel use their power to extract and accumulate goods and services from their citizens. In one way or another, households are persuaded, manipulated, or forced into producing surplus to support the elite.349

State societies, therefore, have the largest and densest populations, are politically and territorially defined, with centralized as well as incredibly complex and specialized (a distinguishing feature) decision making and administrative centres, a codified legal and judicial system, as well as both political and economic differentiation and stratification, all of which is backed up by power that applies to the entire societal population (another distinguishing feature). Clearly the subsequent history of the state covers many other issues, but they are not germane to this discussion.

349 Bogucki, 334, 335; Johnson and Earle, 35; Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel, 279; Fried, 239-240. 110 From organization to a good life

With an understanding of what is meant by band, tribe, chiefdom and state society, and of how a tribal society differs from a state society, I can now turn to a discussion of a tribal conception of a good life and its enactment that, in important ways, follows from the above recounted reality of tribal life (e.g., real absence of power and substantial inequality) and expresses it. Ill Chapter Two: A Tribal Conception and Enactment of a Good Life

As mentioned in the Introduction, what I will present is a tribal conception and enactment of a good life, not the tribal conception and enactment, which would be impossible to present given the extensive diversity of tribal cultures. So, while the examples I draw upon are whole societies that have existed and the accounts I give of them represent a consensus among anthropologists and Indigenous peoples, the examples themselves are selective. The ethic and practices I will present draws on both outside observations of ethnographers and primary accounts of how tribal societies articulate their own values.

When thinking about what a tribal conception and enactment of a good life looks like, one could rightly imagine a respect for autonomy that is itself based on a notion of unity, interrelatedness and interdependence, that, as a corollary, denies the priority of any one constituent element and demands the significance and respect of all. This ethic allows for both group cohesion and a respect for individual integrity, autonomy and difference.350 I will take these four elements - interrelatedness and interdependence, respect for all, group cohesion, and individual autonomy - in turn throughout this chapter. Basically, however, one can understand the logic as follows: the unity, interrelatedness and independence of everything in existence means that all possess

350 There have been theorists within political science who have discussed issues related to this ethic of respect. For example, in discussing whether or not interrelatedness, interdependence, respect for all and group cohesion are fundamentally at odds with individual autonomy, one could look at the work of Jean- Jacques Rousseau as an example of a thinker for whom the reconciliation of individual autonomy with collective unity was a primary concern [see "The Social Contract, or the Principles of Political Right" in Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Basic Political Writings, trans. Donald A. Cress (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987)]. 112 significance. To respect the significance of everything in existence, the necessary and sufficient conditions for each must be met to the fullest extent without denying the same to any. This means that while sustaining group cohesion was important because human society plays an integral role in existence, the conditions for being what was considered fully human could not be sacrificed, which meant giving them what they needed to be individuals, which translated into, among other things, respecting individual autonomy and what was needed to fully exercise it.

It should be noted, however, that for the purpose of my argument, the focus should be on both the conception of a good life embodied in, and enabled by, the tribal experiences discussed below, but not all of the practices themselves. I say this, firstly, because not all the ideas or practices are applicable to contemporary or future societies

(other than tribal ones, of course). I cannot envision a way that state societies can totally implement a tribal formation. In the next chapter I will not be advocating a wholesale adoption of a tribal good life and tribal practices. Rather, what I will suggest is altered and piecemeal borrowing and imitation, which means that specific tribal practices will not be advocated. More importantly, however, the distinction between the conception of a good life embodied in tribal experiences and the actual practices themselves must be maintained because it is entirely possible to enact the conception in other ways. Granted, there are limiting conditions (e.g., absence of power and substantial inequality) surrounding the enactment of an ethic, but within those limitations several possible enactments exist. My goal here is to pre-empt a dismissal of the ethic on the grounds of a disagreement with a specific enactment, when another enactment of the ethic that would 113 be found agreeable exists or could be conceptualized. This being so, the point of this chapter is to get a set of values clear, a conception of a good life, a political theory, as experienced by the tribal societies discussed below, which can be and is logically and practically separate from its existent realizations in many important ways.

A notion of unity, interrelatedness and interdependence

Tribal societies typically view the world, and the processes that go on in the world, as sacred. Moreover, humans are a part of, and belong to, the world, as does everything else that exists and has existed. All that exists is part of a "general community of life."351 In this way, as Dorothy Lee notes, in non-state societies like a tribe "religion is always present in man's view of his place in the universe, in his relatedness to man and nonhuman nature.. .[which we find] permeating daily life - agriculture and hunting, •5 CO health measures, arts and crafts." Paul Radin finds that reality, no matter how impermanent and changing, is seen as a unity.353 Our condition is that of universal relatedness and togetherness, as Stanley Diamond describes it.354

As Lee maintains, existence is seen as a continuum where all elements are in communion with one another. Humans are not separated from nature, but rather a part of nature, with no distinct separation of self and other where the individual is completely

351 Daniel Quinn, The Story ofB, (Toronto: Bantam, 1996), 160, 181, 189; Daniel Quinn, Ishmael (Toronto: Bantam, 1992), 239. 352 Dorothy Lee, Freedom and Culture (U.S.: Prentice-Hall, 1959), 162. 353 Paul Radin, Primitive Man as Philosopher (New York: Dover, 1957), 252. 354 Stanley Diamond, In Search of the Primitive: A Critique of Civilization (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1974), 146. 114 un-embedded and unattached from the larger natural environment.355 The productive activity of humans is not meant to be aggressive towards the environment, is not about exploiting resources or about working against nature. Productive activity is not meant to be an exercise in subduing and subjecting nature. We are not in opposition to nature.

Rather than working against nature, we should work with nature, aiding natural processes perhaps, cooperating definitely, in harmony. Humans are mutually interdependent with the rest of nature, as, for example, when we are involved in planting. And this mutual interdependence should breed respect, care and courtesy. Respect for the idea of interrelatedness of all existence is shown with the care many indigenous groups took to use every part of the hunted animal, or the use of only dead wood for fuel.357

Further speaking to a notion of all existence being a whole comprising interrelated and interdependent parts is the concern for the balance and order of the parts that constitute the whole. Radin finds that tribal societies attach importance to the

-3 co maintenance of balance, of maintaining order, when it comes to the whole of reality.

Human actions, as Lee observes, must maintain the harmony between humans as well as humans and the rest of nature, or restore such harmony when lost. Life and well-being depend on the balance that sustains existence continuing, so maintaining and restoring •J CQ balance is essential to continued life and well-being. For this reason, there is a great concern with the order of things and events as well as rectifying what is perceived to be a

355 Lee, 164-165. 356 Ibid., 167-168. 357 Ibid., 163. 358 Paul Radin, The World of Primitive Man (New York : H. Schuman, 1953), 72. 359 Lee, 166-167. 115 360 disorder, as Diamond points out. For example, as Radin argues, when an individual's act is seen to have taken away something, is seen to have removed an essential element in the unity of existence, punishment is about replacement, specifically replacing that which has been removed from the equation.361 He continues to note that instead of prosecuting the murderer as our state does, the primitive community attempts always to save his life and to make this defense of the murderer dependent upon as complete as possible a replacement of what the murdered man represented to his family and the group. In some tribes, like the Eskimo and a few Indian tribes of Canada, this went so far that the kin of the murdered man could demand that the murderer take his place. In other words, the economic replacement and substitution were complete. So here, again, the function of the group is reconciliation or, better, the restoration of harmony.362

None of this is to say that this would entirely staunch the wound inflicted by the murder.

Individuals are not regarded solely in terms of their economic function(s). The individual is unique and the loss cannot be entirely compensated for, cannot be entirely replaced.

The goal of this practice, rather, is to provide "as complete as possible a replacement," and while individuals are more than just their economic contributions, at least this can be restored.

Examples of this view of the interrelated nature of existence abound. According to Lee, the Polynesian Tikopia had a cosmology wherein it is proper to speak about a universal interrelatedness in which humans are one constituent element. And the Hopi of Arizona believed that everything in existence, from rocks to plants to animals, and

360 Diamond, In Search of the Primitive, 149. 361 Radin, The World of Primitive Man, 258. 362 Ibid, 251. 363 Lee, 29. 116 even the dead, all cooperate in maintaining a universal order in which they all relate and partake.364

The Lakota also illustrate this view. As Charmaine White Face puts it, the Lakota phrase mitakuye oyasin means "all my relatives." This not only extends to other humans, Lakota or not,366 but also to the rest of the natural world, be it plant life, animal life, or the rest of existence.367 Humans have many "relatives [that] stand in the ground,

i/ro or swim in the water, or fly in the air, or walk on four legs instead of two." This view of relatedness is predicated on a cosmology that sees all of reality as a circle, as J.

Marshall Beier tells us.369

Thomas Tyon gives us an account of this pre-reservation cosmology having himself reached adulthood as a member of a pre-reservation Oglala Lakota band. He authored his own narratives, and he consulted his own elders and other Lakotas, which were published by James R. Walker.370 As Tyon tells us, [t]he Oglala believe the circle to be sacred because the Great Spirit caused everything in nature to be round except stone. Stone is the implement of destruction. The sun and the sky, the earth and the moon are round like a shield, though the sky is deep like a bowl. Everything that breathes is round like the body of a man. Everything that grows from the ground is round like the stem of a tree. Since the Great Spirit has caused everything to be round mankind should look upon the circle as sacred for it is the symbol of all things in nature except stone. It is also the symbol of the

364 Ibid., 21. 365 Charmaine White Face, "We have another chance to learn 'mitakuye oyasin'," Indian Country Today, September 21, 2001, http://www.indiancountry.com/content.cfm?id=515 (visited 31/08/2006). 366 Ibid. 367Charmaine White Face, "Do we have a responsibility for our relatives?," Indian Country Today, March 06, 2002, http://www.indiancountry.com/content.cfm?id= 1015342167 (visited 31/08/2006). 368 Ibid. 369 J. Marshall Beier, International Relations in Uncommon Places: Indigeneity, Cosmology, and the Limits of International Relations Theory (New York: Palgrave, 2005), 100. 370 Ibid., 98. 117 circle that marks the edge of the world and therefore of the four winds that travel there. Consequently, it is also the symbol of a year. The day, the night, and the moon go in a circle above the sky. Therefore the circle is a symbol of these divisions of time and hence the symbol of all time.

'XT)

One can see here, as Beier notes, how the Lakota see all things as intrinsically related.

Nicholas Black Elk, a Lakota 'holy man,' who also reached adulthood during pre- reservation times, talks to us through the interview notes used by Raymond DeMallie to write The Sixth Grandfather. As he maintains, "[y]ou will notice that everything the

Indian does is in a circle. Everything they do is the power from the sacred hoop.. .The "XIA power won't work in anything but circles." Tyon agrees, saying it is "[f]or these reasons the Oglala make their tipis circular, their camp circle circular, and sit in a circle in all ceremonies."375 And as Beier observes, just as the power and unity inherent in the circle is important to the well- being of individuals, so too is it crucial to the health of the nation. The sacred hoop of the nation is a metaphor, derived from the camp circle, for the holistic unity of the Lakota people. Like the tipis that make up the camp circle, the nation is seen in terms of a hoop wherein no one constituent part is logically or implicitly prior to any other and such that all are equally necessary to complete the unity of the circle. The significance of the circle, then, is rooted in the assumption of an essential continuity from individual, through nation, to all elements of the cosmos, and back again. In fact, no one of these can be separated out from the others, since together they constitute a single totality encompassing all of Creation.376

371 J. R. Walker, "The Sun Dance and Other Ceremonies of the Oglala Division of the Teton Dakota," Anthropological Papers of the American Museum of Natural History 16 (Part 2), 1917, page 112, http://digitallibrary.amnh.Org/dspace/bitstream/2246/201/l/A016a02.pdf (visited June 5, 2007). 372 Beier, 100. 373 Ibid., 98. 374 Raymond J. DeMallie, The Sixth Grandfather: Black Elk's Teachings Given to John G. Neihardt (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1984), 290-91 375 Walker, 112. 376 Beier, 101. 118 This notion of the interrelatedness and interdependence of all of existence directly leads into the second aspect of a tribal conception of a good life.

All are significant

With reality conceived of as an interrelated and interdependent whole, the Lakota image of the circle becomes even more apt because it, unlike a linear conception, makes it impossible to think of any one element in whole as any more important than another. As

Quinn says, "humans belong in a sacred place because they themselves are sacred.

Humans may be sacred in ways different from other beings, but they are not more sacred than anything else, but merely as sacred as anything else - as sacred as bison or salmon or crows or crickets or bears or sunflowers."377 The idea that this world was made for any one species, humans for example, is denied. Similarly, the idea that humans, for example, should (re)shape the world to suit themselves is also rejected. The idea is not for humans to wage a war against the rest of the world, to exterminate their competitors by, for example, destroying their food or denying access to it. Competing, taking what you need and leaving the rest of existence alone to do its own thing, is one thing. War and destruction is quite another. Diversity is not to be destroyed so a single species like

•3 nn humans can expand.

377 Daniel Quinn, If They Give You Lined Paper Write Sideways (Hanover: Steerforth, 2007), 197. 378 Quinn, Ishmael, 145. 379 Ibid., 126-133. 119 As Pierre Clastres describes it, the whole must be respected.380 This respect and responsibility is, as Lee tells us, connected to the idea of the unity and relatedness of existence. There is a democratic attitude in the recognition of mutual interdependence, the respect and courteousness that is given (e.g., when offerings are made to animal spirits before the hunt). The significance of everyone and everything is given consideration and recognition. This is a relationship of conference and consent, not

•501 coercion.

With all the elements of existence interrelated and interdependent, there is not only an acceptance but a valorizing of diversity and difference. When discussing humans, this is perhaps best illustrated by noting, according to Lee, how human dignity is inviolate, individual freedom exists, and members of society have the full opportunity that the available cultural resources can provide. But none of this is done out of a sense of equality, at least not exactly. It should be obvious that inequality is acknowledged, that not all humans are born with equal ability, or else we would not talk about a leader taking on such a role due to excellence of character.382 While differences are acknowledged, each unique entity is respected.

With the Trobrianders from the Trobriand Islands that lie to the east of New

Guinea we see a culture that has both a language and set of practices that respect individual uniqueness. People claimed a desire to be good at something, rather than being better than someone else. A person joined an activity out of enjoyment and a desire to 380 Pierre Clastres, Society Against the State: Essays in Political Anthropology, Robert Hurley and Abe Stein, trans. (New York: Zone Books, 1987), 131. 381 Lee, 169-170. 382 Ibid, 41-42. 120 participate in a significant way, but his or her work was not evaluated against a common standard. People strove to enhance their uniqueness, boasting that they stand alone and are unique. In this sense, when comparisons are made they are not made to evaluate as better or worse, but to celebrate people's uniqueness.

The Hopi of Arizona are similar in their respect of difference. As Harry C. James notes, "[e]ach village functions in a decidedly democratic way. Each individual has his place and he shares in a definite community security of great personal psychological value."384 The "basic Hopi values," as Peter Whiteley observes, are "self-control in eating, decorous and respectful interpersonal relations, nonaggression,

385 nonacquisitiveness, noninquisitiveness, sexual modesty, etc." David Friend Aberle notes that "[f]ailure of ceremonies is attributed to the 'bad hearts' of individuals or to the malign influence of witches. This amounts to a universal taboo on aggression in action, speech, and thought, which is quite explicit." Of course, this is not to say that this taboo can be consistently observed on every occasion, but rather it is a standard to be strived for.386 Richard O. Clemmer tells us there "are no institutions or mechanisms that compel individuals to perform their duties, ceremonial or otherwise. Each individual is considered to be his own master and decision-maker. It is up to each person to decide what kind of life he wants." Instead, we see a drive to "insure that this principle of individual decision and independent judgment, which is important in Hopi behaviour, 383 Ibid., 42-43. 384 Harry C. James, The Hopi Indians: Their History and their Culture (Caldwell, Idaho: Caxton, 1956), 39. 385 Peter M. Whiteley, Rethinking Hopi Ethnography (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1998), 99. 386 David Friend Aberle, The Psychological Analysis of a Hopi Life-History (Berkeley: University of California, 1951), 26. 121 may continue to operate." Village leaders interpret custom rather than legislating for people, "for there are no mechanisms by which.. .[they] could enforce decisions or punish dissenters." They are looked upon as guides, not an executive. It would be quite appropriate for the motto of Hopi society to be "It's up to you."387 This ethic of respect fits with Lee who maintains that for the Hopi all of existence was made up of differentiated (although related) elements, with each being equal in the sense that each was significant and indispensable. Each element had a unique role and function in maintaining cosmic harmony. This principle was worked out in practice with individuals helping one another, their families and society, with a view to cooperation and harmony.

The idea was of a society whose members mutually help each other, creating a balanced

388 and harmonious whole.

Wayne Dennis tells us that "the Hopi approves most highly of a man who is good- natured and industrious and who causes no trouble. To be approved of, a man should do his duties by his clan and his ceremonial group.. .A lazy man is scorned." Making a living among the Hopi, as Lee observes, is a cooperative endeavour and directed towards the health and thriving of the group as a whole. People were ashamed of not aiding cooperative endeavours, or not giving (whether the gift was needed or not), of not being good to others. The idea of one person enjoying success while others are failing or in need was, again, so repugnant to them that they were reluctant to stand out and be singled out from the group, or to be praised in public. Such comparative evaluation was very

387 Richard O. Clemmer, Continuities of Hopi Culture Change (Ramona, California: Acoma, 1978), 28. 388 Lee, 47-48. 389 Wayne Dennis, The Hopi Child (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1940), 28. 122 disturbing to them. People did not compare their achievements, the importance of their work, and a person with one responsibility, a stone cutter for example, was perfectly content to except the same as a general labourer at the end of the day.390 This was grounded in the idea of relatedness of existence and the refusal to prioritize any one element of existence over another. A productive activity was aimed at the benefit of everyone in society and not for the profit or fame of any one individual. Likewise, ceremonies aimed at the well-being of the entirety of existence, not the individual. Any individual benefit comes because he or she is part of a balanced and harmonious whole.391

However, as will be discussed in further detail below, none of this is to deny the importance of human society and the individual among the Hopi. Lee finds that human society just one element in the whole of reality, so a given human in interacting with his or her society also participates in the whole of existence. Every individual in existence, be it rocks, plants, animals or humans, affects and is therefore in relations with the whole of existence, and the efforts of all therefore make a contribution to the whole. Every aspect of every individual, human or not, affects the world around it in some way. So every change and development of every individual changes and develops its participation in the whole, and in this way the whole changes as well. This makes every behaviour, every achievement, the entire unique being of every element in existence, significant. For example, in a ceremony that helps to maintain balance in the gathering and releasing of

390 Lee, 19-21. 391 Ibid., 22. 123 rain so that planted vegetation and food can grow, the individual helps to perpetuate the harmonious existence of all. As Clemmer notes, ceremonies "perpetuate the thrust of Hopi culture, and place responsibility on the individual not merely to be a cog in the system, but to actively continue the processes of history and environmental integration."393

The Lakota also share this respect of diversity. As Beier observes, the cosmology of a circle "defies the construction of hierarchy."394 This is because, as Paula Gunn Allen points out,

[t]he circular concept requires all 'points' that make up the sphere of being to have a significant identity and function, while the linear model assumes that some 'points' are more significant than others. In the one, significance is a necessary factor of being in itself, whereas in the other, significance is a function of placement on an absolute scale that is fixed in time and 395 space.

As noted before, the Lakota idea of mitakuye oyasin, that all are related, that all are relatives, speaks to the significance of everything. Fritz Detwiler has shown us that [t]he Oglala understand that all beings and spirits are persons in the fullest sense of that term: they share inherent worth, integrity, sentience, conscience, power, will, voice, and especially the ability to enter into relationships. Humans, or 'two-leggeds' are only one type of person. Humans share their world with Wakan and non-human persons, including human persons, stone persons, four-legged persons, winged-persons, crawling-persons, standing-persons (plants and trees), fish-persons, among others. These persons have both ontological and moral significance. The category person applies to anything that has being, and who is therefore capable of relating.396

392 Ibid., 21-22. 393 Richard O. Clemmer, Continuities of Hopi Culture Change (Ramona, California: Acoma, 1978), 28. 394 Beier, 102. 395 Paula Gunn Allen, The Sacred Hoop: Recovering the Feminine in American Indian Traditions (Boston: Beacon Press, 1992), 59. 396 Fritz Detwiler, '"All My Relatives': Persons in Oglala Religion," Religion 22:3 (July 1992), 239. 124

We can see in these ideas, where the natural world beyond humans has significance, why, as Robert Bunge argues, adjusting to nature, harmony with nature, as opposed to defying and subduing it, is considered the proper course of action. According to Beier, the unity and relatedness of the circle of existence is thought to be a balance set long ago, and

"[a]djusting to this balance ensures its maintenance and, by extension, the security of all in Creation."398

The extension of personhood to things and animals as well as human beings should not necessarily be seen as reducing the significance of what it means to be a person, because non-human persons - animate or inanimate objects - are often conceived of differently that many in Western society do, as they are often thought to have spirits of their own. In this way, they can relate to humans and each other because the spiritual component is considered capable of relating to humans. One might be concerned that since natural objects are subject to use, even if, for example, prey are shown respect, and if things and animals are accorded personhood as humans are, then what prevents humans from using other humans in the same way, so long as they are shown due respect. How, for example, can one derive a sense of inviolable dignity for humans399 out of this

397 Robert Bunge, An American Urphilosophie: An American Philosophy BP (Before Pragmatism (Lanham: University Press of America, 1984), 94. 398 Beier, 102. 399 Political theorists have sought to do just his, with the thinker Immanuel Kant being an example. In the second section of the Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant concludes that a categorical imperative to "Act in such a way that you treat humanity...always at the same time as an end and never simply as a means" can be derived a priori from a reasoned consideration of humans as rational creatures that think of themselves as the purpose or "end" to which all their actions are directed, along with a recognition of the need for morals to have universal validity [see: Immanuel Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals: On a Supposed Right to Lie Because of Philanthropic Concerns, trans. James W. Ellington (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993), 19-36.] 125 worldview? This criticism, however, suffers from a misunderstanding of the worldview under examination. The personhood extended to things and animals is considered no less than that of humans, but it is of a different nature, because while of equal worth, the beings themselves are qualitatively different. Since the specific respect due is often based on the nature and fulfillment needs of the being under consideration, the differences between the natures of humans and other beings in existence result in different forms of respect being considered as due. As will be discussed below in the section on respect for individual autonomy, the very nature of a human determines what respect is due, and it so happens that what is due is, in part, the inviolable dignity of the individual.

As said above, humans are a part of nature, an integral part of the interrelated unity of existence. And since nature is to be adjusted to, not subdued, other humans, even non-Lakota, are to be respected. As Beier observes, "bringing ruin upon them in warfare or by any other means would be inconsistent with Lakota cosmological commitments.

Moreover, it would be self-destructive since it would fragment the sacred hoop upon which all life depends a hoop must be complete to be hoop at all." Everything in existence is not only interrelated, but also interdependent.400

We can see this ethic of respect when it comes to Lakota conflict. As Beier points out,

conflict with other peoples involved efforts to restore balance perceived to have been temporarily lost. In this context, the existence of the revenge complex is particularly significant inasmuch as it both sustained low intensity

400 Ibid., 103. 126 violence between groups and mitigated against disproportionate acts of retaliation - an exercise mandated by and subordinated to the imperative of maintaining/restoring balance. Here too, then, the point is not to deny that conflict was part of the aboriginal condition but, rather, is to highlight the absence of a general anarchy. Simply put, functional non-state mechanisms worked to furnish political order. What would have been unthinkable as a persistent feature of life on the pre-Columbian Northern Plains is large-scale exterminative warfare; such conduct would have been seen to jeopardize one's own well-being by threatening to break the sacred hoop.401

Conflict in this way can be used to prevent large-scale, exterminative warfare. Conflict disturbs peace, it is true, but the disruption it causes is less severe than warfare, which it can prevent to the extent that it is seen as an exercise to restore balance. In this sense, conflict can be consistent with, not at odds with, an ethic of respect.402 And Beier cites a

British officer complaining about this indigenous approach to conflict: "'[t]his fight is more for pastime, than to conquer and subdue enemies.. .They might fight seven years and not kill seven men'."403

And Harry C. James similarly situates the Hopi, noting

[t]he Hopi have ever sought to be true people of peace. Only occasionally have they been forced into physical conflict. The most memorable struggle in recent times was that in the early 1900's between Tewaquaptwa and Yokeoma [different descent group leaders of the Oraibi Hopi village]. But even then the ingenious Hopi found a way of waging war without bloodshed.. .[Although it may have seemed that a] civil war was inevitable [on the basis of religious and social schisms].. .[the settlement came when] [t]he bows and arrows, the knives, and the guns - with which both sides had armed themselves - were ordered discarded. A line was scored across the sandstone. Yokeoma agreed that if Tewaquaptewa could push him across this line, he and his followers would leave the village peacefully [with Yokeoma being successfully moved].. .The war was over. No one was killed. No one was seriously hurt; and the matter was settled.. .By sunset all their belongings were packed and.. .they

401 Beier, 106. 402 The point here, however, is not to endorse the practice of low intensity conflict, but rather to see the importance of the ideas of respect and balance. 403 Beier, 126. 127 left.. .[and] traveled about eight miles to a place that Yokeoma had already determined upon in case of defeat, and there they established the village of Hotevila.404

Dennis also notes this, saying that there is a "strong anti-violence tradition. The Hopi defended themselves vigorously when the Navaho attacked, but they practically never engaged in aggressive warfare. A Hopi will fight if he is forced to do so.. .but rarely can he be induced to strike the first blow."405

Beyond preventing warfare, low-level conflict also played a role in the respect and maintenance of diversity. Raising points already discussed by Service in the previous chapter, according to Quinn, there was no idea that one society knew what was right for everybody, that what others were doing was therefore wrong, and should be converted.406

A given society had their way of doing things that worked well for them, and that is as far as it went.407 What conflict did occur was more or less constant and low-level, with a typical event involving one party inflicting a certain amount of damage (disruptive but not destructive) on the other and returning home. Soon, revenge was sought, doing damage in kind, and then returning home as well. Although it may not be obvious, one thing going on here is the preservation of distinct cultural identities. The attacks do not seek to destroy another culture, but rather inflict some damage to demonstrate and affirm one's own cultural identity. The attack is a declaration of the existence and distinctness of the attacker. The targeting of a society also serves to acknowledge not only its presence but its strength and health, and therefore honour was being bestowed in the sense that

404 James, The Hopi People, 42-47. 405 Dennis, The Hopi Child, 22-23. 406 Quinn, Ishmael, 167. 407 Ibid., 206. 128 their recognition is considered important. But the attacker wants its health and strength noted too. There can be years where there is no attack and counter attack, and during these times relations between tribes are typically very pleasant. But when such an attack comes it will definitely serve to maintain cultural diversity.408 The basic idea is to give as good as you get, but not be predictable. In the first part, bother those who bother you and do not bother those who are not. That said, as the second part says, it can be a good idea to instigate a little bothering yourself. There will be retaliation, but you will have let them know that you are still strong and healthy. And once they have retaliated, there is usually no problem getting together for a celebration that just may include

409 intermarriages.

Retaliation in kind shows that you are willing and able to be nice or nasty depending on, and in accordance with, how others behave. In any case, the object of conflict is not to conquer others and impose your way of life.410 To do so would be to invite other societies in your area to, after seeing you are no longer playing the above tit- for-tat (with a little initiation occasionally) game, and likely come together and destroy your society.411 The respect of diversity is seen in a tribal forbearance on waging exterminative warfare, with both humans and the rest of the natural world.412 There "is no

408 Daniel Quinn, The Story ofB, (Toronto: Bantam, 1996), 217-219. 409 Quinn, My Ishmael, 89. 410 My Ishmael, 103. 411 Ibid., 90-91. 412 While these particular tribes demonstrate the existence of this ethic, none of this is to say that there are not tribes that show mutual restraint because, for example, while believing their way of life is genuinely best, they simply view the well being of other tribes as not their concern. Indifference, in this example, could explain some tribes' lack of interest in wars of conquest. I am certain that tribes can be found that do not hold a mutual respect for other cultures. 129 one right way to live"413 and one should be concerned with "letting the rest of the community [of life] live."414

The above commitment to diversity, to actions that uphold and value difference, should underscore what is meant by respect and how it can be practiced. It is important to note that practicing respect is done with a view to maintaining balance.415 As Linda

Tuhiwai Smith suggests, "[t]he term 'respect' is consistently used by indigenous peoples to underscore the significance of our relationships and humanity. Through respect the place of everyone and everything in the universe is kept in balance and harmony."416

Laurie Anne Whitt argues that "[a]s an ethical and cognitive virtue, respect mediates not only human, but human/nonhuman relationships; it is readily and regularly extended to the natural world and its nonhuman inhabitants. Since everyone and everything has important functions, they deserve to be respected for what and how they are."417

This valuing of diversity can be seen, for example, in the Lakota respect of other cosmologies. As Howard L. Harrod suggests, "[e]ven though there were religious interchanges among groups, Native American peoples were not motivated to convert others, because they did not believe that one religion was true while the other was less

A 1 O true or even false." And Vine Deloria Jr. tells us that

413 Quinn, Ishmael, 248. 4,4 Ibid., 250. 415 Beier, 103. 416 Linda Tuhiwai Smith, Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples (London: Zed Books, 1999), 120. 417 Laurie Anne Whitt, "Indigenous Peoples and the Cultural Politics of Knowledge," in Michael K. Green, ed. Issues in Native American Cultural Identity (New York: Peter Lang, 1995), 243. 418 Harold L. Harrod, Becoming and remaining a People: Native American Religions on the Northern Plains (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1995), 103. 130 [n]o demand existed... for the people to go into the world and inform or instruct other people in the rituals and beliefs of the tribe. The people were supposed to follow their own teachings and assume that other people would follow their teachings. These instructions were rigorously followed and consequently there was never an instance of a tribe making war on another tribe because of religious differences.419

As Beier describes it, nowhere in Lakota oral history is there an account of "any attempt or inclination to convert others, past or present."420 And this all fits with a notion of a good life whereby the continuity of an interrelated and interdependent whole is maintained through respecting, even valorizing, the diversity of its constituent parts.421

Sustaining group cohesion

According to Radin, in addition to "the respect for the individual, irrespective of age or sex," the two other "outstanding positive features of aboriginal civilizations" are "the amazing degree of social and political integration achieved by them; and the existence there of a concept of personal security which transcends all governmental forms and all

a99 tribal and group interests and conflicts."

Production and (re)distribution contribute significantly to both integration and security. For example, one can look at the Arapesh of New Guinea. Lee observes that

"food, in its entire process, from production or gathering to consumption, is regarded primarily as a medium for social warmth and intercourse." 491 They live in a mountainous

419 Vine Deloria, Jr., "Is Religion Possible? An Evaluation of Present Efforts to Revive Traditional Tribal Religions," Wicazo Sa Review 8:1 (Spring 1992), 36. 420 Beier, 103. 421 Ibid., 104. 422 Radin, The World of Primitive Man, 11. 423 Lee, 155. 131 region that is rugged with almost no level land, and have small gardens that can be separated by miles of territory from their homes. The most efficient way to maximize the volume of food production would be to have one gardener on each of the small plots.

However, with respect to production, efficiency is sacrificed in the interest of improving the quality of labour and life in general. They crowd the small plots with up to six families (husbands, wives and children), moving from one to another as a group, traveling over difficult territory to do so, and losing that time (about a third of the total time spent in production), all so they can enjoy each other's company and share the work.

When eating the food, the aim is for each person to eat food grown by another, or killed by another in the case of game. People will walk a mile or more to plant food on the plots of others, or hunt and give their kills away. Everything that is consumed has some aspect of social cooperation and participation because so much energy is spent on ensuring as much social warmth and intercourse as possible. The end result is a society that lives and works happily and successfully reproduce themselves.424 Lee gives us another example of this in the above mentioned Trobrianders. They resemble the Arapesh, with the main part of one man's harvest given to his brother-in-law. The idea behind the exchange was not, for example, to introduce variety into another's diet, but rather social intercourse. Often the gift of food was unneeded, and although it functioned to cement social ties, it would rot andi go uneaten. 425

424 Ibid., 155-156. 425 Ibid., 156. 132 Redistribution of goods and services went far to promote social cohesion and security, as was discussed in the previous chapter. As Quinn points out, tribal people do suffer - this societal type is not a Utopia - but no one suffers unless everyone suffers.

Suffering is diffused across everyone in society, with no one person or subgroup taking on the burden for others' relief.426 Social and economic egalitarianism are predicated on

(although also reciprocally enables) an ethic that says when you give support you get support, and when you get support you give support 427 This kind of wealth - security from cradle to grave for every member of society - does not have a tendency to flow into the hands of a minority, not because tribal people are more 'noble,' but because there is no way to accumulate such wealth and monopolize it.428 Remembering the discussion in the previous chapter, there is no way to exclude someone from producing the wherewithal to live because the means of production are not the exclusive property of anyone. This is not to say, as Quinn argues, that people do not go hungry, but rather that if someone does go hungry you can bet they are not suffering this alone because everyone else is going hungry too.429 This highlights that one of the most significant features of a tribal life is that no one is left alone to deal with an enormous difficulty. The whole tribe takes on the burden when one or more families suffer. And this is not always about altruism. Distributing and diffusing a problem over the whole of society makes the shared

426 Quinn, The Story ofB, 321. 427 Quinn, My Ishmael, 175. 428 Ibid, 178. 429 Ibid, 180. 133 burden relatively easy to deal with, and no one knows when he or she will be in need.430 Cohesion and security come together when total support is given and received by all.

Social cohesion is also gained through tribal customs. Problems are bound to arise when living with other people and tribal customs are, in part, ways of handling these problems. Obviously, the survival of the tribe requires that individuals support and defend it, that they cooperate with others.431 Although not seen as flawed, humans are not thought of as always 'noble.' Humans can cause trouble, disruptions, think of themselves to the exclusion of others, engage in cruelties, and the list can go on. In some ways, customs do not merely forbid disruptive behaviour, which is assumed likely to happen on occasion, but rather to rectify the situation once such behaviour has occurred. For example, in the case of the Alawa of Australia and adultery,

[i]f you have the misfortune to fall in love with another man's wife, or another woman's husband, the law doesn't say, 'This is prohibited and may not go forward.' It says, 'If you want your love to go forward, here's what you must do to make things right with all parties and to see to it that marriage isn't cheapened in the eyes of our children.' It's a remarkably successful process.432

The custom (of which more detail is given below) does not seek to merely forbid adultery, but rather also lay down what can be done to minimize damage when it occurs.

As mentioned above, punishment seeks to make the situation right, to restore balance, to heal people, as much as possible, to regain harmony. In this sense, the success of tribes

430 Ibid, 183-184. 431 Ibid, 87-88. 432 Quinn, If They Give You Lined Paper, 191. 433 Quinn, My Ishmael, 107-108. 134 does not depend on people being absolutely 'noble,' since they had ways of dealing with people who are far from that, to manage their shortcomings.434

Social and peer pressure are also ways of maintaining social order and cohesion.

As characterized by Radin, when mistakes are made, when a person deviates from the opinion that is generally accepted, when a person acts peculiarly or eccentrically, when a person attempts to change a ceremony, or retell a story in a different manner than usual, they are likely to face criticism and sarcasm.435 Although it is true that the person who was different or who had different opinions and interpretations was likely to be met with sarcasm and ridicule, it is equally true that when a person felt strong enough to stand up and weather the storm of teasing and unpopularity he or she would suffer no further prosecution or persecution. "If a man chose to disbelieve in the efficacy of the spirits, apart from the ridicule to which he would unquestionably be subjected, this led to nothing worse than a shrug of the shoulders for his idiocy and uncalled-for bravado. Essentially this was considered a matter of private concern although it probably would mean worry and concern to friends and relatives."436

The Lakota, at the same time as refusing to force conformity on each other, are a great example of cohesion as a group. We can see this first in their decision-making structures. As Beier notes, collective decisions were reached by a council that was convened when, and only when, a decision needed to be made. All members of society were free to speak in counsel, and decisions had to be reached by consensus rather than

434 Quinn, My Ishmael, 121; Quinn, If They Give You Lined Paper, 192. 435 Radin, Primitive Man as Philosopher, 50-51. 436 Ibid., 54-55. 135 by the majority. No decision would be made if consensus was not reached.437 Luther

Standing Bear, who also reached adulthood during pre-reservation times, and who received a Western education and wrote his own

books, tells us that "[t]here was no such word as democracy in the Lakota language, but the spirit prevailed in the phrase,

Oyate ta woecun, which meant, 'Done by the people' or 'The decision of the nation.'"439

According to Beier, "[although a form of executive authority did come to prevail in matters of immediate urgency - such as when the tiyospaye was under attack - it was completely specific to and coterminous with the special conditions that called into being in the first place." Authority was temporary, and "was not automatically vested in any one designated individual or group, but was deferred to those most adept at dealing with the particular concern at hand." Leaders, as discussed in the previous chapter, were followed because of an excellence of character that earned them respect. That said, they could not independently make decisions and bind members of their society. When they represented their society, it was "it would have to be on matters were collective decisions had already been reached in

council."440 Finally, as William K. Powers describes it, these leaders held their positions of authority with people's consent. They had to maintain people's respect by maintaining an excellence of character, and if they failed to do so,

"they were shunned and new leaders were solicited."441 437 Beier, 104. 438 Ibid., 98. 439 Luther Standing Bear, Land of the Spotted Eagle (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1978), 129. 440 Beier, 105. 441 William K. Powers, Oglala Religion (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1975), 202-203. As Catherine Price notes, consensus was not always reached. For most cases, coercion was not an option. However, dissenters hindering the decision-making process around important issues that needed resolution would be subject to persuasion in the form of family and social pressure.442 That said, this sustaining of group cohesion was not won at the cost of individual autonomy. Even when important issues required resolution, and dissenting individuals were faced with social pressure, the final decision is with the individual. As Price observes, if dissenters were not persuaded, if they were still dissatisfied with the direction the society was going in, they could secede, either joining another established society or founding a new society, "rather than submit to tradition and family pressure."443 In such cases of secession, the cohesion of society was maintained, while what Delmer Lonowski calls "the individual's right to secede" was also respected.

In fact, as Lonowski points out, "[d]eci si on-making was by consensus imposed by the individual's right to secede."444 As Beier shows, secession "served to deter intransigence by the majority and, simultaneously, prevented exercises of tyranny by the preponderance of numbers." 445 None of this is to deny the costs associated with leaving the tribe, but it has to be noted that newly formed tribe or the existing one the individual joined would not experience "lasting enmity" with the individual's original tribe, with the various individual Lakota societies that comprised the Lakota people or nation, still coming together for ceremonies and communal hunts. It can be seen, then, that "secession was an

442 Catherine Price, "Lakotas and Euroamericans: Contrasted Concepts of 'Chieftainship' and Decision- Making Authority," Ethnohistory 41:3 (Summer 1994), 451. 443 Price, 451-452. 444 Delmer Lonowski, "A Return to Tradition: Proportional Representation in Tribal Government," American Indian Culture and Research Journal 18:1 (1994), 154. 445 Beier, 106. 137 accepted and legitimate mode of dispute resolution" that fit in nicely with "the cosmological emphasis on adjustment of human conduct so as to maintain balance."446

Similarly, group cohesion was of a concern when looking at the goings-on in what

Beier calls the "inter-national realm." Conflicts with others sought to restore balance temporarily lost. In this sense, as noted above, "sustained low-intensity violence between groups.. .mitigated against disproportionate acts of retaliation - an exercise mandated by and subordinated to the imperative of maintaining/restoring balance." Although political order was gained from such conflict, "large-scale exterminative warfare [would have been unthinkable]; such conduct would have been seen to jeopardize one's own well- being by threatening to break the sacred hoop."447 Additionally, it is also important to remember, as noted above, that low-level conflict served to maintain the integrity of one's own society: a society's continued existence could very well depend on ensuring that their neighbours continued to take them seriously.

Respecting individual integrity, autonomy and difference

Customs limit individual behaviour. However, customs can, in their application, demonstrate a profound respect for individuality to the extent that they place limits on the ability of some members of society to deny equal and commensurate autonomy for others 448 This is the case in some tribal societies. As Radin argues, one of the

446 Beier, 106. 447 Ibid. 448 John Stuart Mill is one political theorist who discussed this matter, correctly discussing how "prevailing opinion and feeling... [allow] society to impose, by other means than civil penalties, its own ideas and practices as rules of conduct on those who dissent from them" (John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (New York: 138 "outstanding positive features of aboriginal civilizations" is "the respect for the

individual, irrespective of age or sex."449 This is echoed by anthropologist after

anthropologist. According to Lee, "[t]he individual... [is] shown absolute respect from birth and valued.. .for his own uniqueness, [and] apparently learns with every experience to have this same respect and value for others."450 Individuals do not impose their wills on others out "deep-seated respect for individual worth, and their awareness of the unique tempo of the individual."451 The Wintu, for example, are described as "a tightly knit group with great respect for individual integrity and autonomy."452 Asher Horowitz and

Gad Horwitz, discussing Lee's work, note that with the Wintu,

all individuals, including children, have the prerogative to decide for themselves.. .This is done out of a deep respect for the unique tempo of the individual, and the feeling that it would be grossly presumptive to impose an external time schedule on her. This society abounds in individual freedom, but not as we know it. There exists no notion that the individual needs protection against society. ..In asking "Can I?" children are not asking an adult for personal permission, they are not asking "Do you allow me?" but rather requesting information about the rules of the structure, about customs and taboos.453

These thoughts provide an entrance into the discussion that will show how it is that tribal societies can be said to respect individual freedom, difference, and autonomy.

Penguin, 1974), 63). However, as Mill recognized, customs can, in their application, demonstrate a profound respect for individuality to the extent that they place limitations on those who would deny equal and commensurate autonomy for others. 449 Radin, The World of Primitive Man, 11. 450 Lee, 7. 451 Ibid., 6. 452 Ibid., 5. 453 Asher Horowitz and Gad Horowitz, Everywhere They are in Chains: Political Theory from Rousseau to Marx (Scarborough: Nelson Canada, 1988), 39. 139 It should be obvious from the previous chapter that members of a tribe did not suffer the personal power of a leader. As Clastres observes, leaders were denied power, they could not demand, could not use force, but only attempt to persuade others.454 The leader's ability to persuade rests on his or her competence when it comes to the issue at hand, and does not extend beyond their competence into generalized power 455 So, if not a personal power limiting individuals, what about impersonal forces, or more specifically, customs?

Tribal societies value each individual's autonomy and uniqueness, but only up to a point. Customs limit behaviour, but in doing so they demonstrate a profound respect for individuality. While tribal societies respect individuality, they do impose boundaries on individual behaviour. Limits are imposed on those who would deny freedom and individuality for others. Radin notes that once a person is alive he or she is typically believed to be entitled to what is connected with life, to what is needed for life, "to the irreducible economic minimum, to self-expression and to freedom of movement." This point needs spelling out because it is of central importance. The conception here is that individuals are entitled to that which allows them to fulfill themselves and actualize what it means to be human. Particular examples, as discussed above and below, include economic security through guaranteed access to strategic goods as well as autonomy in and action. Of course, as will be discussed below, limits are needed to ensure that individuals can experience this autonomy equally; however, it needs to be noted that this

454 Clastres, 131. 455 Ibid., 175. 140 conception of the nature of individuals entitling them to autonomy and security itself limits arbitrary uses of power by, for example, the tribe itself, or its leaders. The nature of the individual specifies what is owed, and what others in society can and cannot do to one another. If another member of the tribe violates this entitlement, depending on the complexity of the tribe, other tribe members including the kin of the violator, the violated person's kin, or the tribal leader are appealed to, with the basis of the appeal being the individual's natural entitlement, and the above and below mentioned sanctions take effect.

Given what has been said before ensuring an economic minimum should not seem that strange. Once a person is alive he or she should have what is connected to life, in this case, food, shelter and clothing.456 "To deny anyone this irreducible minimum was equivalent to saying that a man no longer existed, that he was dead."457 Autonomy was considered so central to being fully human that the denial of independence that came with being deprived of economic security, being denied access to strategic goods, was forbidden. Granted, with secession and exile are existent practices, one could argue there were limits to subsistence rights. However, this forgets that individuals leaving their tribe could and did either form a new tribe with kin, or join another tribe, and once this was done, no lasting enmity existed between old and new tribe, and the fruits of regular cooperation were still available to all. Radin, like so many other anthropologists, notes

456 Radin, The World of Primitive Man, 255. 457 Ibid, 15. 141 the existence of these features in several tribes, including the Semang of the Malay peninsula, the Bushmen of South Africa, and the Maori.458

So an entitlement to the wherewithal to life is readily seen. Moreover, freedom of self-expression is also valued. As Radin notes, "self-expression" is found within many tribal societies.459 A person's different opinions and interpretations would be thought of as a matter of private concern. They could be met with criticism and sarcasm, but if they stood their ground they would not face suppression, or be prosecuted or persecuted. If a person was determined, they were not to be suppressed, because this is part of his or her personality, part of the distinct and valuable person that they are. To deny them this was to deny their significance.460 This is why there is such free scope to self-expression.

There is freedom to be your own person and develop your unique personality. However, it is also incumbent upon people to know themselves, to know what they want and value, and to accept the consequences of their personalities and actions.461 Again, matters such as differences of opinions and interpretation were considered a private concern and would be subject to criticism or sarcasm. However, a person's autonomy, in the end, is limited only when harm or injury is inflicted on another, with given examples including destruction of personal property or its theft, intentional speech or slander leading directly to another's physical harm, intentionally and directly causing physical harm (e.g., assault, rape), or murder being. There is, therefore, much room for people to do as they wish.462

458 Ibid, 105-110. 459 Ibid, 255-256. 460 Radin, Primitive Man as Philosopher, 54-58. 461 Ibid,, 34-35. 462 Radin, The World of Primitive Man, 257-258; Lee, 10. 142 And within the limits of this custom-as-prohibition is another goal of custom, which is the facilitation of individual autonomy by aiding people in successfully navigating their chosen path in life.

Customs are also obeyed because in many cases it allows people to proceed without taking (enforceable) orders from someone or some group. People act autonomously finding that custom provides guidance.463 In many cases, customs do not involve order that are given and actions that are taken due to enforceable punishments.

Rather, Radin finds many cases where "[a] man does not obey the customs of his elders because a rigid tradition forces him to do so but because he is convinced that they have worked in the case of his elders. If they do not work he is apt to abandon them or allow them to become moribund."464 In these cases, it is better to look at customs as a means to successful action. Customs are views as connected to the rest of the natural world in the sense that they are themselves successful means of relating to the rest of existence.

Whether one is striving for success within the confines of society (e.g., building and maintaining social ties through reciprocity) or in one's interactions with larger nature

(e.g., how to hunt successfully), following customs supports personal freedom by enabling successful action. When the specific characteristics of a given structure are not clear turning to authority can give clarification, especially when, as in the case of tribal societies, authority is predicated upon proven and sustained excellence in the given matter. As Lee observes, the authority of a leader is akin to the authority of a dictionary

463 Lee, 9. 464 Radin, The World of Primitive Man, 223. 143 or an Einstein text. When we consult such texts there is no hint of coercion or order- giving. These people go to a leader as we would go to a reference book. The leader answers a question with his or her greater knowledge or clarifies an issue. Leaders do not give orders, but rather say, given their understanding and experience, this is what they think should be done. Just like no one consulting a cookbook that tells them what to do, and when to do it, feels this guidance as a barrier to their freedom and autonomy, but rather a guiding, enabling, and freeing source, customs can do the same.465 People are free to take another path, a non-customary one, as long as their actions do not, as mentioned above, harm others.

And the experiences of anthropologists bear this out. Diamond points out that

"authentic individuation is more likely to occur, because the pre-conditions for personal growth.. .are present."466 Aside from what can be called the material preconditions for individual autonomy (e.g., the abovementioned absence of power and substantial inequality) there are immaterial supports for autonomy whereby individuality and difference are respected. Individualism, as Radin shows us, is seen everywhere, and there were no official restraints on free expression 467 In addition to their actions, one can often find the lack of imposition of one person's will on another in the language of a tribal society. According to Lee, for example, the Wintu of California have words that express coordination, sharing and cooperation. Rather than saying, as an example, "I fed my

465 Lee, 9-10. 466 Diamond, In Search of the Primitive, 166. 467 Radin, Primitive Man as Philosopher, 38, 41. 144 A/r o child" they would say something like "I participated in my child's eating." In tribal societies, where each element in existence is given value and none are prioritized over others, the simple quality of being is valued. As Lee tells us, there are no inferiors or superiors when being itself is valued. Rather, being different is not only expected, it is recognized and valued. By providing its members with all the opportunities available given the material circumstances, fullness of experience, opportunity and freedom are provided. With 'being' considered a value, with all people considered significant, with the integrity of all people having value, there is a preoccupation with people developing as fully as possible, developing in their unique way. Customs are not merely binding standards or expectations relative to which a person is either degraded or elevated in value. Rather, customs can be guides for procedures, tested and successful measures that increase opportunity for people to achieve what they desire.469 According to Lee, customs are not always "rigid expectations of performance." They do not always "evaluate the progress of one man against that of another." There is no "reward according to distance covered." Rather, the concern is with seeing that "each individual is enabled to set out on his own chosen path, among those offered by the culture; and when he errs.. .or.. .stumbles, the society does not judge nor punish, but may even help the individual to use this misstep toward a richer progress."470 She continues to note that [these societies] do not make, but help their members to be; they enable them to select, within the limits of the structure, the raw material they need for their own unique growth. In such societies, individuals set their conduct

468 Lee, 44. 469 Lee, 44-45 470 Lee, 46. 145 according to an internal standard, not according to external expectations....Here we have.. .the full valuing of man in his uniqueness, enabling him to actualize himself, to use opportunity fully, undeterred by the standards of an outside power, not forced to deviate, to meet the expectations of others.471

As Radin notes, the lack of consistently sceptical people, unbelievers, and even revolts or revolutionaries, is partially because such persons would see the proper course of action to be to leave society to join or found another group, rather than attempting to force others in society to agree with him. There is the belief that although related, and though they can and do constrain each other at times, the individual and the group are distinct entities.

The distinctiveness and autonomy of each person must be properly respected and never be submerged to the will of another. People can try to persuade others, but when that fails

479 ATX the integrity of each must not be compromised. The idea underpinning all this,

(whether or not it is always fully actualized), as discussed above, is that all the distinct

(though related) entities must exercise self-discipline and self-control and respect in their relations with other entities so as much autonomy is granted to each while allowing equal autonomy for all. In this way, order, proportion, and harmony in all things are maintained 474

471 Ibid. 472 Radin, Primitive Man as Philosopher, 43. 473 None of this is to say that the ground for equality is merely values. Social experience is an essential component. As discussed above, with the reversion to gumlao among the Kachin, it can be seen that the social relations of the Kachin allowed the development of gumsa over time, but at some point the social inequality became intolerable. This was not merely the case of new or re-emerging values, and it must have been possible for the same people who valued the form of gumlao society to live for periods of time under gumsa. They would not have lost the moral framework of equality, but did lose the social foundation for it. Then, at some point, they responded by re-embracing the lost social condition, violently if necessary. The point here is that, to a significant extent, a tribal good life is grounded in a social reality that provides for the maintenance of equality. The ethic of respect both fosters social equality - as in challenging vainglorious behaviour - and depends upon it. 474 Ibid., 64. 146 The pathologies and disturbances found in tribal societies were discussed in the introduction, and we know members of tribal societies can be as friendly, loving, affectionate, kind, generous, pitying, and respectful as any other group of people, but also engage in arguments or act with jealousy, envy and hatred, among other things. Such traits, positive and negative, exist, as Radin argues, in all societies, even tribes.475

However, the mechanisms tribal societies have for dealing with these problems when they occur are extremely effective.

According to Diamond tribal societies "tend to be systems in equilibrium. They are not disrupted by institutional conflicts." There are, for example, conflicts, but measures exist to successfully deal with these in ways that strive to respect individual autonomy.476 As Quinn puts it, misbehaviour, unpleasant behaviour, behaviour that is disruptive, is to be expected. Falling in love with the wrong person (e.g., someone else's wife), losing one's temper too quickly, or any other disruptive behaviour occurs now and again. However, what can differ is how such problems are approached and dealt with.477

Tribal societies have mechanisms that both deal with social problems in ways that allow for the continuation of a particular society and allow for the difference and autonomy of individuals. As Diamond tells us, idiosyncratic individuals are accommodated and their unconventional behaviour is permitted, although they are still penalized.478

An example of this is the way that the Alawa of Australia handles adultery. As

Quinn describes it, imagine that an unmarried man and a married woman had left camp to

475 Radin, The World of Primitive Man, 38. 476 Diamond, In Search of the Primitive, 137. 477 Quinn, The Story ofB, 265. 478 Diamond, In Search of the Primitive, 169. 147 have sex together. Assume further that they have been discovered. When they return home, they will be greeted by the men grouped together and the women similarly grouped together, with each group violently descending upon the man and the women respectively. The man and the women, however, fight back in defence of their love. Once the violence dies down, the woman is sent back to her husband and the adulterous man is told to leave camp. After he leaves camp he is faced with two choices. If he really does not want the woman he can leave for a few weeks and return once the other men's anger has died down. Of course, he will be met with sarcasm and ridicule for a while, a few weeks or so, but once he has offered some sort of recompense to the offended husband, all will be forgotten. However, if he really does want the woman, he can return later that night and will find her lightly guarded. The light guard is to keep her from running off with him, but also allows her to make a choice. Although she is guarded, the man is not, and by coming for her he proves his courage. She does not need to prove her courage by running to him, even if she could, which she cannot because she is guarded. This is all for the good because if the man does not come for her she is not insulted and shamed. She is not to blame, because she is guarded. It is his cowardice of the guards that has kept them apart, and her value is unquestioned. The guards, however, also protect him as well, because, as is her choice, she may not want him. If not, she simply does not go along with the rescue attempt (if it comes). She does not do her part, does not make the requisite effort on her part, not doing so because of the guards. The presence of the guards, then, allows her to make her choice in a way that protects the man's self-esteem as well. In the end, the guard is effective enough to serve all the above purposes, but also ineffective 148 enough to allow her escape at his signal, assuming she so chooses. All this shows the

Alawa's good sense that if two people want to be together this much, forbidding it is impossible. Once all the testing is over, once they have made their decision, they must, however, pay the price. Their decision to be together has had a disruptive effect on the tribe by cheapening marriage in the eyes of impressionable children. And although they are allowed to be together the price they pay is heavy, the heaviest next to death: exile for life. Once the decision to be together has been made, they run off together, but never to return. But this is less a punishment than a price they knowingly pain of their own choice.

They know that marriage must remain sanctified in the eyes of children if the tribe is to continue. Adultery without consequences would, it is believed, make marriage worthy of ridicule and laughter, and the basis of the family and the tribe would disintegrate. And they have no wish to destroy the tribe. No, this custom does what tribal customs, and tribal punishments, are meant to do. On the one hand, the integrity of the lovers, their choice to have each other, is respected. Moreover, in facing the previous violence and exile, they have proven that they are not cowards, but rather two lovers who desire each other desperately. On the other hand, the tribe continues on. Additionally, the husband's dishonour has been rectified because rather than others in the tribe laughing at him, they stood side by side and took on the adulterer.479

479 Quinn, The Story ofB, 314-319 149 Without denying the cost (e.g., going through all the described actions, a life of exile from the tribe), and without endorsing the particular practice,480 I want to demonstrate that they strive to both ensure the continuation of their society and respect individual autonomy. I do not deny that a greater degree of respect for individual autonomy could be practiced (e.g., maintain marriage but introduce the possibility of divorce; grant people the freedom to question and even reject the institution of marriage without imposing a harsh social sanction), without a guaranteed consequence of the destruction of their tribe. However, admitting that a greater amount of individual autonomy could be possible does not deny the fact that the tribe is attempting to grant individual autonomy in their current practices. It is important to see that this is the aim, that this is a value that is trying to be embodied, imperfect as any attempt may be.

The fundamental respect afforded to individual freedom, autonomy and integrity by tribal societies to individuals when they do not harm others can be further illustrated by some specific examples, of which there are many. Dorothy Lee has a cross cultural, anthropological text entitled Freedom and Culture and given the title one would expect to find examples of tribal societies that, among other things, respect individual freedom when the individual is not harming others, and does. I will take just four of her examples to further demonstrate my point: the Navaho, the above-mentioned Hopi, the Lovedu, and the Dakota.

480 There is an inherent subordination of women relative to men in this construction of what is permissible, with a difference between men and women being integral to this conception, which can be considered, in itself, objectionable. 150 Looking at the Navaho Indians of Arizona and New Mexico, Lee tells us that whether you are talking about adults or children, they are valued for their being, for what they uniquely are. No one is urged toward a specific form or type of achievement.

Different types of work are not evaluated as better or worse, rather hard work is valued in itself, as it shows a willingness and ability to withstand hardship and a sense of responsibility to the larger group. What is important is that every individual lives a safe life that maintains harmony with the rest of existence. Customs guided people when they sought to undertake an action or learn a skill. Customs were viewed, in part, as similar to a map that allowed the freedom and ability to make one's way through a jungle.

Commands to be obeyed were not issued, rather advice was given. If not followed, there was no aggression, no rough talk. Rather, further advice was given, perhaps along the lines of saying that unpleasant thing X will happen if you follow (or fail to follow) action

Y. A person is guided by parents and/or leaders, and a wrong turn is not seen as a guilt- worthy sin in need of repentance and forgiveness. Rather it is a mistake that must be made right. Feelings of guilt, being humble or apologetic, are seen as betraying the

481 respect and value people should have for themselves.

Personal autonomy is granted as much to children as to adults. Children have no minority status. No one is to speak for another person, child or adult. Children are not forced to do what the parents want for them, even 'for their own good.' This is similar to the lack of political coercion - leadership is character-based and limited and incidental - where leaders will not make decisions for others or given them orders. Children are free 481 Lee, 10-12. 151 to make their own successes or mistakes, have their own joys or pains, and learn from such experiences. Parents have faith in their children, not as in a set of specific expectations, but in the sense of trusting their children. They known their children have the typical mix of human passions, and that in an unpredictable life a mistake can have serious consequences. But they still do not interfere as the children explore existence.

When a problem occurs, parents will help children learn from the situation to avoid or better deal with the future. But this trust in their children helps to prepare for the inevitable dangers that arise, as oppose to sheltering them and leaving them ignorant and unprepared. The result is that children, as the rest of society, have freedom as they live their lives.482

More can be said about the Hopi of Arizona as another example of a society that respects individual freedom and autonomy. According to Lee, the efforts of the individual, whether in productive work or ceremonial functions for example, allow the individual "to find spontaneity, significance and freedom, motivation and personal integrity." There is motivation and individual initiative because each individual's actions are seen as incredibly significant. Every individual "has a unique role, and each role is different and indispensable." Because of the significance of each individual, it is believed that "the group can prosper only to the extent that this uniqueness is fully actualized."

Not only do individuals find their clarified and precise role helpful in delineating the broad spectrum of what is possible, the work they do is apparently very satisfying to them. This seems to be the case largely because individuals can and do work

482 Ibid., 12-13. 152 autonomously within their role. The household is a "self-directing group;" no one can

coerce and tell the others what they should do, or when or how it should be done; no one

exercises power. Individuals decide in what ways and to what extent they will fulfill their responsibilities. They take their own initiative, although it is within an established

framework. Society does not strive for uniformity or equalization, and individuality,

instead of being suppressed, is considered to enrich the group, especially if it reaches the desired end (e.g., production of food). Although the welfare of the group, and of all

existence in some case, is considered to depend on the sum of all the individuals, they were not bound or monitored or coerced to carry out their responsibilities.

The fact that no provisions are made for a person's failure, neglect or error, demonstrates the significant respect and trust of the individual. Responsibility for the group and perhaps the entirety of existence seems to motivate the individual, and even encourages spontaneity. The group encourages such displays and feels that is it enriched by them. When individuals fully develop themselves the group thrives, and this is why everyone is given a significant role and trusted fully. When society appreciated difference, gives individual initiative respect and room to be exercised, it provides channels for its use in ways that might otherwise be wilfully used in ways that harm society. Rather than the group existing at the expense of its members, it encourages the growth of individuals, who are given a significant place in society and given freedom to

482 Ibid., 12-13. 153 fulfill this role in their own way. In this way both the group and the individual grow and prosper, with balance and harmony in this relationship maintained.484

The Lovedu of South Africa also respect the individual. As Lee observes, the individual was seen as unique, with comparisons and measurements between individuals impossible. Individuals were not subject to standards or expectations. There was

"tremendous respect accorded to individual worth." Respect for individual uniqueness meant that he individual was held to be inviolate and the individual was to be free from encroachment and force of any kind (except in dealing with very young infants). For example, if there was a dispute between two people, they were to work it out themselves rather than have a decision forced on them, to be coerced. To this end, conciliation through mutual consensus agreements was sought.485 Respect for the individual can be seen in that people were not valued for achievements relative to others, but rather for their personal qualities, such as intelligence, though not for the results of such qualities, such as this or that positive result. A person was not valued for the excellent performance of a particular skill, but rather for, as an example, the willingness to help another.486

This emphasis on personal qualities was connected to the opportunity given to people for self-fulfillment. Individuals acted as they desired, and this freedom was available to the young and old. Again, no specific achievement was expected. Rather, people, especially children, were allowed to develop at their own pace, and differ as they pleased, although some children might feel pressure from their age group. Freedom from

484 Ibid., 25-26. 485 Ibid., 48-49. 486 Ibid., 51. 154 interference is guarded by the respect for individual uniqueness, and through the valuing of cooperative and mutually beneficial endeavours where helpfulness and undertaking responsibilities in different and effective ways is a form of self-expression and fulfillment.487

The Dakota, who like the Lakota were part of the Native American Sioux Nation, demonstrate respect for the individual in their ethic of responsibility. As Lee puts it, the

Dakota notion of responsibility was rooted in their cosmology that saw all of existence as related. To exist was to be related, and this relationship was one of interdependence and therefore one of responsibility. As people grew up their responsibility increased because their awareness of the interrelatedness of all things increased. A corollary of this relatedness was the belief that, in addition to aiding others, one had to develop oneself because in doing so, through increased bravery, skill, intelligence, for example, one also

488 enhanced society and all of existence. Children were given responsibilities to work, work that would have social results, so as to develop their autonomy. They were not supervised and neither reward nor punishment was offered as inducement. However, a child might be told, at the beginning of a task, that this is something adults do. No further inducement was offered, because it is unacceptable that one person make a decision for another, so coercion was not allowed. Ideally, decisions were all autonomous, except in the cases of group hunts and warfare where the group had to act together. In the ordinary case, leaders could not enforce their decision on others. But even when a decision was

487 Ibid., 51-52. 488 Ibid., 61-62. 155 rendered, to move camp for example, a family might stay at the old site without interference from others.489

None of this is to say that there were not social pressures. Parents would perhaps tell children that doing X will lead to the tribe to think Y of them, yet in the end people were left to act autonomously and responsibly rather than obediently, and this trait was itself admired. Although people were responsible for others, for example, that everyone had eaten and was clothed and sheltered, ideally no one was accountable to anyone or for anyone. There was no speaking, deciding, or answering for another, and no answering to another for oneself. For example, a person would divulge or withhold information about him- or herself as he or she wished. This combination of autonomy and a lack of accountability existed because people trusted each other to behave in a responsible manner. Children were not supervised, and adults were not overseen.490 No one determined the specifics of responsibility for another, rather the individual was trusted to instruct and guide and determine the details for him- or herself. A leader might discuss, give an opinion to help clarify, but would do so only on the basis of experience and knowledge. They had no power to coerce or enforce their opinions or suggestions on society, except when endeavours were collective and individual initiative would endanger

i 491 the group.

Finally, though by no means exhausting all possible examples, we can look at the

Winnebago Indians of Wisconsin and Nebraska for an ethic that respects the integrity and

489 Ibid., 64. 490 Ibid, 64-66. 491 Ibid, 68-69. 156 autonomy of the individual. Radin tells us that people in this society have "a right to indulge in any action that does not involve harm or danger to someone else. You may accordingly indulge in as much gossiping as you desire to and make as many slanderous and sarcastic remarks about other people as you dare."492 Moreover, one can do this without causing a feud and still stay on very good terms with those slandered. The reason for this is a belief in the freedom to express "normal human feelings" and a belief that a given remark or set of comments only represent the feelings at the present moment, and nothing more, and definitely not a final and complete estimate of the person slandered.

As we are told,

[w]hat it comes to at bottom is simply this: that every individual has the same right to indulge in slander, gossip, outbursts of conceit, jealousy, etc., that he has to give vent to the more respectable emotions. Once having given this naive relief to his sensitiveness, jealousy, or what not, he forgets all about it, not, however, in the manner of a child who forgets because he can be easily distracted, but because he attaches no ethical evaluation to the expression of such emotions.493

There is an acceptance that humans will express their emotions, and this is considered normal. More than this, there is an acceptance that different people will makes these expressions differently. Everyone - man, woman and child - is an individual, standing alone in a sense, not associating themselves with, or ascribing to themselves, the qualities of other people, understanding that other people are not a direct extension of themselves.

492 Radin, Primitive Man as Philosopher, 77. 493 Ibid., 78. 157 The absence of such behaviour, Radin argues, "explains primitive man's capacity for seeing human relations and understanding human conduct so objectively."494

According to Radin, this respecting and acceptance of individual personalities has a corollary. People insist upon individuals taking responsibility.495 Each individual is responsible for his or her own actions. Raising a child, for example, involves suggesting an ideal and perhaps giving suggestions for how to accomplish it. Parents cannot and do not do more. At most, children are told that if they do X they will lead a life of happiness and prosperity.496 This or that ideal or course of action is recommended because it is thought to adequately prepare a child for life's realities, and successfully coping with life, successfully relating with the rest of existence, was thought to bring happiness.497 If people were successful at discerning and acting upon the right proportion, it was thought to bring success.498 Again, the importance of the individual, specifically of self- awareness, is paramount here. Although it is important to understand the ways nature limits a person, it is of the utmost importance to learn one's own limitations. To be unaware of one's abilities and limits will inevitably "brings one into collision with reality, and a collision with reality means lack of success and often death."499

When people are dealing with others, Radin notes the importance again placed upon proper proportion. It is considered essential to consider others' comfort and not inflict one's own problems on others. That a leader is valued for wisdom, kindness,

494 Ibid., 78-79. 495 Ibid., 79. 496 Ibid., 81. 497 Ibid, 89-90. 498 Ibid, 90, 91. 499 Ibid, 91. 158 selflessness, moderation, and generousness, says much about societal ideals. And just because there is a right to self-expression does not mean that self-control is not valued when it would prevent injustice and discomfort, especially when it would avoid dragging others into one's problems. Ideally, everyone is to be happy and enjoy free expression as befits their unique personalities, while at the same time recognizing that limitations to free expression are imposed by their relationships with others, and that they must accept responsibility for what expressions are made.500

A review and summary: a tribal model

Abstracting further from the materials found in Chapter One and this chapter, I would propose a tribal model based on the following nine features:

1. A group that is a whole composed of parts whose interrelations and

interdependence are unmediated and direct. For the whole to be maintained

relations between the distinct parts must be balanced and harmonious.

2. Within the whole, for balanced and harmonious relations, no one element is any

seen to be more important than another, none is given priority, all are seen as

necessary, all are treated as significant. Each distinctive element must be

respected for its uniqueness, treated with dignity, and allowed to fully develop

itself to the extent compatible with the equal chance for development of others.

3. Group cohesion is maintained through: a) leadership; b) collective decision-

making and consensus; c) building bonds of reciprocity; d) a common goal (i.e.,

500 Ibid, 93-96. 159 the maintenance and success of the tribe); e) the mutual respect of each

other's distinctiveness; f) the threat of secession and the possible breakup of the

tribe (which prevents excesses on the part of sub-groups); g) respect for the tribe

as an entity that should not be destroyed by a dissenting individual or group (with

the latter choosing to secede instead); and, h) conflict resolution through

reconciliation or secession.

4. Individual autonomy is maintained through: a) leadership and knowledgeable

guidance without power; b) individuals as equal partners in decision-making; c)

subsistence rights and the security and freedom that they enable; d) the

distinctiveness of individuals respected; e) the full development of individuals is

encouraged (so long as it does not inhibit the same with respect to others); and, f)

the threat of and right to secession without enmity.

5. With 1 though 4 in mind, such a group will have multiple and differentiated roles,

held on the basis of personal characteristics and abilities alone.

6. These different roles are not attached, because of the role itself, to differences in

access to strategic and subsistence goods.

7. Subsistence is guaranteed to all. Full opportunity for development is provided to

all relative to the material means available. If one member suffers, everyone

suffers. Insecurity is diffused among the entire group. Therefore, reciprocity and

redistribution is about satisfying the subsistence needs of all members first, and

the available surplus is used to satisfy desires secondarily. Reciprocity is 160 essential, with everyone giving support and everyone getting support, again,

to the extent possible given the material means available.

8. Leadership, simply one role among many, is regular and repetitive. Such a

position is based upon authority, resting upon excellences of character of leader

specifically related to their role as leader, with no recourse to power, no sanctions

for enforcement. There is no hierarchy of power, with the leader simply a first

among equals. The role includes management, mediation, conflict resolution,

offering opinions and advice, and continues only so long as the confidence of the

group is maintained, at which point the leader is immediately replaced.

9. Decision-making is collective, with the group being a system of conference and

consent. Decision-making seeks a consensus, will let non-urgent matters rest

unresolved rather than impose a majority decision on the minority, and only with

urgent matters settle with a majority decision. However, the latter decisions are

not binding on the minority, who are free to secede without enmity.

From a tribal good life to the benefits of autonomy and relatedness

These nine features, then, comprise a tribal model that that manages to provide the individuals of a tribe with both autonomy and relatedness. And as Chapter Three will demonstrate, decades of psychological and psychiatric research have produced a consensus in these research fields that both autonomy and relatedness make the greatest contribution to, and are the greatest predictors of, human happiness. 161 Chapter Three: Autonomy, Relatedness and Subjective Well-being

As discussed in the introduction, tribal societies can be beneficial for their members, in that they express a sense of pleasure and contentment. In subsequent chapters we have seen that they have customs facilitating respectful relations with other members of their society where there was both a respect for individual autonomy and cohesive relatedness with others; comparable lifestyles had by all, where everybody had full opportunity

(within the limits of cultural resources) to fulfill themselves; leadership but not power; and the ability to have respectful and sustainable relations with their neighbours. Again, these societies are not perfect, they have their pathologies (e.g., murder, aggrandizing individuals), the people are not 'noble,' but rather as potentially disruptive as anyone.

However, they have their ways of implementing their good life, and these are just as, if not in some cases more, successful than attempts to deal with the problems found in state societies.

The people historically living in tribe societies, in fact all humans for at least the last forty thousand years (and reasonably around a hundred thousand years ago, perhaps as early as two hundred thousand years ago), were, as Allen W. Johnson and Timothy

Earle tell us,

modern in all physiological senses. Human cognitive abilities for language, symbolism, and abstract thought are shared across all human populations, some isolated from each other for tens of thousands of years. These capabilities.. .constitute a human nature shared by people modern 162 and ancient. People may have very different cultures, but the bases of their thoughts and emotions are equivalent to our own.501

Ronald Wright points out that the "big changes" we have seen in recent history "have all been cultural, not physical. A long-lived species like ours can't evolve significantly over so short in interval. This means that while culture and technology are cumulative, any intelligence is not." He continues, "[t]o use a computer analogy, we are running twenty- first-century software on hardware last upgraded 50,000 years ago or more." The fact is that "cultural growth runs far ahead of [biological] evolution."502

With this in mind Robert Boyd and Peter J. Richardson's idea of "tribal instincts" becomes more understandable. They tell us that humanity has been living in cooperative social environments at least as long as we have had our modern physiology. They argue that

[r]udimentary cooperative institutions favored genotypes that were better able to live in more cooperative groups. Those individuals best able to avoid punishment and acquire the locally relevant norms were more likely to survive. At first, such populations would have been only slightly more cooperative than typical nonhuman primates. However, genetic changes, leading to moral emotions, like shame and the capacity to learn and internalize local practices, would allow the cultural evolution of more sophisticated institutions that in turn enlarged the scale of cooperation.504

They continue their argument, saying that such changes continued, round after round,

"until eventually people were equipped with capacities for cooperation with distantly related people, emotional attachments to symbolically marked groups, and a willingness

501 Allen W. Johnson and Timothy Earle, The Evolution of Human Societies: From Foraging Group to Agrarian State, 2nd ed. (California: Stanford University Press, 2000), 45-46. 502 Ronald Wright, A Short History of Progress (Toronto: Anansi, 2004), 34-35. 503 Robert Boyd and Peter J. Richardson, The Origin and Evolution of Cultures (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 260. 504 Ibid., 263. 163 to punish others for transgression of group rules." They imagine cultural institutions aiding in the process, with, for example, people discriminating against those that refuse to conform to social norms, or expelling the self-serving or aggressive. Or such people would find it hard to attract mates. This is not to say that selfishness, for example, was suppressed. Obviously such impulses can serve "genetic fitness" in various ways.

However, the story they unfold is one where a long history of band and tribal cultures creates "new selective environments that build cultural imperatives into our genes," and this long evolutionary history (both genetic and cultural) of people living in tribe societies leaves people "innately prepared to act as members of tribes."505 They argue that in contemporary state societies we can see "tribal instincts" being (fairly) successfully mobilized for specific purposes although on a larger scale. For example, we can see

"ideologies of symbolically marked inclusion" in "[military and religious organizations

(e.g., Catholic Church)...[that] dress recruits in identical clothing (and haircuts) loaded with symbolic markings and then subdivide them into small groups with whom they eat and engage in long-term repeated interaction."506

However, as should be clear from the previous two chapters, the selective cultural environments were more than just cooperative. They were societies founded on a respect for difference and diversity. They were societies where there was group cohesion (e.g., through leadership, collective and consensus decision-making, reciprocity both in goods and respect). There was also respect for individual autonomy (e.g., through leadership

505 Ibid., 264. 506 Ibid., 265. 164 without power, collective and consensus decision-making, subsistence rights for all,

respect for difference and the full development of each). Everyone's role was respected,

and no one's role gave them power over others. Leadership was based on authority, with

respect gained though excellence of character, which could be terminated by the will of

the group.

As Stanley Diamond tells us, individuals in tribe societies feel they have "worth,

dignity and competence" since they are "[ajctive in manifold participation in culture."

The right of subsistence and support gave people security, and "[tjherefore, no crippling

anxieties were doubts about personal worth derived from that fundamental source."507

Moreover, "functionlessness" is not a problem for people since "each person learns as an

organic part of the socialization process the requisite variety of skills." This is also

prevented when "ordinary humanity is celebrated in an extraordinary way." For example,

there are rituals celebrating the transition from one stage in the lifecycle to another,

allowing people to "change roles while maintaining, and expanding, identity," allowing

people to adopt a new place in society once they can no longer fulfill a previous role,

leaving peoples' "wisdom, work or honor" intact.508

Diamond also explains that the "social alienation" associated with many

contemporary state societies is unknown because people are embedded509 within

507 Stanley Diamond, In Search of the Primitive: A Critique of Civilization (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1974), 171. 508 Ibid, 253-254. 509 Again, political theorists have touched upon this issue. For example, Emile Durkheim observed that modern society, being organized impersonally and without forms of solidarity to manifestly bind people together, is inherently prone to "anomie" or un-relatedness and rootlessness [see: Emil Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society (New York: The Free Press, 1964), 368-9], 165 associations (e.g., kinship ties) that "sets the developing person firmly in a matrix of reciprocal rights, obligations and expectations."510 From the point of view of individual actors, the "major elements" in their lives "interpenetrate in a circular, self-reinforcing manner" so that "society is neither compartmentalized nor fragmented, and none of its parts is in fatal conflict with the others.. .The primitive stands at the center of a synthetic, holistic universe of concrete activities."511 A possible example of this is the way in which societal customs are not always seen as impositions of external wills on the autonomous individual, but rather as sources of guidance and recipes for success. At the same time, the successes of autonomous individuals as they act out their life plans serve to benefit society as a whole, whether this comes in the form of gains directly to society (e.g., increased production yields) or through more indirect gains such as improving or expanding knowledge that can contribute to further successes. In any case, as Diamond argues, living within such a society limits individual isolation and conflict, as well as abstracted experiences (e.g., 'I did this for society alone, and not for myself as well') and other forms of alienation.512

Diamond also tells us that with the material basics (e.g., food, clothing, shelter) provided and with "personal participation" actualized, and these accomplished "in all primitive cultures in a socially non-exploitive manner, revolutionary activity is, insofar as

I am aware, unknown. It is probably safe to say that there has never been a revolution in

510 Ibid., 254. 511 Ibid., 142: 512 Ibid., 142. 166 the primitive society."513 Moreover, the style of leadership in tribe societies "reduces the occasions for what can be termed 'broad spectrum' social hostility, while diminishing the alienation that develops in response to arbitrary, remotely exercised, and impersonal authority."514 Finally, with no laws and no legal apparatus administered from above, with no special legal functionaries, "that curious aspect of alienation that arises in all political societies, the division between 'we' and 'they,' the citizen versus constituted public authority does not develop.. .the people and the tradition are for all practical purposes indistinguishable."515

The idea that cultural models such as a tribe (and similar to it, the band) have selected genotypes that flourish therein - the idea, that is, there are tribal instincts alive and well in humans in the present day - may be supported by looking at what makes us so happy and unhappy (and not only in Western and/or individualist societies). As David

M. Buss notes, "[a]n evolutionary analysis leads to several key insights about barriers that must be overcome to improve the quality of human life." These barriers are the

"large discrepancies between ancestral and modern environments [that] create unanticipated psychological problems and reduce quality of life." This proposition is supported by the empirical evidence coming out of decades of modern psychology and psychiatry research, and which has produced a consensus on what most contributes to and

513 Ibid., 138. 514 Ibid.,. 515 Ibid., 137. 167 acts as a predictor of human happiness - specifically, individual autonomy and relatedness.516

Subjective well-being

A recent turn in psychology and psychiatry is the focus on "understanding the processes that underlie happiness" and a veritable consensus has arisen about the factors the

517 contribute most to, and are the best predictors of, human happiness. That said, as Ed

Diener points out, the term happiness518 is avoided by most in this field. Since the term happiness has several meanings in both popular discourse and scholarly literature - "[f]or example, happiness can mean a general positive mood, a global evaluation of life satisfaction, living a good life, or the causes that make people happy, with the interpretation depending on the context" - many use more specific terms for the various aspects of well-being.519

Rather than happiness, Diener, Eunkook M. Suh, Richard E. Lucas, and Heidi L.

Smith tell us that the term "subjective well-being" is used in this context to include people's emotional responses, their satisfaction in the various parts of their life, and their

516 David M. Buss, "The Evolution of Happiness,"American Psychologist, January 2000, Vol. 55, No. 1, 15-16. 517 Ed Diener, Eunkook M. Suh, Richard E. Lucas, and Heidi L. Smith, "Subjective Weil-Being: Three Decades of Progress," Psychological Bulletin, 1999, 1999, Vol. 125, No. 2, 276. 518 Using happiness as a measure of the good life has great antiquity in political theory. For example, Aristotle wrote extensively about "eudaimonia," most often translated as "happiness," but perhaps better translated as "flourishing," and concluded that complete happiness or flourishing requires perfecting both intellectual virtues (e.g., practical reason) and virtues of character (e.g., bravery) [(see: Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics Harris Rackham, trans. (Hertfordshire, England: Wordsworth Editions Ltd, 1996; Aristotle, Politics, Ernest Barker, trans. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995)]. 519 Ed Diener, "Guidelines for National Indicators of Subjective Well-Being and Ill-Being," Applied Research in Quality of Life, 2006, 1, 153-154. 168 overall satisfaction with their life. Diener points out that subjective well-being or

"SWB refers to people's evaluations of their lives - evaluations that are both affective and cognitive. People experience abundant SWB when they feel many pleasant and few unpleasant emotions, when they are engaged in interesting activities, when they

1 experience many pleasures and few pains, and when they are satisfied with their lives."

As Diener, Robert W. Lent and Steve D. Brown tell us, cognitive evaluations include such things as life and work satisfaction, as well as being interested and engaged.

Affective reactions to life events, such as joy and sadness, are also included in SWB. In this sense, SWB involves evaluations people make about their lives, events that happen to them, their bodies and minds, and their circumstances. Diener distinguishes between positive and negative affect. About the former he writes that [p]ositive affect denotes pleasant moods and emotions, such as joy and affection. Positive or pleasant emotions are part of subjective well-being because they reflect a person's reactions to events that signify to the person that life is proceeding in a desirable way. Major categories of positive or pleasant emotions include those of low arousal (e.g., contentment), moderate arousal (e.g., pleasure), and high arousal (e.g., euphoria). They include positive reactions to others (e.g., affection), positive reactions to activities (e.g., interest and engagement), and general positive moods (e.g., joy).523

And about the negative affect he notes that

[njegative affect includes moods and emotions that are unpleasant, and represent negative responses people experience in reaction to their lives, health, events, and circumstances. Major forms of negative or unpleasant

520 Diener et al, "Subjective Weil-Being," 277. 521 Ed Diener, "Subjective Weil-Being: The Science of Happiness and a Proposal for a National Index," American Psychologist, January 2000, Vol. 55, No. 1, 34. 522 Diener, "Guidelines," 153. See also: Robert W. Lent and Steve D. Brown, "Social Cognitive Career Theory and Subjective Well-Being in the Context of Work," Journal of Career Assessment, 2008, Vol. 16, No. 1, 8. 523 Diener, "Guidelines," 153. See also Lent and Brown, "Social Cognitive Career Theory," 8. 169 reactions include anger, sadness, anxiety and worry, stress, frustration, guilt and shame, and envy. Other negative states, such as loneliness or helplessness, can also be important indicators of ill-being. Although some negative emotions are to be expected in life and can be necessary for effective functioning, frequent and prolonged negative emotions indicate that a person believes his or her life is proceeding badly. Extended experiences of negative emotions can interfere with effective functioning, as well as make life unpleasant.524

In SWB literature, "[djomain satisfactions are judgments people make in evaluating major life domains, such as physical and mental health, work, leisure, social relationships, and family." People's domain satisfactions usually indicate the degree to which they like their lives in each domain, their proximity to their ideal in each domain, the amount of enjoyment they feel in each domain, and to what degree they desire change

S9 ^ in specific domains. Finally, "[l]ife satisfaction represents a report of how a respondent evaluates or appraises his or her life taken as a whole." It goes beyond domain satisfactions to provide "a broad, reflective appraisal the person makes of his or her life."

Life satisfaction may refer to all the domains of a person's life at a particular time, or 526 refer to the degree of satisfaction with a person's life since birth.

As Diener tells us, SWB is usually measured through self-report questions assessing people's experience over time, including in specific activities and situations.527

Questions measure both positive and negative affect, and overall life satisfaction. SWB self-reports have demonstrated stability and reliability over the course of many years, and

Paul Dolan and Mathew P. White note specifically that self-reports on domain 524 Ibid. 525 Diener, "Guidelines," 154. 526 Diener, "Guidelines," 154. See also Lent and Brown, "Social Cognitive Career Theory," 8. 527 Diener, "Guidelines," 154. 528 Diener, "Subjective Weil-Being: The Science of Happiness," 35. satisfaction have significant "reliability because they are relatively straightforward judgments."529 Also, overall life satisfaction reports converge with daily mood reports.530

As John F. Helliwell and Robert D. Putnam note, "[generally speaking, self-ratings of

'happiness' turn out to reflect relatively short-term, situation-dependent expressions of mood, whereas self-ratings of 'life satisfaction' appear to measure longer-term, more stable evaluations, but both produce broadly consistent findings."531 Moreover, self- reports generally agree with reports by other significant people in participants' lives and by trained observers, further supporting claims to validity of self-reports.532 Self-reports are, for example, compared to reports from friends and relatives. Self-reports, reports by friends and relatives, and people's memories of positive versus negative life events inter-correlate at moderate-to-strong levels, and "low life-satisfaction reports predicted suicide over the following five years."534 Finally, Helliwell and Putnam, along with

Diener et al., point out that "[c]urrent research, though still preliminary, is beginning to establish biochemical correlations that reinforce this impression that measurements of

529 Paul Dolan and Mathew P. White, "How Can Measures of Subjective Well-Being Be Used to Inform Public Policy?," Perspectives on Psychological Science, Vol. 2, No. 1, 73. See also: John F. Helliwell and Robert D. Putnam, "The social context of well-being," Phil. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B, 2004, 359, 1435. 530 Diener et al, "Subjective Well-Being," 277-278. 531 Helliwell and Putnam, "The social context," 1435. 532 Dolan and White, "How Can Measures," 73. See also: Diener et al, "Subjective Well-Being," 277-278. 533 Diener, "Subjective Well-Being: The Science," 35. 534 Diener, "Subjective Well-Being: The Science," 35. See also: Ed Sandvik, Ed Diener, and Larry Seidlitz, "Subjective well-being: The convergence and stability of self-report and non-self-report measures," Journal of Personality, 1993, No. 61, 317-342; Kennon M. Sheldon and Sonja Lyubomirsky, "Is It Possible to Become Happier? (And If So, How?)," Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 2007, Vol. 1, No. 1, 130-131. 171 subjective well-being are reasonably reliable and valid."535 This all suggests

c 1/ significant validity to SWB measures.

An example measuring SWB is the life satisfaction measurement entitled the

Satisfaction With Life Scale or SWLS, which contains five items (e.g., "in most ways my life is close to my ideal"), and participants respond by indicating the degree of their agreement on a 7-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). As Lent et al. note, "[o]ne of the more popular measures of life satisfaction, the SWLS has shown adequate internal consistency, temporal stability, and convergent validity with conceptually related measures, such as happiness."537

This data collected this way is tested for co-relational associations with a variety of CIO life conditions (e.g., autonomy at work). Additionally, beyond purely survey research and statistical analyses (e.g., regression analysis), other methods are employed to strengthen causal understandings. Richard M. Ryan and Edward L. Deci speak of part of this approach by noting that [t]he empirical methods used [see] social contextual variables., .directly manipulated to examine their effects on both internal processes and behavioural manifestations. The use of experimental paradigms has allowed

535 Helliwell and Putnam, "The social context," 1435. See also: Diener, "Guidelines," 153; Diener et al, "Subjective Well-Being," 277-278. 536 Diener, "Subjective Well-Being: The Science," 35. See also: Ed Diener, "Assessing subjective well- being: Progress and opportunities," Social Indicators Research, 1994, 31, 103-157. 537 Robert W. Lent, Daniel Singley, Hung-Bin Sheu, Kathy A. Gainor, Bradley R. Brenner, Dana Treistman, and Lisa Ades, "Social Cognitive Predictors of Domain and Life Satisfaction: Exploring the Theoretical Precursors of Subjective Well-Being," Journal of Counseling Psychology, 2005, Vol. 52, No. 3,433. See also: Kennon M. Sheldon and Tan H. Hoon, "The Multiple Determination of Well-Being: Independent Effects of Positive Traits, Needs, Goals, Selves, Social Supports and Cultural Contexts," Journal of Happiness Studies, 2007, 8, 573-574. 538 Sonja Lyubomirsky, "Why Are Some People Happier Than Others?: The Role of Cognitive and Motivational Processes in Well-Being," American Psychologist, Vol. 56, No. 3, March 2001, 240; Diener et al, "Subjective Well-Being," 277-278; Helliwell and Putnam, "The social context," 1437-1438. 172 us to specify the conditions under which people's natural activity and constructiveness will flourish, as well as those that promote a lack of self- motivation and social integration. In this way, we have used experimental methods without accepting the mechanistic or efficient causal meta-theories C7Q

that have typically been associated with those methods.

Similarly, a longitudinal study approach is also taken to ensure that the same individuals are repeatedly observed over long periods of time to both limit the chances that results are due to cultural differences across generations and to gain a better understanding of the

"causal priority of the variables" as the consequences of actions and behaviours undertaken emerge over time.540

As Corey L. Keyes points out, SWB has been called hedonic or emotional well- being since it "consists of perceptions of avowed interest in life, happiness and satisfaction with life, and the balance of positive to negative affect." In the past, some have contrasted this with "eudaimonic well-being, sometimes referred to as positive functioning, [which] consists of individual's evaluation of their psychological well-being

[or PWB]."541 Lent and Brown note that the PWB approach usually has "six ideal characteristics (autonomy, personal growth, self-acceptance, purpose in life, environmental mastery, positive social relations)."542

539 Richard M. Ryan and Edward L. Deci, "Self-Determination Theory and the Facilitation of Intrinsic Motivation, Social Development, and Well-Being," American Psychologist, Vol. 55, No, I, January 2000, 69. 540 Diener et al, "Subjective Well-Being," 277-278; Dolan and White, "How Can Measures," 77. 541 Corey L. Keyes, "Subjective Well-Being in Mental Health and Human Development Research Worldwide: An Introduction," Social Indicators Research, 2006, 77,4. 542 Lent and Brown, "Social Cognitive Career Theory," 9. See also: Carol D. Ryff, "Happiness is everything, or is it? Explorations on the meaning of psychological well-being," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1989, 57, 1069-1081; Carol D. Ryff, "Psychological well-being in adult life," Current Directions in Psychological Science, 1995,4, 99-104; and Keyes, "Subjective Well-Being," 77,4-5. 173 There are also self-reports assessing people's PWB. For example, the Basic

Psychological Needs scale is a 21-item scale assessing the degree to which people feel autonomy, competence, and relatedness.543 Autonomy, for example, can be tested by people reporting why they engage in specific actions (e.g., in the workplace) through an examination of "four different reasons: 'because others expect you to, or think you should' (external motivation); 'because you really ought to, even if you don't really want to' (introjected motivation); 'because you really identify with doing it' (identified

• motivation); and 'because of the enjoyment or stimulation it provides you' (intrinsic motivation)." Also, behaviours can be classified by degree of participant choice "using a

1 ('not at all my choice') to 5 ('completely my choice') scale."544

Lent and Brown rightly point out that over two decades of research in the field has seen SWB and PWB interrelate, with the elements of PWD strongly correlating with elements of SWB.545 This has led to a unification of SWB and PWB coming to the fore:

eudaimonic processes serve as key routes by which people achieve and sustain hedonic well-being. For instance, by setting and progressing toward personal goals, engaging in valued activities, and interacting with those in their social support system, people contribute to their own growth and sense of purpose, organize and make meaning of their lives, and, in turn, are able to enhance their own SWB.. .[Personality or affective variables, especially positive and negative affect, [are] precursors of life satisfaction... [And] overall life satisfaction.. .[is] open to other influences, such as the sense of satisfaction that people experience within the central domains of their lives, including work.546

543 Sheldon and Hoon, "The Multiple Determination," 574. 544 Kennon M. Sheldon, Tim Kasser, Linda Houser-Marko, Taisha Jones and Daniel Turban, "Doing One's Duty: Chronological Age, Felt Autonomy, and Subjective Well-Being," European Journal of Personality, 2005, 19, 101-102. 545 Lent and Brown, "Social Cognitive Career Theory," 8-9. 546 Ibid, 8. 174 And it is this body of research that connects autonomy to SWB that is of particular

interest here.

Necessary though not sufficient for SWB

As Sonja Lyubomirsky notes, "the general conclusion from almost a century of research

on the determinants of well-being is that objective circumstances, demographic variables,

and life events are correlated with happiness less strongly than intuition and everyday

experience tell us they ought to be."547 Objective variables - such as a comfortable

income, robust health, a supportive marriage, and lack of tragedy or trauma in their lives

- when all put together account for no more than 8% to 15% of the variance in happiness

C A O according to several estimates. Focusing in on wealth, there is a remarkably small

association between it and SWB. While American's personal incomes have, on average,

nearly tripled in the last half of the twentieth century, their levels of SWB have remained

the same.549 Americans earning more than $10 million per year only report only "trivially

547 Lyubomirsky, "Why Are Some People Happier," 240. See also: Diener et al, "Subjective Well-Being," 276-302; Sonja Lyubomirsky and Lee Ross, "Changes in attractiveness of elected, rejected, and precluded alternatives: A comparison of happy and unhappy individuals," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1999, 76, 988-1007. 548 Lyubomirsky, "Why Are Some People Happier," 240. See also: Diener et al, "Subjective Well-Being," 276-302; Ed Diener, "Subjective well-beingPsychological Bulletin, 1984, 95, 542-575; Michael Argyle, "Causes and correlates of happiness," in Daniel Kahneman, Ed Diener, and Norbert Schwarz, eds. Well- being: The foundations ofhedonic psychology (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1999), 353-373; Frank M. Andrews and Stephen B. Withey, Social indicators of well-being: America's perception of life quality (New York: Plenum Press, 1976). 549 Lyubomirsky, "Why Are Some People Happier," 240. See also: David G. Myers, "The Funds, Friends, and Faith of Happy People," American Psychologist, January 2000, Vol. 55, No. 1, 56-67; Gregg Easterbrook, The Progress Paradox (New York: Random House, 2003); Ed Diener and Shigehiro Oishi, "Money and happiness: Income and subjective well-being across nations," in Ed Diener and Eunkook M. Suh, eds. Culture and Subjective Well-Being (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000); Robert E. Lane, The Loss of Happiness in Market Democracies (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000). 175 greater" levels of personal happiness than the less affluent.550 The same findings apply in Canada and across Europe, with the correlation between income and SWB

"surprisingly weak (indeed, virtually negligible)."551 As David G. Myers notes, while

SWB does tend to be lower among the very poor, once comfortable, more money provides people with diminishing returns on happiness. In fact, "the number of people reporting themselves 'very happy' has, if anything, declined slightly between 1957 and

1998, from 35% to 33%...The more people strive for extrinsic goals such as money.. .the

eel less robust their well-being." And in addition to being true across Europe, the same is true in Japan.554 Granted, as Kennon M. Sheldon and Lyubomirsky note, citizens of wealthier countries typically describe themselves as having considerably higher SWB than citizens of poorer countries. "However, even this effect seems to be driven by a lack of basic self-sufficiency (i.e., unmet basic needs) in the poorest nations; among nations with adequate average income, national differences in SWB are driven by other factors besides gross domestic product, such as democratic government and support for equal rights."555 Money is a necessary, though not sufficient, determinant of happiness.

550 Lyubomirsky, "Why Are Some People Happier," 240. See also: Ed Diener, Jeff Horwitz, and Robert A. Emmons, "Happiness of the very wealthy," Social Indicators Research, 1985, 16, 263-274. 551 Ronald Inglehart, Culture shift in advanced industrial society (NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), 242. 552 Myers, "The Funds," 59; Sheldon and Lyubomirsky, "Is It Possible," 131. 553 Myers, "The Funds," 61. See also: Tim Kasser and Richard M. Ryan, "Further examining the American dream: Differential correlates of intrinsic and extrinsic goals. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 1996, 22, 280-287. 554 Myers, "The Funds," 61. See also: Richard Easterlin, "Will raising the incomes of all increase the happiness of all?," Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 1995, 27, 35-47. 555 Sheldon and Lyubomirsky, "Is It Possible to Become Happier?," 131-132. 176 Most people associate happiness with pleasures such as engaging in satisfying work, intellectual stimulation, friendship, and other non-commercial goods. Robert E.

Lane succinctly captures many important points so I will quote him at length:

Quality of life studies tend to divide the sources of well-being into two categories: external circumstances, such as available community services or family life, and internal dispositions, such as self-esteem or the sense that one controls one's own fate. As regards the first category, most studies agree that a satisfying family life is the most important contributor to well- being. Beyond that, the joys of friendship often rank second. Indeed, according to one study, an individual's number of friends is a better predictor of his well-being than is the size of his income. Satisfying work and leisure often rank third or fourth but, strangely, neither is closely related to actual income. (In contrast, neither church membership and piety nor good government and civic pride make much difference in well- being. Political activity is often last on the list; it is at best a duty and almost never a pleasure.) None of these factors is a market commodity. But the market is not irrelevant, for even if actual income is not a good predictor of well-being, satisfaction with one's income or standard of living (which is not itself closely related to level of income) is. It is the subjective rather than objective aspects of income that enter into the hedonic calculus.

Among the internal sources of well-being, self-esteem and sense of effectiveness rank first and second in some studies. Neither is related to level of income. In other studies the belief that one has met life's challenges ranks first. Money might be relevant here, but more as a token of social esteem than for what it buys.

If the things that contribute most to well-being are unrelated to money, we cannot buy them. This is the principle cause of money's curious failure to produce happiness."556

So, as David McNally notes, "[rjather than treating a high level of human fulfillment and happiness, capital's wealth merely perpetuates the emptiness and loss of meaning built

556 Robert E. Lane, "Does money buy happiness?," The Public Interest, Fall 1993, 113, 57-58. Ill into the system of alienated labour and capitalist property." This is consistent, as

John F. Schumaker notes, with the "plague of 'existential disorders' has been reported in

America, with large portions of Americans seeking psychotherapy complaining of

'psychic deadness', coming in a variety of forms from "chronic

cco boredom...purposelessness, meaninglessness and alienation."

Autonomy and SWB

As mentioned above, psychological and psychiatric research has linked autonomy to

SWB. As Buss notes, "[i]t is reasonable to speculate that.. .large discrepancies between ancestral and modern environments create unanticipated psychological problems and reduce the quality of life." More specifically, "the sense of powerlessness modern humans feel in large anonymous organizations compared with the small social hierarchies of the past."559 Richard M. Ryan and Deci argue that autonomy is a "basic need," meaning by basic need "an energizing state that, if satisfied, conduces toward health and well-being but, if not satisfied, contributes to pathology and ill-being." They argue that, among other basic needs like competence and relatedness, the basic need for autonomy must be satisfied across people's life spans for them to experience ongoing SWB.560

Martin E. P. Seligman and Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi have also found support for Ryan

55an7 dDavi Deci'd McNallys positio, Anothern tha t Worldautonom is Possible:y appear Globalizations to be "essentia and Anti-capitalisml for facilitatin (Winnipegg optima: Arbeitel r Ring, 2002), 84. 558 JohnF. Schumaker, "Dead Zone," New Internationalist, July 2001, 336, 35. 559 Buss, "The Evolution of Happiness," 16-17. 560 Ryan and Deci, "Self-Determination Theory," 74-75. 178 functioning of the natural propensities for growth and integration, as well as for constructive social development and personal well-being."561 When the need for autonomy is satisfied people "are intrinsically motivated, able to fulfill their potentialities, and able to seek out progressively greater challenges."

Deci and Ryan are clear to distinguish autonomy from detachment and independence, noting that

[t]o be autonomous does not mean to be detached from or independent of others, and in fact.. .autonomy can be positively associated with relatedness and well-being. Autonomy involves being volitional, acting from one's integrated sense of self, and endorsing one's actions. It does not entail being r

separate from, not relying upon, or being independent of others.

Autonomy in this sense, as Gian Vittorio Caprara and Patrizia Steca point out, is positively and statistically-significantly correlated with SWB.564 Deci and Ryan note that autonomy "relate[s] positively to self-actualization, self-esteem, ego development, and other indicators of well-being."565 When people's motivations are autonomous or authentic in the sense of literally being self-authored or self-endorsed, as opposed being externally controlled during an action or activity, they "have more interest, excitement, and confidence, which in turn is manifest both as enhanced performance, persistence, and

561 Ryan and Deci, "Self-Determination Theory," 68; See also: Martin E. P. Seligman and Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, "Positive Psychology: An Introduction," American Psychologist, January 2000, Vol. 55, No. 1, 10. 562 Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi, "Positive Psychology," 10. 563 Edward L. Deci and Richard M. Ryan, "The 'What' and the 'Why' of Goal Pursuits: Human Needs and the Self-Determination of Behavior," Psychological Inquiry, 2000, Vol. 11, No. 4, 240. See also: Edward L. Deci, Jennifer G. La Guardia, Arlen C. Moller, Marc J. Scheiner and Richard M. Ryan, "On the Benefits of Giving as Well as Receiving Autonomy Support: Mutuality in Close Friendships," Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 2006, 32, 315. 564 Gian Vittorio Caprara and Patrizia Steca, "Affective and Social Self-Regulatory Efficacy Beliefs as Determinants of Positive Thinking and Happiness," European Psychologist, 2005, Vol. 10, No. 4, 281. 565 Deci and Ryan, "The 'What' and the 'Why'," 241. 179 creativity,"566 "heightened vitality,"567 relatively higher self-esteem,568 and general

well-being.569 As Sheldon, Kasser, Linda Houser-Marko, Taisha Jones and Daniel Turban

note, individuals acting for autonomous reasons consistently report higher-levels of SWB

than people acting because of controlled or externally-regulated reasons.570 In fact,

beyond the connection between autonomy and SWB, researchers including Max Haller

and Markus Hadler,571 Sheldon,572 Lent et al.,573 Albert Bandura,574 Diener et al,575 as

well as Ryan and Deci,576 have concluded that autonomy (along with relatedness, which

will be discussed below), is the strongest determinant and predictor of SWB.

566Ryan and Deci, "Self-Determination Theory," 69. See also: Edward L. Deci and Richard M. Ryan, "A motivational approach to self: Integration in personality," in Richard A. Dienstbier, ed, Nebraska Symposium on Motivation: Vol. 38. Perspectives on motivation (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press), 237-288; and Kennon M. Sheldon, Richard M. Ryan, Laird J. Rawsthorne and Barbara Ilardi, "Trait self and true self: Cross-role variation in the Big Five traits and its relations with authenticity and subjective well-being," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1997, 73, 1380-1393. 567Ryan and Deci, "Self-Determination Theory," 69. See also: Glen A. Nix, Richard M. Ryan, John B. Manly, and Edward L. Deci, "Revitalization through self-regulation: The effects of autonomous and controlled motivation on happiness and vitality," Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1999, 35, 266-284. 568 Ryan and Deci, "Self-Determination Theory," 69. See also: Edward L. Deci and Richard M. Ryan, "Human autonomy: The basis for true self-esteem," in Michael H. Kemis, ed. Efficacy, agency, and self- esteem (New York: Plenum, 1995), 31-49. 569 Ryan and Deci, "Self-Determination Theory," 69. See also: Richard M. Ryan, Edward L. Deci, and Wendy S. Grolnick, "Autonomy, relatedness, and the self: Their relation to development and psychopathology," in Dante Cicchetti and Donald J. Cohen, eds. Developmentalpsychopathology: Theory and methods (New York: Wiley, 1995), 618-655. 570 Sheldon et al, "Doing One's Duty," 99-104. 571 Max Haller and Markus Hadler, "How Social Relations and Structures Can Produce Happiness and Unhappiness: An International Comparative Analysis," Social Indicators Research, 2006, 75, 185-189. 572 Kennon M. Sheldon, "The self-concordance model of healthy goal-striving: When personal goals correctly represent the person," in Edward L. Deci and Richard M. Ryan, eds. Handbook of Self- determination Research (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2002), 65-86. 573 Lent et al, "Social Cognitive Predictors," 431,438-9. 574 Albert Bandura, Self-efficacy: The exercise of control (New York: Freeman, 1997). 575 Diener et al, "Subjective Well-Being," 284. 576 Ryan and Deci, "Self-Determination Theory," 70. 180 As hinted at already, autonomy is about defining and acting upon one's

S77 "personal goals." As Diener et al. tell us, it is essential that a person's goals must be

both intrinsically valued and autonomously chosen. This is what is meant by the term

intrinsic motivation: "action undertaken for its own sake, as the individual follows

interests, finds flow, and develops skills."578 Autonomy is also consistent with identified

motivation, which is action that has been internalized and then undertaken with a sense of

volition and authenticity, even though it may not be enjoyable.579 In this case, there is full

integration and assimilation by the individual, "which means they have been evaluated

and brought into congruence with one's other values and needs." It is essential, however,

that there is a sense of choice, volition and freedom from coercive external pressure corj

toward behaving or thinking in a particular way. This way, in both cases, the individual

is felt to be the origin or the cause of his or her actions.581 These need to be contrasted

with forms of motivation that are less autonomous, or more controlled. First, is external motivation, which is behaviour that is undertaken with a sense of situational compulsion or necessity, or that is oriented towards attaining rewards or avoiding punishments. Second is introjected motivation, which is behaviour undertaken due to a sense of guilt or internal compulsion or to avoid self-sanctions or anxiety. Behaviours undertaken for external or introjected reasons have an external perceived locus of causality, as people

577 Lent et al, "Social Cognitive Predictors," 431, 438-9. 578 Sheldon et al, "Doing One's Duty," 98-99. See also: Teresa M. Amabile, Creativity in context (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1996); and Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, Finding flow: The psychology of engagement with everyday life (New York: Basic, 1997). 579 Sheldon et al, "Doing One's Duty," 98-99. See also: Richard M. Ryan and James P. Connell, "Perceived locus of causality and internalization: Examining reasons for acting in two domains," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1989,57, 749-761; Sheldon et al, "'True' self," 1380-1393. 580 Ryan and Deci, "Self-Determination Theory," 72-74. 581 Sheldon et al, "Doing One's Duty," 98-99. See also: Richard deCharms, Personal causation, (New York: Academic, 1968). See also: Ryan and Deci, "Self-Determination Theory," 71-72. 181 acting for these reasons typically feel they are pawns.. .controlled by ego-alien forces.582

Lent et al. found that the more people progress towards their own goals, the more they experience satisfaction with their lives.583 Ryan and Deci similarly found that such autonomy was "positively associated with well-being indicators such as self- esteem, self-actualization, and the inverse of depression and anxiety, whereas placing strong relative importance on extrinsic aspirations was negatively related to these well-being indicators."584 Diener found that having the resources (e.g., money, physical attractiveness, social skills) to pursue one's goals is a more accurate predictor of happiness than having more resources that can be directed to either one's less important goals or the goals of others. In the end, people experience higher-levels of SWB when they are making progress towards their own highly-valued ends than when they make equal or greater progress towards

f Of achieving ends they value less or are the ends of others. Thus, while progress towards, and achievement of, autonomous aspirations is positively associated with

SWB, attainment of extrinsic aspirations was not. "[E]ven highly efficacious people

582 Sheldon et al, "Doing One's Duty," 98-99. See also: Ryan and Deci, "Self-Determination Theory," 71- 72. 583 Lent et al, "Social Cognitive Predictors," 438-9. 584 Ryan and Deci, "Self-Determination Theory," 75-76. See also: Kennon M. Sheldon, Harry T. Reis, and Richard M. Ryan, "What makes for a good day? Competence and autonomy in the day and in the person," Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 1996, 22, 1270-1279. 585 Diener, "Subjective Well-Being: The Science," 38. 182 may experience less than optimal well-being if they pursue and successfully attain

goals that do not fulfill basic psychological needs"586

These findings are applicable to the workplace.587 Ryan and Deci note that SWB

at work, in addition to worker performance, is positively correlated with autonomy.588

Sheldon et al. also found that an individual's satisfaction as a worker is directly and

highly "attributable to the degree to which that role supports authenticity and autonomous

COQ

functioning." Tony Delamothe also found that SWB is related to being autonomous

over how, where and the pace at which work is done, and especially effective and

extensive participation in decision-making.590 Diener and Martin E.P. Seligman note that job control or feelings of control over one's work increase levels of SWB, both at work

and in other areas of life.591 Jobs that provide "[opportunity for personal control" are CQO

more conducive to SWB. On the other hand, "threats, deadlines, directives, pressured

evaluations, and imposed goals diminish intrinsic motivation because, like tangible

586 Ryan and Deci, "Self-Determination Theory," 2000, 75. See also: Kennon M. Sheldon and Tim Kasser, "Pursuing personal goals: Skills enable progress, but not all progress is beneficial," Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 1998,24, 1319-1331. 587 The lack of autonomy in the workplace has been highlighted by many political theorists. For example, Marx's conception of alienated labour, in part, directly criticizes a lack of worker autonomy or control over both the process and product of worker labour [see: Karl Marx, "Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts (selections)," Karl Marx: Selected Writings, ed. Lawrence H. Simon, Loyd D. Easton and Kurt H Guddat, trans. (Indianna: Hackett, 1994), 58-68]. 588 Ryan and Deci, "Self-Determination Theory," 75. See also: Paul P. Baard, Edward L. Deci and Richard M. Ryan, Intrinsic need satisfaction: A motivational basis of performance and well-being in work settings (Fordham University Press, 1998). 589 Sheldon et al, "Trait self and true self," 1380-1393. 590 Tony Delamothe, "Happiness," BMJ, December 2005, Vol. 331, 1490. 591 Ed Diener and Martin E.P. Seligman, "Beyond Money: Toward an Economy of Well-Being," Psychological Science in the Public Interest, Vol. 5, No. 1, 12. 592 Diener and Seligman, "Beyond Money," 12. See also: Peter Warr, "Well-being and the workplace," in Daniel Kahneman, Ed Diener, and Norbert Schwarz, eds. Well-being: The foundations ofhedonic psychology (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1999), 392-412; and Stephen Overell, "A working recipe for quality of life," Financial Times, 2002, 13; and Sheldon et al, "Doing One's Duty," 107. 183 rewards, they conduce toward an external perceived locus of causality."593 As Melvin

Kohn et al. note, "those who lack [occupational] self-direction are more prone to psychological 'distress' (anxiety and a lack of self-confidence)."594

Similarly, Helliwell and Putnam demonstrated the connection between autonomy, civic participation, and SWB, showing that autonomous civic participation increases life satisfaction, even when individual-level personality differences are controlled for.595 It is important to note, as Lent et al. do, that SWB is better predicted when one is satisfied across more areas or domains of life (e.g., the workplace, civic participation).

"[Satisfactions in different life domains combine additively to predict or promote a sense of overall life satisfaction (i.e., that life satisfaction reflects the accumulation of domain- specific satisfactions."596 Therefore, not only does autonomy in areas such as working life and civic participation increase a person's SWB in these specific domains of life, but contribute to enhanced SWB in life more generally.

As Deci and Ryan report, a lack of autonomy and a corresponding regular imposition of control is "not positively associated with well-being," but instead related to public self-consciousness, an outward focus, pressure, impatience, a sense of time

cq n urgency and pervasive and regular hostility. It turns out that, as Barry Schwartz

593 Ryan and Deci, "Self-Determination Theory," 70. 594 Melvin Kohn, Atsushi Naoi, Carrie Schoenbach, Carmi Schooler and Kazimierz M. Slomczynski, "Position in the Class Structure and Psychological Functioning in the United States, Japan, and Poland," American Journal of Sociology, 1990, Vol. 95, No. 4, 964. 595 Helliwell and Putnam, "The social context of well-being," 1441. 596 Lent et al, "Social Cognitive Predictors," 439. See also: Shigehiro Oishi, Ed Diener, Eunkook Suh, and Richard E. Lucas, "Value as a moderator in subjective well-being," Journal of Personality, 1999, 67, 157- 184. 597 Deci and Ryan, "The 'What' and the 'Why'," 241. 184 reports, "autonomy.. .has a profound influence on our psychological well-being."

When we experience over and over again that we are helpless, that we are not in control of this or that aspect of our lives, we are less motivated to try to be autonomous in the future. This can also lead to difficulties seeing how you have control in the future or in brand new situations. Learned helplessness "can suppress the activity of the body's immune system, thereby making helpless organisms vulnerable to a wide variety of diseases. And it can, under the right circumstances, lead to profound, clinical depression." Our sense of well being is fundamentally dependant on both our ability to control our environment and our recognition of this fact.598 "[H]elplessness has taught us that a lack of control, coupled with a certain characteristic style of causal explanation, creates candidates for clinical depression." The other side of the coin is that an important means to prevent or reduce clinical depression is for an individual to have increased levels of autonomy.599

It is interesting to also note the research attesting to the potential for generalizing the above findings across cultures. As Michelle Downie et al. note, "[c]ross-cultural research has demonstrated that self-determination is associated with well-being in diverse countries."600 Autonomy's positive relationship to SWB indicators such as self-esteem,

598 Barry Schwartz, The Paradox of Choice: Why More is Less (New York: Harper, 2004), 102-103. 599 Barry Schwartz, "Self-Determination: The Tyranny of Freedom," American Psychologist, January 2000, Vol. 55, No. 1,85. 600 Michelle Downie, Richard Koestner and Sook Ning Chua, "Political support for self-determination, wealth, and national subjective well-being," Motivation and Emotion, 2007, 31, 175. See also: Valery Chirkov, Richard M. Ryan, Youngmee Kim, and Ulas Kaplan, "Differentiating autonomy from individualism and independence: A self-determination theory perspective on internalization of cultural orientation, gender and well-being," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 2003, 84, 97-110; Edward L. Deci, Richard M. Ryan, Marylene Gagne, Dean R. Leone, Julian Usunov and Boyanka P. Kornazheva, "Need satisfaction, motivation, and well-being in the work organizations of a former Eastern 185 self-actualization, and the inverse of depression and anxiety, and the negative relationship between extrinsic aspirations and these same SWB indicators, was demonstrated in a Russian study by Ryan et al.601 Ryan and Deci point out that "recent research in Korean.. .samples has found a more positive relation between autonomy and collectivistic attitudes than between autonomy and individualistic attitudes."602 Similarly,

Sheldon et al. conducted a study in Singapore, which is considered a collectivist culture, in which they demonstrated that autonomy and felt choice were associated with increased

SWB. At the very least, they conclude, this helps establish that the above findings exist in both non-Western as well as Western cultures.

Part of the reason why autonomy contributes so strongly to SWB is it allows us to develop and use more of our skills and capacities. Years of research has led Ryan and

Deci to conclude that acting with autonomy reflects a human "tendency to seek out novelty and challenges, to extend and exercise one's capacities, to explore, and to learn."604 Displaying competence is associated with greater SWB.605 Myers notes that

SWB is increased when work and leisure engage one's skills. People report greatest

SWB, not when overwhelmed and stressed, not when underwhelmed and bored, and note

bloc country: A cross-cultural study of self-determination," Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 2001,27, 930-942. 601 Richard M. Ryan, Valery I. Chirkov, Todd D. Little, Kennon M. Sheldon, Elena Timoshina, Edward L. Deci, "The American dream in Russia: Extrinsic aspirations and well-being in two cultures," Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 1999,25,1509-1524. 602 Ryan and Deci, "Self-Determination Theory," 74. 603 Sheldon et al, "Doing One's Duty," 108-112. 604 Ryan and Deci, "Self-Determination Theory," 70. 605 Ryan and Deci, "Self-Determination Theory," 68. See also: Susan Harter, "Effectance motivation reconsidered: Toward a developmental model," Human Development, 1978, 1, 661-669; and Robert W. White, Ego and reality in psychoanalytic theory (New York: International Universities Press, 1963). 186 when mindlessly passive, but rather when "unself-consciously absorbed in a mindful challenge."606

Relatedness

As mentioned above, Buss noted that "[i]t is reasonable to speculate that.. .large discrepancies between ancestral and modern environments create unanticipated psychological problems and reduce the quality of life." One characteristic of some ancestral environments was "deep intimate contacts, being a valued member of an enduring social group, and being enmeshed in a network of extended kin." Myers notes that "[sjocial bonds boosted our ancestors' survival chances. Children kept close to their caregivers were protected from harm. Adults who formed attachments were more likely to come together to reproduce and co-nurture their offspring to maturity. Groups shared food, provided mates, and helped care for children. For hunting, six hands were better than two. Facing enemies, there was strength in numbers. As inheritors of this legacy, we

ZAO therefore have a deep need to belong."

It should come as no surprise, then, that relatedness in the above sense is associated with SWB, and the lack of it can cause depression.609 As Delamothe notes, the breadth and depth of an individual's social connections is an incredibly important predictor of SWB, and when relatedness is combined with autonomy they are two most 606 Myers, "The Funds," 58. 607 Buss, "The Evolution," 16-17. 608 Myers, "The Funds," 62. See also: Roy F. Baumeister and Mark R. Leary, "The need to belong: Desire for interpersonal attachment as a fundamental human motivation," Psychological Bulletin, 1995, 117,497- 529. 609 Buss, "The Evolution," 16-17. 187 significant contributors to and predictors of SWB.610 Caprara and Steca point out that

"social relationships.. .consistently predicted SWB. People's involvement in intimate and

satisfying interpersonal relationships has beneficial effects on their emotional and

physical well-being throughout the entire course of life."611 Part of the reason for this

connection seems to be that relatedness is a self-chosen goal of many people. Across

different cultures and socio-demographic conditions, people consistently report that

having successful relationships is one of their most important goals in life.612 Another

reason is that relations with others can support an individual's autonomy. As Deci et al.

have it, autonomy support exists when one partner in a relationship acknowledges the

610 Delamothe, "Happiness," 1490. 611 Caprara and Steca, "Affective and Social," 283. See also: Michael L. Barnes and Robert J Sternberg, "A hierarchical model of love and its prediction of satisfaction in close relationships," in Robert J. Sternberg and Mahzad Hojjat, eds. Satisfaction in close relationships (New York: Guilford, 1997), 79-101; Christopher L. Coe and Gabriele R. Lubach, " Social context and other psychological influences on the development of immunity," in Carol D. Ryff and Burton H. Singer, eds. Emotion, social relationships, and health (London: Oxford University Press, 2001), 243-261; Susan S. Hendrick and Clyde Hendrick, "Love and satisfaction," in Robert J. Sternberg and Mahzad Hojjat, eds. Satisfaction in close relationships (New York: Guilford, 1997), 56-78; David G. Myers, "Close relationships and quality of life," in Daniel Kahneman, Ed Diener and Norbert Schwarz, eds. Well-being: The foundations ofhedonic psychology (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1999), 374-391; Harry T. Reis and Brian C. Patrick, "Attachment and intimacy: Component processes," in Edward T. Higgins and Arie W. Kruglanski, eds. Social psychology: Handbook of basic principles (Chichester, UK: Wiley, 1996), 367-389; Teresa E. Seeman, "How do others get under your skin: Social relationships and health," in Carol D. Ryff and Burton H. Singer, eds. Emotion, social relationships, and health (New York: Oxford Press, 2001), 189-210; Robert L. Sternberg and Mahzad Hojjat, Satisfaction in close relationships (New York: Guilford, 1997); Shelley E. Taylor, Sally S. Dickerson and Laura Cousino Klein, "Toward a biology of social support," in C.R. Snyder and Shane J. Lopez, eds. Handbook of positive psychology (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 556-569; Ryan and Deci, "Self-Determination Theory," 68; Helliwell and Putnam, "The social context," 1444; Schwartz, "Self-Determination," 86, 107-108; Baumeister and Leary, "The need to belong," 497- 529; and Harry T. Reis, "Domains of experience: Investigating relationship processes from three perspectives," in Ralph Erber and Robin Gilmour, eds. Theoretical frameworks for personal relationships (Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1994), 87-110. 612 Caprara and Steca, "Affective and Social," 283. See also: Robert A. Emmons, The psychology of ultimate concerns: Motivation and spirituality in personality, (New York: Guilford, 1999); Robert A. Emmons, "Personal goals, life meaning, and virtue: Well springs of a positive life," in Corey L.M. Keyes and Jonathan Haidt, eds. Flourishing: A positive psychology and the life well-lived (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 2003), 105-128; and Robert A. Hinde, Relationships: A dialectical perspective, (Cambridge, UK: Psychology Press, 1997). 188 other's perspective, provides choice, encourages self-initiation, and is responsive to the other. When a person received autonomy support, he or she "experiences enhanced motivation, performance, and well-being." What occurs is that the individual is supported in enacting greater degrees of autonomous motivation and is more likely to make progress towards or achieve his or her desired goals. As noted above, this all enhances SWB.614 None of this, however, should be seen as a denial of the bi-directional nature of relatedness and SWB. As Schwartz observes, "the causality works both ways: happy people attract others to them, and being with others makes people happy."615

Now, having said that autonomy increases SWB, it may seem contradictory to say that those in relationships broadly defined are happier than those without. As Schwartz admits, "in many ways, social ties actually decrease freedom, choice, and autonomy."

For example, monogamous marriage with its commitment to another person curtails (at least in theory) the ability to be sexually and even emotionally involved with others. How can what seems to contribute so much to our SWB (i.e., social ties) limit rather than free us, especially when we see that autonomy also increases SWB?616

613 Deci et al, "On the Benefits," 313-325. See also: Deci et al, "Need satisfaction," 930-942. 614 Deci et al, "On the Benefits," 313. See also: Paul P. Baard, Edward L. Deci, and Richard M. Ryan, "Intrinsic need satisfaction: A motivational basis of performance and well-being in two work settings," Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 2004, 34, 2045-2068; Edward L. Deci, Allan J. Schwartz, Louise Sheinman, and Richard M. Ryan, "An instrument to assess adults' orientations toward control versus autonomy with children: Reflections on intrinsic motivation and perceived competence." Journal of Educational Psychology, 1981, 73, 642- 650; Ryan and Connell, "Perceived locus," 749-761; Geoffrey C. Williams, Virginia M. Grow, Zachary R. Freedman, Richard M. Ryan, and Edward L. Deci, "Motivational predictors of weight loss and weight loss maintenance," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1996,70,115-126; and Myers, "The Funds," 62. 615 Schwartz, The Paradox, 107. 616 Ibid, 107-108. 189 Autonomy and relations

Ryan and Deci clearly state that "autonomy refers not to being independent, detached, or selfish but rather to the feeling of volition that can accompany any act, whether dependent or independent, collectivist or individualist.. .Clearly, then, we do not equate

(\ 17 autonomy with independence or individualism." It has already been noted that partners in relationships can support each other's autonomy by acknowledging the other's perspective, providing choice, encouraging self-initiation, and being responsive to the other. There is also, as Schwartz tells us, the additional benefits of the guidance we receive from others we relate with. Relying on the previous experiences, ideas, suggestions, and the like, of other people we relate to can increase our effectiveness and efficiency in achieving our goals, and free up our time, energy and attention for additional self-motivated goal-seeking. Following advice based on successful experiences /rio enables people "to experiment, to explore, to create" without certain worries.

Deci et al. have demonstrated that individuals "who were more autonomous in their own self-regulation, reported more positive, honest relationships than did those who scored lower on the autonomy orientation.. .That is, being autonomous was associated with warmer, more satisfying interpersonal interactions."619 Also, another study found that "when a person felt autonomous in a relationship, that is, [when] he or she felt free to

617 Ryan and Deci, "Self-Determination Theory," 74. 618 Schwartz, The Paradox, 235-236. 619 Deci et al, "On the Benefits," 314. See also: Holley S. Hodgins, Richard Koestner, and Neil Duncan, "On the compatibility of autonomy and relatedness," Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 1996, 22, 227-237; Marc R. Blais, Stephane Sabourin, Colette Boucher, and Robert L. Vallerand, "Toward a motivational model of couple happiness," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1999, 59,1021- KB 1; and Deci and Ryan, "The 'What'," 240. 190 be who he or she is rather than feeling pressured to be a certain way, the person reported greater attachment security with the relational partner and more relationship satisfaction. Taken together, these studies show that the more a person feels autonomous within a relationship, the more he or she will be satisfied and feel attached

ft) ] within that relationship. It was also found that "the autonomy support a person gives to his or her friend contributes to the person's own experience of relationship quality over and above the contribution made by the autonomy support the person receives from the friend."622

Increasing SWB

There are at least two ideas supporting the position that sustainable increases in SWB are impossible. First, there is the idea of a genetically-determined set point for happiness.

Sheldon and Lyubomirsky point out that the heritability of SWB is widely thought to be

f.'yi

50%, and as high as 80%. This suggests that "each person has a chronic or characteristic level of happiness, from which it will be difficult, if not impossible, to depart. Thus, although there may be substantial variation around this baseline level in the

620 Deci et al, "On the Benefits," 314. See also: Jennifer G. La Guardia, Richard M. Ryan, Charles E. Couchman, and Edward L. Deci, "Within-person variation in security of attachment: A self-determination theory perspective on attachment, need fulfillment, and well-being," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 2000, 79, 367-384. 621 Deci et al, "On the Benefits," 314. 622 Ibid, 326. 623 Kennon M. Sheldon and Sonja Lyubomirsky, "Achieving Sustainable Gains in Happiness: Change Your Actions, Not Your Circumstances," Journal of Happiness Studies, 2006, 7, 56-57. See also: Diener et al, "Subjective well-being," 302; and David Lykken, and Auke Tellegen, "Happiness is a stochastic phenomenon," Psychological Science, 1996, 7, 186-189. short-term, in the long-term, people perhaps cannot help but return to their set

point."624 Second, there is the conception of hedonic adaptation that suggests gains in

SWB are impermanent because humans so quickly adapt to change: "although new

circumstances may cause temporary increases in happiness or sadness, people rapidly

adjust, and the effect of these new circumstances on their well-being then quickly

diminishes or even entirely disappears." An example of this is a study showing that

recent lottery winners were no happier than control groups.625

It is important to know whether the above arguments lead to the conclusion that

the pursuit of increased SWB is fruitless, and that, rather than seeking more SWB, people

should accept their current level of SWB. Sheldon and Lyubomirsky have argued this is

not so. "First, some researchers have had preliminary success, albeit short-term, in using

interventions to enhance happiness.. .The potential of happiness-increasing interventions

is further demonstrated by recent research showing that practicing certain virtues, such as

gratitude.. .forgiveness.. .and thoughtful self-reflection.. .can bring about enhanced well-

624 Sheldon and Lyubomirsky, "Achieving Sustainable Gains," 56-57. See also: Bruce Headey and Alexander Wearing, "Personality, life events, and subjective well-being: Toward a dynamic equilibrium modelJournal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1989, 57, 731-739. 625 Sheldon and Lyubomirsky, "Achieving Sustainable Gains," 56-57. See also: Philip Brickman and Donald T. Campbell, "Hedonic relativism and planning the good society," in Mortimer H. Appley, ed. Adaptation-level Theory (New York: Academic Press, 1971), 287-302; Shane Frederick and George Loewenstein, "Hedonic adaptation," in Daniel Kahneman, Ed Diener and Norbert Schwarz, eds. Well- being: The foundations of hedonic psychology (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1999), 302-329; Daniel Kahneman, "Objective happiness," in Daniel Kahneman, Ed Diener and Norbert Schwarz, eds. Well-being: The Foundations of Hedonic Psychology (New York; Russell Sage Foundation, 1999), 3-25; Tibor Scitovsky, The Joyless Economy: The Psychology of Human Satisfaction (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976); Philip Brickman, Dan Coates and Ronnie Janoff-Bulman, "Lottery winners and accident victims: Is happiness relative?," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1979, 36, 917-927; Marcel Dijkers, "Quality of life after spinal cord injury: A meta-analysis of the effects of disablement components," Spinal Cord, 1997,32, 829-840; and Dolan and White, "How Can Measures," 72-73. 192 being." Second, many motivating factors associated with SWB are amenable to some volitional control. One example is the choice of particular kinds of goals, specifically "goals that are intrinsic in content.. .concordant with an individual's interests, values, and motives...and internally consistent."627

Dolan and White have also noted that adaptation is not universal across individuals or the domains of their lives. There are positive experiences (e.g., friendships) and negative experiences (e.g., pain, noise, unemployment, divorce) to which people do

^o not appear to fully adapt. Also, research has shown that baseline levels of SWB, or

626 Sheldon and Lyubomirsky, "Achieving Sustainable Gains," 57. See also: Richard Schulz, "Effects of control and predictability on the physical and psychological well-being of the institutionalized aged," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1976, 33, 563-573; Michael W. Fordyce, "Development of a program to increase happiness," Journal of Counseling Psychology, 1977, 24, 511 -521; Michael W. Fordyce, "A program to increase happiness: Further studies," Journal of Counseling Psychology, 1983,30, 483-498; Shelley Lichter, Karen Haye and Richard Kammann, "Increasing happiness through cognitive retraining," New Zealand Psychologist, 1980,9, 57-64; Giovanni A. Fava, "Well-being therapy: Conceptual and technical issues," Psychotherapy and Psychosomatics, 1999, 68, 171-179; Kennon M. Sheldon, Tim Kasser, Kendra Smith and Tamara Share, "Personal goals and psychological growth: Testing an intervention to enhance goal-attainment and personality integration," Journal of Personality, 2002, 70, 5-31; Robert A. Emmons, and Michael E. McCullough, "Counting blessings versus burdens: An experimental investigation of gratitude and subjective well-being in daily life," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 2003, 84, 377-389; and Laura A. King, "The health benefits of writing about life goals," Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 2001, 27, 798-807. 627 Sheldon and Lyubomirsky, "Achieving Sustainable Gains," 57-58. See also: Tim Kasser and Richard M. Ryan, "A dark side of the American dream: Correlates of financial success as a central life aspiration," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1993, 65,410-422; Kasser and Ryan, "Further examining the American dream," 280-287; Joachim C. Brunstein, Oliver C. Schultheiss and Ruth Grassman, "Personal goals and emotional well-being: The moderating role of motive dispositions," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1998, 75,494-508; Kennon M. Sheldon, and Andrew J. Elliot, "Goal striving, need- satisfaction, and longitudinal well-being: The Self-Concordance Model," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1999, 76,482-497; Robert A. Emmons and Laura A. King, "Conflict among personal strivings: Immediate and long-term implications for psychological and physical well-being," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1988, 54, 1040-1048; and Kennon M. Sheldon and Tim Kasser, "Coherence and congruence: Two aspects of personality integration," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1995, 68, 531-543. 628 Dolan and White, "How Can Measures," 73. See also: Frederick and Loewenstein, "Hedonic adaptation," 302-329; Richard E. Lucas, "Time does not heal all wounds: A longitudinal study of reaction and adaptation to divorce," Psychological Science, 2005, 16,945-950; Richard E. Lucas, Andrew E. Clark, Yannis Georgellis and Ed Diener, "Unemployment alters the set point for life satisfaction," Psychological Science, 2004 15, 8-13; and Lyubomirsky et al, "Pursuing happiness," 111-131. 193 /OQ those levels people return to after adapting, can change over time. Finally, individuals differ in the degree and speed of their adaptation.630

It is important to note, as Sheldon and Lyubomirsky do, that the heritability of

SWB is widely believed to be about 50%, which although a large number, still provides considerable room to manoeuvre when compared to inherited biological features such as eye colour. Also, as people age, their SWB tends to increase, indicating that SWB can increase over a period of decades rather than being permanently stable, and "people do tend to move towards more positive trait profiles as they age, in particular becoming

/•11 lower in neuroticism as they approach middle age." Recent research suggests that one source of these positive changes as people age is "older peoples' ability to resist social pressures and to pursue goals for more self-endorsed reasons, the result of a normative ft'XO maturational process." Other reasons to think that positive changes in SWB are sustainable include "the fact that psychotherapy can have a measurable and lasting positive impact upon peoples' mood and adjustment.. .the fact that some well-being interventions have shown a degree of success.. .and the fact that starting a happy marriage has been shown to have lasting positive impacts on SWB for some 629 Dolan and White, "How Can Measures," 73. See also: Frank Fujita and Ed Diener, "Life satisfaction set point: Stability and change," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 2005, 88,158-164. 630 Dolan and White, "How Can Measures," 73. See also: Richard E. Lucas, Andrew E. Clark, Yannis Georgellis, and Ed Diener, "Reexamining adaptation and the set point model of happiness: Reactions to changes in marital statusJournal of Personality and Social Psychology, 2003, 84, 527-539. 631 Sheldon and Lyubomirsky, "Is It Possible," 133-134. See also: Argyle, "Causes and correlates," 353- 373; and Dustin Wood and Brent W. Roberts, "The effect of age and role information on expectations for big five personality traits," Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 2006, 32, 1482-1496. 632 Sheldon and Lyubomirsky, "Is It Possible," 133-134. See also: Kennon M. Sheldon and Tim Kasser, "Getting older, getting better? Personal strivings and psychological maturity across the life span," Developmental Psychology, 2001,37,491-501; and Laura L. Carstensen, Derek M. Isaacowitz, and Susan T. Charles, "Taking time seriously: A theory of socio-emotional selectivity," American Psychologist, 1999, 54, 165-181. 194 individuals." Another indicator that an individual's baseline is not unchangeable is the fact that negative events can permanently alter SWB, producing lasting negative changes, such as divorce, a spouse's death, unemployment and disability.634 Sheldon and

Lyubomirsky summarize the research findings in their conclusion, noting that

about 10% of the variance in SWB can be explained by relatively static demographic and circumstantial factors and that about 50% of the variance can be explained by genetics (i.e., unchanging personality, and temperament).. ..[T]he remaining 40% of the variance must perforce by determined by what people do - that is, the activities with which people fill up their days, with greater or lesser degrees of success and enjoyment.63

Keeping in mind that individuals do adapt, research has shown that it is important that the intentional activities the people undertake be repeated. Diener tells us that how often a person experiences pleasant emotions is an excellent predictor of a person's SWB. It seems that emotional intensity is not as important for SWB as feeling pleasant emotions most of the time and infrequently experiencing unpleasant emotions, even if the pleasant emotions are only mild. In fact, intense positive moments are rare even among individuals with the highest level of SWB. Rather, mild-to-moderate pleasant emotions

633 Sheldon and Lyubomirsky, "Is It Possible," 133-134. See also: Giovanni A. Fava, Chiara Rafanelli, Manuela Cazzaro, Sandra Conti and Silvana Grandi, "Well-being therapy: A novel psychotherapeutic approach for residual symptoms of affective disorders," Psychological Medicine, 1998,28,475—480; Giovanni A. Fava, Chiara Ruini, Chiara Rafanelli, Livio Finos, Luigi Salmaso and Lara Mangelli, "Well- being therapy of generalized anxiety disorder," Psychotherapy and Psychosomatics, 2005,74, 26-30; Fordyce, "Development of a program," 511-521; Fordyce, "A program," 483-498; and Lucas et al, "Reexamining adaptation," 527-539. 634 Sheldon and Lyubomirsky, "Is It Possible," 133-134. See also: Richard E. Lucas, "Adaptation and the set-point model of subjective well-being: Does happiness change after major life events?," Current Directions in Psychological Science, 2007, 16, 75-79. 635 Sheldon and Lyubomirsky, "Is It Possible," 134-135. See also: Lyubomirsky et al, "Pursuing happiness," 111-131; and Kennon M. Sheldon, and Sonja Lyubomirsky, "Achieving sustainable new happiness: Prospects, practices, and prescriptions," in Alex Linley and Stephen Joseph, eds. Positive Psychology in Practice (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons, 2004), 127-145. 195 most of the time seem far more important to SWB. Intense experiences do not seem

f/lf. to be the cornerstone of SWB.

And the activities people undertake on a regular basis seemingly have to meet

certain conditions. First, as mentioned above, a person's experiences must fit his or her personality, dispositions and needs. It is also important that there is variation in content

and timing so the effects of adaptation are minimized. In this way, a steady stream of positive experiences will enhance SWB over and above a person's baseline. That said,

novelty is not everything; the content of intentional activities matters. Activities that have received experimental support in their ability to enhance SWB are those that provide

opportunities for positive experiences and personal growth, such as "contemplating best

possible selves, cultivating gratitude, being kind, replaying happy life events, savoring

daily experiences, and employing one's strengths, among others."638 Even if people are

636 Diener, "Subjective Well-Being: The Science," 36. See also: Ed Diener, Ed Sandvik, and William Pavot, "Happiness is the frequency, not the intensity, of positive versus negative affect," in Fritz Strack, Michael Argyle and Norbert Schwarz, eds. Subjective well-being: An interdisciplinary perspective (New York: Pergamon, 1991), 119-139; Ed Diener and Carol Diener, "Most people are happy," Psychological Science, 1996,7, 181-185; Randy J. Larsen and Ed Diener, "A multitrait-multimethod examination of affect structure: Hedonic level and emotional intensity," Personality and Individual Differences, 1985, 6, 631- 636; and Allen Parducci, Happiness, pleasure, and judgment: The contextual theory and its applications (Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, 1995). 6 7 Sheldon and Lyubomirsky, "Is It Possible," 135-138. See also: Kennon M. Sheldon and Andrew J. Elliot, "Goal striving, need-satisfaction, and longitudinal well-being: The Self-Concordance Model," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1999, 76,482-497. 638 Sheldon and Lyubomirsky, "Is It Possible," 141-142. See also: Kennon M. Sheldon, Richard M. Ryan, Edward L. Deci, and Tim Kasser, "The independent effects of goal contents and motives on well-being: It's both what you pursue and why you pursue it," Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 2004, 30,475- 486; Lyubomirsky et al, "Pursuing happiness," 111-131; Sonja Lyubomirsky, Lorie Sousa, and Rene Dickerhoof, "The costs and benefits of writing, talking, and thinking about life's triumphs and defeats," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 2006, 90, 692-708; Martin E.P. Seligman, Tracy A. Steen, Nansook Park, and Christopher Peterson, "Positive psychology progress: Empirical validation of interventions," American Psychologist, 2005, 60,410—421; Martin E.P. Seligman, Tayyab Rashid, and Acacia C. Parks, "Positive psychotherapy," American Psychology, 2006, 61, 774-788; and Kennon M. Sheldon, and Sonja Lyubomirsky, "How to increase and sustain positive emotion: The effects of expressing gratitude and visualizing best possible selves," Journal of Positive Psychology, 2006, 1, 73-82. 196 highly motivated, if the activity they are doing is uninspiring, SWB will not increase.

In this sense, the 'what' and the 'why' of activities matters for increasing SWB.

Why some avoid autonomy

Since the case is being made that autonomy increases SWB, it is important to at least partially explain the empirical fact that some people avoid autonomy to varying degrees.

Deci and Ryan tell us that "[ajlthough humans innately tend toward autonomy.. .and relatedness, these tendencies are not the only determinants of behavior, and they can be constrained or subverted by other factors such as rewards, punishments, and rituals of specific cultures."640

Christopher K. Hsee and Reid Hastie have sought to explain why people do not choose what would seemingly make them happy, and offer several reasons. First, people often fail to predict future experiences accurately. "Impact bias" means that people often overestimate the impact of an affective event, both in terms of the intensity and duration of the impact. This can occur because people can pay too much attention to the central event causing them to ignore context events that can moderate the impact of the central event. Impact bias can also be caused by people damping the emotional impact of an emotion-evoking event by rationalizing it in an attempt to make sense of it. In underestimating the damping effects of this sense-making mechanism, people overestimate the impact of an event.

639 Sheldon and Lyubomirsky, "Is It Possible," 141-142. 640 Deci and Ryan, "The 'What' and the 'Why'," 255. 197 "Projection bias" means that people make predictions in one emotional state, but experience the event predicted in another state. What often happens is that when predictors in one emotional state make predictions about experiences in another state, they project aspects of the former state onto the latter, as if the experience will occur in the former not the latter. The result is that choices are made that one will regret because, while the choice was sensible given the former state, the difference between the former and latter states renders the choice insensible. There is also "distinction bias," which means that the person-as-predictor and the person-as-experiencer are in different evaluation modes. The predictor often makes predictions by comparing multiple options, whereas the experiencer is exposed only to the chosen option. In comparing multiple options, predictors pay too much attention to subtle quantitative differences which seem obvious when comparing multiple options, but make little or no difference when experiencing the single chosen option. This disproportionate focus on subtle qualitative differences can lead to non-optimal choices, especially if there is a trade-off between subtle quantitative differences and important qualitative differences, because the result is often that one obtains a gain in a quantitative aspect at the cost of a lost qualitative one.

"Memory bias" occurs because predictions of future experiences are often based on memories of related past experiences, but memory has been shown to be fallible and to introduce biases into evaluations. Memory-based evaluations of past events are disproportionately influenced by events' peak experience and end experience, and insensitive to event duration. Peak and end experiences are relatively well-recalled during evaluation. Unusual past events are also disproportionately well-remembered. Memory 198 recall distorted in these ways provides poor material in making accurate predictions and choices based on those predictions. "Belief bias" occurs when people apply learned theories about what makes them happy or unhappy to situations where they do not hold.

All of the above prediction biases occur because prediction and experience occur in different states but people making the predictions do not appreciate the differences.

With projection bias the difference is between differences in emotional states. The distinction bias highlights differences in evaluation modes, between many and one object being evaluated. Impact bias shows the difference created by non-central events and our sense-making system creates. Memory bias highlights differences between the recollection of past and the actuality future events. "If predictors could sufficiently appreciate the differences between their current state and their state as an experiencer, and correct for the differences, they would not commit systematic prediction errors."641

Hsee and Hastie also highlight the added complication that even when decision- makers make accurate predictions, they can fail to act on their predictions. "Impulsivity" occurs when people choose the immediately gratifying option instead of the one that will better promote long-term SWB. While impulsivity may result from failing to accurately predict long-term experience, it also occurs when people cannot or choose not to resist immediate cravings. "Rule-based decisions" are those based on rules for 'good behaviour' rather than predicted experience. Examples of this include 'seek variety' and

'don't pay for delays.' Such rules can prevent people from choosing what they predict

641 Christopher K. Hsee and Reid Hastie, "Decision and experience: why don't we choose what makes us happy?," Trends in Cognitive Sciences, January 2006, Vol.10, No.l, 31-33. 199 will produce the greatest SWB. The problem of "Lay rationalism" occurs when decision-makers try to 'do the rational thing' and it prevents them from choosing what they predict will enhance their SWB.

[There are] three specific manifestations. One is 'lay economism', the tendency to base decisions on financial aspects of the options and neglect experiential aspects. For example, when asked to choose between a 500 small chocolate that looks like a heart and a $2 large chocolate that looks like a cockroach, most respondents opted for the larger cockroach- shaped chocolate, even though when asked to predict which they would enjoy more, most favored the smaller, hearted-shaped chocolate.. .Another manifestation is 'lay scientism', a tendency to base choices on objective, 'hard' attributes rather than subjective, 'soft' attributes. For example, when choosing between two equally expensive audio systems, one with a higher wattage rating (a hard attribute) and the other with a richer sound (a soft attribute), most people chose the high-wattage model, even though when asked to predict their enjoyment, they favored the richer-sounding model. A third manifestation of lay rationalism is 'lay functionalism', a tendency to focus on the primary goal(s) of the decision and overlook other aspects that are important to overall experience.642

"Medium-maximization" can also be a problem.

Often when people exert effort to obtain a desired outcome, the immediate reward they receive is not the outcome itself, but a medium - an instrument or currency that they can trade for the desired outcome. For example, points in consumer loyalty programs and miles in frequent flyer programs are both such a medium. In decisions involving a medium, individuals often maximize the medium rather than their predicted experience with the ultimate outcomes... the presence of a medium could lead decision-makers to exert more effort, but without a better outcome... Money is also a medium.. .[and a] a prevalent social phenomenon.. ..[is] that people work harder and harder to accumulate more and more wealth, but are not in fact happier.643

Like with prediction biases, there are relationships between these failures to follow predictions. The last three factors - rules, lay rationalism and medium-maximization -

642 Ibid., 33-36. 643 Ibid. 200 are self-control devices against the first factor, impulsivity. Self-control devices can sometimes help and sometimes hurt decision-makers, and whether it is hurt or help often depends on whether the options faced involve a trade-off between short- and long-term

SWB. If they do, these devices usually help. If not, they can hurt. The problem is that often people do not effectively distinguish between these situations. "When situations involve a short-term/long-term trade-off and require self-control to combat impulsivity, they do not exert enough self-control and act myopically. When situations do not involve such trade-offs and do not require self-control, they still exert some self-control and deny themselves optimal enjoyment. Consequently, decisions are often too regressive, that is, too much 'in the middle'."644

Benefits of increased SWB

There is considerable evidence that SWB is worth promoting not only because it feels good to the individual, but also because of additional individual benefits. Sheldon and

Lyubomirsky have demonstrated that such benefits include "greater career success, better relationship functioning, increased creativity, enhanced physical health, and even longer life expectancy."645 To deal with the criticism that a third variable, such as personality

644 Ibid. 645 Sheldon and Lyubomirsky, "Is It Possible," 131. See also: Sonja Lyubomirsky, Laura A. King, and Ed Diener, "The benefits of frequent positive affect: Does happiness lead to success?," Psychological Bulletin, 2005,131, 803-855; Dolan and White, "How Can Measures," 76; David Snowdon, Aging with grace: What the nun study teaches us about leading longer, healthier, and more meaningful lives (New York: Bantam Books, 2001); Gerald M. Devins, Jacquelin Mann, Henry P. Mandin, and Leonard C. Paul, "Psychosocial predictors of survival in end-stage renal disease," Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 1990, 178,127-133; Sandra M. Levy, Jerry Lee, Caroline Bagley, and Martin Lippman, "Survival hazard analysis in first recurrent breast cancer patients: Seven-year follow-up," Psychosomatic Medicine, 1988, 50, 520-528; Bruce Kirkcaldy and Adrian Furnham, "Positive affectivity, psychological well-being, 201 differences, could be the underlying cause of both enhanced SWB and, for example, better health outcomes, and at the same time enhance the case for causality, experimental studies based on the random allocation of participants to conditions have been conducted.

"One study using this approach found that recovery times following surgery were shorter when patients were convalescing in a room with an attractive rather than unattractive view...The implication is that a pleasant recovery environment improves SWB and that greater SWB, in turn, aids the recovery process."646

Diener argues that people who experience high levels of SWB have a number of qualities desirable from perspectives beyond the individual (e.g., societal). Initial studies indicate they "participate more in community organizations, are more liked by others...perform better at work.. .[H]appy individuals seem on average to be more productive and sociable."647 And Corey L. Keyes points out that individuals with SWB

accident and traffic-deaths and suicide: An international comparison," Studia Psychologica, 2007,42, 97- 104; Sheldon Cohen, William J. Doyle, Ronald B. Turner, Cuneyt M. Alper, and David P. Skoner, "Emotional style and susceptibility to the common cold," Psychosomatic Medicine, 2003, 65, 652-657; Harry Verkley and Jan Stolk, "Does happiness lead into idleness?," in Ruut Veenhoven, ed. How harmful is happiness? (Rotterdam, The Netherlands: University of Rotterdam, 1989), 79-93; Ed Diener, Carol Nickerson, Richard E. Lucas, and Ed Sandvik, "Dispositional affect and job outcomes," Social Indicators Research, 2002, 59, 229-259; Russell Cropanzano and Thomas A. Wright, "A 5-year study of change in the relationship between well-being and job performance," Consulting Psychology Journal: Practice and Research, 1999, 51,252-265; James K. Harter, Frank L. Schmidt and Corey L.M. Keyes, "Well-being in the workplace and its relationship to business outcomes," in Corey L.M. Keyes and Jonathan Haidt, eds. Flourishing: The positive person and the good life (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association Press, 2003), 205-224; Gary N. Marks and Nicole Fleming, "Influences and consequences of well-being among Australian young people: 1980-1995," Social Indicators Research, 1999,46,301-323; and Thomas A. Wright and Barry M. Staw, "Affect and favourable work outcomes: Two longitudinal tests of the happy- productive worker thesis," Journal of Organizational Behavior, 1999,20, 1-23. 646 Dolan and White, "How Can Measures," 76. See also: Roger S. Ulrich, "View through a window may influence recovery from surgery," Science, April 1984, 224,420-421; and Roger S. Ulrich, "Wellness by design: Psychologically supportive patient surroundings," Group Practice Journal, 1991,40,10-19. 647 Diener, "Subjective Well-Being: The Science," 41. See also: Barry M. Staw, Robert I. Sutton and Lisa H. Pelled, "Employee positive emotion and favorable outcomes at the workplace," Organization Science, 1994, 5, 51-71; Ruut Veenhuven, "The utility of happiness," Social Indicators Research, 1988,20. 333- 354; and Dolan and White, "How Can Measures," 77. 202 increase the levels of social capital through higher-levels civic participation,

(LAQ generosity, community involvement and volunteering. In the workplace, as Diener and

Seligman note, higher-levels of SWB lead to individuals more likely to help other employees and the enterprise in ways not directly related to their job description.649 Given the empirical findings indicating "higher (relative to lower) levels of SWB are associated with fewer symptoms of mental illness, more positive social functioning, stronger interpersonal relations, more functional health status, more adaptive dispositions and temperaments, and more self-enhancing cognitive styles,"650 it is understandable why "a high level of SWB is conceptualized as an indicator of optimal human functioning"651 and "is considered an important personal and societal goal."

Beyond empirical reasons for supporting measures the enhance SWB, Helliwell and Putnam argue that "[a] prima facie case can be made that the ultimate 'dependent variable' in social science should be human well-being, and in particular, well-being as

648 Corey L. Keyes, "Subjective Well-Being," 6. 649 Diener and Seligman, "Beyond Money," 10-11. 650 Busseri et al, "A Person-Centered Approach," 167. See also Diener, "Subjective well-being," 542-575; Diener, "Assessing subjective well-being," 103-157; Diener, "Subjective Well-Being: The Science," 34- 43; Sonja Lyubomirksy, Kennon M. Sheldon, and David Schkade, "Pursuing happiness: The architecture of sustainable change," Review of Generaly Psychology, 2005,9, 111-131; Sarah D. Pressman and Sheldon Cohen, "Does positive affect influence health?," Psychological Bulletin, 2005,131, 925-971. 651 Busseri et al, "A Person-Centered Approach," 167. See also: Corey L. Keyes, "Mental health and/or mental illness? Investigating axioms of the complete state model of health," Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 2005, 73, 539-548; Richard M. Ryan and Edward L. Deci, "On happiness and human potentials: A review of research on hedonic and eudaimonic well-being," Annual Review of Psychology, 2001,52,141-166. 652 Busseri et al, "A Person-Centered Approach," 167. See also: Diener, "Subjective Well-Being: The Science," 34-43; and Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi, "Positive Psychology," 5-14. 653 Political theorists such as Robert Nozick have discussed this topic. Nozick gives two fundamental reasons why happiness or satisfaction with life is so important to us: first, the feeling of happiness in enjoyable; second, a life considered as being happy is often considered a 'good life' [see: Robert Nozick, The Examined Life: Philosophical Meditations (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989), 137], 203 defined by the individual herself, or 'subjective well-being'."654 Daniel M. Haybron has argued that there are at least four reasons why the social sciences should care about

SWB. First, people often appeal to considerations of happiness when they deliberate about important life decisions (e.g., 'Will being with person X make me happy' or 'Will doing job X make be happy?'). Second, people often assess their situation or the situation of others in terms of happiness (e.g., 'Is my spouse happy?'). Third, happiness is often a clear predictor of behaviour (e.g., happier people are more likely to be fun and/or funny as companions at work and'leisure). Finally, happiness is often a useful explanation of behaviour (e.g., unhappiness can cause people to avoid making decisions).655

From increased SWB via autonomy and happiness to a society that maximizes these for all

A tribal model and good life challenges dominant conceptions, and we can see why the life made possible by tribalism offers people a good quality of life, as the autonomy and relatedness they make possible and enact are the strongest determinants and predictors of

SWB. But how can a tribal good life and model, and the benefits they offer, be realized nowadays, for those of us living in state society?

654 Helliwell and Putnam, "The social context," 1435. 655 Daniel M. Haybron, "What do we want from a theory of happiness?," Metaphilosophy, 2003, 314-317. See also: Haller and Hadler, "How Social Relations," 170-171, 177. 204

Chapter 4: Adapting Tribalism for Stateless Economics and Politics

Up to this point, three things have been argued. First, a tribal social organizational form is distinct from state societies. Second, a tribal conception of the goods life is centrally about maximizing individual autonomy and relatedness in ways that allow these to be equally enjoyed by all. Third, decades of psychological and psychiatric research showed that individuals experience the greatest amount of SWB when they are autonomous and in relations with others. In addition to the longevity and stability of a tribe, this is a why a tribal social organizational form, which makes possible both individual autonomy and relatedness, provides lessons that if implemented have the potential to increase SWB.

The reason why I say increase SWB is because for those currently living in a state society individual autonomy in the political realm can be limited by the very existence of a state, when compared to the level of autonomy granted in this arena for those living in tribe societies. And for those living in capitalist state society autonomy is further limited in economic decision making because of the nature of capitalist property and the power it confers to owners. Thus, for those living in capitalist state societies, implementing lessons learned from tribal societies will mean a move towards a post-state and post- capitalist society. A society enacting the lessons of tribal societies discussed above, and making possible the autonomy and relatedness discussed in psychological and psychiatric research, could be a democratized participatory polity with a similarly democratized participatory economy, where individuals will be granted the autonomy denied them in capitalist state societies, and thereby increase their SWB.

Why not states

As discussed in Chapter One, state societies limit individual autonomy insofar as they have centralized government656 and socio-economic stratification,657 both of which are backed up by authority and power, such as police forces.658 To the extent that state societies have a government composed of individuals numbering less than the total population, they are structured in a way that different members of society participate unequally in political, social, and economic decisions.659 In this way, the individuals composing the governing body exist outside and above the remaining members of society. Central elements of political, social and economic decision-making occur above and beyond those people not involved, above and beyond their participation and control.

This is seen in the general trend of state societies having complex institutions of decision making and administration with specialized roles for rulers, that is, those who make the day-to-day decisions in their role as their society's political leaders.660 This separate- from-the-rest-of-society, specialized set of decision-making and administrative offices

656 Fried, 235; Bogucki, 334; Service, Origins, 14. 657 Fried, 235; Bogucki, 334; Johnson and Earle, 35, 304. 658 Fried, 235; Johnson and Earle, 35, 304; Service, Origins, 14; Service, Primitive, 163. 659 Again, it is important here to note differences between the ideal-type of state and the real experiences that have existed historically and may exist in future. In ancient Athens, for example, there was no hierarchy among citizens; however, women and slaves were excluded politically. One can look to the Swiss cantons to see large assemblies that in at least some cases include all citizens (now that women participate). And there is also the Paris Commune as a revolutionary state (although it did not endure). 660 Johnson and Earle, 35,304; Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel, 280; Service, Primitive, 164. As mentioned above, there are exceptions to the general trend of state societies having specialized roles for rulers, such as ancient Athens. 206 can be the state referred to when one speaks of a state society. Where state institutions see political rulers enjoy the power and autonomy denied others, existing separately, above and beyond the rest of society, state societies limit the autonomy of the individuals,

This is no less true merely because a state society has representative democracy. As

David McNally observes,

the notion of an actively self-governing people (who make the laws according to which they live) is replaced by the passive doctrine of representation. In the representative system...people are entitled merely to vote occasionally for those who will make the laws - at the same time surrendering all control over the representatives they elect. Between elections, these representatives assume virtually total power over the ostensibly sovereign people. Representative democracy is thus based upon the ideal of a de-mobilized and de-politicized demos who, because they are not governing themselves, become detached and alienated from the political process.661

Moreover, even when not capitalist, state societies usually see some form of direct elite management of production and/or other wider economic functions to promote maximum surplus production, which in turn maintains and increases their power base. In some state societies, the state personnel use their power to extract and accumulate goods and services from their citizens. In one way or another, households are persuaded, manipulated, or forced into producing surplus to support the elite.662 This brings us to a discussion of why autonomy is not compatible with capitalism.

Why not capitalism

661 McNally, Another World, 273-274. 662 Bogucki, 334, 335; Johnson and Earle, 35; Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel, 279; Fried, 239-240. 207 McNally accurately and succinctly captures why capitalism limits individual autonomy. As he argues, "capitalist 'democracy'...involves a dramatic contraction in the public sphere and the range of public powers. Major questions related to the distribution of property, the ownership of resources, and the allocation of wealth are now defined as issues of private economic life... where private individuals pursue their self-interest, free of public interference." This is so because strategic goods can be owned by private individuals, "sheltered...behind a barricade of laws that declared it off limits to all but its private owners." In this way, it is the condition of ownership that allows individuals to make decisions distribution, ownership and allocation, and non-owners, the rest of society, have no say in these matters. "With the 'expulsion of politics' from these spheres, the ambit of democracy has been radically reduced." In fact, what occurs is a

"privatization of economic power." By expelling politics from the economic sphere

"some of the most important events in peoples' lives - the closing of a factory, difficulties paying the rent, the decline of working class living standards, the lack of affordable housing and so on - are treated as. ..outside the purview of politics." Thus, for example, a capitalist owner employing many people can have the dominant say over the workplace's organization and utilization, over how employees spend their days, and if that owner decides to move a venture to a new a new locale, despite the fact that the employees fired and the community left behind can be devastated, neither the discarded employees or the gutted community have significant say in the decision despite the degree to which they are affected. In the end, this represents the "domestication [of 208 democracy], its containment by capitalist property rights that prevent people from affecting the real sources of power (and suffering) in society."663

Some might argue that businesses within capitalist economies need not be organized along capitalist lines, need not, for example, use an owner-directed hierarchical organizational structure. Some have even argued that businesses within capitalist economies can be organized in ways commensurate with tribal principles. In this way, a tribal model could be integrated into capitalist state societies by being used as a model for making a living. In this argument, it is important to see the tribe as an organizational typology with certain characteristics, and no longer associate it with, for example, hunting and gathering, horticulture, pastoralism, and so on. What would a tribal business look like? Daniel Quinn describes a tribe as a "cooperative structure that helps a group implement its way of life."664 The members of the group are equals, although there is a boss.665 "Tribes have leaders.. .but leadership carries little or nothing in the way of special benefits that are denied to other members of the tribe." Leaders are not despots; they are not a ruling class.666 The group exists for all its members "because all are perceived as involved in the success of the tribe." People have different roles, and each role is the most important at a particular time, so no one role is more important than the others. The success of the group venture is the goal because "[ejveryone's interest lies in

663 McNally, Another World, 273-274. 664 Daniel Quinn, Beyond Civilization: Humanity's Next Great Adventure (New York: Three Rivers Press, 1999), 58. 665 Ibid., 65. 666 Ibid, 73. 209 the success of the whole."667 And success means security, so all both lend and enjoy

rr o support. The goal is security from cradle to grave for every member of the group, and in the meantime if someone is suffering everyone is suffering, because no one is to be left alone to deal with an enormous difficulty.669

It should be noted that while this description goes far, and that Quinn is someone from whom I have drawn for information, he has not gone far enough to fully account for a tribal experience. His account does cover that a tribe is a whole composed of interrelated and interdependent parts and that relations between parts must be predicated upon the importance, necessity and dignity of all. But the idea of individual autonomy, and importantly the impetus to the self-directed growth of individuals is missing. The fact of group cohesion is maintained through leadership, reciprocity, a goal of tribal success, and mutual respect is mentioned. That people are equals is provided, as is that the leader is merely one equal among the rest. Leadership based on authority, not power, is covered, but the idea that leadership requires the consent of the group is absent. Finally, although he says that leaders are not despots, not a ruling class, and although he says that leadership does not carry (many, if any) benefits that are denied others, he seems to take this back, however inadvertently, in what is seemingly his most celebrated, certainly most repeated, example of tribal organization. After he has given his non-despotic description of tribal leadership, he empowers his conception of a tribe-style boss with the ability to

667 Ibid, 64. 668 Daniel Quinn, My Ishmael (Toronto: Bantam, 1997), 175. 669 Ibid, 180. 210 fire people.670 However, the idea that a tribe-style boss can make such unilateral decisions, as opposed to merely making suggestions, offering advice, and generally being the spokesperson for the group, flouts much of the core values of a tribal conception of a good life discussed above: the interrelatedness of the whole that demands respect and dignity for the constituent elements of the group; the significance of individual autonomy and self-directed fulfillment that underwrites collective and consensus decision-making; the collective and consensus decision-making, and the mutual respect of others that underwrites group cohesion; leadership as guidance, grounded in sustained group confidence, as opposed to power-based with coercive sanctions; the leader as first among equals. Of equal importance is the reason the boss can fire people that becomes, if inadvertently, clear earlier on: the boss on Quinn's account can still be a private

cn i "owner," which as discussed above confers decision-making powers to the owner that are denied to all others.

Noting those issues, we can move on to looking at Quinn's problematic application of his equally problematic a tribal model to making a living. Again, he has done a lot of work. As he tells us, a tribal venture would involve more than the typical workplace. For example, taking care of workers in a tribal sense would take us beyond normal capitalist business practices simply because there is no profit in such a venture.

Rather, capitalists pay their workers wages and have the workers take care of themselves.

That one person (e.g., a single person) may thrive on a salary while another (e.g., single

670 Quinn, Beyond Civilization, 73. 671 Ibid., 64. 211 parent of two; single person with a sick parent; single person bad at managing money) barely survives on it is not considered improper, especially if the salary is "fair" in the first place. Of course, with every company doing this, there is not much worry about losing the employee to another company, especially with the risk of not finding another job.672

As Quinn describes it, those making a living tribally would not be paid a salary, not be paid a wage. At the end of a given period of time resources can be divvied up.

The group has to be "content with a modest standard of living" as opposed to making a

"killing," and "take what they need out of the business rather than to expect set wages."674 Although the reasoning for this is not provided by Quinn (although I provide an account below), people will likely have to be content to have a more modest lifestyle

(e.g., no power, lowered material social status, luxuries), although they would have more of what people seem to want ("security, meaningful work, more leisure, and social equality").675 Everyone's job would be considered essential to the success of the venture.

Obviously, making money is necessary, but this is not the end in itself. Rather, the goal is to keep the venture going so that the group's way of life can keep going.

Quinn also tells us that members of the group are to be equals, and the leader is

cn o to do work like the rest. In addition, there cannot be too great a disparity between what

672 Ibid., 107. 673 Ibid., 141. 674 Ibid, 146. 675 Ibid, 115-116. 676 Ibid, 142. 677 Ibid, 147. 678 Ibid, 165. 212 7Q different members contribute to the venture. Moreover, the ethic of cradle to grave security680 allows for, and even expects, certain members to suffer hardships that will require the support and diffused suffering among the entire group. And, as Quinn maintains, when a person can no longer perform the task they performed up to that point, they can move on to another job within the group.681

Although inconsistent with previous statements regarding the apparent acceptability of tribal bosses as owners and having the power to fire members, Quinn seems to hint that a tribal venture will, or ought to, reflect the desire of the group's members. "[T]he tribe is its members, the tribe is what its members want it to be - nothing more and nothing less." We see immediately, however, that the impetus for this idea is not to deprive his version of a tribal boss of powers he seems to find acceptable

(all contradictions aside), but rather his concern that there be the potential and respect for diversity in practices across tribal ventures. As he says, "there's no one right way for this to be done," perhaps forgetting that there are wrong ways to do it.

Quinn is quick to distinguish a tribal venture from a commune, with the latter about people living together to pursue common moral values, people who may or may not make a living together. Tribal organization as presently conceived is about making a living together, with the individuals involved not necessarily living together. Communes

679 Ibid., 147. 680 Ibid., 150. 681 Ibid., 151. 682 Ibid, 153. 213 will only include those who share their moral values, whereas a tribal venture can extend membership to anyone who can extend the group's earnings to include themselves.683

I will not take the time here to take Quinn's model and modify it to better reflect the tribal conception of a good life I shaped above, as this discussion will take place below in the section on participatory economics. I would, however, like to highlight some ventures within capitalist economies that conform to varying degrees to a tribal model as discussed above, although they do so to varying degrees. I think it is important to partially see a tribal model as a set of what Mark Kingwell calls "regulative ideals, guiding principles for an imperfect world.. .[that can] act to edge actual circumstances towards an ideal state." I say partially because Kingwell says that with regulative ideals there is no assertion that we will ever fully achieve such a state,684 whereas I see no reason why a tribal model is not a functionally viable alternative, as I will argue below.

Two businesses that can be said to run along tribal lines, although again imperfectly so, are the wildly popular Rimsky-Korsakoffee House in Southeast Portland and the Sylvia Beach Hotel in Newport. I say imperfectly because Goody Cable is the owner of the former and the co-owner of the latter, and the discrepancies between such ownership and a tribal model have been discussed at length above.

With that said, with the issue of ownership acknowledged and put aside for now, we can discuss these two ventures and how they fit a tribal model. As Shanna Germain

683 Ibid, 157-160. 684 Kingwell, The World We Want, 50. 214 reports, the businesses are geared, rather than to earning significant profits, to just making a living, and to making an impact on "the staff, the patrons, the community and the environment." The employees, we are told, all "feel involved in, responsible for and rewarded by the success of the business." Moreover, no employee falling on hard times is ever left to go without food, shelter or the support he or she needs. This is an environment of everyone giving support and everyone getting support, with everyone

/Of being treated as respected members of an extended family. As Quinn describes from personal experience,

[t]o take a table is to enter a special world that can really only be adequately described as tribal. When things get especially busy, customers will often be pressed into service to wait tables, and I know of one local author who waits tables one night a week just for the privilege of belonging to the tribe. There are often long lines of people waiting to get in; they like being there because the people working there obviously like being there.686

Although, as Germain reports, the "Under No Management" sign that sat in the front window has been stolen, this is still the way the businesses are organized. Cable eschews hierarchy, refuses to have a "pecking order," is involved in activities such as shopping for needed supplies or disposing of the trash, and never tells, for example, the cooks how to, or even what to, cook, admitting they know more about it that she does. In their given role Cable says that "[a]nybody who feels like it can be manager and make decisions."687

685 Shanna Germain, "Iconoclast brews coffee klatch: No ordinary owner invented Rimsky-Korsakoffee, Sylvia Beach Hotel," The Portland Tribune, Apr 19, 2002, http://www.portlandtribune.com/news/story.php?story_id= 10957 (visited June 26,2007). 686 Quinn, Beyond Civilization, 167. 687 Germain, "Iconoclast brews coffee klatch." 215 The coffee house was created to allow Cable to hold parties without dirtying her house. The pastry chef says that this is still how the place is organized; not so much a business but a place for people to interact and things to happen. And the hotel was started by her and her best friend, not to make a killing, but "to make good friends." It is organized like "a community hub," without the distractions of, for example, a phone or television, but with communal dinners, with a view to facilitating "great conversation."

What is important for her is to spend each day in a way she enjoys and to feel good inside on account of it.688

We see another tribal-like model by looking at South End Press, a non-profit collectively run book publisher, established in 1977. The venture "has organized itself as an egalitarian collective with decision-making arranged to share as equally as possible the rewards and stresses of running the business. Each collective member is responsible for core editorial and administrative tasks, and all collective members earn the same base salary."689

Similarly, there is also Arbeiter Ring Publishing whose name means 'Worker's

Circle.' The venture is a non-profit workers' collective, practicing workplace democracy,690 where all members have comparably empowering responsibilities so that they "are equally able to participate in decision making."691 And the Mondragon

Bookstore and Coffee House is also run along these lines. As Michelle French notes, the

688 Ibid. 689 South End Press, "About Us," http://www.southendpress.org/about (visited February 10, 2008). 690 Arbeiter Ring Publishing, "About Arbeiter Ring," http://www.arbeiterring.com/about.html (visited February 10,2008). 691 ParEcon, "Doing ParEcon," http://www.zmag.org/parecon/doing.htm (visited February 10,2008). 216 venture tries to be a "non-hierarchical, collective workplace." 692 David Leibl observes that every worker is also a co-owner, there are no bosses, no managers, with hierarchy being eschewed. "No one at Mondragon is ever required to perform work at the behest of someone else and all decisions affecting the workplace are reached by

/rqi consensus." This collective ensures that everyone can raise concerns and is empowered through participatory planning.694 This autonomy is "based upon intellectual equality achieved through 'balanced work complexes'...which combine rote with empowering tasks." For example, the financial committee and dishwashing duty are rotated among all the employees so that a subgroup of people are not doing all the "intellectual work" and thereby gaining a disproportionate amount of empowering knowledge.695 The workplace policies focus, in part, on "equally dividing the cooking, cleaning, table-waiting, bookkeeping, book-selling and decision-making duties required to operate a bookstore and cafe." Moreover, the blueprint for the workplace structure is the product of participatory planning and a policy handbook is collectively authored and updated. The cafe's menu is based on the members' own recipes, and the bookstore orders books the members think should be carried.696 It is important to note that the Mondragon Bookstore and Coffee House is itself a part of a network of collectives operating according to such

692 Michelle French, "Mondragon at 5: ParEcon collective celebrates anniversary," The Manitoban, Sept. 12, 2001. http://www.themanitoban.com/2001-2002/0912/features_4.shtml (visited February 10, 2008). 693 David Leibl, "Cafe resistance: in downtown Winnipeg, a group of radicals is trying to create a different kind of cafe/bookstore. But as David Leibl finds out, even when there are no bosses, some things in the service industry never change," This, Vol. 36, Iss. 1, 26; Mondragon Bookstore and Coffee House, "Welcome!," http://mondragon.ca (visited February 10,2008). 694 French, "Mondragon at 5." 695 Ibid. 696 Leibl, "Cafe resistance." 217 participatory economic principles called The Old Market Autonomous Zone (or A-

Zone), founded in 1995 in Winnipeg. The A-Zone networks of coordinates collectively run enterprises, such as Natural Cycle Worker Co-op and G7 Welcoming Committee

Records, cooperating with one another "according to the principles of participatory economics as well." As above, individual workplaces of collective members employ democratic decision-making in the workplace. And for the collective as a whole, necessary labour is shared in a way "that all people engage in both creative and empowering work on the one hand, and rote and menial tasks on the other." Jobs are

"balanced for overall empowerment and desirability of work circumstances. Not only do member groups share in the responsibilities of building maintenance, but the A-Zone collective (which assumes some of the more 'managerial' tasks) is, in turn, made up of representatives from a range of A-Zone member organizations."698

Another example discussed by Joyce Rothschild are the cooperatives given initial organization support by the Self-Employed Women's Association, which started in 1972 in Gujarath, India. Nearly 700,000 women are organized into democratically-run, local, self-sustaining cooperatives, with institutionalized advice and training on how to effectively participate in local democratic meetings.699 There is also the worker-owned underground coal mining cooperative in Wales. The mine is co-managed by all the

697 Robin Hahnel, Economic Justice and Democracy: From Competition to Cooperation (New York: Routledge, 2005), 369. 698 The Old Market Autonomous Zone, "A-Zone Principles," http://a-zone.org/principles/ (visited August 10, 2008). 699 Joyce Rothschild, "Workers' Cooperatives and Social Enterprise: A Forgotten Route to Social Equity and Democracy," American Behavioral Scientist, 2009,52,1030. See also: Leslie J. Caiman, Toward empowerment: Women and movement politics in India (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1992). 218 worker-owners, and a study into the operation as compared to private and government owned and managed mines found that its

flatter structure, equal-share ownership, and newly embraced egalitarian beliefs, all brought about by the change to cooperative ownership, combined to add to the workers' loyalty to the enterprise and confidence that procedural justice norms would prevail. Workers' newborn confidence in the fairness or justice of the organization led them to stay with the firm; prevented many possible disputes from arising; and, when they did arise, helped to ensure that they could be resolved informally.700

It is also important to realize that participatory practices like these can also exist on scales larger than a single workplace. The town of Mondragon in the Basque region of Spain has an initial co-op established in 1956. Since then, not only have other worker owned and democratically managed cooperatives been established and run, but a system has grown out of this, a cooperative network linking the cooperatives into a larger, self- supporting economy. For example, a mutually supporting network of manufacturing related cooperatives (e.g., suppliers and producers) have created a cooperative and supportive network able to produce stoves, refrigerators and other appliances, is the largest tool-and-die maker in Spain, and provides dozens of other goods and services including engineering consultation and software development. Over 150,000 workers- owners are linked together in a network of roughly 150 cooperative enterprises, generating $5 billion in annual sales and having $7.5 billion under their management.

The Mondragon also has a cooperative community bank that allows it to keep earned revenues inside the community, with funds seeding new cooperatives, funding a pension

700 Rothschild, "Workers' Cooperatives," 1030. See also: Elizabeth A. Hoffmann, "Confrontations and compromise: Dispute resolution at a worker cooperative coal mine," Law and Social Inquiry, 2001,26, 150-170; and Elizabeth A. Hoffmann, "The ironic value of loyalty: Dispute resolution strategies in worker cooperatives and conventional organizations," Nonprofit Management and Leadership, 2006, 17, 163-177. and health care system, and a cooperative school system where children learn both the participatory skills and trades. These initiatives are also funded by the individual co-ops that contribute a specified part of their surplus to the costs of health, education and research for the purposes of development and innovation. And a study comparing

Mondragon co-ops with similar private-sector businesses found that the former had higher growth in sales volume, in exports, in employment creation, and surplus

nc\ 1 generated.

Another important example of participatory processes extending beyond individual workplaces is participatory budgeting. As Daniel Schugurensky notes, participatory budgeting goes back at least twenty years to 1989, when it originated in

Porto Alegre, Brazil, and it has since been refined, deepened and expanded to many other jurisdictions both in Brazil and worldwide. Participatory budgeting is a participatory decision-making process where citizens deliberate and make decisions collectively about public budget allocations for investment and improvement (e.g., pavement, sewage, storm drains, schools, health care, child care, housing).702 Participatory budgeting has several basic design features: "identification of spending priorities by community members, election of budget delegates to represent different communities, facilitation and technical assistance by public employees, local and higher-level assemblies to deliberate

701 Rothschild, "Workers' Cooperatives," 1029-1030. See also: Fred Freundlich, The Mondragon Cooperative Corporation (Washington, DC: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1998); William Foote Whyte and Kathleen King Whyte, Making Mondragon (Ithaca, NY: ILR Press, 1988); and Henk Thomas and Chris Logan, Mondragon: An economic analysis (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1982). 702 Daniel Schugurensky, "Participatory Budget: A Tool for Democratizing Democracy," talk given at the meeting Some Assembly Required: Participatory Budgeting in Canada and Abroad, Toronto Metro Hall, April 29, 2004. 220 and vote on spending priorities, and the implementation of local direct-impact community projects...combined and implemented together [in participatory processes]."703 Between 2000 and 2006, the total number of cities with participatory budgets group from 200 to approximately 1200.704

In Porto Alegre, Brazil, the participatory budgeting process covers allocation from neighbourhoods to city-wide investments. In the first stage, city specialists provide instruction in the technical and system aspects of the process. Then there is a

"Presentation of Accounts" from the previous year, where the plan for the current year as decided in the previous year's meetings is presented. Then the deliberation for the next year begins. Each of the city's 16 districts has two types of plenary assemblies: the first discusses general investment needs and the others are dedicated to specific thematic areas such as transportation, health, education and economic development. At these meetings, delegates are elected to represent their neighbourhood. Also, the mayor and staff attend to respond to citizen concerns. In the following few months, these delegates meet every one or two weeks in each district to better understand the technical criteria involved in requesting a particular investment be made in that district, and to deliberate about the district's needs as developed by its residents earlier on. Representatives from the city's departments (e.g., transportation) participate in the meetings to lend their expertise. These meetings end when a second plenary at the regional level is held, involving district

703 Josh Lerner and Estair Van Wagner, "Participatory Budgeting in Canada: Democratic Innovations in Strategic Spaces," Transnational Institute, February 2006, http://www.tni.org/archives/newpol- docs_pbcanada (visited August 18. 2008). 704 Worldwatch Institute, "State of the World 2007: Notable Trends," January 10, 2007, http://www.worldwatch.org/node/4840 (visited August 18, 2008). 221 delegates participating in a deliberative process to prioritize the districts' demands.

The representatives of all the districts and thematic meetings serve on the city's budget council, which functions to reconcile each district's demands with available resources and propose an overall city budget. The resulting budget is submitted to the mayor who may veto it and remand it back to the council (although this has never happened). The internet is used extensively in this process, facilitating individual involvement in priority setting, posting progress reports, budget updates, meetings calendar, etc.705

In addition to cities in Latin America, European towns and cities in France, Italy,

Germany, Spain and England, communities in India and Africa, there are also examples of participatory budgeting in North America. As Josh Lerner and Estair Van Wagner note, in the city of Guelph, Ontario, residents have used participatory budgeting to allocate a portion of the city's budget since 1999. The process takes about four months to reach a collective decision about the allocation of budget funds, and another year to implement the funding. Residents meet in their local neighbourhood groups to discuss and deliberate on both their local spending priorities and citywide priorities. All groups make decisions by a collectively designed consensus process. These discusses yield a project proposal for each group that is divided into "needs" and "wants." Residents elect two delegates to represent their group in a higher-level finance committee, where delegates present their needs and wants to each other and review the budget funds that are

705 David Lewit, "Porto Alegre's Budget Of, By, And For the People," YES!, May 20, 2004, http://www.yesmagazine.org/issues/what-would-democracy-look-like/562 (visited August 18,2008); Deepti Bhatnagar, Animesh Rathore, Magiii Moreno Torres and Parameeta Kanungo, Empowerment Case Studies: Participatory Budgeting in Brazil, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTEMPOWERMENT/Resources/14657_Partic-Budg-Brazil-web.pdf (visited August 18. 2008). 222 available. After the meetings, delegates return to their neighbourhood groups to re- evaluate their needs and wants based on the information from other groups and available funds. Delegates return to the finance committee to decide on budget allocations, where delegates negotiate and make compromises on the proposed activities until they agree by consensus on a budget. The implementation is monitored, in part, by neighbourhood groups through their paid community development coordinator. Each year, hundreds of community-prioritized services are funded, including peer support groups, community carnivals, summer camps, and language classes.706

In Toronto, Ontario, since 2001, the Toronto Community Housing Corporation

(TCHC) has used a participatory budgeting process to involve tenants in budgetary decision-making, deciding 13% ($9 million) of the TCHC's capital budget. There are six phases to their process. First, tenants and staff have open meetings at the single building level (e.g., those within an individual apartment building or group of houses) where they discuss local budget issues and decide on their top five priorities. This decision is made by identifying and discussing necessary projects; compiling a list; individuals choosing their top five; and selecting the five projects selected most. Delegates are also elected to represent their buildings at the regional level in a higher-level forum for buildings and communities in their region of Toronto. Delegates deliberate spending priorities, reviewing building priorities, identifying priorities that could be addressed with existing resources and those that would require additional funding. Those requiring additional funding are ranked in the manner above, and delegates are elected for the citywide

706 Lerner and Van Wagner, "Participatory Budgeting." 223 council, where they present both sets of priorities, and deliberations again occur.

Trade-offs and compromises are negotiated until a final list of projects to be funded is developed. The final budget goes to TCHC's CEO and board of directors for approval, and staff and tenants implement and monitor the approved project and budget, with information disseminated in the affected buildings. There is also an evaluation process where tenants give feedback on their experience and work with staff to make improvements for the next round. Examples of tenant-prioritized projects that were funded include new stoves, playgrounds, and roof renovations.707

A third example is the West Vancouver's Ridgeview Elementary School's participatory budgeting process, where the elementary school students decide a small amount of their school's funding. Their process takes place over one month and has three main steps. For the first two weeks, students in individual classes discuss their needs and indentify priority proposals for school projects, with teachers aiding students in doing needs assessments. Through dialogue and deliberation, each class decides on its top three proposals, and in the third week the school administration reviews student proposals for feasibility and once approved, each class chooses its top proposal. In week four, a school- wide assembly sees class representatives present their class' proposals and vote on their preferred idea. All students, including those in kindergarten, participate in the voting, with the winner being implemented in the following year. In 2005, students voted to

707 Lerner and Van Wagner, "Participatory Budgeting;" See also Toronto Community Housing, "Participatory Budgeting - Working together, making a difference," http://www.torontohousing.ca/participatory_budgeting (visited August 18, 2008). 224 allocate $2000 to create a school store, in part because this could help generate

70S additional money for other projects.

Despite these stories, existing limitations within a capitalist society need to be kept in mind. In addition to capitalist private property in strategic goods limiting the autonomy of non-owning individuals, capitalism also generates pressures that constantly work to undermine the viability of ventures organized along non-capitalist lines so as to increase individual autonomy. As French notes, such businesses can be hard to sustain and the amount of money they can bring in can result in a lean lifestyle for members. Being a non-capitalist business in a capitalist economy is a struggle. The continued existence of such businesses rests entirely on the voluntary support they receive from customers.709

Karl Marx maintained that "cooperative factories run by workers themselves are, within the old form [capitalism], the first examples of the emergence of a new form, even though they naturally reproduce.. .all the defects of the existing system, and must reproduce them."710 Although Marx did not elaborate on this, McNally points out the systematic issues here. In a capitalist market economy no one is guaranteed that what they produce will successfully be exchanged. In order to maximize chances of success,

"there is a competitive scramble to meet or exceed average levels of productivity.. .[making] competition an essential feature of the relations between the individual producing units." 71 1 The best means of succeeding, or at least surviving, this

Lerner and Van Wagner, "Participatory Budgeting." 709 French, "Mondragon at 5." 710 Karl Marx, Capital, Volume 3, trans. David Fernbach (New York: Penguin, 1991), 571. 711 David McNally, Against the Market: Political Economy, Market Socialism and the Marxist Critique (New York: Verso, 1993), 179. 225 competition is to continually increase the productivity of labour, to produce goods in less time to make them cheaper. The "key" to this drive for increased productivity is employing the newest and most efficient means of production, which requires spending large amounts of money generated by the business as profit. "It follows that successful accumulation will rest on a constant drive to maximize surplus-value - unpaid labour which takes the form of capital as means of production."713 When

economic reproduction occurs by means of exchange according to market criteria.. .[it] will inevitably produce all of its basic relations, irrespective of the precise form of ownership. For what is crucial to capitalism is not a specific form of ownership of the means of production, but rather the capital relation, that relation in which the direct producers are dominated by the means of production and the incessant drive to develop and expand them...[C]apitalism refers to that specific set of social relations in which workers are subjected to the pressures of exploitative accumulation in order that the producing unit can survive in the world of commodity exchange.714

Michael Albert comes to the same conclusion.

Consider a workplace and a market economy: even without private ownership and profit-seeking for owners, the firm must compete for market share and reduce costs and raise revenues in pursuit of surpluses to invest. If it fails in the competition for surpluses relative to other firms in its industry, it will lack funds to invest and will steadily decline in assets and eventually go out of business. Therefore survival in a market system, even in the absence of private ownership, requires pursuit of surplus. A key component of pursuing profit or surplus is reducing labor costs and extracting more work from those employed.715

Workplaces that exist in a market "must compete with other firms or go bankrupt."716

712 Ibid., 179 to 80 713 Ibid., 180 714 Ibid., 180 715 Michael Albert, Parecon: Life After Capitalism (New York: Verso, 2004), 69. 716 Ibid, 70. 226 Similarly, Hahnel argues that "as long as worker-owned companies must compete with capitalist firms in goods, labor, and financial markets they will be under relentless pressure to sacrifice the good of the public to their own bottom line...to abandon prioritizing the quality of work life and fair systems of compensation, and to succumb to

717 exploitative relations with suppliers, customers, external parties, and the environment."

As McNally points out, ventures under collective worker control in a capitalist market economy still have their revenues "governed by market prices," the fund for their wages is still "determined by the market prices for their commodities," and they are still "forced to accumulate in order to [compete]." All this being true, these wages themselves will depend on the success of strategies of 'self- exploitation', i.e. the accumulation of a surplus from their own labour which enables the workers to utilize a quality and quantity of means of production which ensure the market viability of the firm. This is why even workers cooperatives producing commodities for the market will tend inevitably to 'become their own capitalist' - they will be driven by market competition to accumulate a growing surplus from their own labour in order to invest in new means of production which gives them a fighting chance to meet the survival conditions established on the market. 718

In the face of this pressure Albert argues there are two choices:

they can opt to reduce their own wages, worsen their own work conditions, and speed up their own levels of work, which is a very alienating approach that they are not very emotionally or psychologically equipped to undertake. Or, they can hire managers to carry out these cost-cutting and output enlarging policies while insulating the managers from feeling the policies' adverse effects by giving the managers better conditions, higher wages, etc. In practice, very predictably, the latter is what occurs. Even ignoring their remunerative implications, markets therefore have a built-in pressure to organize a workforce into two groups: a large majority that obeys and a small minority that makes decisions, with the latter in joining greater income,

717 Hahnel, Economic Justice, 348-349. 718 McNally, Against the Market, 181 227 power, and protection from the adverse effects of the cost-cutting decisions they 71Q

will impose on others.

McNally similarly concludes that as long as the market exists there would simply be

"capitalist competition between workers' cooperatives.. .[or] the crystallization of a new class of capitalist managers within the enterprise itself." n

Yugoslavia as a case in point.

One can see some of these effects in the case of the Yugoslav economy of the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. Yugoslavia was that Stalinist state which most seriously tried to co-ordinate elements of workers' participation in the firm with market regulation. And the results were entirely consistent with the analysis we have presented: inherent tendencies towards unemployment (partially relieved for a time through emigration), inflation, increasing social inequality, and concentration and centralization of capital. The Yugoslav case demonstrates that market regulation imposes its own imperatives on the firm irrespective of its structure of ownership or the degree of workers' self- 721 management.

Worker self-management of their workplace, McNally argues, is not sufficient to ensure their control of their workplace. "So long as acts of concrete labour are connected only through the market, society's means of production will obey the competitive imperative to accumulation as an end in itself and will thus continue to evade the control of the direct producers."722 The logic of the market will still control their decisions pressuring them to constantly "accumulate at the expense of labour in order to raise levels of productivity." What is required is "democratic, planned control of the economy...

[Otherwise the means of production will continue to be subject to the market-driven

719 Albert, Parecon, 70. 720 McNally, Against the Market, 183 721 Ibid., 182 722 Ibid. 228 imperative to accumulate at the expense of [workers]." For workers to "insist upon the priority of non-market criteria (and thus on their right to determine the structure of social production on the basis of some attempt to ascertain social need)," they are insisting on "regulating their labour and the allocation of goods and services according to criteria other than those of prices and profits. This would be moving the economy in the direction of demarketization, however much market mechanisms might be utilized in a

10 A. context of planned regulation." This is about "uniting 'freely associated producers' in a democratic process in which they regulate and plan the expenditure of human labour and the utilization of means of production in order to satisfy freely expressed needs."725

If "[t]here can be no market regulation.. .without...the unplanned drive to accumulate for the sake of further accumulation," then a tribal venture, not to mention a tribal good life, comes into direct conflict with capitalist market society. As McNally tell us, [t]he heart of the issue here is the continued growth of the socialized consumption sector of the transitional economy, that sector governed by need not ability. To the degree to which housing, basic diet, clothing, healthcare, education, childcare, electricity, water, sanitation, transportation and access to cultural and recreational activities are guaranteed as social rights, the realm of 'bourgeois right' contracts. Within advanced capitalism, tendencies towards the socialization of services such as health and education have existed for a long time, as a result of working-class pressure and capital's need for the physical and cultural reproduction of labour-power - albeit tendencies distorted by and subordinated to capital accumulation. In an economy free from the dynamics of exploitation, and disengaging from the pressures of accumulation, this realm of

723 Ibid, 181 to 182 724 Ibid, 183 to 184 725 Ibid, 184 726 Ibid, 183 229 guaranteed social consumption could increasingly encroach on that governed by 797 exchange.

We see here a call for struggle to socialize various aspects of the current economy. One way this can be accomplished is by implementing lessons learned from the above discussion on tribalism and creating a system of democratized, participatory economics.

This will mark the beginning of the discussion of how tribal organizational and conceptual lessons can be applied to larger and more complex societies. What follows is a broad outline of one possible way to organize a large and complex society along tribal lessons, because, firstly, a detailed account would be a thesis in itself, and, secondly, within certain limiting conditions (e.g., a lack of centralized power and substantive socio- economic inequality) these possibilities and their details can vary.

That said, what I will recommend is a democratized participatory polity with a similarly democratized participatory economy. I will be presenting my own original synthesis of two separately developed but compatible ideas, each of which are themselves exceptionally compatible with a tribal ethic. Specifically, the two ideas synthesized will be Michael Albert and Robin Hahnel's "parecon," or participatory economics, and

Stephen Shalom's "parpolity," or participatory polity. These two ideas, which have to date remained separate systems of economics and politics (and unconnected to a tribal organization and ethics), can be worked into a single system that provides a conception of society that can realize the autonomy and relatedness so essential to a tribal conception of a good life and so conducive to increased SWB.

727 McNally, Against the Market, 196 230

Applying tribal lessons to a large and complex society: a participatory polity with participatory economics

One way to combine Albert and Hahnel's ideas of parecon with Shalom's ideas of parpolity is to conceive of a society with three permanent roles for individuals, one temporary and transient role, and the institutions and processes to enact them. In brief, society would have worker councils, consumer councils, political councils, and courts.

These councils would operate at several layers (e.g., neighbourhood, city ward or rural county, city, provincial / state / regional, society-wide). For each type of council (i.e., worker, consumer, political), the different council levels would be nested, the idea being that many decisions (e.g., production, consumption, regulation) affect only or overwhelmingly the members of a particular local council, and so these decisions would be made at this lowest level. At the same time, there are would decisions affecting more than the people in a local council, and these jointly affected councils would coordinate their decision-making by sending delegates to higher-level councils. And if these decisions affect more than one of these higher-level councils, delegates would be sent to even higher-level councils, and so on. In this way, decision-making in these bodies would recognize and support individual's relatedness to one another in the spheres of production, consumption and politics, and respect individual autonomy by ensuring individuals influence decision-making to the degree they are affected by the decision.

While being structurally different from tribal assemblies in many ways, nested councils with specific and limited areas of decision-making can provide the meaningful 231 engagement and responsiveness similar to that of tribal decision-making. I will take each of these councils in turn, and also discuss a judicial system, describing their organization and processes.

Worker councils

Remembering that a tribal society is without centralized decision-making and planning institutions, rather having democratic and participatory decision-making, a society implementing the lessons from tribal societies detailed above would have to engage in democratic economic decision-making. This would be done based on respect for the autonomy of economic actors, because economic institutions would be structured in a way that all economic actors are interrelated and therefore significant participants. This respect for autonomy would be institutionalized, in part, by ensuring all had guaranteed access to strategic goods. One way this could be accomplished is to do as Albert and

Hahnel recommend for a participatory economy and have each and every workplace owned by society, removing individual or sub-group ownership of strategic goods as an economic consideration, so that individual or sub-group ownership would not convey

79 R differential decision-making power. That said, it would be essential that the autonomy of each individual is respected only up to just before the point that the same autonomy would be denied others. Workers would be self-determining up to the point that it is consistent with others doing the same. One person's sphere of influence would extend up to the point just before it would impinge on another's equally defined sphere. The degree

728 Michael Albert, Idealizing Hope: Life Beyond Capitalism (Black Point, NS: Fernwood, 2006), 8-9; Albert, Parecon, 9, 90; Hahnel, Economic Justice, 53-55. 232 of a person's influence would be proportional to the degree he or she is affected by the matter at hand. Sometimes a single individual making a unilateral decision would make sense. A worker who wants to hang a picture of his wife in his cubicle would be the sole decision maker in this matter. This would not affect anyone else working with him, so full authority would belong with the worker. However, a modification of the scenario could change this. If the same worker wanted to put a radio in his cubicle, given the ease with which sound travels in a cubicle environment, everyone who would hear the radio would have a say in the decision, and those closer to the radio who would be bothered or benefited to a greater degree would have more say than others further away. In this case, the original worker would no longer have sole authority, although neither would anyone else. It is important to realize, then, that a majority would not decide everything all the time, and neither would lone individuals. Nor would consensus always be the way to go, or any other approach to discussing issues, expressing preferences, and tallying votes to make decisions. Various methods of decision making that would be applied in some cases would disrespect individual autonomy in other cases. Different decisions voting and tallying methods (e.g., three-quarters, two-thirds, consensus) would therefore be used because different approaches to decision-making would be seen as appropriate for different situations. There would be no a priori correct and method, but rather a particular norm being implemented: decision-making input would be in proportion to the degree individuals are affected by decisions. 79 Q It would be up to the particular actors affected by

729 Michael Albert, Idealizing Hope: Life Beyond Capitalism (Black Point, NS: Fernwood, 2006), 8-9; Albert, Parecon, 9, 90; Hahnel, Economic Justice, 53-55. 233 decision-making procedures to decide on which methods would be employed in which scenarios. While in this instance it would likely be one-worker-one-vote majority, because all workers would be equally affected by the initial decision on defining the procedures for decision-making, refining them would still be possible in light of lessons learned from experience. It may be that changes and additions would only be needed for sub-groups, and so they could hone their practices within larger organizations, deciding on their own as they would be the ones affected by changes to their own decision-making procedures.730

In order for workers to have a place to express and pursue their preferences, every workplace would be governed by a worker council where every worker would have the same overall decision-making entitlements and responsibilities. When necessary, smaller and lower-level councils could be organized for teams, units and other smaller divisions.

And all the worker councils in a particular industry would be organized into a larger industry worker council, with delegates from each worker council a member on the industry council.731 This process of using delegates, however, could differ from the representative democracy criticized above. As Peter Somerville argues,

[a]t some point, it becomes impracticable for all decisions to be made in one general assembly (the direct democratic ideal). The usual solution is to adopt some form of representation, whereby, for example, a cooperative sends one

730 It needs to be noted that, as Hahnel says, there is ample evidence that people with a say in how they work find work more enjoyable, are more efficient and more productive (Hahnel, Economic Justice, 189). This not only fits in with the consensus in psychological and psychiatric research presented in Chapter Four, but also with the survey of the literature evaluating the effect of participation on worker productive by David I. Levine and Laura D'Andrea Tyson ("Participation, Productivity, and the Firm's Environment," in Alan S. Binder, ed. Paying for Productivity: A Look at the Evidence (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1990). 731 Albert, Idealizing, 9-10, 92; Hahnel, Economic Justice, 189. 234 of its members to represent it on a body operating on a wider geographical scale. There are, however, at least two different kinds of representation here: one is in the traditional political sense of representing a constituency to a 'higher' decision-making authority, and the second is in a more functional sense of participation in, for example, a cross-community gathering or 'secondary' cooperative or confederation of cooperatives, which is responsible for supporting and regulating 'primary' cooperatives that operate on the basis of direct democracy. Representation is necessary to ensure, on the one hand, that the needs and concerns of cooperatives are fed into a wider process of decision making and, on the other, that the activities of cooperatives are effectively funded and regulated. Representation in this context is a technique that allows a two-way linking between participatory democratic bodies on a small scale and larger-scale institutions, in such a way as to extend the democratisation of public life.. .The problem with political representation...is that it leads to oligarchy...while functional representation serves to tame oligarchy...to maximise the citizen base of the political 732 process.

The central difference between representation in a participatory economy (and a participatory polity below) and the representative democracy in state societies criticized above would be that unlike the latter, the former would not see the represented surrender virtually all control over the representatives they elect between elections. Rather, many institutions could be put in place to ensure that the representatives will not assume virtually total power over those they represent.

Stephen Shalom suggests, for example, the delegates would only be sent if they have been part of the council sending them upwards and have effectively participated in deliberative processes with its members, and therefore understand member sentiments and concerns, and are considered capable and trustworthy to deliberate on their behalf with other delegates. Also, delegates could be rotated (although perhaps candidates will

732 Peter Somerville, "Community governance and democracy," Policy & Politics, 2005, Vol. 33, No. 1, 134-136. 235 be limited to council members with an interest and who also have the council's confidence), with no one continually serving as a particular council's delegate, and delegates could be subject to immediate recall if the sending council no longer believes they are adequately reflecting the sending council's concerns and sentiments, after perhaps randomly monitoring recorded higher-level council proceedings (e.g., all meeting of councils higher than primary level could be open, broadcast live, recorded and archived). Delegates in higher-level councils could also be limited to voting on matters that are relatively non-controversial (as decided by lower councils), and close votes (e.g., where higher-level councils cannot come to an agreement, so delegates clearly formulate positions through deliberation and then send the issue down to the lower-level council to deliberate and decide), or when enough lower councils insist on it (e.g., a petition signed by a given number of people or primary councils requesting an issue be returned to that level for a vote), decisions can be returned to lower councils for a decision. It could be decided that councils above the primary level can only make one of three decisions: (1) consensus decisions whenever possible; (2) majority vote decisions when consensus cannot work, but a decision is immediately needed; and (3) decisions to return the issue to the primary level for deliberation and voting when a higher-level council vote would be close, but a decision is not immediately needed. And Sommerville notes that there is research showing how to ensure that individuals continue to participate meaningfully at high levels. This can be achieved when: (a) democratic processes are transparent due to

733 Shalom, Stephen, "A Political System for a Good Society," June 2006, http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/3854 (visited April 15, 2009); Stephen Shalom, "Parpolity and Indirect Elections," July 15, 2009, http://www.zcommunications.org/znet/viewArticle/22017 (visited April 15, 2009). clear and direct lines of accountability from representatives to those represented; (b) representatives are provided advice, guidance and expertise by those being represented; and (c) the represented perceive themselves as having a real stake in, and effect on, the decision(s) being made.734 All of these conditions can be met, as will be discussed below.

In this way, the represented can continue to be active and the representatives can be prevented from assuming virtually total power over those they represent. Those represented will still be mobilized and politicized because they will continue to govern themselves in matters separate from those dealt with by their representatives, and because they are involved in monitoring their representatives.

So, a tribe-like organization would require that decision-making procedures and means of communication would be used in ways that give individuals the degree of say in each decision in proportion to the degree each is affected. As discussed above, participatory economy as Albert has it, would have different council decisions could use variety of procedures: majority rule, three-quarters, two-thirds, consensus, etc., where more or less individuals would be involved, and when individual votes could be differently weighted. Some decisions could use one-worker-one-vote majority rule, but in cases where this system would give equal input for all members when the decisions will impact them unequally, councils could employ different degrees of consensus required for resolution, different actors participating, and with different weights, and the like. A particular venture could have teams with different functions (e.g., production, promotion, research and innovation), and each team could make its own workday decisions, but

734 Somerville, "Community governance," 134-136. 237 always within the broader context of policies decided on by all the members of the venture. Some decisions, like funding research into a new but related area might involve only the research and innovation team, and require a two-thirds affirmative vote to go ahead, whereas hiring a new person in the same group might require consensus in the group because of the high impact a new person can have on the members of the group he or she is now constantly working with. And a decision to invest in the production and promotion of a new product might well require a three-quarter affirmative vote by all the members of the venture because of the significant impact, good or bad, a newly launched product can have. The important point here is that within a particular workplace, workers would make decisions in nested councils varying in their scope (e.g., team, whole workplace) based on the proportional affect of the matter under consideration, decisions that touch on everything from day to day workplace decisions to longer-term strategies to the workplaces norms and decision-making procedures.

To ensure that autonomy is effective, workers must have not only the procedural ability to decide, but also have all of the necessary and sufficient conditions to decide; that is, they need to be able to effectively participate in decision-making processes. In workplaces, this could mean that effective individual participation in workplace and industry decision-making would be supported by working conditions that provide people with the necessary confidence, skills and knowledge. This would require, for example, that daily decision-making positions (e.g., management) cannot be monopolized by a minority of workers in a workplace. Moreover, the knowledge needed to comprehend

735 Albert, Idealizing, 9-10, 92. 238 what is going on, what options exist, and what the likely effects of various options are, cannot be monopolized by a minority of workers in a workplace. Formal voting rights would not entail proportionate autonomy when the agenda, the options, etc., are authoritatively defined by a monopolizing minority. In such cases, workers would only be voting on the plans and options put forward by the actually-empowered workers. Albert and Hahnel argue that the work of everyone would need to be informing, enlightening and empowering, and this could be achieved by all workers having balanced job complexes. Jobs would not be divided so that some are empowering (e.g., those that involve figuring out how best to do other jobs, or satisfy consumers, or plan for the future), others stultifying, some conveying knowledge and authority, others providing no

T\fi empowerment.

Each person would have a job that involves many tasks. Initially, one would consult his or her own personal tastes and talents in choosing what role and position to occupy (e.g., doctor, professor, policy analyst). Each person will be better suited to, and more likely to enjoy, some pursuits and not others, and will naturally prefer the former.

Once publicly-provided training was completed, everyone could apply for whatever work they choose, and every worker council could add members as they choose (through the use of participatory decision-making methods as discussed above), and the need for workers would be in part based on a workplace's work agenda for the coming period

736 Albert, Idealizing, 11-13, 18; Albert, Parecon, 10, 104-111; Hahnel, Economic Justice, 190. 239 (which will be discussed below). Similarly, anyone seeking work or a move to a new workplace can apply for openings.737

However, while each job would be suited to the talents, capacities and energies of the worker, it would also contain a mix of talents and responsibilities in such a way that both the overall quality of life and degree of resulting empowerment would be comparable for all. Rather than, for example, one person doing only surgery and another person only cleaning bedpans, the people who do surgery could also help clean the hospital and other such tasks so that the sum of what they do would be a balance of different conditions and responsibilities. In a factory, the workers won't be divided into managers and those doing rote tasks, but rather all workers would do a mix of empowering, rote and boring tasks. Of course, this means that more people would be needed for surgery, as an example, but also that those who would otherwise only be, for example, cleaning the hospital get the training and experience to develop additional capacities and capabilities otherwise suppressed. While it is not necessary that everyone perform every task in his or her workplace, each worker would do a mix of tasks that both accords to his or her abilities and interests, and also contains a comparable share of rote and tedious, as well as interesting and empowering tasks. The aim would not be to deny expertise and to eliminate experts, or prevent those with expertise in a particular matter predicting, explaining and debating the consequences of complicated decisions.

However, the goal would be to recognize that, once experts have contributed to an understanding of the consequences of this or that outcome, those affected by a matter can

737 Albert, Idealizing, 11-13, 18; Albert, Parecon, 10, 108-111. 240 know whether they prefer one outcome to another and can register their desires. Also, the aim would not be an end to division of labour, but that people would have responsibility for a series of tasks they are adequately trained for and which would average out the empowerment effects of their work. When workers in a work come together (e.g., work teams, units, divisions, whole workplace) there would not be one subset of workers whose working conditions have disproportionately well-prepared them, allowing them to dominate debate and outcomes, because the preparation for participation due to involvement in workplace daily life would have been essentially equalized. The workers themselves could balance jobs internally in each workplace through a flexible rating system that differentiates tasks according to their empowerment effects. There could be job complex committees within workplaces responsible for proposing ways of combining tasks and assigning work times to balance work complexes. Workers within each workplace could engage in a collective evaluation of their own circumstances, with lengthy discussions and debates about the characteristics of different tasks. Following the first approximation of balanced job complexes, regular adjustments could occur as, for example, the introduction of new technology could alter the human impact of particular tasks and thereby alter the balance of jobs. There would, of course, be no perfect balancing, but short of perfection these balanced job complexes would aid in ensuring that everyone's work will comparably prepare them to participate effectively in self-managing production, consumption and allocation, and effectively self- managing their lives and institutions. In this way, necessary conceptual and coordinative tasks and expertise would be retained alongside the conditions necessary for effective 241 -jio decision-making participation and autonomy. It is also possible, for example, that balancing of jobs would be something achieved over a period of time. It may be that tasks would be balanced over the course of a variety of timescales, including, for example, over a day, week or month.

Obviously, the goal of enabling and supporting individual autonomy in the workplace via equalization of tasks preparing workers to participate in workplace decision-making cannot be achieved by only balancing job complexes within workplaces.

Working life would also be equally empowering across workplaces as well so that, for example, workers in some industries or subsets thereof would not be better able to manifest their preferences throughout the broader economy. Cross-workplace balancing could be achieved by having people spend some of their working time outside their primary workplace to offset (dis)advantages and average out empowerment across workplaces. Just as workers would balance jobs internally in each workplace through a flexible rating system, delegates from worker councils and industry councils could develop a flexible rating process to balance across workplaces. As noted above, job complex committees could propose ways to combine tasks and assign work times to balance job complexes, although in this case it would be economy-wide committees to arrange positions for workers to redress empowerment (dis)advantages due to their primary workplace conditions.740

738 Albert, Idealizing, 11-13, 18; Albert, Parecon, 10, 104-111, 150-151; Hahnel, Economic Justice, 190. 739 Hahnel, Economic Justice, 190. 740 Albert, Parecon, 107-109. 242 Consumer councils

Remembering that a tribal ethic ensures autonomy for each up to the point just before this would infringe on the equal autonomy of others, and that people affected by decisions should have a say in them proportionate to the degree they are affected, aspects of worker autonomy would be constrained by the autonomy afforded to consumers. As will be discussed in more detail below, workers in a particular venture would have their own worker council, and would be autonomous in that they would consider what they want to contribute to the social product, both as individuals and in association with those they work with. Workers would deliberate exactly how they would combine their efforts and resources to create outputs members of the rest of society desire and would benefit from.

Workers would deliberate on the dynamics of production and its implications for themselves and the rest of society, weighing their direct understanding of their production situation and their preferences about it against the implications of their choices for those consuming their products. That said, many workplace decisions would not only affect the workplace in those in it, but everyone who consumes what is produced. Production would utilize inputs that could have been used to produce other things that could have met other needs or desires, so consumers would have a degree of say in what occurs in production in the same way that producers would have an impact on what consumers can opt for as it will be they that do the productive work. Basically, decisions of what a workplace would produce would also be shaped by those who would be affected by what is produced. For consumers to autonomously enjoy what is produced, they would consider what they desire from what is produced society-wide, although these considerations might be made 243 as individuals or in groups such as in families, neighbourhoods, communities, regions and the like. Albert and Hahnel suggest consumer councils as the organizational structures that could accomplish this. Each individual, family or other social unit living on their own would comprise the smallest consumer decision-making unit. Each of these smallest units would also belong to a neighbourhood consumption council. Each neighbourhood council would in turn belong to a city ward or rural county consumption council. Each ward / county council would belong to a city council, each city council to a provincial / state / regional council, and each regional council would in turn belong to a national or society-wide council. Everyone in society would be in one of these neighbourhood-level councils, but some individuals would be elected to higher-level councils as well. Neighbourhood councils would elect a delegate to ward councils, ward councils would elect delegates to city councils, city councils would elect delegates to regional councils, and regional councils would elect delegates to a national council.741 As

Shalom argues for a parpolity (to be discussed below), the numbers of council members could be determined on the basis of a society-wide decision, and perhaps revised on the basis of experience. Councils would be small enough that council members can be effectively involved in face-to-face deliberations, but large enough that diversity of opinion, where it exists, would b included, and the number of nested councils including all of the society would be minimized. For example, higher-level councils of 25 members, and five layers deep, could accommodate a society of 19 million people

(assuming half the population are adults), and 5 layers of 40 member councils could

741 Albert, Idealizing, 17-18; Albert, Parecon, 90-94,164; Hahnel, Economic Justice, 191. 244 accommodate a society of 200 million people. 6 layers of 25 member councils could

749 accommodate about 500 million people.

These nested councils would organize consumption. This organization would be in recognition that different acts of consumption would affect different groups in different ways and to different degrees. The colour of my shirt affects me, the shrubbery on my lawn affects all on my block, although perhaps some more than most. The quality of playground equipment in the local park affects those in the neighbourhood. The volumes of books in a library affect those in the county, and the frequency and punctuality of busses and subways affects those in a city. Regional and transnational transportation

(e.g., trains, planes) can affect all in a province and nation respectively. Arranging for all those affected by consumption activities to participate in choosing them would facilitate self-management and autonomy. Having different consumption councils for different levels of consumption would accommodate the full range of consumption activities into the participatory decision-making process.743

Those who consume what workplaces produce (e.g., books, video games) would affect production. And those affected tangentially, by pollution for example, would influence the decision. The autonomy of workers would accommodate and be balanced with the autonomy of other affected actors so that the autonomy of the one does not preclude the proportional autonomy of the other. What consumers ask for so as to

742Shalom, "A Political System;" Stephen Shalom, "Parpolity Interview," September 20, 2004, http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/7826 (visited April 15, 2009); Stephen Shalom, "ParPolity: Political Vision for a Good Society," November 22, 2005, http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/4957 (visited April 15, 2009). 743 Albert, Idealizing,17-18; Albert, Parecon, 90-94, 164; Hahnel, Economic Justice, 191. 245 advance their lives would be balanced with the effects on the producers making the outputs. Consumers would assess their own desires and conditions, but also the likely implications of their consumption preferences. The benefits of consumption preferences would be weighed against any adverse effects that would be borne by those required to do the work. This raises the question of economic planning and allocation.

Participatory planning

To ensure autonomy, allocation would be an informed, self-managed cooperative negotiation of inputs and outputs, with all individuals having a say proportionate to the degree they are affected by the choices being made. This would require that everyone have access to accurate information, and the training, confidence, conditions and motivation allowing them to develop, communicate and express their preferences. Albert and Hahnel suggest that a participatory economy could see workers and consumers cooperatively negotiate workplace and consumer inputs and outputs. There would be a back and forth communication of mutually informed preferences, rounds of accommodation to new information, permitting people to express, mediate, and refine their preferences given the feedback concerning the preferences of others.744

Every level of worker council (e.g., workplace, industry) and every consumer council (e.g., neighbourhood, ward, city, regional, national) would participate in the planning process. There would also be boards or agencies that facilitate information

744 Albert, Idealizing, 17-18; Robin Hahnel, "Eco-localism: A Constructive Critique," Capitalism Nature Socialism, 2007, Vol. 18, No. 2, 76. exchange and process collective production and consumption proposals. The steps of the participatory planning process could include several general features. First, individuals would propose their own consumption activities by preparing a consumption plan, deciding on how much time they want to work, knowing they will accrue a surplus if they work more and/or consuming less than they earn working, or they will accrue a debit by working less and/or consuming more than they earn working (remuneration will be discussed below). Individuals, in essence, could propose to work X amount and consume Y amount. Individuals might, for example, use a computer to try out various combinations of different goods, checking the value (e.g., time required of them at work) of their proposed bundle of goods and services. The computer could contain anticipated consumption averages and other relevant information to aid individuals in their decisions, and even software with templates that would help people save time and effort and consider all the relevant factors. Developing proposals could also be aided by records of production and consumption that took place in the previous year (e.g., what was proposed, changes made, final approvals, ongoing investment commitments). With new technology, especially information and networking technology, enabling relevant information to be disclosed and shared, planning and the information required for it could be readily available.745 One way to simplify the process would be to group together

745 As Diane Elson notes ("Market Socialism or Socialization of the Market," New Left Review, November/December 1988, No. 172, 32), the problem to be dealt with is more a lack of information disclosure and sharing rather than information generation. With capitalism, information is fragmented and hard to share to due institutionalized private property, and competition creates an interest in withholding relevant information to prevent competitors from benefiting, blocking rather than enabling the communication of information. See also: Martijn Konings, "On the Political Economy of Socialism: 247 similar products of comparable quality and required resources, so that individuals would only need to express preferences for types of goods, like socks, but not specific colours or types, for soda pop, books and bicycles, but not for flavours, titles or styles of each. Since goods and service have been grouped by type and required resources, the inter-changeability of groups of goods with comparable resource requirements would allow, later, once an overall all production plan has been established, industry and worker councils for these types of products to negotiate and coordinate production of specific and diverse styles and qualities of goods for different purposes, by negotiating exactly how the interchangeable required resources would be utilized, using statistical data, demographic data, past and current trends, balanced by proposals for innovative creations, as a measure so to make judgements on size, colour, design, etc.746

With collectively consumed goods, individuals would make a request knowing that they will be charged their share of its cost, which would be divided amongst the members of the council with the jurisdiction over those population affected by the good's existence, and charged regardless of how they individually voted. If individuals also request collective goods (e.g., new play park equipment), these would be passed up to the neighbourhood councils so collective proposals can be debated and formulated. If the proposals would affect higher-levels (e.g., city, region) they would in turn be passed up to the appropriate higher-level councils to be debated and decided on. Disagreements arising over the appropriate level at which a decision would be made could be settled by council

Against the Regulation of Social Relations by Markets," Research in Political Economy, 2001, Vol.19, 127. 746 Albert, Parecon, 128-136, 258-259; Hahnel, "Eco-localism," 76-77; Hahnel, Economic Justice, 193- 194, 219; Albert, Idealizing, 17-18. 248 courts, which will be discussed in the section on political councils below. That said, collective good requests would move from their origin (e.g., an individual or lower-level council) and progress upwards to the successively higher-level councils as they are voted up or down by the council's delegates. At the end of the process, a first proposal of individual and approved collective goods and services would be created. Importantly, all of these consumption decision-making processes would be incorporated into one's

747 balanced job complex to ensure leisure time is not eroded.

After individuals and consumption councils at various levels submit their proposals, workers in the workplace councils would take them, and along with data from last year's production (e.g., proposals, changes, approvals) and extrapolations (e.g., from demographic data, last year's negotiations), consider the information, and individually propose what could be produced, the needed inputs, how long they would like to work, and discuss ideas to improve working life. These individual proposals would be discussed and combined into a limited number of production proposals that are voted on, with the winning proposal being their first workplace production plan. Worker councils would then pass their proposal up to industry-wide councils and regional councils that aggregate proposals and keep track of excess supply and demand for enumerated inputs workplaces want and the outputs they will make available. Again, all of these production decision-

747 Albert, Parecon, 128-136, 258-259; Hahnel, "Eco-localism," 76-77; Hahnel, Economic Justice, 193- 194,219; Albert, Idealizing, 17-18. 249 making processes would be incorporated into one's balanced job complex to ensure

74. R leisure time is not eroded.

With the first consumer and worker proposals in, the total demand and total supply for every class of final good and service, for every intermediate good, and for every primary input would be collected and compared. Every individual and council would receive this new information from the facilitation boards indicating which goods and services are in excess supply or demand and by how much, how the council's proposal compares to other similar decision-making units and social averages (e.g., work time, consumption levels). Consumer individuals and councils would modify their requests in light of these indicators and comparable social averages in order to win approval for their requests. Consumers need to compare and adapt their proposals in light of the concerns of other consumers and producers. The idea is that if consumers' initial individual consumption proposals are in line with comparable work proposals (e.g., how much time the individual will spend working), and can be accommodated as is given worker production plans, then their consumption proposals would approved and integrated into the overall consumption plan as is. However, if consumers request above average consumption for comparable work proposals, or if their consumption choices conflict with what workers propose to produce, they would have to reduce or substitute their requests in order to achieve the approval of other consumers in their neighbourhood council who regard their initial requests as disproportionately greedy, and workers who

748 Albert, Parecon, 128, 136,258-259; Hahnel, "Eco-localism," 76-77; Hahnel, Economic Justice, 193- 194,219. do not initially wish to produce what they desire. Similarly, if a higher-level council

(e.g., neighbourhood, ward, city) requests above average collective consumption levels, it would reduce or substitute its collective request in order to achieve the approval of other councils at the same level who regard their initial requests as disproportionately greedy.

Or, if a consumption council (e.g., neighbourhood) requests a good that affects others

(e.g., a community recreation centre), the delegates at the higher-level council (e.g., community level) to which these lower-level councils belong would have to approve the proposal to move forward. Also, personal or collective consumption choices could affect others beyond the fact that some would have to produce it and that the needed inputs would not be available for other products, that is, because some consumption can have harsh negative external consequences (e.g., cigarettes causing cancer through second- hand smoke). It is entirely possible that consumer councils would collectively assess individual consumption orders (which could be submitted anonymously) for such externally harmful requests, indicate displeasure at specific requests with such negative effects, and seek remedies (e.g., restrictions like no smoking zones, fees to cover induced expenses to deal with negative effects like ventilation, banning of the product).749 The method for seeking these remedies would be through political councils, which will be discussed in more detail below.

Worker councils would also modify their proposed work and production commitments in the face of pressure from industry councils or consumer requests, for

749 Albert, Parecon, 133, 136-7, 154, 166-167, 222-223; Hahnel, "Eco-localism," 76; Hahnel, Economic Justice, 193-194. 251 example, to increase their outputs relative to requested inputs, or alter the proposed outputs for others. As with consumers, to win approval of other workers, worker councils with proposals to, for example, use a greater-than-average amount of inputs to produce a lesser amount of products, or proposing to work less hours than the industry average, must increase either their efforts or their efficiency to win approval for their proposal.

Similarly, to win approval from consumers, producers would have to alter their proposals in directions that approach a convergence with consumer proposals. These new proposals from consumers and produces would again be summed up and the new information made available for a third iteration, and so on, where this coordinated planning and negotiation process would move consumer and produce proposals towards a feasible plan being reached.750

Flexible rules could be used to facilitate a convergence on a feasible plan being reached within a reasonable time without unduly biasing outcomes or subverting equality.

For example, simple formulas carried out by a computer program could take shortcuts towards equilibrium between iterations, or negotiation rules might be designed to prevent time consuming cycles of discussion. For example, up until the third iteration, no rules or limits would be placed on consumer and worker responses. There could, however, be a change at this point, with limits (or requirements) being placed on the direction and amount of change allowed (or needed) by consumers and producers. For example, consumers could be required to reduce their demand for certain goods to a maximum

750 Albert, Parecon, 133, 136-7, 154, 166-167, 222-223; Hahnel, "Eco-localism," 76; Hahnel, Economic Justice, 193-194. 252 percentage above projected averages for the economy. Or producers might be limited in the degree to which they could lower output proposals in this and subsequent rounds.

Another option is that the iteration process might end with facilitation boards extrapolating from previous iterations to provide, for example, five plans, each entailing slightly different total product, work expended, average consumption, and average investment. If this were to occur, everyone affected would vote for one of these five plans. This could be the end, or once one of these could be chosen as a base operating plan, with an accompanying set number of rounds of negotiations where individuals and councils could adjust details in conformity with the base plan. As above, there would be

751 no one right way to carry out participatory planning.

In order to minimize the amount of meetings, there would be no need to have meetings between different worker and consumer councils, with deliberation only occurring inside each council regarding its own proposal and how to revise it during each iteration of the planning process, because decisions about what they do themselves are the decisions that most affect their members. That said, there could be requests for meetings face-to-face meetings with representatives from other councils when, for example, explanations for extraordinary consumption proposals are needed to assess their legitimacy, or appeals are made for decisions rendered by higher-level councils on the requests of lower-level councils. Again, all of these consumption and production

751 Albert, Parecon, 128-138, 150-151; Albert, Idealizing, 17-18; Hahnel, "Eco-localism," 76. 253 decision-making processes would be part of one's balanced job complex to ensure

leisure time is not eroded.752

There would also likely be mechanisms that allow consumers, who begin the year

with a working plan for consumption, to change their minds, for example, adding or

deleting or substituting items they have proposed to consume. First, neighbourhood

consumer councils, which in turn are nested in higher-level councils, could make

adjustments so that consumer modifications cancel each other out when taken together with changed requests from others at the various consumption levels. As long as the

consumer adjustments cancel each other out at some level, production plans need not

change. It is also possible that proposed consumer changes could be processed and

communicated to the relevant industry and workplace councils affected, with consumer

councils, industry councils and individual workplaces negotiating adjustments in

consumption and production. A possible way this could be done is for each consumer to have a swipe-able card recording what they consume during the year, comparing their rate of consumption item by item against the amount asked for. If/when their consumption rate deviates by a certain percentage (e.g., 20%) from the rate they implied in their proposal they would be prompted and asked if they needed a request change. At the same time, this information could be sent directly to the relevant industry and worker councils to make the possible corrections within the limits of their proposals and the inter-changeability of groups of goods with comparable resource requirements. At the

752 Albert, Parecon, 128, 136, 258-259; Hahnel, "Eco-localism," 76-77; Hahnel, Economic Justice, 193- 194,219. 753 Albert, Parecon, 133. 254 end of the year, excesses or deficiencies in consumption can be reflected in debits or credits to individual accounts.754

A tribe-like economy would have institutions of production, consumption and allocation that enhance equity in peoples' share of the distributed outputs of an economy.

Albert and Hahnel argue that a participatory economy could, rather than, for example, see people remunerated because they have access to more productive tools, or because they have greater inborn talents, remunerate based on the meritorious action of those being remunerated, that is, based on the effort and sacrifice people put into producing that which is desired by society. The longer one works, the harder one works, the worse the conditions one works in, or the more boring one's job is, the more of a reward he or she would receive. A person working a balanced job complex - working at an average intensity for, as an example, thirty hours - could provide the base income. With everyone having a balanced job complex, everyone would earn either the base income, some higher amount due to having worked longer or more intensely, or some lower amount due to having worked fewer hours or at a below average intensity. It would be easy to determine the first variable, the duration of work for individuals.755 The second variable, the intensity, effort or sacrifice made during work, is more difficult. One example of how this could be done is that every worker council would provide every worker with an effort rating. An effort rating committee in each worker council, perhaps made up of workers on rotation, could collect information and testimony about individuals' work, ensuring a

754 Hahnel, Economic Justice, 243. 755 Albert, Idealizing, 5-8; Albert, Parecon, 10-11, 30-38, 115-117; Michael Albert and Robin Hahnel, "Participatory Planning," Science and Society, Spring 1992, Vol. 56, No. 1, 54-55; Hahnel, Economic Justice, 190. 255 grievance procedure existed.756 Since there could be only so much variation in time and intensity worked, there would not be extreme income differentials. And this would enable people to still work and consume more or less according to their needs and choices. Workers could have personal accounts credited their base income, plus or minus extra hours worked or not worked, with credits being used to buy goods and services, and

ncn the credits automatically deducted.

An important caveat to this is that a tribe-like society that guarantees individuals what they need to fulfill themselves to the extent that this does not impair the same being afforded to others, would likely have it that those who ca not work (e.g., for reasons of physical or mental disability) would still see their needs met in accordance, for example, with social averages. Albert and Hahnel suggest a participatory economy where particular consumption activities such as health care or public parks would be free to all. They would, obviously, have a social cost with everyone paying for goods and services equally, regardless of their direct participation in consumption, and in the reduction of other output being available because productive potential would be lessened by the production of these goods and services. The exact list of items on this free list would have to be debated, but health care is an example. Moreover, individuals may make particular requests for need-based consumption that will be addressed case-by-case by others in the economy. There might be, for example, individuals or groups thereof may submit a consumption request above the level warranted by effort ratings that will be

756 Hahnel, Economic Justice, 190. 757 Albert, Idealizing, 5-8; Albert, Parecon, 10-11, 30-38, 115-117; Albert and Hahnel, "Participatory Planning," 54-55; Hahnel, Economic Justice, 190. 256 accompanied by an explanation of what they regard as the justifiable special need.

Requests would be considered by the relevant consumer councils and approved or rejected, with approved costs being spread over the population of the approving

IfO council.

While participatory economics can produce goods and services and allocate them through institutions and processes that respect the autonomy and relatedness of individuals so central to both a tribal conception of a good life and human SWB, many deep and meaningful controversies will remain (e.g., animal rights, education policy and programming). This means that in addition to a participatory economy, participatory political institutions and procedures are needed as well.

Political councils

How could political issues broader than the economic issues of production, consumption and allocation be dealt with? Like with economic matters, all members of the society would have the opportunity for meaningful and constructive participation in the formation of social policy.

In addition to participating on worker councils and consumer councils, individuals would also participate on political councils. Like worker and consumer councils, political councils would, as Shalom suggests, be nested. As above, there would be neighbourhood, city ward or rural county, city, provincial / state / regional, and society-wide councils.

Everyone in society would be in one of these neighbourhood-level councils, but some

758 Albert, Idealizing, 5-8; Albert, Parecon, 10-11, 30-38, 115-117; Albert and Hahnel, "Participatory Planning," 54-55; Hahnel, Economic Justice, 190. 257 individuals would be elected to higher-level councils as well. Neighbourhood councils would elect delegates (whose work as a delegate would be part of their above mentioned balanced job complex) to ward councils, ward councils would elect delegates to city councils, city councils would elect delegates to regional councils, and regional councils would elect delegates to a national council. As above, the numbers of council members could be determined on the basis of a society-wide decision, and perhaps revised on the basis of experience, but would be small enough for effective face-to-face deliberations and large enough to include diversity of opinion where it exists.759

As with a participatory economy, the logic behind nested councils would partially be that many decisions affect only or overwhelmingly the members of a particular neighbourhood council, and so these decisions would be made at this lowest level. At the same time, there would be many decisions affecting more than the people in a neighbourhood council, and these jointly affected councils (e.g., for other neighbourhoods, wards, cities) could coordinate their decision-making through their delegates on higher-level councils. As above, delegates can be chosen because of past effective participation, a demonstrated understanding of member sentiments and concerns, and confidence in their capability and trustworthiness. If higher-level councils are to be deliberative bodies, then there is no need to mandate delegates to vote in particular ways. Rather, delegates would do their best to reflect the views of their sending members, but with the flexibility to, for example, come up with novel solutions not thought of at lower-levels. Rotation of delegates, recourse to immediate delegate recall,

759 Shalom, "A Political System;" Shalom, "Parpolity Interview;" Shalom, "ParPolity." and monitoring of higher-level council proceedings could still occur. Again, limits can be placed on the scope of higher-level council voting, with controversial or close votes going to lower-level councils, or when a petition requests it. And higher-level councils can still be restricted to three types of decisions: consensus decisions whenever possible; majority vote decisions when consensus cannot work, but a decision is immediately needed; and decisions to return to the primary level for deliberation and votes by everyone when a higher-level council vote would be close, but a decision is not immediately needed.

As Shalom points out, sometimes higher-level councils would vote and make decisions, and sometimes they would deliberate and report back to lower-level councils that would vote and decide.760 In some cases it will be clear which level of council would decide an issue; however, sometimes there will be disagreements over which is the appropriate jurisdiction. It could be that, to encourage diversity, whenever possible the lowest level will make the decision. However, if coordination is needed (e.g., national defence), a higher-level council could be the best place for decision-making to occur.

Council courts could make such decisions in cases of disagreement, determining the appropriate decision making level for an issue. Moreover, these council courts could also be used to settle disputes over which is the appropriate council level when, for example, disputes over collective consumption or negative externalities of consumption occur.

While courts will be discussed in more detail below, here it can be mentioned that council courts could make a determination on whether, for example, a city- or region-level

760 Shalom, "A Political System." 259 council should decide an issue. There could be many possible rulings: the city-level should decide; the region-level should decide; the city-level would decide but only after deliberative meeting with region-level delegates, or vice versa; the decision would be made by the city-level but only with two-thirds vote, or vice versa; or the decision would be with neither, but rather with individuals or neighbourhood-level councils. The idea would be that the court council ruling would attempt to make decision-making power

761 proportionate to the degree to which individuals and councils would be affected.

As above with participatory economics, the precise means and methods of voting within political councils could vary from case to case, from council to council, but a possible option would be to consensus when possible, majority rule when not. In such cases, however, protecting minorities from majorities could be a concern. If a neighbourhood council enacts a measure undesirable to this or that individual, there would always be the option of the individual moving and joining another more compatible council. However, at the end of the day, the society's commitment to individual autonomy and the necessary limitation on other individual and groups therefore, could lead to a mechanism like a constitution spelling out limitations on the power of the majority. However, since the most effective constitution would not likely to be specific enough to define and provide resolution for every possible circumstance and conflict that could arise, violations could often require case-by-case resolutions by Iff) council courts (see below).

761 Shalom, "A Political System;"Shalom, "Parpolity Interview;" Shalom, "ParPolity." 762 Shalom, "A Political System;"Shalom, "Parpolity Interview;" Shalom, "ParPolity." 260 It should also be noted that society could also impose another check on majority power through the right of secession that would be recognized constitutionally.

As Shalom argues, despite seeing secession as, in some cases, the best among a set of bad options, certain conditions could be applied, such as the minority not being permitted to take a disproportionate share of common resources, but rather resources would be equitably shared, or the minority would not be permitted to oppress some minority with its proposed borders, but rather assuring some set of defined basic rights. It could also be possible that a neighbourhood or ward or city, for example, is allowed to secede from one larger unit and join another, serving as a both a check on majority power and allowing people to live under local laws of their choosing. Whether this secession occurred could be decided by a higher-level council that heard from all involved, both those seeking secession, those being left behind, and those being joined.763

It is important to distinguish the types of decisions made by political councils from those made in worker and consumer councils, and this distinction could come down to the regulatory role of political councils. This regulatory role could be distinguished from what other societies could consider executive functions, because some of the latter could be handled by the structures of participatory economics. Delivering the mail, for example, could be handed by a worker council not particularly different from a worker council involved in, for example, book publishing. Those delivering mail would be like other service workers, receiving consumers' requests for mail delivery, putting forward production proposals, using an iterative negotiation process to reach a feasible plan, and

763 Shalom, "ParPolity." 261 the plan would be carried out like any other, with those delivering mail having balanced job complexes. Regulation functions as Shalom discusses them, like health conditions in food production facilities, could be handled differently, with a separate inspection firm outside of food production workplaces being established with the responsibility for monitoring food facilities. The major difference here could be that the appropriate level of political council could give the inspection firm authority to conduct investigations to ensure compliance with health standards that have been codified in political council-passed standards. These standards could very well be beyond the ability of council members to develop, due to a lack of expertise, and could perhaps be developed by political council staff (who have balanced job complexes) so as to be consistent with other council regulations and expert opinion, but they could be still voted on by political council members. Violations would be met with political council- approved disciplinary measures, such as reduced worker compensation on the view that violations represent cutting corners that reflect less than average effort, or if the violation was done with malicious intent it could be turned over to council courts.764

Council courts

Shalom proposes that council courts could: (1) review political council decisions to ensure they are commensurate with the constitution; (2) determine if individual have violated previous political council decisions; and (3) adjudicate disputes between individuals. Each political council could have a corresponding court that would

764 Shalom, "ParPolity;" Albert, Idealizing, 27. 262 adjudicate disputes arising from the parallel political council's decision. Also, higher- level courts could be used as appeal courts when needed to adjudicate disputes arising from a lower-level court's decision. Council courts could each have a jury that would be a small group chosen at random from the population to adjudicate over the court. The number of jury members for each court would be large enough that by the laws of probability it would be broadly representative of the overall population, but small enough that effective deliberation can take place. These juries would be a deliberative body, and perhaps even have terms longer than a single case, such as staggered two year terms. As a cross-section of the population, operating on consensus or majority rule, these will be democratic bodies acting as checks on political councils. Jury members' duties would be part of their balanced job complexes. There could also be judges, also with balanced job complexes, who would be experts in previous political council decisions and democratically-established court procedures, who run the trials, presiding over the process of jury selection, ruling on claims of procedural irregularities, etc., without deciding whether or not the evidence is sufficient to convict someone, which would be a matter for the jury. Judges could be chosen by the political councils on the basis of merit, with open and reviewable selection processes, with short terms and the ability to recall if overwhelming opinion warranted it. Council courts could also review consumer and worker council decisions when disputes arise within or between councils.

765 Shalom, "A Political System;" Albert, "Parecon and Polity;" Shalom, "Parpolity and Indirect Elections;" Shalom, "Parpolity Interview;" Shalom, "ParPolity." Lawyers, having their own workers councils and balanced job complexes, would work on behalf of clients, with well-trained lawyers and prosecutors available to all disputants. There would also be a police force, with the latter having balanced job complexes like everyone else. A police force would be needed to the extent that there are actions such as theft, violence, and the like, which require investigation and capture of perpetrators, with investigation and capture involving special skills. Policing, especially effective policing, like piloting or surgery, involves special skills and knowledge. Not only would there a need for this training, but institutionalized policing would allow for special rules and supervision to avoid misuse of police prerogatives. That said, there could be independent complaint review boards that allow citizens who feel mistreated or that their rights have been violated by police to register a complaint. The board could have its own investigatory division, issue reports and recommend remedies, with individuals still able to pursue that matter in council courts if not satisfied with the outcome. Moreover, like other jobs in the participatory economy, it could be that police, along with doctors and teachers for example, have special job requirements, and therefore need to be certified or licensed, stringently screened in to their positions, and the like.766

Parecon andparpolity supporting each other

Finally, it should be noted that a participatory economy and participatory polity will support one another. With entitlements and responsibilities equitably distributed, including the redress of violations of social agreements, and with solidarity, as opposed

765 Shalom, "A Political System;" Albert, "Parecon and Polity;" Shalom, "Parpolity and Indirect Elections;" Shalom, "Parpolity Interview;" Shalom, "ParPolity." 264 to anti-sociality being produced, along with the respect for diversity, participatory politics will reinforce participatory economics, and vice versa. A participatory polity with participatory economics will recognize and respect the relatedness of individuals in the areas of production, consumption and politics, and use this understanding to ensure that everyone's autonomy is ensured through individuals' influence decision-making to the degree they are affected by the decision.

Moving from here to there

Up to this point, the nature and value of tribal organization and ethics have been recounted, and ways to implement lessons learned in a large and complex society have been suggested in the form of a participatory polity with participatory economics. Next, in the Conclusion, I will discuss how those living in a capitalist state society can make the transition to a post-state, post-capitalist society where the tribal practices of participatory economics and politics can be enacted. 265 Conclusion: Transitioning Through Small Changes and Sticking to the Upside

As mentioned above, the main challenges associated with implementing lessons learned from tribal society will be those associated with moving beyond state society and capitalism, towards a social organizational form that has participatory economic and political institutions, so as to increase SWB through enhanced individual autonomy and relatedness. As mentioned in the introduction, it is impossible to say that tribal knowledge and practices, if modified, cannot work in larger and more complex societies.

That tribal societies themselves existed and functioned until colonialism and the violence of state societies disrupted them, that their knowledge and practices have not yet been modified, adapted and utilized by larger and more complex society, could be simply the result of external violence wrought upon them, as opposed to an element inherent in their structure. Moreover, given that elements of tribal knowledge currently exist in complex societies (e.g., Canada), although in partial and piecemeal forms as discussed above and below, any verdict should be reserved until empirical evidence can validate a position one way or the other.

So, beyond acknowledging the challenges to an application of tribal lessons inherent in state society and capitalism, I feel it necessary to at least begin a discussion about how those living in a capitalist state society can make the transition to a post-state, post-capitalist society where the tribal practices of participatory economics and politics can be enacted. I say I will begin the discussion because there is no way I can predict how the transition will occur, or the necessary and sufficient conditions to make it occur because much of what will be done will be in reaction to what those opposing change will do and what future conditions make relevant and possible.

Generations of change

I once had a professor tell me that the most likely way a capitalist state society will be transformed into a post-state and post-capitalist society will be through small changes wrought by the intended and unintended consequences of individual and group action. To the extent that these small changes result in improvements and betterments that people desire and want to retain (e.g., expansion of opportunities for participation in political decision-making), and to the extent that these changes have (often unintended) consequences that work to limit peoples' ability to return to previous ways of life (e.g., agriculture producing surpluses that increased population to the point where a return to pre-agrarian ways of life would result in starvation due to the inability of pre-agrarian methods to produce enough food for the expanded population), these small changes are

'sticky on the upside,' in that they tend to all but lock in the altered states they create.

With this in mind, the professor told me that the process of transition would likely be the result of small changes over the course of many generations that worked to transform society away from a capitalist state society. That professor is not alone in his opinion.

Robin Hahnel argues that rather than a final conflict between capitalism and a challenging paradigm that ushers in a new era, capitalism will likely be replaced by a challenge that is generations-long, with a new society being built within the shell of the 267 old one.767 People "will have to create imperfect pockets of equitable cooperation in the midst of...capitalism, and learn how to improve them, expand them, and connect them to one another."768 As discussed above, alone, the incremental increase of worker- ownership in capitalism will not succeed in replacing capitalism with participatory economics. While worker-owned firms can be an important part of a transition strategy, until they, for example, democratically and equitably coordinate their activities with other producer and consumer cooperatives, planning production with consumers, "they are only

769 • partial and imperfect experiments in equitable cooperation." This is just one way in which a transition process will be long and drawn out, likely over generations, but before

I go too far into ideas about how this could be done, I will quickly discuss how some of the above mentioned currently existing achievements were accomplished.

Successful, if partial, implementation strategies

Guelph's participatory budgeting process started "through a combination of grassroots neighbourhood activism, funding from external donors, and municipal facilitation." The early 1990s saw neighbourhood groups from lower-income areas in Guelph organize for social change. One particular group successfully applied for funding from the province's

Better Beginnings Better Futures program, and used the funding to organize recreation, family support, and other community-building programs. These successes led Family and

Children's Services of Guelph to fund other neighbourhood groups, using money from the

767 Hahnel, "Eco-localism," 67 768 Hahnel, Economic Justice, 254. 769 Ibid., 349-350. 268 United Way. After a few years, some groups wanted to get involved with the City and more groups wanted to get involved as well. City staff was invited to observe their work, and liking what they saw, decided to work with the groups through a formal umbrella organization to collectively allocate community funding. At first, funding was divided equally between neighbourhoods, but with some over- and under-resourced, a city staff member familiar with the participatory budgeting process in Porto Alegre suggested that it would be more equitable if groups deliberated their needs and priorities together. A participatory budgeting process was formalized in a written agreement, and neighbourhood groups agitated until the city made the money for their allocation an official line in the city's budget. Similarly, the Toronto Housing Corporation's tenant participatory budgeting system began in response to tenant demands for increased participation in budget decisions. Tenants and staff worked together to develop the process based on the Porto Alegre participatory budgeting model and revised the model through experimentation in two pilot projects. The participatory budgeting process at

Ridgeview Elementary School began with a teacher who had experienced participatory budgeting in Brazil and studied it in Canada and approached staff and parents with a proposal for student participatory budgeting. The Parent Advisory Council agreed to set aside 10% or $2000 of its budget for this process.770

Josh Lerner and Estair Van Wagner are right to observe that these examples of

"participatory budgeting emerged when staff were passionate and prepared, politicians were looking the other way, community members were demanding, and budget funds

770 Lerner and Van Wagner, "Participatory Budgeting." 269 were scarce." That said, an important enabling condition was leadership from within the government or institution (e.g., Ridgeview, TCHC). Not to say politicians or high- level decision makers were leaders, but rather mid-level staff (e.g., managers at the City of Guelph, staff at the TCHC, a teacher at Ridgeview). In each case, a few enthusiastic and committed individuals were the catalyst for making participatory budgeting happen.

"These staff leaders were likely able to develop new budgeting processes because they were out of the political spotlight and able to work relatively autonomously."771 It is also interesting to note the role experience with participatory budgeting played in beginning and developing these initiatives, where

the Canadian initiatives have depended on staff experience in community participation. Each process was able to emerge because core staff members already had some experience facilitating democratic participation. They had therefore already acquired mentalities, attitudes, and capacities necessary to guide the participatory budgeting process. Several of the program leaders were aware of participatory budgeting in advance. Their skills and knowledge were especially important for the early phases of each initiative, to guide those with less experience. Later, staff and participants were trained and reoriented as necessary. None of the initiatives would have likely been feasible, however, without experienced staff that were already oriented 779

towards democratic participation.

Also, these participatory budgeting initiatives, while not driven by politicians, did depend on their acceptance or inattention. "In Guelph, politicians only began to take notice of the

Coalition after it had existed for several years. The CEO of the TCHC has been supportive of the Tenant Participation System, but Toronto politicians have paid it little attention. At Ridgeview, the principal accepted participatory budgeting but was not

771 Ibid. 772 Ibid. 270 actively involved in the process." So, staff members were able to experiment with participatory budgeting when they avoided politician attention or interest.

It is essential to recognize the important role played by "grassroots community pressure and support" in the Guelph and TCHC cases. It was neighbourhood groups that initiated the Guelph coalition and the city only got involved after they had begun working together and pooling their funds. Also, it is the neighbourhood groups that have ensured the participatory budgeting processes survival and growth by continuously seeking out new funding and devoting money for new groups. Similarly, at the TCHC, "tenant demands for greater involvement in decision-making motivated staff to develop a new budget process. Since the Tenant Participation System started, tenants have continued to pressure the TCHC for more autonomy and local control of budget funds."774 These successes provide a starting point for thinking about how the movement toward a post- state and post-capitalist society can be continued and expanded.

Multiple strategic paths

As both Peter Somerville and Alain Touraine argue, those seeking counter-hegemonic change need to struggle both horizontally and vertically to include more and more people in their own local areas and at progressively higher and broader levels of society (e.g., ward, city, province, region, nation). A double-pronged attack is needed. On the one hand, there needs to be a "social movement" directly contesting established power by

771 Ibid. 772 Ibid. 271 engaging "strategically and democratically with dominant corporate and state power.. .[operating within established institutions, in order to transform them." On the other hand, in order to not be co-opted into these institutions, there must also be an autonomous "political movement" that brings together a diversity of actors from different social contexts into public arenas so that established power can be challenged at

775 strategically key sites and moments.

One starting point for building this counter-hegemonic movement can be increasing the scope and depth of participatory democratic decision-making. For example, at the local level, political institutions can be opened to increased citizen participation, which in turn requires implementing techniques for them to self-manage, such as formal and informal mechanisms facilitating the linking, networking and communication between local organizations. Examples include interactive websites, participatory budgeting, and participatory appraisal / evaluation. It is essential that these institutions be dedicated to, and implement, the principles, institutions and processes of participatory decision-making discussed above. First, this not only builds individual and group capacity to participate effectively in decision-making, but it also increases the individuals, groups, social capital and scale of institutions dedicated to and engaged in a participatory movement and existing participatory structures. These organizations work to anchor and secure counter- hegemonic movements, providing, for example, resources for activity, capacity building, means to leverage the strengths of multiple actors, and with these and many more

775 Somerville, "Community governance," 132-134; Alain Touraine, "The importance of social movements," Social Movement Studies, 2002, Vol. 1, No. 1, 89-95. 272 benefits, the means to resist co-optation. In this sense, they are anchors because they can act "as bedrocks for the growth of a distinctive counter-hegemonic movement."776

Politico-economic gains can make these and other gains both easier to sustain and easier to introduce in the future. Political struggle to win reforms, such gains in work places

(e.g., better conditions and pay), in neighbourhoods (e.g., pollution controls and public services), and in the wider economy (e.g., redirection of national budgets and expansion of democratic control over them), can see people, in trying to improve their lives in the present, facilitate a process that replaces the defining features of states and capitalism fully in the future. The goal will be to win changes in decision-making practices (e.g., increased local, community-directed control of budgeting, executive policies and programming, instant run-off voting procedures, vast extensions of public media and debate), and people wanting different economics and politics can incorporate the necessary institutions and processes whenever and wherever possible.777

These participatory institutions are essential because, as Takis Fotopoulos argues, it is not only institutions and processes (e.g., the state, capitalism) that need replacing, because history "has clearly shown that if the revolution is organised, and then its program carried out, through a minority, it is bound to end up with new hierarchical structures rather than with a society where concentration of power has been abolished."

In a situation where only a minority of a population has already "broken with the

776 Somerville, "Community governance," 132-134. See also Jane Wills, Union futures: Building networked trade unionism in the UK (London: Fabian Society, 2002); Brendan Martin, In the public service (London: Zed Books, 2002); Naomi Klein, "Out of the ordinary," The Guardian Weekend, January 25, 2003, 14-24; and Dan Corry, Warren Hatter, Ian Parker, Anna Randle, and Gerry Stoker, Joining-up local democracy: Governance systems for new localism (London: New Local Government Network, 2004). 777 Albert, Realizing, 138-139. 273 dominant social paradigm," with the majority unattached to and/or inexperienced with participatory ideas, institutions and processes, it is essential that "citizens to experience for themselves an inclusive democracy in practice and this can only be achieved if they take active part in the establishment and in the running of alternative political, economic and social institutions."778 Somerville agrees, noting,

[t]here is an expanding literature concerned with how such a movement can practically be developed. This literature highlights the need for such things as: quick wins; building grass-roots political parties; the maintenance of high standards of participatory democracy within the movement; thorough understanding of the operations and effects of oligarchical regimes; the development of the movement's capacity for strategic action; and widespread 77Q

mainstreaming of participatory democratic action.

As Fotopoulos argues, the strategy should comprise the involvement of increasing numbers of people in a new kind of politics and a new kind of economics, shifting power away from state and market institutions and processes. The goals of this would be "to create changes in the institutional framework and value systems that, after a period of tension between the new institutions and the state, would, at some stage, replace the market economy, statist democracy, as well as the social paradigm 'justifying' them," with participatory politics and economics. Popular bases of political and economic power would be created from below through "the establishment of local public realms of direct and economic democracy which, at some stage, would confederate in order to create the conditions for the establishment of a new society." The idea for now is, in part, to create

778 Takis Fotopoulos, "Inclusive Democracy as a way out of the present multi-dimensional crisis," The International Journal of Inclusive Democracy, June 2006, Vol. 2, No. 3, http://www.inclusivedemocracy.org/jouraal/vol2/vol2_no3_Takis_ID_Crisis_PRINTABLE.htm (visited September 10, 2009). 779 Somerville, "Community governance," 136-137. 274 "new institutions at the local level which prefigure a future society."780 Hahnel similarly argues that a process of constraining state and capitalist power, gradually reallocating decision-making power and resources away from them, and directing these to alternative participatory political and economic institutions and process that are being

no i continuously developed horizontally and vertically. These alternative institutions and processes are "living experiences in equitable cooperation...[providing] palpable evidence that a better world is possible. They are an invaluable testing ground for ideas about how to achieve equitable cooperation...[aiding] the process of establishing new norms and expectations among broad segments of population beyond the core of anti-capitalist activities."782

Linking alternatives

The existence of non-capitalist ventures for several decades in some cases shows that the beginning of this is possible, but they can only succeed with the continued and increased support of customers willing to shoulder the burden of increased prices. Not bending to market pressures when others do will mean increased costs in the production process and increased prices of goods produced. And as Albert argues, when the market externalizes negative effects of production and consumption (e.g., child labour, pollution) and these are not reflected in prices, their prices will be lower than other products that do not

780 Fotopoulos, "Inclusive Democracy." 781 Hahnel, "Eco-localism," 68. 782 Hahnel, Economic Justice, 341. 275 engage in such practices and therefore have higher costs. To combat these pressures, as Hahnel argues, it is essential that both producer and consumer cooperatives are linked together, the latter often taking the form of retail outlets owned and democratically operated by their consumers to ensure that consumer needs not met

784 capitalist firms can be served. First, producer and consumer cooperatives need to "buy and sell more to each other, and less from capitalist firms. This would cut down on ways that relationships with capitalist suppliers and buyers undermine cooperative principles."

This process can be facilitated by online services similar to eBay, but reserved exclusively for consumer and producer co-ops. A rudimentary form a participatory planning can be instituted, connecting cooperatives into a network. When the network needs to deal with the capitalist economy (e.g., obtaining unavailable inputs, selling 7RS output), it can relate to the capitalist economy as a unit rather than as isolated ventures.

Recognizing that most people cannot exclusively join or initiate a full-scale experiment in equitable cooperation, it is essential that existing or future ventures create room and roles 786 for people to make partial commitments so that more people can be reached. And, remembering the above lessons learned from implementing a participatory budgeting process for public funds, this participatory economic control can be extended to this area as well.

783 Albert, Parecon, 75-76. 784 Examples of these include the UK's The Co-operative Group (http://www.co-operative.coop/) and Australia's University Co-operative Bookshop Ltd (http://www.coop-bookshop.com.au/). 785 Hahnel, Economic Justice, 357-358. 786 Hahnel, Economic Justice, 372. More than just building alternatives

There cannot be an exclusive focus on organizing alternative economic and political institutions. As Hahnel argues, "exclusive focus on building alternatives...is to isolating."

For example, "[u]ntil the noncapitalist sector is large, the livelihoods of most people will depend on winning reforms in the capitalist sector, and therefore that is where most people will become engaged." Also, since the rules of capitalism put alternative institutions at a disadvantage compared to the capitalist ventures they must compete against, and since they also pressure alternatives to abandon cooperative principles and practices, concentrating exclusively on organizing alternatives without a parallel focus on reforming and/or restraining capitalist forces in the meantime can damage or draw-out long-term efforts.787 Also, there are benefits to reforms. As Albert argues, successes empower people to win more gains as well as educating and inspiring people to want to do this. Knowledge will be refined and improved, and peoples' capacity for self- determination will be developed. For example, struggling for higher wages will not be an end in itself, but will also raise public consciousness of the benefits and possibility of later instituting a system that remunerates for effort and sacrifice. Or, struggles for better working conditions will also highlight the benefits and viability of later instituting balanced job complexes. Struggles over pollution will highlight the viability and benefits of later instituting consumer and produce influence over all economic decisions and

787 Hahnel, Economic Justice, 379-380. 277 participatory planning. These types of struggles will leave people better organized, more committed and more desirous of further gains.788

Obviously, much of the above strategizing rests on effectively reaching out to people to spread and mainstream participatory planning - its ideas, institutions and processes. For example, cooperatives will be immeasurably benefited if they can maintain and increase a consumer base willing to pay these higher prices, thereby growing non-capitalist sector of the economy. As a first step in this direction, that is, in terms of spreading the vision by convincing others currently outside the movement of its value, and them behaving accordingly, I would draw attention to the extensive body of psychological and psychiatric research on the most effective ways to do this. Many activists recognize the importance of communication, public education and awareness- raising. Activist literature is replete with calls for this. The famous activist and writer

Saul D. Alinsky, for example, says his "'thing'.. .is solid communication with the people in the community. Lacking communication I am in reality silent."789 This concern makes sense when, as John P. McHale notes, "[t]he terms social movement activists, advocates, or organizers... refer to those involved in efforts to influence public opinion and public policy direction, often as part of the endorsement of a framework for the evaluation of social or political conditions."790 Alinsky argues that revolutionary change requires a

788 Albert, Realizing, 138-139. 789 Saul D. Alinsky, Rules for Radicals: A Pragmatic Primer for Realistic Radicals (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), xix. 790 John P. McHale, Communicating for Change: Strategies of Social and Political Advocates (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004), 3. 278 change in the attitudes of the mass of the people,791 and "[t]he organizer's job is to... 7Q9 agitate, introduce ideas, get people pregnant with hope and a desire for change."

As Charles Dobson tells us, changing people's attitudes so they will actually mobilize around a social issue requires that people have a "mobilizing frame.. .an interpretive scheme that people used to simplify and make sense of some aspect of the world. When a mobilizing frame becomes widely shared, the chances of collective action increase markedly."793 When a mass of people has a mobilizing frame that contradicts one that supports and legitimates a particular social movement, it is up to movement supporters to provide convincing "examples and rationales" so that those people will

"adjust their view of issues and events to fit the new mobilizing frame."794 Brian K.

Murphy notes that [t]here is an intrinsic connection between knowledge and action. What people do is absolutely bound up in what they know and think, and what they know and think is bound up in what they do. If we wish to transform practice, we have to identify and decode critically what it is that people know and think, what makes them do what they do, and what makes them except the practices and structures they accept. To transform practice, we must transform people's paradigms, the "apparently coherent and comprehensive concept of reality" they hold. 7Q ft And the experiences of activists bear

791 Alinsky, xix, 119-120. 792 Ibid., 103. 793 Charles Dobson, The Troublemakers Teaparty: A Manual for Effective Citizen Action (Gabriola Island, BC: New Society Publishers, 2003), 183. 794 Ibid., 184. 795 Brian K. Murphy, Transforming Ourselves, Transforming the World: An Open Conspiracy for Social Change (Halifax: Fernwood Publishing, 1999), 122-123. 796 Ibid., 123-124. 279 out these observations. Dobson points out that during interviews activists said that education was "one of the most important elements in successful recruitment."

Education shows people the seriousness of the problems; and it gives them concrete ideas about things that need to be done. It makes them feel like they can do something about the problem because they know what needs to be done and where to get involved. For the activists, educating fishermen about oceanic issues, churchgoers about homelessness, urban residents about inadequate transportation, women about reproductive rights issues, and homeowners about the indirect benefits of walking trails were all critical to gaining support for and participation in their respective organizations.797

The problem with all these sound suggestions, and others like them, is that they do not tell us what makes for successful communication, that is, what the most effective ways to communicate and change people's attitudes and behaviour are.

This question of effectiveness must be addressed. There are so many different activist methods that are employed and, as will be shown, they are not particularly effective at changing people's attitudes and behaviours. Letters to the editor, publishing articles and reports, petitions, boycotts, discussion groups, public forums and presentations, posters and leaflets, press releases, information pickets, marches and rallies, street theatre, film screenings, concerts, and the like. These all basically have this in common: they seek to expose target groups to information about the costs or dangers of their current practices and, in most cases, the benefits of changing to the recommended ones. They provide the details of a given practice or policy, then they list several criticisms of it in terms of, for example, how it offends social justice, weakens democracy or sovereignty, or is destroying our environment. And, finally, when they are at their best,

797 Dobson, 196. 280 they recommend an alternative practice or policy and espouse its benefits. The problem is that these methods are unlikely to induce attitude or behavioural change, and for the most part the audience just continue to live their lives as before.

• The reason for their ineffectiveness is that there are certain conditions that typically must be met in order to induce attitude and behavioural change, and these methods fail to meet these conditions. As it turns out, they can have a supportive role to play in an effective strategy, but they are not sufficient in themselves. Once we understand how to effectively change people's attitudes and behaviours, the insufficiencies of the above methods will be clear, so it is to a new methodology that I now turn. It is a twofold theory and method that draws on results from social psychology persuasion studies for attitude change, and then social psychology dissonance theory for encouraging the conformity of people's behaviour with their attitudes.

Persuasion and changing attitudes

David Myers and Steven Spencer tell us that for persuasion to be most effective, it is essential that you directly engage with those you are trying to bring into the struggle. The major influence on us is our contact with people, and for this reason live interaction is the most persuasive, followed by communication through videotape, then communication by audiotape, and, finally, the written word. However, messages are best comprehended and recalled when written, and with a message that is complex and/or difficult to comprehend persuasion will be most effective when live interaction is supplemented with written 281 7QR

materials. This explains why, as McHale notes, face-to-face interaction can be used

to effectively educate the public. For one thing, it "allows personal interaction with the

uniqueness of each human being." He cites U.S. advocates for universal health care and

anti-death penalty issues who specifically employ face-to-face communication because it

allows them to "engage them [non-advocates] with recognition of where they sit."

Examples included simple interpersonal communication, soliciting different individuals'

opinions and responding to them with the aim of convincing "people outside of advocate

communities that an advocacy's position merits consideration and subsequent action."799

He continues to point out that face-to-face communication "allows opportunity for much

feedback," allows one to make use of non-verbal cues like body language, and it makes

more of an impact on people. It is also easier to adapt during face-to-face

communications since the immediate context provides more information than mediated

contact, and the communication is not permanent as, for example, a pamphlet would be, but rather changeable.800 Of course, face-to-face communication is relatively labour

intensive, and although the act of talking costs nothing, actually achieving contact can be

difficult and costly, especially if travel is required.801

Now, understanding the value of face-to-face communication is one thing, but knowing what to say is quite another. There is no one right way to create one's message because its effectiveness depends on the people to whom it is being delivered. The people 798 David Myers and Steven Spencer, Social Psychology, 2nd ed, (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 2004), 233-234. 799 John P. McHale, Communicating for Change: Strategies of Social and Political Advocates (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004), 23-24. 800 Ibid, 28-29. 801 Ibid, 33. 282 you will engage with can be divided into two types, both of which often exist in a single grouping. First, there are audience members who do not care about the issue. They are likely unmotivated to think about the issue since they, for example, perceive the message as relatively unimportant and not personally relevant. Secondly, there are those audience members who perceive the message as one that matters to them, since it perhaps deals with issues that are important or personally relevant, and such people are therefore motivated to think through the issue.

According to what is called the 'elaboration-likelihood' model of persuasion, these two types of people will be persuaded, or not, for different reasons. As Michael

Billig notes, there are two "routes to persuasion," or simply ways that people are persuaded. One way is through "the assessment of the content of arguments." The other is through "the form of a message," and since content is not assessed this agreement or disagreement is done "unthinkingly." The latter reason for persuasion usually occurs when one does not pay full attention to the issue at hand. However, when people are interested in the issue at hand, they are likely to pay attention to the content of the message.802 The idea here, as Myers and Spencer, among others, put it, is that with those who are disinterested, who are unmotivated to extensively think through a message, content and arguments matter little. What counts is how or by whom or in what surroundings the message is presented. These people will respond to messages in a seemingly automatic way on the basis of such criteria as the source's prestige, credibility,

802 Michael Billig, Arguing and Thinking: A Rhetorical Approach to Social Psychology (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 78. 283 likeability, style and form of the message, or the sheer length or number of the arguments presented. This being the case, they will pay less or no attention to, and even reject, messages based on, for example, speaker characteristics such as lack of popularity, specific social status, 'unattractiveness', or dissimilarity to the audience.803 It is therefore very important that activists are aware of the audience they are addressing. I mention this not to endorse the use of certain speaker characteristics, for example, to manipulate people into accepting a message they otherwise would not. Rather, take this as a precautionary warning of the importance of understanding and avoiding things that will foreclose upon one's message being received, let alone accepted, by audience members.

The most important thing to do, then, with audience members who do not care much about the issue is to make a message more personally important or relevant. But how is one to do this, and why ought it be done? First, as Alinsky notes, you should communicate "within the experience of...[the] audience."804 Additionally, Alinsky and

Billig point out that you must understand audience values.805 Starting with the experiences and values of one's audience allows them to begin what may be a hard transition from a comfortable - because familiar - starting place.806 Moreover, as Billig correctly notes, criticisms are meaningful only once an accepted norm or end or value is infringed upon or violated. "Decisions or actions are criticized in relation to accepted

803 Myers and Spencer, 201,223; Robert A. Baron and Donn Byrne, Social Psychology: Understanding Human Interaction, 7th ed, (Toronto: Allyn and Bacon, 1994), 142; Henry Gleitman, Psychology, 3rd ed, (New York: W.W. Norton and Co, 1991), 461-462; and Robert A. Baron, Donn Byrne and Jerry Suls, Exploring Social Psychology, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Allyn and Bacon, 1989), 84-85. 804 Alinsky, xviii, 69-70, 81, 84; Dobson, 133. 805 Alinsky, xviii; Billig, Arguing, 196. 806 Alinsky, xxi-xxii. 284 rules or values." 807 Ideally, activists should "try to slide their controversial views into categories which are familiar and well valued by the audience." For example,

the best way to argue with bigoted racists in the United States is not to dispute the details of prejudice directly. That would emphasize the differences between the tolerant speaker and the prejudiced audience. Instead, the tolerant person should make an appeal to common values of democracy and fairness ["fundamental American values"].808

By working within existing values the arguments on offer are based on matters of agreement and therefore become arguments with which the audience can agree.809

As Robert A. Baron and Donn Byrne, among others, argue, it is essential that the issue at hand be made relevant to the audience. When an issue is important to a person he or she is motivated to think it through. Such a person will tend to follow the message with some care, and mentally elaborate its arguments with yet further arguments and counterarguments of their own. This has been called 'thinking deeply', and when people rely on the cogency of the persuasive appeals and on their own responses to them, any changed attitude will more likely persist, resist attack, and influence behaviour. This obviously makes argument quality central to persuasion. In these instances, content and information are what matter, and strong, systematic arguments will be needed to change people's attitudes. Having several activists unanimously present a firm, consistent, systematic, and coherent message not only conveys validity, but it also disrupts the norm,

807 Billig, Arguing, 87. 808 Ibid, 194-195. 809 Michael Billig, Ideology and Opinions: Studies in Rhetorical Psychology (London: Sage Publications, 1991), 179. 285 leading to questioning of assumptions and opening the door to, if not the recognition

O 1 A of, alternatives (when the latter is not immediate or automatic).

So, in terms of argument content, Billig notes that "attitudes are changed when a basic cognitive or evaluative component is reversed, usually by the reception of new, persuasive information."811 For example, "laboratory subjects could be induced to reject 812 • unconsidered assumptions when receiving new information." However, we still need to know what information is persuasive. When developing the arguments intended to change a person's attitude, much must be kept in mind. First, and most generally,

"[a]ttitudes refer to evaluations which are for or against things, issues, people or whatever."813 More specifically, all attitudes are situated within a wider argumentative context. This becomes apparent if we ask what it is that individuals have attitudes about. Having asked this question, we can see that people hold attitudes about controversial issues and that there are certain issues on which people are expected, or are liable, to take pro or con stances. Whether the topic is political, moral, religious, commercial, or whatever, an attitude refers to a stance on a matter of public debate and disagreement. In other words, an attitude represents an evaluation of a controversial issu814e or sometimes a controversial individual, such as a president or a queen.

It is important, as Baron and Byrne point out, that we must know the attitude that is held.815

Secondly, as Billig as well as Baron and Byrne note, attitudes serve functions for the individual. For example, they can be held for utilitarian reasons, enabling the person 810 Baron and Byrne, 145-147; Myers and Spencer, 216-217; Baron, Byrne, and Suls, 86-89. 811 Billig, Ideology, 146. 812 Ibid. 813 Billig, Arguing, 176. 814 Ibid, 176-177. 815 Baron and Byrne, 150. 286 to achieve a desired goal and avoid the undesirable, they can express central values or beliefs, maintain a self-image, or help organize, structure, and process information about the social world and thereby provide security.816 We must know the function the attitude the serves because, as Baron and Byrne argue, the approach to attitude change should match the function. For example, to change an attitude that serves an organizational and processing function, expose the person to new information; to change an attitude that is in service of a person's self-image, appeal to his or her self-image. The precise conditions required for successful persuasion can vary with the functions served by various attitudes.

For example, because of their basic nature, certain objects are associated with attitudes serving a function. It could be argued that for some people air conditioners serve primarily a utilitarian function because they buy and use them for the rewards they provide. In this case, more successful persuasive appeals should focus on the appropriate attitude function for the air conditioner, its utilitarian appeal.817

Moreover, as Robert A. Baron, Donn Byrne and Jerry Suls, among others, note, there are good reasons grounded in people's psychology to refrain from presenting the issue at hand in a simplified, one-sided way. When developing and delivering arguments, it tends to be more effective to present both sides of the issue, especially when the audience has contrary attitudes. It is best to strongly advocate one side while 818 acknowledging when the other side has a good point. This will likely enhance the speaker's credibility or believability, insofar as those who seem to know what they are

816 Baron and Byrne, 150; Billig, Arguing, 176. 817 Baron and Byrne, 150. 818 Baron, Byrne, and Suls, 85; Myers and Spencer, 229; Baron and Byrne, 143-144. 287 talking about and seem to have and present all the facts are usually perceived as both

an expert and trustworthy. And those seen as experts are typically more persuasive than

OIQ non-experts. Moreover, a person's trustworthiness is further enhanced by

acknowledging the good points the opposition has insofar as one is seen as putting forth

arguments that seem to be against his or her self-interest, which creates the impression that his or her position is a result of the evidence, not bias.820

Furthermore, as Myers and Spencer, as well as others, argue, when developing strong systematic arguments arousing fear in the audience enhances persuasiveness, especially if the message provides specific recommendations about how a change in attitude and/or behaviour will prevent the feared consequences. If arguments evoke fear but fail to tell the audience what change(s) they can make, they may feel overwhelmed by negative emotions and refuse to acknowledge the reality of the situation, avoiding the whole issue by denying the existence of the problem. Again, the specificity of the audience is important, since to the extent that an attitude was formed through emotion, 091 the use of arguments that make emotional appeals will increase persuasiveness.

None of the above is meant to deny important insights into persuasive communications already made by activists. In fact, there is much information to be gained from consulting works of social activists for more specific recommendations. For example, Dobson tells us that a short and simple message, like "Our electoral system is out of date," is often more effective than a more complex message like, "We should

819 Myers and Spencer, 220; Baron and Byrne, 142; Baron, Byrne, and Suls, 84. 820Baron and Byrne, 142; Baron, Byrne, and Suls, 84. 821 Myers and Spencer, 224-226; Baron and Byrne, 144; Baron, Byrne, and Suls, 85. 288 discard our old-fashioned first-past-the-post electoral system and replace it with proportional representation or partial proportional representation." He also tells us to use messages that motivate. So, rather than saying "Take the train today," say "The train is

899 faster and more relaxing."

Above, I listed typical social activist methods - letters to the editor, publishing articles and reports, petitions, boycotts, discussion groups, public forums and presentations, posters and leaflets, press releases, information pickets, marches and rallies, street theatre, film screenings, concerts, etc. - and said they are ineffective at changing attitudes and behaviour. It should be now clear why after these approaches have been implemented the general public typically continues on as before, with no discernable changes having been affected. The reason for this is that such methods are usually insufficient at penetrating the audience's psyche to modify their attitudes. These methods do not necessarily, if at all, engage with the reason(s) a person adopts a certain attitude, that is, the function(s) that the attitude serves for the person. This can and does vary widely between people, but, as mentioned above, knowing and addressing this is usually necessary before an attitude can be modified. Again, one should use an approach to attitude change that matches the function of the attitude (e.g., make utilitarian arguments to those who hold an attitude on utilitarian grounds), and insofar as these differ between individuals, the aforementioned unspecific, undifferentiated, and/or mass actions will be ineffective.

822 Dobson, 132. 289 But even if one is able to change an audience's attitudes, there is still a concern whether attitudes and behaviour will match, for, as everyone has experienced, this need not happen at all. Breeding what is called 'dissonance' can be an effective technique for changing behaviour.

Breeding dissonance and changing behaviour

Dissonance occurs when individuals notice that there is conflict between either their attitudes themselves, or between their attitudes and behaviour. As Billig tells us, people are typically motivated "to justify a position and to ward off criticisms" because

"[inconsistency is uncomfortable to the extent that it represents an unanswered criticism, which threatens one's public advocacy or the preferred direction of one's private deliberations."823 These inconsistencies "can rest undisturbed, and undisturbing" if the present discussion does not touch on them and they are not directly criticised. But once criticised, by others or from within ourselves, we feel disturbed and provoked, and feel

894

"the need for defensive justification."

And, as Baron and Byrne, among others, note, whether it is a person's tendency towards logical consistency, or for more emotional reasons, such as an effort to maintain a favourable picture of ourselves, or feelings of guilt or responsibility, dissonance creates unpleasant, negative feelings that people try to reduce. One way dissonance can be reduced is by people changing their behaviour so as to make them more consistent with

823 Billig, Arguing, 161. 824 Ibid, 162-163. 290 their attitudes. Thus, by breeding dissonance, or evoking it within people, one can work towards adjusting peoples' behaviour to make it commensurable with their attitudes.825

As Baron and Byrne observe, to breed dissonance, first one has to make the person clearly conscious of the attitude he or she holds. Second, one has to remind the person of his or her counter-attitudinal behaviour. However, often the essential condition for a person experiencing dissonance is not just realizing the discrepancy between attitude(s) and behaviour, but that he or she accepts responsibility for the action and its outcomes. This requires showing that the behaviour in question is under his or her control, and that he or she chooses to engage in it. This will typically induce unpleasant psychological arousal, feelings of discomfort due to the dissonance, which act as a motivation to change. It is also important that the person makes the connection between dissonance discomfort and the inconsistency between his or her attitude and behaviour.

The person must attribute the former to the latter. Thus, a person must be aware of the inconsistency, take responsibility for the behaviour, experience negative psychological arousal, and attribute that arousal to the inconsistency.

That said, how much dissonance one feels depends on the magnitude of the inconsistency and upon the importance of the issue. If you have ample justification for acting in contradiction to your beliefs, you will not feel significant dissonance, and you will not have ample motivation to change your behaviour. Again, for this reason,

825 Myers and Spencer, 132-136; Baron and Byrne, 170; Gleitman, A34). 826 Baron and Byrne, 165-166. 291 inconsistent behaviour needs to be seen as freely done. And it is important to show that the negative consequences of the behaviour were foreseeable. Finally, one must show people that their reasons for engaging in counter-attitudinal behaviour are quite weak, especially when compared to the costs, which will likely lead to stronger feelings of dissonance, because they really have no significant reasons for acting in contradictory

827 ways.

Breeding dissonance has proven itself successful at changing counter-attitudinal behaviour in ways that benefited social concerns. For example, a study was conducted in

California, where population growth and drought have raised concerns regarding water conservation. To demonstrate the effectiveness of breeding dissonance to achieve socially desirable goals, an experiment was conducted to encourage actions that conserved water using swimmers taking showers. The first group of swimmers about to enter the shower room was asked to sign a flyer advocating water conservation. The second group was asked questions about their own showering activities designed to remind them of their own past failures to conserve water. The third group was asked to both sign the flyer urging others to conserve water and answer the questions making them aware of their own past failures to follow this advice with the hope of eliciting the highest feelings of hypocrisy. A fourth group, the control group, was not asked to do either. And, sure enough, the third group took the greatest steps to conserve water, measures that were a significant improvement from showers they took in the past, followed by the first two

827 Baron and Byrne, 162. 292 groups, and then, taking the longest showers (almost one-third longer than the third group), was the control group.

This study suggests that breeding dissonance can be an effective technique for changing behaviour. The benefit of this is that individuals who change their behaviour are not engaging in counter-attitudinal behaviour. They are merely being reminded of attitudes they hold; their own failure to live up to them can be effective at behavioural change. Individuals change their own behaviour by saying and doing things they

89Q believe. In this sense, what an individual feels and does can be used to change his or her behaviour.

The success of breeding dissonance to change behaviour so it matches with attitudes should at least suggest why the typical activist methods mentioned above usually fail to encourage the populous to behave in ways in line with their attitudes.

Similar to the reasons for their ineffectiveness at affecting high levels of attitude change, this process behavioural change usually-requires a significant level of specificity and intimacy. As mentioned above, this often requires that the person is clearly conscious of the attitude he or she holds, is reminded of his or her counter-attitudinal behaviour, and that he or she accepts responsibility for the action and its outcomes. Accepting responsibility requires that the person accepts that the behaviour in question is or was under his or her control and a matter of choice, and that the negative consequences of the behaviour were foreseeable. And the person would also have to come to accept that his or

828 Ibid., 161-162. 829 Ibid, 160-162. 293 her reasons for behaving that way are quite weak, especially when compared to the costs for him- or herself and/or others. Again, the shortcomings of activist methods that are unspecific, undifferentiated, and/or mass actions, which cannot by their very nature attend to the specificities of people, should be obvious. Changing people's attitudes and behaviour are typically complex, intimate, and heterogeneous processes. Activists seeking to accomplish this will have to engage in a dialogue wherein their audience makes clear their values, goals, reasons for holding attitudes, the character of their behaviour, their reasons for behaving this way and not another, among a myriad of other aspects of their lives.

Resisting attitude and behavioural change, and a place for typical methods

As Myers and Spencer, as well as others, tell us, there are several reasons why people's attitudes may be maintained even though there is sufficient good evidence to justify change. The fact that people generally stay in the same social and economic environment, continuing to encounter the same old views that they have had for years, is one reason why there is a tendency to hold on to the attitudes that one already has. Another reason is that people may shift in a direction opposite to that being recommended simply to counter the message of someone they feel is trying to limit their personal freedom by trying to unduly influence them. This is called 'reactance', or the protection of a person's personal freedom and image of self-efficacy. People typically experience unpleasant, negative reactions whenever they feel that someone is trying to limit their personal freedom, and often they will consequently defy them. A third concern is that people are known to direct 294 their attention away from information that challenges their attitudes and actively seek out information consistent with them. These three factors alone are strong forces working against attitude change, although they are by no means an exhaustive list.830

When it comes to resisting behavioural change a similar story unfolds. As Billig notes, people are very capable of (re)categorizing this or that action in a way that makes it consistent with their attitudes. Even though people "can admit that a particular sort of action runs counter to her attitudes," they will "argue that the present act is very different: its essence suggests that it should not be categorized under the forbidding attitude, but that it should be classed very differently." For example, they can argue that the particular action fits in a "different attitudinal category by a redefinition of the situation," falsely interpreting the existence of mitigating circumstances, all in an attempt to qualify the

01 1 particular action. People can also "arrange the essence of the attitude in such a way that it seems to marry happily, but controversially, with the disputed actions." The meaning of the general attitude is here defined to best suit our case, which is possible because

"attitudinal statements possess an inherent vagueness, and.. .different prescriptions for behaviour can be derived from them." So, a different interpretation of the attitude allows for different behaviours.

Similarly, Henry Gleitman notes that people may respond to dissonance, not by changing their behaviour, but, for example, by seeking out information that rationalizes their behaviour, making it consistent with their attitudes, and reassuring them that there is 830 Myers and Spencer, 210-213; Baron and Byrne, 154; Myers, 229-30; Gleitman, 465-466; Baron, Byrne, and Suls, 93-94). 831 Billig, Arguing, 183-185. 832 Ibid., 186. 295 really no inconsistency. A person might also re-evaluate the counter-attitudinal behaviour so as to minimize or negate its importance so that it can safely be ignored and dissonance can be avoided. It is also possible that someone might attempt to reduce dissonance by re-evaluating the alternative behaviours they could have engaged in, such that the one chosen will seem more attractive or the only possible choice, thereby reducing the attractiveness of un-chosen options or dismissing them as unfeasible and consequently avoiding responsibility for any harm caused. Although other examples could be listed, it should be clear that dissonance could be reduced or eliminated in ways

Oil that do not affect behaviour at all.

Moreover, even when dissonance is reduced by aligning behaviour with attitudes, people may be uncertain about exactly what they should do and/or how they should do it, among other concerns, which may not be obvious. A very significant concern with attitude and behaviour issues is that the issue(s) and/or solution(s) are very complex and/or not considered 'realistic' by the audience. When thinking about the two-step method advocated above, it should be clear that when persuading people to adopt a certain attitude or set of attitudes, and to behave in accordance with them, one will be persuading people to perform particular actions stemming from those attitudes. To the extent that activists are thorough, they can pre-emptively deal with individuals' uncertainty by providing concrete tactics. And, although in themselves insufficient to promote attitude and behavioural change, the relevance of the information-type activist methods criticized above (e.g., information pickets, petitions) should be noted at this

833 Gleitman, 463-464. 296 juncture for their ability to inform those seeking both ways of and arenas for action.

Moreover, when these activists methods are themselves a value-in-practice (i.e. a participatory budget), they immediately and necessarily demonstrate the 'realistic' nature of the value and its practice, not to mention provide information for others on how to operationalize this particular value. As Alinsky says, these methods demonstrate "that something can be done, and that there is a concrete way of doing it that has already proven its effectiveness and success."

I would like to say that the aforementioned caveats do not warrant abandoning the above psychological approach since the ideas it is based upon have proved themselves workable. The fact that there are reasons why people's attitudes and behaviour may remain unchanged or revert to their previous form after an encounter with activists should demonstrate the need for constant vigilance and continual engagement on the part of activists in their dealings with their audience. It should also highlight that the above program, if adopted, should always be viewed as a part of a larger activist picture.

Moreover, and importantly, although changing people's attitudes and behaviour are typically complex, intimate, and heterogeneous processes, this should not discourage activists from adopting this method.

834 Alinsky, 118. Also, this should highlight that beyond simply being a matter of individual behaviour, there is a collective dimension to this issue, or at least a collective solution, although it is only partial, allowing people to act on their attitudes, providing a strategy that can offset uncertainty. It is beyond the scope of this paper to investigate such collectivities, their ability to provide information and strategies to reinforce attitude-behaviour alignment, and other related issues, although this is surely deserving of attention. 297 Admittedly, this process will, for example, not be able to reach as many people at a time as other methods, and therefore take a long time to work, and it will not likely have the pomp, pageantry and drama that other methods can boast. But, as Alinsky says,

[e]ffective organization is thwarted by the desire for instant and dramatic change.. .It's the kind of thing we see in play writing; the first act introduces the characters and the plot, in the second act the plot and characters are developed as the play strives to hold the audience's attention. In the final act good and evil have their dramatic confrontation and resolution. The present generation wants to go right into the third act, skipping the first two, in which case there is no play, nothing but confrontation for confrontation's sake - a OIC flare-up and back to darkness. To build a powerful organization takes time.

It would be a shame if current activists' pre-conceived notions about what activist methods 'should' be like resulted in them overlooking a form of activism derived from proven methods, and that can help to create a different society. As Hahnel says, a "sense in which capitalism serves as a midwife for its heir is by forcing people to learn to think and live non-capitalistically in order to meet needs it leaves unfulfilled. It falls to progressives to learn and teach others how to do this. And there can be no mistake about it, this is a monumental task. We can ill afford to repeat the error of our twentieth-century predecessors who failed to face up to the magnitude of this task, looking instead for short cuts and excuses for why it would not be necessary."836

Concluding with what has come and where to go

835 Alinsky, xx. 836 Hahnel, Economic Justice, 339. 298 This thesis has argued that there is value to an examination by political theory of a tribal social organizational form and its conception of a good life. A tribal conception of a good life is germane to political theory and a tribal account of a good life should be dealt with by the discipline. In addition to incredible historical longevity and stability, a tribal organization and ethic provide autonomy and relatedness, which, according to a consensus in psychological and psychiatric research, make the greatest contributions to, and are the greatest predictors of human happiness. More than this, the lessons provided by an examination of a tribal form and ethic can be implemented in larger and more complex societies through having a participatory polity with a participatory economy. In this way, tribal societies demonstrate that non-state societies are an important source of information for those seeking to learn how to construct future human societies that will increase SWB for their members. Thus, while this work took an unconventional approach by not directly addressing the ideas and debates of political theorists, but rather grounded its analysis and arguments in experiences of a good life, it has still made a consummately political argument and thereby contributed to important canonical debates. 299 Works Cited

Aberle, David F., The Psychological Analysis of a Hopi Life-History (Berkeley: University of California, 1951).

Adams, Richard E.W., Prehistoric Mesoamerica (Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).

Albert, Michael, Idealizing Hope: Life Beyond Capitalism (Black Point, NS: Fernwood, 2006).

Albert, Michael, Parecon: Life After Capitalism (New York: Verso, 2004).

Albert, Michael and Robin Hahnel, "Participatory Planning," Science and Society, Spring 1992, Vol. 56, No. 1,39-59.

Alinsky, Saul D, Rules for Radicals: A Pragmatic Primer for Realistic Radicals (New York: Vintage Books, 1989).

Allen, Paula Gunn, The Sacred Hoop: Recovering the Feminine in American Indian Traditions (Boston: Beacon Press, 1992).

Amabile, Teresa M., Creativity in context (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1996).

Andrews, Frank M. and Stephen B. Withey, Social indicators of well-being: America's perception of life quality (New York: Plenum Press, 1976).

Arbeiter Ring Publishing, "About Arbeiter Ring," http://www.arbeiterring.com/about.html (visited February 10, 2008).

Argyle, Michael, "Causes and correlates of happiness," in Daniel Kahneman, Ed Diener, and Norbert Schwarz, eds., Well-being: The foundations of hedonic psychology (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1999), 353-373.

Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, Harris Rackham, trans. (Hertfordshire, England: Wordsworth Editions Ltd, 1996).

Aristotle, Politics, Ernest Barker, trans. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).

Arnold, Jeanne E., ed., Emergent Complexity: The Evolution of Intermediate Societies (Ann Arbor, Michigan: International Monographs in Prehistory, 1996) 300 Baard Paul P., Edward L. Deci, and Richard M. Ryan, "Intrinsic need satisfaction: A motivational basis of performance and well-being in two work settings," Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 2004, 34, 2045-2068.

Baard, Paul P., Edward L. Deci and Richard M. Ryan, Intrinsic need satisfaction: A motivational basis of performance and well-being in work settings (Fordham University Press, 1998).

Bandura, Albert, Self-efficacy: The exercise of control (New York: Freeman, 1997).

Barnes, Michael L. and Robert J Sternberg, "A hierarchical model of love and its prediction of satisfaction in close relationships," in Robert J. Sternberg and Mahzad Hojjat, eds., Satisfaction in close relationships (New York: Guilford, 1997).

Baron, Robert A. and Donn Byrne, Social Psychology: Understanding Human Interaction, 7th ed., (Toronto: Allyn and Bacon, 1994).

Baron, Robert A., Donn Byrne and Jerry Suls, Exploring Social Psychology, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Allyn and Bacon, 1989).

Baumeister, Roy F. and Mark R. Leary, "The need to belong: Desire for interpersonal attachment as a fundamental human motivation," Psychological Bulletin, 1995, 117, 497-529.

Beier, J. Marshall, International Relations in Uncommon Places: Ihdigeneity, Cosmology, and the Limits of International Relations Theory (New York: Palgrave, 2005).

Beiner, Ronald, and Wayne Norman (Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press, 2001).

Bhatnagar, Deepti, Animesh Rathore, Magiii Moreno Torres and Parameeta Kanungo, Empowerment Case Studies: Participatory Budgeting in Brazil, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTEMPOWERMENT/Resources/14657_Parti c-Budg-Brazil-web.pdf (visited August 18. 2008).

Billig, Michael, Arguing and Thinking: A Rhetorical Approach to Social Psychology (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

Billig, Michael, Ideology and Opinions: Studies in Rhetorical Psychology (London: Sage Publications, 1991). 301 Blais, Marc R., Stephane Sabourin, Colette Boucher, and Robert L. Vallerand, "Toward a motivational model of couple happiness," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1999, 59, 1021-1031.

Blanton, Richard E., Gary M. Feinman, Laura M. Finsten, and Stephen A. Kowalewski, Ancient Mesoamerica: A comparison of change in three regions, 2 ed. (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1993).

Bogucki, Peter, The Origins of Human Society (Massachusetts: Blackwell, 1999).

Boyd, Robert and Peter J. Richardson, The Origin and Evolution of Cultures (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).

Brickman, Philip and Donald T. Campbell, "Hedonic relativism and planning the good society," in Mortimer H. Appley, ed., Adaptation-level Theory (New York: Academic Press, 1971).

Brickman, Philip, Dan Coates and Ronnie Janoff-Bulman, "Lottery winners and accident victims: Is happiness relative?," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1979,36,917-927.

Brody, Hugh, The Other Side of Eden: Hunters, Farmers and the Shaping of the World (Vancouver: Douglas and Mclntyre, 2000).

Brunstein, Joachim C., Oliver C. Schultheiss and Ruth Grassman, "Personal goals and emotional well-being: The moderating role of motive dispositions," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1998, 75, 494-508.

Bunge, Robert, An American Urphilosophie: An American Philosophy BP (Before Pragmatism (Lanham: University Press of America, 1984).

Buss, David M., "The Evolution of Happiness," American Psychologist, January 2000, Vol. 55, No. 1, 15-23.

Busseri, Michael A., Stanley Sadava, Danielle Molnar and Nancy DeCourville, "A Person-Centered Approach to Subjective Well-Being," Journal of Happiness Studies, 2009, 10, 161-181.

Caiman, Leslie J., Toward empowerment: Women and movement politics in India (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1992).

Caprara, Gian Vittorio and Patrizia Steca, "Affective and Social Self-Regulatory Efficacy Beliefs as Determinants of Positive Thinking and Happiness," European Psychologist, 2005, Vol. 10, No. 4, 275-286. 302 Carstensen, Laura L., Derek M. Isaacowitz, and Susan T. Charles, "Taking time seriously: A theory of socio-emotional selectivity," American Psychologist, 1999, 54, 165-181.

Chirkov, Valery, Richard M. Ryan, Youngmee Kim, and Ulas Kaplan, "Differentiating autonomy from individualism and independence: A self-determination theory perspective on internalization of cultural orientation, gender and well-being," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 2003, 84, 97-110.

Clastres, Pierre, Society Against the State: Essays in Political Anthropology, Robert Hurley and Abe Stein, trans. (New York: Zone Books, 1987).

Clemmer, Richard O., Continuities of Hopi Culture Change (Ramona, California: Acoma, 1978).

Coe, Christopher L. and Gabriele R. Lubach, "Social context and other psychological influences on the development of immunity," in Carol D. Ryff and Burton H. Singer, eds., Emotion, social relationships, and health (London: Oxford University Press, 2001).

Coe, Michael D., Ancient Peoples and Places of Mexico (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1962).

Coe, Michael D., Mexico: From the Olmecs to the Aztecs, 4 ed. (New York: Thames and Hudson, Inc., 1994).

Cohen, Sheldon, William J. Doyle, Ronald B. Turner, Cuneyt M. Alper, and David P. Skoner, "Emotional style and susceptibility to the common cold," Psychosomatic Medicine, 2003, 65, 652-657.

Corry, Dan, Warren Hatter, Ian Parker, Anna Randle, and Gerry Stoker, Joining-up local democracy: Governance systems for new localism (London: New Local Government Network, 2004).

Cowgill, George L., "Social Differentiation at Teotihuacan," in Diane Z. Chase and Arlen F. Chase, eds., Mesoamerican Elites: An Archaeological Assessment (Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1992).

Cropanzano, Russell and Thomas A. Wright, "A 5-year study of change in the relationship between well-being and job performance," Consulting Psychology Journal: Practice and Research, 1999, 51, 252-265.

Csikszentmihalyi, Mihaly, Finding flow: The psychology of engagement with everyday life (New York: Basic, 1997). 303 Dawkins, Richard, The God Delusion (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2006). deCharms, Richard, Personal causation, (New York: Academic, 1968).

Deci, Edward L., Jennifer G. La Guardia, Arlen C. Moller, Marc J. Scheiner and Richard M. Ryan, "On the Benefits of Giving as Well as Receiving Autonomy Support: Mutuality in Close Friendships," Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 2006,32,313-327.

Deci, Edward L. and Richard M. Ryan, "A motivational approach to self: Integration in personality," in Richard A. Dienstbier, ed., Nebraska Symposium on Motivation: Vol. 38. Perspectives on motivation (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press), 237- 288.

Deci, Edward L. and Richard M. Ryan, "Human autonomy: The basis for true self- esteem," in Michael H. Kemis, ed., Efficacy, agency, and self-esteem (New York: Plenum, 1995), 31-49.

Deci, Edward L. and Richard M. Ryan, "The 'What' and the 'Why' of Goal Pursuits: Human Needs and the Self-Determination of Behavior," Psychological Inquiry, 2000, Vol. 11, No. 4, 227-268.

Deci, Edward L., Richard M. Ryan, Marylene Gagne, Dean R. Leone, Julian Usunov and Boyanka P. Kornazheva, "Need satisfaction, motivation, and well-being in the work organizations of a former Eastern bloc country: A cross-cultural study of self-determination," Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 2001, 27, 930- 942.

Deci, Edward L., Allan J. Schwartz, Louise Sheinman, and Richard M. Ryan, "An instrument to assess adults' orientations toward control versus autonomy with children: Reflections on intrinsic motivation and perceived competence." Journal of Educational Psychology, 1981, 73, 642- 650.

Delamothe, Tony, "Happiness," BMJ, December 2005, Vol. 331, 1489-1490.

Deloria, Jr., Vine, "Is Religion Possible? An Evaluation of Present Efforts to Revive Traditional Tribal Religions," Wicazo Sa Review 8:1 (Spring 1992), 35-39.

DeMallie, Raymond J., The Sixth Grandfather: Black Elk's Teachings Given to John G. Neihardt (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1984).

Dennis, Wayne, The Hopi Child (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1940). 304 Detwiler, Fritz, '"All My Relatives': Persons in Oglala Religion," Religion 22:3 (July 1992), 235-246.

Devins, Gerald M., Jacquelin Mann, Henry P. Mandin, and Leonard C. Paul, "Psychosocial predictors of survival in end-stage renal disease," Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 1990, 178, 127-133.

Diamond, Jared, Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed (New York: Viking, 2005).

Diamond, Jared, Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1999).

Diamond, Stanley, In Search of the Primitive: A Critique of Civilization (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1974).

Diener, Ed, "Assessing subjective well-being: Progress and opportunities," Social Indicators Research, 1994, 31, 103-157.

Diener, Ed, "Guidelines for National Indicators of Subjective Well-Being and Ill-Being," Applied Research in Quality of Life, 2006, 1, 151-157.

Diener, Ed, "Subjective well-being " Psychological Bulletin, 1984, 95, 542-575.

Diener, Ed, "Subjective Well-Being: The Science of Happiness and a Proposal for a National Index," American Psychologist, January 2000, Vol. 55, No. 1, 34-43.

Diener, Ed and Carol Diener, "Most people are happy," Psychological Science, 1996, 7, 181-185.

Diener, Ed, Jeff Horwitz, and Robert A. Emmons, "Happiness of the very wealthy," Social Indicators Research, 1985, 16, 263-274.

Diener, Ed, Carol Nickerson, Richard E. Lucas, and Ed Sandvik, "Dispositional affect and job outcomes," Social Indicators Research, 2002, 59, 229-259.

Diener, Ed and Shigehiro Oishi, "Money and happiness: Income and subjective well- being across nations," in Ed Diener and Eunkook M. Suh, eds., Culture and Subjective Well-Being (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000).

Diener, Ed, Ed Sandvik, and William Pavot, "Happiness is the frequency, not the intensity, of positive versus negative affect," in Fritz Strack, Michael Argyle and Norbert Schwarz, eds., Subjective well-being: An interdisciplinary perspective (New York: Pergamon, 1991). 305 Diener, Ed and Martin E.P. Seligman, "Beyond Money: Toward an Economy of Well-Being," Psychological Science in the Public Interest, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1-31.

Diener, Ed, Eunkook M. Suh, Richard E. Lucas, and Heidi L. Smith, "Subjective Well- Being: Three Decades of Progress," Psychological Bulletin, 1999, Vol. 125, No. 2, 276-302.

Dijkers, Marcel, "Quality of life after spinal cord injury: A meta-analysis of the effects of disablement components," Spinal Cord, 1997, 32, 829-840.

Dobson, Charles, The Troublemakers Teaparty: A Manual for Effective Citizen Action (Gabriola Island, BC: New Society Publishers, 2003).

Dolan, Paul and Mathew P. White, "How Can Measures of Subjective Well-Being Be Used to Inform Public Policy?," Perspectives on Psychological Science, Vol. 2, No. 1,71-85.

Downie, Michelle, Richard Koestner and Sook Ning Chua, "Political support for self- determination, wealth, and national subjective well-being," Motivation and Emotion, 2007, 31, 174-181.

Durkheim, Emil, The Division of Labor in Society (New York: The Free Press, 1964).

Durkheim, Emile, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (New York: The Free Press, 1965).

Easterbrook, Gregg, The Progress Paradox (New York: Random House, 2003).

Easterlin, Richard, "Will raising the incomes of all increase the happiness of all?," Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 1995, 27, 35-47.

Elson, Diane, "Market Socialism or Socialization of the Market," New Left Review, November/December 1988, 172, 3-44.

Emmons, Robert A., "Personal goals, life meaning, and virtue: Well springs of a positive life," in Corey L.M. Keyes and Jonathan Haidt, eds., Flourishing: A positive psychology and the life well-lived (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 2003).

Emmons, Robert A., The psychology of ultimate concerns: Motivation and spirituality in personality, (New York: Guilford, 1999).

Emmons, Robert A. and Laura A. King, "Conflict among personal strivings: Immediate and long-term implications for psychological and physical well-being," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1988, 54, 1040-1048. 306 Emmons, Robert A. and Michael E. McCullough, "Counting blessings versus burdens: An experimental investigation of gratitude and subjective well-being in daily life," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 2003, 84, 377-389.

Fava, Giovanni A., "Well-being therapy: Conceptual and technical issues," Psychotherapy and Psychosomatics, 1999, 68, 171-179.

Fava, Giovanni A., Chiara Rafanelli, Manuela Cazzaro, Sandra Conti and Silvana Grandi, "Well-being therapy: A novel psychotherapeutic approach for residual symptoms of affective disorders," Psychological Medicine, 1998, 28, 475^80.

Fava, Giovanni A., Chiara Ruini, Chiara Rafanelli, Livio Finos, Luigi Salmaso and Lara Mangelli, "Well-being therapy of generalized anxiety disorder," Psychotherapy and Psychosomatics, 2005, 74, 26-30.

Fordyce, Michael W., "A program to increase happiness: Further studies," Journal of Counseling Psychology, 1983, 30, 483-498.

Fordyce, Michael W., "Development of a program to increase happiness," Journal of Counseling Psychology, 1977, 24, 511-521.

Fotopoulos, Takis, "Inclusive Democracy as a way out of the present multi-dimensional crisis," The International Journal of Inclusive Democracy, June 2006, Vol. 2, No. 3, http://www.inclusivedemocracy.org/journal/vol2/vol2_no3_Takis_ID_Crisis_PRI NTABLE.htm (visited September 10, 2009).

Frederick, Shane and George Loewenstein, "Hedonic adaptation," in Daniel Kahneman, Ed Diener and Norbert Schwarz, eds., Well-being: The foundations of hedonic psychology (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1999).

French, Michelle, "Mondragon at 5: ParEcon collective celebrates anniversary," The Manitoban, Sept. 12, 2001. http://www.themanitoban.com/2001- 2002/0912/features_4.shtml (visited February 10, 2008).

Freundlich, Fred, The Mondragon Cooperative Corporation (Washington, DC: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1998).

Fried, Morton H., The Evolution of Political Society: An Essay in Political Anthropology (U.S.: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1967).

Friedman, Jonathan, System, Structure, and Contradiction: the Evolution of Asiatic Social Formations, 2nd ed. (California: AltaMira Press, 1998). 307 Fujita, Frank and Ed Diener, "Life satisfaction set point: Stability and change," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 2005, 88, 158-164.

Germain, Shanna, "Iconoclast brews coffee klatch: No ordinary owner invented Rimsky- Korsakoffee, Sylvia Beach Hotel," The Portland Tribune, Apr 19, 2002, http://www.portlandtribune.com/news/story.php?story_id= 10957 (visited June 26, 2007).

Gleitman, Henry, Psychology, 3rd ed., (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1991).

Hahnel, Robin "Eco-localism: A Constructive Critique," Capitalism Nature Socialism, 2007, Vol. 18, No. 2, 62-78.

Hahnel, Robin, Economic Justice and Democracy: From Competition to Cooperation (New York: Routledge, 2005).

Haller, Max and Markus Hadler, "How Social Relations and Structures Can Produce Happiness and Unhappiness: An International Comparative Analysis," Social Indicators Research, 2006, 75, 169-216.

Harris, Marvin, Our Kind: Who We Are, Where We Came From, Where We Are Going (New York: Harper and Row, 1989).

Harrod, Harold L., Becoming and remaining a People: Native American Religions on the Northern Plains (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1995).

Harter, James K., Frank L. Schmidt and Corey L.M. Keyes, "Well-being in the workplace and its relationship to business outcomes," in Corey L.M. Keyes and Jonathan Haidt, eds., Flourishing: The positive person and the good life (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association Press, 2003).

Harter, Susan, "Effectance motivation reconsidered: Toward a developmental model," Human Development, 1978, 1, 661-669.

Haybron, Daniel M., "What do we want from a theory of happiness?," Metaphilosophy, 2003, 34, 305-329.

Headey, Bruce and Alexander Wearing, "Personality, life events, and subjective well- being: Toward a dynamic equilibrium model," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1989, 57, 731-739.

Helliwell, John F. and Robert D. Putnam, "The social context of well-being," Phil. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B, 2004, 359, 1435-1446. 308 Hendrick, Susan S. and Clyde Hendrick, "Love and satisfaction," in Robert J. Sternberg and Mahzad Hojjat, eds., Satisfaction in close relationships (New York: Guilford, 1997), 56-78.

Hinde, Robert A., Relationships: A dialectical perspective, (Cambridge, UK: Psychology Press, 1997).

Hodgins, Holley S., Richard Koestner, and Neil Duncan, "On the compatibility of autonomy and relatedness," Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 1996, 22, 227-237.

Hoffmann, Elizabeth A., "Confrontations and compromise: Dispute resolution at a worker cooperative coal mine," Law and Social Inquiry, 2001, 26, 150-170.

Hoffmann, Elizabeth A., "The ironic value of loyalty: Dispute resolution strategies in worker cooperatives and conventional organizations," Nonprofit Management and Leadership, 2006, 17, 163-177.

Horowitz, Asher, Rousseau, Nature, and History (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987).

Horowitz, Asher and Gad Horowitz, Everywhere They are in Chains: Political Theory from Rousseau to Marx (Scarborough: Nelson Canada, 1988).

Hsee, Christopher K. and Reid Hastie, "Decision and experience: why don't we choose what makes us happy?," Trends in Cognitive Sciences, January 2006, Vol.10, No.l, 31-37.

Inglehart, Ronald, Culture shift in advanced industrial society (NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990).

James, Harry C., The Hopi Indians: Their History and their Culture (Caldwell, Idaho: Caxton, 1956).

Johnson, Allen W. and Timothy Earle, The Evolution of Human Societies: From Foraging Group to Agrarian State, 2nd ed. (California: Stanford University Press, 2000).

Kahneman, Daniel, "Objective happiness," in Daniel Kahneman, Ed Diener and Norbert Schwarz, eds., Well-being: The Foundations of Hedonic Psychology (New York; Russell Sage Foundation, 1999), 3-25. 309 Kant, Immanuel, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals: On a Supposed Right to Lie Because of Philanthropic Concerns, trans. James W. Ellington (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993).

Kasser, Tim and Richard M. Ryan, "A dark side of the American dream: Correlates of financial success as a central life aspiration," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1993, 65, 410-422.

Kasser, Tim and Richard M. Ryan, "Further examining the American dream: Differential correlates of intrinsic and extrinsic goals. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 1996, 22, 280-287.

Keyes, Corey L., "Mental health and/or mental illness? Investigating axioms of the complete state model of health," Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 2005, 73, 539-548.

Keyes, Corey L., "Subjective Well-Being in Mental Health and Human Development Research Worldwide: An Introduction," Social Indicators Research, 2006, 77, 1- 10.

King, Laura A., "The health benefits of writing about life goals," Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 2001, 27, 798-807.

Kingwell, Mark, The World We Want: Virtue, Vice, and the Good Citizen (Toronto: Penguin, 2001).

Kirkcaldy, Bruce and Adrian Furnham, "Positive affectivity, psychological well-being, accident and traffic-deaths and suicide: An international comparison," Studia Psychologica, 2007, 42, 97-104.

Klein, Naomi, "Out of the ordinary," The Guardian Weekend, January 25, 2003, 14-24.

Kohn, Melvin, Atsushi Naoi, Carrie Schoenbach, Carmi Schooler and Kazimierz M. Slomczynski, "Position in the Class Structure and Psychological Functioning in the United States, Japan, and Poland," American Journal of Sociology, 1990, Vol. 95, No. 4, 964-1008.

Konings, Martijn "On the Political Economy of Socialism: Against the Regulation of Social Relations by Markets," Research in Political Economy, 2001, Vol.19, 107- 153.

Kottak, Conrad Phillip, Cultural Anthropology (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1994). 310 La Guardia, Jennifer G., Richard M. Ryan, Charles E. Couchman, and Edward L. Deci, "Within-person variation in security of attachment: A self-determination theory perspective on attachment, need fulfillment, and well-being," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 2000, 79, 367-384.

Lane, Robert E., "Does money buy happiness?," The Public Interest, Fall 1993, 113, 56- 65.

Lane, Robert E., The Loss of Happiness in Market Democracies (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000).

Larsen, Randy J. and Ed Diener, "A multitrait-multimethod examination of affect structure: Hedonic level and emotional intensity," Personality and Individual Differences, 1985, 6, 631- 636.

Leach, E.R., Political Systems of the Highland Burma: A Study of Kachin Social Structure (London: G. Bell and Sons, Ltd., 1954).

Leacock, Elanor and Richard Lee, eds., Politics and History in Band Societies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).

Lee, Dorothy, Freedom and Culture (U.S.: Prentice-Hall, 1959).

Leibl, David, "Cafe resistance: in downtown Winnipeg, a group of radicals is trying to create a different kind of cafe/bookstore. But as David Leibl finds out, even when there are no bosses, some things in the service industry never change," This, Vol. 36, Iss. 1,26.

Lent, Robert W. and Steve D. Brown, "Social Cognitive Career Theory and Subjective Well-Being in the Context of Work," Journal of Career Assessment, 2008, Vol. 16, No. 1,6-21.

Lent, Robert W., Daniel Singley, Hung-Bin Sheu, Kathy A. Gainor, Bradley R. Brenner, Dana Treistman, and Lisa Ades, "Social Cognitive Predictors of Domain and Life Satisfaction: Exploring the Theoretical Precursors of Subjective Well-Being," Journal of Counseling Psychology, 2005, Vol. 52, No. 3, 429^42.

Lepowsky, Maria, "Big Men, Big Women, and Cultural Autonomy," Ethnology 29:10 (1990), 35-50.

Lepowsky, Maria, Fruit of the Motherland: Gender in an Egalitarian Society (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). 311 Lerner, Josh and Estair Van Wagner, "Participatory Budgeting in Canada: Democratic Innovations in Strategic Spaces," Transnational Institute, February 2006, http://www.tni.org/archives/newpol-docs_pbcanada (visited August 18. 2008).

Levine, David I. and Laura D'Andrea Tyson ("Participation, Productivity, and the Firm's Environment," in Alan S. Binder, ed., Paying for Productivity: A Look at the Evidence (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1990).

Levy, Sandra M., Jerry Lee, Caroline Bagley, and Martin Lippman, "Survival hazard analysis in first recurrent breast cancer patients: Seven-year follow-up," Psychosomatic Medicine, 1988, 50, 520-528.

Lewit, David, "Porto Alegre's Budget Of, By, And For the People," YES!, May 20, 2004, http://www.yesmagazine.org/issues/what-would-democracy-look-like/562 (visited August 18, 2008).

Lichter, Shelley, Karen Haye and Richard Kammann, "Increasing happiness through cognitive retraining," New Zealand Psychologist, 1980, 9, 57-64.

Lonowski, Delmer, "A Return to Tradition: Proportional Representation in Tribal Government," American Indian Culture and Research Journal 18:1 (1994), 147- 163.

Lucas, Richard E. "Adaptation and the set-point model of subjective well-being: Does happiness change after major life events?," Current Directions in Psychological Science, 2007, 16, 75-79.

Lucas, Richard E., "Time does not heal all wounds: A longitudinal study of reaction and adaptation to divorce," Psychological Science, 2005, 16, 945-950.

Lucas, Richard E., Andrew E. Clark, Yannis Georgellis, and Ed Diener, "Reexamining adaptation and the set point model of happiness: Reactions to changes in marital status," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 2003, 84, 527-539.

Lucas, Richard E., Andrew E. Clark, Yannis Georgellis and Ed Diener, "Unemployment alters the set point for life satisfaction," Psychological Science, 2004 15, 8-13.

Lykken, David and Auke Tellegen, "Happiness is a stochastic phenomenon," Psychological Science, 1996, 7, 186-189.

Lyubomirsky, Sonja, "Why Are Some People Happier Than Others?: The Role of Cognitive and Motivational Processes in Well-Being," American Psychologist, March 2001, Vol. 56., No. 3, 239-249. 312 Lyubomirsky, Sonja, Laura A. King, and Ed Diener, "The benefits of frequent positive affect: Does happiness lead to success?," Psychological Bulletin, 2005, 131, 803-855.

Lyubomirsky, Sonja and Lee Ross, "Changes in attractiveness of elected, rejected, and precluded alternatives: A comparison of happy and unhappy individuals," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1999, 76, 988-1007.

Lyubomirksy, Sonja, Kennon M. Sheldon, and David Schkade, "Pursuing happiness: The architecture of sustainable change," Review of General Psychology, 2005, 9, 111- 131.

Lyubomirsky, Sonja, Lorie Sousa, and Rene Dickerhoof, "The costs and benefits of writing, talking, and thinking about life's triumphs and defeats," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 2006, 90, 692-708.

Marks, Garry N. and Nicole Fleming, "Influences and consequences of well-being among Australian young people: 1980-1995," Social Indicators Research, 1999, 46, 301-323.

Martin, Brendan, In the public service (London: Zed Books, 2002).

Marx, Karl, Capital, Volume 1, trans. Ben Fowkes (New York: Penguin, 1990).

Marx, Karl, Capital, Volume 3, trans. David Fernbach (New York: Penguin, 1991).

Marx, Karl, Selected Writings, ed. Lawrence H. Simon (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994).

Marx, Karl, "Toward a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction," in H.B. McCullough, ed., Political Ideologies and Political Philosophers, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Thompson, 1995).

McHale, John P., Communicating for Change: Strategies of Social and Political Advocates (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004).

McNally, David, Against the Market: Political Economy, Market Socialism and the Marxist Critique (New York: Verso, 1993).

McNally, David, Another World is Possible: Globalization and Anti-capitalism (Winnipeg: Arbeiter Ring, 2002).

McNally, David Another World is Possible: Globalization and Anti-Capitalism, 2nd ed. (Winnipeg: Arbeiter Ring, 2006).

Mill, John Stuart, On Liberty (New York: Penguin, 1974). 313 Miller, Barbara D., Penny Van Esterik, and John Van Esterik, Cultural Anthropology (Toronto: Pearson Education Canada Inc., 2001).

Millon, Rene, "Teotihuacan: City, State, and Civilization," in Jeremy Sabloff, ed, Supplement to the handbook of Middle American Indians (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981).

Millon, Rene, "The Last Years of Teotihuacan Dominance," in Norman Yoffee and George L. Cowgill, eds., The Collapse of Ancient States and Civilizations (Tuscan: University of Arizona Press, 1988).

Mondragon Bookstore and Coffee House, "Welcome!," http://mondragon.ca (visited February 10, 2008).

Morgan, Lewis Henry, Ancient Society: Or Researches in the Lines of Human Progress From Savagery Through Barbarism to Civilization (Chicago: C.H. Kerr, 1877).

Murphy, Brian K., Transforming Ourselves, Transforming the World: An Open Conspiracy for Social Change (Halifax: Fernwood Publishing, 1999).

Myers, David, Social Psychology, 3rd ed., (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1999).

Myers, David and Steven Spencer, Social Psychology, 2nd ed., (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 2004).

Myers, David G., "Close relationships and quality of life," in Daniel Kahneman, Ed Diener and Norbert Schwarz, eds., Well-being: The foundations of hedonic psychology (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1999), 374-391.

Myers, David G., "The Funds, Friends, and Faith of Happy People," American Psychologist, January 2000, Vol. 55, No, 1, 56-67.

Nix, Glen A., Richard M. Ryan, John B. Manly, and Edward L. Deci, "Revitalization through self-regulation: The effects of autonomous and controlled motivation on happiness and vitality," Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1999, 35, 266-284.

Nozick, Robert, The Examined Life: Philosophical Meditations (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989.

Oishi, Shigehiro, Ed Diener, Eunkook Suh, and Richard E. Lucas, "Value as a moderator in subjective well-being," Journal of Personality, 1999, 67, 157-184.

Overell, Stephen, "A working recipe for quality of life," Financial Times, January 24, 2002,13. 314 Parducci, Allen, Happiness, pleasure, and judgment: The contextual theory and its applications (Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, 1995).

ParEcon, "Doing ParEcon," http://www.zmag.org/parecon/doing.htm (visited February 10, 2008).

Powers, William K., Oglala Religion (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1975).

Pressman, Sarah D. and Sheldon Cohen, "Does positive affect influence health?," Psychological Bulletin, 2005, 131, 925-971.

Price, Catherine, "Lakotas and Euroamericans: Contrasted Concepts of 'Chieftainship' and Decision-Making Authority," Ethnohistory 41:3 (Summer 1994), 447-463.

Quinn, Daniel, Beyond Civilization: Humanity's Next Great Adventure (New York: Three Rivers Press, 1999).

Quinn, Daniel, If They Give You Lined Paper Write Sideways (Hanover: Steerforth, 2007).

Quinn, Daniel, Ishmael (Toronto: Bantam, 1992).

Quinn, Daniel, My Ishmael (Toronto: Bantam, 1997).

Quinn, Daniel, The Story ofB, (Toronto: Bantam, 1996).

Radin, Paul, Primitive Man as Philosopher (New York: Dover, 1957).

Radin, Paul, The World of Primitive Man (New York: Henry Schuman, 1953).

Reis, Harry T., "Domains of experience: Investigating relationship processes from three perspectives," in Ralph Erber and Robin Gilmour, eds., Theoretical frameworks for personal relationships (Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1994), 87-110.

Reis, Harry T. and Brian C. Patrick, "Attachment and intimacy: Component processes," in Edward T. Higgins and Arie W. Kruglanski, eds., Social psychology: Handbook of basic principles (Chichester, UK: Wiley, 1996).

Rothschild, Joyce, "Workers' Cooperatives and Social Enterprise: A Forgotten Route to Social Equity and Democracy," American Behavioral Scientist, 2009, 52, 1023- 1041.

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, The Basic Political Writings, trans. Donald A. Cress (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987). 315 Ryan, Richard M., Valery I. Chirkov, Todd D. Little, Kennon M. Sheldon, Elena Timoshina, Edward L. Deci, "The American dream in Russia: Extrinsic aspirations and well-being in two cultures," Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 1999, 25, 1509-1524.

Ryan, Richard M. and James P. Connell, "Perceived locus of causality and internalization: Examining reasons for acting in two domains," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1989, 57, 749-761.

Ryan, Richard M. and Edward L. Deci, "On happiness and human potentials: A review of research on hedonic and eudaimonic well-being," Annual Review of Psychology, 2001, 52, 141-166.

Ryan, Richard M. and Edward L. Deci, "Self-Determination Theory and the Facilitation of Intrinsic Motivation, Social Development, and Well-Being," American Psychologist, January 2000, Vol. 55, No.l, 68-78.

Ryan, Richard M., Edward L. Deci, and Wendy S. Grolnick, "Autonomy, relatedness, and the self: Their relation to development and psychopathology," in Dante Cicchetti and Donald J. Cohen, eds., Developmental psychopathology: Theory and methods (New York: Wiley, 1995), 618-655.

Ryff, Carol D., "Happiness is everything, or is it? Explorations on the meaning of psychological well-being," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1989, 57, 1069-1081.

Ryff, Carol D., "Psychological well-being in adult life," Current Directions in Psychological Science, 1995, 4, 99-104.

Ryff, Carol D. and B.H. Singer, eds., Emotion, social relationships, and health (London: Oxford University Press, 2001), 243-261.

Sabloff, Jeremy A., The Cities of Ancient Mexico: Reconstructing a Lost World (Spain: Thames and Hudson, Inc., 1989).

Sandvik, Ed, Ed Diener, and Larry Seidlitz, "Subjective well-being: The convergence and stability of self-report and non-self-report measures," Journal of Personality, 1993, No. 61, 317-342.

Schugurensky, Daniel, "Participatory Budget: A Tool for Democratizing Democracy," talk given at the meeting Some Assembly Required: Participatory Budgeting in Canada and Abroad, Toronto Metro Hall, April 29, 2004. 316 Schulz, Richard, "Effects of control and predictability on the physical and psychological well-being of the institutionalized aged," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1976, 33, 563-573.

Schumaker, John F., "Dead Zone," New Internationalist 336 (July 2001), 34-35.

Schumaker, John F., "Dead Zone," New Internationalist, July 2001, 336, 34-35.

Schwartz, Barry, "Self-Determination: The Tyranny of Freedom," American Psychologist, January 2000, Vol. 55, No. 1, 79-88.

Schwartz, Barry, The Paradox of Choice: Why More is Less (New York: Harper, 2004).

Schwartz, Barry, The Paradox of Choice: Why More is Less (New York: Harper, 2004).

Scitovsky, Tibor, The Joyless Economy: The Psychology of Human Satisfaction (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976).

Seeman, Teresa E., "How do others get under your skin: Social relationships and health," in Carol D. Ryff and Burton H. Singer, eds., Emotion, social relationships, and health (New York: Oxford Press, 2001).

Seligman, Martin E. P. and Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, "Positive Psychology: An Introduction," American Psychologist, January 2000, Vol. 55. No. 1, 5-14.

Seligman, Martin E. P., Tayyab Rashid, and Acacia C. Parks, "Positive psychotherapy," American Psychology, 2006, 61, 774-788.

Seligman, Martin E.P., Tracy A. Steen, Nansook Park, and Christopher Peterson, "Positive psychology progress: Empirical validation of interventions," American Psychologist, 2005, 60, 410-421.

Service, Elman R., Origins of the State and Civilization: The Process of Cultural Evolution (U.S.: W.W. Norton and Co., 1975).

Service, Elman R., Primitive Social Organization: And Evolutionary Perspective, 2nd ed. (New York: Random House, 1971).

Shalom, Stephen, "A Political System for a Good Society," June 2006, http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/3854 (visited April 15, 2009).

Shalom, Stephen, "ParPolity: Political Vision for a Good Society," November 22, 2005, http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/4957 (visited April 15, 2009). 317 Shalom, Stephen, "Parpolity and Indirect Elections," July 15, 2009, http://www.zcommunications.org/znet/viewArticle/22017 (visited April 15, 2009).

Shalom, Stephen, "Parpolity Interview," September 20, 2004, http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/7826 (visited April 15, 2009).

Sheldon, Kennon M., "The self-concordance model of healthy goal-striving: When personal goals correctly represent the person," in Edward L. Deci and Richard M. Ryan, eds., Handbook of Self-determination Research (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2002), 65-86.

Sheldon, Kennon M. and Andrew J. Elliot, "Goal striving, need-satisfaction, and longitudinal well-being: The Self-Concordance Model," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1999, 76, 482-497.

Sheldon, Kennon M. and Tan H. Hoon, "The Multiple Determination of Well-Being: Independent Effects of Positive Traits, Needs, Goals, Selves, Social Supports and Cultural Contexts," Journal of Happiness Studies, 2007, 8, 565-592.

Sheldon, Kennon M. and Tim Kasser, "Coherence and congruence: Two aspects of personality integration," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1995, 68, 531-543.

Sheldon, Kennon M. and Tim Kasser, "Getting older, getting better? Personal strivings and psychological maturity across the life span," Developmental Psychology, 2001,37, 491-501.

Sheldon, Kennon M. and Tim Kasser, "Pursuing personal goals: Skills enable progress, but not all progress is beneficial," Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 1998, 24, 1319-1331.

Sheldon, Kennon M., Tim Kasser, Linda Houser-Marko, Taisha Jones and Daniel Turban, "Doing One's Duty: Chronological Age, Felt Autonomy, and Subjective Well-Being," European Journal of Personality, 2005, 19, 97-115.

Sheldon, Kennon M., Tim Kasser, Kendra Smith and Tamara Share, "Personal goals and psychological growth: Testing an intervention to enhance goal-attainment and personality integration," Journal of Personality, 2002, 70, 5-31.

Sheldon, Kennon M. and Sonja Lyubomirsky, "Achieving Sustainable Gains in Happiness: Change Your Actions, Not Your Circumstances," Journal of Happiness Studies, 2006, 7, 55-86. 318 Sheldon, Kennon M. and Sonja Lyubomirsky, "Achieving sustainable new happiness: Prospects, practices, and prescriptions," in Alex Linley and Stephen Joseph, eds., Positive Psychology in Practice (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons, 2004), 127- 145.

Sheldon, Kennon M. and Sonja Lyubomirsky, "How to increase and sustain positive emotion: The effects of expressing gratitude and visualizing best possible selves," Journal of Positive Psychology, 2006, 1, 73-82.

Sheldon, Kennon M. and Sonja Lyubomirsky, "Is It Possible to Become Happier? (And If So, How?)," Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 2007, Vol. 1, No. 1, 129-145.

Sheldon, Kennon M., Harry T. Reis, and Richard M. Ryan, "What makes for a good day? Competence and autonomy in the day and in the person," Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 1996, 22, 1270-1279.

Sheldon, Kennon M., Richard M. Ryan, Edward L. Deci, and Tim Kasser, "The independent effects of goal contents and motives on well-being: It's both what you pursue and why you pursue it," Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 2004, 30, 475-486.

Sheldon, Kennon M., Richard M. Ryan, Laird J. Rawsthorne and Barbara Ilardi, "Trait self and true self: Cross-role variation in the Big Five traits and its relations with authenticity and subjective well-being," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1997, 73, 1380-1393.

Somerville, Peter, "Community governance and democracy," Policy & Politics, 2005, Vol. 33, No. 1, 117-144.

Snowdon, David, Aging with grace: What the nun study teaches us about leading longer, healthier, and more meaningful lives (New York: Bantam Books, 2001).

South End Press, "About Us," http://www.southendpress.org/about (visited February 10, 2008).

Standing Bear, Luther, Land of the Spotted Eagle (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1978).

Staw, Barry M., Robert I. Sutton and Lisa H. Pelled, "Employee positive emotion and favorable outcomes at the workplace," Organization Science, 1994, 5, 51-71.

Sternberg, Robert L. and Mahzad Hojjat, Satisfaction in close relationships (New York: Guilford, 1997). 319 Strathern, Andrew, Big-Men and Ceremonial Exchange in Mount Hagen New Guinea (London: Cambridge University, 1971).

Taylor, Shelley E., Sally S. Dickerson and Laura Cousino Klein, "Toward a biology of social support," in C.R. Snyder and Shane J. Lopez, eds., Handbook of positive psychology (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).

The Old Market Autonomous Zone, "A-Zone Principles," http://a-zone.org/principles/ (visited August 10, 2008).

Thomas, Henk and Chris Logan, Mondragon: An economic analysis (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1982).

Toronto Community Housing, "Participatory Budgeting - Working together, making a difference," http://www.torontohousing.ca/participatory_budgeting (visited August 18, 2008).

Touraine, Alain, "The importance of social movements," Social Movement Studies, 2002, Vol. 1, No. 1, 89-95.

Tuhiwai Smith, Linda, Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples (London: Zed Books, 1999).

Ulrich, Roger S., "View through a window may influence recovery from surgery," Science, April 1984, 224, 420-421.

Ulrich, Roger S., "Wellness by design: Psychologically supportive patient surroundings," Group Practice Journal, 1991,40, 10-19.

Veenhuven, Ruut, "The utility of happiness," Social Indicators Research, 1988, 20. 333- 354.

Verkley, Harry and Jan Stolk, "Does happiness lead into idleness?," in Ruut Veenhoven, ed., How harmful is happiness? (Rotterdam, The Netherlands: University of Rotterdam, 1989).

Walker, J. R., "The Sun Dance and Other Ceremonies of the Oglala Division of the Teton Dakota," Anthropological Papers of the American Museum of Natural History 16 (Part 2), 1917, http://digitallibrary.amnh.Org/dspace/bitstream/2246/201/l/A016a02.pdf (visited June 5, 2007). 320 Warr, Peter, "Well-being and the workplace," in Daniel Kahneman, Ed Diener, and Norbert Schwarz, eds., Well-being: The foundations of hedonic psychology (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1999), 392-412.

Weaver, Muriel Porter, The Aztecs, Maya, and Their Predecessors: Archaeology of Mesoamerica, 4 ed. (New York: Academic Press, 1981).

Weber, Max, Max Weber: Selections in Translation, W.G. Runciman, ed., E. Matthews, trans. (London: Cambridge University Press, 1978).

Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, A.M Henderson and Talcott Parsons, trans. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947).

White Face, Charmaine, "Do we have a responsibility for our relatives?," Indian Country Today, March 06, 2002, http://www.indiancountry.com/content. cfm?id=1015342167 (visited 31/08/2006).

White Face, Charmaine, "We have another chance to learn 'mitakuye oyasin'," Indian Country Today, September 21, 2001, http://www.indiancountry.com/content.cfm?id=515 (visited 31/08/2006).

White, Robert W., Ego and reality in psychoanalytic theory (New York: International Universities Press, 1963).

Whiteley, Peter, M., Rethinking Hopi Ethnography (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1998).

Whitt, Laurie Anne, "Indigenous Peoples and the Cultural Politics of Knowledge," in Michael K. Green, ed., Issues in Native American Cultural Identity (New York: Peter Lang, 1995).

Whyte, William Foote and Kathleen King Whyte, Making Mondragon (Ithaca, NY: ILR Press, 1988)

Williams, Geoffrey C., Virginia M. Grow, Zachary R. Freedman, Richard M. Ryan, and Edward L. Deci, "Motivational predictors of weight loss and weight loss maintenance," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1996, 70, 115-126.

Wills, Jane, Union futures: Building networked trade unionism in the UK (London: Fabian Society, 2002).

Wood, Dustin and Brent W. Roberts, "The effect of age and role information on expectations for big five personality traits," Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 2006, 32, 1482-1496. 321 Worldwatch Institute, "State of the World 2007: Notable Trends," January 10, 2007, http://www.worldwatch.org/node/4840 (visited August 18, 2008).

Wright, Robert, Nonzero: The Logic of Human Destiny (New York: Vintage Books, 2000).

Wright, Ronald, A Short History of Progress (Toronto: Anansi, 2004).

Wright, Thomas A. and Barry M. Staw, "Affect and favourable work outcomes: Two longitudinal tests of the happy-productive worker thesis," Journal of Organizational Behavior, 1999, 20, 1-23.