SERBIA’S ANTIBUREAUCRATIC REVOLUTION CONCLUSION Nebojša Vladisavljević CONCLUSION: PROTEST POLITICS, THE FALL OF COMMUNISM AND NATIONALIST CONFLICT* The late 1980s witnessed a mobilization of ordinary people across Eastern Europe that played an important part in the conflicts that triggered the fall of communism. The levels of mobilization in the eastern part of socialist Yugoslavia exceeded those in most other parts of the region, and their immediate consequences were no less dramatic. And yet, images from popular and scholarly writing associated with this wave of mobilization stand out for different reasons. The generally accepted image of protest politics that unfolded across Eastern Europe is that of people power employed to bring about democratization of communist party-states. By contrast, the literature that touches on the antibureaucratic revolution and the episodes of mobilization that surrounded it conveys exclusively images of top-down, authoritarian mobilization and virulent, chauvinistic nationalism. The evidence I presented in this book suggests that most published accounts provide a misleading interpretation of this wave of mobilization. Below I sharpen my argument about the mobilizational wave in the light of this evidence, and show how it sheds light on the fall of Yugoslav communism and the rise of a new populist authoritarianism, as well as on the break-up of Yugoslavia and the contemporary Serb–Albanian nationalist conflict in and over Kosovo. Explaining the antibureaucratic revolution and related protest campaigns According to the popular and scholarly literature, the mobilization of ordinary people in socialist Yugoslavia in the 1980s is an emblematic case of elite-driven and purposive nationalist mobilization. The key players were political and cultural elites, while ordinary people were little more than passive participants in the events. With the decline of communism, opportunistic high party-state officials engineered the mass mobilization in search of new ways to preserve their political power. The events principally reflected the Serb nationalist revival, which provoked a reactive mobilization of Kosovo Albanians. Nationalist themes spread from small groups of dissident intellectuals to the general public, and the developments were boosted by the support of Leninist officials who aimed to protect their power by embracing nationalism. According to this view, these and subsequent nationalist outcomes mainly originated from the nationalist strategies of the political and cultural elites.† Ordinary people or elites The elite thesis is misleading because non-state and non-elite actors played a vital role both in the early stages of mobilization and in the expansion of protest politics. Driven by different causes, aiming at different goals, and working independently from each other, the grass-roots groups of Kosovo Serbs and industrial workers across Yugoslavia initiated popular * Poglavlje iz Nebojša Vladisavljević (2008) Serbia’s Antibureaucratic Revolution: Miloševid, the Fall of Communism and Nationalist Mobilization (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan). † Cohen (2001: 62–78) and Popov (1993: 20–3) offer the most sophisticated version of the elite argument. The purposive nationalist mobilization argument can be found in Cohen (2001: 57–88), Pavlowitch (2002: 184–98), Popov (1993: 16–23), Pavković (2000: 89–90), Đilas (1993), and Crnobrnja (1994). 1 SERBIA’S ANTIBUREAUCRATIC REVOLUTION CONCLUSION protests in the mid-1980s and over time became influential political actors. Most observers failed to identify the main agents in these events largely due to an erroneous assumption that non-state and non-elite actors could not initiate and sustain protests under communist authoritarianism. Since high officials did not suppress the protests and since the protest groups managed to organize, recruit activists, appeal for popular support and make major demands on the party-state, observers came to believe that Milošević or dissident intellectuals, or both, had orchestrated the events. This assumption originates from the view that modern non-democratic regimes are invariably closed, exclusive and repressive and thus an extremely hostile political context for the collective action of ordinary people at all times. And yet, modern non-democratic regimes vary considerably in their institutional design, informal relations among their various power centres and strategies towards challenger groups. Economic decline, political instability, political realignments and elite conflicts often create political opportunities for previously powerless and disadvantaged groups to engage in popular protest. Indeed, the rise and expansion of protest politics in Yugoslavia in the 1980s was an unintended consequence of its peculiar communist authoritarianism, that is, a largely relaxed and tolerant non-democratic regime with radically decentralized federal, local and self- management institutions, and of political change which began after the death of Tito. The communist leadership mainly targeted ideological dissidence and was considerably more responsive to discontent when it came from the working class, students and grass-roots groups with national grievances, due to their strategic position in the officially sanctioned legacy of the liberation war and indigenous revolution. Industrial workers and Kosovo Serb activists repeatedly demonstrated their loyalty to the party-state and the Yugoslav federation, and worked partly within official channels, thus exploiting the institutional resources of this most liberal and decentralized East European communist state. Growing elite conflict, driven by leadership succession, generational change and by disputes between the republics and autonomous provinces, paralysed Yugoslavia’s collective leadership and further impeded attempts at the suppression of popular challenges. While pursuing separate goals, industrial workers and Kosovo Serb activists exploited a long-standing popular discontent with the political class that had overseen a sharp decline in the previously successful economy and the rise of nationalist tensions in Kosovo. The open defiance of the previously unassailable party-state further undermined its legitimacy and invited other popular challenges. The rapid expansion of protest politics accelerated conflicts in Yugoslavia’s political class, that is, between and within regional elites and between higher and lower-level officials, and set the stage for an alliance between a variety of non-state actors and Milošević against an increasingly old-fashioned and dispirited Titoist establishment. The broad alliance, sparked off by the sudden and far-reaching success of protest politics and Milošević’s populist appeals, and cemented by their struggle against common foes, signalled the fall of the Yugoslav version of communism and the formation of a new populist consensus, which became the bedrock of Milošević’s authoritarian rule in the early 1990s. The antibureaucratic revolution involved the agency of elite and non-elite actors, in roughly equal measures. The extent to which one or the other prevailed in specific events varied temporally and spatially. The antibureaucratic movement rested largely on the breakthroughs achieved by industrial workers and Kosovo Serb activists in previous years, especially their strategies and action frames, well-established networks, and the destruction of a dominant but 2 SERBIA’S ANTIBUREAUCRATIC REVOLUTION CONCLUSION misleading image of unified and dignified elites. In the late summer and autumn of 1988, however, the social movement became a strategic alliance of protest groups, intellectuals, individual rebels from official organizations and parts of the old political establishment. In Vojvodina and Montenegro, where mobilization originated largely from local sources, non-state actors and opponents of high officials from the official organizations organized rallies and demonstrations on their own, with the support of Belgrade’s powerful media. In central Serbia, the role of Milošević and party-state officials was critical. The Kosovo Albanian protests followed a similar route. The November 1988 and March 1989 protests appear to have been a spontaneous counter-mobilization, without much input from elites, while the February 1989 protests reveal an important role played by elites, who launched an effective public relations campaign during the Stari Trg protest and the general strike, backed by much of the province’s media. In short, in the light of the evidence presented in this book, the argument that ordinary people are incapable of coherent political action without the involvement of elites is deeply flawed. On the other hand, it would be unwise to exaggerate the power of ordinary people. Only under very specific circumstances can they challenge authorities and elites with success, that is, exert substantial political influence. In most cases, under both authoritarianism and democracy, authorities can easily confront and weather out popular challenges. In the case of Yugoslavia, the extraordinary period of the 1980s undermined the communist regime and thus made it vulnerable to the mobilization of ordinary people. Even when popular unrest undermines established regimes and protest groups achieve recognition for some of their demands, consolidated elites and their priorities principally shape the ways in which the polity and its policies are reconstituted. The politics of nationalist mobilization or nationalist strategies The purposive