Securing Sumatra's Pepper Periphery: Resistance and Pacification in Lampung During the 18Th and 19Th Centuries

研究ノー卜

Securing Sumatra's Pepper Periphery: Resistance and Pacification in Lampung during the 18th and 19th Centuries

Jeff Kingston

1. Introduction Lampungis a region located at the southernmost tip of Sumatra, geograph- ically separated from Java by a narrow, navigable straits that historically facilitated generally strong but vacillating economic,political and cultural ties with Banten in western Java. Lampung's history is inextricably intertwined with that of more powerfulexternal trading interests, within the Indonesian archipelagoand extendingfrom China to Western Europe, by virtue of its locationalong a major trading nexus, the Straits of Sunda, and because of the high quality and vast amounts of its pepper production.The region's profitable trade led successiveexternal forces to assert varying degressof suzeraintyover the-centuries, with attendant influenceson political and social institutions1). The first mention of Lampung in European sources is in the Portugese ex- plorer Tome Pires' Suma Oriental(1512-1515) which reflects a similar preoccu- pation with pepper while subsequent accounts from the representatives of the Dutch East India Company(VOC) and early Dutch colonial officials also largely ignore Lampung society, generally focusing on matters of trade. As a conse- quence, Lampung society is never treated on its own terms for it was primarily viewed as a source of profit, emergingas little more than a backgroundto the actions of Bantenese, Palembangers, English and Dutch. This is an unsatisf- actory, unidimensionallegacy with great potential for trapping the historian into an exceedingly narrow and unrevealing perspective. While a historian is always to somedegree a prisoner of his sources, I have tried to cast my net widely and infuse my account with the sensibilities imbued by the Indonesian 77 東南アジア-歴史と文化- No. 19, 1990 historiographical debates emerging since WWII2). Nevertheless, sensitivity and analytical acuity can not entirely compensate for the very blurred and indistinct image of society and people carried in these early sources. This essay traces the origins of colonial influence in Lampung against the backdrop of accelerated extension of Ducth colonial rule through much of the Indonesian archipelago during the 19th century. I have focused on the "obstacles" encountered by the VOC and subsequently the Dutch government in transforming this bountiful pepper pot to their own advantage while also trying to deconstruct some of the colonial myths about Lampung society and Lampu- ngers. While the contemporary sources impart a "Dutch eye view", it is possible to infer and speculate in an informed manner about how Lampungers may have perceived and experienced Dutch intrusions and balance the false impress- ions conveyed about the range and extent of Dutch influence prior to the 20th century.

2. Banten's Lampung and the Coming of the Dutch East India Company (VOC) Whatever the degree of Banten's(a sultanate in western Java) influence in Lampung, it seems likely that it expanded its authority there to gain control over the trade in pepper3). At the time that the Dutch arrived in Indonesia at the end of the 16th century, Banten was one the preeminent trading powers in Java and derived most of its income from the pepper trade4). The Sultan of Banten maintained his control over this lucrative spice by appointing representatives who came to form a relatively centralized ruling hierarchy residing in the coastal regions and ports of Lampung to monitor deliveries and keep a watchful eye for smugglers and other interlopers. The Sultan agreed to buy all of the pepper delivered at a set price, although claiming 11%, at a minimum, as his royal tribute5). In fact the entire system was a form of tributary trade as the Lampung producers were compelled to deliver all of their produce at low prices under the threat of exile or death. In order to ensure compliance without the expense of mounting regular expeditions, the Sultan also employed a system whereby he bestowed various titles or courtly regalia on local traders or chief- 78 Securing Sumatra's Pepper Periphery Mainsresident in Lampung in exchange for their fealty, vigilance and prams (boats) laden with pepper. These titled traders were often provided with copper plates, piagems (charters), which granted them authority as representatives of the Sultan and spelled out in detail their obligations and penalties for non- compliance. While it is not certain that the regulations spelled out in recovered piagems were ever fully observed or are reliable sources at all, one example dated 1663 stipulated that every married man was required to plant 1, 000 pepper trees while bachelors had to plant 5006). The local traders and chiefs were charged with ensuring that pepper cultivation was expanded and delivered to the appointed agents of the Sultan in Lampung or taken directly to Banten7). Whether at the behest of the Sultan or not, it appears that Lampungers did respond to the rise of the pepper trade and expanded production considerably while under Bantenese rule8).

3. Procuring the Prize: The Dutch East India Company (VOC) and Lampung The VOC first established contact with Banten in 1596 and its continuing interest in the Banten trade was certainly linked to the regular arrival of pepper prauws from Lampung every Autumn. The first reported hostilities of the VOC in Lampung occurred in 1633 in connection with a VOC initiative in Banten, but no special influence was spawned thereby and the VOC appears to have had limited contact directly with Lampung for the next half century9). The lucrative tributary pepper trade conducted by the Sultan of Banten(largely derived from production in Lampung) was covetously viewed by the VOC, a yearning which was intensified by competition from the Portugese, English, indigenous traders and pirates trying to get a foot in the door. Until the end of the 18th century the VOC demonstrated its unswerving resolve to convert the Sultan's pepper tribute from Lampung into its own monopoly, but ultimately it did not have the resources to match. There is a curious reference in the archival materials that sheds some light on the Dutch methods in securing their trading interests. In the early 1680s the 79 東南アジア-歴史と文化-NO. 19, 1990

Sultan's son, blessed with an amorous nature, had 30 wives and and an esti-

mated 1,000 women in his harem. He approached the VOC's local representative

and requested the company's assistance in requiring all of the villages to send

their prettiest women to the court for his perusal and choice if they struck his

fancy. The company official wrote to his superiors in Batavia, intimating how

this request was not in his brief and requested advice on how to handle this

delicate matter10). He received instructions that since the old sultan was nearing his end, it would behoove the company to curry the favor of the son and thus

it was expected that the local official would work to further the company's

interests in this regard. These tantalizing tidbits about the pandering proclvities

of the VOC are a loose thread in the archives and there are no indications how the bewildered official executed his task, but in the event the son ousted the old

sultan with the aid of the VOC. In exchange for its services, the VOC received a monopoly in the pepper trade based on the tributary system still maintained, to some degree, by the

Sultan11). Five years later the new Sultan died, but by this time the Dutch were experienced in court intrigues and managed to retain their trading rights which they proceeded to back up by erecting two forts of their own in Lampung during 1687, one in the Tulang Bawang region and the other in Semangka12). As with the Sultan's earlier effort, leakages in the pepper trade, particularly in the prime producing region of northern Lampung, forced the VOC to try and counter the rising influence of Palembang. Weakened by dynastic struggles, the encroachment of the Dutch and the gathering strength of trading rivals such as the English and Palembang, the Sultan was in no position to enforce his monopoly. The VOC stepped in the breach with mixed success, abandoning the Tulang Bawang fort after only five months while nearly half of the contingent of 90 soldiers stationed in the outpost in Semangka died or were so ill they had to return to Batavia within nine months13).

The deterioration of Banten's power and influence and the rise of trading rivals and smuggling continued to plague the VOC throughout the 18th century and its policies towards Lampung were primarily guided by its desire to enforce an illusory pepper monopoly. Even if the Dutch were not controlling all of the

80 Securing Sumatra's Pepper Periphery

pepper trade they still earned quite a bit from pepper, accounting for an estimated one-third of its entire income in the 18th century, ensuring continuing efforts to project the VOC's influence in southernmost Sumatra14). J. de Rovere van Breugel's 1788 account of the VOC's activities in Lampung during the 18th century features the difficulties experienced in maintaining the pepper monopoly and how the waning power of the Sultanate and the VOC created a disruptive vacuum of power in Lampung that left the political and economic conditions of this once promising prize in a woeful condition at the time the Dutch government assumed control at the outset of the 19th century15). In 1724 pepper deliveries from Banten, mostly produced in Lampung, peaked at an estimated 19, 000 bahras16). By the 1780s, the VOC's once lucrative pepper monopoly had vanished as deliveries fell to 5,500 bahras. Rovere van Breugel argued that the decline in pepper production was related to the subsistence mentality of the Lampungers, a popular refrain among subsequent 19th and 20th century colonial officials, and the ineffectiveness of the Bantenese Sultanate in maintaining order in Lampung conducive to trade, raising the possibility that more extensive intervention by the VOC in Lampung could reverse the flagging fortunes of the pepper trade17). As early as the 1730s the VOC acted on its concerns about the decline in pepper deliveries by conducting two official inquiries into this problem which concluded that the Sultan of Palembang, pirates and the English were up to their old tricks, flouting the cherished illusion of the Company's pepper monopoly. The forts constructed in the 1680s had been abandoned, but once again the VOC felt obliged to gain a foothold in northern Lampung, realizing that from its vantage in Banten it could not effectively monitor its trading interests in the wilds of Lampung. In 1737 Fort Valkenoog was established far inland on the Tulang Bawang river in the Bumi Agung area, closer to the source of pepper production than the earlier fort in the downriver Menggala settlement, with a contingent of one European official and 20 native soldiers18). The VOC issued orders that its representative should maintain peace in the region, apparently troubled by endemic warfare and marauding pirates, promote the pepper trade and keep a watchful eye on Palembang intrigues, a tall order for this 81 東南アジア-歴史と文化- No. 19, l990 farflung outpost. At the time, VOC officials privately conceded that Banten's (and by inference their own) influence in the area was negligible and therefore a forward policy was necessary19). Shortly thereafter, in 1750, rebellion broke out in Banten related to dynastic complications in which the VOC played no small part. During the 18th century the Banteness court was in tumult with the Dutch ushering new compliant leaders in as fast as they could rid themselves of recalcitrant satraps20). In 1750 rebellion broke out in protest against the VOC's machinations and its unpopular choice for Sultan. The VOC was briefly driven from Banten in pitched battles and supporters of the rebels also drove the VOC from its foothold in Tulang Bawang. Within a year the VOC reclaimed its position in Banten and Lampung at considerable cost and its authority was never seriously chal- lenged in either region during the last four decades of its operations in the Ind- ies21) However, unquestioned authority did not translate into effective trading operations and the inroads made by pirates, the Palembangers and English continued to siphon off a rising share of the pepper trade. In 1763, with a specific view towards the English smuggling actvities, the VOC established a second outpost in the Semangka Bay region, just around the Kroe isthmus from the British factory at Bengkulu. Here the VOC also bloodied its nose, briefly losing the fort to the British in 1781, but in larger sense, neither this small outpost, Petrus Albertus, nor its brother, Valkenoog on the Tulang Bawang were successful in achieving their purpose; the once vaunted pepper monopoly with Lampung had sprung serious leaks which could not be plugged. By the end of the 18th century the pepper trade had, for the most part, fallen into the hands of small scale traders, so called "smugglers", and VOC deliveries from Tulang Bawang alone had dropped from 2,000 bahra in 1683 to 25 bahra in 178622).

4. On the Eve of Dutch Colonialism Writing during WWI, Roelofs Broersma concluded that the Dutch had not yet accomplished much in terms of bestowing the fruits of colonialism on 82 Securing Sumatra's Pepper Periphery

Lampung, suggesting that the grim legacy of the 18th century plagued and undermined colonial efforts throughout the 19th century23). At the end of the

18th century Lampung emerges in the Dutch literature as a troubled land, wracked with famine and disease, infested with pirates and showing the ill effects of protracted internecine warfare. The Sultan had effectively abdicated control over Lampung to the VOC at the end of the 17th century, but the VOC was never able to effectively fill the vacuum of power left by the decline of

Banten, plunging Lampung into what Broersma describes as a "century of darkness and decline".

While the people of Lampung may have experienced some troubles at the time, there is no evidence that the situation had deteriorated markedly from conditions prevailing in the past; Dutch writers assumed that declining profits earned by the VOC from Lampung's trade reflected general socio-economic conditions for which we have little evidence. It may well be that Lampung experienced a century of darkness and decline, but it is largely a matter of speculation. From a Lampung vantage, it was a period when external inter- ventions abated, and it is quite possible that a lively export trade continued to flourish, with the VOC's operations supplanted by those of small scale indigenous traders. The standard depiction of Lampung as a war ravaged territory at the end of the 18th century is also highly speculative and most certainly an exaggeration. The one 18th century account of a battle in Lampung where the coastal Malays attacked inland Abung villages in retaliation for alleged head hunting raids suggests that "warring" between groups had less than catastro- phic effects. In the campaign ten Abung villages were razed, but only one Abunger was reported killed while the sole Malay casualty occurred from stepping on a sharpened spike stuck in the ground24). Apparently the Abung settlements merely relocated in the interior, perhaps suggesting that warfare led to migrations rather than decimation of populations. As argued for the

Bataks to the north, the ferocity of wars in pre-colonial indigenous society was probably limited and the accounts of chaos were exaggerated as a pretext for colonial intervention25).

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In 1793 the VOC finally abandoned its outpost in Tulang Bawang, leaving Lampung ungoverned, unwilling to submit to external authority and a welcome refuge to the highwaymen who plied the busy commerce in and around Java and Sumatra26). Rotten with corruption and overextended in its operations, the VOC fell into insolvency and on the last day of the 18th century transferred its eastern "possessions" to the Dutch government, including Lampung, somewhat worse for the wear. The legacy of what Dutch scholars viewed as anarchy, famine, declining pepper production and infestations of pirates from as far away as the Sulu archipelago greeted the Dutch colonial government when it took over where the VOC left off.

5. The Lampung Quagmire: The Pacification of Lampung 1805- 1856 In 1800 external influence in Lampung was minimal and local chiefs were the sole form of "government", enjoying and exercising limited authority rarely extending beyond the villages in the immediate vicinity. The Napoleonic Wars in Europe left the colonial situation confused in the Indies and the European market for pepper effectively dormant. Prior to the arrival of Governor General Daendals (1808-1811), appointed to administer the Dutch colony, disturbing reports from Lampung had already prompted his predecessors, with the assistance of the decrepit Bantenese Sultanate, to launch an expedition in 1805 to clear the land of "pirates and troublesome elements"27). This was the first of many inconclusive expeditions launched by the Dutch against Lampung, a region that unwillingly submitted to colonial rule and successfully resisted per- sistent aggressions by the Dutch State over five decades. In 1808 Governor General Daendals terminated the Sultanate of Banten and from that date the Dutch assumed direct control over the affairs of Lampung. At this point the Dutch had limited means at their disposal and mainly concen- trated efforts in Java so that areas such as Lampung were left simmering on the colonial backburner. At about the time that Governor General Daendals conferred direct rule on Banten and Lampung, it is reported that he met one of the more powerful local chiefs in Lampung, Raden Intan. Raden Intan 84 Securing Sumatra's Pepper Periphery emerges as a notorious figure in the Dutch literature, believed to be half Lampunger and half Bantenese with blood ties with the Sultan of Lingga28). He was based in the marga Negara Ratoe in the mountainous Varkenshoek of southeast Lampung and reportedly held sway about half way up the eastern coast, drawing a large measure of support from the pirate groups infesting the coastal littoral. Whether a rogue or not, Raden Intan was the closest thing to a powerful leader in Lampung known to the Dutch at that time and since there was little the Dutch could do to oust him, and with a variety of other more important tasks at hand, Governor General Daendals may have named him Prince Regent of Lampung with the rank of colonel. It is not certain that this indeed was the case because Governor General Daendals left no records of having named Raden Intan as the government's representative and Raden Intan himself is the sole source for this alleged appointment. When the Dutch first arrived in 1817, following a six year interregnum during which the English under Raffles held power in the East Indies (1811-1816), Raden Intan met with a Dutch representative who duly reported the status claimed by Raden Intan. Virtually all colonial sources dealing with Raden Intan express skepticism that Governor General Daendals would have appointed such a "villainous brigand" as the State's representative and there is a self-serving consensus that many of the ills of Lampung could be ascribed to the depredations of Raden Intan the "usurper" and his followers 29). From this perspective it was a short step to justifying Dutch rule, rendering it a mission to save the people from the alleged iniquities of their venal traditional leaders. Of course the Lampungers had no monopoly on rogues and Dutch officials had to be sacked for abuses, but in the larger scheme of things the Dutch believed that such ugly incidents did not detract from the overall good they were accomplishing; colonial excesses were forgiven for it was assumed that they were generally well intentioned aberra- tions. Whether appointed by Governor General Daendals or not, in 1817 the Dutch judged Raden Intan to be sufficiently powerful and troublesome to warrant a substantial pension of f. 1200 per year and an additional f. 600 per year for 85 東南アジア-歴史と文化-NO. 19, 1990 each of his two brothers30). In exchange Raden Intan was required to pledge allegiance to the Dutch, renounce his claims to being Prince Regent in the region and generally not trouble the colonial officials. Contemporary archival sources suggest that Raden Intan was a very powerful leader belying subsequent shrill attempts on the part of Dutch scholars to dismiss him as a self -aggrandizing figure with very limited authority31). Raden Intan had to be portrayed as a treacherous usurper so that his demands for local autonomy could be dis- missed while providing a pretext for Dutch intervention. Emmanuel Francis, who enjoyed an illustrious career as a Resident in Min- angkabau and eventually served as president of the Java Bank, wrote his memoirs in 1864, recalling among other things his first posting to Lampung in 181882. Clearly Lampung left a strong impression on Mr. Francis and even forty five years after the fact he resisted the chance to wax enthusiastically about the region, mostly dwelling on his own heroic exploits in the face of insurmountable odds. In reading his memoirs one is left with the impression that with a few dozen of his kind the Dutch could have made short work of pacifying the archipelago. As a fresh recruit Francis reported to Assistant Resident Dubois in Bumi Agung, Lampung for instructions. He drew an undesirable first assignment, detailed to survey some very swampy regions of northern Lampung, an area embroiled in political unrest, for the preparation of the first map of Lampung. While Francis only briefly describes his experiences in Lampung there is much in his fast paced narrative to lend a sense of the economic and political tasks at hand which shed considerable light on subsequent Dutch efforts and problems in the province33). Francis allowed how there certainly were many difficulties hampering the work of the colonial official in Java, but these paled next to the difficulties involved in administering Lampung where he described the situation as being a hundred times more dreadful34). As later residents would repeat ad nauseum, he noted the execrable condition of the roads, little more than overgrown foot- paths, and the sparsity of population, lamenting that he could walk a day without seeing any but the faces of his Buginese troops. For the colonial offi- 86 Securing Sumatra's Pepper Periphery

cials who followed, the lack of good communications and scarce population represented substantial obstacles to developing a land deemed rich in potential. For six months Francis traipsed around Lampung, leaving him with the impression that it was a land of pirates, malcontents and leeches. Events in Palembang, however, interrupted his idyllic cartographic survey providing him the opportunity for a number of swashbuckling exploits. Palembang and the Dutch were at odds over trade matters and the unwillingness of the Sultan to accept the Dutch as his master. Initially the Dutch expedition against Palembang failed, but in 1821 they were able to vanquish the Sultan of Palembang. By this time Lampung was beginning to move up on the colonial agenda, a pocket of anarchy (i. e. not yet subjugated) laying between the defeated Sultanates of Palembang and Banten. From Francis' account it is clear that the Dutch had their work cut out for them in Lampung. From the colonial government's perspective, the land was embroiled in political turbulence and lawlessness inimical to economic prosperity and trade. Furthermore, the dispersed population and poor communications were severe obstacles to development. For the remainder of the century the government strove to overcome these political and economic problems while transforming its own relative irrelevance to a presence to be reckoned with.

Economic interests figured prominently in Dutch efforts to consolidate rule in Lampung, involving eight expeditions between 1805-1856. It was generally believed that Lampung's economy was in a shambles by the time that the Dutch assumed direct control in 1808, but colonial officials were convinced that proper administration and peace could soon restore the land to its former glory as the pepper pot of Indonesia3b). In addition, Lampung occupied a strategic position commanding the Straits of Sunda, one of the two main gateways to the Far East from the Indian Ocean and was also a nexus for inter-island trade. Above all, the threat of the English usurping Dutch control in Lampung was very real and a source of grave consternation36). Raffles apparently had plans for gaining control of Lampung as a means to extend British control over the key waterways at both ends of Sumatra. He maintained that the 87 東南アジア-歴史と文化- No. 19, 1990

Dutch government had no claim to Lampung and it thus was not covered by the Congress of Vienna under the provision of which The Netherlands recovered its eastern possessions from the English in 1816. The Dutch were not amused by Raffles' suggestion in 1818 that Dutch claims in Lampung were no more legitimate than British claims to Calais and registered strong protests with the Governor General in Bengal, in the end prevailing. Nonetheless the Dutch continued to harbor concerns about British intentions towards Lampung, only partially alleviated by the Treaty of London (1824) which delineated spheres of influence and territorial control between the rivals. It is safe to say that the Dutch and British never fully trusted each other and this mistrust translated into a determination on the part of the Dutch to make good their claim to Lampung by establishing peace and administrative order. The economic potential of Lampung always exceeded its performance, but it certainly was not going to be left vulnerable for the nefarious intrigues of the English, a bete noire of the 19th century Dutch colonial official. The first Assistant-Resident in Lampung, J. A. Dubois (1818-1834) convincingly argued to his superiors that for little investment the Dutch could consolidate their position in Lampung and stood to reap substantial returns once the political situation became set- tled37). However, as the Dutch came to learn, establishing peace and the rule of law would prove a formidable task. Raden Intan, the pensioned Prince Regent, was not coopted for long and numerous allegations about his extortions from traders and intimidation of other local chiefs aroused the ire of local colonial officials. Unable to ignore the repeated challenges to their nebulous authority and urged on by Dubois, the authorities in Batavia sent a small expedition of 43 men to arrest Raden Intan in 1825. Upon meeting the Dutch representatives, Raden Intan pleaded ill health and requested a week before he accompanied the troops back to the ship. One night while waiting for Raden Intan to recover, the Dutch were attacked by his followers and the leader of the expedition was slain38). There were predict- able calls to revenge this "treachery", but the demands of the Java War (1825 -1830) held the Dutch hand. It was not until 1832 that a reprisal expedition of 250 troops was launched, but by this time Raden Intan had died (1828) and 88 Securing Sumatra's Pepper Periphery

the intent was to destroy the fortifications erected by his son Raden Imba Kusuma. This was the second in a long line of inconclusive campaigns waged in Lampung, the Dutch continually frustrated by the rebels tendency to disappear into the forests at the sight of government troops. By this time there was no question of winning "hearts and minds", the Dutch meant business and had scores to settle, torching the abandoned villages and laying waete to the land, a practice later described as "customary at that time- 39)" During this expedition the Dutch lost a captain in Semangka, in southwestern Lampung, a region which was also up in arms against the Dutch under the leadership of Dalem Mangkunegara. The resistance to colonial intrusion in Semangka proved to be every bit as intractable as that in the IV Margas (Negara Ratu, Dantaran, Raja Bassa and Wai Orang) where Raden Intan and his successors held sway in southeastern Lampung, forcing the Dutch to launch continued expeditions that were no more effective in securing Dutch interests than the numerous scathing reports about the indigenous local leaders submitted by colonial officials.

In 1833 the Dutch launched two more campaigns against Raden Imba Kusuma, with over 1,200 soldiers and supporting warships. Again the opposition fleed and villages were torched until the Dutch reached the rebel fort Radja Gepe nestled in the mountainous terrein nearbye the marga Negara Ratu. Despite repeated attempts the Dutch were not able to overcome the rebel defenses and retired to Java. The Dutch remained determined, however, to have their way in Lampung and in the following year yet another expedition was launched which successfully destroyed the rebel fortress and chased Raden Imba Kusuma into hiding with his relative, the Sultan of Lingga. Under pressure from the Dutch, however, the Sultan was compelled to turn Raden Imba Kusuma over to the colonial authorities who exiled him to Timor40). No sooner than they had pacified the IV Margas, the Dutch found their hands full with Dalem Mangkunegara, the Semangka based marga leader who also had rallied his followers in armed rebellion against the European interlopers41). He was chased into hiding by a large expedition in 1843, but the tenor of 89 東南アジア-歴史と文化-No. 19, 1990 reports submitted by colonial officials even twelve years later suggest that he remained their biggest headache, exercising authority, (or as the Dutch would have it, "wreaking havoc"), in remote areas of Lampung, most of which lay distant and untouched by the short arm of Dutch authority42). Outside the small Dutch settlements the reach of the government was quite short and never sustained in the first half of the 19th century43). In an area nearly as large as The Netherlands one or two European officers and a handful of troops were the sole sustained presence of the Dutch, a near absence exploited by the local heads to maintain their own power and prosperity. Lampung social relations and institutions had been largely unaffected by the colonial intrusions, irksome as they were. The indigenous leaders knew that the Dutch would come with an expedition, but this could easily be eluded and when it departed for the friendlier climes of Java, life went on as before. While we have no reports from the Lampungers' perspective, one can speculate that they must have been resentful and mildly bewildered at the grim determination of the Europeans to wreak havoc in their lands, burning villages and crops and killing non-belligerents. The persistence of rebellious opposition, smuggling and piracy in all corners of Lampung was a constant reproach to the colonial government and its preten- sions, but in 1846 the authorities in Batavia advised officials in Lampung to carry on as best as they could and avoid hostilities with the rebels. There was no consensus behind launching yet another expedition, especially as troops were already spread quite thin in Java with seven companies in action at various hotspots spread throughout the archipelago44). The State was discovering that translating treaty rights into effective governance was more troublesome than it had bargained for; the carefully drawn maps imparted an order that did not exist and did not convey the people's desire to be left to their own devices.

This brief interlude in the hostilities was not to last as the history of Lam- pung once again was intertwined with that of Banten. Lampung had long been viewed as a security risk in that many of the government's most bitter enemies 90 Securing Sumatra's Pepper Periphery

in Banten would make the brief journey across the Straits of Sunda and take refuge in the wilds of Lampung, far from the reach of the Crown's servants, from where they could slip back into Banten at short notice. In 1850 rebellion broke out in Banten led by Haji Wachia who was forced to flee to Lampung when the colonial troops seized the upper hand45). In Lampung the forces of Islam and tradition joined together, as Haji Wachia and his followers formed an alliance with the young Raden Intan II, the son of Raden Imba Kusuma46). Realizing that peace could never be restored in Banten as long as Lampung remained unpacified, the Dutch abandoned their hands off policy and launched their seventh expedition in 1851. As with the earlier campaigns the fighting was inconclusive, the rebels elusive and the Dutch eventually tried to achieve by diplomacy what they could not win on the alternately mountainous or swampy battlefields. In 1853 the government pardoned Raden Intan and it was believed that relations had improved dramatically, with the local colonial official accepting an elephant from the young prince as a token of his sincerity. The fragile peace did not last for long. Claiming breech of faith and extra- ordinary provocations, (it seems that Lampungers were yet determined to rule in their own land), the government launched a final conclusive campaign from August to October 185647). Toting their cannons through swamps and steep ravines the Dutch were able to breach the rebel fortifications and chase down the evaporating forces of Raden Intan II who in the end was betrayed by a local village head and died by hanging. Two years later the Dutch managed to quell rebellion in Semangka as well, making peace with the son of Dalem Mangkunegara, Pagger Alam alias Orang Kalipa who had carried on a low level guerrilla campaign with a band of sixty odd followers48). Thus brought an end to a half century of resistance to colonialism. There were subsequent disturbances of a messianic nature49), but these were isolated incidents. The second half of the 19th century is the story of State efforts to bestow administrative organization, build better roads and undermine the alleged subsistence mentality of Lampungers, cited as the main obstacle to government development efforts.

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Conclusion The annexation of Lampung was achieved at considerable effort and cost stretching over five decades during which time it was evident that Dutch pre- tensions to power were exagerrated. The Dutch were lured by potential riches from the pepper trade, acted to exclude their European rivals and sought revenge against those who resisted the imposition of colonial rule. Lampungers exploited their vast area and difficult terrain, but were unable to hold off the Dutch partially due to parochial social organization; supravillage ties were limited and even the most powerful traditional leaders held sway in narrowly -circumscribed areas. As elsewhere throughout the archipelago, Lampung eventually succumbed to military superiority and dogged persistence, unable to successfully respond to the new challenges to local authority. As colonial power ;grew in the latter half of the 19th century, these new challenges multiplied and intensified as the Dutch sought to translate annexation into effective governance. Nonetheless, up through the end of the 19th century colonial rule was more apparent than real as there were too few officials to effectively implement numerous policy initiatives. Indirect rule came to coopt, channel and undermine the authority of traditional leaders, accelerating change in social structures and the way people viewed the world and acted in it. Future essays will elucidate and examine how indigenous institutions, leaders, customs and perceptions responded to and influenced the less violent, but gradually more pervasive and enduring contacts with the colonial state which ensued.

Notes 1) Despite its economic and strategic importance there is a relative paucity of modern studies on Lampung. See J. Kingston "The Manipulation of Tradition in Java's Shadow: Transmigration, Decentralzation and the Ethical Policy in Colonial Lampung", unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1987. 2) e. g., John R. W. Smail, "On the Possibility of an Autonomous History of Modern Southeast Asia, " Journal of Southeast Asian History, vol. 2 (1961), pp. 72-102; Soedjatmoko, "An Approach to Indonesian History: 92 Securing Sumatra's Pepper Periphery

Towards an Open Future, " Cornell Modern Indonesia Translation Series (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1960); Sue Nichterlein, "Historicism and Historiography in Indonesia, " History and Theory in the Philosophy of History, vol. 13 (1974), pp. 253-272. 3) R. Broersma, De Lampongsche Districten, (Batavia: Javasche Boekhan del, 1914), pp. 152-153. 4) J. W. J. Wellan, "Onze Eerste Aanrekening met Lampoeng. " TBG, vol. 78a (1937), p.146. 5) J. de Rovere van Breugel, "Beschriving van Bantam en de Lampongs. BKI, vol.5 (1856), pp. 319-326. 6) H. D. Canne, "Bijdrage tot der Gescheidenis der Lampong, " BKI, V (1862), pp. 514-515. For an excellent discussion of a controversial piagem, and what it may or may not say about Bantenese-Lampung relations see Th. Pigeaud, "Afkondingen van Bantamsche Soeltans voor Lampoeng.", Djawa, vol. 9, no. 4 & 5(1929), pp. 123-159. 7) This position was not without its hazards and subject to arbitrary ruth- lessness on the part of officials obsessed with smuggling and demonstrating their authority. See the biography of a Minangkabau pepper trader in Lampung translated by William Marsden, Memoirs of a Malayan Family Written by Themselves, (London: The Oriental Translation Fund, 1830). For a critical commentary and estimable discussion of the historical roots: and controversies raised in this manuscript see, G. W. J. Drewes, "De, Biographie van een Minangkabausen Peperhandeler in de Lampongs.", BKI, vol. 36 (1961), pp. 1-159. 8) Citing Tomes Pires Suma Oriental and drawing on other sources Meilink Roelofsz, Asian Trade and European Influence in the Indonesian Archipe- lago Between 1500 and About 1630, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962), pp. 92, 153, notes the sharp rise in Lampung pepper production in the 16th century and it appears from Rovere de Breugel, op. cit., p. 343 that until the early 18th century there was considerable further expansion. 9) H. Djajadiningrat, Tinjuan Kritis Tentang Sejarah Banten, (Jakarta: Djambatan, 1983. 1st published in Dutch in 1913), p. 189. For numerous; brief references from the Dagh Register about the travels and trade of the: VOC's ships in the Lampung region during the 17th century see J. W. J. Wellan, op. cit., passim. 10) J. W. J. Wellan, op. cit., pp. 141-143. 11) J. W. J. Wellan, ibid., p. 147. The edict conferring the monopoly was: signed 8/22/1682. 12) ibid., p. 151; It is reported that the VOC staged a brief expedition in 93 東南アジア-歴史と文化-No. 19, 1990

1684 to disperse pirates in the Tulang Bawang area while in 1687 in the southwest corner of Lampung, in Semangka Bay, the VOC tangled with the English. See R. Broersma, op. cit., p. 25. 13) N. Macleod, "De Oost-Indische Compagne op Sumatra in de 17 Eeuw." Indisch Gids, Vol. 28, I (1906), p. 798. 14) R. Broersma, op. cit., p. 166. 15) J. de Rovere van Breugel, op. cit., pp. 309-362. This account draws on early 18th century sources up through the 1780s when he wrote his account. His descriptions of the VOC in Banten and Lampung were not published until 1856, the year that the Dutch finally put an end to intermittent unrest which had plagued the State's colonial efforts in Lampung for the preceding five decades. 16) ibid., p. 343. Meilink-Roelofsz mistakenly refers to these figures as the total pepper production throughout the Indies while it appears that Rovere de Breugel only referred to the Bantenese trade and that a lion's share of this total emanated from Lampung. 17) ibid., pp. 326-329, 351-352. In citing a 1749 VOC report the author notes conflict between two ethnic groups, the Abungs to the north and the Pubians in central Lampung which disrupted pepper production. He took the Sultan to task for not interceding, perhaps reflecting how far the powers of the once commanding sultanate had waned. 18) ibid., p. 341. The fort was named after the reigning Governor General Valkenier. Other sources date the fort to 1738 with a contingent of 28 men. H. D. Canne, op. cit., p. 341. 19) 1738 VOC document cited by R. Broersma, op. cit., p. 25. Apparently, in a bid to shore up its pepper monopoly the VOC resorted to paying off local chiefs to promise to sell only to the VOC, surmising that the Sultan's title and tribute system was no longer functioning. 20) For a brief overview of the VOC's involvement in Bantenese dynastic conflicts see M. C. Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia, Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, pp. 101-102. 21) E. B. Kielstra indicates without citation that the same fort was razed in 1755, but it is not clear whether he may have been confused on the dates and was referring to the 1750-51 events or indeed had evidence of another outbreak of rebellion. See E. B. Kielstra, "De Lampongs. ", Onze Eeuw, vol.15, no.2 (1915), p.246. 22) H. D. Canne, op. cit., pp. 517-518. 23) R. Broersma, op. cit., p. 30. 24) W. Marsden, op. cit., pp. 9-13. 94 Securing Sumatra's Pepper Periphery

25) Lance Castles, "Statelessness and Stateforming Tendencies Among the Batak Before Colonial Rule, "in A. Reid and L. Castles (eds.), Pre- Colonial State Systems in Southeast Asia, (Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 1979), Monograph Series no. 6, p. 75. 26) In 1784 pirates from Sulu settled on the central east coast of Lampung near Seputih where they conducted an active slave trade stretching from Lampung to Banten, Bangka, West Borneo, Riouw and Lingga. By 1793 they reportedly were well established and erected a fort with 14 cannons. Herman T. Colenbrander, Koloniale Geschiedenis, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1925), Vol. II, p. 286. 27) ibid., p. 286. 28) Raden Intan is a national hero and there is a vast amount of writing about what little is known about his career and somewhat more about that of his illustrious and rebellious son, Raden Imba Kasuma, and grandson, Raden Intan II. For an early and detailed archival description that has not yet been tapped by his biographers see I 07 (Report on Conditions in Lampung 1820). Some standard references include, "Raden Intan. Bijdrage tot de Kennis der Geschiedenis van de Lampongs. "TNI, (new series) vol. 4, I (1875), pp. 165-180; Z. Arifin Ryagede, In Memoriem Radin Inten, Jakarta: Panitia Peringatan Pahlawan Raden Intan, 1956; Sejarah Daerah Lampung, Jakarta: Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayan, 1977/ 78. For a particularly unflattering portrayal of Raden Intan as a self- aggrandizing usurper that is characteristic of colonial views on the recalcitrant line of Lampung's erstwhile rulers see P. H. van der Kemp, Het Nederlandsch-Indie Bestuur van 1718 op 1818. Over de Molukken, Suma- tra, Billiton en de Lampongs, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1917. 29) R. Broersma, op. cit., pp. 30-39; E. B. Kielsta, op. cit., p. 248. 30) R. Broersma, op, cit., p. 32. 31) I 06 1818 Letter from Assistant Resident Dubois who was stationed in Lampung from 1818-1834 where he died. 32) E. Francis, Herinneringin uit mijn Dienst-Tijd in Nederlandsch Indie, Leiden: n. p, 1864. 33) ibid., pp. 7-137 23-24. 34) ibid., p.8. 35) I 09, Assistant Resident Dubois' thoughts about Lampung circa 1823. Also see KITLV H407, a lengthy report on various aspects of Lampung recorded in 1817 by Lieut. J. D. Kruseman. 36) See P. H. van der Kemp "Raffles Bezetting van de Lampongs in 1818.", BKI, 6e vlgrks., VI(L), (1899), pp. 1-58; C. A. H. Kuhr, "Eene Procla- 95 東南アジア-歴史と文化-No. 19, 1990

matie van Sir Thomas Raffles aan de Margahoofden der Lampongsche Districten. "BKI, 4e vlgrk, 3e deel. pp. 330-337. 37) I 09 Kort Overzicht der Lampung 1823. 38) Of course it is conveniently overlooked that the Dutch were intent on doing harm to Raden Intan, but "natives" were expected to do the bidding of the Crown, and his self-defense is thus equated with treachery. 39) E. B. Kielstra, op. cit., p. 256. 40) For a good description of Dutch efforts against Raden Imba Kusuma see E. B. Kielstra, "De Lampongs van 1832-1834. "IG, no. i (1888), pp. 667-681. 41) For good summary descriptions of the troubles in Semangka, which is generally given less attention in the secondary literature see, Arsip Na- sional Republik Indonesia. Ikhtisar Keadaan Politik Hindia-Belanda Tahun 1839-1848, (Penerbitan Sumber-Sumber Sejarah, No. 5.), Jakarta: Arsip Nasional, 1977, pp. 126-133; J. H. R. Kohler, "Bijdrage tot de Kennis der Geschiedenis van de Lampongs. " TNI, (new series) 1(1874), pp. 122-151, 325-351. For contemporary accounts see II 03 Algemeen Verslag 1838; II 04 Algemeen Verslag 1839; II 08 Algemeen Verslag 1845. 42) III 03 Political Report for Lampung 1855. It is interesting in this regard that Raden Intan's grandson who had the same name was considered much less of a threat to Dutch interests only a year before the final expedition of 1856 primarily aimed at pacifying he and his Bantenese supporters. The military authority in command mistakenly believed that he had reached an agreement with Raden Intan II. 43) J. H. R. Kohler the Civiele en Militaire Gezaghebber lamented as late as 1854 that the government's influence in Lampung was tenuous in general and absolutely nil in Semangka. II 13 Algemeen Verslag Lampung 1854. 44) E. B. Kielstra, "De Lampongs. " Onze Eeuw, vol. 15, no. II (1915), p. 263. 45) For details on the 1850 rebellion and its leaders consult, W. A van Rees, Wachia, Taykong en Amir, of Het Nederlandsch-Indisch Leger in 1850, Rotterdam: H. Nijgh, 1859. For a brief summary of the Bantenese political spillover into Lampung see Sartono Kartodirdjo, The Peasants Revolt of Banten in 1888-Its Conditions, Course and Seguel; A Case Study of Social Movements in Indonesia, VKI no. 50, (The Hague: M. Nijhoff), pp. 122-127. 46) This is the rebellion joined by the protagonist fleeing by prauw across the Straits of Sunda from persecution in Lebak, Banten depicted in E. Douwes Dekkker (Multatuli), Max Havelaar(1859). 96 Securing Sumatra's Pepper Periphery

47) For a comtemporary account written by the officer in charge of the campaign see the lively narrative of A. W. P. Weitzel, Schetsen uit het Oorlogsleven in Nederlandsch Indie., De Lampongs in 1856, (Gorinchem: J. Noorduijn en Zoon, 1862). A substantial archival bundle relating to the 1856 campaign and preceding events is stored under the AGS Geheime Besluiten-1856 July 29, L. NI. In this bundle, Missive 12 November 1855, no. 1830 contains a lengthy and unflattering account of Raden Intan, Raden Imba Kusuma and Raden Intan II, providing an overview of the political tumult in southeastern Lampung from 1808. 48) III 05 Political Report for Lampung 1857. 49) There are three recorded instances of messianic movements in Lampung. For details concerning Raden Mohammad in 1867 see "Patrouille-Tocht in de Lampongsche Districten", Militaire Tijdschrift, vol. 1(1870), pp. 28-33; III 15 Political Report for 1867; N 15 Monthly Reports for Lampung 1867; AGS Kommissorial March 8, 1868 (Process Verbaal and related letters and papers). For reports on Kemis, a women who dressed as a man, leaped around and made strange noises see IV 22 Monthly Reports for Lampung 1875. For Benkas, whose white robes and white horse caused quite a stir see N 25 Monthly Reports for Lampung 1878.

BIBLIOGRAPHY Journal Abbreviations BKI- Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde van Nederlandsch- Indies IG-Indisch Gids KS-Koloniale Studien KT-Koloniale Tijdschrift TBB-Tijdschrift voor het Binnenlandsch Bestuur TBG-Tijdschrift voor Indisch Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde VKI-Verhandelingen van het Koninklijke Instituut voor Taal-, Land en Volkenkunde I. Bibiliographical and Research Sources Chijs, J. A. van der. Catalogus der Bibliotheek van het Bataviaasche Genoot- schap van Kuntsen en Wetenschappen. Batavia: Lange & Co., 1864. Connover, Helen F., comp. The Netherlands East Indies. Washington, D. C.: Library of Congress, Division of Bibliography, 1942. Doorn, Marlene van and Telkamp, Gerald, Bouwstoffen voor de Social Eco- nomische Geschiedenis van Indonesie van ca. 1800 tot 1940; een Beschrivende Bibliographie- 2 vols; Indexes Koloniale Studien, Koloniaal Tijdschirift en 97 東南アジア-歴史と文化-NO. 19, 1990

De Indische Gids. Amsterdam: Instituut voor de Tropen, 1979. Jacquet, Frits G. P., comp. Sources of the History of Asia and Oceania in the Netherlands. 2vols. New York: K. G. Saur, 1983. Kennedy, Raymond. Bibliography of Indonesian Peoples and Cultures. Revised and edited by T. Maretzli and H. T. Fisher. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962. Muttalib, Jang Aisjah. The History and Society of South Sumatra, 1800- 1920: Publications in New York Libraries. New York: Southern Asian Institute, Columbia University, 1973. Occasional Bibliographical Papers, no. 2. Wellan, J. W. J., and Helfrich, O. L. Zuid Sumatra: Overzicht van de Literatuur der Gewesten Bengkoelen, Djambi, de Lampongsche Districten en Palembang. 2 vols.'s Gravenhage: H. L. Smits, 1923. II. Manuscript Sources A. Algemeen Generale Secretaris, Indonesia 1. Arsip National, JI. Gadja Mada, Jakarta (pre-1890 materials) Inventaris Arsip Lampung. Jakarta: Arsip Nasional, 1977. Consult for a comprehensive index to materials on Lampung from 1739 to 1890. All these inventoried items are stored together and are accessed by the call numbers listed in this index. I. Miscellaneous Letters and Reports 1739 to 1866; 1-20. II. General Yearly Reports 1832-1890; 1-49 111. Yearly Political Reports 1854-1873; 1-19. N. Monthly Reports 1853-1881; 1-28. Agricultural Reports 1863-1866; 29-31. Abbreviations: Ag. =Agenda; Ags. =Algemeen Generale Secretaris; B. (Bt.) =Besluit; Kab. =Kabinets Verbaal; Kl(Cl.)=Kommissorial; Mgs. =Missive Gouvernements Secreteris; R. (Rv.) =Renvoi; V.=Verbaal 1841 Ag. 1/31/1841, no.8 Ag. 4/1/1841, no.347 Ag. 8/19/1841, no.15 Ag. 10/16/1841, no.3882 1842 Ag. 4/29/1842, no. 1284 B. Ministry of Colonies, Algemeen Rijksarchief, The Hague There are numerous inventories for colonial documents on Indonesia. I found that the most useful was the Aantekingen Betreffende Zakelijke Ontwerpen. I give the Ministry of Colonies citation and in parentheses the dossier number by which the archives can be ordered at the Rijksarchief. (geh. =geheim or 98 curing Sumatra's Pepper Periphery secret) 19th Century Archives Verbaal V. 1/26/1836, no.7 V. 5/18/1847, no.7 V. 12/10/1849, no.3 V. 4/25/1850, no.7 V. 9/27/1850, no-17 V. 2/21/1851, no.13 V. 4/9/1851, no.27 V. 5/26/1851, no.13 V. 1/17/1853, no.35 V. 10/14/1856, no. 599 Geh. Private Papers Stored at Alg. Rijksarchief, 2 afd. C. P. H. C. E. Steinmetz Collection (Lampung ca. 1820-1835) (Folios 1 and 5.) C. Koninklijke Instituut voor Land-, Taal, en Volkenkunde H134b-Lampung 1818 H172-Muntinghe Letter 1818 H407-Kruseman, J. D. Kort Overzigt der Lampongsche Districten, 1817 H797 (Folio 321) Penjimbang Marga 1924 H797 (Folio 467) Islam in Menggala H1051 (Folio 96) Adat in Lampung H1148-P. L. C. Le Sueur, Mijn Wederwaardigheden Als Controleur Tijdens en na De Vulcanische Uitbarsting op het Eiland Krakatau op 8/26/1883. III. Printed Sources A. Primary Sources a. Published Official Documents Resume van het Onderzoek naar de Regten welke in de Gouvernements Landen op de Onbebouwde Gronden Worden Uitgeoefend. (Section C-Lampongsche Districten). Batavia: Landsdrukkerij, 1896. (First published in 1872) Royen, J. W. Van "Nota Over de Lampoengsche Merga's". Mededeelingen van de Afdeeling Bestuurszaken der Buitengewesten van het Departement van Binnenlandsche Bestuur. (Eerie B, No. 7.). Weltevreden: Landsdrukkerij, 1930. Rutgers, A. A. L. "De Pepercultuur in de Lampongsche Districten." Dept. van Landbouw, Nijverheid en Handel. Instituut voor Plantenziekten en Cultures. Mededeelingen van het Laboratorium voor Plantenziekten, no. 27. Batavia: Ruygrok, 1916. C. Contemporary Monographs 99 東南アジア-歴史と文化-No. 19, 1990

Adatrechtbundels Vol. XXXII(Zuid Sumatra). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1930. Broersma, Roelofs. De Lampongsche Districten. Betavia: Javasche Boekhandel, 1914. Bruyn Kops, G. F. de. Overzicht van Zuid-Sumatra. The Hague: The South Sumatra Institute, 1919. Collet, Octave J. A. Terres et Peuples de Sumatra. Amsterdam: Societe D'Edition "Elsevier", 1925. Djajadiningrat H. Critische Beschouwing van de Sedjarah Banten. Bijdrage ter Kenschetsing van de Javaansche Geschiedscrijving. Haarlem: Joh. Ensch- ede en Zonen, 1913. Hooyer, G. B. De Krijgsgeschiedenis van Nederlandsch-Indie van 1811 to 1894. Batavia: G. Kolff, 1895. Marsden, William. The History of Sumatra. Reprint of 3rd Edition. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1966. -. Memoirs of a Malayan Family Written by Themselves. London: The Oriental Translation Fund, 1830. Probonegoro, K. R. T. A. A. Lampung, Tanah dan Tiyangipun. Jakarta: Balai Pustaka, 1940. d. Contemporary Articles Aekerlin, J. A. "De Pangkat Pepadon in de Lampongsche Districten. " IG.. vol. 16, no. II (1894). Alexander. "Uit den Vreemde (De Lampongs)." Jaarboek Celebes 1864. pp. 78-90. "Blik op de Lampongsche Distrikten en Hunne Bevolking." TNI. XXIV(1862).

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I gratefully acknowledge support from the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science in writing this article and my ongoing research.

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