Securing Sumatra's Pepper Periphery: Resistance and Pacification in Lampung During the 18Th and 19Th Centuries

研究ノー卜 Securing Sumatra's Pepper Periphery: Resistance and Pacification in Lampung during the 18th and 19th Centuries Jeff Kingston 1. Introduction Lampungis a region located at the southernmost tip of Sumatra, geograph- ically separated from Java by a narrow, navigable straits that historically facilitated generally strong but vacillating economic,political and cultural ties with Banten in western Java. Lampung's history is inextricably intertwined with that of more powerfulexternal trading interests, within the Indonesian archipelagoand extendingfrom China to Western Europe, by virtue of its locationalong a major trading nexus, the Straits of Sunda, and because of the high quality and vast amounts of its pepper production.The region's profitable trade led successiveexternal forces to assert varying degressof suzeraintyover the-centuries, with attendant influenceson political and social institutions1). The first mention of Lampung in European sources is in the Portugese ex- plorer Tome Pires' Suma Oriental(1512-1515) which reflects a similar preoccu- pation with pepper while subsequent accounts from the representatives of the Dutch East India Company(VOC) and early Dutch colonial officials also largely ignore Lampung society, generally focusing on matters of trade. As a conse- quence, Lampung society is never treated on its own terms for it was primarily viewed as a source of profit, emergingas little more than a backgroundto the actions of Bantenese, Palembangers, English and Dutch. This is an unsatisf- actory, unidimensionallegacy with great potential for trapping the historian into an exceedingly narrow and unrevealing perspective. While a historian is always to somedegree a prisoner of his sources, I have tried to cast my net widely and infuse my account with the sensibilities imbued by the Indonesian 77 東南アジア-歴史と文化- No. 19, 1990 historiographical debates emerging since WWII2). Nevertheless, sensitivity and analytical acuity can not entirely compensate for the very blurred and indistinct image of society and people carried in these early sources. This essay traces the origins of colonial influence in Lampung against the backdrop of accelerated extension of Ducth colonial rule through much of the Indonesian archipelago during the 19th century. I have focused on the "obsta- cles" encountered by the VOC and subsequently the Dutch government in transforming this bountiful pepper pot to their own advantage while also trying to deconstruct some of the colonial myths about Lampung society and Lampu- ngers. While the contemporary sources impart a "Dutch eye view", it is poss- ible to infer and speculate in an informed manner about how Lampungers may have perceived and experienced Dutch intrusions and balance the false impress- ions conveyed about the range and extent of Dutch influence prior to the 20th century. 2. Banten's Lampung and the Coming of the Dutch East India Company (VOC) Whatever the degree of Banten's(a sultanate in western Java) influence in Lampung, it seems likely that it expanded its authority there to gain control over the trade in pepper3). At the time that the Dutch arrived in Indonesia at the end of the 16th century, Banten was one the preeminent trading powers in Java and derived most of its income from the pepper trade4). The Sultan of Banten maintained his control over this lucrative spice by appointing representatives who came to form a relatively centralized ruling hierarchy residing in the coastal regions and ports of Lampung to monitor deliveries and keep a watchful eye for smugglers and other interlopers. The Sultan agreed to buy all of the pepper delivered at a set price, although claiming 11%, at a minimum, as his royal tribute5). In fact the entire system was a form of tributary trade as the Lampung producers were compelled to deliver all of their produce at low prices under the threat of exile or death. In order to ensure compliance without the expense of mounting regular expeditions, the Sultan also employed a system whereby he bestowed various titles or courtly regalia on local traders or chief- 78 Securing Sumatra's Pepper Periphery Mainsresident in Lampung in exchange for their fealty, vigilance and prams (boats) laden with pepper. These titled traders were often provided with copper plates, piagems (charters), which granted them authority as representatives of the Sultan and spelled out in detail their obligations and penalties for non- compliance. While it is not certain that the regulations spelled out in recovered piagems were ever fully observed or are reliable sources at all, one example dated 1663 stipulated that every married man was required to plant 1, 000 pepper trees while bachelors had to plant 5006). The local traders and chiefs were charged with ensuring that pepper cultivation was expanded and delivered to the ap- pointed agents of the Sultan in Lampung or taken directly to Banten7). Whether at the behest of the Sultan or not, it appears that Lampungers did respond to the rise of the pepper trade and expanded production considerably while under Bantenese rule8). 3. Procuring the Prize: The Dutch East India Company (VOC) and Lampung The VOC first established contact with Banten in 1596 and its continuing interest in the Banten trade was certainly linked to the regular arrival of pepper prauws from Lampung every Autumn. The first reported hostilities of the VOC in Lampung occurred in 1633 in connection with a VOC initiative in Banten, but no special influence was spawned thereby and the VOC appears to have had limited contact directly with Lampung for the next half century9). The lucrative tributary pepper trade conducted by the Sultan of Banten(largely derived from production in Lampung) was covetously viewed by the VOC, a yearning which was intensified by competition from the Portugese, English, indigenous traders and pirates trying to get a foot in the door. Until the end of the 18th century the VOC demonstrated its unswerving resolve to convert the Sultan's pepper tribute from Lampung into its own monopoly, but ultimately it did not have the resources to match. There is a curious reference in the archival materials that sheds some light on the Dutch methods in securing their trading interests. In the early 1680s the 79 東南アジア-歴史と文化-NO. 19, 1990 Sultan's son, blessed with an amorous nature, had 30 wives and and an estimated 1,000 women in his harem. He approached the VOC's local representative and requested the company's assistance in requiring all of the villages to send their prettiest women to the court for his perusal and choice if they struck his fancy. The company official wrote to his superiors in Batavia, intimating how this request was not in his brief and requested advice on how to handle this delicate matter10). He received instructions that since the old sultan was nearing his end, it would behoove the company to curry the favor of the son and thus it was expected that the local official would work to further the company's interests in this regard. These tantalizing tidbits about the pandering proclvities of the VOC are a loose thread in the archives and there are no indications how the bewildered official executed his task, but in the event the son ousted the old sultan with the aid of the VOC. In exchange for its services, the VOC received a monopoly in the pepper trade based on the tributary system still maintained, to some degree, by the Sultan11). Five years later the new Sultan died, but by this time the Dutch were experienced in court intrigues and managed to retain their trading rights which they proceeded to back up by erecting two forts of their own in Lampung during 1687, one in the Tulang Bawang region and the other in Semangka12). As with the Sultan's earlier effort, leakages in the pepper trade, particularly in the prime producing region of northern Lampung, forced the VOC to try and counter the rising influence of Palembang. Weakened by dynastic struggles, the encroachment of the Dutch and the gathering strength of trading rivals such as the English and Palembang, the Sultan was in no position to enforce his monopoly. The VOC stepped in the breach with mixed success, abandoning the Tulang Bawang fort after only five months while nearly half of the con- tingent of 90 soldiers stationed in the outpost in Semangka died or were so ill they had to return to Batavia within nine months13). The deterioration of Banten's power and influence and the rise of trading rivals and smuggling continued to plague the VOC throughout the 18th century and its policies towards Lampung were primarily guided by its desire to enforce an illusory pepper monopoly. Even if the Dutch were not controlling all of the 80 Securing Sumatra's Pepper Periphery pepper trade they still earned quite a bit from pepper, accounting for an estimated one-third of its entire income in the 18th century, ensuring continuing efforts to project the VOC's influence in southernmost Sumatra14). J. de Rovere van Breugel's 1788 account of the VOC's activities in Lampung during the 18th century features the difficulties experienced in maintaining the pepper monopoly and how the waning power of the Sultanate and the VOC created a disruptive vacuum of power in Lampung that left the political and economic conditions of this once promising prize in a woeful condition at the time the Dutch government assumed control at the outset of the 19th century15). In 1724 pepper deliveries from Banten, mostly produced in Lampung, peaked at an estimated 19, 000 bahras16). By the 1780s, the VOC's once lucrative pepper monopoly had vanished as deliveries fell to 5,500 bahras.

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