UN Common Country Assessment 2005

Acknowledgements

The 2005 UN Common Country Assessment (CCA) document was produced by a drafting committee led by Mr. Christopher Louise (Advisor to the UN Resident Co-ordinator) and supported by Mr. Michele Ribotta (Head of Co-ordination Unit), Ms. Nanna Ahlmark (UN Coordination Officer), Ms. Daiana Marino (UNDESA Fellow) and Ms. May Seraphim (UN Coordination Assistant). The UN Country Team collectively undertook the CCA process and its involvement is described in the relevant section of the Report.

The cover design is inspired by the shape and form of human DNA. As with the DNA structure, the analysis in the Common Country Assessment depends on the complex relationship between two axes critical to the function of Egyptian society: human capabilities and state capabilities. It is the interplay of these features with the essential elements of participation, social contract and rule of law which determines the quality and pace of development in the country (see pp. 91-92).

1 UN Common Country Assessment 2005

Embracing the Spirit of the Millennium Declaration

United Nations Egypt

2005

Published by Moody Graphic Int.

Cover design concept by Mr. Antonio Vigilante Design by Ms. Simona Galbiati and Mr. Davide Galbiati

3 United Nations Country Team in Egypt United Nations Resident Coordinator Office Mr. Antonio Vigilante, Resident Coordinator (UNRC) Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) Mr. Abdel Latif Tabet, Country Representative International Civil Aviation Organization Mr. Mohamed Khonji, Regional Representative (ICAO) International Finance Corporation (IFC) Mr. Sami Haddad, Country Director International Labour Organization (ILO) Dr. Ibrahim Awad, Director International Monetary Fund (IMF) Mr. Cyrus Sassanpour, Senior Resident Representative International Organization for Migration (IOM) Ms. Iuliana Stefan, Chief of Mission International Telecommunication Union (ITU) Eng. Ebrahim Al Haddad, Regional Representative Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS Ms. Maha Aon, UNAIDS Country Officer (UNAIDS) United Nations Educational, Scientific and Mr. Mohamed Abdulrazzak, Director Cultural Organization (UNESCO) United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) Mr. Faysal Abdel-Gadir Mohamed, Resident Representative United Nations Human Settlement Programme Mr. Ali El Faramawi, Programme Manager (UN-Habitat) United Nations High Commissioner for Mr. Saad Al-Attar, Regional Representative Refugees (UNHCR) United Nations Information Centre (UNIC) Mr. Dysane Dorani, Director United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) Dr. Erma Manoncourt, Representative United Nations Development Programme Ms. Sophie De Caen, Deputy Resident (UNDP) Representative United Nations Industrial Development Mr. Massimo Garzelli, Representative and Head Organization (UNIDO) of Regional Office in Egypt United Nations Development Fund for Women Ms. Maya Morsy, Co-ordinator (UNIFEM) United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime Dr. Mohamed Abdul-Aziz, Regional (UNODC) Representative United Nations Truce Supervision Mr. Hans Nielsen, Chief Observer Organization (UNTSO) Universal Postal Union (UPU) Mr. Negib Boulares, Regional Advisor World Food Programme (WFP) Mr. Bishow Parajuli, Country Director World Health Organization (WHO) Mr. Zoheir Hallaj, Representative World Bank Mr. Emmanuel Mbi, Representative

Glossary of Terms

AEA Adult Education Authority AHDR Arab Human Development Report AIDS Acquired Immuno- Deficiency Syndrome ARV Anti-Retroviral Treatment CAIP Cairo Air Improvement Project CAPMAS Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics CCA Common Country Assessment CCIMD Curriculum and Instructional Materials Development CEDAW Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women CEO Chief Executive Officer CERD Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination CIT Communication and Information Technology CNG Compressed Natural Gas CO2 Carbon Dioxide CRC Convention on the Rights of the Child CSWs Commercial Sex Workers DAG Donors Assistance Group DNA Deoxyribonucleic Acid EDHS Egypt Demographic and Health Survey EEAA Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency EEC Energy Efficiency Council EISI Egyptian Information Society Initiative EGP Egyptian Pounds EHDR Egypt Human Development Report ENNA Egyptian NGOs Network Against AIDS EOHR Egyptian Organization for Human Rights ERSAP Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Programme FAO Food and Agricultural Organization Feddan One Feddan equals 0.42 acres FGC Female Genital Cutting FGM Female Genital Mutilation GDP Gross Domestic Product GNP Gross National Product GoE Government of Egypt Hai Urban District HDR Human Development Report HDI Human Development Index HIECS Household Income, Expenditure, and Consumption Survey HIV Human Immunodeficiency Virus HSRP Health Sector Reform Programme ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ICESCR International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ICPD International Conference on Population and Development IDSC Information and Decision Support Centre of the Egyptian Cabinet IDU Injecting Drug Users IFC International Finance Corporation ILO International Labour Organization IMF International Monetary Fund IMR Infant Mortality Rate IMSWM National Strategy for Integrated Municipal Solid Waste Management INP Institute of National Planning IOM International Organization for Migration ISO International Standardization Organization IT Information Technology Markaz Rural District MB Muslim Brotherhood MCIT Ministry of Communications and Information Technology

5 MD Millennium Declaration MDGs Millennium Development Goals MENA Middle East – North Africa MISR Municipal Initiative for Strategic Recovery MRM Mortality Rates of Mothers MOHP Ministry of Health and Population MOLD Ministry of Local Development MISA Ministry of Insurance and Social Affairs MP Members of Parliament MSEA Ministry of State for Environmental Affairs MWRI Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation MSM Men who have Sex with Men NAP National AIDS Programme NCCM National Council for Childhood and Motherhood NCW National Council for Women NDP National Democratic Party NEAP National Environment Action Plan NGO Non- Governmental Organization NHDR National Human Development Report NSC National Social Council NWRP National Water Resources Plan OAU Organization of African Unity ODA Official Development Assistance OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development PAT Professional Academy for Teachers PLHIV People Living With HIV/AIDS PM10 Particulate Matter PRAP Poverty Reduction Action Plan SMEs Small and Medium Enterprises SFD Social Fund for Development STIs Sexually Transmitted Infections SWM Solid Waste Management TOE Tons of Oil Equivalent UN United Nations UNAIDS United Nations Country Team UNCT Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS UNDAF United Nations Development Assistance Framework UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization UNFPA United Nations Population Fund UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNIC United Nations Information Centre UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund UNIDO United Nations Industrial Development Organization UNIFEM United Nations Development Fund for Women UNODC United Nations Organization for Drugs and Crime USAID United States Agency for International Development USD United States Dollars VCT Voluntary Counseling and Testing VOCs Volatile Organic Compounds WB World Bank WFP World Food Programme WHO World Health Organization

6 Contents

Preface 8 Chapter I: Embracing the Spirit of the Millennium Declaration 9 Introduction 9 Millennium development goals and human rights 10 Egypt in the peace, security, development nexus 13 UN system in Egypt 14 Duty bearers and claim holders 15 The CCA process 15 Chapter II: Quality of Growth and Poverty Eradication 17 The need to translate economic growth into social gains 17 Overview of recent economic growth 18 Characteristics of poverty in Egypt 20 Food security and self sufficiency 21 Employment and sustainable livelihoods 23 Education as an engine for human development 26 Quality of health and poverty considerations 30 Duty-Bearer-Claim-Holder Responses and Capacities 33 Chapter III: Human Rights, Democracy and Good Governance 41 Setting a reform agenda 41 Legal and institutional frameworks for democracy and political pluralism 43 Society and the political Establishment 45 The role of women in Egyptian society 48 Violence against women 51 Good governance and local administration 52 The administration of justice 56 Duty-Bearer-Claim-Holder Responses and Capacities 58 Chapter IV: Our Common Environment 65 The problem of water scarcity 67 Pollution and human health 67 Land use and human settlements 71 Biodiversity and protected areas management 74 Disaster protection and crisis management 75 The cost of environmental degradation 75 Duty-Bearer-Claim-Holder Responses and Capacities 75 Chapter V: Social Protection of Vulnerable Groups in Egypt 82 Children at risk 83 People living with and vulnerable to HIV/AIDS 85 Refugees and asylum seekers 87 Caring for the elderly 89 People living with disabilities 89 A Framework for UN System Support to Egypt and Priority Areas for the 91 UNDAF 2007-2011 Common Country Assessment Indicators 95 CCA Bibliography 99

Preface

The Common Country Assessment (CCA) is an important planning tool for the United Nations in its support to Egypt’s national development priorities over the next five years. This report reflects the challenges that Egypt faces in today’s world, putting into context past, current and potential UN assistance. From this perspective the analysis in the 2005 CCA shows that Egypt has come far in terms of social, economic and developmental achievements over the past 30 years, with many Egyptians experiencing tremendous improvements of standards in health and education, and in their general quality of life. However, such achievements cannot dilute the severity of the major social-economic disparities which characterize modern Egyptian society, and the report highlights the fragility of some of these social gains.

At the core of the 2005 CCA is an analysis of human capabilities and state capabilities, seen through the lens of the legal obligation that the government of Egypt has towards its citizens in fulfilling social, economic and political entitlements. In this vein the report concludes that Egypt continues to suffer from the three principal human development deficits identified by the 2002 Arab Human Development Report (AHDR), namely in knowledge, freedom and the empowerment of women. The main message which emerges is that the state needs to strengthen its capacities to build the human capabilities of all citizens in an equitable way, so as to ensure that all Egyptians can realize their full potential and benefit from the expansion of choices in their lives.

Chapter I sets the frame for the 2005 CCA, placing the analysis within the context of Egypt’s pursuit of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the fulfillment of the spirit of the Millennium Declaration. In chapter II, the analysis explores the juxtaposition of Egypt’s macroeconomic growth with the pursuit of social and welfare gains, looking at how far economic prosperity has been translated into human capabilities. Chapter III looks at the political and governance framework in which human and state capabilities interact and feed upon each other to furnish the nature and form of Egyptian society. In chapter IV the range of analysis expands to look at the state of the natural resource base upon which Egyptian society depends for its survival, and the extent to which these resources are being managed to support human capabilities. Finally, chapter V looks at the capacity of the state to manage the welfare of Egypt’s most vulnerable citizens.

In conclusion the report identifies a twin-track strategy for future UN system support to Egypt; by supporting projects and programmes which will help Egyptian citizens to improve their quality of life and individual welfare through better social services, and by supporting the state and its institutions to perform their duties more adequately in the pursuit of realizing the MDGs and the protection of established human rights norms. This support will also involve strengthening the three essential pillars on which the strategy rests – the genuine and meaningful participation of all citizens, a shared social contract between state and society and the rule of law. The UN Country Team has agreed to present this scheme pictorially as the DNA of the country, which is depicted on the front cover of the report and which represents both the conceptual and symbolic framework for the UN’s future assistance.

Antonio Vigilante UN Resident Co-ordinator

8 Chapter I: Embracing the Spirit of the Millennium Declaration

The second United Nations Common Country Assessment (CCA)1 for Egypt marks an attempt to provide an updated and comprehensive analysis of the national development situation from the perspective of the UN system in the country. This analysis has been undertaken by the United Nations Country Team (UNCT) in consultation with the Government of Egypt (GoE) and UN system partners in the donor community, research institutions and non-governmental organizations.

Conceived as a substantive analytical instrument, the CCA represents a coherent and joint diagnosis of the development challenges faced by Egypt and is the basis upon which the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) is formulated. The CCA report intends to identify the causal relationships between different developmental impediments and pinpoint the root causes of the challenges the government and society face in meeting the major human rights norms embraced by Egypt and the international community, as well as the obstacles to fully reaching the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). In accordance with this analysis and the national development priorities of the country, the UNCT has identified in the CCA the priority areas in which the UN system in Egypt should concentrate its efforts for the next UNDAF cycle (2007-2011).

Introduction

This CCA looks at Egypt’s current development situation through the lens of the Millennium Declaration which the Egyptian government signed in September 2000. A central part of that Declaration was the Millennium Development Goals, which represent today the centrepiece of the international development agenda. But the Millennium Declaration is not just about these goals; it asks every country to put human rights and the commitments to build the capacities to reach those rights at the centre of national development priorities. Indeed, since the realization of human rights is the ultimate outcome of development, the vehicle for achieving the eight MDGs is imbued with the principles of democratic governance which are at the heart of the Millennium Declaration. At the same time the sustainability of development outcomes can only be assured if they are built on the rule of law and civil liberties, in which citizen participation and government accountability is critical. From this vantage point the CCA analysis rests on two structural concepts: the human capabilities of citizens to fulfill their potential in society and the institutional capabilities of the state and its organs to create the right kind of environment for human development.

The Millennium Declaration spells out the commitment to help people achieve their human capabilities, which allow them to lead the lives they value. This means the ability to fulfill basic human needs like feeding oneself and avoiding premature morbidity, as well as the capability for self-betterment through opportunities created as a result of good education and participation in decisions which impact on an individual’s life. It has long been recognized that a deficit in these areas leads to deep and endemic poverty, which not only derives from a lack of income but also from a lack of capabilities to make choices in life. The 1997 Human Development Report demonstrated how poverty is more than the lack of income, but rather a “deprivation in the

1 The first Common Country Assessment for Egypt was published in 2001.

9 valuable things a person can do or be”, which includes deficits in education, health, equity in political and social rights and security. This sentiment had already been endorsed by Egypt and other nations in the 1993 Vienna Declaration, where there was agreement that “extreme poverty and social exclusion constitute a violation of human dignity” (1993 Conference on Human Rights).

In March 2005 the UN Secretary-General issued his report, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All, where he made the categorical link between peace, human development and human rights. It confirms that “development, security and human rights go hand in hand” and identifies the ultimate goal of development as that of granting “men and women everywhere […] the right to be governed by their own consent, under law, in a society where all individuals can […] speak, worship and associate freely […] and be free from want”.2 But these rights, which provide the environment for people to make free human capability-related choices, need to be claimed and provided by those who have the power to do so. Thus “If human development represents the enhancement of the capabilities and freedoms that individuals enjoy, human rights represent the claims that individuals have on the conduct of individual and collective agents and on the design of social arrangements to facilitate or secure these capabilities and freedoms”3. Egypt’s CCA constitutes a timely exercise, for it provides to the UN system in Egypt an opportunity to assess the current challenges faced by the country in its efforts to meet these commitments to the Millennium Declaration.

Millennium development goals and human rights

Achieving the MDGs is inherently a step towards the “progressive realization of human rights”. At the same time the negation of human rights will inevitably hinder the pursuit of these development goals, since the achievement of the MDGs can only be assured and sustained by establishing a solid base in human rights norms and the democratic principles which support them. Thus viewing the MDGs through human rights expands the understanding of the policies and institutional reforms required to achieve them. Against this background the CCA report not only aims to describe the development situation in any given sector, but also explores the responses and capacities of national authorities and stakeholders in supporting the environment to achieve the goals. The progressive realization of certain rights is an accepted norm since progress in areas such as health, education, an adequate standard of living and the environment does depend on long-term economic growth, long-term institutional development, planning and the augmentation of human capacities. However, the pace of this progressive realization is rarely spelled out. The 2015 deadline for the MDGs helps to better define a set of benchmarks by which government progress and achievements can be measured and be held to account by their citizens. As such each MDG is supported by a set of human rights norms which the Egyptian government has adopted, and which have, in large part, been ratified by the People’s Assembly.

2 The Secretary General’s report ‘In larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All’, March 2005 3 Human Development Report 2000, UNDP, New York, p.20

10 Table: 1 Millennium Development Goals and corresponding human rights standards and Conferences

Millennium Human rights standards in Status of Progress Development Goals international human rights treaties4 Will the Goal/Target be met? and relevant global conferences Probably Potentially Unlikely Lack of data Draft guidelines on a human rights Goal 1 approach to poverty reduction strategies • ICESCR (article 11), GC 12, CRC Eradicate extreme (articles 24 par. 2 and 27 par. 3) poverty and hunger Copenhagen + 5: A Social Development Resource for All Stakeholders Following-Up the World Summit for Social Development / WSSD +5 (Geneva, 2000) ICESCR (articles 13 and 14, and GC 11), Goal 2 CRC (article 28 a) and GC 1), CERD • (articles 5 and 7) Achieve universal Education for All (Bangkok, Thailand, primary education 1997)

CEDAW; ICESCR (articles 3 and 7 par. a Goal 3 (i)); ICCPR • (articles 3, 6 par. 5 and 23 par. 2); CRC Promote gender equality (article 2); and empower women CERD (GC 25) UN General Assembly Special Session (Beijing +5): Gender Equality, Development and Peace for the 21st Century (New York, 2000)

4 United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights - CEDAW: Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women; CERD: Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; CRC: Convention on the Rights of the child; GC: General Comment; ICCPR: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; ICESCR: International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

Millennium Human rights standards in Status of Progress Development Goals international human rights treaties5 Will the Goal/Target be met? and relevant global conferences Probably Potentially Unlikely Lack of data CRC (articles 6 and 24 par. 2.a); ICESCR Goal 4 (article 12 par. 2 a, GC 14) • International Conference on Reduce child mortality Population and Development (Cairo, Egypt, 2004) CEDAW (articles 10 h, 11 f, 12 para. 1, Goal 5 14 b, and GC 24; • CERD (article 5 e iv); ICESCR: GC 14; Improve maternal CRC (article 24 d) health International Conference on Population and Development (Cairo, Egypt, 2004) International guidelines on HIV/AIDS Goal 6 and human rights, • • ICESCR: GC 14; CRC (article 24 c) Combat HIV/AIDS, UNGASS, Declaration of Commitment Malaria/ HIV/AIDS malaria and other on HIV/AIDS (New York, 2001) Other diseases Disease

Safe drinking water: ICESCR: GC 14 Goal 7 Slum dwellers: ICESCR:GC 4 and GC 7 • World Summit on Sustainable Ensure environmental Development (Johannesburg, South sustainability Africa, 2002)

Charter of the United Nations (article 1 Goal 8 par. 3), ICESCR • (article 2), CRC (article 4) Develop a global International Conference on Financing partnership for for Development (FFD) (Monterrey, development Mexico, 2002)

Against this background the second Millennium Development Goals Country Report6 for Egypt shows that at the aggregated national level Egypt remains on track to reach the targets of the great majority of MDG indicators. The government continued to give attention to critical areas of development, such as health and education, access to water and sanitation as well as improving the livelihood of the most deprived segments of the population. However, the pace of progress towards these targets varies among the goals; fast and sustained in some areas (child and maternal mortality, water and sanitation), at acceptable levels for others (education and poverty reduction), while somewhat more slowly in others (women empowerment, and the environment). In addition, the report showed that the disparities in development progress between Upper and Lower Egypt remain stark and demonstrate the need for greater and better-targeted investments to address these

5 United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights - CEDAW: Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women; CERD: Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; CRC: Convention on the Rights of the child; GC: General Comment; ICCPR: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; ICESCR: International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 6 Millennium Development Goals Second Country Report- Egypt 2004, Cairo, United Nations/Ministry of Planning, 2005

12 regional differences. For the UN system in Egypt this has tremendous implications where the emphasis for co-operation is on helping Egypt’s regions to reach the Millennium Development Goals by 2015.

Egypt in the peace, security, development nexus

Egypt continues to be a major diplomatic actor in the Arab world and has certainly embraced the spirit of the part of the Millennium Declaration which promotes the importance of international peace and security, especially in relation to moves to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. Following President Anwar Sadat’s visit to Israel in 1977, Egypt was the first Arab state to sign a peace agreement with Israel in 1979. Since then the government in Cairo has attempted to play a moderating force in Arab-Israeli relations, while also being a strong advocate of Palestinian rights. Egypt has retained a leading role in Israeli-Palestinian talks, hosting a number of summits. More recently, Egypt, with U.S. support, helped Israeli and Palestinian leaders to reach an understanding on a cease-fire agreement, and is now deeply involved in plans to manage security following the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. Egypt has also recently stepped up efforts in Sudan's peace process, pledging 10 million USD in aid to Sudan at a donors’ conference held in Oslo in April 2005, and hosting several rounds of talks between the Sudanese government and the Sudanese opposition grouping, the National Democratic Alliance. Egypt’s First Lady, Suzanne Mubarak, now leads an international women’s movement for peace, which is at the same time a part of the Global Women for Peace Coalition.

The Government has demonstrated its commitment to cooperate with member states to fight terrorism, organized crime and corruption at the international level. In this respect Egypt has ratified ten out of the twelve United Nations international anti-terrorism instruments7, the Transnational Organized Crime Convention and one of its Protocols8 in 2004, and the United Nations Convention against Corruption in early 2005. Due to the wide-ranging demands of these instruments several domestic legislative changes have been made to modernize and streamline the legal system to meet these international obligations, such as mutual legal assistance and information sharing with other countries. As one example, Egypt passed strong anti-money laundering legislation in 2002, enabling it to establish an anti-money laundering financial intelligence unit in March 2003. Although the GoE fully cooperates with the United Nations Disarmament Department and other forums dealing with disarmament, Egypt has not yet ratified the “Protocol Against the Illicit Manufacturing and Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts and Components and Ammunition”, which supplements the UN Convention Against Transnational Crime.

On the domestic front Egypt has a well-deserved reputation as being safe from crime, though in recent years there has been evidence that crime rates have been increasing. This trend has been linked to growing economic hardship among Egypt’s poor. Cannabis and to a lesser extent opium, are cultivated in the Sinai Peninsula, with reports of cannabis cultivation in Upper Egypt. In addition Egypt's location makes it a potential transit point for trafficking of heroin and cannabis from major production areas in South East Asia to European markets. Illegal drugs have penetrated Egyptian society and the most common form of drug abuse focuses on cannabis (bango), while heroin injecting is more common in large urban centres such as Cairo and

7 The most recent instrument to be ratified is the Convention on the Suppression of Terrorist Financing in February 2005 8 The Protocol to Prevent and Suppress the Trafficking in Human Beings, Especially Women and Children

13 Alexandria9. While there are no reliable statistics concerning the extent of drug abuse, it is clear that here is a general increase in it and that young people aged 15-25 years are the most likely to be involved in drug-taking, though there are strong social factors which mitigate the practice. At the same time there appears to be an increase in injecting drug users, and evidence of high rates of needle exchange which may increase the risk of HIV infection.

For a number of decades international assistance to Egypt has been an important aspect of its internal peace and development agenda, receiving approximately 1.5 billion USD annually from the international community in support of its social and economic development priorities. This assistance constitutes an important opportunity to finance critical projects in the area of human development, while at the same time providing international expertise and capacity building opportunities for the benefit of Egyptian institutions. The country is helped by a large number of foreign partners (some forty agencies equally divided between multilateral and bilateral), and this often poses several challenges to the government in ensuring the optimization of international cooperation. The GoE actively took part in the Paris ministerial level conference on aid harmonization and has recently indicated to the donor community in Cairo its intention to ensure appropriate country level follow up to the decisions agreed upon in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness10, an important aspect of which is the improvement of public financial management capacity and transparency.

UN system in Egypt

The UN system in Egypt is represented by 24 UN and UN- affiliated agencies including the World Bank, IFC and IMF. While each UN agency pursues its specific mandate in various fields from agriculture, vulnerable groups, health, education, poverty reduction and the environment, each is also committed to collaborating within the framework of the UN Resident Co-ordinator system in support of national development priorities and the Millennium Development Goals. The UN family currently supports about 80 projects country-wide, and in 2002 it provided over 100 million USD in assistance to Egypt.

The first United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) for 2002-2006 classified UN system support by three areas: 1) Enhanced governance through a more participatory policy dialogue, institutional capacity building and civil society empowerment 2) Improved natural resources management, environmental sustainability and food security and 3) Poverty reduction with emphasis on addressing social and geographical disparities.

In addition to monthly Country Team meetings, the UN Theme Groups on HIV/AIDS (Expanded), Disaster Management and Common Services constitute some of the tools instrumental for planning and implementing joint initiatives. The Office of the UN Resident Co- ordinator plays an important part in the Donor Assistance Group (DAG), and the RC chaired the DAG in 2003-2004. One major joint UN initiative regards support to girls’ education, where eight UN agencies support the work of the National Council for Childhood and Motherhood (NCCM). So far 456 girl friendly schools have been established with 75% of the enrolled children being girls and representing a positive step towards achieving a key goal of the national plan of action, which aims to close the gender gap in education by 2007.

9 Rapid Assessment of Trends and Patterns of Drug Abuse in Egypt, UN Office for Drugs Control and Crime Prevention, March 2001 10 With the declaration, donor and partner countries reached an agreement to deliver concrete results over 12 specific indicators in the area of ownership of ODA, harmonization, alignment, results and mutual accountability

Duty bearers and claim holders

Since the Secretary-General’s reform agenda, launched in 1997, the quest to place human rights at the centre of the United Nations System’s activities has continuously gained momentum, a key part of which has been the adoption of a human rights based approach to development. This approach implies that the UN system has a responsibility to help countries meet their obligations towards the realization of their citizen's human rights. Obligations emanate from the fact that, wherever there is a right, there is someone who has a claim to that right – claim-holders - and someone else with a corresponding duty or obligation to fulfill that claim – duty bearers.

Development work aims to help build the capacities of claim-holders to assert their rights and of duty-bearers to meet their obligations. Table 1 shows that these claimable rights are based in international law and are legally binding. In order to create a sound basis for identifying adequate development priorities, the CCA aims to identify claim-holders - individuals or social groups - whose rights should be taken into account when analyzing specific development challenges. On the other side the report identifies the duty-bearers, who are primarily state actors and institutions, who have a corresponding obligation to ensure that specific rights are met. In some cases it is non-state actors who are in a position to influence the rights of other actors, while in some situations principal claim holders – usually citizens – also have duties and responsibilities. The CCA aims to explore the responses of claim-holders and duty-bearers to different development challenges and identify the main capacity gaps which impede the fulfillment of these obligations.

The CCA process

The CCA process was launched during the November 2004 UN Inter-Agency Retreat. As a result of a brainstorming exercise, an analytical framework and timeframe for preparing both the CCA and UNDAF were agreed. The CCA analysis was done in accordance with three broad themes: Governance, Environment and Poverty. The entire Country Team participated in collecting and analyzing information for the CCA process. Sixteen Task Forces led by different UN agencies were established to produce background papers on the different areas of interest under each of the three themes mentioned above (see Table 2).

Interested agencies joined the relevant task forces, while agency heads assigned members of their staff with specialized knowledge to contribute their expertise to the process of producing the background papers. Each background paper was produced on the basis of available information and the expertise of a number of national and international consultants. Egyptian experts from a wide range of governmental and non-governmental organizations worked in close collaboration with UN agencies to assess Egypt’s development needs and priorities.

The UNCT has used the DEVINFO database, prepared by UNICEF as the major tool for cross referencing the statistical data in this report. In general, the latest available data from CAPMAS (the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics) provides the basis for the CCA Indicators. The indicators provide an adequate framework to measure Egypt’s progress towards achieving specific development goals and objectives.

Subsequently, the UN Country Team held a one-day retreat in April 2005 to review the findings of the background analysis and agree upon an outline for the CCA document. Following the retreat, a drafting committee was formed at the Office of the Resident Coordinator and supported by an interagency readers group. A semi-final draft document was reviewed at a consultation seminar in June 2005 where representatives and experts from the government of Egypt, civil

15 society organizations and academic institutions provided in depth comments on the content and structure of the report, which were taken into account in the final version of this document. In addition, the UN Quality Assurance Group offered timely inputs, many of which could be accommodated in the final revision of the CCA

Table 2: CCA Theme Groups

Governance Sub category Task Force Lead Agency Rule of law and criminal justice UNODC Democracy UNDP Decentralization and civil service reform UNDP Gender UNIFEM Environment Sub-category Task Force Lead Agency Water and sanitation UNICEF Pollution (air, solid waste, water, industrial) UNIDO Energy UNDP Biodiversity and natural resources UNDP Urban planning UNHABITAT Poverty Sub-category Task Force Lead Agency Economy World Bank Employment and decent work ILO Vulnerable groups and access to services WFP Education UNESCO/UNICEF Health and population UNFPA/UNICEF HIV/AIDS UNAIDS Secretariat Rural development FAO

16 Chapter II: Quality of Growth and Poverty Eradication

The need to translate economic growth into social gains

Egypt has gone through a number of phases in marrying its economic progress with social and human development benefits. In the 1950s the country was able to reduce social inequality through wealth distribution. In the 1960s access to education and health expanded exponentially as did job opportunities in the public sector. In the 1970s subsidies and social safety nets became important tools in social protection, while the 1980s saw a focus on improving infrastructure. The cost of these achievements was high and in spite of a good economic growth record since 1991, when the GoE adopted a bold economic reform and stabilization programme, the country is still faced with the challenge of making this growth equitable and sustainable. The challenge revolves around striking a balance between equity and efficiency, while better utilizing the nation’s resource base and investing more in the country’s most vital asset – its citizens – ensuring that they play a bigger role in the entire process.

Using economic gains as one vehicle for investing in people, the enhancement of human capabilities is at the core of the human rights perspective adopted in the Millennium Declaration. It is also the essence of “in larger freedoms” outlined in the Secretary-General’s 2005 report, wherein governments need to create partnerships with society to remove obstacles preventing people from achieving their full potential. Ultimately this means providing citizens with the skills and human capabilities to be able to make their own choices and escape poverty. Thus the goal of halving poverty by 2015 has become the overall objective of the global community in addressing development and improving the lives of millions worldwide. Through the Millennium Declaration countries accept that poverty can only be truly defeated by improving the human capabilities in education, health, women’s emancipation and protection of the environment. At the same time all of these objectives are not just aspirations but constitute claimable rights in international law, while affirmation of the 1986 Convention on the Right to Development enshrines the concept of poverty eradication as a government duty.

Recently, Egypt has achieved a solid economic record, economic growth has been picking up to the range of 3-4 % in the past 3-4 years. The World Bank postulates that growth of between 5-6% is feasible in the next few years. However, translating economic growth into universal social gains and enhanced human capabilities remains a challenge, as does the task of improving Egypt’s competitiveness and global standing. For example, the World Economic Forum's competitiveness ranking for the Arab world placed Egypt’s economy ninth out of twelve countries11. While this points to the urgent need to speed up economic reform, it also highlights the need to accelerate those changes which will create the right kind of political and institutional environment (see Chapter IV) allowing those reforms to take place in a sustained manner, and which will expand the range of human capability choices available to citizens. At the same time Egypt can look to good progress over the past three decades which has seen an increase in the country’s human development index by almost 50% (from 0.438 in 1975 to 0.653 in 2002), pulling it from a low to a medium income country12, though it is still ranked 120 of 177 countries. However, the fragility of these social gains is of most concern, with many Egyptians still living barely above the official poverty line. In this sense the quality and equity of economic growth is a

11 The Arab World Competitiveness Report 2005, World Economic Forum 12 Egypt Human Development Report 2004, UNDP/Ministry of Planning, Cairo, 2004, p.20

17 critical factor in the progressive realization of economic, social and cultural rights, whereby the government’s macro-economic plans are juxtaposed with the continuance of personal poverty across the country13.

The fragility of Egypt’s social gains is due, in large part, to the lack of attention paid to the critical relationship between overall growth and its distribution as a vehicle for poverty reduction. Though it is clear that poverty reduction cannot be achieved without positive economic growth, some leading economists now argue the sustainability of growth and poverty reduction depend on more equitable distribution of wealth, and this is something which policymakers can influence significantly14. This is most aptly demonstrated by the nature of the poverty reduction which took place in Egypt between 1995-2000 (See Table 4), in which worsening income distribution served to undermine the poverty reducing impact of growth and the increase in average household incomes15. From this perspective poverty reduction for Egyptians would have been far greater over this time period had the distribution of wealth been more equal. The effect was to mitigate the positive effects of poverty reduction in urban areas, while accentuating poverty in rural regions of the country. The important point which emerges from this discourse is that policies aimed at ensuring a more equitable distribution (and in some cases straightforward redistribution) of wealth may enhance economic efficiency and growth. The emphasis on wealth distribution returns the discussion and attention for public policy to the issue of investments for human capital addressing education, public service delivery and improved physical infrastructure.

Overview of recent economic growth

External shocks in the late 1990s, combined with a sluggish regional and global economic environment, the fallout of 11 September attacks in New York and the war in Iraq led to a slowdown in the Egyptian economy. Domestically, economic growth was further constrained by shortages of foreign exchange and by an uninviting business climate. These factors kept the GDP annual growth rate at between 2-3%16 per annum – almost half of what would be required to provide jobs for the rapidly growing labour force. However, there was a change of direction in economic policies in 2004 and economy recovery gained momentum, with real GDP growing by 4.4% in 2004, and accelerating to 4.8% in the first half of 2005. This recovery was driven largely by the external sector, as exports of goods (i.e. manufactures) and services (i.e. tourism and Suez Canal earnings) recorded robust gains. Growth was also supported by the global economic recovery and the improved export competitiveness in Egypt. Following the initial floatation of the currency in early 2003, the Egyptian pound depreciated sharply but later, supported by appropriate economic policies and institutional reforms in the foreign exchange market it began to stabilize. In the first months of 2005, it had appreciated about 7% against the US dollar, which itself has gained strength against the Euro. While the initial depreciation had an adverse impact on consumer prices, and hence on the poor, the subsequent appreciation has dampened the inflationary pressures

In July 2004, Ahmed Nazif was appointed Prime Minister of Egypt and a new cabinet took office. The new government set out an ambitious programme of economic modernization and social development. The reform of the foreign exchange market (which was already in progress)

13 Arab Republic of Egypt: Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes - Data Module, Response by the Authorities, and Detailed Assessments Using the Data Quality Assessment Framework, Country Report No. 05/238, July 2005 14 See Francis Bourguignon, The Poverty-Growth-Inequality Triangle: With Some Reflections on Egypt, Distinguished Lecture Series 22, The Egyptian Centre for Economic Studies, 2005 15 Ibid, pp.6-8 16 Egypt Country Profile: The Road Ahead for Egypt, Economic Research Forum, Cairo, 2004, p.12

18 established a market-based system and had eliminated the black market by the second half of 2004. In the area of trade policy, reforms have already been introduced to substantially reduce the number of tariff bands (from 27 to 6), abolish surcharges, reduce the weighted average tariff rate (from 14.6% to 9.1%), and simplify customs procedures. A new income Tax Law was passed by the Parliament in May 2005, slashing corporate and (top marginal) personal tax rates by half, eliminating many tax loopholes, and improving tax administration. In the financial sector, the government has proposed reforms that envisage, among other things, the privatization of at least one state-owned bank, divestment of public shares in a number of joint venture banks, and increased mergers within the banking sector. A large number of state-owned companies outside the financial sector have also been slated for privatization. In the area of monetary policy, the Central Bank of Egypt expanded the range of its instruments to influence the conditions in the money market, and started anchoring monetary policy more firmly on targeting inflation.

Reflecting these reform initiatives, the Egyptian economy is now being viewed more favorably in the international context. There has been an increase in portfolio investment (to an inflow) and FDI is expected to triple to around 1 billion US dollars in 2004-2005. In the last three years, total investment in Egypt has been steady at around 16% of GDP (and declined in 2004 in relation to GDP). The renewed confidence in the policy framework would be expected to raise investments. The share of the private sector has been stable at around one-half of total investment, while the share of holding companies has increased from 12.8% to 20%, and the share of government and economic entities has declined. Reflecting the market reforms and growing inflow of foreign exchange in the banking channels, Egypt’s gross official foreign exchange reserves raised from 14.8 billion US dollars in mid-2004 to 19.2 billion US dollars by mid-2005, representing the highest level since the year 1999.

One of the achievements of the stabilization programme in the 1990s was to control the budget deficit and reduce inflation and these continue to be a priority for the government. The export sector has supported growth with a strong increase in non-oil merchandise exports (up by 36.9%), as well as oil exports (by 47.7%). The fastest growing export sectors in the first quarter of 2005 are metals and metal products, electrical equipement, food products (all more than doubled), grains (up by 89%), chemical products (30.7%), cars and other transportation (20.8 %). On the other hand, cotton and other textile exports declined by 18.6 percent17. Imports have also been growing, reflecting a pick-up in economic activity.. Accordingly, the trade deficit widened from US$3.6 billion (4.7% of GDP) in 2004 to US$ 4.8 billion (5.9% of GDP).

From 2004-2005 exports of services, particularly tourism (up by 22.7%), and Suez Canal (up by 15.4%) continued to drive services balances to new record highs. Also, net inflows of transfers rose to US$ 2.5 billion (40.4 percent), with private transfers (essentially workers remittances) rising to US$ 1.9 million and official transfers to US$ 0.6 billion. Tourism remains one of Egypt’s most vital sources of foreign exchange and employment. The tourism sector witnessed a record year in 2004, with the number of tourists growing by 43.4% to reach 7.5 million and tourism receipts increasing by 44%, totaling US$ 5.5 billion. The trend continued in the first 7 months of 2005. The government is aiming to double the number of tourists to 16 million over the next 10 years, at an annual increase of 7.2%, which is expected to create some 1.5 million new jobs. Though ambitious, and in spite of the recent terrorist events in Egypt, which may temporarily slow down the growth of tourism, this target is feasible, and would require

17 These growth rates are calculated from exports classification by CBE. However, using CAPMAS data show that the fastest growing exports were agriculature (up by 73%), building and construction (25%). On the oterh hand, textiles, food products and chemical and paharmaceutical products declined by 54, 8% and 5%, respectively.

19 significant new investments in hotels and infrastructure. However, these developments need to be measured against the impact on the environment, especially since many tourist destinations are located in protected areas.

Table 3: Breakdown of main economic sector by contribution to GDP in 2004 18

Economic Sector Percentage contribution to GDP Agriculture 16 Industry 36 Construction 4 Gas, Electricity, water 6 Mining and quarrying 6.5 Manufacturing 19 Services 48

Main Issues

Characteristics of poverty in Egypt

Poverty reduction remains one of the main objectives in the long-term development vision for the government, whereby the objective is to reduce poverty to 6% by 2022. Despite a picture of regional disparities, national poverty has declined over the past few decades and this has been borne out by an improvement in a number of social indicators such as reductions in infant and child mortality rates and increased primary and secondary education enrollment rates. Indeed the Millennium Development Goal’s Second Country Report for Egypt indicates that taken as a national average the MDG commitment to halve poverty by 2015 will be achieved. According to a World Bank-Government of Egypt study and using the lower of two national poverty lines19, the percentage of the population considered poor fell from 19.4% in 1995/6 to 16.7% in 1999/2000, or almost 10.7 million people20. Figures for the 1999/2000 period show that the proportion of people living on less than US$ 1 a day is very low at 3.1%. In spite of the positive poverty reduction trends (see Table 4), a study on subjective poverty published in 2003 revealed an increase in poverty levels according to the lower poverty line to 20.4%21, while 31.8% of people claimed that their aspirations were above their actual income (subjective poverty)22. The 2004 Human Development Report puts Egypt’s human poverty index at 30.9%, inferring that one-third of the population suffers some form of deprivation. Egypt will be updating the Household Income, Expenditure and Consumption Survey in 2005, which should provide updated information on these issues.

The positive national picture belies the fact that economic growth has not necessarily trickled down to improve the lives of large parts of Egypt’s population, and especially the poor of Upper

18 World Bank data 19 The Lower National Poverty Line refers to the economic capacity of a household to obtain basic food items. The calculations are sensitive to household composition (size, age, gender) and regional location. The Upper National Poverty Line, while using the same methodology, measures the household's economic capacity to obtain basic food as well as non-food items (such as education and other services). Both poverty lines are calculated based on the most recent Household Income and Expenditure Survey (HIES). Refer to the MDG Second Country Report - Egypt 2004. p. i-iv. Unless stated all references to the poverty line in this report denote the Lower National Poverty Line. 20 Millennium Development Goals Second Country Report- Egypt 2004, p.11 21 Subjective Poverty and Social Capital, UNDP, Cairo, April 2003, p.11. The report followed the same methodology used in the Household Income Expenditure and Consumption Survey, but applied to a smaller sample. 22 Ibid, p.11

20 Egypt. In general it appears that both urban and rural areas of Lower Egypt are better able to reap the benefits of economic growth, while poverty in Upper Egypt is far more persistent than anywhere else in the country. For many years poverty in Egypt had been characterized by its rural nature nationwide, however in the past few years it has become a predominantly Upper Egypt phenomenon, with poverty deepening in both rural and urban areas in Upper Egypt governorates. Between1995-2000 poverty across Upper Egypt increased from 29% to 34% in rural areas and from 11% to 19% in urban areas. Meanwhile all areas of Lower Egypt witnessed significant reductions in poverty, from 13% to 5% in urban metropolitan centres and from 22% to 12% in rural areas23.

In economic terms regional disparities in poverty can be explained by the structure of the growth across the country, with Lower Egypt (both Metropolitan and rural areas) benefiting most and witnessing the greatest reductions in poverty. This is consistent with the structure of the growth itself, which has occurred primarily in those sectors, namely industry and services, which are most heavily concentrated in Metropolitan areas and Lower Egypt24. The agriculture sector, which employs some 30% of the overall population and is the mainstay of economic activity in Upper Egypt, grew at a slower rate, but in spite of this the sector in Lower Egypt has been responsible for significant poverty reduction in the northern part of the country.

Table 4: Poverty Measures25

1990/ 1995 1999 One analysis suggests that pro-poor policies could do 2015 1991 /1996 /2000 much to address poverty, since in Egypt the National Lower phenomenon is shallow, with relatively low values of Poverty Line 24.32 19.41 16.74 10.80 the distribution-sensitive measures. Using the national Headcount poverty line, the poverty gap index (P1) was 2.97 Poverty Gap 7.08 3.39 2.97 2.06 percent, implying that most of the poor were clustered Poverty Line at just below the poverty line. This means that if there US1$/day PPP 8.241 2.497 0.682 0.88 Headcount was perfect targeting of poverty-alleviating transfers Poverty Gap 2.273 0.325 0.073 0.20 (which is admittedly extremely difficult), it would Poverty Line at require only about 350 million EGP per year (about US2$/day PPP 39.45 41.52 24.84 16.49 0.1 percent of GDP in 1999/2000) to lift everyone out Headcount of poverty (based on the national lower poverty Poverty Gap 12.41 9.93 5.00 3.33 line)26.

Food security and self sufficiency

In spite of its relative decline over the past 30 years, agriculture continues to represent a major share of the economy, contributing 16% to overall GDP, and is a mainstay of incomes and livelihoods, employing 27% of the workforce. Egyptian agriculture has gone through a variety of changes since the 1960s, prompting an ongoing popular and policy debate relating to the role of the sector in Egyptian society. Today the key feature of this dialogue focuses on improving the quality of agriculture as a vehicle for poverty reduction, while creating the conditions for greater food self-sufficiency. Egyptians depend on cereals as the most important food staple, with wheat constituting 55% of food consumption requirements. Since local production volumes of wheat (7.2 million metric tons) and coarse grains (4.8 million metric tons) cannot currently satisfy this

23 Millennium Development Goals Second Country Report- Egypt 2004, p.13 24 A Poverty Reduction Strategy for Egypt, World Bank/Ministry of Planning, September 2004, Cairo, p.2 25 Household Income Expenditures and consumption surveys 1990/91, 1995/96 & 1999/2000 and Second MDG Report for Egypt, 2004 26 Millennium Development Goals Second Country Report- Egypt 2004, p.11-12

21 level of demand, Egypt depends on importing 50% of the food required to feed the population, which in 2004 amounted for approximately 12 million metric tons of wheat and coarse grains27. Local wheat production is checked by the limitation of available arable land (agricultural production confined to less than 4% of the total land area) and the dictates of crop rotation, prompting the government to aggressively pursue land reclamation for cultivation as a key policy directive.

The National Agriculture Strategy document 2000-2017 highlighted the need to increase the annual growth rate of agricultural production to 4.1%, by way of optimizing the allocation and utilization of resources, with the aim of achieving food security. It is hoped that this will also bring, as far as possible, a greater degree of self-sufficiency in basic foodstuffs such as wheat and cereals, (increasing local wheat production to 75% of consumption requirements) while also creating new opportunities for gainful employment in rural areas, leading to improved incomes and standards of living of agricultural and rural communities. In addition to reclaiming and cultivating 3.4 million acres through national mega projects (see Chapter V), the strategy also aims to improve vertical plant expansion by adopting higher yield crop strains, develop poultry and fishery production, rationalize the use of water irrigation, decrease the use of chemical pesticides and more actively promote the export of agricultural commodities.

The regional dimensions of food insecurity

It is in this overall context that the fragility of food security across the regions of Egypt stands out as one of the most pervasive characteristics of poverty in the country. The national level of food security, which indicates a per capita calorie intake in 1999/2000 of 2960 calories per day28, belies serious deficits in the food security situation in Upper Egypt governorates and some governorates of Lower Egypt. In three governorates - Luxor, Fayoum and Menofia - one-third of the population are unable to obtain their minimum daily calorie intake, while Giza, Beni Soeuf, Assuit, New Valley, Matrouh and Garbia all have significant levels of food insecurity29. Manifestations of this include higher rates of all types of malnutrition in poor families; according to EDHS 2003 the prevalence of stunting among children of less than five years is 16%30.

Chronically low purchasing power and dependence on government support means that a large number of Egyptians are vulnerable to even slight fluctuations in food prices. One report suggests that the fluctuating prices between January-November 2003 (partly due to the depreciation of the Egyptian Pound), may have contributed to a 7% increase in poor, while many people who escaped poverty between1995-2000 may have slipped back again31. This may have further contributed to the reported doubling of malnutrition in 2003. Ultimately over 40 million Egyptians benefit from, and to some extent depend on an extensive food subsidy programme (estimated 11.8 billion EGP between the years 2004-2005), to fulfill their basic food needs. Reaching 75% of the population, the programme provides basic supplies such as bread, sugar, oil, rice, lentils and tea at less than a quarter of market price. In spite of the cheapness of staples under the programme, one recent survey has found that the income of some households is so low that they are not able to take full advantage of the scheme32. The fact that many Egyptians live on a food-security “knife edge” requires careful planning and implementation of any future reform on the food subsidy program.

27 FAO Food Outlook No. 1, April 2005. 28 Ibid., p.14 29 Ibid., Annex B.7 30 Egypt Interim Demographic and Health Survey 2003, p.81 31 Millennium Development Goals Second Country Report- Egypt 2004, p.14 32 Vulnerability and Food Subsidy Study, WFP /Ministry of Supply and Internal Trade, April 2005

Employment and sustainable livelihoods

Over the past 20 years, reform did little to alleviate youth unemployment. Two forces have dominated the labour market; a 2.9% annual increase of labour market entrants from 1996 and the move from a state-led to a market economy. On the demand side, there has been a slowdown in the creation of government jobs, which used to be the traditional source of employment for many new graduates, while there has been a decline in state-owned enterprises. Together, these two factors have curtailed the, hitherto, dominant labour absorption outlet of the Egyptian economy. The main problem across all sectors is that while the number of workers has increased, the economy is not growing fast enough and may not be sufficiently job-intensive to create the jobs needed. A recent study shows that while 523,000 workers per year enter the labour market, the economy has only been able to create 435,000 new jobs annually. Consequently, unemployment has increased over time and was standing at 10.6 % in 2004. This is also compounded by the relatively high level of underemployment. Young educated graduates are most affected by unemployment (in 1996 75% of the unemployed held Intermediate Certificates), while the unemployment rate among the poorly educated is marginal.

Table 5: % Distribution of employed (15–64 years) by economic activity and gender (1995 – 2002) 33

1995 2002 Branches of economic activity 2002 Males Females Males Females Total Agriculture 26.7 27.6 26.9 31.4 41.8 Fishing 0.8 0.0 0.6 Mining 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.3 Manufacturing 15.7 8.1 12.3 8.6 11.6 Electricity & Gas 1.3 0.5 1.5 0.7 1.4 Construction 7.7 0.5 8.8 1.1 7.4 Trade 14.1 7.6 12.9 11.2 7.1 Hotels & Restaurants 2.0 1.5 1.9 Transportation, Storage & 6.7 1.5 7.3 2.2 6.3 Communications Finance 2.0 1.5 1.1 1.8 1.2 Real Estate 2.0 1.6 1.9 Public Administration 10.5 12.8 10.9 Education 8.1 23.7 11.0 23.7 38.8 Health & Social Work 2.1 8.9 3.3 Social Services 2.3 1.3 2.1 Household Services 0.2 0.5 0.3 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

33 Dr. Naglaa El Ehwany, “Labour Market Analysis and Macroeconomic Framework: Policies and Incentives for Increasing Employment in Egypt”, Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Cairo University, 2004, Table 4, p.43

Poverty and employment trends

In the Egyptian context employment does not guarantee a decent standard of living, while the link between compensation for one’s work and the means to gain human capabilities through an income is not necessarily clear-cut. While there is a correlation between unemployment and poverty in urban areas, this is not the case in rural areas and the data shows that many employed people in Egypt are poor, especially those working in the agriculture sector in Upper Egypt. The data shows that the self-employed and those hiring workers are the least likely to be poor in the urban areas of Egypt, hinting at the importance of micro, small and medium enterprises as an engine for economic growth and as a source for sustainable livelihoods. However, those working in the private sector are more likely to be poor than those working in the public sector; 21.5% of people working in the private sector are poor. This has a significant impact on the structure of poverty and employment in Egypt, since nationally 71.6% of workers are in the private sector, 23.9% in the government sector and 3.6% in the public sector34. Since the largest proportion of private sector employment is in rural areas, attention is focused on the sources of poverty of private sector wage labour.

It is against this background that the relationship between poverty and unemployment needs to be explored. The data shows that being unemployed does not necessarily equate with poverty or increase the chances of being poor. This is due, in the first place to the fact that the poor cannot afford to be unemployed, since while they already live close to the subsistence line, they will take any kind of wage labour and often have more than one job. Second, a significant fraction of the unemployed are graduates, who may of their volition decide to remain unemployed and wait for a public sector job to come their way, and though not necessarily well paid, public sector jobs do carry benefits such as security and health insurance. Of these graduates, many come from non- poor families who can afford to support them while they search for employment.

Economic realities and livelihoods in rural Egypt

Over half the population (some 37 million people), live in rural areas, where agriculture is by far the largest employer (5 million workers) and plays a vital role in the local economy. Its ratio of investments has accounted for 14.7 % of the total investments in the year 2002/2003, while more than half of Egypt’s exported [non-energy] raw materials are agricultural in nature. The agricultural sector has achieved an average growth rate of 3.6% during the period 2000/2001 to 2002/2003. Over the past 20 years, agricultural productivity has grown and Egypt is a producer in several commodities including rice, sugar cane, wheat and cotton.

In spite of this, agriculture is not able to play a significant role in absorbing the rising labour demands, and the sector has limited work opportunities available to the new comers in rural areas. The limited employment opportunities are a result of modest public investment in rural development in general and agriculture in particular, as well as low private and cooperative investment, while high technology methods are making labor-intensive jobs redundant. Agriculture’s portion of total national investments has fluctuated between 11% in 1997/98, rising to 17% in 199/2000 and falling to 14.7% in 2002/2003, corresponding to about 10 billion EGP. The largest share of these allocations has been for horizontal construction and expansion of agricultural infrastructures. This includes reclamation of desert lands, execution of irrigation and drainage projects, establishment of storage and freezing warehouses and their maintenance.

34 Subjective Poverty and Social Capital, p.22

However the overall picture of agriculture and the rural economy is fragmented, with Egyptians employed in agriculture being twice as likely to be poor than those employed in the manufacturing sector and three times more likely than those employed in services. Indeed, the bulk of Egypt’s poor work in agriculture, in contrast to 12% in services and only 8% in manufacturing. The main reason for this is the dominance of traditional crops, such as fodder, in rural Upper Egypt, which represents 94% of cropped land and 88% of net revenues, but whose market value is far below that of high-value non-traditional crops such as fruit and vegetables, which are more intensively farmed in rural Lower Egypt and are exported. The cultivation of non- traditional crops, which bring higher revenues per unit, (ranging between 1000-3,700 EGP per feddan compared to 50-2000 EGP per feddan for traditional crops) helped support poverty reduction in rural Lower Egypt between the years 1995-2000. However, a vicious cycle of poverty has also been established since cultivation of non-traditional crops requires resources and investments which the poor farmers of Upper Egypt cannot afford. 35

The informal sector

Though difficult to quantify the informal sector in Egypt not only stands as a major feature of the economy, contributing 20%36 of the nation’s GDP, but it is also the largest employer in Egypt; providing work for 8.2 million workers, compared to 6.6 million workers in the formal private sector and 5.9 million in the government sector37. The informal sector absorbs 1.4 million entrepreneurs (82% of all entrepreneurs in Egypt)38, while over 90% of these informal businesses are run as proprietorships, and work in the service sector. In urban areas the informal economy is usually made up of micro and small enterprises, such as workshops or shopping stalls, and according to some estimates nearly one-fifth of Egyptian business takes place in the informal sector. Some are larger with 10 to 15 workers, as an informal workshop would not generally exceed 25 to 30 workers. These businesses are not registered or have a license and consequently escape taxation and other costs associated with the formal sector. As a result, the volume of transactions of these businesses is never captured, though it is estimated that the value of the informal economy could range between 50-60 billion EGP per year39. In rural areas informal wage earners are a key feature of the informal sector, working both for formal and informal sector businesses. In both urban and rural areas informal sector work is usually labour intensive, using low technology, while wages are strictly linked to productivity.

From the social welfare perspective the informal sector represents a major challenge to individual working rights and claim-holder entitlements. In the context of the Egyptian reality the unregulated nature of the sector provides livelihoods for Egyptians, who may otherwise have no form of income. The typical profile of the Egyptian informal sector worker is a poor and quasi- literate or illiterate individual who depends on the flexibility of informal and casual employment. However, these workers are not registered in any system and are not able to claim any kind of social welfare entitlements such as health insurance, social security or pensions. At the same time most informal sector entrepreneurs are poor, and feel that the total costs associated with entering and operating within the formal sector are greater than the potential benefits40. As a result they

35 A Poverty Reduction Strategy for Egypt, World Bank/Ministry of Planning, September 2004, Cairo, pp.6-11 36 Mr. Medhat Hassanein, Former Minister of Finance, , “Seminar on streamlining the informal sector into the formal economic framework”, Public Policy Series, PARC, Cairo University, May 2000 37 Ahmed Galal, The Economics of Formalization: The Potential Winners and Losers from Formalization in Egypt, The Egyptian Centre for Economic Studies, Working Paper 95, March 2004, p.10 38 Development Outreach, World Bank, May 2005 39 Mr. Medhat Hassanein, Former Minister of Finance 40 Ahmed Galal, The Economics of Formalization: The Potential Winners and Losers from Formalization in Egypt, p.3

25 willingly accept difficulties such as problems with the local authorities, limited access to finance, infrastructure, technology and markets, and forego the benefits of formality such as better protection of property rights. The price of informality (e.g. in the form of bribes) and the absence of social protection for workers, are outweighed by the perceived benefits of being informal, including tax avoidance. The nature of the informal sector is a response to the structure of poverty in Egypt and the reasons for retaining its characteristics are linked to its mode as another form of “coping mechanism” during times of hardship. In this respect the labour intensive nature of the sector is consistent with the low education levels of many Egyptians, while informality grants businesses greater market flexibility, allowing them to compete with formal sector companies. In addition, the informal sector can produce low quality products at a price affordable to the mass of low-income families in the country, while the absence of legal work contracts allows informal businesses to employ family members without the burden of paying wages.

Education as an engine for human development

The Egyptian government has long recognized the necessity of education as a main vehicle for social and economic progress and as one of the key drivers for competitiveness on the world stage. In this vein the government has embarked on an ambitious and comprehensive educational reform programme, a main focus being on ensuring universal access in basic education in accordance with the Jomtian Declaration. The result has been the significant expansion of education and today Egypt has one of the largest education systems in the world with 15.5 million students (over 90% enrolled in public schools), 807,000 teachers and 37,000 schools. From a purely quantitative perspective school enrollment rates have increased exponentially from 61.3% in 1960-61 to 91.7% in 2000-2001 at the primary level, with a gender gap of 4%, and from 17.1% to 71.1% at the secondary level41 with a gender gap of 2%. Increased levels of public expenditure on education is also testament to the government’s strong commitment to prioritizing education as a key tool for development, and increased resources to the education sector have been mobilized even during periods of sharp fiscal contraction. Recent public expenditure on pre- university and university education (in nominal terms) increased from 4.7 billion EGP in 1990/91 (9.5% of total public expenditure and 5.0% of GDP) to 15.08 billion EGP in 1996/97 (22.6% of total public expenditure and 6.6% of GDP). Public expenditure on education further increased to 18.18 billion EGP in 2000/2001 (18.1% of total public expenditure and 6.2% of GDP) and reached 24.2 billion EGP in 200342.

In spite of these achievements there are still several major shortfalls which hinder the full potential of education to support the long-term prosperity of the country. One of the main manifestations is the 30% illiteracy rate among the adult population43 (over 15 years) and the higher rate of illiteracy among women compared to men. For adults aged 15-24, literacy among men is 83.2% and among women it is 76.4%44. The last figure of women illiteracy presented by the National Council for Women in the National Conference stated that the rate of female illiteracy was 50% in the year 1996 while decreasing to a 40.65% in 2004. Disparities in women education is also reflected regionally, with rural women being less likely to read and write than their peers in urban areas. Nationally, net enrollment rates of boys and girls to primary education have improved over the past ten years, reaching in 2003-2004 99% and 95% respectively. As a general rule the gender-gap in enrollment has been closing, though in some Upper Egypt

41 Egypt Human Development Report 2003, UNDP, Cairo, 2003, p.127 42 Millennium Development Goals Second Country Report- Egypt 2004, p.18 43 Egypt Human Development Report 2004, p.173 (Other sources put the illiteracy rate at a higher level) 44 Millennium Development Goals Second Country Report - Egypt 2004, annex C.2

26 governorates the gap varies from between 7% (Menia) to 14% (Beni Soeuf)45. In addition, the drop-out rate for girls has been falling faster than for boys, and recent figures show more boys dropping out of school46.

School drop-outs continue to fuel the large pool of illiterates in the country. The main issues revolve around persistent regional disparities and a stark urban-rural divide, in which literacy rates in Upper Egypt governorates such as Fayoum, Miniya and Sohag do not exceed 50%, while some of the poorest districts of the country have literacy rates below 30%47. In both cases the root causes are traced to the low quality of the education being delivered, the highly centralized nature of the Egyptian education sector, linked to the poor incentive structure for teachers, limited autonomy at the local level and a shortage of capability and capacity building.

Moreover, in spite of the major investments over the past 30 years, there are still mismatches between allocation of resources and the needs of different levels in the system. The initial results of the recent public expenditure review shows that there is overstaffing and inefficient staff deployment. While capital expenditure is high, maintenance of non-wage and other recurrent costs is low and there is little co-ordination between the two. The largest share of expenditure on education goes to administrative staff, while there is a long-standing bias for expenditure on tertiary (university) education, at the expense of basic and secondary education, which accounts for almost 80% of total enrollment, but only received 36% of the education budget in 2002/03. Similarly, technical secondary education (industrial and agricultural) receives almost the same amount of funds as general secondary education, though the cost of a technical school is 10 to 15 times more than that of a general school. One may speculate that since the population pyramid currently has a wide base at the level of school age children, the education system has an opportunity to take advantage of the next few years which will see relatively fewer new entrants to Egyptian schools. This will perhaps allow accelerated modernization in the quality of education during a period which will be less demanding in terms of building new school infrastructure.

Access to education for the poor

Improving the quality and coverage of education is one of the most prominent factors in reducing poverty. There is a very strong correlation between poverty and education with data showing that rising educational levels reduce the probability of being poor. For example the chances of a university educated Egyptian being poor is much less (2%) than someone who is illiterate (24%)48. This reflects a general inequality of access to education among income groups and the low educational attainment of the poor. The strong correlation between low educational attainment and poverty is borne out by the concentration of illiteracy among the poor and poor regions of the country, while the regional character of educational attainment is consistent with the general observation that rural Upper Egypt lags behind the rest of the country in all social and economic indicators. One estimate puts the proportion of poor children out of school nationally in 1999/2000 at 23%49.

Although for the most part education is provided free of charge, poor families must incur some direct and indirect costs, which may include school supplies, transport and Ministry of Education user charges, as well as costs related to private tutoring, which is encouraged by teachers to

45 Ibid., Annex C.1 46 Ibid., p.19 47 See Human Development Indexes of Egypt Human Development Report 2003 48 A Poverty Reduction Strategy for Egypt, p.22 49Millennium Development Goals Second Country Report- Egypt 2004, p.20

27 supplement their own income. The government operates a lunch programme worth some 60 million USD, which targets 7 million children and helps families to bear the costs related to education. However, the poor on average spend 3% of total household expenditure on education. One-third of this is used to finance private and group tutoring, which has become a practice to help children pass exams and progress up the education ladder, but actually creates an inequity which free public education was supposed to eliminate50. The result is the shortfall in universal coverage of basic and secondary education enrollment rates or high drop-out rates, where many poor families cannot afford to maintain such high levels of household expenditure on education. Recently the GoE introduced a 20 EGP subsidy for poor households to support education. During the period 1995/96-1999/2000, the cost of basic education increased by 70%, the cost of secondary education increased by 196% and that for university education by 18%51. The poor also receive the lower levels of public spending in education, with the poorest quintile receiving only 15.6% of educational expenditures in 1999/2000, while the richest quintile received 21.8%. This is attributed to the lower enrollment rates of the poor and the relatively high proportion of public spending on post-basic education, where the enrollment of the poor is very low52.

In general poor people do demand education but many poor parents are deterred from sending their children to school due to the low quality of education and the hidden costs. As a phenomenon the low education attainment of a household head results in a low income, leading in turn to low education access and achievement for all the children, thus perpetuating the low education-poverty nexus across generations. This has an impact on other social factors, since typically the higher the education level of the woman in the household, the lower the fertility and household size, also lowering the dependency ratio of children to adults.

This is certainly borne out by a number of related facts: the average household size of a poor family is 7.2 persons compared to 4.6 persons for non-poor families, the incidence of illiteracy among female heads of households is 85% in rural areas and 57% in urban areas (compared to 43% and 20% respectively for male heads) 53 and female-headed households with more than three children are more likely to be poor in both urban and rural areas54. Indeed poor Egyptians living in households headed by an illiterate woman are also more likely to be illiterate (98% of household members in rural areas and 96% in urban areas) than those in households headed by a literate woman (39% in rural areas and 36% in urban areas)55.

Quality of education

Many young Egyptians are dissatisfied with the quality of the education they receive. One study56 showed that most young people believe that Egyptian education makes them mainly competitive inside Egypt (62%) while only 15% believe that it makes them competitive in an overseas job market. Generally speaking over three-quarters of young people recognize that there are flaws in the education they receive, with some 23% indicating that it offers them nothing at all. It is against this background that the GoE has focused attention on improving the quality of education in the country, using schemes such as the Education Enhancement Programme.

50 A Poverty Reduction Strategy for Egypt, Cairo, p.31 51 Millennium Development Goals Second Country Report- Egypt 2004 , p.21 52 A Poverty Reduction Strategy for Egypt, p.29 53 Ibid., p.23 54 Subjective Poverty and Social Capital, p.24 55 A Poverty Reduction Strategy for Egypt, p.23 56 National Youth Aspirations Survey, 2004, National Council of Childhood and Motherhood/UNDP

28 Most observers agree that progress on quality issues needs accelerating if Egypt is to fulfill its potential and compete in the global knowledge economy. In this respect there are three important determinants of educational quality that still need addressing: the school environment (where students are taught), the learning processes (how students are taught), and learning contents (what students are taught). Together with inhibiting expenses, low quality is one of the reasons why children drop out of the school system, some of the main problems being poorly trained teachers, overcrowded classes, insufficient instructional time, and maltreatment of pupils by teachers, boring rote learning methods and poor libraries. At the same time the education system lacks an adequate incentive and accountability framework to govern the delivery of high quality education. In such a context the key duty-bearers – teachers – often lack the capacities to fulfill their role. Thus teachers’ duty-bearer responsibilities can only be fulfilled if they are able to effectively assume their role as claim-holders vis-à-vis the education authorities, which are responsible for ensuring high quality training of teachers and satisfactory remuneration. It’s in this framework that many commentators believe that the education system does not offer Egyptians the skills and training to be competitive in the job market, with vocational and technical training facing a number of hurdles such as a shortage of qualified teachers, outdated programmes and curricula and poor training materials. The need to expand skills and align vocational and technical competencies of the labour force with the demands of the market is self- evident.

Studies show that upgrading school facilities remains an issue, with many school buildings being unfit for use, while classroom crowding is a particular concern in some governorates. In many cases school sanitation facilities and classroom cleanliness is an issue, while there is an absence of adequate medical facilities57. The teaching process needs to be improved in many areas and especially the quality of teachers, which has fallen since the policy was introduced to hire under- qualified teaching staff that have less than a tertiary education and no pedagogical background. Egyptian students are not encouraged to engage in critical thinking in a system which emphasizes memorization, while in general students have relatively few opportunities to actively participate in the learning process. Considerable progress has been made in improving learning contents through the establishment of a specialized Centre for Curriculum and Instructional Materials Development (CCIMD). In general, however, curricula are predominantly planned centrally and focus on the theoretical at the expense of the practical.

Finally, there are questions about the quality of the National Literacy Programme, which is run under the Adult Education Authority (AEA). The programme aims to spend 80 million EGP over four years to provide basic literacy skills to 7.5 million people. Some critics have already said the 9-month course being provided is too short and lacks tangible links to the real life situation of students. The relative weakness of this programme prompted a change of management at the end of 2004 and the development of a new approach to literacy. Supported by the Prime Minister and the Board of GALAE58, the national literacy initiative will be transformed into an adult education programme, which will not only emphasize literacy but also life learning, social skills and civic education. This new approach will embrace the principles of community development and participation and will be piloted in at least seven governorates in Upper and Lower Egypt. The new management of AEA has already secured agreements with a number of ministries to deliver integrated adult education and literacy courses at the local village level using established networks of community centres, cultural clubs and IT clubs. The content of the courses will link literacy with practical skills and knowledge in areas such as health, business, environmental

57 Millennium Development Goals Second Country Report- Egypt 2004, p. 20 58 The Prime Minister and the GALAE Board accepted the new approach and strategy for adult learning in 2005 and GALAE has become the current ‘Adult Education Authority’ (AEA)

29 protection and political participation. Within this context the new organization which will manage this programme seeks to modernize its own internal management practices and retrain its own staff to support the new vision of adult learning. This includes forging partnerships with civil society organizations such as locally based NGOs, the private sector and universities.

Population health and poverty considerations

Good health is one of the most basic human capabilities necessary for people to achieve their full potential in life, and one of the most crucial claimable rights in a society. It lies at the heart of human security and is the basis for protecting the individual from illness, disability and avoidable death. From a human capabilities perspective health is defined not just as the absence of disease, but as a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being; both objective physical wellness and subjective psychological well-being and confidence about the future. Good health enables individuals to exercise choices, pursue social opportunities and plan for their future. In Egypt poor health can both be a factor that leads to poverty and also an indicator reflecting the extent of human poverty in a particular region. In this respect those who suffer from prolonged illness can plunge a whole family into poverty because of loss of income and the expense of treatment. Although partial health insurance is available to public sector workers as well as those in certain private companies, many more do not have any health coverage and must rely on social safety nets. One study shows that 37% of Egyptian households from the lowest wealth quintile have no health insurance, compared to 15% of households from the highest quintile59.

Although there has been a slowdown in fertility rates (from 5.3 children per women in 1980 to 3.2 in 2004), due in large part to a strong government-led national family planning programme, the Egyptian population is still growing in absolute terms and currently stands at 70.5 million, and is projected to reach 88.8 million by 2017. The population growth rate is expected to decrease from 1.8% during 2006-2011 to 1.4% during 2016-2021. A wide base of the population pyramid characterizes the age distribution of the population, with 38% of the population under the age of 15 years, while there has been an increase in the proportion of people in the productive age (15- 64)60. Life expectancy has increased over the years and now stands at 68.4 years61, moving Egypt above the average for lower middle-income countries worldwide and within the MENA region.

Political leaders are aware of the impact a large population has on social economic indicators and the challenge is to ensure that population growth does not become an obstacle to achieving the MDGs. Indeed, the underlying contextual determinants of several evolving development issues in Egypt are population related. The perpetuation of poverty, increasing unemployment rates, particularly among youth and women, food shortfalls, the fragmentation of cultivable land, higher rates of illiteracy, especially among women, gender gaps in educational enrolment and dropouts, the persistence of unmet needs in reproductive health/family planning services, increasing trends of urbanization, shortages in housing and water resources and environmental degradation are all predisposed and compounded by the nature of Egypt’s population growth and its composition. The explicit realization of the detrimental impacts of population issues on sustainable development by policymakers and planners in Egypt has greatly shaped the political commitment to invest increasing efforts to address population issues within the ICPD/MDGs operational framework. The Government of Egypt has reaffirmed its commitment to mobilize resources to advance reproductive health services and rights, not only as a means of implementing poverty

59 Poverty Reduction Strategy for Egypt, p.6 60 The Age dependency ratio is the ratio between the “non active” population (below 15 and over 65) and the “active population” (15-64 years old). 61 CAPMAS 2005

30 reduction strategies but also as a factor for curbing population problems that inhibit the sustainability of the development process.

Population Pyramid for Egypt, 2005 (projections) 62

75- 2005 70- 65- 60- 55- 50- 45- 40- 35- 30- 25- 20- 15- 10- 5- >5 -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15

Fe m ale Male

On track to achieve the millennium development goals in maternal health

There is no doubt that Egypt’s progress in reducing poverty over the years is largely due to the remarkable progress in improving the country’s health indicators. This has included establishing an extensive network of primary heath care facilities and providing access to basic health services to almost the entire population (95 % of the population is within 5km of a facility). However, this achievement should not mask the fact that in many areas, clinics are not adequately staffed with health professionals. Modern technology for health care and pharmaceuticals is available and communicable diseases are decreasing, with massive immunization campaigns becoming a regular part of the heath care system. This success is largely due to major government investments which started in the 1970s.

The country is reported to be on track to reach the Millennium Development Goals of reducing maternal mortality and child mortality by 3/4 and 2/3 respectively. According to the Surveillance Health System of the Ministry of Health and Population, maternal mortality rates (MMR) reached 68 per 100,000 live births in 2003. The MMR is expected to reach 43 per 100,000 live births in 2015 if the rate of decline remains constant as the rate between 1992/93 and 2000. One concern remains the slowing of the pace of reduction in MMR over the past few years indicating that there are still challenges in the area of child morbidity that need to be addressed, related to factors such as family hygiene and education, sanitation and environmental health. Poliomyelitis is close to being eradicated (only 2 cases were recorded between 2003 and 2004). In 2003 78 % of women received one or more tetanus toxoid injections to prevent neo-natal tetanus, an important cause of

62 Population Projections in Egypt, CDC and CAPMAS 2002

31 death of newborns; 69% of them received medical assistance at delivery from a doctor or a midwife; and 59% delivered at health facilities. Though these indicators reveal the need for further improvement in the provision of basic health services, they constitute a remarkable achievement with respect to the previous two decades.

Disparities in health quality and coverage

In spite of the improvements in the health services vast variations still exist, with rural Upper Egypt consistently featuring low health achievement indicators, and given the current pace of progress, Upper Egypt will not meet many of the health related MDGs by 2015. For example long-term malnutrition in Upper Egypt remains a problem, where the prevalence rate reaches 21.8% in rural areas. Further analysis of nutritional deficiencies correlated with the Human Development Index (HDI) at the governorate level, shows that the two governorates with the lowest HDI have the highest levels of nutritional deficiencies (Assuit and Beni-Soeuf), while the urban governorates that are ranked at the top in human development in Egypt have the lowest levels of protein-calorie deficiency and iron deficiency anemia. Meanwhile, the increase of acute malnutrition in 2003 can be seen as a one effect of the increase in the price of staple foods and decrease in food consumption of poor households.

Nutrition deficiencies impact severely on child health, calling for attention by duty bearers to try and abide by the CRC. In general underweight, stunting and wasting levels decreased steadily during the second half of 1990s, though there was an increase in malnutrition during 2003 and in 2005, stunting was as high as 25% (of which 8.5% severe cases)63. Children who suffer from acute or chronic malnutrition or both are usually prone to repeated infections, and Upper Egypt still stands out as having a problem with child health in this area. Moreover, school children who suffer from poor nutrition are less likely to fulfill their learning potential, with iron deficiency being the most serious micronutrient deficiency in Egypt.

Despite past achievements child mortality is still high and exhibits a strong geographic and gender pattern, with child mortality becoming concentrated in early infancy. The under-five mortality rate is 46 deaths per 1000 births, while the infant mortality rate is 38 per 1000, indicating that 80% of early childhood deaths occur before the child reaches its first birthday64. In general child mortality rates are higher in rural areas, with children in rural Upper Egypt being more likely to die than those in rural Lower Egypt. Similarly urban children in Upper Egypt are at greater risk of dying in infancy compared to those who live in urban or Lower Egypt governorates65. Among the under-fives, the leading causes of deaths are respiratory diseases (30%) and diarrhea (16%), followed by congenital and prenatal causes (13%).

Urban–rural disparities are also featured in family planning. The use of contraception has more than doubled in Egypt, from 24 % in 1980 to 56% in 2000 and to 60 % in 2003. However, contraception use differs significantly according to residential category. Married women are more likely to use a method in urban areas, compared to rural (66% and 56 %, respectively) and contraceptive use rates have exceed 65% in urban governorates and in both urban and rural areas of Lower Egypt. In contrast, rates are lower in urban Upper Egypt (about 60%) and rural Upper Egypt (about 45%), even though rural Upper Egypt experienced the largest increase in contraceptive use over the period 1995-2003. In general, rural areas of Upper Egypt still lag

63 Vulnerability and Food Subsidy Study (WFP/ Ministry of Supply and Internal Trade, Cairo, April 2005 64 Egypt Interim Demographic and Health Survey 2003, p.89 65 Ibid, p.90

32 behind on reproductive health issues, where women still face major obstacles in accessing health care. This includes the need to seek permission from husbands to visit a health clinic, the need to be accompanied, a dearth of female doctors or an absence of finances.

Egypt’s health system also needs to deal with a number of infectious diseases, such as Hepatitis C, which is very high across the country, while illnesses like Schistosomiasis, Tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS all remain concerns to health professionals. Finally, lifestyle patterns and personal habits such as smoking, substance abuse, lack of physical exercise and over-consumption of fatty and salty food, has led to a significantly increase in obesity, which is associated with diabetes, hypertension and heart disease.

Duty-Bearer-Claim-Holder Responses and Capacities

A new social contract for Egypt

The first “social contract” in modern Egypt was born in the immediate aftermath of the 1952 revolution. As duty-bearers post-revolution governments attempted to address the social rights of the majority, which served immediate social needs, but which over time became unsustainable. A key feature of this was the redistribution of property and privilege and the creation of a large, and at one time productive and socially successful public sector, using the ideas of various social reformers in areas such as free universal education and land reform. However, the price for this social arrangement was the loss of political rights, and subsequently the un-sustainability of social gains. Thus the old social contract placed an emphasis on the role of the state as the provider of public goods, services and employment, with citizens expected to provide their uncritical allegiance and following in return. It was a duty-bearer-claim-holder relationship in which the claim holder rights of citizens were abrogated by the state’s image of itself as the benevolent guarantor of social welfare, but at the expense of those fundamental human rights which constitute a free and democratic society.

Over time this social contract has broken down and become untenable as well as undesirable, since it creates a passive citizenship deprived of its rights to participation. It is also a very expensive deal which may have been sustainable in the short term, but is no longer so. Finally these old arrangements create relationships of inequity and dependency in which there is huge room for waste, corruption, and cronyism. For this reason Egyptian’s are seeking to create a new social contract defined as an integrated rights-based programme of action that is tailored and targeted to the poor, but which provides choices and alternatives to other citizens so as to enable Egyptians to realize the ambitions and capabilities that they value. Under this new paradigm duty- bearer-claim holder relations will be put back in line with the values of social justice and rule of law. The new social contract entails the active participation of equally powerful partners. The state will provide safety, security, and the protection of basic systems and rights through discharging its responsibilities of security, defense and justice. The state will also supply quality public goods that aim to achieve equity and that are efficient and effective, particularly in the areas of health, education, social protection and environmental sustainability. Citizens will in return provide, not only their allegiance and respect to the law, but they will also provide their oversight and active participation in the application of the contract, and in so doing assume an oversight role in guarding and securing its gains and outcomes.

The pursuit of economic growth and pro-poor policies

33 One key tenet of the new social contract is the government’s responsibility to adopt policies that balance the requisites of a market economy with the demands of employment and livelihoods. Thus the quality of growth is a paramount issue, whereby the government’s tentative move towards decentralization may well initiate regional growth patterns that are more specifically in line with the needs of the poor. In this respect the government has made job creation and creating an improved climate for investment and private sector development specific priorities. Political leaders recognize the need to address pro-poor growth in a deliberate and strategic fashion and have made it a part of the overall planning process. The challenge is to build the environment so that Egypt’s poor benefit from economic growth opportunities, while the spending on social development sectors like health and education is far more efficiently utilized and far better targeted. To this end the GoE is working with UN agencies to develop a Poverty Reduction Action Plan (PRAP) and has supported the publication of annual National Human Development Reports, going back to 1994, as well as producing poverty analysis papers with the support of the World Bank and other institutions. A PRAP should systematically identify areas where increased investments could have an impact on reducing poverty. These have shown the need to address directly the regional disparities in the country and particularly the structural causes of poverty in Upper Egypt. One response was to increase the share of public investments to Upper Egypt from 26% in 1998 to 32% in 200266. In 2004 the GoE launched the Municipal Initiative for Strategic Recovery (MISR), which will seek to rehabilitate the public services and physical infrastructure of over 200 of the poorest villages across the country, mostly in Upper Egypt. This is in addition to a number of other rural development programmes under the auspices of the Ministry of Local Development. In this respect the attempt to include genuine community participation in the planning and implementation of the MISR programme will aim to achieve more efficient and more equitable levels of service delivery.

The promotion of small and medium enterprises is a crucial plank in the government’s poverty reduction and employment generation strategy. In 2004 a new SME law was passed and the government is currently designing a National Strategy for Micro Finance. In recent years the government has provided various support measures to private sector development such as the establishment of Business Development Service Centres, the creation of a unit at the General Authority for Export and Import Control offering support to small exporters and the adoption of measures to channel 10% of government procurement to SMEs. In addition the Social Fund for Development is the government’s principal body responsible for running micro-credit programmes and supporting job creation through private sector development. The government recognizes the importance of the private sector in export promotion and improving Egypt’s trade balance, and within this the role that should be played by SMEs. However, the Ministry of Finance states clearly that SME’s are currently not robust enough and “unless [they] increase their competitiveness they will not be able to survive the progressive de-protection of the economy and the increasing competition in both local and international markets”67. Additionally, the recognition that private sector development through small and micro-enterprises has the potential to be a tremendous pro-poor income generation tool, a variety of constraints in the banking sector (i.e. absence of functioning credit bureaus, absence of functioning credit risk assessment mechanisms, and presence of a large stock of non-performing loans) prevents banks from providing the kinds of financial services which could support entrepreneurship by the poor themselves. Any strategy towards SMEs also needs to accommodate the informal sector, and while the temptation to formalize may be strong, any actions need to be socially appropriate, so that policy puts the protection of those in the informal sector at the top of the agenda. There are good reasons to encourage formalization, but experts agree that unless the current regulatory

66 A Poverty Reduction Strategy for Egypt, p.13 67 Enhancing Competitiveness for SMEs in Egypt, Ministry of Finance, November 2004, p.17

34 framework is changed formalization is not socially desirable. The key duty-bearers need to reduce the cost of entry, operation, and exit for firms in the informal sector as well as take steps to expand opportunities for all small entrepreneurs across Egypt68.

There is a general problem in the country, both in the informal and in the formal sectors, related to the rights of workers. Although the country ratified all ILO conventions on core labour standards, in practice there are difficulties in ensuring their implementation. Observers have criticized the Egyptian government with regards to various aspects of the law related to its respect for freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining. For example, unions are requested to join a single union federation and public authorities exercise control over their internal finances. In addition, the effective exercise of the right to strike remains extremely difficult and often impossible due to several restrictions, in spite of its recognition in the 2003 labour law.

The Egyptian government is also looking towards information and communication technologies as a main driver for economic growth and it has embraced the concept of the “techno-economic shift”. However, the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology, which is responsible for leading this effort, recognizes that with only 2.3%69 Internet penetration across the country, much needs to be done to make ICT a meaningful economic asset. The government vision sees universal access as a cornerstone of the Egyptian information society which can enhance education and literacy, delivery of government services (e-government), private sector growth (e-commerce), health services, promoting Egyptian culture, exports and industry. Challenges faced by the government include the lack of awareness by claim holder citizens of the potential of ICT and more significantly the question of access by the poor. The response is in the form of several initiatives to make Internet access affordable through IT Clubs nationwide (to reach 1000 villages by 2005) and schemes offering specially priced computers to low income groups. However, the GoE also needs to change the macro environment to make the vision work, which will involve up-grading and liberalizing the telecom sector and developing the appropriate regulatory and legal framework, such as data protection policies and security systems for e- commerce. Although an e-signature law was adopted in 2004 more needs to be done to build the necessary trust of both government and business in IT networks, enabling an environment of confidence in which the Egyptian information society can take root. Although Egypt is one of the Arab world’s leaders in scientific research and development (half of all fulltime researchers are based in the country), the 2003 Arab Human Development Report paints a poor picture of R&D investments, with the R&D outlays of the entire Arab world amounting to 0.2% of Arab countries collective GDP, compared to 2.5-5% in developed countries. 70

Rising youth unemployment rates need to be acknowledged as a fundamental block to poverty eradication. If properly addressed, youth employment could be a powerful mechanism for delivering the MDGs. This also signals the need to expand sex-disaggregated and age- disaggregated data, both qualitatively and quantitatively, on youth poverty at both national and regional levels. The private sector and government have a major role in supporting micro- enterprise endeavors that target adolescents and youth, with particular focus on rural areas which currently contain high levels of unemployed youth and where few public services are available. Both the GoE and civil society organizations should include adolescents and youth in the

68Ahmed Galal, The Economics of Formalization: The Potential Winners and Losers from Formalization in Egypt, p.16 69 Building Digital Bridges: Egypt’s vision of the Information Society, Ministry of Communications and Information Technology, p.14 70 Arab Human Development Report 2003, UNDP, New York, 2003, p.72

35 implementation of new projects identified in the national development plans and strategies, as well as support existing youth-led development initiatives.

Social safety nets and coping strategies

The Egyptian social protection system, implemented through a variety of safety net mechanisms since the late 1970s, is probably the most prominent duty-bearer responsibility to poor citizens carried out by the government. Social safety nets have on the other hand been the most significant mechanism ensuring social stability, and currently comprise three parallel systems: broad and untargeted consumer subsidies, cash payments to poor households and various social assistance programmes run by the Social Fund for Development (SFD). In addition there are a variety of social insurance programmes which do not really target the poor per se. A challenge for Egypt in the coming years will be to balance the disciplined policies need to ensure continued economic growth with the social policies required to protect the most vulnerable groups in society. A key message of the Prime Minister’s statement (December 2004) on market discipline to control prices, curb inflation, and restructure the tax law (reducing corporate taxes), was the promise that the government would continue to subsidize basic commodities as one of the measures to cushion the blow to low-income groups.

At the same time, however, the government recognizes that its entire subsidy system needs to be reformed and it is currently drawing up a plan, supported by WFP, to better target subsidies to the poorest, perhaps through ‘self-targeting’ mechanisms, which could represent a more pro-poor and sustainable way of supporting the GoE’s poverty-reduction strategy. It is estimated that 46 million Egyptians are eligible for subsidies (calculated as about 9.5 million ration card holders). The GOE faces major challenges as the food subsidy program has and continues to have serious problems ranging from leakage and under coverage, diversion of subsidized goods to open markets and quality of goods. Consumer subsidies make up 5% of public expenditure71 and cover several food items such as baladi bread72 (available to Egyptians regardless of income) and non- food items such as electricity, energy products, and services like primary health care and basic education. Though the subsidy on baladi bread has been the most effective in lifting people out of poverty73, it is commonly recognized that it is imperfectly targeted since the non-poor also benefit from the same system. On the other hand subsidies to the energy sector, petroleum- derived products74 and electricity accounted for 88% of total implicit subsidies in the fiscal year 200475. This has exponentially increased the impact of the subsidies program on the GoE’s expenditure budget and threatened its very sustainability in the long term.

Indeed, with the exception of the baladi bread subsidy, the poverty reduction impact of social safety net programmes appears to be extremely weak. For example the social assistance programmes of the Ministry of Insurance and Social Affairs (MISA) have lifted less than 4% of

71 Egypt Country Profile: The Road Ahead for Egypt, p.22 72 Food subsidies are not only the major component of direct subsidies, but also one of the oldest subsidy programs delivered to the population in terms of continuity of assistance. Back in the early 1990s, however, food subsidies had been applied to only four items (cooking oil, flour, bread, sugar) out of the original 18 products covered by the subsidy strategy. In addition to the implicit food subsidies, representing 23% of total implicit subsidies currently applying January 2003, the government added seven additional items (quantities per person are 1 Kg of Rice and pasta, 0.5 kg of brown beans, lentils and margarine; 50 gm of tea; and an additional edible oil item at a higher price than the old one). 73 Without the bread subsidy, 730,00 more people would have been in poverty (18.9 percent in poverty in total) 74 Natural gas, cooking gas, kerosene, benzene 80 and 90, kerosene, diesel and fuel oil represent petroleum-derived products implicitly subsidized by different percentages of their respective costs (ranging from a 28% for diesel oil to a 90% for cooking gas) 75 The Budgetary Cost of Subsidies in Egypt: Structure and Trends, Internal World Bank Report, 2005

36 all poor from poverty76. Those eligible for support from MISA are typically orphans, widows, unmarried women with no means of support, divorcees and their children, people living with disabilities and prisoners’ families. This also includes a variety of pension schemes like the Sadat Pension. In 2001/02 MISA distributed over 500 million EGP to almost 900,000 families, with 90% going to pensions and only 10% going towards temporary assistance. In this respect, the reach of MISA’s payments did not target the poor, with less than 20% of beneficiaries being poor and 80% being non-poor. Even in rural Upper Egypt 76% of beneficiaries were non-poor, though the payments did reach a large number of people from the lowest 40% of the population by income.

The programmes of the SFD do aim to help the most vulnerable groups but the overall impact of this support is unclear. In addition to government social protection, a number of private religious and charitable funds support the poor. These private social assistance funds, though small, account for 4.9% of the income of the poor, compared to 5.1% from public assistance. Private funds have been most successful in metropolitan and urban parts of Lower Egypt, where half the recipients would have been poor without them. It is clear from this that the duty-bearer responsibility to social safety nets needs to be strengthened in two ways: by increasing the cash transfers to the genuinely poor and by better targeting social assistance to the most deserving recipients.

How do the main claim holders – the poor – manage to survive? One study77 has shown that the poor have few capacities of their own to improve their standards of living, often being resigned to a life of poverty and attributing their situation to “God’s Will”. Consequently many of the poor indicate a satisfaction with their lives and find grass roots coping strategies to manage their often precarious financial situation. For many of the poor in the study both direct government support and assistance from NGOs was minimal, with most relying on immediate family, neighbours, relatives and friends for help. In times of particular hardship the poor will seek loans and financial assistance from families, while also seeking to get favours through influential contacts or “wasta” (pulling strings). Such kinship relations and willingness to support each other seems more common in Upper Egypt. When possible the poor do try to put money aside as well as join “gameya” collective community saving/borrowing schemes.

The need to improve the quality and efficiency of education and health provision

It is a self-evident truth that a fully educated society that has unimpeded access to quality health services will be more productive and more competitive in the global market place. Yet in spite of enormous public investments over the past 30 years, (the education budget is 6.2%78 of GDP and the health budget is 3.9%79 of GDP) Egypt continues to have varying levels of illiteracy, while many Egyptians are still unable to access good health care (Chapter V demonstrates the costs of ill health arising from environmental problems). In addition, the regional disparities in both these vital sectors points to endemic structural inequalities in the management and allocation of public finances, and particularly the health sector, appears to be under-funded. In addressing these issues the 2004 Egypt Human Development Report confirmed that the principal obstacle to overcoming these hurdles was the centralized nature of public services. The result being that local units are unable to manage these services in a manner that meets local needs, while so often the wrong type of personnel, lacking the right type of incentives are allocated to the wrong place, having a severe

76 Poverty Reduction Strategy for Egypt, p.42 77 Subjective Poverty and Social Capital, p.44 78 Millennium Development Goals Second Country Report- Egypt 2004, p.18 79 Country Co-operation Strategy for WHO and Egypt 2005-2009, p.16

37 impact on the quality of services. In addition the general cultural dilemma of lack of meaningful public participation and the exclusion of women from decision-making further compounds the problems faced by the people in most need – the poor. Educational reform has been an ongoing debate for many years in Egypt and in February 2004 the Ministry of Education issued its national strategy 2003-2016, “National Plan for Education for All”. One of the key objectives is to ensure that all Egyptians are included in the education system and the quality of education is improved. Qualitative goals include introducing advanced technologies into classrooms, reduce class densities, improve the learning environment, improve the standards of school managers and teachers, rationalize expenditures and decentralize the delivery of education. All these themes have been picked up by the government of Ahmed Nazif and a committee has been set up by the Ministry of Education that will discuss decentralization policies with members of the business community, NGOs, the legal profession, academics and others. A 2003 Ministerial decree now allows for units to be set up in schools to promote quality, productive activities and training and monitoring of performance. The Ministry of Education has also established a Strategic Planning Steering Group which has designed a standard- based strategic framework. Current policy reforms include the design of a Professional Academy for Teachers (PAT), which will be able to create a licensing and accreditation system for training and educational programmes for the professional development of teachers, and the establishment of a national accreditation authority which will accredit schools for quality.

Designing curricula that are compatible with domestic and international markets and encouraging decentralization and community participation are also features which have been put at the forefront of the government’s attention. In Alexandria claim holders have had an opportunity to see the results of such reform. The Governor of Alexandria has been given unprecedented powers to implement a pilot exercise in decentralized education, covering 70 existing and new schools at the primary, preparatory and secondary levels in poor areas. The programme, which will be able to mobilize resources from the community and have the flexibility in disbursement, is showing that the highly centralized nature of Egyptian education needs to be changed, while decisions on curriculum, budget allocation, staffing and salaries need to be moved away from the central Ministry level and to local education authorities. In a similar vein there may be opportunities for the government to promote engaging adolescents and youth as peer educators in schools and through community-based initiatives. This would help increase the participation of adolescents and youth in mechanisms to support quality improvements in school curriculum and school governance, possibly via school boards. Moreover, parents, students and teachers need to be involved in reform initiatives and plans, while local autonomy needs to be effected to identify local needs, while duty bearers at all levels must address the inadequate incentive structure for teachers, which often emerge as a result of budgetary constraints.

Similar to the education system, the governance of Egypt’s complex health system seems to be weak. Health policies and strategies are not supported by evidence, and regulatory mechanisms are not well developed. In spite of healthcare successes Egypt is a low health sector spender compared to other countries of a similar economic development. Households bear a higher share of the burden and government financing is too limited and fragmented to be truly effective. Overall Egypt has one of the lowest shares of national health expenditure funded from public financing in the Middle East and North Africa80. At the same time the system remains highly centralized, while coordination by the MOHP with other related agencies and ministries is weak.

It’s for these reasons that many now believe that the price of not decentralizing Egypt’s health services will be a heavy one. The disparities in the quality of people’s health and the health

80 Ibid., p.17

38 services they receive between different governorates and even between different districts in the same governorate have been well documented. For example it is typical for the doctor-citizen ratio to range from 40 per 10,000 to 1 per 10,000 in two different markaz in the same governorate81. In large part the disparities in people’s health is connected to the uneven course of development across the country. At the same time, health issues and service to citizens cannot be divorced from local conditions, and that is why many observers are saying that decentralization is the only answer to the health system’s rehabilitation. A current institutional problem is the lack of capacity to set health policies in a holistic fashion, such as the linkages between diarrheal disease and a polluted water supply. Similarly, access to healthcare frequently requires available transportation in rural areas, with healthy life styles being linked to good hygiene, education and public health information campaigns, while nutrition and food security at the household level are affected by the availability of foods and their prices.

In this context government responses now revolve around the implementation of the Health Sector Reform Programme, which started in 1997 and is due to run until 2018. It has five guiding principles: universality, quality, equity, efficiency, and sustainability. Some of the major challenges facing the implementation of HSRP include delays in infrastructure development, due to complicated procurement procedures that vary from donor to donor; limited availability of an adequate number of family physicians; sustainability of financial resources; advocacy and marketing; community participation; managerial capacity at district level; lack of public health expertise to design the public health services part of the basic package; cost-effectiveness of different health interventions and the application of decentralization and delegation of authority. In addition there does not seem to be an effective mechanism of coordination between the Ministry of Higher Education and the Ministry of Health and Population to ensure that the training of doctors takes into account the needs of the health system, including preventive and curative care. Information on human resources remains fragmented and concerns have also been expressed about the relevance of the content of the curricula as well as of the quality of training imparted in medical schools.

On the other side patients have little confidence in the government-owned hospitals, representing the only choice available to low-income groups. These hospitals are hampered by the huge demand and the government’s failure to keep up with escalating costs, inefficient use of available resources and ineffective management. The result is that many people are turning to the private sector and paying sums which often put people into debt. Despite the efforts made during the last decade, the coverage by social health insurance is relatively limited. Equally important efforts are needed to ensure access to health and reproductive health information for adolescents and youth, while the provision of adolescent and youth-friendly health services is currently limited. With appropriate training, young people can also be community resource in providing health-related services such as vaccinations, clean water and sanitation to children at risk.

81 See Governorate Human Development Report for Qalobia, UNDP, 2003

39 Causal analysis tree for poverty in Egypt

Manifestation Human poverty across significant parts of Egyptian society and the denial of basic rights in accordance with the Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights

Immediate causes Inadequate Low incomes, restricted Poorly targeted mechanisms access to economic social assistance which promote assets and insecure programmes and and consolidate livelihoods (e.g. job poor state capacities quality education insecurity, informal to accommodate the for all, eradicate sector practices, necessities of the illiteracy and underemployment and most vulnerable secure universal unemployment groups access to quality particularly among youth health services and women, food insecurity)

Underlying causes The pace of Gender inequality Insufficient pro- poor economic growth which leads to the policies and action-plans have slowed down feminization of (e.g. job intensive private in recent years human poverty investments, access to while inflation has micro- finance and land, increased availability of low cost housing and effective sanitation coverage) to support social justice, equity and more balanced territorial development, exacerbated by high population growth

Root Causes

Breakdown of the Excessive Insufficient 'voice ‘old’ social contract, centralization of of the poor' to unequal distribution social, economic influence policy of wealth and a and political making growth structure authority for basic which marginalizes service provision Upper Egypt

Chapter III: Human Rights, Democracy and Good Governance

The triangulation of development, freedom and security forms the cornerstone of international relations in the 21st century. This nexus was openly acknowledged by the drafters and signatories of the UN Charter in 1945, and created for the UN a mandate to “ensure respect for fundamental human rights, establish conditions under which justice and the rule of law could be maintained, and promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom”82. The most recent re- articulation of this came in the 2004 Arab Human Development Report, Towards Freedom in the Arab World, in which the authors unequivocally declare: “Freedom is pivotal in human development”83. This sentiment extends to the values contained in the Millennium Declaration and the associated commitments made by Heads of State at the Millennium Summit in 2000. In this forum governments declared that the best way to ensure that “men and women have the right to live their lives and raise their children in dignity, free from hunger and the fear of violence, oppression or injustice”, was through “democratic and participatory governance, based on the will of the people”84.

This chapter explores the different obstacles to genuine freedom such as the restrictions in all forms of citizen participation, the government’s capacity to respond to societal needs, the nature of the rule of law and the challenges faced by women such as discrimination and gender-based violence. This analysis is pivotal to understanding Egypt’s progress towards the achievement of human development, which is means by which human rights can be realized in all areas of life. At the same time human rights norms and the democratic governance structures which secure them are the guiding principles for the achievement of the standards and goals set out in the Millennium Declaration.

Setting a reform agenda

Expanding the space for democracy

On becoming Prime Minister in 2004, Ahmed Nazif announced that his government would work to improve the environment for political participation, echoing a reform agenda which had been laid out at the National Democratic Party’s 2003 annual conference. During the conference President Mubarak promised a variety of democratic reforms, including the annulment of many military injunctions under the country’s Emergency Law, and invited opposition parties to enter into a dialogue with the NDP to amend a host of laws pertaining to political rights. Subsequently, one of the most significant moves was to change the Constitutional Amendment during 2005, which allowed for direct multi-candidate presidential elections. According to one leading political commentator, this move, which was adopted in time for the 2005 Presidential elections, “has ushered in a new and dynamic phase in political reform and development that will mesh with progress being made in the economic and social spheres. It has set in motion a series of legislative measures that will bring political parties and forces on board as responsible and effective partners in decision-making”85.

82 In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All, paragraph 5 83 Arab Human Development Report 2004, Towards Freedom in the Arab World, UNDP, New York, 2005, p.2 84 The United Nations Millennium Declaration, 18 September 2000 85 Ibrahim Nafie, “Turning Point in Reform”, Al Ahram Weekly, 3-9 March 2005

The amendment of Article 76 and the onset of the 2005 Presidential campaign stimulated a wealth of activism among Egypt’s intellectual and political class. Many commentators see the change to Article 76 as the first step towards opening up Egypt’s political system, which may have a profound affect on all aspects of political life, while others believe that the pace of democratic change is still too slow, and warn of rising frustrations among ordinary Egyptians. One result is that the politically active strata have started to mobilize themselves, and Egypt is witnessing the growth of numerous opposition political movements ahead of the 2005 Presidential elections. One of the most active of these, Kefaya (Enough) has inspired poets, writers, academics and former politicians to articulate their opposition to the current status of governance in the country. While there are indications of increased political expression and participation, there seems to be also unnecessary police violence against political demonstrators. Recently some 40 demonstrators were arrested and more than half of them were charged for "spreading tendentious propaganda that could damage the public interest"86.

However, this rise of political activism remains contained largely to educated parts of society, while the majority of poor Egyptians observe from a distance, marginalized from the current spate of political dialogue.

Pursuing a human rights agenda

Egypt is already a signatory to 18 United Nations human rights conventions and to 60 of the International Labour Organization's (ILO) conventions, as well as to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. However, the government recognized that more needed to be done to protect the human rights of citizens and on 19 January 2004 the government formally announced the formation of the National Council for Human Rights (NCHR). The Council issued its first Annual Report for the period February 2004 - February 2005, producing a candid first assessment of the human rights situation in the country. In particular the report noted the activities of the security forces, cases of unlawful deaths of prisoners while in custody and restrictions to some civil liberties by the application of the Emergency Law. Led by former UN Secretary-General Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, one of the main functions of the Council is to accept complaints of human rights violations, refer them through the right channels and follow-up on cases. In general the Council has a mandate to preserve human rights, raise people’s awareness on human rights norms, and guarantee the practice of human rights in Egypt. While it is made up of independent experts the decision to establish the Council was taken under the condition that it would be affiliated to the People’s Assembly87.

One of the most prominent human rights and governance issues which the government has attempted to address over the past several years is the situation of women. Both the Human Rights Committee and the CEDAW Committee have noted the “persistence” of patriarchal attitudes which limit the role of women in Egyptian society and especially the full implementation of the CEDAW convention in the country. However, it is against this background that the GoE has made numerous attempts to provide greater opportunities for Egyptian women. In recent years this has meant the establishment of the National Council of Women (NCW), which has the mandate to oversee the implementation of CEDAW and has encouraged the greater

86 Egypt: Security Forces Attack Opposition Demonstrators. Human Rights Watch, 2 August 2005, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/08/02/egypt11554.htm 87 The National Council for Human Rights does not comply with the Paris Principles for independent human rights bodies.

42 participation of women in public life (the first woman judge was appointed to the Supreme Constitutional Court in 2003), while the National Council for Childhood and Motherhood (NCCM) aggressively addresses the practice of female genital mutilation (FGM) which was outlawed by a Ministerial Decree in 1996 (Ministry of Health and Population).

Main Issues

Legal and institutional frameworks for democracy and political pluralism

Legislative constructs and democratic decision-making

Egypt’s Constitution, which was adopted in 1971, is the cornerstone of the country’s political life. Though often cited by observers as one of the most progressive Constitutions in the Arab world, enshrining many of the freedoms enunciated under the International Bill of Rights, it equally encourages and formalizes a significant level of political centralization. According to Egyptian political commentators, the 1971 Constitution was not able to incorporate the fundamental features of a democratic system, but rather resembled more the authoritarian style of an earlier era. As a result there are weak accountability and oversight mechanisms of government action.

The Constitution puts the President at the heart of the political life. He is the head of state, nominated by a two-thirds majority of the People’s Assembly and elected by a referendum. President Mubarak is currently approaching the end of his fourth term in office (Article 77 of the Constitution allows an indefinite number of Presidential terms for any one person). The President holds a wide range of powers, which include making political appointments of key figures in the government, like the Prime Minister, and having the right to issue decrees. The constitutional bias towards the executive power is compounded by the relative weakness of the institutions mandated to act as the checks and balance in the political system. The most important of these is the People’s Assembly, which constitutionally represents the main national institution entrusted to make, approve and scrutinize national legislation. Its law-making powers are complemented by the responsibility to approve the state budget and conduct oversight of the executive branch. However, the constitution and political practice is perceived to limit the People’s Assembly’s capacity to carry out its functions in a way which promotes political pluralism and meaningful democratic decision-making. In practice the Assembly has little power to amend legislation, change the government or influence national budgets. The parliamentary domination of the ruling party, with 88% of the seats, effectively limit’s the capacity of the People’s Assembly to oppose or question executive decisions, largely reducing the oversight function of the body. In addition, there are questions regarding the effectiveness of parliamentarians. The Constitution forces a 50% quota for “peasants and workers”, a throw back to the socialist origins of the modern Republic. A study which measured the performance of MPs demonstrated that non-peasants and non-workers were the most active in debates and far more effective in using their parliamentary rights.88

The Upper House or Shura Council is essentially an advisory organ of the parliamentary system. The Constitution charges the Shura Council with the responsibility to discuss proposed amendments to the Constitution, bills on basic rights, annual socio-economic development plans, international treaties and other subjects referred to it by the President. However, the Council’s decisions are not binding and Ministers are not accountable to the Council. Despite this the Council has been gaining more recognition among political parties and the media, who have acknowledged the quality of the debates and the advice offered.

88 Yasser Fathi, “The Effect of the Characteristics of Membership on the Effectiveness of Legislative Functions of the People’s Assembl y- 1995-2000”, Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Cairo University, 2004, p.52-55

43 Political pluralism in a state of emergency

It is not insignificant that one of the first recommendations made by Egypt’s National Council for Human Rights to the GoE was to end the State of Emergency, which started in 1981 following the assassination of President Sadat, and which currently extends to May 2006. The call to reconsider the State of Emergency is supported by the UN Human Rights Committee and the Committee Against Torture. The Emergency Law is the reflection of the bias towards security, which has characterized Egyptian society for several decades. In this atmosphere citizens’ ordinary civil liberties, protected by the Constitution, become subject to security prerogatives, where the state is able to prevent demonstrations, strikes, “hostile meetings” and to close down newspapers and other publications. The authorities also have the right to arrest suspects arbitrarily and put all types of civil associations, such as NGOs and unions, under bureaucratic control. In this respect the Emergency Law, which was first put on the statute book as Law 162 in 1958, is supported by a number of additional restrictions going as far back as 1914. The Emergency Law impinges on the political life of the country and conflicts with the spirit of international human rights obligations in the area of civil and political rights. There is no doubt that Egypt needs to be concerned about terrorism and unlawful threats to the rule of law, but numerous voices are now raised in opposition to the state of emergency as the vehicle for maintaining security in the country.

According to the NCHR such unlawful threats can be managed within the ambit of ordinary legislation (e.g. anti-terrorism laws) and through the co-operation of various state institutions. The authors of the NCHR 2004 report clearly state the social impact of the current situation: “The continuation of the state of emergency would increase the sense of alienation and the temptation not to engage in public life which would have a negative impact on society and its progress and development”89. Thus for duty bearers and claim holders alike, the dominant place of security has contributed to setting limits on the degree of political pluralism in the country.

Multi-party politics came to Egypt in 1976 as part of reforms undertaken by Anwar Sadat. However, the nature of this political pluralism has also been conditioned by the mechanisms which have been built into state-society relations, and as key duty bearers in society, political parties are limited both by law and the dearth of legitimacy which they command among their constituencies. The formation of political parties is overseen by the Political Parties Affairs Committee, which is made up of different senior government officials and headed by the Speaker of the Shura Council. The Committee is charged with approving new political parties on the basis of strict criteria, and of the 18 legal parties functioning today it has approved only seven, though the most recent approval came in 2004. The other 11 parties were sanctioned through the courts, while only 6 parties occupy seats in the People’s Assembly. The Ruling party, the National Democratic Party, holds 88% of the seats. Additionally, the Emergency Laws play a role in restricting the activities of political parties (assembly, movement and expression) and can be used to target individual opposition leaders.

One of the political groupings that has not found its way into the political mainstream is the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). Muslim Brotherhood candidates stand as independents and in the 2000 parliamentary elections the candidates with MB sympathies gained 17 seats, making it the biggest opposition grouping in the People’s Assembly. There is a debate among intellectuals as to whether the Muslim Brotherhood poses a threat to the state and the consequences of allowing it to become a legitimate part of the political mainstream (though the constitution bans any political grouping based on religion).

89 Egypt National Council for Human Rights First Annual Report, 2004-2005, Cairo, 2005

44 Political culture is still dominated by traditional and patriarchal values, resulting in an emphasis on loyalty and submission. Political organizations remain weak, due in part of the environment in which they operate, but also because of their internal structure. Many political parties do not have a strong presence close to constituents outside of Cairo, while ideologically none can deviate too far from the thinking of the Establishment. Generally, parties represent particular groups in society, and though no party can exclude a particular social class, they are more often than not characterized by specific interest groups, so limiting their wide social appeal and further undermining their legitimacy among the general public. In addition, all political parties tend to be elitist, male-oriented and dominated by the older generation of political leaders; the role of women in political parties is minimal. Moreover, political parties lack internal democracy and have also been unable to attract the most talented people to their ranks. In large part this is because potential party members are drawn to civil society organizations, which are often more attractive vehicles for public service. The weak financial base of parties, and consequently their inability to educate the general public about their manifestos and policies, has contributed to a vacuum of purposeful political dialogue in society, while the public has become disillusioned with politics as a vehicle by which their day-to-day lives can be improved.

Society and the political Establishment

Participation and public discourse

Signs that the political system is gradually opening up cannot disguise the low demand for political participation and political apathy which characterize popular politics across the country. This is largely the result of the closed decision-making system at all levels, the absence of any true political opposition which seeks to reflect the needs and demand of “claim-holder” citizens, the exclusion of women from the political party system, a general feeling of mistrust of politicians and a socio-political culture in which obedience to the local power structures is the norm. The disinterest in politics was most eloquently demonstrated by the 25% turn-out of registered voters in the 2000 elections, mostly reflecting the poor level of “cultural literacy” and the lack of trust in the election results or in the legislature as a tool for peaceful change90. It can also be attributed to the fact that people are preoccupied with their social-economic conditions and the hardships of poverty, to care about participation in a political system to which they attach little significance. Popular mistrust of politics is mirrored by expert opinion, whereby 45% of respondents to a 2004 Governance Profile of Egypt said the voting system is not transparent and fair91. There are 24.7 million registered voters, though this figure is frequently disputed, as there is no reliable electoral roll of eligible voters. Cleaning up the electoral registration system and getting all eligible voters onto to the system is at the heart of political reform demands and at the top of the agenda of political parties. The key element of any reform initiative is to introduce and efficiently manage an effective nation-wide ID system. In addition, there have been reports that Egyptian elections witness some degree of violence and intimidation, with supporters of opposition candidates sometimes being prevented from entering polling stations. 92

In many parts of Egypt NGOs play an instrumental role in delivering social services to the community. This role has roots dating back to 19th century and currently, there are over 16,000 such organizations registered throughout the country, the majority of which offer services which are complementary to those offered by the government in fields like health care and education. However, this high number of organizations belies the low number of functioning organizations

90 Democracy in Egypt, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2005, p.53 91 Governance Profile of Egypt, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, December 2004, p.11 92 “The day the Gloves Came Off”, Cairo Magazine, 2-8 June 2005, p.14

45 which actually provide a public service. The right to free affiliation enshrined in the Constitution, is tempered by a raft of laws which places such organizations under the close scrutiny of the authorities. Article 55 protects the citizens’ right to establish NGOs with the exceptions of secret NGOs, or those whose activities are hostile to social order, or are of military nature. The current law governing NGOs (Law 84/2002) requires that NGOs can only be established via governmental authorization from the Ministry of Insurance and Social Affairs (MISA). The law also obliges NGOs to seek government approval for receipt of funds. While NGOs consider this a restriction, the government argues that it is an administrative requirement aimed at ensuring that no funds are used for money laundering or derived from other illicit activities, and that the money is used properly. Many civil society representatives, while acknowledging that many NGOs lack adequate capacities to be effective, believe that the government exploits this fact as a means to impose grater regulation on civil society as a whole.

More broadly, the government has the right to object to the establishment of civil associations, co-operative associations and youth centers. It can object to candidates for their administrative bodies, nullify their decisions and suggest that they be dissolved. The Ministry of Insurance and Social Affairs has the authority to dissolve associations by administrative decree. However, within this context, the past ten years have seen the rise of a number of human rights organizations which have become a part of the political discourse and an important factor in shedding light on Egypt’s political system. Such organizations need to work within the law but are also testament to the political space which has been opened through the work of civil society.

The recent liberalization of the media sector is also contributing to greater political space and accountability outside of the formal structures of democracy. Indeed, the media often scrutinizes the actions of the government more vigorously than the legislative branch or the opposition political parties. However, press freedoms which are protected by article 48 of the Constitution, has often been subject to government control and individual journalists can still be subject to sanction by the authorities. According to the international press freedom organization, Reporters Without Borders, Egypt is one of 19 countries worldwide which imprisons journalists93. The organization’s 2004 review also reported that one journalist had gone missing, four had been imprisoned and six had been physically attacked by members of the security forces. Although this shows that efforts still need to be made to protect press freedoms, the NCHR noted in its 2004 report that progress had been made, with the re-establishment of two previously banned publications (Al Mawqef Al Arabi and Al-Dostour) and the licensing of the opposition paper – Al Ghad. President Mubarak has also ordered the drafting of a bill that would protect journalists from arrest and detention. Formally the Law of Radio and Television still puts these media under government control, allowing the ruling party a monopoly of public airtime. Similarly the state- owned or national papers are under the control of the Shura Council, which functions according to government directives and appoints the chairmen and Editors-in-Chief of these newspapers. It is rare for opposition parties to use these instruments to espouse their policies or opinions. 94

Since 2003, when the Iraq crisis sparked a new phase of press boldness, particularly in criticizing government policy, there has been a noticeable change in the media environment. This has mainly been reflected through the increasing number of private and satellite channels now available to the public and which have gained widespread popularity through their style of interviewing high- ranking public officials and ministers in a way that would be inconceivable on government run television. At the same time press ownership is also shifting away from the government to the private. A number of independent newspapers and magazines have been opened, including Al-

93 Al Ahram Weekly, “Another Brick in the Wall”, 12-18 May 2005; see also http://www.rsf.org 94 Democracy in Egypt, p.29

46 Dostour which re-started publishing in March 2005. Some of the national newspapers have been criticized for not staying in step with the new atmosphere of political dialogue following Mubarak’s announcement to modify article 76 of the Constitution. They too are being encouraged to begin questioning the system and promote political reform. Indeed, the new liberal atmosphere is being exploited most by the newspapers of opposition parties, which are raising the tone of scrutiny of government policies and officials.

Finally, popular and mass opposition to government policies have become a common sight in Egypt over the past two years. Prompted by events in Palestine and Iraq, universities and other societal groups, including Islamic organizations, began to organize mass demonstrations in Cairo and elsewhere in Egypt. Though always heavily policed, these popular expressions of anger at political events did sometimes turn violent and were reported on through the international media. Significantly, however, some of these demonstrations, which started as protests against Israeli or western policies, often turned into calls for domestic reform. Recently established social movements demanding democratic reforms and encompassing Islamic, pan-Arab, leftist and liberal currents are slowly becoming surrogates for organized political parties, since for many ordinary people they represent more genuine expressions of popular feeling. In this context several anti-government street protests were organized during 2005.

Young people in Egypt are searching for a voice

Young people make up 31.5%95 of the population, with one fifth of Egyptians aged between 15- 24 years96. However, there are many impediments to this very large adolescent and youth population being able to express their opinion and to having a meaningful role in the social and political development of the society. Egyptian adolescents and youth face all the tremendous physical and psychological changes experienced by all young people worldwide, and as such Egyptians in this age bracket are seeking to take new responsibilities and experiment with independence. Yet most young Egyptians find it difficult to find the information to help them come to terms with issues such as drugs, sexual health, relationships and marriage. In general specialized services targeting young people are lacking in these areas, leading to misinformation and misconceptions. This is compounded by the low quality education and illiteracy among 15-24 year olds (male illiteracy is 17% and female illiteracy is 25%), accentuating the fact that many young Egyptians do not possess the full set of human capability tools required to help them manage the tremendous changes in their lives. In addition to inadequate education, adolescents and youth throughout the country face large unemployment problems, with many working fewer hours than they would like, while others work long hours with little gain and often in hazardous conditions.

Overall, current avenues for political participation are insufficient and consequently young people are often viewed as apathetic or disengaged. Youths are still not viewed as key participants in decision-making in the development process. This is also reflected in the absence of a large number of active non-governmental youth-led organizations or structures, active youth advisory boards and active youth programmes. Large numbers of young people feel excluded from the political process and do not feel able to influence the decision-making process at any level. This degree of passivity among young people was borne out in a 2004 National Youth Aspirations Survey carried out by the NCCM, which showed that over half of the students (62%) said that they had never been involved with activities to improve the performance of their school,

95 The UN General Assembly defines young people as being aged between 10-24 years. Figures from CAPMAS, 2005 96 Adolescents are defined as being aged between 10-19 years (WHO) and youth are aged 15-24 years (UN General Assembly)

47 67% admitted to never being part of any school clubs or activities, and the majority (56%) had never voted in Student Union elections, while 84% said that they had never been involved in public protests97. This attitude stems from the wide belief that the systems do not exist to channel young people’s concerns, while young people attribute their passivity an environment which discourages public protest or critical dialogue.

However, a recent study entitled “The Future as Seen by Egyptian Teenagers” (2001) revealed that although most adolescents are pessimistic regarding a solution to their personal future and the prospects of the country in general, they are still ready to work to shape their futures and participate actively in the economic, social and political life of the country. This is supported by the high number of young people who appear to have a lot of faith in the process of democracy, with 75% ready to vote98. However, since traditional outlets like youth centres and schools are ill equipped to cater for young people’s needs and support their expression, many young people are finding alternative and less traditional political channels which move beyond voting as a vehicle to make their voices heard. For those who are able, this revolves around organizing locally and via the Internet or by volunteering. Girls are probably the least able to express themselves, with their access to youth centres being limited, especially since the centres generally do not have female staff members and do not design programmes for girls. Young girls are least likely to use the Internet and are least likely to engage in sports.

In addition the media, and particularly television, have limited programmes targeting adolescents and youth. The programmes that exist are mainly tailored to children, and there is a dearth of programming catering to the interests of adolescents. This information gap also points to the fact that available data specific to adolescents is not sufficient, with the most recent national survey on adolescents being conducted in 1997. There is a need to update information on adolescents, as well as addressing gaps in available knowledge.

The role of women in Egyptian society

One of Egypt’s biggest and most important challenges is to emancipate the country’s women. Egypt’s outward commitment to equal rights for men and women is exemplary. Domestic law guarantees women’s equality, enshrined in article 40 of the Constitution which states that citizens “are equal in front of the law and equal in rights and duties. There shall be no discrimination between them based on gender, origin, language or belief”. Reflecting this egalitarian spirit, the country has ratified the seven main Human Rights instruments including the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) 99 on 18 September 1981. Upon ratification, Egypt made reservations to articles 9 (2), 16 and 29 pledging compliance provided that it does not run counter to the Islamic Sharia law. Article 16 concerns women’s rights within marriage and family and Article 9(2) concerns the equal right of men and women to pass their nationality to their children. In 2004 the government amended the Nationality Law allowing gender equality regarding the right to pass on the mother’s nationality to her children in cases where the father is a non-Egyptian.

Egypt’s second Country Report on the Millennium Development Goals states that gender equality is one of the areas where there needs to be an accelerated effort, though the country is potentially on track to attain the targets by 2015. In spite of concerted efforts to support women’s rights in society the CEDAW Committee notes that the “persistence of patriarchal attitudes and

97 National Youth Aspirations Survey 98 Ibidem 99 For more information see the combined fourth and fifth report (2000) of Egypt to the CEDAW Committee

48 stereotypical behaviour with respect to the role of women and men in the family and society limit the full implementation of the Convention”.100 In view of this observation the CEDAW Committee has urged the GoE to pursue awareness-raising programmes targeted specifically at men to change their attitudes.

Such socio-cultural attitudes towards women are also deeply rooted in the larger challenges which impact on Egypt’s process of democratic transformation. Not least Egyptian society is caught between two opposing social-political currents – on the one hand, modernization, progress and positive engagement with the outside world, and on the other, conservative and deeply traditionalist thinking and practices which resist adaptation to liberal thinking and emphasize confrontation with “foreign” ideas at the expense of internal progress. The result is a governance dualism in which women are afforded absolute equal rights in law, but have a reduced status in society as a result of attitudes which promote patriarchy and resistance to change. Thus, there is a dearth of opportunities for most Egyptian women to fulfill their potential, characterized by numerous cultural barriers in a male-dominated society, leaving the majority of women lacking the self-confidence to participate fully in the communities in which they live.

Women in politics

These male-dominated and deeply patriarchal socio-cultural currents are most aptly demonstrated through the political system. Very few women hold high political positions in governorates or local councils, nor do they occupy senior positions in the justice system. Today only 2.9% of the seats in the People’s Assembly are occupied by women, which represents a decrease of female participation in the legislature from 1979, when women occupied 9% of the seats. The high point in women’s political representation was due to a law allowing a quota of 30 seats for women parliamentarians, though the law was rescinded in 1986. In the 2000 elections, of 4,250 candidates running for the People’s Assembly, only 109 were women and today’s share of women in the Egyptian parliament is lower than that in other Arab legislatures. Women occupy 6.8% of the seats in the Shura Council.

The reason for the low level of female participation in politics is rooted in a prevailing attitude which dictates that it is a career unsuited for a woman, and is part of the general cultural attitude which deems certain careers not appropriate for women to pursue. Bureaucratic obstacles are put in front of qualified women candidates who wish to enter politics, while the performance of women in parliament is often disparaged, even though women’s performance is no better and no worse than the general standard. Ultimately the most acute demonstration of the marginalization of women in politics is the very low number of women belonging to political parties. For example, of the 444 NDP candidates running for seats in the 2000 elections, only 11 women were put forward by the ruling party; a mere 2.28% of the total. Similarly, none of the leading political parties put forward a significant number of women to contest seats and no women candidates contested seats in the local council elections in 2001.

Contrast this to the profound role played by women in civil society organizations. For example women’s representation in the country’s 23 professional associations and unions reached 28%, while women have held leadership positions in four labour unions. At the same time the number of volunteer and civil organizations and women’s federations has risen in the past ten years and with this the percentage of women involved in civil society work. In this context the National Council for Women was established in 2000, since when it has become a forum to express the voice of women in all walks of life and to encourage women to enter public life. Understanding

100 Concluding observations, CEDAW, 2 February 2001

49 this need the NCW and the United Nations Development Programme are running a project to prepare leading women candidates for political life, by teaching them skills in a variety of areas designed to help them run successfully for elections in 2005 and 2006.

The quality of women’s economic participation

In general women cannot claim to have the same access to the benefits of the economy as men. While male unemployment stands at 5.6%, unemployment among women is almost four times as high at 22.6%. Similarly women’s wages are often 80% that those of men. In spite of these disparities the proportion of working women has increased from 18% of the total work force in 1984 to 22 % in 2002101. Indeed the average growth rate of female employment has been more rapid over the past 25 years. The main reason for this has been increasing education levels with more women passing through secondary education, while more married women are working102. The public sector remains one of the largest employers of women, accounting for over 40% of women’s jobs across the country. Most of these are in urban areas where the government employs almost 60% of working women, compared to 24% in rural districts, demonstrating once again the greater opportunities available in the urban centres of Egypt where the gender balance is relatively more egalitarian. In spite of its rapid growth over the past ten years, the private sector has not provided a significant outlet for female employment, with only 16% of private sector jobs being filled by women nationwide.

By contrast 1.1 million women work in the informal sector, 93% of these in rural areas. In general women’s engagement in the informal sector is different to men’s, with women taking up a larger share of non-wage workers, while they are less likely to be employers. Women in urban areas are more likely to be engaged in non-wage family oriented labor than those in rural areas. Overall the informal sector sheds light on the discrepancies between the nature of male and female labour. Data shows that 10.3 % of women working out of establishments were wage workers compared to 33.5% of men; 13.6% of women were employers compared to 29.1% men; 18.1% women and 20.1% men were self employed and 58% of women were non-wage workers for families compared to 17.3% of men. One third of all working women are employed in agriculture, with women making up 20% of agricultural workers. However, only 5.7% of landholders are women and women hold no more than 6.1% of the cultivated land in Lower Egypt and 4.1% in Upper Egypt, and even then women often don’t exert control over it.

The relatively low quality of female economic participation is largely due to prevailing conservative social cultural trends and currents, in which they are seen primarily as dependents and are expected to be the principal child care providers in the family, while in times of high unemployment women are expected to step aside to leave the work to the men. In this respect the preponderance of early marriage of teenage girls is another feature of the cultural fabric of Egyptian society which curtails women’s opportunities, and the CEDAW Committee has requested the GoE to consider modifying the legal age of marriage as part of its duty to reconcile the domestic law and practice with its international obligations. There is also an assumed gender division of labour, where public and government work is seen as more befitting of a woman, while the private sector is seen as a man’s domain. At the same time Egyptian laws and regulations prevent women from assuming certain jobs, since women are barred from working at night, except under certain circumstances and in certain sectors. Moreover, regulations that were put in place to protect women workers, such as the right to three months paid maternity leave and the right to a nursery in firms with more than 100 workers, are likely to affect employers’

101 Beijing + 10, Report from the National Council for Women, 2005 102 Millennium Development Goals Second Country Report- Egypt 2004, p.24

50 decisions to employ women. At the same time, the absence of regulations and the non- enforcement of others encourage non-compliance by private firms with women’s maternity leave entitlements, thus making women hesitant to join the private sector.

Credit markets are generally less accessible to women as they have limited access to land for collateral and limited holdings of other assets. Among the most in need of credit are those in the informal sector. The available data on this issue suggests that women receive far fewer loans than men, and that these loans are mostly small. Women’s access also varies greatly according to region. It seems that credit is mostly more limited in governorates where agriculture is important. Women have less access to medium and long term loans, though youth loans indicate that short term loans are equally accessible to both young men and women. According to several NCW reports, various government entities as well as NGOs and the private sector are active in providing women with credit and a number of schemes have been set up to support women’s access to credit.

The overall result of this situation is women are particularly vulnerable to the uncertainties of life and must contend with numerous obstacles to realizing their full human development potential. In particular a woman trying to stand on her own two feet has a much weaker support network. Figures show that 12-17% of households in Egypt are headed by a woman, and the chances of these households facing poverty is marginally higher than those headed by a male. Surveys show that 42% of female-headed households are unable to meet their basic needs, compared to 31% of households headed by a man103. In addition, the extent of poverty in female-headed households is four times worse in urban areas and twice as bad as in rural districts, compared to the national average. Overall 81% of these women are unemployed and depend on financial assistance and allowances.

Violence against women

There are no reliable systems for monitoring the extent of the nature of violence against Egyptian women. In spite of the protective provisions in the penal code, violence against women whether occurring at home, in the work place or in the public sphere is a serious concern. According to the CEDAW Committee, the GoE needs to take holistic measures to prevent and eliminate domestic violence, marital rape; violence against women in detention centres and so called “honour crimes”. The Committee considered that the extent of violence against women was high and recommended that the GoE investigate the root causes of such violence and improve the effectiveness of legislation, policies and programmes aimed at combating such violence104. Egyptian campaigners against honour killings point to the discriminatory laws which help create an environment of impunity, in which such crimes are both socially and to a degree legally tolerated105. One Egyptian NGO reports that honour killings make up 42% of the violent crimes

103 El-Laithy, Heba, Policy of Poverty and Inequality alleviation according to Gender in The Arab Region, 2003 (http://www.APF.org.jo) (Arabic) 104 CEDAW Committee observations, 2 February 2001 105 Honour crimes refer to the murder of a woman by her male family members for a perceived violation of the social norms of sexuality, or a suspicion of women having transgressed the limits of social behaviour imposed by traditions. Article 17 of the Egyptian Penal Code allows judges to decrease sentences given in the case of murder when they decide that the condition of the murderer requires so. In this sense murder of a wife (but not that of a husband) caught in the act of committing adultery is categorized as an extenuating circumstance, thereby commuting the crime of murder to the level of a misdemeanor (article 237). Such reductions reach as little as six months and may include time spent during the trial. Therefore the murderer can escape being imprisoned and may walk free. Also in the same penal code, a man's act of adultery is adulterous only in the marital home (article 277), but a wife is adulterous outside, or inside the marital home.

51 against women, involving both husbands killing wives, fathers killing daughters and brothers killing sisters106.

The raft of laws in the penal code provides the authorities with a range of powers to prosecute those responsible for abusing women. However, women are often too afraid to report violent crimes against them, while prevailing attitudes among local authorities means that such incidents, particularly relating to domestic violence, is not dealt with the gravity that it deserves. Steps have already been taken in this direction including the creation of mechanisms that remove factors inhibiting women from speaking out and there have been a number of duty-bearer actions towards stiffening the letter of the law, such as the change in the law that now ensures rapists can no longer escape prosecution if they marry their victim. The ombudsman office of the NCW in cooperation with the Ministry of Interior has trained officers at police stations on how to register complaints by women victims of domestic violence, while NGOs are advocating the need to assign police women to investigate cases related to domestic violence. At the same time NGOs are advocating for a unified law that covers all forms of violence instead of having several scattered articles in the existing penal code.

Violence against girls engaged in domestic labour and against those living on the street is reported to be quite common. These girls are more likely than boys to be physically abused or sexually assaulted. One of the most prevalent forms of violence against girls is the traditional practice of female genital mutilation, also known as female genital cutting (FGM/C). This practice is carried out both by Egyptian Muslims and Christians and has been at the forefront of the public health discourse for the past ten years. Two separate surveys in 1995 and 2000 showed that up to 97% of women had been circumcised. In 1996 the Minister of Health issued a Decree prohibiting doctors from carrying out FGM/C. Although attitudes towards the practice has started to change, especially among young people, the practice continues in many parts of the country due to embedded socio-cultural beliefs; it makes girls eligible for marriage, it moderates a woman’s sexuality, it is sanctioned by religion and it contributes to a woman’s hygiene. The evidence is that FGM/C increases the chances of severe gynecological problems for thousands of women. Over half of all circumcisions are performed by a trained doctor (52%), while 9% are carried out by a nurse and the remainder is performed by a traditional birth attendant (Dayas). One growing concern is that the individual medical professionals may find it lucrative to continue to offer their services and refuse to stop carrying out operations in spite of the government’s decree. Indeed the Doctors Syndicate is one national institution which maintains that there are legitimate reasons for conducting FGM/C procedures on healthy young girls. On the other side a national FGM taskforce was established in 1994 which included a group of advocates and NGO representatives whose community-based interventions and initiatives over the years represent a sustained commitment to ending this form of violence against girls. Similarly the National Council for Childhood and Motherhood has launched a large programme in 120 villages, with the objective of making them free of the practice and using this as a model that communities may follow nationwide.

Good governance and local administration

The centralized nature of the Egyptian state has its roots in the Pharaonic period. For various cultural, historic and political reasons the centralized form of government has remained a feature of Egypt’s modern development, but it’s a form of government that is widely seen as being an obstacle to development and progress. Its features also mirror many of the socio-political traits of

106 Between 2002 and 2003, the Association of Legal Aid for Women (CEWLA) monitored reports of violence against women in Cairo. See http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/egm/vaw-gp-2005/docs/experts/khafagy.honorcrimes.pdf

52 the society in which the dominant authority figure, traditional values, resistance to change and the unquestioned ascendancy role of “big” government are accepted as the norm.

Today one of the main features of the reform debate concerns how best to decentralize power to local authorities as a means to improve the efficiency and quality of service delivery of social services and public utilities. The 2004 National Human Development Report helped to put this discussion at the centre of the reform debate and it has been influential in demonstrating the crucial link between good governance and public management of resources with the necessities of human development. Indeed, the 2005 report by the Millennium Project, “Investing in Development”, highlighted the need for strong and functional decentralized forms of government as one crucial vehicle for achieving the MDGs in the next ten years.

Why there is a need to strengthen the civil service

Egypt’s governance system is burdened by a swollen and less than effective civil service. While central government employs half of all public sector workers, local authorities are often understaffed or staffed with the wrong type of professional expertise. Overall there is a disproportionate number of administrative workers compared to people with expertise in required fields, and this particularly applies to the distribution of government-employed professionals such as doctors and teachers, who are also considered to be part of the civil service.

The problems derive from the non-competitive environment in which most public organizations operate, added to the fact that they are far away from a client-oriented culture. The current issues are also rooted in past practices whereby the last 50 years have seen an expansion of the civil service as one instrument to ensure full employment, while the government pursued a policy of guaranteeing jobs to all graduates. However, the expansion of the bureaucracy all over the country caused overstaffing in all departments and local government units. The salaries of the civil servants did not increase proportionately to the cost of living which has led to frustration and demoralization. Recruitment based on examinations was replaced by graduation criteria and the result was that government organizations were quickly filled with graduates irrespective of their specialization. The number of civil servants increased from 857,095 in 1970/71 to 4,929,457 in 1994/95, and today the figure stands at almost 5.5 million. The overall magnitude and wage bill of the civil service in Egypt is of great concern and accounts for 24% of public expenditure. The public sector wage bill has also increased over time as successive governments have compensated public sector workers for increases in the cost of living and in providing additional jobs in the absence of private sector employment opportunities.

The myriad of problems not only stem from the size of the civil service but also the organizational structure and culture of the administration at all levels. The misallocation of human resources and expertise is compounded by the existence of underemployment and the duality of administrative responsibility, where two people are doing the same job. The incentive and promotion structures do not support the retention of qualified staff, while all too often there are unclear job descriptions. Institutionally, different government bodies often have overlapping responsibilities or unclear responsibilities with contradictory objectives and priorities. Similarly, many government units use resources poorly, and though there is a major e-government programme that has been launched, the use of advanced IT is still superficial in many government offices around the country. These performance issues, underpinned by the absence of a client- oriented culture, are compounded by the realities of centralized decision-making, which together hamper the delivery of quality services.

53 The local government system – decentralization in a centralized framework

The major irony is that Egypt put in place the legislative framework for a decentralized state some 50 years ago, but the practice has always leant towards the authority of the central government. Before the 1952 revolution, Egypt was divided into 14 provinces, each being headed by a high central-government official, who was responsible to the Minister of Interior, but who also enforced the mandates of all other ministers. The desert was excluded from the civil administration and placed under the control of the Ministry of the Military. After the revolution Egypt began its first steps towards decentralizing these responsibilities.

The government established field units in the central ministries and Centralized local decision-making provided these units with the necessary equipment, technical skill • According to the law, all state plans and budgets should be developed locally and then integrated and approved and full responsibility to carry out 107 centrally. their tasks. The Governorates • Locally elected councils at all levels should participate were created by law 144/1960 in the formulation in village, district, city and which delegated to the local governorate development plans which would then be authorities all functions which by submitted to the Ministries of Planning and Finance for their nature were predominantly review and approval. local. The system of local • However, in reality, a set of guidelines is developed by authorities sought to promote local every central ministry and sent to the lower levels participation through centralized within the local government, which usually tend to planning and decentralized accept these guidelines and develop their plans and implementation. Laws in 1971 and budgets that reflect them. 1975 attempted to increase the • Within the governorate and district levels, Executive Councils contain senior directors of the central effectiveness and efficiency of local bureaucracy, who are responsible for specific services government by creating a twin such as health, education and housing. hierarchy of Executive Committees • Although administratively, they are affiliated to the and Popular Councils to provide governorate or district chief, technically they get their more administrative flexibility to guidelines for work from the respective ministry in municipal authorities and to give an Cairo. active role to citizen participation • One result is that the local People’s Council within through electing the Local Popular most governorates, especially in villages and towns, Councils. tends to be completely dominated by the Executive Council. Local People’s Councils take their cue from The system was amended in 1979 to the governor. strengthen the authority of Governors, who were granted considerable powers and have become the direct representatives of the President. They have control over housing, public utilities, land development, slum upgrading and most aspects of urban planning, design and project implementation.108 The law also stated the importance of reviewing the Popular and Executive Councils in each Governorate and getting their approval over any large scale development plans. Currently five distinct levels of local government units exist – Governorate, Urban Districts (Hai), Rural Districts (Markaz), City and Village. Each level has an Executive Council and a People’s Council. In practice, however, the central government has the power to veto any

107 UN HABITAT, Metropolitan Planning and Management in the Developing World: Spatial Decentralization Policy in Bombay and Cairo, Nairobi, 1993 108 Serageldin, Mona, “Planning and Institutional Mechanisms”, in ‘The Expanding Metropolis - Coping with The Urban Growth of Cairo’, Aga Khan Award of Architecture, Cairo, 1985, pp.121-128

54 decision made by the local units that might run against the grain of its own policy. 109 The Governorate People’s Council and local People’s Council (Popular Council) are directly elected by the people, and have the right to attend the meetings of the Executive Council and take part in its deliberations but without voting rights.

The limits of decision-making and implementation at the local level

Despite the attempts towards decentralization, the central government has tight control over the local government system. The central government can rely on certain in-built mechanisms to veto and control local decision-making, such as the concentration of decision making powers in the hands of the Governors, who has a direct link to the President. Local Government staff looks to the Governor for all important decisions and initiatives including interpretation and understanding of the legal framework to mobilize local resources and the commitment of those resources to implementing projects. Thus, Governors are the key people in the local government framework and they may in turn, control the presidents of each Executive Committee and appoint or dismiss them at will.

Though responsibility for local development is “decentralized” administratively to the Governorates and its local units, government funds to finance such development is often centralized110. All local resources come from central government, with 20% provided directly to the governorate which is able to determine their use, while the use of the other 80% is pre- determined by central line Ministries before being allocated to the local level. Local government units rely on this annual central government transfer and centrally administrated loans to finance their capital investment projects and recurrent costs. This fact precludes the establishment of any meaningful system of autonomy or local initiative. As a result, the central government agencies control most large-scale projects.

In the Local Administration Law the Local People’s Council assumes the supervision of various utilities and activities that fall under its jurisdiction at the local level. Theoretically, this gives great power to these councils, but in reality this supervision is always generalized and more advisory and evaluative than administrative and managerial. For example, the law charges the local People’s Council at the governorate level with the responsibility to approve public projects aimed at meeting housing and construction needs. The law, however, is not clear in showing where the basic initiative should rest for developing these projects. In addition, the director of housing in the governorate also has prime responsibility for the development of housing projects, and even the Executive Council has the authority to specify all regulations pertaining to housing and urban planning projects. This duplication of responsibility has the effect of stifling action and initiative since no unit is willing to take responsibility for a decision that may prove to be against the law or later subject to administrative penalties. Officials usually follow orders and guidelines from the ministry before commencing any project. One exception for this common situation is the presence of a strong governor who will take the decision to develop projects through his own initiative.

109 World Bank, “Egypt- Greater Cairo Urban Development Project”, A Staff Appraisal Report, Washington D.C, 1982 110 Land Management and Development Tasks, Draft Final Report submitted to USAID and GoE, July 1992

55 Frustrations in management and human resources

It is no surprise that the administration of most local governments is weak and fragmented. Basic tasks and investments which should be controlled and coordinated by local civil servants continue to be the responsibility of central agencies, which in turn compete with each other to enlarge their own budget and preserve their own interests. Amid this, local authorities are often overwhelmed by the magnitude of the problems they face and frustrated by their inability to cope with mounting problems, such as the inefficiency in the delivery of public services and managing land and environmental issues.

At the same time the multiplicity of ministries, agencies and enterprises sharing control over sectors or specialized functions is a critical problem which undermines the efficiency and quality of decision-making, while also slowing the rate of implementation. This problem is not so much a product of outright conflict stemming from divided responsibilities, but rather subtle issues of rationalizing and coordinating activities under management procedures based on centralized directives. In this regard the capacity to achieve inter-sectoral rationalization and coordination often remains limited by real or perceived constraints on mandate and leverage and by a tendency to focus on specific activities rather than on more general issues of policy.

It is within this environment that Egypt’s civil service finds itself unable to attract the most qualified candidates. Low salaries deter prospective candidates and poor incentive structures, while existing personnel are frustrated by inflation of numbers, slow career advancement opportunities and poor management111. Chief Executive Officers and key officials find it difficult to extricate themselves from the imperatives of crisis management, in order to concentrate on the broader issues and the longer-term perspective of programme planning beyond the requirements of annual budgets. Managerial competence and technical expertise is adequate at the higher levels, but in local government overall performance is hampered by inefficient and often unproductive support. Often local government units do not have the information upon which to base their decision-making and support their functions. Cross-fertilization of information between local units and central units is often lacking and there is no co-ordination between ministerial civil service training centers. Consequently, the result is an acute shortage of qualified and experienced staff for both program planning and implementation112. In terms of development planning and implementation many local administrators have limited knowledge of modern project management methods such as results-based management or logical frameworks, as well as lacking essential knowledge on key development concepts and debates.

The administration of justice

According to the Constitution, “the independence and immunity of the judicature are two basic guarantees to safeguard rights and liberties.”113 However, both the NCHR Annual Report for 2004 and observations of the UN Treaty Body Committees have indicated that in several areas there is a need for greater attention to specific individual rights. In this regard there are three main challenges that the Egyptian Government now faces concerning the rule of law and the judiciary: 1) fighting corruption; 2) modernizing the judiciary 3) civil liberties issues raised by the Emergency Law.

111 In this respect the best-qualified civil servants are often attracted to the better salaries and benefits offered by projects funded by external donors. 112 Serageldin, Mona, “Planning and Institutional Mechanisms”, pp.121-128 113 Arab Republic of Egypt: Laws and Constitution [http://www.egypt.gov.eg/english/laws/constitution/default.asp ]

56 Fighting corruption

Corruption poses a threat to political and judicial reform in Egypt. Research shows that much of the corruption that takes place is due to the non-enforcement of laws and the application of regulations in contradiction with the relevant law. According to a representative sample from the business community there is a prevalent sense of high-level corruption114, and in spite of the 2005 ratification of the United Nations Convention against Corruption, there is still work to be done in fighting corruption in Egypt. At the grass roots level corruption takes place in the course of daily interaction between citizens and public officials, where officials often expect to receive informal payment for small services which are actually part of their job. Although corruption is one area where there has been limited scientific research exploring the true extent of the phenomenon, the recent adoption of the UN Convention against Corruption will provide a unique opportunity for the government to join forces with relevant UN programmes and agencies to devise and implement a comprehensive strategy to combat corruption. Considering the dearth of accurate information on corruption there is need for an independent commission to conduct a vulnerability analysis, which would be mandated to systematically review the status of affairs in the country and develop public proposals to address corruption.

The judiciary – training, modernization and proper remuneration

Egypt needs to establish a developed criminal justice system which meets the interests of society and individuals. Key to this is the establishment of a system that can protect society and deliver justice while also protecting the human rights of defendants. One major challenge is the inadequate number of qualified judicial staff required to cope with the increasing number of cases. This has led to an increasing backlog of criminal cases and slow administrative procedures. In addition to understaffing there are also questions about the quality of the training they receive. The duration of training that staff receives at the National Centre for Judicial Studies has been reduced to four months, while training at other comparable judicial Schools lasts nearly three years. Consequently there is an urgent need to develop the National Centre for Judicial Studies in a way that enables it to provide the required training both in terms of quality and quantity, while the issue of low salaries, not only deters quality candidates from joining the public service but also makes justice officials vulnerable to corruption.

Violations of human rights within the justice system

As elsewhere Egypt is rightly concerned about terrorist actions on its territory, especially since 2004 and the first half of 2005 have seen several terrorist atrocities carried out against Egyptians and foreigners. The practice of trying cases involving terrorism in military courts or the State Emergency Security Courts is, according to the NCHR “one of the biggest impediments to a fair trial”, although no new cases were referred to military courts in 2004. In addition the NCHR, the Human Rights Committee115 and the Committee against Torture116 have noted incidents of maltreatment of prisoners at the hands of law enforcement personnel, while recommending that detainees have access to their basic rights. In June 2004 the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights (EOHR) issued a report entitled "Torture: An Unchecked Phenomena,"117 in which it documented 41 cases of torture in police stations resulting in 15 deaths in custody from April 2003 to April 2004. EOHR also asserts that from April 1993 to April 2004, it documented 412

114 Egypt Country Profile, ESCWA, pp. 130-131 115 Observations of the Human Rights Committee, 28 November 2002 116 Observation of the Committee Against Torture, 23 December 2002 117 http://www.eohr.org/

57 cases of torture in police stations, including 120 cases where detainees died as a direct result of torture118. It is reported that prison conditions are poor and tuberculosis has been widespread. Prisoners often suffer from overcrowding of cells, the lack of proper hygiene, food, clean water, proper ventilation, recreational activities and medical care. In 2004 poor conditions and mistreatment of prisoners led to hunger strikes at the Abu Za‘abal prison in Alexandria119, while some prisons are closed to the public. Another concern is the practice of mixing juveniles and adult prisoners, with the abuse of minors being common in such circumstances.

The NCHR observed that the families of prisoners had been subject to detention and mistreatment by the authorities, quoting the circumstances around investigations concerning the Taba bombing in October 2004, when thousands of people in Al Arish were randomly arrested. The NCHR is clear that torture and arbitrary arrest not only violates the Constitution but also damages Egypt’s image in the international community120. Observers of these events have warned that such heavy- handed tactics do risk fuelling general resentment among local communities, which could give rise to social tensions and result in violent responses against the security forces. At the same time the Ministry of the Interior has taken several steps to discipline officials found guilty of torturing prisoners, while the Office of Public Prosecution has worked to bring these officials to trial. Finally, the Human Rights Committee considers the large number of offences which are punishable by the death penalty under Egyptian law, as incompatible with the CCPR 121, and has thus requested the GoE to review.

Duty-Bearer-Claim Holder Responses and Capacities

The political and administrative reform agenda

One of the main observations by the proponents of reform is that the government is perceived as not having a clear and comprehensive vision for transition, which links political, administrative and fiscal reform with economic growth and national development, specifically with regard to poverty reduction122. Sector-specific visions and national strategies have been plentiful in recent years, but many of these have been hinged on the pursuit of economic growth. The one attempt to date to bring to the table an overall strategic picture is being pursued by the 2005 Egypt Human Development Report: “The Egypt we want to be in 2015”.

The Egyptian government has recognized the need to initiate political reform and in 2004 the GoE participated in the decision taken by the Arab Summit to intensify political, economic social and educational change initiatives that reflect the aspirations of Arabs, enshrined in the Declaration on the Process of Reform and Modernization. Civil society has also been active in recent years, and in March 2004 Egyptian organizations joined others from the Arab world to agree on the Alexandria Charter, which emerged from a conference in Alexandria entitled “Arab Reform Issues: Vision and Implementation”. Such demands for political reform in Egypt have also been emboldened by the constitutional reform to allow multi-candidate Presidential elections. The demand for greater transparency in the political system also came from 2000 Egyptian judges in May 2005, when they refused to oversee the Presidential elections unless a law was passed guaranteeing their independence, and ensuring that the judiciary would be free

118 There are examples of victims of torture winning civil cases and receiving compensation from the authorities. 119 National Council for Human Rights, Annual Report 2004 120 Ibidem 121 Observation of the Human Rights Committee, 28 November 2002 122 Though there are several ongoing efforts to develop poverty reduction plans, some of which are cited in the 2005 CCA, Egypt currently does not have a formal government approved Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper

58 from government control. On the other hand political parties have requested other constitutional amendments, especially on article 77 that allows the President to be re-elected for endless terms, and on clause 74, which grants the President major powers in times of emergencies. The issue of a quota system for women has attracted a lot of media and political attention, with the UN system being in the forefront of advocacy efforts to support greater female participation in politics. The main impetus for invigorating youth participation and helping young people to become more active citizens has come from the ruling party in recent years, with proposals for a “Youth Observatory” and a “National Council for Youth” being currently discussed within government circles.

The low levels of citizen participation in local and national politics (participation in 2002 local elections was 42.4%, but voter turnout varied from 13% in Cairo to 60% in Sohag), is also reflected in the narrow space left open for citizens to meaningfully participate in local development and influence the decisions that affect them. To this extent the Local Popular Councils are particular weak links between decision-making and citizens123. The government’s efforts to improve participation in elections has so far focused on addressing the administration of the electoral process, especially the defects in the electoral registers, with a main emphasis on the completion of the national ID program, which will be due by the end of 2006. Although the government has officially said it wishes to stay with its current “first past the post” electoral system, there have been signs that it may consider a proportional system which would give smaller parties a chance for electoral success. At the same time the NDP has started a process of greater internal party democracy, while also creating a powerful “Policy Secretariat”, which is charged with formulating the party’s economic, domestic and foreign policies. In this regard the Secretariat has started to look at the question of decentralization and is currently carrying out studies on how the former centralized states of Eastern Europe have de-concentrated power.

In this vein the GoE is currently introducing new mechanisms to improve the delivery of public services. The first of these is through a commitment to e-government, which has been expressed through the launch of the Egyptian Information Society Initiative (EISI) in 1999, with the objective of delivering high quality government services to the public where they are and in the format that suits them. The goal of this initiative is to reach a new level of convenience in government services, offer citizens the opportunity to share in the decision making process, and greatly improve efficiency and quality. This is a major challenge, requiring the transformation of current government practice and culture. The challenge of making e-government work has fallen on the shoulders of Ministry of State for Administrative Development which must address such problems as inadequate standards and specifications for the process of government automation, the reluctance of government units to use automated systems or modify workflows and overlapping authority among government bodies. The other thrust for modernizing public services comes from the Egyptian Postal Service, which has the largest number of distribution outlets of any organization in Egypt, offering pensions and saving facilities as well as postal and parcel services. The potential benefits of making even greater use of this huge network are currently being explored, with the possibility of integrating Egyptian postal services with a modern information society and e-government. This effort will also focus on modifying practice and sponsoring attitude change, as well as capacity building throughout the organization which employs over 46,000 people working through 3,600 outlets.

123 With the support of donors UNDP and the GoE are implementing the Municipal Initiative for Strategic Recovery will use a participatory approach, working with Local People’s Councils and NGOs to support regeneration projects in over 50 of the poorest markaz in the country.

59 Promote adolescent and youth participation in decision-making, youth policies and strategies

The Egyptian government, civil society organizations and international institutions must create or revitalize channels that ensure adolescents and youth are involved in strategy and policy development. Youth forums are viable mechanisms to ensure young people's participation, in which their perspectives are heard and strategies formulated which are relevant to their local concerns. An updated national youth policy or strategy incorporating benchmarks measuring youth development must be formulated in consultation with young people. There is a great need to raise awareness about the MDGs among adolescents and young people at the national and local levels using media, schools, organizations, and local communities, while the potential exists to engage young people in monitoring the progress towards achieving the MDGs.

Administration of justice

Over the last five years several measures have been taken to improve the efficiency of the judicial system. In May 2005 Egypt joined a UN-led programme on “Strengthening the Rule of Law in Arab States”, which will focus on modernization of public prosecution offices. Egypt has already formulated a policy to simplify litigation procedures and introduced reforms to improve judicial performance. Measures have included consolidating, revising, coordinating, simplifying and shortening laws, as well as eliminating ambiguities or contradictions therein. Amendments have been made to Criminal Procedural Law in the form of conciliation agreements to address the backlog of criminal cases, while new technologies are being brought into the court system. A major goal for the Ministry of Justice is the establishment of a judicial data bank at the premises of the “Supreme Court”, where all judicial principles established by the higher courts will be collected.

Technical assistance is also necessary to support Egypt’s efforts to fulfill international obligations relating to the United Nations Convention against Corruption, and the country continues to receive on-going bi-lateral and multi-lateral technical assistance in this area. This includes significant support to render the bureaucracy more accountable and transparent, and resistant to corrupt behaviour. Moves to address corruption led to the prosecution, in recent years, of several high-level public officials, including the Minister of Finance, on a sweeping array of corruption charges124. Egypt also led discussions on achieving good governance in public finance administration in order to curb corruption, and put forward proposals for the Arab Region at the Conference on Good Governance for Development which took place in Jordan in February 2005. Projects are underway to educate the public about the scourges of corruption, and to train law enforcement officials on the benefits of and practices for fighting corruption.

In order to provide proper training for its judiciary and prosecution staff the Ministry of Justice is currently working on the establishment of a “Justice Academy”, which will aim to strengthen the skills of judges and prosecutors, paralegal officers, including experts and secretaries. To join the Academy, the incumbent must successfully pass the competitive admission examination, and receive training for at least one year and successfully pass the graduation examination. Equally important is the assistance that should be provided to the Ministry of the Interior, particularly in respect of law enforcement training and cooperation, as well as rehabilitation of prisoners and the promotion of human rights in the administration of justice. The UN system agencies continue to encourage the Egyptian government to make use of United Nations standards and norms in crime prevention and criminal justice, particularly those related to prison conditions and treatment of

124 Freedom House, Egypt Country Profile [http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2003/countryratings/egypt.html], as of 26 April 2005.

60 prisoners, alternatives to prison and restorative justice. Currently, the government is making efforts to update its law and practices related to juvenile justice issues. To support the fight against terrorism, Egypt is currently drafting legislation to facilitate cross-border cooperation in criminal matters, as current extradition laws are out of date.

Addressing gender disparities

Gender is one area where the relationship between duty-bearers and claim holders has seen improvements over the years, though many observers believe much more is required. Even though a variety of laws have been changed to bring women’s personal status in line with international obligations, women are still discriminated against in several legal statutes. In particular the Penal Code hands down harsher penalties for women committing adultery, while the murder of a wife (but not a husband) caught in the act of committing adultery is categorized as an extenuating circumstance, thereby commuting the crime of murder to the level of a misdemeanor. Thus duty bearers must guard against using predominant social-cultural attitudes as an excuse for not removing those legal norms which deliberately discriminate against women. The 2004 NCHR report communicated a number of pointed recommendations to the government on the issue, including a quota system for women MPs, changes to the penal code to make it gender equal, taking action to combat violence against women and affirmative measures to support women in education, employment and the justice system.

The institutional framework for protecting women’s rights has developed over the past 15 years and comprises two main government bodies: The National Council for Childhood and Motherhood (NCCM) and the National Council for Women (NCW). These bodies have the full support of Egypt’s First Lady, Mrs. Suzanne Mubarak, who has become a figurehead for many child and women’s rights issues in the country. The NCW has made a significant impact on the way the GoE deals with gender issues in policy-making and decision-making, creating gender units in 20 Government Ministries and integrating gender into the National Development Plan 2002-2007, as well as approaching the issues of gender budgeting. One result has been that the government has earmarked 3.257 billion EGP for programmess aimed at the advancement of women, twice the amount allocated for the period 1997-2002. At the same time, Egyptian women have seen a variety of legal amendments between 2000-2004, most notably the new personal status law in 2000 and the establishment in 2004 of Family Courts which will facilitate judicial arbitration regarding family disputes. There are still a variety of legal constraints to the full equality of women, particularly regarding women’s rights in the family, while the main duty bearers still lack the requisite capacities to better understand women’s issues. An Ombudsman Officer in the NCW is now taking up a variety of complaints of inequality and discrimination against women.

The government has also worked with UN system organizations and civil society to help break the social-cultural currents which relegate the status of women. Practical steps include tackling the deficit in women’s literacy and girl’s education, especially in rural Upper Egypt, (e.g. Girls’ Education Initiative), while also providing the tools for women to become economically active through vocational training programmes and the extension of credit facilities. In this same vein NCW and NCCM work, where possible, with other relevant Ministries to combat violence against women, such as the 150 family counseling bureaus to assist victims of domestic violence, which are run by the Ministry of Insurance and Social Affairs. However, the real institutional weakness still lies with the attitudes of local authorities who have not been sensitized to consider violence against women as a criminal offence. Changing attitudes is also at the core of the very visible nationwide campaign to eradicate FGM/C led by NCCM and supported by a coalition of NGOs, international organizations and donors. A major hurdle is to close the loophole in the

61 current legislation which still allows a surgical procedure to cut a girl’s genital organs if “necessitated by a medical diagnosis”.

In spite of these advances, a recent “Assessment of Gender Mainstreaming”,125 showed that the NCW needs to strengthen its role in a variety of areas in order to institutionalize gender mainstreaming in government programmes. Recommendations from the assessment focused on strengthening the culture of results based management, the continuation of gender mainstreaming in the GoE’s Five Year Plan, initiatives in NCW and other agencies to introduce gender budgeting and the establishment of a system for rapid evaluations to provide feedback on progress and draw on lessons learned. Egyptian men are key duty-bearers in this gender perspective. The male-dominated nature of Egyptian society places a tremendous onus on men to support and empower women in all walks of life. From the human rights perspective this is an especially powerful argument, since without the active and deliberate involvement of men, the task of delivering social justice to women, rolling back female poverty, ensuring the primacy of women’s services and needs, such as reproductive health, and protecting women from violence will continue to be frustrated. This report has already shown how women in Upper Egypt can be denied their human rights to healthcare since many often require their husband’s permission to attend a clinic. Equally the absence of female healthcare workers also leads to a violation of this basic right. Thus the entire analysis in the CCA points to the need for a change in the relationship between Egyptian men and Egyptian women. This requires an approach which emphasizes a change in men’s attitudes, and in so doing draws upon a bedrock of legal norms which enforces protective measures, allowing women to claim their rights: attitudes and law carry equal currency for future projects aimed at rolling back the deficit in the empowerment of Egyptian women. Crucially both these elements will need to cultivate an environment which challenges, and over time, transforms traditional social-cultural currents throughout society, and particularly among men at all levels.

As claim holders Egyptian women have a number of hurdles to overcome and currently many women across the country have neither the tools nor the social support mechanisms to aspire to the equal opportunities which the GoE is trying to promote. This is most evident in the area of women’s political participation and why today most observers and a growing number of government supporters within the ruling party are advocating for a return to the women MPs quota system of the late 1970s. Indeed the draft law on political rights currently being discussed also aims to look at the role of women. Low education, low self-esteem and a variety of social cultural and bureaucratic obstacles close down the space for women in politics. Addressing this problem is one of NCW’s biggest priorities and it has exerted considerable efforts to empower women for a more effective role in politics. This has included supporting women candidates for the Peoples’ Assembly Elections in the year 2000 and the Local Popular Council Elections in 2002. In 2004 the NCW established the Center for the Political Empowerment for Women to help develop the skills of a cadre of qualified women to be able to stand as candidates in the 2005 and 2006 elections. At the end of the day enhancing the political participation of women is part and parcel of activating political participation of the society as a whole, which necessitates the creation of an enabling social, cultural and educational environment. As has already been mentioned all duty bearers, from the executive branch of government to the legislature to the political parties, need to build a value-system which promotes the centrality of genuine citizen participation and which is truly inclusive of women’s views, values and specific needs in society.

125 The assessment was commissioned by the UNDP Evaluation Office in late 2004.

62 Civil society as duty-bearer and claim-holder

The legal framework governing the role of civil society (NGOs, professional associations, the media, faith-based organizations and institutions, etc.) restricts the room for a vibrant and truly independent national discourse from such organizations. A full and comprehensive analysis of the role and impact of such organizations is lacking, though it is commonly accepted that most, particularly in the NGO sector, have a role restricted to implementing parts of projects and programmes determined by the government. In this respect civil society are by and large not invited to be part of the government’s decision-making process, though many have significant expertise in a variety of fields. From this perspective the effective role of civil society as a claim holder on the part of citizens and a authoritative duty-bearer is in question. This is particularly true at the local level where many NGOs (effective or not) feel less able to challenge the authority of the local administration, reducing their role to deliverers of services, rather than effective lobbyists and advocates for social change. This is also compounded by the fact that many NGOs and charitable organizations are fully dependent on outside funding for their operations and survival. Many of the 16,000 NGOs in the country exist in name only and discerning genuinely affective NGO partners for projects and programmes is often fraught with uncertainty.

This trend has, however, been broken by a few of the stronger NGOs in recent years, most notably the NGO Coalition on the rights of the child, which successfully produced “shadow” report to the government’s second official Report to the CRC treaty body. Presently the Coalition is working as part of the process to produce Egypt’s third report to the CRC. An experiment with establishing local civil society coalitions to support the MDGs is currently being piloted in the governorates of Miniya and Qena. These coalitions aim to bring together NGOs, community organizations, local media, local private sector and other governorate-based civil society actors, and using their combined influence and resources begin to establish a popular agenda for achieving the MDGs at the local level. This not includes the formulation of joint MDG-based projects, but also establishing a genuine dialogue with the local authorities on local policies and actions to push the respective governorate closer to meeting the MDG targets by 2015. In this role civil society has the opportunity to “localize the MDGs” by playing a co-ordinated activist role in both supporting local government development actions and influencing, through advocacy, the policy directions most suited to MDG achievement at the local level. This approach is in line and consistent with the strategy which the UN Country Team will wish to pursue in the next UNDAF cycle. Both the CRC Coalition and local MDG coalitions are being supported by UN agencies.

The Egyptian media are clearly a powerful societal force and its potential role in facilitating the social-economic and political-cultural changes required for Egypt to meet the MDGs and fulfill the aspirations of the Millennium Declaration. However, the duty-bearer role of the media has been curtailed over the past 50 years due to its control by the state and its use as tool for mobilizing the masses around the government’s political agenda. Only in the past two decades has the media been recognized as an asset for advancing development issues, particularly in the area of health, where several “communication for development” initiatives have successfully inspired attitudinal and behavioural change. National level media campaigns on family planning, bilharzias, oral re-hydration therapy and immunization have met with varying levels of success, depending on the amount of support and planning provided by the international partners that usually supported them. Mass media campaigns — such as in family planning — have been employed in conjunction with community level and interpersonal channels relying on a network of communication centres (Nile Centres) operating under the State Information Service. Additionally, the creation of the regional TV and radio channels over a decade ago was prompted by a vision of media services directly supporting the goals and processes of local development. However, the effectiveness of those channels is seriously curtailed by a severe lack of technical

63 and human capacities. Today the authorities controlling the state-owned media are much more open and cooperative in allowing free air time for development oriented programming, especially public service announcements, though this often remains contingent on the level of political support such programmes receive. For example, Egypt’s First Lady, Suzanne Mubarak, has been instrumental in the success of the “Reading for All” campaigns and the recent communication activities of NCCM. Apart from these types of cases, the principle media authority, the Egyptian Radio and Television Union (ERTU) lacks a clear understanding of its role in advancing social development (for instance, gender equality) and as a duty-bearer it rarely takes responsibility or initiative in this area.

64 Chapter IV: Our Common Environment

Egypt’s achievements and future plans in economic growth, poverty reduction and social protection will be undermined unless the environment and natural resources upon which society depends is protected and preserved. The question arises as to whether the country’s development road is sustainable or do the current levels of human activity threaten the environmental and ecological balance. In this respect the Secretary-General’s “In Larger Freedom” report is unequivocal and its global perspective is easily translated to the Egyptian reality:

“We fundamentally depend on natural systems and resources for our existence and development. Our efforts to defeat poverty and pursue sustainable development will be in vain if environmental degradation and natural resource depletion continue unabated. At the country level, national strategies must include investments in improved environmental management and make the structural changes required for environmental sustainability”126.

In this context Egypt faces major environmental dilemmas. Population increase has put a tremendous strain on land and water and biological diversity. Egypt’s population has grown from 36.5 million in 1974 to an estimated 70.5 million127 in 2004 and is projected to reach 77.5 million by 2010 and 88.8 million by 2017. The outcome is a high population density along the small portion (3.5% of total area) of the country which is easily habitable and agriculturally productive. The vast majority (3.24 million ha) of this productive land lies within the Nile Valley and Delta, and it is where roughly 95% of the population resides. Against this background the onset of modern and industrial economic activities has also set in train a process of large-scale urbanization which in turn has put increasing pressure on the existing arable land. Today 57% of Egyptians still live in rural areas, but with an annual increase in the urban population of 2.2% expected over the next few decades, experts agree that the urban population will outweigh the rural within the next 20-30 years.

Though the GoE demonstrates strong political support for the environment, the absence of strong governance at the decision-making level is an impediment to tackling major environmental and public health problems. In spite of large-scale financial commitments (31.9 billion EGP)128 over the past 10 years, complemented by 2.4 billion EGP of donor funds, Egypt was ranked 74 among 145 countries in the Environmental Sustainability Indicator listing. In large part the scale of the country’s environmental challenges has forced a major turn around in the government’s approach to environmental management, with the release of the first National Environment Action Plan (NEAP) in 1992129. This was the first policy instrument that attempted to mobilize government and donor resources to address the environmental problems and put in place the legislative infrastructure to manage and protect Egypt’s environmental resources. The adoption of the Environmental Protection Law (1994) added to this legislative framework, while the Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency (EEAA), which was established in 1982 to promote and protect the Egyptian environment, has had its powers expanded.

126 General Assembly 59/2005, In Larger Freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all, 21 March 2005 127 Egypt Human Development Report 2004, p. 3 128 This has been used to fund water supply projects (13.1 billion EGP), wastewater projects (4.27 billion EGP), land improvement projects (5.05 billion EGP), energy projects - electrification and renewable energy (4.62 billion EGP) and miscellaneous coastal protection, industrial pollution, air pollution, solid waste management projects accounting for 4.86 billion EGP. 129 The NEAP was revised in 2002.

65 Today Egypt’s environmental policy stands at a critical crossroad, with the future well being of the country’s environmental resources reliant on a more assertive approach to environmental governance. Policies can continue to remain sector-specific in terms of management or move towards a more holistic approach where policies and measures are well co-ordinated and accommodate the most pressing strategic management issues. For Egypt the situation demands the correct mix of policies and action, since the bio-geographical nature of the country, added to societal pressures do threaten to create the conditions that may in the future challenge the integrity of governance and social cohesion. These challenges are quite stark and revolve around a high population density, which combined with long-postponed infrastructure investments are threatening to overwhelm the water and wastewater services of urban areas, creating numerous environmental hazards. Oil pollution and careless anchoring of boats have damaged coral reefs off the coast, as has pollution from urban and industrial sources and improper disposal of solid wastes. Rapid population growth is straining natural resources as agricultural land is being lost to urbanization, desertification, and salinization. The Nile and its tributaries are being contaminated with pollutants, chemicals, and heavy metals.

In spite of these challenges, progress has been made over the past 10-15 years. Water and sanitation improvements have been achieved in Egypt with rates of access to municipal water supply reaching almost 100% and 80% in urban and rural areas respectively. Meanwhile domestic sewage disposal coverage improved to about 98% in urban areas but still remains as low as 5% in rural areas. Poor air quality was recognized as one of the major issues in the 1992 National Environmental Action Plan, and though it remains a concern lead in gasoline has been phased out, resulting in reductions of atmospheric particulate lead levels across Cairo130. In addition, Egypt introduced programs (1999) to encourage the switch to the cleaner burning compressed natural gas for private cars and municipal buses. Government Agricultural Expansion Plans There has also been an effort to address industrial pollution, which has helped The government has undertaken massive land curtail the discharge of polluted reclamation schemes based on horizontal expansion of wastewater into the Nile, while policies irrigated agriculture lands in the Sinai and the are being pursued regarding solid waste Western Desert. Diversions of water from the Nile management and protected areas. system feed approximately 400,000 feddans through the El Salaam canal system of the North Sinai Expansion Area and 450,000 feddans by the Toshka Main Issues Diversion in southwestern Egypt. The East Oweinat Project will create another 200,000 feddans in the Egypt is divided into four major areas: extreme south of the Western desert relying solely on Nile River valley and delta, Inland Sinai groundwater from the Nubian Sandstone Aquifer. Peninsula and Eastern Desert, Western The major objectives are to develop agriculture for Desert and the North Coast. Each presents export, create job opportunities, divert investment a different set of environmental conditions pools outside the old valley to new regions and to and therefore exhibits different responses discourage migration from Upper Egypt into the Nile Valley. The "Toshka" mega initiative diverts Nile towards threats to the conservation and waters from the Toshka overflow basin through a 360- sustainable development of the country’s km long canal network into the desert. It is estimated biodiversity and natural resources. Some that the project will initially remove 0.5 km 3 of water of the main problems concern the loss of annually and eventually require about 4.5 km 3/ year arable land, over irrigation and poor by 2017. The El Salaam canal feeding the North Sinai drainage, pollution of soil and water expansion area is designed to divert 4.5 km 3/ year resources, poor air quality, lack of from the lower Delta. sediment deposition leading to erosion of shoreline along Nile River and at the mouth of the delta, sand encroachment affecting fertility of

130 Nasralla, Mahmoud, Cairo Air Quality Profile, Egyptian Environmental Policy Program, Cairo, 2001, p. 23

66 agricultural land, loss of indigenous flora and fauna, declining freshwater flows and the damage to coastline habitats from tourist construction.

The problem of water scarcity

Egypt is an arid country located in a part of the world acknowledged as facing water scarcity issues. Consequently the Water issue is one of the most pressing environmental priorities for the country, posing difficult questions on the sustainability of economic growth and the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. Ninety-five per cent of Egypt’s water comes from the Nile and Lake Nasser system and is regulated by the 1959 treaty with Sudan, fixing Egypt’s allocation to 55.5 Km3 per annum. The rest of Egypt’s water resources is mainly fossil (non- renewable) groundwater in the coastal zones, the desert and Sinai, estimated at some 3-4 Km3/yr). Agriculture consumes the largest proportion of available resources (39 Km3), with drinking water and industry consuming about 3 Km3, while open water evaporation and waste water drainage accounts for 3 Km3 and 10.5 Km3, respectively. With total water availability standing at 58.8 km3 per annum, per capita water allocation is 834 m3 which is already below the water scarcity benchmark of 1000 m3 per person per year, a level where countries can sustain an agricultural base and industrialization, albeit with difficulties. However, water availability is expected to be further reduced as the population grows and demand increases, falling to 670 m3 per person by 2017. Though in theory this is a point where Egyptian agriculture would not be self-sufficient and maintaining a modern industrialized society would be difficult, the introduction of modern water management methods and the introduction of high yield strains of crops may help offset the shortfalls in water availability. In the final analysis the resolution of Egypt’s water issues depend on a combination of forward-looking water governance policies and the adoption of modern technologies.

In this respect the major challenge is to find a way of reconciling the disparity between limited water resources and escalating demand. Major issues include an anticipated 50% rise in urban water demand, an increase in industrial demand flows and the burden of satisfying an aggressive land reclamation programme, which proposes to increase irrigated lands by about 44% (from 7.8 to 11.1 million feddans). Environmental users of water include the ecology of the Nile River, northern lakes, estuaries and other wetland areas and the green spaces around Egypt. It is estimated that 8.5 km3 is the minimum volume required to sustain a water quality suitable for fish development and environmental equilibrium in the northern lakes and to maintain the Delta estuarine ecology. Diminished flows would allow intrusion of saltwater further south into the Delta thus severely impacting agriculture, fisheries and domestic drinking water uses. Including horizontal agriculture expansion plans already under implementation in 2002, future water demand will be 63.8 km3, with demand jumping to 69.0 km 3 if full agriculture expansion occurs by 2017.

Pollution and human health

Pollution is a key contributor to environmental degradation and a principal public health concern, both lowering living standards across Egypt and compounding poverty, since it is often the poor who suffer most from poor air and water quality, deficits in solid waste management and from the discharge of industrial pollutants and agricultural effluents. For example, fertilizers and pesticides are considered to be the biggest sources of air, water and soil pollution in Egypt.

67 Water quality as a key public health issue

Limited water resources, lack of awareness and inefficient services still pose a challenge in the area of water quality and sanitation. The government’s major water and sanitation investments in the period 1992-2002, totaling 13.1 billion EGP, has had a significant impact on improving the water and sanitation sector, and today 99% of the urban population and 96% of the rural population benefit from piped water131. In spite of this there are serious water quality issues in several rural regions, while water access disparities exist between rural and urban centres. It is reported that rural piped water systems are poor, with actual supply reduced to several hours a week in some areas132. In this sense poverty also plays a significant role in determining access to water and sanitation services. Thus while 77% of buildings in urban areas are connected to water systems, only 49% are connected in Upper Egypt. The World Bank’s Country Environmental Analysis for 1992-2002 indicates that while 98% of urban citizens can access sanitation services, access for the rural population is as low as 5%.133 Cairo has the best sewage system in the country, with about 97% of buildings connected, though sewage service rates in rural villages are frequently much lower with most of the population relying on trenches and septic tanks for disposal of wastewater and excreta. 134

In terms of drinking water 82.3% of households nationwide receive the water service through system networks (62% from indoor taps, 11% from taps inside the building, and 8.8% from public taps). Eighteen per cent of households receive potable water from sources other than the network system (16.1% through pumps, 0.2% from wells, and 3.4% from other sources). In border governorates, especially Matrouh and South Sinai, households depend mainly on water wells. However, this wide coverage is offset by high loss rates of up to 50%, which are more often than not due to poorly designed networks.

There is also a major question over the quality of drinking water, and the evidence suggests that the quality of potable water is often not in line with international standards. Ministry of Health studies (2000) demonstrated the significance of water exposure to varied pollution sources. Results indicated that there are four governorates where the bacteriological incompatibility in filtrated water exceeds permissible limits; seven governorates faced similar problems vis-à-vis groundwater sources. This has impacted on public health and according to the World Bank an estimated 17,000 children die (20% of all child deaths) each year as a result of diarrheal diseases caused by sub-standard and inadequate drinking water, poor personal and domestic hygiene, inadequate sanitation facilities and practices and lack of healthy personal, food and domestic hygiene behavior135. Such public health concerns are more acute in rural areas, confirming the water and sanitation disparity between rural and urban areas, while child mortality rates are significantly higher than the average within other countries with the same income per capita level.136

The sources of pollution vary according to the phases through which the water passes; whether in the water intakes, treatment plants, networks, or house connections. The main pollutants which contribute to poor water quality can be traced to sewage from cities/villages, industrial effluents into Nile/canals/drains (especially from large state industries), agricultural discharges to the Nile

131 Millennium Development Goals Second Country Report- Egypt 2004, p.42 132 Country Co-operation Strategy, WHO, 2005-2009, Cairo, 2005, p.25 133 Comprehensive Environmental Analysis 1992-2002, World Bank, February 2005 (Draft Version 2), p. ixx 134 WHO Country Co-operation Strategy, p.25 135 Cost Assessment of Environmental Degradation in Egypt, World Bank, Cairo, August 2002, 3.07 136 Comprehensive Environmental Analysis 1992-2002, p.42

68 (containing pesticide/fertilizer residues and salts), municipal wastes from villages and secondary cities disposed into adjacent waterways, and disposals from inland navigation. Of these, sewage is the most critical, especially in the rural areas of the Nile Delta. Most waterways receive raw sewage either directly from housing units and sewage/sludge emptying trucks, or indirectly through agricultural drains loaded with semi-treated/untreated wastewater. Highly polluted wastewater is mainly generated from the food industry, textiles, and chemical industries such as tanneries, fertilizes, oil and soap. During the last few years significant attention has been given to the protection of the Nile from pollution, and 34 large industrial establishments (which had discharged 100 million m3/year of untreated industrial waste into the river), have stopped their flows of polluted discharge, either by way of end-of-pipe treatment, or by discharging wastewater into drains or the pubic sewer system. Though this has dramatically lowered the pollution level of the Nile it has caused other problems where municipal wastewater treatment plants are ill- equipped to deal with these effluents, while agricultural drains have been seriously polluted.

The Mediterranean and Red Sea Coasts are also vulnerable to high levels of contaminated wastewater from industrial sources causing adverse impacts on fishing, marine biodiversity and recreational activities. The wastewater discharges come from a variety of industries as well as oil- related activities in the Gulf of Suez, especially where oil spills are involved. The industrial wastewater flowing into the marine environment near Suez is estimated at about 80 million m3 per year.

Air quality

For the past five years public concern has focused on deteriorating air quality in Egypt’s major cities and particularly Greater Cairo. The concern was sparked by the appearance of a black cloud in the skies of the capital in November 1998. Related to a thermal inversion climatic phenomenon, trapping air pollutants from multiple sources in and around Cairo, the cloud is thought to be caused by the open burning of solid waste in general, and agricultural residues in particular. As a result of strong media attention the government decided to search for rapid solutions for decreasing air pollution in Greater Cairo.

In addition to agricultural detritus, energy generation and industrial sites, vehicular emissions and smoke from burned garbage are major contributors to poor air quality. While industry contributes 34% of air pollution, solid waste burning accounts for 30%, followed by transport (28%) and burning agricultural residue (10%). The burning of solid waste in a city like Cairo contributes to smog and damages human health and this has prompted the adoption of a comprehensive solid waste management policy and system in recent years. Emitted primarily by industrial sources and vehicles, pollution by fine particulate matter (PM10) poses a number of threats to human health, as PM10 can penetrate deep into people's lungs. Some industrial areas and areas with traffic congestion sometimes record higher PM10 levels than those recommended by both Egyptian and World Health Organization standards.

Industry accounts for 21% of the environmental damage caused by air pollution, which in turn has a relatively severe impact on communities across Egypt, especially those located near to cement-, iron-, steel- and coke factories south of Cairo, as well as chemical industries in Aswan and Alexandria. The emissions include particulate matter, sulfur oxides, carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxides, heavy metals, and a variety of volatile organic compounds (VOCs). In addition children and housewives suffer the effects of indoor household air pollution emanating from cooking and heating, especially in cases where agricultural waste is used as fuel. This problem, which mainly affects rural homes, can be alleviated by increasing the affordability and availability of clean energy. In Egypt’s secondary cities the main source of pollution comes from

69 the energy sector and from the burning of agricultural residues (An estimated 20% of agricultural waste is disposed of in this way).

It’s clear that the energy sector is one of the major sources of air pollution in the main and secondary cities of Egypt. However, the energy sector is vital to Egypt’s economy as a key source of income, while generating a large share of Egypt’s foreign currency receipts and having a major impact on Egypt’s balance of payments. In this respect Egypt’s energy intensity is high compared to neighbouring countries (Algeria, Jordan, Syria, and Tunisia) and five times that of OECD countries, with local energy production in 2002/2003 set at approximately 62.3 million tons of oil equivalent (TOE)137. Egypt's growing energy sector and use of fossil fuels has inevitably increased carbon emissions, which rose by 34% over the period 1990-2001 to 34.3 million metric tons of carbon. Though this is less than 0.5% of global emissions, the local impact is tremendous.

Solid waste

As previously mentioned the burning of solid waste contributes to urban and rural air pollution. Such burning practices have taken place in the absence of a clear solid waste management system and as a cheap alternative to solid waste disposal. Egypt annually generates 20 million tons of agricultural waste, 6.2 million tons of special waste of which 0.3 million tons is hazardous waste, 4 million tons of demolition waste and 130,000 tons of medical waste. Eighty-eight percent of collected waste is disposed of in open dumps in urban areas, left in streets or dumped in drainage canals in rural areas, while 8% of organic waste is composted, though it is not generally sufficiently treated. Some recycling activities are undertaken in some cities (particularly Cairo)138.

The National Waste Management Strategy of 2000 identified that “The present systems could not satisfy the served community needs with its various strata for a reasonably accepted cleansing level, as well as reducing the negative health and environmental impacts or in improving the aesthetic appearance”. The problem derived from the weak capacity of management systems and an overall deficit which derived from the fact that before 1998 there was no coherent government policy on solid waste management (SWM). Today in most large cities there are three collection systems working simultaneously: the formal system operated by the municipalities which targets street sweeping and emptying large curb-side containers; the informal Zabelleen private system of door to door service (a highly efficient service for capturing recyclable materials for resale and green organic materials for use as animal feed); and organized private enterprises for servicing specific sectors. The municipal system is patchy in performance, private enterprise is beyond the budgets of many governorates and the Zabelleen system cannot collect more than 10% of the waste in Egypt. In general rural governorates manage their solid waste in an unsafe manner, creating both public health and environmental concerns. Organic waste is fed to farmers’ animals and residual waste (organic and non-organic) is dumped alongside waterways, drains, deserted lands and neighboring dumping sites, where it is incinerated.

Industrial pollution and hazardous waste

Industry is a significant source of pollution in Egypt, with more that 275,000 facilities, 90% of which are micro establishments located in residential areas. With 70% of these facilities located

137 55.3% is from crude oil (including condensates), 40.1% from natural gas, and 4.5% from hydropower. The industrial sector is responsible for most of the final energy consumption (48%), followed by the transport sector (28%), the residential and commercial sector (20%), government and public utilities (3%), and the agricultural sector (1%). 138 Comprehensive Environmental Analysis 1992-2002, p.62

70 in Greater Cairo and Alexandria, the industrial sector features significantly in discussions relating to environmental degradation and health concerns in Egypt’s main urban centres. Egypt’s industrial facilities generate numerous wastes and emissions, including high levels of sulfur dioxide. In addition 99 industrial estates have been established without fully integrating environmental considerations in their planning and operation causing a new set of pollution problems. The unsafe disposal of industrial hazardous waste is a particular concern to the environment and public health, and in most governorates’ industrial facilities lack hazardous waste disposal sites. Although EEAA has developed guidelines for the treatment and disposal of hazardous waste, investments needed to establish such facilities have not yet been mobilized. EEAA is encouraging the facilities to store the waste on-site, but for many the absence of enough space on-site prompts most facilities to dispose of their waste in unsafe dumps. EEAA has not initiated any projects to provide technical assistance concerning minimization at source and on- site treatment. The only hazardous waste disposal and treatment site in Egypt was licensed in 2005 and is currently receiving inorganic hazardous waste from different sources which is put into land fills, and organic waste which can be stored. Moreover incineration of hazardous waste in cement kilns is an approach recently adopted by a private cement company. Working conditions in many industrial plants have the potential to cause health problems for workers, who may be exposed to high levels of dust and other harmful emissions.

Land use and human settlements

The challenge of maximizing land resources

The prevention of desertification and land reclamation is at the centre of the country’s efforts to manage its land and water resources, with optimization strategies of these resources being a national priority. Environmental experts believe that an integrated management strategy, encompassing water, agriculture, population, transport, sanitation (sewage and solid waste disposal), community planning and development and people’s participation, would best serve this objective. The gravest long-term threat to Egypt’s development comes from the consequences of unchecked desertification, and stalling this process, while assuaging the demands generated by a growing population is a priority for environmental planners. Although Egypt recently finalized a National Action Plan to Combat Desertification (still to be formally adopted by the government), the current framework for policy co-ordination required to address these threats is still less than efficient.

These established challenges are compounded by the consequences of climate change. A report published in 2005139 by the Ministry of State for Environmental Affairs warns that sea-levels may well rise by 50 centimeters by 2050 affecting communities living along Egypt’s costal zone. Rising sea-levels will cause flooding and salt-water intrusion, forcing millions of people to abandon land and homes in the northern delta region; an estimated 1.5 million people could be displaced in the governorate of Alexandria alone. The report also predicts that rising temperatures and shortages of water caused by increased demand from farming and domestic consumption will put pressure on agriculture and reduce crop yields. Moreover agricultural areas may become uncultivable as crops are no longer able to tolerate the climate, forcing farmers to move to marginal lands — whose soils are already poor — and in farming them, accelerate their degradation. The report urges the government to prioritize funding for research into the impacts of climate change on Egypt's coastal zone and how it will affect supplies of food and water. It adds that efforts should be made to evaluate technologies for mitigating and adapting to climate change. Another recommendation is that Egypt improves its capacity for climate monitoring and

139 http://www.scidev.net/dossiers

71 forecasting, and implements schemes to conserve water. Researchers behind the report assert that Egypt needs to reduce its green house gas emissions and prepare for climate change by developing crops that can tolerate environmental stresses such as drought and salinization.

The impact of urbanization and urban encroachment

Urbanization has dominated the Egyptian development experience over the past 50 years, and though the 1996 census showed a slowing in urbanization, 43% (some 30 million people) of Egyptians today live in urban centres. With rapid urbanization have come a number of societal challenges which directly and indirectly degrade the environment and affect the quality of life for millions of people. These include the building of unregulated (informal) urban structures, which has resulted in the loss of 1.2 million feddans of agricultural land, a dramatic increase in residential densities in both urban and rural areas (e.g. in some districts of Cairo there are 1500 persons per feddan), poor public utilities such as solid waste management systems, which undermine public health and economic development and the decay of urban heritage and loss of several buildings with architectural significance.

Urban encroachment onto agriculture lands has been one of the major consequences of rapid urbanization. The flat alluvial land of the Nile Valley is the best land for agriculture but also the easiest and most desirable for urban development. It is estimated that urban encroachment and soil scrapping for brick production may have led to the desertification of 20,000 feddans yearly140. The government response has been to adopt legislation to regulate the conversion of agricultural land to other non-agriculture uses (Law No. 116 1983) and in recent years the conversion has slowed somewhat, though the dominant trend is still towards urban settlement. Although the responsibility for enforcement has been with the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation, a central problem has been the co-ordination of policies and regulations relating to land use planning, urban development and agriculture.

One consequence has been the relatively unchecked expansion of informal settlements, which built on former agricultural land141, is now home to 40% of Egypt’s urban population (12 million people). The situation has arisen due to the limited scope of affordable housing for low-income families, and in most cases informal dwellings are developed on privately owned land which is informally subdivided into small plots and then sold to individuals who construct their housing blocks on it. Since Egyptian laws prohibit the transformation of agricultural land to urban land without entering into long bureaucratic and costly procedures and approvals, land-owners prefer to take the easier and cheaper way of informally subdividing their land and developing it. This practice has led to the fragmentation of productive land, leading to a stage where the remaining cultivable land is so small as to be non-productive. On the other hand the kinds of informal housing usually built on this land are made from concrete blocks. At the same time informal settlements have also been built on state-owned desert land and the inhabitants are technically illegal squatters. The occupiers are thus always under the threat of being evicted or bulldozed by the governmental authorities and consequently construct temporary shelters, hoping that over time their squatting will be tolerated by the authorities, at which point they will feel able to replace temporary shelters with permanent ones.

140 Hegazi, A.M. and I. H. El Bagouri, National Action Plan for Combating Desertification, Desert Research Center, Cairo, 2002, p. 17 141 80% of these settlements are built on what was formerly agricultural land.

72 As many Egyptian are all too aware, informality brings its own price. Non-recognition by local authorities of informal settlements means that these areas are often deprived of infrastructure, paved roads, and services such as schools, health care centers and other facilities. In the case of squatters, these factors are aggravated by the sense of insecurity. Article 11 of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights clearly lays down the state’s obligation towards the crucial issue of living standards: “The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions”. In this context the current overall situation is problematic for many Egyptians living in informal housing, whereby the social ills normally associated with such housing contribute to degrading the environment.

In 1998 the National Specialized Councils (NSC) in its 18th round drafted a terse statement about informal settlements, calling them “Uncivilized areas, named according by Anthropologists as poverty traps, dominated by deprivation and despair [and] social disorganization”. The strength of this statement reflects the hardships of urban life in Egypt, where in many cases citizens are living in sub-standard housing, and for many their living conditions and environment are slum- like in nature. Official figures indicate that there are some 909 slums, inhabited by 5.5 million people across the country142. However the UN Habitat definition of a slum dwelling probably casts doubt on the veracity of this assertion, since according to the UN’s Agency for Human Settlements only one of the following five criteria has to be in place in order to qualify a settlement as a slum dwelling: inadequate access to water for family use, unsatisfactory access to sanitation to adequately serve the excreta disposal needs of a family, no access to secure tenure making residents vulnerable to eviction, inadequate durability of the housing structure and a household density of no more than two people per room. One of the main issues is that the information is not available to accurately determine the status of living conditions for Egypt’s poor in accordance to these criteria.

The root of these problems ultimately lies with the failure to provide poor Egyptians with affordable housing. The magnitude of the problem is explained by the central governmental control of the formal housing market, direct involvement of government in construction, with its administrative overhead and bureaucratic procedures, the withdrawal of the private sector and the failure of the “New Cities” programme to provide affordable housing to low income families. The fact is that in spite of its infrastructure achievements over the past three decades “New Cities”, which have been built on re-claimed desert land, have absorbed less than 20% of the population growth. This failure can be attributed to the separation of these cities from the urban economy, combined with a dearth of efficient transport and social services. In spite of the fact that the target of the New Cities were the urban poor, the decision to pour the bulk of investments into new cites at the expense of formal housing in established cities effectively increased the costs of housing beyond the means of low-income householders, while also creating a vacuum of low-cost formal housing in older cities such as Cairo and Alexandria. 143

Land degradation and the quality of agricultural land

The loss of productive and agricultural land is compounded by the degradation of the land itself. One of the major issues is salinization which is caused by water and dissolved salts moving up in the soil through capillary action. As evaporation occurs salts are left deposited in the upper soil layers. While salinization is occasionally the result of natural soil-forming processes, it occurs most frequently in irrigated soils where lands with poor drainage or water input control remain

142 Millennium Development Goals Second Country Report- Egypt 2004, p.43 143 National Human Development Report 2004, p.105

73 saturated in the lower soil layers. It is exacerbated by the higher salt content of irrigation water, and while in the past the Nile floods saturated these soils and flushed away the excess salt, the construction of the Aswan Dam has prevented these annual floods necessitating good drainage to wash away excess salts from the soil. Salinization has a deleterious effect on soil productivity and crop yields. In extreme cases damage from salinization is so great that it is technically unfeasible or totally uneconomic to reverse the process.

According to the FAO, the total agriculture land of Egypt in the Nile Valley and Delta is about 7.8 million feddans, which is almost entirely dependent on irrigation. Approximately 2 million feddans in Egypt suffer from salinization problems. Sixty percent of the cultivated lands of the northern Delta, 20% of the mid and southern Delta and 25% of the soils of Upper Egypt are salt affected144. While new lands are being cultivated through horizontal expansion projects, other land is being lost to desertification through the mechanisms of water logging, lack of drainage and the concomitant processes of soil salinization and alkalization. The GoE is working to improve the drainage systems of irrigated land and has mandated that only highly efficient irrigation methods, such as drip systems, are to be used in the new lands in order to prevent salinization. This is compounded by sand encroachment onto agricultural land reducing fertility by an estimated 25%. 145

Biodiversity and protected areas management

During the 1990s the Egyptian government made great strides in taking measures to protect Egypt’s rich and varied biodiversity. Conservation of nature and wildlife has now been institutionalized through a system of laws and Protected Areas. In keeping with the Convention on Biological Diversity, the EEAA has established a National Biodiversity Department whose mandate includes actions to develop: a national study (inventory) of Egypt’s biodiversity, a national biodiversity data bank (to be linked with a national biodiversity data network) and a national strategy for biodiversity conservation and a national plan of action. EEAA reorganization has put this department under a new Nature Conservation Sector (NCS) and created a Protected Areas Management Department, which now looks after a network of 24 protected areas across the country, covering about 9.4 % of the country’s land area.

In international forums Egypt has shown active interest in conservation of biodiversity and preservation of natural resources and heritage. Multiple regional and international conventions presently have mandates for conservation of critical ecosystems and biodiversity. In recognition of their role and value as a conservation tool, the Arab Republic of Egypt is signatory to some eight international and regional agreements having provisions for protected areas. These conventions oblige Egypt and other member states to establish and maintain a network of protected areas to protect ecosystems, representative habitats, threatened species, cultural heritage sites and traditional knowledge of value to all mankind. However, a principal issue is finding the means to translate international conventions and agreements into national policy. In spite of the fact that Egypt has worked judiciously to implement the provisions of the Convention on Biodiversity, several factors still hinder full compliance with international law, such as the lack of qualified staff and financial resources to implement the national plans and monitor their progress, as well as inter institutional bottlenecks and limited capacity of coordinating bodies to mobilize resources.

144 http://www.fao.org/ag/agl/swlwpnr/reports/y_nf/egypt/e_arealu.htm) 145 Hegazi, A.M. and I. H. El Bagouri 2002, National Action Plan for Combating Desertification, p. 21

Disaster prevention and crisis management

Protecting the environment is directly linked to preventing disasters, either natural or caused by human activities. As a result of its geographic profile and the environmental challenges analyzed above, effective policies for disaster risk reduction become a very important aspect of Egypt's development process. The government participated in the recent World Conference on Disaster Prevention held in Kobe and submitted information on the status of disaster reduction in the country, including on issues such as institutional arrangements, risk identification, knowledge management, applications, preparedness and contingency planning. The country information note reveals a situation where many initiatives have taken place, both in terms of institutional setting, knowledge management and planning. However, these efforts have occurred to a large extent without a coherent underlying strategy and a clear division of roles and responsibilities, leading to a complex institutional system with too many actors playing overlapping roles, and in the absence of a body that is strongly empowered to play the coordinating function that is of particular importance in this area.

The cost of environmental degradation

World Bank estimates show that environmental degradation is a significant source of financial loss146. The accumulated cost of damage resulting from environmental degradation in Egypt in 1999 was estimated at 10-19 billion EGP per year, or 3.2-6.4 % of GDP, with a mean estimate of 14.5 billion EGP, or 4.8% of GDP. The cost of air pollution is assessed at 1.1-3.2% of GDP (urban outdoor and rural indoor), followed by soil degradation at 1.0-1.4% of GDP (erosion and salinity). In the area of water, the damage cost is estimated at 0.7-1.2% of GDP (mostly from the lack of safe water, sanitation, and hygiene). The cost of coastal zone degradation is estimated at 0.2-0.4% of GDP, and inadequate waste management at around 0.2% of GDP. Of total damage cost, about two-thirds is from damage to health and one-third from natural resource degradation. It is also suggested that air pollution may be responsible for tourism losses in Cairo in the order of 0.2-0.3% of GDP. The cost of natural resource degradation is predominantly from agricultural soil degradation caused by salinity and erosion, followed by coastal zone degradation associated with losses in coastal zone tourism due to degradation of coral reefs and coastal water pollution. These costs are based on the estimated investments associated with a limited number of actions needed to remedy the situation in each environmental category.

Duty-Bearer-Claim-Holder Responses and Capacities

It is no coincidence that this chapter and the part of the Millennium Declaration which it reflects are called “our common environment”. This is because the protection and conservation of the environment is not the sole preserve of any one group in society and all stakeholders, from the farmer in Upper Egypt to the Minister of Environment Affairs, are both duty-bearers and claim- holders. For example, while the farmer can expect the government authorities to put in place proper local mechanisms to collect and safely dispose of solid waste, the government can expect citizens in rural and urban districts to stop burning agricultural residue and domestic waste. Thus government cannot be expected to shoulder the entire burden of development, but rather create the conditions by which citizens can, through their own responsible conduct, claim the benefits of social and economic progress. Therefore, in the area of the environment governmental authorities

146 Cost Assessment of Environmental Degradation in Egypt

75 have a duty to support the cost to construct and maintain water treatment facilities or maintain good quality water supply and sanitation services, but they also have the right to ensure efficient cost recovery mechanisms of construction, operations and maintenance so that it can continue to provide and extend the services to citizens.

Egypt is a signatory to 64 multilateral environmental agreements related to different issues such as industrial pollution, oil pollution, climate change, ozone depletion, biodiversity and hazardous substances. Within this context, Egypt’s environmental policy is directed by the National Environmental Action Plan (NEAP), which was first issued in 1992 and updated in 2002. Both the Prime Minister and Minister of State for Environmental Affairs (MSEA) note that the goal of linking development with environmental protection is the key to Egypt’s future. The NEAP process employed “a participatory, consultative, gender anchored, holistic planning modality to create an enabling environment” and received the approval of all affected line Ministries. The updated version is designed to represent Egypt’s agenda for environmental actions up to 2017 and is designed to complement and integrate existing sectoral plans for economic growth and social development. The World Bank views NEAP 2002 as an impressive diagnostic document with a qualitative analysis of the environmental issues but with little quantitative analysis for setting priorities.

Government at the centre of environmental management

The Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency and its 8 Regional Branch Offices (RBOs) are the main entities responsible for protecting the environment of Egypt. EEAA is within the Ministry of State Environmental Affairs whose Minister heads the Governing Board for EEAA. A Chief Executive Officer (CEO) is nominated by the Council of Ministers. The CEO provides day-to-day administration of EEAA and ensures that policies of the Governing Board are implemented. Within this structure the government identifies problems, seeks solutions and implements laws and policies. It is the main force behind conventional efforts to modify environmental behavior by principally using command and control measures to encourage stakeholders to comply with multiple laws, decrees, economic policies and agreements.

The main challenges in managing Egypt’s environmental problems concern the weak coordination capacity between the EEAA and the 14 other ministries which deal with environmental issues. Many line ministries have a department or unit that deals with environmental management issues, however the capacity and experience varies widely, while the mechanisms for collaboration are not clear within EEAA’s mandate or within the policies of the collaborating ministries. Consequently there are a number of impediments to implementing an effective environmental portfolio. First, there is the absence of a body that cuts across sectoral lines and that can effectively co-ordinate the different government bodies. The original Board of Directors for EEAA does include representatives from six different ministries related to the environment, but it meets irregularly and the MSEA sits as the chairman. The few examples where environmental policy decisions were made at the highest levels of government occurred as a result of response to crises, such as air pollution in Cairo.

Second, EEAA faces a number of human resource deficits which curtail its overall capacity. The Agency has found it difficult to find and retain qualified staff, with many leaving the agency for work in private consulting firms after gaining experience in the government, often citing heavy bureaucracy and low salaries as being the reason. There is also a general absence of university educated staff and curricula specializing students in environmental policy, natural resource economics, environmental management, regulatory code enforcement and natural resource protection. Third, there is a lack of enforcement and compliance with the terms of the law.

76 Despite capacity building by several donor projects, there is still a critical need for additional capacity within the inspection function of EEAA and donors report that at present EEAA faces a serious shortage in the number of inspectors. Finally, more needs to be done to pursue the law that systematically requires an environmental impact assessment (EIA) and ensuing environmental management plans to mitigate the adverse impacts of projects. EIA is a key opportunity to evaluate projects or major policy changes in a multi-sectoral fashion but its practice is not uniformly applied to all applicable projects. Many observers agree that there is a need for the government to review its laws relating to the protection of the environment with a view to devising and codifying new policy guidelines, rules and regulations which could ensure broad enforcement by all actors involved.

Government responses to specific issues

Water – In December 2004 the Prime Minister announced a variety of measures to protect the country’s natural resources, including a package of proposals to maximize water resources. The statement contained proposals which are clearly aimed at making agriculture more water sustainable, including the gradual replacement of high water use crops with lower water use crops (E.g. replacing sugar cane with red beet); expanding the cultivation of fruits and vegetables in new agriculture lands for export purposes in order to gain more income from a unit of water; rationalizing Nile water consumption through expanding the use of modern irrigation systems in old lands and spreading the trickle irrigation systems in new lands; reducing rice cultivation in order to expand cultivation of sweet corn; and maximizing the use of Egypt’s seas and lakes in increasing fish wealth as a nutritious and low-cost food source.

The World Bank Assessment (1992-2002) points to the absence of a policy-driven and priority- setting integrated and co-ordinated approach as being the “foremost problem regarding water quality and pollution in Egypt”. There is no joint strategy or action plan that coordinates the different tasks of the involved ministries and institutions. The redundancies and split responsibilities between the different ministries, particularly in applying the different laws and in ensuring monitoring and compliance need to be mainstreamed. The government response has been to seek a more efficient water service and reduce the burden on government by establishing “Holding Companies”. A Presidential Decree in 2004 (135) set up a Holding Company for Drinking Water and Sanitation and its affiliates operating in the governorates. The company status will allow water and waste water utilities to bypass government civil employment requirements that make it difficult to properly regulate the workforce. It also allows the utilities to seek new funding for providing good quality services and relieve the burden of central government. However, it is expected that the company’s plans to raise tariffs will be unpopular, while the establishment of two additional holding companies for different regions marks a move towards the decentralization of service delivery. A second Presidential Decree (136) issued in 2004 allows for the creation of the Central Authority for Drinking Water and Sanitation Sector, and Protection of the Consumer. This decree aims at monitoring and regulating quality control and consumer price control.

Tackling the problem of water quality is now being addressed by a Task Force which was appointed by the Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation. The priority areas were identified as the larger urban conglomerates, where high bacteriological and chemical pollution levels are encountered together with highly populated areas. Through this move MWRI recognizes the need to adopt an integrated approach, also reflected in its National Water Resources Plan (NWRP) which encourages the coordinated development and management of the country’s water resources. This horizontal approach consists of certain measures with the involvement of the

77 different stakeholders in implementing and incorporating these measures. MWRI has proposed a redefinition of the responsibilities and functions of the different stakeholders.

Air quality – Although there is no unified national air quality strategy, sector specific policies in energy, transport and refineries have been adopted. In June 2004 the Board of EEAA agreed to a “National Air Quality Strategy Framework” which set out elements of an air quality strategy for the Greater Cairo area, and which may act as a guide to a national strategy. In spite of this, much of the work in this area is donor-driven. One such initiative is the Cairo Air Improvement Project (CAIP), which has for several years introduced new technologies to reduce fine particle emissions, while also promoting the use of compressed natural gas (CNG) as a fuel for municipal buses, private vehicles, and as energy for power plants throughout Greater Cairo. As of 2001, 50 municipal buses were using CNG and multiple CNG fueling stations were set up throughout the city. CAIP is also promoting the use of environmentally friendly technologies at lead smelting plants and supporting the removal of such facilities away from populated areas.

Though formally under the auspices of the Supreme Energy Council, energy policy has in recent years been set by the Energy Efficiency Council (EEC), which is an informal consortium of public and private sector organizations. With the support of the USAID-funded Egyptian Environmental policy Programme, the EEC developed a National Energy Efficiency Strategy, which is still to be adopted by policy-makers. The Strategy focuses on three goals: (1) accelerating the use of natural gas rather than oil, (2) developing national energy efficiency codes and standards, and (3) promoting private investment in energy efficiency activities. The EEPP estimates that if Egypt can aggressively adopt energy efficient technologies, there could be annual savings of about 1% of GDP and a more than 10% drop in annual CO2 emissions by 2017.

One of the major policy constraints that seriously impact the environment is the prevailing subsidies in the energy sector. These subsidies have huge implications for the use of fuel, since they encourage waste and they discourage substitution. They also have a significant impact on the state budget, and while the political pressures to maintain these subsidies are understandable, the environmental impacts from excessive energy use impinge on the very people that subsidies are meant to assist; it is commonly understood that environmental degradation affects the poor more than the non-poor. From this perspective Egypt is looking towards new and renewable energy sources and technologies, while beginning the process of energy conservation. The depletion of Egypt’s natural oil reserves has prompted the shift to natural gas, but this is proving expensive and difficult, while the commitment to renewable energy is a major policy consideration. The government has set a target to cover 5% of the primary energy consumption through renewable energy by 2020, excluding large hydropower plants and the present biomass utilisation in industry and agriculture. In spite of the commitment to wind power and solar energy the costs associated with a transition that will have a significant impact seem to be a major obstacle. It is likely that more radical and far-reaching measures will be required if Cairo’s air quality is going to improve significantly.

Solid waste - In the past five years the GoE has established a policy and institutional framework for the long-term management of solid waste across the country. Crucially this has involved the establishment of a joint ministerial committee, co-chaired by the MSEA and the Ministry of Local Development (MOLD), to coordinate the implementation of the strategy and the preparation of the National Strategy for Integrated Municipal Solid Waste Management (IMSWM). The strategy incorporates a cost recovery system for SWM services, which is charged to the electricity bill, provides a tax break and custom duties exemption for SWM equipment and aims to enhance public awareness and participation, through information dissemination of all SWM-related issues.

78 The trend has been for the government to out-source SWM services to private companies and take away service delivery from the control of governorates. In governorates such as Alexandria and Greater Cairo international companies have already been contracted and have started operations with a great deal of success. A total of 56 municipal solid waste composting plants have been established by the Ministry of Local Development, at a cost of 265 million EGP. Though these plants cover the entire country, many of them are not operating satisfactorily, due to the lack of technical expertise and operational know-how within the municipalities, as well as design drawbacks of the plants themselves. In general the effectiveness of solid waste management remains patchy, with poorer governorates and many rural areas unable to afford privatized services and thus continuing to use traditional practices to manage their waste, with the same legal, financial and efficiency constraints. There are very low collection rates in rural villages and though some NGOs are involved in SWM, the absence of financial, technical and human resources means that many rural settlements are polluting their environment through inadequate disposal methods. Currently, the government does not envisage extending private services to rural governorates. Although the strategy is being implemented by several governorates, some observers believe that insufficient attention is being given to public awareness, community buy-in, social consideration and public consultation.

Looking at the main stakeholders in SWM, it would seem that central government still has to build its capacities to address privatization requirements, while there is still a need to make the joint ministerial committee active. Local government authorities are coming to terms with the new role as supervisors, rather than service providers. Current difficulties relate to the capacity to evaluate, monitor, enforce and inspect the quality of the service being provided by private contractors. The future of the Zabeleen, the traditional collectors of waste in Cairo, is uncertain and there has been insufficient attention given to how to incorporate them into the privatization initiative.

Industrial pollution - The GoE has undertaken numerous interventions to address industrial pollution, including technical support to industrial facilities through guiding manuals, info sheets, demonstration projects and preparation of pollution abatement studies. Financial support has been provided through several donor-funded projects to implement pollution abatement measures and establish environmental management systems. EEAA in cooperation with concerned entities has prepared industry related strategies and plans and the National Cleaner Production Strategy was issued and approved in 2004. Other plans were prepared for the relocation of polluting industries outside of residential areas and for the conversion of industrial facilities to natural gas. Several programs have addressed the industrial sector such as the Environmentally Friendly Industrial Cities Program. There is a need to operationalize these different strategies and plans, with the Cleaner Production Strategy providing the framework for implementing all the actions needed to enhance industrial environmental performance.

Urban planning and protecting agriculture - The Prime Minister’s 2004 policy statement emphasized the need to protect Egypt’s agricultural land. This has included the satellite mapping of urban areas to control their expansion into agricultural areas. The government has also decided to prepare an urban plan aimed at achieving the protection of existing agricultural areas and the requirements of urban growth, and with this a warning to take measures against informal settlements. At the same time Egypt is pursuing a number of “mega projects” to cultivate desert land and create new human settlements.

Facilitating urbanization has been a main government priority for over 20 years, with the Ministry of Housing, Utilities and Urban Communities spending 135 billion EGP on housing, water supply and sanitation, roads and bridges and urban services. The urban poor have not particularly

79 benefited from this huge investment, especially when it comes to housing and land accessibility, leading to the exponential expansion of informal settlements. The major urban planning problems derive from flaws in the decision-making process, in which the involvement of several governmental bodies and ministries in the urban planning process leads to overlap, duplication and even contradiction in decisions. Decisions and mandates to enforce them are often delayed, while the convoluted legal framework and less than effective urban planning process has created the space for wide spread informal development.

The increasing annual loss of agricultural land to urban development prompted civil society and political parties to demand improvements in the conduct of urban planning. A new law is being proposed to create an enabling environment for decentralizing the decision making and plan formulation to the local level, with great emphasis on ensuring local community participation. This will charge one government entity, the General Organization for Physical Planning, with the responsibility for setting national urban development policies and strategies, establish directorates in each governorate to be the main local body responsible for implementing urban development plans, incorporate environmental and sustainable development considerations into urban planning and delegating to Governors the sole responsibility for approving any urban activity within the administrative boundaries of villages and cities. The move towards a decentralized approach to planning is however fraught with the difficulties highlighted in Chapter III.

Non-governmental actors as claim-holder and duty-bearer

Individuals are the real consumers of environmental services and products, but many citizens are excluded from the decision-making process on environmental issues at the local level and are also poorly educated about the consequences of poor behaviour which harms the environment, requiring an increase in public information campaigns. Environmental awareness often comes as a result of sensational stories from the media, such as the black cloud episode, but the understanding of the issues is not designed to foster change in individual behaviour. There is an absence in the systematic exchange of information in a clear and transparent manner in order for the general public to appreciate the functions and values of different environmental services. The media’s sensationalist approach to environmental problems often succeeds in sparking responses that are reactionary and short-term in nature.

In general the media has had a growing capacity and interest to deal with environmental issues and has been important in increasing awareness and thus helping to catalyze change by producing articles and programs that illustrate the importance of the environment. Individual ministries or organizations often initiate media coverage such as “Children’s Water Awareness Week” inaugurated by the Minister of Water Resources and Irrigation. Civil society in general plays an important role in environmental protection and there are more than 270 environmental NGOs in Egypt. Their activities range from broad awareness raising and environmental education to very topic-specific or site-specific causes that implement environmental management and community improvement programmes. However, as with many Egyptian NGOs the effectiveness of each organization can differ radically depending on the leadership.

There is a need for NGOs and other civil society to play a greater role in promoting environmental issues through multi-stakeholder partnerships. Recent initiatives in this direction, which could serve as a model for future civil society involvement, have seen the creation of two organizations: the Water Users Association that manages irrigation and drainage of small plots of land, and the Egyptian Water Partnership, which was created to serve as a neutral platform for discussion on national water resources plans, water sector policies, projects, legislation and the dissemination of information. NGOs and other civil organizations are recognized as being

80 important to environmental management, and EEAA has a special unit to enhance NGO collaboration. The capacity of environmental NGOs has been enhanced through co-operation with international donors who have provided direct assistance to design and implement community– based initiatives.

Though the private sector is an important source of problems, it is also a part of the solution. Though traditionally perceived as a polluter of air, water and land, the private sector is increasing its support to environmental solutions, particularly those businesses trying to export their products under ISO 14000 and 14001 Certification or when they are operating as part of an international joint venture. Companies are finding that pollution control not only benefits the environment but also helps them to save money and make a profit. For example, organic produce is becoming increasingly widespread in Egypt. Hotels that nurture their environment are able to sustain the attributes that make their establishment a desirable place to visit and in this vein some private sector companies have now embraced the 10 principles of the Global Compact and have committed themselves to protecting and promoting environmental sustainability. In this respect the private sector is now involved as purveyors of consulting services, financiers of environmentally related investments and operators of environmental activities.

81 Chapter V: Social Protection of Vulnerable Groups in Egypt

In September 2000 the Egyptian government joined other nations worldwide to reaffirm its commitment to protecting vulnerable groups in society. Egypt has a number of groups, who because of their circumstances are at extra risk from the problems associated with low incomes and low levels of human development. Their particular conditions create an environment in which they are even less able to fulfill their potential as human beings and for whom the space for making life choices are even smaller than the average citizen. In essence these groups face a double vulnerability and a double burden – pertaining first to poverty and second to a specific disadvantage or circumstance in their lives which makes their resistance to poverty all the more difficult. International human rights legislation has a particular resonance for these groups, and Egypt’s key duty-bearers (i.e. the government, NGOs and international aid organizations) have a particular responsibility to help ameliorate the specific disadvantages that characterize the lives of vulnerable groups through special social protection programmes and measures.

However, the organs of the state generally have few resources and legal mechanisms to accommodate for the special circumstances of vulnerable groups in the Egyptian society. The social security system is divided into two: the social security pension and the social security assistance (social safety nets). The social security pension provides a monthly allowance to marginalized groups such as the elderly, widows, divorced women, women (and families) with husbands in prison, the disabled and the poor in general. The average assistance was increased in May 2005 from 50 to 60 EGP per month per individual and from 70 to 80 EGP per household per month. The social security assistance targets vulnerable groups on an ad hoc basis, such as poor children attending school, poor pregnant and nursing women or poor households in the case of sudden death of the head of the household, fire or illness. Approximately 600,000 people benefit from the social security system and the government increased its annual allocation from 600 million EGP to 1 billion EGP in May 2005147. The Ministry of Insurance and Social Affairs administers the system through 2300 social units across the country.

One of the main limitations of the system is the great number of people who are not captured. A certain budget is allocated to each governorate according to its poverty level, but this is often not sufficient to cover assistance to all those in need and consequently claimants applying for the pension/assistance are often queued. Difficulties in determining eligibility for assistance further prolong administrative procedures. The second main shortcoming is the fact that beneficiaries have to apply themselves. The lack of awareness of the system, illiteracy and fear of being registered by the authorities are all factors which might prevent those in need from applying.

As a result the capacities and environment of both duty-bearers and claim holders (i.e. members of vulnerable groups) are limited, while the overall social-economic situation does not favour an immediate improvement in the quality of life for vulnerable groups. The principal groups which fall into this category are children at risk such as working children and street children, the elderly, the disabled, people living with and vulnerable to HIV/AIDS and refugees. Features which single out these groups for special attention and special needs relate to the fact that they have a much weaker base from which to claim their rights as citizens, particularly where those rights involve access to special requirements such as anti-retroviral drugs for AIDS or special societal arrangements for people with disabilities. As mentioned earlier, the particular circumstances of

147 World Bank, Interview with Dr. Ala Hamed, May 2005

82 Egyptian women creates an environment in which many face a variety socio-cultural obstacles to the pursuit of life choices and the realization of their human rights. In this respect the government has recognized the need to adopt special measures to try and balance social forces to better support the cause of women’s advancement.

Main Issues

Children at risk

Although there are a variety of categories of children at risk, UN agencies and their government counterparts are particularly concerned about the welfare of street children and working children. Of course in some circumstances the two categories may well overlap. A variety of government institutions, NGOs and international organizations are involved in supporting these two groups and most of these agree that more needs to be done in Egyptian society to enhance the voice of youth and to improve the conditions of children from deprived backgrounds.

The prevalence of working children in Egypt continues to be a concern for those government agencies charged with ensuring compliance with the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). It is estimated that between 2.6-3.3% of Egyptian children work. The exact numbers and extent of child labour is not clear, though many children are known to work as unwaged labour in their parents’ homes or in local businesses belonging to their families. Thus an estimated 8.3% of urban children and 29% of rural children work in contravention of the minimum legal working age, which has been set at 14 years in the 1996 Child Law. Child labour is more common in rural areas where many jobs are concentrated in seasonal farming, while urban work concentrates on workshops and small factories. A high percentage of working girls in urban centres are involved in domestic labour at home on in helping to Six points of the National Council for Human run family businesses, excluding them from Rights 2004 annual report on the protection of education. children’s rights

The working child is exposed daily to 1. Examine rising the minimum age for a child numerous dangers and hazards which violate to be held criminally responsible to fifteen the CRC’s statutes on child protection, while years. Egypt’s Child Law stipulates that children 2. Abolish the role of the security forces in below 17 years should not be exposed to handling street children hazardous work. Invariably the reality is that 3. Criminalize dangerous child labour, both urban and rural working conditions are including working in quarries, in agriculture and being subjected to harmful pesticides, as fraught with numerous physical threats where well as regulating the work of girls in children are often required to manipulate households dangerous machinery and tools, as well as 4. Set plans and programmes to ensure the handle hot substances and poisonous protection of all the rights of the handicapped chemicals. In one study up to 27% of working child children in rural areas had been injured148. 5. Draft a bill that would openly criminalize Apart from the physical dangers, children are FGM often requested to work between 8-10 hours a 6. Consider rising the age of marriage for girls day, which also contravenes the Child Law. from 16 to 18 years

Child labour is driven by the economic imperative to escape poverty, allied to the fact that social protection mechanisms are not

148 Amany Adel Fattah, Social Variables Related to Child Labour in Rural Areas, Ain Shams University, Cairo, 1994

83 sufficient to compensate families which may wish to send their children to school. Low-income families often rely on the working child to help furnish the household budget. In addition, the costs associated with sending children to school puts education out of reach of many families. Thus illiteracy is prevalent among working children in urban workshops and a high proportion of working children have never join the school system or dropped out before completing the elementary stage. Parents who worked as children are twice more likely to send their own children to work, than those parents who did not work as children. It seems that the value of education among this segment of the population has been degraded as child labour becomes a self-sustaining phenomenon among many families caught in cycles of poverty. At the same time many working children view education as a less attractive option than earning an income and in many cases children voluntarily opt for work over school.

Although many children may use the streets of Cairo and other big cities as a place to work, the phenomenon of Egypt’s Street Children has many specific causes which reflect some of the major problems brought about by the worse affects of poverty in society. Studies suggest that there are anywhere between 83,000-200,000 street children living in Egypt’s cities149. A common feature seems to be the early age at which street children turn their backs on home life, choosing or forced by circumstances, to live on the streets and sleeping in parks, public squares and bus stops. Some children are as young as five years, while the average period to stay on the streets is eight years. Most girls on the street are from rural Upper Egypt while most boys are from the slums of Cairo150. In both cases the children are usually from poor large families which are beset by social and economic problems and live in crowded conditions. A number of street children are orphans who leave their care institutions151. While on the street these children are exposed and succumb to a variety of anti-social behaviour such as taking drugs and stealing, while others have been sexually abused. One NGO working152 with Street Children reports that 95% of the pubescent girls that it supports have lost their virginity, while the harsh conditions of the street takes its toll on young mothers and their babies, who are often malnourished, while the mothers lack any form of parenting guidance.

A major threat to the security of street children is being arrested by the police for vagrancy, and although in need of protection, the police regularly see street children as criminals and a nuisance to public order. The 1996 Child Law provides for legal sanctions against street children, though more often than not the court will issue a warning to the guardian. In this regard the Committee on the CRC has noted the very low age in Egypt of criminal responsibility, which currently stands at seven years, and has expressed its concern that offences such as begging and truancy are criminalized under article 96 of the Child Law153. Such legal parameters contribute to the lack of sympathetic concern by the authorities with regard to the situation of street children. Nearly all forms of social assistance come from the NGO sector.

Children subjected to violence and abuse

Experiences from street children and working children programmes have highlighted an area of concern related to violence and abuse of children. There is sufficient information from street children that abuse at home is one of the push factors leading them to live on the streets. The little

149 Arab Council for Childhood and Development, Street Children in Cairo, 2000, p. 160 150 El Kurdy, Maha, “Social and Psychological attributes of street child”, The National Review of Social Services, Vol. 39, No. 2, May 2002, Cairo, p76-77. 151 There are over 2000 orphans in Egypt, who live in institutions. They mainly receive assistance from religious organizations and NGOs. The emphasis on institutions denies many orphans the rights to be cared for by a family. 152 Data from the Hope Village Society 153 Observations of the CRC Committee, 21 February 2001

84 information that exists on sexual exploitation of children is also through street children who report of regular such incidences taking place on the street. The media is playing an important role in frequent reporting of abuse, torture, rape and killing of children which is an important step for identifying the problems. Very few surveys on intra familial abuse have been conducted, though an in- depth 1998 survey involving 2,170 preparatory and secondary students in Alexandria found that one third had been physically punished by their parents154. Moreover, the latest thinking is moving towards a consensus that FGM should also be considered within the construct of violence against children.

Duty-bearer capacity and response

Though the responsibility of children at risk is shared among different stakeholders, more partnerships are needed in the planning and implementation phases to secure the protection of children at risk and their families. The National Council for Childhood and Motherhood is the main governmental body responsible for supporting children at risk and is entrusted with policy making, planning, coordination, monitoring and evaluating activities related to protection and development of children and safe motherhood. In 2003 NCCM launched a national strategy to protect and rehabilitate street children in Egypt, while Egypt has ratified ILO convention 182 on the Elimination of worst forms of child labour. While the legislation is in place it lacks adequate oversight mechanisms, and NCCM is currently drafting a national strategy to combat child labour.

Regarding violence against children, a ministerial decree by the Ministry of Education prohibits corporal punishment in schools. However this is not put into effect and corporal punishment is commonly quoted by working children and street children as a reason for dropping out of school. In June 2005 NCCM hosted the MENA Regional Consultation on Violence against Children as part of deliberations of the Global UN Study on Violence due in June 2006. The conference produced a “Cairo Declaration” to which governments committed themselves to improved legislation, policies and programmes for the protection of children from violence, which includes the practice of FGM/C and abuse. The GoE is expected to submit its NCCM is currently revising the 1996 Child Law, with the aim of providing more legal protection to children. Working with UN agencies NCCM has launched a number of national media campaigns to change public attitudes to child labour, girls’ education, early marriage and FGM/C, while Egyptian NGOs are playing an important role in the dissemination of the provisions of the CRC. One of the main initiatives is the NGO Coalition on the Rights of the Child, where 97 NGOs from 14 governorates advocate for the protection and development of children.

People living with and vulnerable to HIV/AIDS

Egypt is considered to be a low prevalence country with regard to HIV/AIDS, and to date a total of 2,115 people living with HIV/AIDS (PLHIV) have been reported to the Ministry of Health and Population (MOHP) since 1986155. However, the absence of good data collection mechanisms and the cultural taboos surrounding HIV/AIDS mean that the veracity of this figure is questioned, and in 2004 WHO/UNAIDS estimated that the number of PLHIV was 12,000156. Irrespective of the accuracy of these figures, all sides in the debate agree that there has been a rise in HIV cases

154 Youssef, R. M., Attia, M. S., and Kamel, M. I. (1998) “Children experiencing violence: Parental use of corporal punishment, Prevalence and determinants of corporal punishment in schools, Child Abuse & Neglect, 22: 959-85 155 MOHP Quarterly Surveillance Report, 28/2/2005 156 UNAIDS , Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic (2004)

85 in Egypt since 1991. Of the 2,115 official cases of HIV/AIDS (1,492 Egyptians and 623 foreigners) 80% are male and 41% fall within the 25-34 age group. The predominant mode of known HIV infection is sexual intercourse, accounting for 64% of cases, mostly through heterosexual transmission. Infection through infected blood accounts for 31% of cases while mother-to-child transmission seems to be minimal. Factors which may contribute to the potential spread of the illness are prevalent in Egyptian society, with some people having multiple sexual partners, the very low rate of condom use, poor education, unemployment, poverty, the disempowerment of women and high rates of mobility.

One of the biggest challenges is the low level of knowledge about HIV/AIDS among Egyptians, including modes of transmission, methods of detection and symptoms, though higher educated citizens are more likely to posses the knowledge to protect themselves from behaviour that may invite infection157. The lack of knowledge contributes to stigmatizing views and discriminatory behavior against PLHIV and groups vulnerable to infection. In one survey over 70% of respondents did not think PLHIV should be allowed to continue work,158 and a sample study of secondary school students revealed that 72% would not sit next to someone who was HIV- positive159.

Women tend to be more vulnerable to HIV infection, not only because of biological factors, but also because they are more likely than men to lack access to education and health care, and they often do not have decision-making power in the home which may directly influence HIV risk, such as negotiating for condom use in a relationship. Other population groups are at risk due to their engagement in high risk behaviour, such as commercial sex workers (CSWs), men who have sex with men (MSM) and injecting drug users (IDUs). Certain population groups may be in a situation which renders them more vulnerable to engaging in high risk activities, e.g. prisoners, street children, refugees and mobile populations. These groups also suffer strong stigma and discrimination due to cultural and/or legal restrictions on the behaviours they may practice. There is a need for improved HIV/AIDS and sexually transmitted infection (STIs) surveillance with a focus on vulnerable groups to support the planning of the response. A ministerial decree determines that all non-Egyptians with HIV/AIDS must be deported, including migrants and asylum seekers who have not been granted refugee status. This practice runs contrary to UN and human rights judgments relating to people living with the disease.

Duty-bearer capacity and response

The National AIDS Programme (NAP) was officially established in 1987 by a ministerial decree as a programme of the Ministry of Health and Population.160 The main objective of the NAP is to improve the general information and awareness among young people on HIV/AIDS. In spite of several initiatives such as counseling services and the HIV/AIDS Hotline which was established in 1996, and the creation of a support group for PLHIV in 2004, support to those living with the illness is limited. Although the National AIDS Programme is currently offering antiretroviral treatment (ARV) to 50 persons free of charge, more needs to be done to ensure the equitable and

157 21 % of ever married women with no education had never heard of HIV/AIDS, while this is only the case for ½% for those with higher and/or secondary education. (Egypt Demographic and Health Survey, 2004) 158 El Sayed et al., 2002, Knowledge and Practices of Egyptian Workers Towards HIV/AIDS in Egypt National AIDS Programme, Egypt. 159 Shokr, “Prevention on HIV/AIDS Programme for Secondary Level Students”, Ein Shams University, Cairo, 2002. There is also a lack of awareness among UN Staff in Egypt, with 17% believing mosquitoes can transmit HIV, and 12% thinking that HIV may be transmitted by having sex with a foreigner while correctly using a condom. 160 The program was established under the Preventive Affairs and Endemic Diseases Sector within the responsibility of the Communicable Disease Control (CDC) Unit.

86 sustainable access to ARV treatment for all those who require it. Physicians and health personnel have been trained on working with PLHIV, but such training has not been adequately put into effect due to the shortage of drugs and the fear of people reporting their HIV-positive status to the medical establishment, which also results in low levels of HIV testing. In 2004 the MOHP inaugurated the first Voluntary Counseling and Testing (VCT) site in Egypt offering support to people, and it is currently setting up a national network of VCT sites.

One of the major obstacles in addressing the potential threat posed by the spread of HIV/AIDS is the dearth of a coherent policy response from the government. The MOHP leans towards the health dimensions of the issue, and though it set up a 15-member multi-sectoral National AIDS Steering Committee in 1987, it is a moribund body. On the other hand the Assessment of the HIV/AIDS Situation and Response in Egypt161 was endorsed at a consensus workshop in 2004 and the MOHP has since developed a draft Strategic Plan for comment and discussion. Civil Society response to HIV/AIDS in Egypt has been limited to date, but is increasing. In December 2003 the Egyptian NGO Network against AIDS (ENNAA) was created, and is currently composed of 18 NGOs. Also university student associations and charity organizations are increasingly becoming interested in HIV/AIDS.

Refugees and asylum-seekers

As of 1 January 2005 there were some 20,500 UNHCR-recognized refugees in Egypt. The vast majority of these are from Africa, with Sudanese refugees constituting the largest refugee population (73%) followed by Somalis (18%). The remainder comes from 27 other countries, mainly in Africa. Egypt is home to some 9,000 asylum-seekers whose refugee status has yet to be determined, as well as an estimated 30,000 to 70,000 Palestinian refugees. Egypt ratified the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol in May 1981. Upon accession to the 1951 Convention, Egypt submitted reservations regarding Article 12 (1) (Personal Status), Article 20 (Rationing), Article 22 (1) (Public Education), Article 23 (Public Relief) and Article 24 (Labour Legislation and Social Security). Egypt is also a party to the 1969 Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa.

However, the effective implementation of these instruments has been hampered by the absence of domestic legislation and procedures for the registration of asylum-seekers and determining refugee status. In the absence of national refugee legislation and the requisite institutional arrangements and capacity, the functional responsibilities for refugee status determination, assistance and solution has largely fallen upon UNHCR, which carries out these functions under a framework agreement signed with the Government of Egypt in 1954.

The majority of refugees and asylum-seekers live in Cairo, dispersed throughout the poor quarters of the city where they compete with local Egyptians for scarce resources and limited jobs. As claim-holders most refugees find it difficult to access state education, public health care, public relief and assistance, social security and food subsidies on the same basis as nationals, partly because of Egypt’s reservations to the implementation of certain provisions of the 1951 Convention. Under these circumstances UNHCR provides a sizeable assistance programme to help refugees meet their basic human needs, though in recent years these efforts have come under increasing pressure as a result of a rise in Egypt’s refugee population (from around 4,000 in 1997 to over 20,000 at present) and the fact that few non-governmental organizations are able to share the burden of refugee assistance.

161 The assessment was carried out by the National AIDS Programme and the Expanded Theme Group on HIV/AIDS in 2003.

87 Although refugees have in principle the right to work by obtaining a work permit, this is rarely the case in practice. A work permit is only granted if the employer can demonstrate that there is no qualified Egyptian to fill the post. Given the unemployment in the country, it is practically impossible for a refugee to be issued a permit to work in the formal sector, and those refugees who are fortunate enough to find work are generally only able to secure short-term employment in the informal sector, where they are often subjected to exploitation, and where they have no legal recourse against the arbitrary termination of their employment, or work-related injury. Rent consumes the greatest part of refugees’ income, and since they are charged high foreign rental rates many refugees try to save money by sharing accommodation, but all too often this leads to overcrowding, which may result in health problems.

Refugee women are generally able to find work more easily than men as they can work as housemaids for foreign and Egyptian families, whilst their husbands stay at home looking after the children. This reversal in gender roles often places a severe strain on marital relations and may negatively impact the health of children. In families where both parents work, young children are often locked inside apartments alone unsupervised or elder children are kept out of school to care for younger siblings.

Children under the age of 18 years constitute 34% of the refugee population in Egypt. Despite the passing of a ministerial decree in 1992 entitling refugee children to attend Egyptian state primary schools, this has not been realized owing to a number of barriers including the lack of absorptive capacity. Presently, around 4,000 refugee and asylum-seeking children attend informal schools run by refugee associations and/or faith-based institutions. However, due to space and budget constraints, these informal educational centres are unable to accommodate all school-aged children. It is estimated that some 4,000 to 6,000 children of refugees and asylum-seekers living in Cairo are not in school.

Duty-bearer capacity and response

As a matter of general principle, and as part of its obligations under the 1951 Refugee Convention, it is the responsibility of the state, as the main duty-bearer, to receive asylum applications from persons in its territory and decide who eligible for refugee status in accordance with internationally agreed norms and standards. Similarly the state is principally responsible for establishing appropriate reception facilities for asylum-seekers and to create conditions conducive to the self-sufficiency and self-reliance of refugees, which it can undertake with the support of the international community.

There are a number of important measures the GoE could take to give immediate effect to its treaty obligations towards refugees deriving from the 1951 Convention. These include drafting national refugee legislation, establishing a single, central authority for managing refugee issues, including refugee status determination and taking measures to ensure that all refugee children have access to at least primary education (currently less than 200 refugee children attend public schools). There are also increasing calls on the GoE to lift the reservations made to the 1951 Convention.

88 Caring for the elderly

The elderly in Egypt, (60 years and above) constitute 15.8% of society, and this group is growing as life expectancy increases162. Seventy per cent of the elderly live with their children and grandchildren and 13% live as couples under the care of their children or relatives. Only 5.3% of the elderly live alone, constituting a vulnerable group, since they seldom seek help while often suffering from several illnesses163. People in this category struggle to live their daily lives, as they have no one to give them help with bathing, dressing and walking, while isolation and poverty combine to restrict their access to health services. Illiteracy among the elderly is as high as 65%164.

Duty-bearer capacity and response

The Ministry of Insurance and Social Affairs (MISA) and the Ministry of Health and Population (MOHP) represent the main public institutions dealing with older persons, and responsible for respectively health and social services. The MOHP’s Population Strategy 2001-2017 sets out to “increase the attention given to services for the elderly”, though to date few concrete measures have been taken to pursue this goal. MISA's programmes and services range from providing Elderly Homes, Elderly Clubs, Elderly sitter services, and support mechanisms through discounts on various public services. Although a 1996 survey showed the existence of 108 elderly clubs and homes across the country, very little data has been collected on these social services. They tend to be concentrated in urban governorates, with over half located in Cairo and Alexandria, while several governorates had only one or two elderly clubs and many had none165. Elderly homes often suffer from inadequate services and utilities, with 57.3% having only one toilet per five or more residents, while 63.4% had one bathroom for the same number of people. Staff in the centres often lacks appropriate training and specialization166. Another source of support is from cash benefits under the social insurance law concerning pensions, and social insurance for employees in governmental and public sectors. However, due to their low levels of literacy, economic status and isolation many old people are often unable to claim these rights.

People living with disabilities

In 1996 the number of people living with disabilities was 284,188, or 0.42% of the population; this figure includes people with mental disabilities. About 22% of people with disabilities in Egypt are under 15 years, thus specialized childcare and educational institutions are of major importance. Children with physical and mental disabilities experience significant problems in schooling, and the 2000 Demographic and Health Survey indicated that of 60,000 children, only 5% were enrolled in primary education. Though the number of rehabilitation centres for children has increased over the last two decades, both their quality and quantity remain inadequate. A study at a rehabilitation school among children aged 9-12 years showed that the children suffered from physical, emotional and in some cases sexual abuse as well as deprivation of love and care.167 The Ministry of Health and Population is planning to expand the number of quality rehabilitation centres especially in deprived areas. The health care system in Egypt is not geared

162 Cairo Demographic Center and CAPMAS, 2002, "Population Projections in Egypt" 163 Nandakumar, A.K., El-Adawy, Maham, Cohen Marc A., "Perception of Health Status and Limitations in Activities of Daily living among the Egyptian Elderly" 164 Ibidem. 165 MOISA, Statistical Indicators, Cairo, MOISA, 1997 166 Hegazy, Ezzat, Institutional Care for Elders: Elders' Houses, The National Review of Social Sciences, Vol. 38, No. 2, May 2001(in Arabic) 167 UNICEF Egypt, Childhood and Motherhood Report, 2000

89 to the early detection of physical and mental disabilities, and families looking after someone living with a disability face difficulties in getting appropriate health services, particularly in rural areas.

Duty-bearer capacity and response

Egypt’s Population Strategy 2001-2017 sets out to provide integrated health care for children with special needs, including establishing a surveillance system. This has not yet been implemented. The Ministry of Insurance and Social Affairs is in charge of the rehabilitation centres and provides devices, tricycles, and hearing devices in addition to physiotherapy. Though the civil society response to people living with disabilities is weak, there are a number of NGOs which have several programs targeting children with special needs, such as the Coptic Evangelical Organization for Social Services, Caritas Egypt, the Integrated Care Association as well as the Red Crescent Association. In all these respects there is a need to create mechanisms or monitoring the quality assurance of all care institutions, especially those that serve children with disabilities.

90 A Framework for UN System Support to Egypt and Priority Areas for the UNDAF 2007-2011

The UNDAF mid term impact evaluation that took place in late 2004 confirmed the relevance of the UN strategy and interventions in the areas of poverty reduction, governance and environmental sustainability, as well as their alignment with national development priorities. The UN contributed to achieve greater impact in key areas of development, such as supporting decentralization, promoting greater access to information, reducing gender disparity, advancing human rights and protecting the most vulnerable in society. In addition, several UN agencies are already following a rights based approach in the implementation of their projects.

With a view to sustain the positive results obtained so far and in light of the large presence of the UN system in the country and the related coordination challenges, the future UNDAF will have to ensure that the potential for joint work is fully exploited.

Strengthening human and state capabilities

The United Nations Common Country Assessment highlights two complementary dimensions of Egypt’s development paradigm at the start of the 21st century. The analysis in this report demonstrates how human capability deficits and state capability deficits feed upon each other to create obstacles to parts of Egyptian society reaching the Millennium Development Goals. These deficits have become the defining impediments separating those who will reach a standard of living comparable or beyond the requisites of the MDGs and those who will find themselves far behind the MDG benchmarks and aspirations. The CCA clearly shows how this delineation of MDG aspirations cuts across the nation, separating the citizens of Lower Egypt who can enjoy the benefits of economic growth and the citizens of Upper Egypt who struggle to lift themselves out of poverty.

Deficits in human capabilities include the inability of one-third of Egyptians to read and write, the thousands of men and women who cannot find decent work because they have no marketable skills, the vulnerablility of the poor to different kinds of illness due to poor diet and nutrition deficiency, the socio- cultural factors preventing women from competing on equal terms as men in the job market or the dearth of confidence among citizens to play an active role in local and national politics. On the other hand the state needs to be strengthened in a variety of areas to ensure that it can function in line with supporting the public interest and move towards greater government efficiency and efficacy. This means reforming the civil service to ensure the delivery of services to citizens as well as communicating clearly so that citizens can become partners in the government’s programme, ensuring that state and society has a shared vision of how to reach the MDGs. In addition the state needs to adopt a mode of operation which can respond to the ebbs and flows of a changing society, managing the impacts of globalization and helping Egyptian business to plug into the global economy. Experience shows that the adoption of democracy, decentralized government and political pluralism are the main ingredients that can help a society towards these goals.

Finally the CCA shows that achieving the MDGs must be based on a platform of human rights norms and principles, which both help guide the course of future action, while also acting as the standard by which all actions will be judged. In this respect measures must be taken to build the capacities of state institutions to enable them to be active agents in society, and allow them to become true duty-bearers based on universal human rights values. As such the state needs to have the capabilities which will enable it to build the human capacities and skills of citizens so that they can fulfill their potential, while supporting the legitimate rights of all claim-holders in Egyptian society. Inherent in the human rights

91 approach, taken by this report, is the philosophy that satisfied claim-holders have a higher chance of becoming productive stakeholder citizens, who are less dependent on the state and better able to be partners in advancing the economic prosperity of their communities. This common UN assessment of Egypt’s development situation shows that deficits in both human and state capabilities requires intensive and urgent support if all Egyptians are to benefit from the achievement of the MDGs. For the UN this will mean prioritizing initiatives which strengthen the capabilities of citizen and state to help Egyptians achieve the MDGs in every region of the country and emphasise the importance of locally empowered and decentralized development.

92 Areas for UNDAF prioritization

Human Capabilities State Capabilities Education - Knowledge and life skills are the Civil service reform – The modern social contract most powerful tools for the productive citizen. involves the responsibility of the duty-bearers in Good quality education is the cornerstone of all government to deliver social services in support of human capabilities, allowing the individual to be building the human capabilities of citizens. This an independent stakeholder citizen in society and process, which also requires the efficient and a contributor to advancing his/her community. effective management of the local and central state Health – People must be able to have natural administration, depends on a decentralized well- defences against illness through their standard of functioning, transparent and professional civil living and diet, and the option to seek and receive service. good quality healthcare when they require it. Fighting corruption – The rule of law must be the Family planning and reproductive health are key cornerstone for an ordered and cohesive society in elements of this paradigm, with the emphasis on which competing interests can be managed in a the welfare of the mother and child. peaceful and just manner by a “disinterested” state Equality for women – Women must be free and authority, whose only motive is to see the confident to pursue the lives they wish and the predominance of the rule of law without favour or values they cherish. A women’s confidence in bias to any group or individual. society derives from a good education, good External co-operation – The state needs to build its health and the knowledge that she will be treated capacity to optimize external assistance in order to equally to men in all walks of life. support regional development and target those parts Decent work – People need to have the chance of the country in most need. to create secure income opportunities as well as Communication – The state must communicate its the opportunity to seek gainful employment policies and actions so that citizens are able to which will provide the means to build a good understand the changes taking place around them quality of life for themselves and their families. and fully participate in the change process. Child labour must be progressively eliminated. Decentralization - Devolving power and authority Protection for the vulnerable – Society’s to the lowest level of governance is consistent with vulnerable groups are those who are likely to the need to deliver improved development to the have the weakest human capabilities. Thus local level and is seen as a means to create an society needs to ensure that groups such as environment for more meaningful participation of children at risk, working children, people living citizens in development. with and vulnerable to HIV/AIDS, drug users, Territorial strategy – The disparities in Egyptian refugees, the disabled an the elderly have their society and sustainable development require a rights fulfilled and are given the chance to build regional development strategy which addresses the secure livelihoods. major obstacles according to their regional primacy, including human settlements, the upgrading of slums, water and sanitation, land, energy and biodiversity.

93 Essential Linking Elements Democratic participation – citizens have the confidence and opportunity to participate in a fair and transparent political system, while being able to influence decision-making at all levels, so increasing the level of human freedom. Social Contract – State and society are joined in a mutually reinforcing discourse related to claim- holder-duty-bearer relationships, based on a set of commonly understood principles and a shared vision of the nation’s future, aimed at constantly advancing equity and welfare. Rule of Law – The fundamental principles and the capacity to enforce practices regulating standards of conduct in society, to which citizens agree to abide for the sake of the common good. It also involves the state’s ability to translate international agreements into domestic laws and practices which will ensure compliance with global norms.

94 Common Country Assessment Indicators – EGYPT

Sector Contextual Indicators168 Data Year

Demographics169 Population size 69.9 million 2004

Percentage of urban/rural population, respectively 42.8%; 57.2% 2005

Breakdown of population by age170 0-5 11.6% 2005 5-14 26.1% 2005 15-24 20.2% 2005 25-59 36.4% 2005 over 60 15.8% 2005

Male/female share of population, respectively 51.2%; 48.8% 2005

Total fertility rate 3.2 2004

Life expectancy at birth 68.4 2004

Number of registered refugees171 20,561 2005

Number of registered asylum seekers172 10,704 2005 Economy 173 GNI per capita (US$) 1,390 2003

Gross domestic savings as percentage of GDP 14.5% 2003

Growth rate per capita 4.4% FY 2004

Ratio of total trade over GDP Exports 8.5% 2003 Imports 14.8% 2003

Percentage of public expenditure on basic social services over GDP: 174 Education 5.2% 2001-02 Health 1.9% 2001-02 Social security benefits 2,5% 2001-02 Governance Number of civil servants175 5.5 million 2005

Number of registered NGOs176 18,622 2005

Percentage of voters in the latter Localities elections177 42.4% 2002

Percentage of voters in the latter People’s Assembly elections178 24.1% 2000

Human Human Development Index 0.659 2003 Development179 Human Development Index Rank 119/177 2003

168 Where no footnote indicates otherwise, data are drawn from the Millennium Development Goals Second Country Report for Egypt 2004 169 CAPMAS 2005 170 Population Projections in Egypt. Cairo Demographic Center and CAPMAS, 2002 171 UNHCR Refugee Population in Egypt Statistics. Monthly update, July 2005 172 UNHCR Refugee Population in Egypt Statistics. Monthly update, July 2005 173 World Bank World Development Indicators, April 2005, except where otherwise indicated 174 Egypt Human Development Report 2004 175 CAPMAS 2005 176 Annual Arab Strategic Report 2004-2005, Al Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, 2004-05 (Arabic) 177 Egypt Human Development Report 2004, percentages have to be considered as in relation to the number of registered voters 178 Egypt Human Development Report 2004 179 Egypt Human Development Report 2005

95 MDG/Conference Goal Target180 Indicators Data Year Income-Poverty Eradicate Halve, between 1990 and Poverty headcount ratio (percentage of extreme poverty 2015, the proportion of population below lower national poverty people whose income is less line) 16.74% 1999-2000 than $1 dollar a day Poverty line at US$1/day PPP headcount 0.682% 1999-2000

Poverty gap 0.073% 1999-2000

Subjective Poverty Incidence181 31.8% 2002

Human Poverty Index182 30.9% 2003 Food Security and nutrition Eradicate hunger Halve between 1990 and Prevalence of (severely) underweight 2015, the proportion of children under five years of age 8.6% 2003 people who suffer from hunger Stunting Rate183 (severe and moderate) 25% 2004-2005

Wasting rate184 (severe and moderate) 4.9% 2004-2005

Underweight Rate185 (severe and 12.4% 2004-2005 moderate) Education Achieve Ensure that, by 2015, Net enrolment ratio in primary M:99% 2003-2004 universal children everywhere, boys education F: 95% primary and girls alike, will be able to education186 complete a full course of Net enrolment ratio in preparatory M: 98% 2003-2004 primary schooling education F: 95%

Net enrolment ratio in secondary M: 79% 2003-2004 education F: 77%

Adult literacy rate (+15)187 69.4% 2002 Gender equality and women’s empowerment Promote gender Eliminate gender disparity in Female-male ratio in189 equality and primary and secondary Primary education 93.2% 2000/01 empower education, preferably by Secondary education 94.9 % 2000/01 women188 2005, and to all levels of Tertiary and university education 91.2% 2000/01 education no later than 2015 Ratio of literate females to males age 15-24 85.5% 2001 Eliminate discriminatory Share of women in wage employment practices in employment in the non-agricultural sector 20.6 % 2001

Equitable access to political Proportion of seats held by women in institutions (Fourth World national Parliament190 Conference on Women) People’s Assembly 2.9% 2005 Shura Council 6.8% 2005

Registered women voters of total 37.8% 2004 registered voters 191

180 Targets as of the MDGs or Millennium Declaration unless otherwise indicated 181 Subjective Poverty and Social Capital- Towards a Comprehensive Strategy to reduce Poverty, UNDP 2003 182 Subjective Poverty and Social Capital- Towards a Comprehensive Strategy to reduce Poverty, UNDP 2003 183 Vulnerability and Food Subsidy Survey, WFP and Ministry of Supply and Internal Trade, April 2005 184 Ibidem 185 Ibidem 186 CAPMAS statistics 2004 unless otherwise indicated 187 Egypt Human Development Report 2004 188 Data for this section drawn from Egypt Human Development Report 2004 189 Egypt Human Development Report 2003 190 National Council for Women 2005 191 Beijing + 10- Arab Republic of Egypt, National Council for Women

96 MDG/Conference Goal Target192 Indicators Data Year

Child mortality and welfare Reduce child Reduce by two thirds, Under five mortality rate per 1000 live births 45.7 2003 mortality 193 between 1990 and 2015, the under-five Infant mortality rate per 1000 live births 38 2003 mortality rate Reproductive and maternal health Improved Reduce by three Maternal mortality ratio per 100,000 live births 68.9 % 2002 maternal health quarters, between and reduced 1990 and 2015, the Proportion of births attended by skilled health maternal maternal mortality personnel 69.4% 2003 mortality194 ratio HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases Combat Have halted by 2015 Prevalence rate, estimated cases 12,000 HIV/AIDS and begun to reverse corresponding to incidence195 < 0,0001% 2004 the spread of HIV/AIDS Combat Malaria Have halted by 2015 Prevalence rates of population with and other major and begun to reverse Tuberculosis per 100,000196 36 cases 2003 diseases the incidence of Malaria and other Prevalence rate of Hepatitis C (antibody)197 6% 2005 major disease Employment Creation of full Universal access to Unemployment rate employment 198 paid employment Urban 14.4% 2004 (WSSD) Rural 8.4% 2004 Total 10.6% 2004 Environment Ensure Integrate the Land area protected to maintain biological 10% 2005 environmental principles of diversity200 sustainability 199 sustainable development into Carbon Dioxide (CO2) Emissions per capita country policies and (metric tons) 201 2.1 tons 2001 programs and reverse the loss of environmental resources Halve by 2015 the Proportion of population with sustainable proportion of people access to an improved water source202 without sustainable Urban 100% 2003 access to safe Rural 80% 2003 drinking water Annual per capita share of fresh water203 834 m3 2002

Daily per capita share of drinking water (covering over 90% population) 204 275 L 2005

192 Targets as of the MDGs or Millennium Declaration unless otherwise indicated 193 Egypt Interim Demographic and Health Survey 2003 194 Egypt Human Development Report 2004 195 UNAIDS Global AIDS Report 2004 196 “Global Tuberculosis Control: surveillance, planning, financing” WHO Report 2005 197 Ministry of Health and Population 2005 198 CAPMAS Statistical Yearbook 2004 199 Egypt Interim Demographic and Health Survey 2003 unless otherwise indicated 200 “The Status of Environment in Egypt” , The Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency, (Arabic), May 2005 201 In comparison, in Mexico 3.7 metric tons of CO2 emissions per capita have been registered in the year 2002United Nations Statistic Division- Millennium Indicators - Egypt (http://unstats.un.org) 202 Egypt Human Development Report 2004. It should be noted that the methodology used globally to measure this indicator is often criticized for not providing a realistic picture. 203 Hagan, Ross. E.., “The Multi-faceted Dimension of Water in Egypt”. Working Paper, USAID, Cairo Egypt, 2002 204 The Status of Environment in Egypt” , The Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency (Arabic), May 2005

97 MDG/Conference Goal Target205 Indicators Data Year Ensure By 2020 to have Proportion of population with access to modern environmental achieved a significant flush toilet sustainability improvement in the Urban 67.8% 2003 lives of at least 100 Rural 13% 2003 million slum dwellers Proportion of population with access to public sewer system Urban 84.6% 2003 Rural 21.7% 2003

Slum population as percentage of urban 206 39.9% 2001

205 Targets as of the MDGs or Millennium Declaration unless otherwise indicated 206 United Nations Statistic Division- Millennium Indicators - Egypt (http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mi/mi_results.asp?crID=818&fID=r15)

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99 General Bibliography

A Detrimental Education in Egypt (Golia, Maria, ‘The Daily Star’, Cairo, October 21, 2004)

Achieving the Two aims of Export Enhancement and Job Creation: the Case of Egypt (Ghoneim, Farouk Ahmed, January 2005)

Analytical Review of Recent Development Literature on Egypt with a focus on Poverty Report No. 2 (ERF, Jan. 2005)

Annual Report 2003/2004 (Central Bank of Egypt)

Annual Arab Strategic Report 2004-2005 (Arabic) (Al Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, 2005)

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Assessment of the HIV/AIDS Situation and Response in Egypt, MOHP National AIDS Programme, (Expanded Theme Group on HIV/AIDS, 2004)

Beijing + 10 (National Council for Women, Cairo, 2005)

Building Digital Bridges – Egypt’s Vision of the Information Society (Ministry of Telecommunications & Information Technology)

Cairo Air Quality Profile (Nasralla, Mahmoud, Egyptian Environmental Policy Program, Cairo, 2001)

Childhood and Motherhood Report (UNICEF Egypt, 2000)

Climate Change and Protection of the Ozone Layer, (Ministry of State for Environmental Affairs, Cairo, 2005)

Compendium of International Legal Instruments on Corruption (United Nations, New York, 2005)

Comprehensive Environmental Analysis 1992-2002 (World Bank, Cairo, February 2005)

Consideration of Reports submitted by States Parties under Article 40 of the Covenant, Third and Fourth Periodic Reports of Egypt (UNCHR, October 2002)

Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt and its Complementary Laws (Al Amirah Publishing House, Cairo, 1999)

Cost Assessment of Environmental Degradation in Egypt (World Bank, Cairo, August 2002)

Country Co-operation Strategy for WHO and Egypt 2005-2009 (WHO, Cairo, 2005)

Country Profile: Poverty, Employment and Policy-making in Egypt (El-Ehwany, Naglaa; El-Laithy, Heba, Cairo, 2001)

100 Democracy in Egypt (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, Cairo, 2005)

Democracy in Egypt: Women’s Political Participation, the Development of Political Party Life and Democratic Elections (Draft Working Paper by IntIDEA, 2005)

Development Cooperation Report (UNDP, Cairo, 2004)

Development of Egyptian Political System (1803-1999) (Helal, Alie, Center of Political Studies and Research, Cairo, 1999)

Economic Indicators during the First Half of 2004/2005 (Ministry of Planning, Cairo, February 2005)

Egypt Agricultural Strategy Document (FAO/UNDP/WB/Ministry of Agriculture)

Egypt and the Millennium Development Goals-Challenges and Opportunities (El Saharty, Sameh; Chase, Susan; Richardson, Gail, World Bank, 2005)

Egypt Common Country Assessment (UN, Cairo, 2001)

Five Years Plan and Long Term Vision (GoE)

Freedom House, Egypt Country Profile [http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2003/countryratings/egypt.html]

Egypt Country Profile - The Road Ahead for Egypt (Economic Research Forum, Cairo, December 2004)

Egypt Country Report (The Economist Intelligence Unit, May 2004)

Egypt- Greater Cairo Urban Development Project (World Bank, A Staff Appraisal Report, Washington D.C., 1982)

Egypt Human Development Report 2004 (UNDP/Ministry of Planning, Cairo, 2004)

Egypt Interim Demographic and Health Survey 2003 (El Zanaty, Fatma; Way, Ann A., Cairo, Ministry of Health and Population/ National Population Council/El Zanaty and Associates/ORC Macro, 2004)

Egypt Investment Climate Assessment, 2005 (World Bank, Cairo, 2005)

Egypt National Council for Human Rights - First Annual Report 2004-2005 (Cairo, 2005)

Egypt Report on Assessment of the ICPD Programme of Action (PoA) 1994- 2004 (UNFPA, Cairo, 2005)

Egypt: Country Profile on Municipal Management (World Bank, 2004)

Egypt: Macro-economics Performance and Poverty, 1965- 2000 (GTZ)

Egypt’s Combined Fourth and Fifth Repot to the CEDAW Committee (2001)

Egypt’s ICPD Report (2005)

Egypt-Energy and Environment Review (World Bank, Cairo, 2003)

101

Employment in Small Enterprises: A Contribution to Egypt’s Employment Policy (El Mahdi, Alia, Cairo, January 2005)

Energy in Egypt (OEP annual reports)

Energy Statistics for non-OECD Countries (OECD)

Enhancing Competitiveness for SMEs in Egypt, General Framework and Action Plan’ (Ministry of Finance, Cairo, November 2004)

Evaluation of Two Components of the National Youth Programme (De Gobbi, Maria Sabrina, January 2004)

FAO Outlook No.1 (April 2005)

Gender Assessment: Egypt (World Bank, 2003)

Governance Profile of Egypt (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, December 2004)

Government Statement to the People’s Assembly (Address to the People’s Assembly by H.E. Mr. Ahmed Nazif, Prime Minister, December 2004)

Human Development Report 2000 (UNDP, New York, 2000)

Human Development Report 2003 (UNDP, New York, 2003)

Human Rights Matrix (NCW, 5th National Women’s Conference, 2005)

In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All - Secretary General Report (UN, New York, March 2005)

Institutional Care for Elders: Elders' Houses (The National Review of Social Sciences, Ezzat Hegazy, Vol. 38, No. 2, May 2001, Arabic)

Internationally - Recognized Core Labour Standards in Egypt. Report for the WTO General Council Review of the Trade Policies in Egypt (Geneva, 26 and 28 July 2005)

Knowledge and Practices of Egyptian workers towards HIV/AIDS (El Sayed, Egypt National AIDS Programme, 2002)

Labour Market Analysis and Macroeconomic Framework: Policies and Incentives for Increasing Employment in Egypt (El Ehwany, Naglaa, Cairo University, November 2004)

Law on Non Governmental Organizations no. 84 of 2002 (Al Amiriah Publishing House, Cairo, 2003)

Metropolitan Planning and Management in The Developing World: Spatial Decentralization policy in Bombay and Cairo (UN HABITAT, Nairobi, 1993)

Millennium Development Goals Second Country Report – Egypt 2004 (United Nations/ Ministry of Planning, 2005)

102

National Action Plan for Combating Desertification (Hegazi, A.M.; El Bagouri, I. H., Desert Research Center, Cairo, 2002)

National Agricultural Strategy 2003-2017

National Human Development Report 2003 (UNDP, Cairo, 2003)

National Human Development Report 2004 (UNDP, Cairo, 2004)

National Youth Aspirations Survey 2004 (National Council for Women/UNDP, Cairo, 2004)

Perception of Health Status and Limitations in Activities of Daily living among the Egyptian Elderly (A.K. Nandakumar, Maha El-Adawy, Marc A. Cohen, in: http://www.hsph.harfard.edu/publication/pdf/no-79.PD)

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Policy of Poverty and Inequality alleviation according to Gender in The Arab Region (Heba El-Laithy, 2003, at: http://www.APF.org.jo, Arabic)

Policies to Stimulate Employment and Raise Productivity in the Informal Sector (Kamel Rizk, Soad, January 2005)

Population Growth and Policies in Mega Cities-Cairo (United Nations, Department of International Economic and Social Affairs, Population Policy Paper No.34, New York, 1990)

Population Projections in Egypt (Cairo Demographic Center and CAPMAS, 2002)

Poverty Reduction Indicative Strategy (World Bank, Cairo, 2005)

Poverty Reduction Strategy for Egypt (World Bank/ Ministry of Planning, Cairo, September 2004)

Poverty, Employment and Policy Making (ILO, 2001)

Prevention on HIV/AIDS Programme for Secondary Level Students (Shokr, Ein Shams University, Cairo, 2002)

Rapid Assessment of Trends and Patterns and Drug Abuse in Egypt (UNODC, Cairo, 2001)

Regional Human Development Reports on 7 Governorates (UNDP/DANIDA/Ministry of Local Development)

Regularizing the Informal land Development Process, Vol.1 (Serageldin, Mona, Office of Housing and Urban Programs, USAID, Washington D.C., 1991)

Seminar on Streamlining the Informal Sector into the Formal Economic Framework (Hassanein, Medhat, Public Policy Series, PARC, Cairo University, May 2000)

103 SMEs Adjusting to Trade Liberalization: Impact on Employment (Abdel Latif, Lobna M., Cairo, January 2005)

Social and Psychological Attributes of Street Child (El Kurdy, Maha, ‘The National Review of Social Services’, Vol. 39, No. 2, Cairo, May 2002)

Social Expenditure and the Poor in Egypt (Galal, Ahmed, ECES, Cairo, November 2003)

Social Variables Related to Child Labour in Rural Areas (Adel Fattah, Amany, Ain Shams University, Cairo, 1994)

Statistical Indicators (Ministry Of International and Social Affairs, Cairo, 1997)

Street Children in Cairo (Arab Council for Childhood and Development, 2000)

Subjective Poverty and Social Capital Study in Egypt (UNDP/MOP/DANIDA, Cairo, 2003)

Success Story, Gender Mainstreaming (NCCM/UNICEF/UNFPA/UNESCO/UNDP/WB/ILO NCW, 2004)

Tanning Industry Survey, Informal Sector - Abo El Seoud Area Old Cairo (El Zanaty, Fatma, January 2005)

The Annual Report on Civil Society and the Democratic Transformation in the Arab World during 2003 (Mansour, Sherif; Ibn Khaldon Center for Developmental Studies, Cairo, 2003)

The Arab World Competitiveness Report 2005 (World Economic Forum, 2005)

The Budgetary Cost of Subsidies in Egypt: Structure and Trends (Internal World Bank Report, 2005)

The Conclusions and Recommendations of the National Tripartite Symposium on Employment Policy in Egypt (Cairo, 16-17 January 2005)

The Day the Gloves Came Off (Cairo Magazine, 2-8 June 2005)

The Economics of Formalization: The Potential Winners and Losers from Formalization in Egypt (Galal, Ahmed, Egyptian Centre for Economic Studies, Working Paper No. 95, March 2004)

The Effect of the Characteristics of Membership on the Effectiveness of Legislative Functions of the People’s Assembly 1995-2000 (Fathi, Yasser, Cairo University, 2004)

The Effect of Party Affiliations on the Effectiveness of the Oversight Function of the Peoples’ Assembly (2000-2002) (Mohamed, Iman, Faculty of Economics & Political Science, Cairo University, Cairo, 2004)

The Multi-faceted Dimension of Water in Egypt (Hagan, Ross. E., Working Paper, USAID, Cairo, Egypt, 2002)

The National Plan for Education for All (2002/2003 – 2015-2016) (Cairo, February 2004)

The Poverty- Growth Inequality Triangle: With Some Reflections on Egypt (Bourguignon, François, ECES, Cairo, 2005)

104

The Role of Society in Supporting the Democratic Culture in Egypt (Hanan, Youssef, FNST, Cairo, 2005)

The Situation of Human Rights in Egypt: Annual Report (Yousri, Mostafa, Egyptian Organization for Human Rights, Cairo, 2002)

Towards a New Balance between Labor Market Flexibility and Employment Security for Egypt (De Gobbi, Maria Sabrina, January 2005)

Turning Point in Reform (Nafie, Ibrahim, Al Ahram Weekly, 3-9 March 2005)

United Nations Learning Needs Assessment Survey on HIV/AIDS (HIV/AIDS Learning Team, Cairo 2005)

United Nations World Population Prospects: the 2002 Revision Population Database

Vulnerability and Food Subsidy Study (WFP/ Ministry of Supply and Internal Trade, Cairo, April 2005)

105