Latin America Program Institute

Brazil as a Regional Power: Views from the Hemisphere

Introduction Cynthia Arnson and Paulo Sotero

Over the last decade, Brazil has played an increasingly prominent role in both hemispheric and global affairs. The examples abound: since 2004, Brazil has led the Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), played a central role in the 2009 Honduran crisis, and was instrumental in the creation of both the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) and a new forum of Latin American and Caribbean countries. Brazil’s economic performance surely plays a role in the country’s enhanced regional and global quest for leadership. Now the 8th largest economy in the world, Brazil’s GDP has expanded at an average rate of 4.2 percent since 2003 and is expected to grow at an even higher rate over the next decade.1 By the end of 2009, Bra- zil’s economy represented 40 percent of the total Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of Latin America and the Caribbean, and 55 percent of the GDP of South America alone.2 Brazil’s rise is reflected in its involvement on critical issues of global governance such as climate change, reform of the international financial architecture, food security, commodities trading, and international security; in the latter category was the Brazilian govern- ment’s controversial attempt, along with Turkey, to broker a deal between Teheran

1 Source: DBRS chart based on Central Bank of Brazil numbers in “Response to Financial Tax Ruling Key to Brazil’s Credit Ratings,” January 2008, http://dbrs.info/research/217861/response-to-financial-tax-ruling-key- to-brazil-s-credit-ratings.pdf.

2 According to International Monetary Fund figures, Brazil’s GDP is 54.94 percent of South America’s total and 39.6 percent of the total for Latin America and the Caribbean. See IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2010, Report for Selected Countries, Gross domestic product, current prices (U.S. dollars). and the five permanent members of country’s attitudes toward the rest of the hemi- the United Nations Security Council sphere. A second section focuses on Argentine, over Iran’s nuclear program. Bolivian, Colombian, and Venezuelan percep- What is Brazil’s view of itself, its role tions of and responses to Brazil’s rise as a re- in the region, and its relations with its gional power. Third, scholars consider Brazil’s neighbors in the Western Hemisphere? In relations with , , and the terms of its place within the region, what Caribbean, highlighting the country’s role in Haiti does Brazil want and why? Can the giant of and its close ties with a Cuba in transition as South America consolidate its position as re- key elements of its exercise of “soft power.” The gional leader, given domestic constraints and concluding section, on Brazilian-U.S. attitudes resistance from its neighbors? Does Brazil see toward one another, anticipates the conflict- its immediate neighborhood as platform for its ing views of the relationship—from the official own global projection onto a rapidly changing American perspective that the two nations have world scene? Seeking answers for these com- national interests that are largely convergent to plex questions, the Woodrow Wilson Center’s the opposite view, dramatically on display in mid- Latin American Program and the Brazil Insti- 2010, when Brasília and Washington clashed tute convened a day-long conference of distin- openly over the Iranian nuclear program. guished foreign policy experts from throughout We are grateful to Program Assistants Renata the hemisphere on March 12, 2010. Historian Johnson and Nikki Nichols of the Brazil Institute Leslie Bethell, professor emeritus at the Universi- and the Latin American Program, respectively, ty of London and a Brazil Institute senior scholar, for their support of conference logistics. We also was instrumental in planning and organizing the wish to thank former Brazil Institute staff mem- conference during a period of residence at the ber Daniel Budny, currently pursuing a Ph.D. in Wilson Center in early 2010. political science at the University of Texas, Aus- This report summarizes the multiple and tin, who provided an initial draft of this report. complex perceptions held by Brazilians as well as a host of other countries in the region re- garding Brazil’s “emergence” as a regional and Brazil’s view of itself global power. The first section considers the and the region views of Brazilian scholars and analysts with respect to their role in the hemisphere. Partici- As an introduction to the first panel on Brazil’s pants reflect on how geography, history, and view of itself, its role in the region, its relations with culture have shaped Brazilians’ perceptions its neighbors in the Western Hemisphere Leslie Leslie Bethell of themselves as members of a neighbor- Bethell, senior scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Cen- hood they have only in recent decades ter, contextualized Brazil’s emergence as a regional begun to incorporate as part of their own power by providing a historical overview of Brazil’s national interest. The historic reluctance relations with both the United States and Spanish of Brazilians to see themselves as Latin America – divided into four broad periods. Americans and the preoccupation that In the first, from the establishment of an inde- the United States could act in South pendent Empire in 1822 to the proclamation of the America in ways that adversely affect republic in 1889, political elites and intellectuals Brazil’s interests emerge as factors did not consider Brazil part of what Spanish Ameri- that—to this day—condition the can governments and intellectuals called América

2 Latina. Except in the Rio de la Plata, Brazil’s rela- Speaking in a personal capacity tions with the Spanish American republics were rather than as a representative of the extremely limited. And Brazil did little to foster its Brazilian government, Minister Achil- relations with the United States. les Zaluar of the Brazilian Embassy in During the second period, from 1889 to the Washington detailed some of the many Second World War, Brazilian governments— historical reasons that Brazil remained dis- and, to a lesser extent, Brazilian intellectuals— tant from its Latin American neighbors for became more interested in establishing close so long and why Brazil’s ties to the United ties with the United States and were enthusi- States cooled after the “unwritten alliance” astic supporters of pan-Americanism. But after period in the first half of the 20th century. To the peaceful resolution of a series of frontier better comprehend Brazilian foreign policy- disputes with its immediate neighbours, Brazil making, particularly the role of Itamaraty, Bra- largely turned its back on the Spanish American zil’s Ministry of External Relations, since the pe- republics once again. Latin America/Spanish riod of the Baron of Rio-Branco (1902–1912), America remained a world apart. Zaluar proposed a thought experiment: imagine During the Cold War, Brazil’s relations with yourself a student of geopolitics from planet Mars the United States became more problematic, in who has just stumbled upon detailed maps of large part due to US neglect. Within the limited the Western Hemisphere in the year 1900. Your room for manoeuvre available to it, Brazil sought first impression of Brazil would most likely be that to develop an independent foreign policy, which the country is blessed with favorable geopoliti- included closer relations with other countries in cal factors—an immense country with rich natu- the Third World. However, this was largely lim- ral resources and navigable rivers, surrounded ited to Africa and Asia; Brazil showed little inter- by 12 smaller nations that, at least individually, est in engaging with the region, Latin America could not plausibly pose a threat. However, per- or South America, in which it was now clearly haps they could, with the help of the larger and the dominant country in terms of territory, popu- far more populated country further north, the lation and GDP. And with the notable exception United States—Brazil’s only potential regional of some prominent politicians and intellectuals rival. This line of reasoning is what led Itamaraty on the Left, most Brazilians still felt little con- in the 20th century to first consolidate national nection to, or identification with, Latin America/ borders through formal treaties and then dis- Spanish America. tance itself from its hispanophone neighbors, In the post-Cold War period, Brazil has be- then enter into an unwritten alliance of mutual come not only more deeply involved in global understanding and détente with the United affairs generally but also for the first time more States, and finally, attract investment and im- Achilles Zaluar engaged, both politically and economically, with migration from Europe as a way to promote its neighbors in South America and, to a lesser national development and counterbalance extent, in Central America and the Caribbean U.S. hegemony. (though not so much Mexico). Brazil has begun Following the Second World War, how- to think of itself, and to some extent to behave, ever, Brazil’s foreign relations underwent as a regional power, at least in South America, as two dramatic shifts. First, the unwritten well as a global power. Partly as a result of this, alliance with the United States col- its relationship with the United States remains lapsed when Brazil felt it had been extremely complex. cast aside. Upon joining the allied

3 war effort and sending 15,000 troops turn, its neighbors refused to concede to Brazil- to the Italian front, Brazil expected ian regional leadership. Brasília preferred to deal the start of a strong U.S.-Brazilian re- with neighbors on an individual, ad hoc basis, es- lationship; instead, U.S. attention—and chewing regional institutions whenever possible. reconstruction funds—centered on Eu- An underlying assumption pervading Brazilian rope, including the former Axis Powers, thinking at the time was that one could become and Japan, not Latin America. In particular, a major power without being a regional power: the underwhelming U.S. response to Brazil- Brazil’s attention was thus elsewhere. ian President Juscelino Kubitschek’s 1958 This regional isolationism was tempered, how- Operação Panamericana—a massive regional ever, by two factors, Spektor argued. First, there financial cooperation plan that was designed were increasing concerns over instability in the rest to be Latin America’s Marshall Plan—hurt the of the region—whether fueled by nationalism or so- Brazilian psyche and led to a change of course. cialism; second, there was the emerging notion that This traumatic abandonment, Zaluar argued, is regionalism could work to Brazil’s national security what began the country’s pronounced drift away advantage. During the 1970s, Brazil’s bureaucratic- from the United States. Brazil began to see itself authoritarian government was an active, albeit re- as a mature, independent nation that was no lon- luctant, participant in the Cold War. Brazil’s military ger in need of securing special relationships with intelligence played a role in Operação Condor, the stronger nations. It was through this very realization multinational military campaign to eradicate radical that the second shift occurred: in distancing itself leftist influence and ideas in the Southern Cone of from the United States, Brazil rediscovered the South America. Brazilian spies infiltrated opposition fact that it had neighbors and began to embrace movements in Bolivia and Uruguay. Declassified the notion that it was a member of Latin America. documents have detailed Brazil’s role in rigging Spurred on in no small part by the flourishing of Uruguay’s 1971 elections and in supporting Chile’s Europe’s regional integration project, Brazil sought military coup d’état in 1973. This did not mean, increased trade and diplomatic ties with the rest however, that Brazil cooperated with the United of Latin America and dreamt up limited economic States. For the most part, Brasília fought the Cold and political integrationist projects that would gen- War unilaterally and on its own terms. erate economies of scale and allow for a stronger Brazil’s clandestine activities were coupled with international presence. a marked increase in regional integration efforts. Matias Spektor, professor of international A new idea began to emerge that engagement relations at Fundação Getúlio Vargas and visit- and cooperation with the region could be used to ing fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, Brazil’s advantage. The idea that the region could Andrew Hurrell traced Brazil’s hesitance to align with the function as a shield from the United States pushed United States and its reluctance to lead the Brazil to set aside earlier antagonisms regarding region back to the Cold War period. Picking its nuclear programs and to put into place the up in the 1970s where Zaluar left off, Spek- foundation for Mercosur, the Southern Common tor noted that Brazil was moving towards Market. This shift in thinking can be understood becoming the strongest power in South as a transition in balance-of-power theory from a America, with over half of the region’s strategy of balancing to one of band-wagoning, population, territory, and wealth. At the Spektor explained. Whereas earlier, Brasília was same time, however, Brazil remained fearful of its smaller neighbors banding together to distant from its neighbors and, in counter Brazil’s growing influence, the newfound

4 understanding was that those same states would of Brazil’s regional involvement increased under not try to resist Brazilian hegemony, but rather Lula, alongside an increase in expectations over concede to it. The reason for this was that balanc- what Brazil could and should achieve. Mercosur ing requires a leader to rally states together, and was re-launched, the Union of South American Argentina—South America’s only potential leader at Nations (UNASUR) was developed, and regional the time—was on the verge of collapse in the 1970s infrastructure activity increased—by 2008 there and thus in no position to counter Brazil’s increas- were over 500 infrastructure projects planned or ing clout. Substantive evidence demonstrating the in the works, totaling almost $70 billion. Alongside consequences of this intellectual transformation can this greater dynamism have been signs of a growing be seen in Brazil’s development of the Itaipu Dam awareness that, as a regional power, Brazil must with Paraguay, its laying of gas pipelines with Bolivia, pay greater attention to the needs and wants of its and its ratification, alongside seven neighbors, of smaller neighbors; there has also been a histori- the Amazon Cooperation Treaty in 1978. cally significant shift in the country’s willingness to Andrew Hurrell, Montague Burton Professor of become more involved multilaterally in regional se- International Relations at Oxford University, looked curity issues (as with Haiti and the South American at the more recent history of Brazil’s foreign rela- Defense Council). tions; he argued that, beginning with Cardoso and There are real limits to what Brazil has been quickening with Lula, the perception has grown that able to achieve, however, noted Hurrell. The coun- Brazil has finally assumed its place as global and try lacks the economic resources to engage in the regional leader. However, this rise to leadership was large-scale provision of regional public goods; its neither historically obvious, not is it unqualified. Un- military power remains limited; domestic political like Zaluar and Spektor, Hurrell noted that, for a opinion on whether the country should play a more long time, it was not at all clear that Brazil would assertive regional role is divided; and it has found it emerge as South America’s leader. Despite its in- difficult to cultivate ‘followership’ in the region and ternal unrest, Argentina remained an economic and a broad acceptance of its role on the part of other military power throughout the 1970s. Up into the regional states. Brasília can only lead if and when 1980s, Brazil accounted only for about one third of South America’s gross domestic product; it was not until later on that Brazil’s economy expanded to …beginning with Cardoso and quick- account for roughly 60 percent of the region’s GDP. ening with Lula, the perception has Politically, the crucial change came with the political grown that Brazil has finally assumed and strategic rapprochement with Argentina in the its place as global and regional leader. 1980s, which was reinforced and consolidated by the economic success of Mercosur in the 1990s. Hurrell pointed to important elements of conti- Andrew Hurrell, Montague Burton Professor of nuity between the policies of the Cardoso and Lula International Relations at Oxford University administrations with respect to the region It was the Cardoso government that spoke of Mercosur as Brazil’s ‘destiny’; that increased Brazil’s involve- its neighbors agree to follow. Brazil’s attitude toward ment in regional support for democracy and conflict regional institutions also remains ambivalent. On the management (as with the Peru-Ecuador conflict); one hand, institutions are potentially important for and that stressed the importance of South rather Brazilian leadership, by structuring interactions, than Latin America. But the scope and intensity setting agendas, and embedding its ideas within

5 regional institutions. On the other hand, regional of U.S. concerns. But decisions are also ambiva- institutions are weak: Mercosur is arguably less co- lent and have unintended consequences, especially herent and effective than it was in the 1990s and when Brazil moves to play the major powers’ game. many of the new institutions are underdeveloped, in Its nuclear policy is ambivalent. no small part due to Brazil’s continued reluctance Guedes da Costa argued that under the intricate to bind itself to international institutions that would bilateral and multilateral non-proliferation measures restrict its autonomy. However, in contrast to earlier negotiated earlier with Argentina and with the In- periods, Brazil cannot escape from deeper involve- ternational Atomic Energy Agency, Brazil would ment in the region and its problems, above all be- likewise have benefited by staking its own ground cause of the increased density of regional links and in the realm of nuclear power, by declining to sign forms of interdependence. the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Signing Thomaz Guedes da Costa, professor of Nation- the Treaty in 1997, he said, may have been a stra- al Security Affairs at the National Defense University, tegic mistake. The diplomatic payoff was less than noted that whether Brazil’s perception of itself within the commercial and technological gains. Measured the Western hemisphere will be characterized by in terms of post-Cold War realpolitik, Guedes da continuity or change does not necessarily depend Costa maintained that Brazil’s political status was on who wins the October 2010 presidential election. not enhanced as a result of its decision to join the Much will depend on how others perceive Brazil Treaty. Brazil’s position contrasts with that of India, and its role in the inter-American and global sys- a non-signatory of the NPT, which reached a nu- tems. Since at least the late 1970s, there has been clear agreement with the U.S. government during remarkable continuity in Brazil’s grand strategy for the George W. Bush administration; the agreement growth and development—pursuit of the aerospace, includes transfer of technology. In the view of for- nuclear, bio-technology, agriculture, mining, oil, and eign policy advisers in the Lula government, Brazil’s ethanol industries—as well as the desire to become earlier decision now threatens the country’s ability a “rule-maker” in the international system. Guedes to enrich and share nuclear fuel unless it observes da Costa noted that the generation of Brazilian de- the NPT Additional Protocol, which the country has cision-makers (“the class of ‘79”) and bureaucrats already announced it will not sign. currently in power were socialized during the period of disappointment with the United States noted by Brazil and Zaluar and Spektor and of perceived constraints created by technology export control regimes of South America advanced countries. Brazil’s role of regional leader in South America In past decades, Brazil has sought to match eco- is not undisputed. As noted by Latin American nomic influence with a prominent role in security Program director Cynthia Arnson, while smaller affairs. It promotes itself as a power broker and as a states such as Bolivia may be inclined to accept moderating actor. It aims to produce changes in the Brasília’s leadership, larger neighbors have chal- international system. For instance, it portrays itself lenged Brazil’s hegemony either openly or dis- as a country that should represent the aspiration of creetly. Hugo Chávez has sought to expand Ven- developing countries in an eventual reform of the ezuela’s influence in the region but has found United Nations Security Council. Brazil has looked ways to exploit Brazilian leadership to advance to Germany, Russia, China, and France, among oth- his own interests. At the same time, historic ri- ers, to pursue strategic partnerships to enhance its valries with Argentina have complicated Brazil’s assertiveness and national security goals, in spite would-be hegemony in the Southern Cone, and

6 ’s strong ties with the United States two countries are limited and diplomatic relations serve to diminish Brazilian influence there. To have been largely inactive until quite recently. In delve further into some of these questions— fact, Venezuela has historically felt threatened including whether Brazil is a regional leader, by its southern neighbor, perpetually afraid that acts like a regional leader, and is perceived as Brazil was interested in expanding northward a regional leader—the second panel explored into the Amazon frontier. This relationship im- Brazil’s growing role in South America as well as proved drastically under Venezuelan President the varied South American responses to more Rafael Caldera in the late 1990s, when Brazil assertive Brazilian leadership. began to be seen as a potential market for oil Michael Penfold, associate professor at the (and a way for Venezuela to diversify its markets Institute for Advanced Studies in Administration and rely less upon the United States). Prior to (IESA) in Caracas, argued that Venezuela has not the recent discoveries of vast amounts of deep- directly challenged Brazil’s increasing leadership water oil deposits off the Brazilian coast, the activity within South America, but rather, has country was projected to need massive amounts found ways to benefit from the country’s lead- of oil imports. Brazil’s newfound energy inde- ership. In the last decade, several regional and pendence, however, has since strengthened international changes worked to Brazil’s benefit Brasília’s hand vis-à-vis Caracas. and helped paved the way for its more active role With the ascent to power of Hugo Chávez in in contemporary South American politics. First, 1998, Venezuela began to use Brazil’s modest in terms of economic growth and development efforts at regional leadership to its own advan- and trade integration, the region is in a much im- tage in two ways. First, Chávez supported Bra- proved situation as compared to the 1990s. This zil’s efforts at South American integration as a worked to Brazil’s favor, as the country was best way to counter-balance U.S. hegemony. Second, positioned to take advantage of the economic Chávez sought to boost Venezuela’s trade rela- upswing: Brazil is among the most important tions and economic integration with Brazil as a foreign direct investors in Latin America today way to replace Colombian economic influence and Brazilian firms are among the most active and imports. However, while Brazil’s ascent investors throughout all Latin America. Second, has helped to advance Chávez’s anti-American for a variety of reasons Mexico plays a far less agenda for South America, Penfold noted that active role in Central America than it did in the Venezuela’s foreign policy has not and will not 1990s, and Brazil adeptly took advantage of the always parallel Brazil’s. This does not bode well ensuing vacuum. Third, in the last decade the for Chávez, as Venezuela needs Brazil far more United States likewise has exerted far less influ- than Brazil needs Venezuela. ence and has been far less of a presence in the The future of South American integration region. This likewise opened up space for Brazil rest upon a solid Argentine-Brazilian political al- to expand its own influence. Finally, the polar- liance, insisted Dante Caputo, special advisor ization around market economic reforms and of the Secretary General of the Organization of the emergence of a new social agenda worked American States and former foreign minister of to Brazil’s benefit as well. The country has em- Argentina. In the beginning of the 1980s, bilat- braced and promoted a number of pragmatic eral relations between Argentina and Brazil were social policies to its receptive neighbors. terrible. As late as December 1983, the Argen- Venezuela does not have a history of deep tine armed forces still saw it necessary to create relations with Brazil. Trade relations between the contingency plans in the event of war with Brazil.

7 The transition to democracy in both comes to relations with Peru, Colombia, and the countries, however, led to an abrupt United States, and pragmatically-driven foreign about-face in bilateral relations. In the policy when it comes to Argentina, Chile, and, span of a few years the two countries particularly, Brazil. This latter strategy had enor- went from being enemies to allies, to mous payoffs in late 2008: the escalation of po- the point where, in 1986, both countries litical tensions between the central government shared with each other the details of their secret uranium enrichment plants. Relations soured again just as fast as Brasília will be confronted with they had improved following the election of increasing tension between its Carlos Menem in 1989. He chose to devel- regional and global aspirations. op a strong political alliance with the United

States at the direct expense of Brazil; the al- liance with Brazil was relegated solely to the Global Leaders Fellow at the University economic realm and thus to the whims of the of Oxford George Gray Molina market. Bilateral relations have yet to recover from this decision. Caputo expressed confi- dence, however, in the rebuilding of a strong po- and the regional opposition over the shape of litical alliance. Relations improved dramatically the new constitution, among other issues, was within a short span of time in the 1980s; it can adroitly defused by Lula’s personal involvement, happen again. What is needed to reestablish a alongside diplomatic support from UNASUR. strong political partnership is political will, not Besides shoring up Evo’s support base in the another set of regional institutions. According to Media Luna region3—the regional opposition Caputo, Latin America has seen the prolifera- largely collapsed after this political standoff— tion of more than enough institutions over the this event also marked a step forward in terms past decade. Brazil’s presidential elections in of Bolivia’s democratic consolidation. It marked late 2010 provide the perfect opportunity to the first time in years that a significant political “reset” bilateral relations. There would be little crisis did not necessitate involvement by the public resistance on the Argentine side; all that Organization of American States. Brazil’s in- is needed is a long-term political partnership volvement did not come without costs, however. between the two countries. Bolivia’s scathed opposition emerged wary and At the heart of Brazilian-Bolivian relations suspicious of Lula, Brazil’s regional leadership, is the intimate friendship between Lula and and Latin America’s multilateral institutions. George Gray Molina Bolivian President Evo Morales, insisted The significance of the Evo-Lula relationship Global Leaders Fellow at the University of to bilateral Bolivian-Brazilian relations is most ap- Oxford George Gray Molina. Bolivia’s di- parent with respect to the natural gas industry plomacy has been quite erratic over the and the anti-narcotics issue. Indeed, the most past two decades, and diplomacy under momentous event of recent times between the Morales has been no exception. For in- two countries was Bolivia’s decision, on the sym- stance, La Paz has engaged in ideo- bolic date of May 1, 2006, to take over Petro- logically-driven foreign policy when it bras-owned natural gas plants. This move ruffled

3 The Media Luna, or “half moon,” refers to a geographical area in eastern Bolivia comprising the provinces of Santa Cruz, Beni, Pando, and Tarija, where opposition to the Morales government is strongest. [Ed.]

8 many Brazilian feathers, as Brazil is, by far, Bo- troublemaking if it wants South livia’s largest market for natural gas exports. Lula America to take seriously its aspi- has gone on the record explaining that he did not rations as regional leader. As is the fight nationalization for a variety of reasons, in- case with many of Brazil’s neighbors, cluding the asymmetric power relations between historically, Brazilian-Colombian rela- the two countries and, more telling, the fact that tions have been defined by mutual in- he could not conceive of a Brazilian metal worker visibility. Despite the fact that the two fighting with a Bolivian Indian—referring to Lula’s countries share a more than 1,000 mile earlier career as a metallurgical worker and Evo’s border in a region of great strategic interest Amerindian ethnicity. The last five years have to Brazil and that both suffer from shared seen the flourishing of a special relationship be- problems of drugs and weapons smuggling, tween the two leaders. Brazil has largely ignored its northern neigh- It is for this reason that Gray Molina believes bor. Colombia, however, is partially to blame Brazil will play an important role in the realm of for these poor relations; Bogotá’s strong al- anti-narcotics as well. Bolivia is the third largest liance with the United States has precluded producer of cocaine in the region and 80 percent the need to establish stronger relations with of Bolivian cocaine destined for Europe and Af- its neighbors. rica now moves through western Brazil. Having Nonetheless, Lula and Colombian President suspended anti-drug operations by the U.S. Drug Álvaro Uribe built a pragmatic partnership dur- Enforcement Administration (DEA), Bolivia is in a ing the 2000s and established the framework for prime position to benefit from a new counternar- what many were calling a “special relationship.” cotics strategy at the multilateral level. Given the Pushed by Lula and by Brazil’s recent embrace of increase in drug-related crime and violence, the regional responsibilities, this political relationship anti-narcotics arena is one in which Brazil could was complemented by a strong recent surge in and should exert its regional leadership. economic relations. For example, bilateral trade Brazil might be an emerging global power, but, more than quadrupled from 2003 to 2008; the as far as Bolivia is concerned, Brazil is already Colombian Air Force bought 25 Brazilian-made an established regional power. However, Gray Super Tucano counter-insurgency airplanes; Molina argued that Brasília will be confronted and Brazil was Colombia’s third largest foreign with increasing tension between its regional and investor in 2007. The intensified relationship global aspirations. These dual roles will necessar- culminated in mid-2009 with the signing of a ily demand conflicting stances, assurances, and bilateral defense accord to share military in- actions over the formal norms and procedures formation, engage in joint training exercises, undergirding international relations. Wary of hege- facilitate border surveillance, and, most im- Arlene B. Tickner mons like all small countries, Bolivia nonetheless portantly, permit both sides to fly into the remains hopeful that Brazil’s regional and global other’s airspace. leadership will be marked by an adherence to Bilateral relations began to unravel, strong multilateral institutionalism. however, when, in October 2009, Co- Arlene B. Tickner, professor of interna- lombia signed an agreement with the tional relations at Bogotá’s Universidad de United States allowing U.S. personnel los Andes, argued that Brazil needs both to to be stationed at various Colombian take on a more active role vis-à-vis Colombia’s military bases. Tickner argued that internal conflict and to stand up to Chávez’s Colombia was taken aback and

9 deeply disappointed by Brazil’s Olga Pellicer, professor of international staunch disapproval of the seem- studies at the Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo ingly innocuous agreement, because de México, argued that Mexico may well see of the Uribe administration’s misreading Brazil as South America’s leader. That said, and misunderstanding of Brasília’s inten- however, in terms of Latin America, Mexico be- tions with its northern neighbor and its lieves it most certainly plays a key role as well. distrust of the United States. While it was Mexico is the second largest country in Latin true that Brazil had sought improved ties America and its income per capita is far higher with Bogotá, it was incorrect on Colombia’s than that of Brazil’s. In a telling comment on the part to see this as support for the govern- earlier panels, Pellicer noted that Mexico had ment against guerrilla insurgents. Much to been largely ignored in the discussion; this is the dismay of Bogotá, Brazil—like most of its largely the perception of Mexico from Brasília neighbors—is reluctant to label the Revolu- as well. Following passage of the North Ameri- tionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) a can Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Brazil has terrorist group. Likewise, Colombia incorrectly shifted the terms of the debate to limit regional assumed that Brazil would be more support- integration to South America at the expense of ive of an increased U.S. presence in Colombia, Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean. in part as a way of counterbalancing Chávez’s Pellicer claimed that this move was deeply re- increasing influence in the region. Such misun- sented by Mexico, which has since felt as if it is derstandings are telling of Colombia’s weak grasp being excluded from the rest of Latin America. of Brazil’s intentions and also of both countries’ Furthermore, this rivalry is too deep-seated and divergent interests—a potential issue hampering consequential to be ignored by Brazil: Mexico Brazil’s regional aspirations. has been central to the effort to block reform that would allow for an enlargement of perma- nent members of the United Nations Security Brazil’s Relations Council, something that would likely result in with Mexico, Central Brazil’s being offered a permanent seat. In the past year, however, there have been ef- America, and forts to turn this rivalry into one of mutual partner- the Caribbean ship. Lula and Mexican President Felipe Calderón negotiated the beginning of a strategic economic Beyond its South American “backyard,” Bra- alliance following a bilateral meeting in Cancún, zil has also played a leadership role within Mexico, in February 2010. This alliance reflects Arturo Cruz, Jr. the greater Latin American region. Director a deeper understanding concerning investment, of the Brazil Institute Paulo Sotero high- joint ventures, and economic cooperation. Most lighted Brazil’s increasing interest and importantly, it holds forth the possibility of a free growing presence in Mexico, Central trade agreement between Latin America’s two America, and the Caribbean. In particu- largest economies that still have surprisingly poor lar, he noted that Brazil has established economic relations (with the exception of Mexi- relations and opened embassies in can direct investment in Brazil) and engage in each and every Caribbean country, limited bilateral trade. Whether or not the alliance far surpassing the U.S. diplomatic succeeds is another question. Factors influenc- presence in the region. ing its possible success include whether the two

10 countries can find common ground given their President Daniel Ortega, there has many divergent features. For instance, whereas not been a strengthening of po- Mexico’s external relations are dominated by the litical relations between Brasília and fact that its neighbor is a superpower, Brazil has Managua; however, Brazil is increas- far more leeway. Eighty percent of Mexico’s trade ingly interested in solidifying economic is with the United States and approximately 20 ties. Cruz noted that Lula has recently million Mexicans live north of the U.S.-Mexican decided to take a gamble on Nicaragua border. Brazil, on the other hand, is South-ori- with the announcement of a $600 million ented and characterized by far more diversified investment for construction of Tumarín— trade relations. Additionally, Mexico has opened Nicaragua’s soon-to-be largest hydropower its economy while Brazil has opted to remain project with an energy generation capacity closed. Politically, however, Mexico has been of up to 220 megawatts. Even so, Venezu- more insular and inward-oriented, while Brazil elan aid to Nicaragua means that Brazil is has embraced wholeheartedly its role as an not the only regional power to have influence emerging global power. in Managua. According to Pellicer, Brazil needs Mexico’s Brazil’s regional leadership is less contest- assistance if it wants to lead Latin America. To- ed in , Cruz continued. The global gether, their influence would be great enough economic crisis has been hard on El Salvador, to find pacific solutions to ongoing regional dis- which was struggling before the crisis even putes and to push forward a Latin American hit. Yet, despite sluggish economic growth, agenda through multilateral institutions. The a quickly rising public debt, the curtailing of possibility for such an economic and political electricity subsidies, and deteriorating citizen alliance, however, is not great. Obstacles pre- security, President has enjoyed venting this potential partnership from coming approval ratings above 75 percent. One reason to fruition include the lack of political momen- for this, Cruz hypothesized, is Lula himself and tum in Brazil, the fact that the private sector and the increased Brazilian influence in San Salva- the media are not yet on board with this largely dor. Lula’s model of macroeconomic stability political elite-driven initiative, and that, as of alongside poverty reduction has resonated in now, the two countries’ stances on a number the country. Tangibly, the Banco Nacional of issues are too far apart to be bridged easily. de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social Arturo Cruz, Jr., of INCAE Business School (BNDES), Brazil’s state development bank, in Nicaragua and Costa Rica, argued that one has extended offers to finance the replace- must disaggregate Central America in order to ment of buses for El Salvador’s public trans- truly understand the extent to which Brazil is portation system; Brazilian construction Olga Pellicer a regional leader there. For instance, Brazil’s firms have won grants to build four new presence and influence in Honduras and Ni- hospitals; and the Brazilian government caragua are far less visible and tangible than is is extending technical assistance in the the case for El Salvador. One should not infer hopes of establishing an ethanol agree- from the fact that deposed President Manuel ment with the country. Zelaya sought refugee in the Brazilian Embassy El Salvador’s closer relations with in Tegucigalpa that the Brazilian government is Brazil—as opposed to Venezuela— actively engaged in Honduras. Given the ideo- have thus meant good relations with logical divide between Lula and Nicaraguan the United States. In addition, Lula

11 has had a personal role in Salvadoran exercises power only within the UN context. This politics and has a strong relationship relationship may ultimately help Brazil in its quest with Funes. Funes’ Brazilian wife (she for a seat in a reconfigured Security Council, is now a naturalized Salvadoran citizen), something that is now on the radar screen of many Vanda Pignato, served as the Workers of the permanent five members. Party representative in Central America. Lula has visited Havana on four separate oc- Lula is among the factors, Cruz argued, casions since taking office. The reasons for this that have helped steer Funes in the direc- are three-fold. First, expressing adoration for the tion of Brazilian-style social democratic left- Castro brothers and denouncing the U.S. em- ism. More broadly, Lula has also been cru- bargo helps Lula reinforce his radical base back cial in helping persuade the Farabundo Martí home and shore up his support throughout Latin National Liberation Front (FMLN) to recognize America. Second, Brazil has an economic agenda the limits of Chávez and his radical brand of for the island nation: Brazil is Cuba’s fourth largest Latin American leftism. Chávez has been Bra- trading partner. On his latest trip, Lula announced zil’s only real obstacle to regional leadership, loans worth $950 million to be used for food, ag- argued Cruz, since Mexico is no longer the rel- ricultural investment, and the modernization of evant player in Central America that it once was, the Cuban port of Mariel. Beyond solidarity and and the United States has, by and large, chosen economic self-interest, however, lies Brazil’s stra- to ignore the region. tegic effort at increasing its global clout, added Brazil’s regional leadership in the Caribbean Mendelson Forman. is best encapsulated in its positions on Cuba and Despite the importance of Brazil’s relationship Haiti, explained Johanna Mendelson Forman, with Cuba, Brazil’s regional leadership is by far senior associate at the Center for Strategic and most visible in Haiti. Even before the 7.0 magni- International Studies. Brazil’s broader interests tude earthquake struck on January 12, 2010, Bra- in the Caribbean are mostly economic; Brazilian zil played a commanding role in the country. Bra- companies use the loopholes in the Caribbean zilian peacekeepers make up the largest and most Basin Initiative and Central American Free Trade significant force in the U.N. Stabilization Mission, Agreement (CAFTA) to export ethanol tariff-free MINUSTAH, and a shared African heritage and to the United States. Politically, though, relations similar cultural influences have traditionally tied with Cuba and Haiti are more consequential in the two countries together. Since reconstruction terms of Brazil’s soft power in the region. began, Brazil has become the de facto voice of Johanna Brazil’s relationship with Cuba goes way be- Latin America on Haiti’s well-being and future. For Mendelson yond the solidarity with the Castro revolution. example, it has been Brazil that spoke out again Forman The relationship may have the potential to a possible long-term U.S. military presence there provide Brazil with a springboard to markets for the purpose of disaster recovery. Alongside in the Caribbean and the United States. It the United States, Brazil has been the main actor is also not a coincidence that Brazil’s re- and engine of commitment to Haiti’s economic lationship with Cuba has other payoffs at recovery and reconstruction, a complement to its the United Nations; there, the Cubans, leading peacekeeping role under the auspices of who are the masters of multilateralism the United Nations. In this sense, Mendelson For- in that institution, can help advance the man argued that Brazil’s role in Haiti demonstrates Brazilian agenda among their friends Brasília’s dual desire to exert regional leadership, in the Non-Aligned Movement that but within a multilateral, institutional context.

12 Brazil also considers its mission in Haiti as reluctant to play. It will not be easy an important part of its broader outreach to the for the Obama administration now to Caribbean, as demonstrated by President Lula’s make Brazil a strategic partner in both frequent visits to Haiti during his term of office. In regional and global affairs, if this is what February 2010, after the earthquake, he made it wishes to do, not least because Brazil a stop in Port au Prince as part of what was de- under the Lula administration has shown scribed as “a strategic tour of Latin America.” little interest in making closer relations with Some have argued that Haiti has been a key ele- the United States a top priority. ment of Brazil’s strategy to assert its status as a The United States has always perceived regional power in the international arena. Its lead- Brazil as a regional power, insisted Christo- ership in the military division of MINUSTAH and pher McMullen, deputy assistant secretary of its convening of other Latin American ministers to state for the Western Hemisphere. Furthermore, develop a Latin American approach to this fragile Brazil’s emergence as a global power—as well state has been effective in terms of bringing Bra- as its leadership role in promoting regional inte- zil’s leadership agenda into the open. It has also gration—has been wholeheartedly embraced by served to irritate some countries of the region, the United States. The conventional wisdom that who see Brazil’s interest as a means of achieving holds that South American integration efforts are other foreign policy goals on a larger international harmful to U.S. interests is unfounded; multilateral- stage. In reality, however, Brazil’s ability to steer a ism is a positive-sum game. However, a prerequi- process of coordination around Haiti since 2004 site to Brazil’s heightened presence on the inter- only underscores how totally distracted the United national stage is safer and more secure borders States was in Iraq and Afghanistan to pay much at home. As the region’s leader, Brazil needs to attention to what has happening in the region. address South America’s numerous intra-regional problems: border disputes, ongoing tensions, and, especially, Colombia’s internal struggle and the Brazil as Viewed by conflict with its immediate neighbors. the United States McMullen insisted that Washington does not see Brazil’s rise as the United States’ loss. The Introducing the fourth and final panel on U.S. United States actively supports a greater role perceptions of Brazil Leslie Bethell commented for Brasília within South America; in fact, the that the United States is beginning to take ac- United States has been working relentlessly to count of the fact that for the first time another facilitate improved Brazilian-Colombian rela- American state has serious aspirations to be- tions. This is because the United States wants Christopher come both a regional power—in South America, regional issues to be resolved from within. McMullen perhaps even in Latin America, a region in which The U.S. role should be secondary, as a the United States has been the undisputed hege- facilitator of discussion; the United States mon for more than a century—as well as a global excels in bringing countries together to the power. Is the United States prepared to allow negotiating table. As Brazil is increasingly Brazil to assume a leading role in South America doing this itself, the bilateral relationship at least, especially if Brazil is able to control its is only improving with time. more troublesome neighbors and maintain sta- The healthy state of contempo- bility in a region of low priority – a role, it should rary U.S.-Brazilian relations is best be said, Brazil has historically always been embodied in the bilateral Global

13 Partnership Dialogue established world. Furthermore, Brazil’s sugar-based ethanol in March 2010 by U.S. Secretary is far superior to the United States’ corn-based of State Hillary Clinton and Brazilian ethanol. Finally, as the U.S. economy sluggishly Minister of Foreign Relations Celso recovers from the global economic crisis, Brazil’s Amorim. This agreement recognizes GDP is estimated to grow at 6.2 percent, spurred that the two Western Hemisphere pow- on by skyrocketing domestic consumption. ers are like-minded democracies with These changes have transformed Brazil— mutual points of convergence, such as alongside India and China—into a global power concern for the environment, the devel- and the United States needs Brazil in order for opment and promotion of biofuels, and international negotiations on a plethora of issues to various existing economic partnerships. proceed. The Doha Development Round of inter- One central objective of the Dialogue is for national trade negotiations will not conclude with- both countries to deal jointly with regional out Brazil’s backing. Reform of the international issues such as narcotrafficking that neither financial architecture must be on Brazil’s terms could solve on its own. During Secretary Clin- as well. Indeed, Brazil’s sound regulatory frame- ton’s visit to Brazil in March 2010, she signed works, high bank reserve levels, and strong over- agreements to cooperate on issues of social sight ensured that the country’s economy was one justice, such as promoting women’s rights. of the last major economies to be hit by the 2008 Another objective is the creation of an institu- recession as well as one of the first to emerge tionalized platform with which both countries from the recession. Finally, climate change talks could deal with irritations in the relationship. will not get anywhere unless the owner of most of As with all friends, the United States and Brazil the Amazon rainforest is on board. Even looking have disagreements, the two most pressing back to the 2009 United Nations Climate Change ones at the moment being relations with Iran Conference, it was Brazil, India, and China at the and bilateral trade disputes. head of the negotiating table. The United States has been slow to compre- The United States needs to adapt to Brazil’s hend Brazil’s transformation into an economic newfound leadership position lest it lose its in- and political power, argued Riordan Roett, di- fluence in Brasília. Brazil has a long history of rector of Western Hemisphere Studies at The diplomatic and trade relations with Iran, and Lula Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced has successfully worked to strengthen these ties. International Studies. Numerous contempo- Bilateral trade has quadrupled in the last five rary developments have worked in Brazil’s years and, if the pre-salt fields do indeed pro- favor and have allowed for this growth. For duce the amount of oil expected, Brazil is ex- Riordan Roett instance, the discovery of pre-salt oil re- pected to become a member of the Organization serves off the Brazilian coast means that of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Brazil will most likely be a major petroleum Additionally, whereas 25 years ago Brazil looked exporter in the next five or six years. For- automatically to the United States for weapons eign investment spurring on oil explo- procurement, it now scours the open market in- ration is coming less from the United stead. It is France’s Dassault Aviation, not the States than from China, and Petrobras, United States’ Boeing, that will supply the Bra- Brazil’s national oil company, is one zilian Air Force with 36 jet fighter planes and of the most financially sound and France’s DCNS that is helping the Brazilian Navy well-managed oil companies in the build nuclear submarines. The United States can

14 U.S. presidents often assume in- discussion of strategic partnerships, only to re- correctly that the United States alize soon thereafter that the two countries are too far apart on key issues to broadly cooperate and Brazil share much in com- with each other. mon and initiate discussion of Disagreements have outnumbered agree- strategic partnerships, only to ments, Hakim said. For example, Brazil wanted soon realize that the two coun- far more from the United States in terms of re- forming U.S. policy toward Cuba. As a result, the tries are too far apart on key is- Obama administration felt aggrieved by Brasília’s sues to broadly cooperate with pressure. The United States saw its actions to- each other. ward Cuba as limited but critical, an important step forward on the politically perilous path of engaging Cuba. Tension has likewise come from President of the Inter-American Dialogue the fallout over the U.S. response to the Hondu- Peter Hakim ran political crisis and Brazil’s outspoken criti- cism of the U.S.-Colombia security agreement. no longer assume that Brazil will necessarily look Brazil’s relations with Iran, its warmth toward to Washington when weighing issues and mak- President Ahmadinejad, and its uncritical state- ing decisions; it must accept Brazil’s new role as ments about the country’s nuclear ambitions are a global power and work harder to develop and a source of particular tension. retain a strong bilateral relation. Because most large countries have numer- U.S.-Brazilian relations are not satisfactory ous divergent interests, they generally do not today. That, however, is to be expected, not have strategic partnerships with other large merely lamented, argued president of the Inter- countries. It is not surprising that the interests American Dialogue Peter Hakim. The past year of Brazil and the United States diverge on many in particular has been characterized by frictions issues. Hakim proposed that perhaps a better in the bilateral relationship. Brazil has been approach to improving the bilateral relationship perceived in Washington as not being particu- is to start with the presumption that the two larly helpful to Obama’s foreign policy agenda. countries are strategic adversaries—that their Brasília has likewise made it clear that it feels interests are not convergent. If Brazil and the disappointed by the Obama administration for United States stop making the unfounded as- not making enough headway on the changes it sumption that their interests are mostly shared, had hoped for. To be fair, it has often been the perhaps negotiations would be less fraught with case historically that new U.S. administrations’ disappointment and perceptions of lost oppor- relations with Brazil initially start out strong, only tunities. This may be the path, according to Ha- to sour quickly. Hakim hypothesized that the kim, toward finding some measure of common reason for this is because new U.S. presidents ground on such contentious issues as climate often assume incorrectly that the United States change, international trade negotiations, and and Brazil share much in common and initiate nuclear non-proliferation. n

Photo of President Lula during the G-Rio Latin American and Caribbean Summit by Ricardo Stuckert, courtesy of the Government of Brazil’s Press Room, available at http://www.info.planalto.gov.br/exec/inf_fotografiagrande.cfm?foto=22022010P00032. Photo of Palácio do Itamaraty by Xenia Antunes from Flickr, http://www.flickr.com/photos/xenia_antunes/168053539/. Photo of Ponte Estaiada (a.k.a. Ponte Octávio Frias de Oliveira), São Paulo, Brazil, by Marcos Leal from Flickr, http://www.flickr.com/photos/ marcosuk/3192059946

15 Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Lee. H. Hamilton, President and Director

Board of Trustees

Joseph B. Gildenhorn, Chair Sander R. Gerber, Vice Chair

Public Members: James H. Billington, Librarian of Congress; Hillary R. Clinton, Secretary, U.S. Department of State; G. Wayne Clough, Secretary, Smithsonian Institution; Arne Duncan, Secretary, U.S. Department of Education; Kathleen Sebelius, Secretary, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services; David Ferriero, Archivist of the United States; James Leach, Chairman, National Endowment for the Humanities

Private Citizen Members: Charles Cobb, Jr., Robin Cook, Charles L. Glazer, Carlos M. Gutierrez, Susan Hutchison, Barry S. Jackson, Ignacio E. Sanchez

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