Fall 08

The Feminist Sex Wars: The Battle for Impact on European Prostitution Policy

Astrid Zwinkels (6125182) [email protected] Research Master Social Sciences Jonathan Zeitlin (first reader) Conny Roggeboom (second reader) Final version 30 June 2016

University of Amsterdam

Table of Contents List of abbreviations ...... 3 Abstract ...... 4 1. Introduction ...... 4 2. Theoretical framework ...... 5 2.1 The EU institutions and reasons for interacting with academia and advocacy groups ...... 5 2.3 Advocacy groups and reasons for lobbying the EU institutions ...... 6 2.3 Possible factors affecting the level of influence in the EU institutions ...... 8 2.4 The case study ...... 10 2.4.1 Case study design and case selection ...... 10 2.4.2 A pan-European approach to prostitution? ...... 10 3. Methods ...... 12 3.2 The Survey ...... 12 3.3 Expert interviews ...... 13 3.4 Documentary literature: Content analysis ...... 13 4. Results ...... 14 4.1 The EU institutions ...... 14 4.1.2 Influence on the European Commission ...... 14 4.1.3 Influence on the European Parliament ...... 17 4.2 Influence of academics on the EU institutions ...... 21 4.2.1 Preferred approach: abolitionist vs. anti-abolitionist ...... 21 4.2.2 Advocacy and academia ...... 22 4.2.4 Networks of academics: personal relations and email lists ...... 22 4.3 Influence of advocacy groups on the EU institutions ...... 24 4.3.1 The main advocacy groups ...... 24 4.3.2 Factors of influence ...... 26 5. Conclusion ...... 31 5.1 Summary of findings ...... 32 5.2 Recommendations for advocacy groups ...... 33 5.3 Recommendations for future research ...... 33 6. Discussion and reflection ...... 34 6.1 Problems with generalizing from interview data ...... 34 6.2 Problems with gathering respondents for survey and interviews ...... 34 6.3 Practical and Theoretical Recommendations ...... 35 Bibliography ...... 37

2 List of abbreviations

ALDE Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (European Parliament) CATW Coalition Against Trafficking in Women CCME Church Commission on Migrants in Europe DG Directorate General DG HOME Directorate General for Migration and Home Affairs DG Justice Directorate General for Justice and Consumers DG SANTE Directorate General for Health and Food Safety EC European Commission ECDC European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control ECR European Conservatives and Reformists Group (European Parliament) EFD Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy Group (European Parliament) EMCDDA European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Addictions EP European Parliament EPP Group of the European People’s Party (Christian Democrats) (European Parliament) EU European Union EWL European Women’s Lobby FEMM Committee Committee for Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (European Commission) Greens/EFA Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance (European Parliament) GUE/NGL Confederal Group of the European United Left – Nordic Green Left (European Parliament) ICRSE International Committee on the Rights of Sex workers in Europe IDU Injecting drug uses MEP Member of European Parliament MSM Men having sex with men NREM National Rapporteurs or equivalent mechanisms OHCHR United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner PICUM Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants S&D Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament STI Sexually Transmitted Infection TAMPEP European Network for HIV/STI Prevention and Health Promotion among Migrant Sex workers TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

3 Abstract Based on a case study of advocacy groups that aim to influence the EU institutions in relation to prostitution or sex work policy, this study aims to explain the relative effectiveness of advocacy groups lobbying the EU institutions for topics where the EU has no official competences. Through the use of interviews, a qualitative survey and documentary analysis the study confirms multiple existing hypotheses. Advocacy groups are more likely to influence the EU institutions if they have access to financial and personal resources; have a physical presence in Brussels; if their position confirms the status quo in the EU institutions; if they are institutionalized; and if they are part of strong lobbying coalitions. Furthermore, two new explanations are found that explain why some advocacy groups are more influential than others in relation to a topic where the EU has no formal competences. First, successful advocacy groups seem to take a position that EU officials can express support for without much risk. Secondly, successful advocacy groups reframe their issue in such a way that it connects to a topic where the EU has official competences. By doing this, they are able to circumvent the prerequisite that advocacy groups can only lobby the EU on topics where the EU has competences and furthermore can increase their area of influence.

1. Introduction

At the beginning of 2014 The European Parliament (EP) adopted Mary Honeyball’s ‘Report on sexual exploitation and prostitution and its influence on gender equality’. Adopting this report means that the EP advises all member states to follow the Swedish policy framework on prostitution policy and to implement the Nordic model. In the Nordic model it is legal to sell sexual services but it is illegal to buy them. The adopted report stands in sharp contrast to the position Amnesty International adopted a year later. Amnesty argues that the best policy for sex work and the one that is best suited to protect the rights of sex workers is decriminalization, in which neither selling nor buying of sexual services is illegal. They speak out against the abolitionist standpoint. Ones preference for policy is often linked to the terminology one uses (prostitution or sex work), which will be elaborated upon in section 2.4.2.1 below. At the level of international agreements and transnational advocacy networks, the abolitionist perspective has shown remarkable success, whereas at the local level of NGOs working with sex workers, the perspective of decriminalization seems to be more popular (Mattson 2015: 172-73). In general, one can say that advocacy groups dealing with prostitution policy at a European level disagree about what the best prostitution policy would be. Furthermore, even among women who define themselves as feminists there exists disagreement. Since these groups are not in agreement, the question arises how the EP has been able to adopt a position that endorses so clearly one side of the debate. Especially interesting here is the fact that the EU has no official competences in relation to prostitution or sex work policy. Every member state decides by itself what legislation it feels is most appropriate. For these reasons, this study aims to explain the reasons for the success of abolitionist advocacy groups at the level of the EU institutions. In line with Andrews and Edwards’ conceptualization of advocacy organisations, in this study these are defined as “groups and organizations that make public interest claims either promoting or resisting social change that if implemented, would conflict with the social cultural, political, or economic interests or values of other constituencies and groups” (Andrews and Edwards 2004: 485). Next to advocacy groups, it is important to take academics into account as well, as we can perceive the emergence of “small elite networks of academics, lawyers, and International Nongovernmental Organizations (INGO) activists who use their expertise and present proposals for European action” on various issues (Guiraudon 2001: 164).

4 There are already a number of studies that deal with how one of the largest advocacy groups advocating for decriminalization tries to influence the EU when it comes to prostitution policy (Grundell 2015; Scaramuzzino and Scaramuzzino 2015) or that try to explain the influence of one of the largest organisations in favour of the Nordic model has on the EU institutions on the topic of prostitution (Agustín 2012; Bygnes 2012; Ramot 2006). However, these studies very rarely take the perspective and preferences of the EU institutions into account. Furthermore, other studies that focus on explaining the success of advocacy groups in influencing the EU institutions normally focus on topics where the EU has official competences (Klüver 2010). In contrast to these studies, this thesis will study the popularity of the abolitionist standpoint within the EU institutions with the aim to provide more insights into factors that favour or hinder advocacy groups in general when they aim to influence the EU institutions in relation to topics where the EU has no official competences. The research question that I will aim to answer in this study is:

What explains the relative effectiveness of advocacy groups lobbying in the EU institutions for topics where the EU has no official competences?

Since effectiveness can be measured in more than one way, this will be measured on five different dimensions: agenda setting; access to decision-making arenas; achieving favourable policies; monitoring and shaping implementation; and shifting the long-term priorities and resources of political institutions (Andrews and Edwards 2004: 492). In the following section, the theoretical framework will be outlined. In this framework I focus on the reasons for the EU institutions and advocacy groups to interact with one another and on existing literature that aim to explain which factors affect the level of influence advocacy groups can exercise in the EU institutions. At the end of the theoretical framework the case that functions as the basis for this study is introduced in more depth. Following this section the methods of the study are discussed, after which I will outline the results of this study, focusing separately on the European Commission (EC), the EP, academia, and advocacy groups. In my conclusion, the results will be summarized and recommendations provided for advocacy groups that want to have more influence on the EU institutions. This thesis concludes by discussing and reflecting on how to overcome some of the difficulties encountered in the study in the future.

2. Theoretical framework

2.1 The EU institutions and reasons for interacting with academia and advocacy groups Most people are unable to explain exactly how the European Union (EU) works. Even for experts in EU governance explaining the workings of the EU is not always an easy task. Central to the EU are the EU institutions, which are the EU’s seven principal decision- making bodies. These seven bodies include the European Parliament (EP), the European Council, the Council of the EU, the European Commission (EC), the Court of Justice of the EU, the European Central Bank and the Court of Auditors. If one wants to measure influence on the EU policy process, as I do, it is the influence on these institutions that one should look at. Due to the limits of a thesis study, not all institutions will be addressed. In this study I will focus on the EC and the EP, since these two institutions particularly provide advocacy groups with the opportunity to influence EU policies. The EC is the institution solely responsible for proposing legislation. Its monopoly of legislative initiative is, however, restricted by the fact that the Council (and under Codecision also the EP) has to consent to the proposed legislation. The EP is the EU’s directly elected law-making body. Based on proposals from the EC it passes EU laws. It

5 also reviews the Commission’s work programme and asks it to propose legislation (Europa.eu 2016). There are multiple reasons for the EU institutions to actively interact with academia and advocacy groups. Some reasons are to increase the democratic legitimacy of the EU institutions and to fight against the idea of the democratic deficit; to assess interests and constraints of external parties and other EU institutions; and, most importantly, to gather (neutral) information. All three reasons will be shortly discussed below. First of all, criticism on the EU focuses, among other things, on the complexity of its institutions and on a perceived democratic deficit. Scharpf (1999) for example argues that the EU institutions should create proper output legitimacy. Output legitimacy “requires policies to work effectively while resonating with citizens’ values and identity” (Schmidt 2013: 7). One way the EC deals with this criticism is by creating new initiatives to increase its contact with advocacy groups and academia, increasing its democratic legitimacy. Mainly advocacy groups that represent a large constituency are hereby of interest (Klüver 2010: 179). Further examples of EU initiatives in this respect are the White Paper on Governance of the Transparency Initiative (Klüver 2011: 1). The EC moreover deliberately builds up networks with the aim to enhance its own position and influence (Mak 2000: 9). Sanchez Salgado believes that the adaptation of Civil Society Organisations is mainly EU-driven (2014: 3). European-focused organisations prosper especially because “it is in the interest of the Commission that they do so, for they provide both information for policy-making and legitimization for the European project” (Tarrow 2001: 250). A second reason for EU institutions to interact with advocacy groups is to assess interests and constraints of external parties and other EU institutions. This way the EU institutions can develop “win-win solutions” (Gornitzka and Sverdrup 2011: 49). Linked to this is the fact that creating stable relationships with advocacy groups enables the EU institutions to enhance its political effectiveness towards other EU institutions (Gornitzka and Sverdrup 2011: 53). The most important reason for EU institutions to interact with academia and advocacy groups is, however, because these can function as prevalent information providers. The EU institutions have to deal with a very broad scale. Drawing on academia enables the EU institutions to legitimize its autonomous basis for action “independent of national, societal and partisan interests” (Gornitzka and Sverdrup 2011: 52). Advocacy groups furthermore “dispose of specialized issue-relevant expertise and enjoy informational advantages vis-à-vis policy makers” (Klüver 2011: 7) and hold expert knowledge and insights of what is happening at the ground (Bouwen 2009: 22). The EU institutions can benefit from this highly specialized policy expertise in creating high quality proposals. When proposals are furthermore based on external academic expertise this strengthens the position of the EU institutions in relation to other political institutions (Gornitzka and Sverdrup 2011: 53). A final very practical reason for the EU institutions to consult academia and advocacy groups to gather expert information is because the EU institutions are “notoriously understaffed” (Klüver 2010: 179; Klüver 2011: 7; Gornitzka and Sverdrup 2011: 59). With a staff similar in size to a large city administration (Bouwen 2009: 20), the EC is in constant need of external expertise. This is not only the case for the EC, but for the EP as well. To build their cases, Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) make use of the expertise of academics and advocacy groups by inviting them to present their opinions either directly in sessions of the EP or in hearings of separate committees.

2.3 Advocacy groups and reasons for lobbying the EU institutions When the EU institutions are the ones benefitting from contact with advocacy groups this may be termed usages by Europe (Woll and Jacquot 2009). However, it is of course possible as well for advocacy groups to make use of the possibilities that Europe

6 provides. This latter situation is coined usages of Europe (ibid). Scholars generally disagree on how exactly one should interpret the relationship between the European level and the level of advocacy groups. While some authors describe a kind of static relationship where they distinguish between a bottom-up or top-down approach or between ‘supply and demand’, others alternatively propose less static models and look at the relationship as a “managed multilevel process with numerous feedback loops and entry points” (Coen and Richardson 2009: 7). This multi-level European governance is understood by Lehmann as “a network of horizontal and vertical cooperative relationships between supranational, national, regional, and local public and private actors” (Lehmann 2009: 42). The EU is becoming “an increasingly important arena for collective mobilisation” (Grundell 2015). The EC can be a focus of lobbying activities for advocacy groups as the EC enjoys a monopoly on legislative initiatives. Since the frames used in particular legislation can have a very large impact on the outcome of that legislation, advocacy groups and other (academic) experts are oftentimes more than happy to share their insights with the EU institutions, as this provides them with the possibility to influence the frame of the status quo (Klüver et al. 2015: 486). This accounts for both national and European advocacy groups. Furthermore, the EP has lately become an important target for the lobbying activities of lobbying groups as well. A reason for this is that since the Lisbon Treaty came into force, the co-decision procedure has become the ordinary legislative procedure, which has increased the power of the EP quite a bit. As its power grew, the EP became of greater interest for advocacy groups. Furthermore, advocacy groups can ask MEPs to lobby for their issue at the level of the Commission. Advocacy groups have a broad range of strategic options and tactics that they can use to advance their cause, such as institutionalized participation, bargaining, political pressure and confrontation (Rucht 2001: 128-29). However, “lobbying EU institutions is by far more adequate and effective than the kind of unconventional protest action that is so common at national and subnational levels” (Rucht 2001: 136). There are different reasons that explain the interest that advocacy groups have in the EU institutions. However, they can all be traced back to the same origin: lobbying the EU institutions provides advocacy groups with an opportunity to influence policy on the topic they are lobbying for. One possible concrete reason as to why advocacy groups lobby the EU institutions is because this provides advocacy groups with new opportunities to convince political actors of the importance of their cause when lobbying at the national level turns out to be unsuccessful. This effect can be described as the Boomerang effect or as the Ping-Pong effect (See Figure 1). The Boomerang effect is an effect “through which weak domestic actors can use alliances with external allies, mediated through other states and international institutions, to advance their claims against their own governments” (Tarrow 2001: 245). Whereas advocacy groups mainly refrain from directly influencing the domestic level with the Boomerang effect, it is also possible that advocacy groups continue to lobby their national governments, but at the same time lobby the supranational level with the aim to influence their national governments even more. This latter effect is described as the Ping-Pong effect (Zippel 2006: 120). When advocacy groups turn to the European level to compensate for their lack of access at the domestic level this is called the compensation hypothesis (Klüver 2010: 176). In conclusion one can say that the EU Institutions are mutually dependent upon one another: the EU needs information from advocacy groups and advocacy groups need to influence (national) policy through the EU institutions. Through this mutual dependency a relationship is established. The influence advocacy groups can exercise in through this relationship is the focus of this study.

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Figure 1: The Boomerang effect and the Ping-Pong effect.

2.3 Possible factors affecting the level of influence in the EU institutions As has now become clear, advocacy groups can aim to influence policy through lobbying the EU institutions. This study will focus on different factors that can influence the effect advocacy groups can exercise on the EU institutions to reach their desired influence on policy outcomes. Both internal as well as external factors that have been mentioned in previous studies will hereby be discussed. Different texts by Heike Klüver will form the main basis for these explanatory factors. The internal factors that will be focused upon are financial and personnel resources of advocacy groups; having a physical presence in Brussels and the resonance of the position with the status quo and with the EU frame. External factors are the complexity and salience of the topic; the degree of conflict in relation to the topic; the lobbying coalitions; the level of institutionalism of the advocacy groups; and the resonance with official EU competences of the topic. All factors will shortly be discussed below. First of all, there are the internal factors that according to the literature can have an effect on the extent to which advocacy groups can affect the EU institutions to influence certain policy outcomes. The first internal factor is whether the advocacy groups trying to influence the EU institutions have access to financial resources. Some even argue that having money is a necessary condition for EU lobbying (Kluver 2010: 187). Advocacy groups “with a very high degree of resources at their disposal, Europeanize their lobbying activities, whereas all interest groups that possess only a very low amount of resources, do not extend their lobbying strategy to the European level” (Klüver 2010: 184). A reason for this is that advocacy groups with fewer resources need to focus their money on the places where their chances of success are the highest, which is often the national level (Dür and Mateo 2014: 6). Furthermore,

8 these groups have to engage in actions that are directly visible, since they need to appeal to their membership (ibid). Closely linked to financial resources is the factor of personnel resources: to be effective in the EU one needs well-trained personnel to “monitor the decision-making process, elaborate statements and reports and participate in hearings and consultations” (Klüver 2010: 179). Finally, having a Brussels-based office has proved to be useful (ibid). Further internal factors are the resonance of the position of the advocacy group with the status quo and with the EU frame. A frame is influential when it contains: “relevance to the issues at hand, adequacy, applicability, appropriateness, and resonance” (Schmidt 2008: 311). Since policy-makers in the EU do not start from scratch, it is likely that advocacy groups whose position confirms the status quo are more likely to influence the EU institutions (ibid). The EU institutions often recognize claims that fit their own frame as more valid. Some claims therefore have “higher value and greater legitimacy from the outset” (Rolandsen Agustín 2008: 514). Advocacy groups are often aware of this preference, as they tend to prefer to modify the dominant ideas and policies of the EU by fitting their own claims into the institutional context. Advocacy groups “must articulate their claims in accordance with the dominant discourse and the official policies of the EU institutions” (Rolandsen Agustín 2008: 509). Next to these internal factors there are many external factors that affect the extent to which advocacy groups can influence EU institutions. First of all, the complexity and the salience of the topic that advocacy groups focus on plays a role. When a field deals with technical, complicated matters or has large repercussions in many fields the EU institutions are more likely to look for the external expertise provided by advocacy groups and academia. Furthermore, EU institutions are also more likely to include advocacy groups and academia when a topic gains importance among stakeholders and/or the overall public (Klüver et al 2015: 451-52). A second external factor that is of interest is the degree of conflict in relation to the topic. While some topics do not cause major opposition, others divide advocacy groups into different sets of competing advocacy coalitions. It is generally assumed that advocacy groups that deal with topics without competing coalitions find it easer to influence the EU institutions (Klüver et al 2015: 452). A third external factor is the level of institutionalism of the advocacy group that tries to influence the EU institutions. In general, the EU institutions tend to be in closest contact with “the resourceful and the already recognised networks” (Rolandsen Agustín 2008: 514-15). The fourth external factor focuses on the strength of the lobbying coalition that an advocacy group belongs to. As multiple advocacy groups often try to shift the policy outcomes to their preferred outcome at the same time, advocacy groups are often lobbying together (Klüver 2011:12). Klüver defines such lobbying coalitions as “a set of actors who share the same policy goal” (ibid). She even argues that political scientists should always study the effect of lobbying coalitions instead of studying single advocacy groups, as one individual advocacy group is not very likely to determine the outcome of the policy formulation process (ibid). She furthermore argues that strong lobbying coalitions are defined by the “sum or the characteristics of all coalition members rather than the individual properties of a few powerful interest groups” (Klüver 2011: 28). and that size and resources of the coalitions play a role here as well (Klüver et al 2015: 452). The final external factor is the level of resonance that the topic has with official EU competences. The competences of the EU are specified in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). This document enumerates in which areas the EU has exclusive competences, shared competences and supporting competences. Some authors see a high resonance with a topic with exclusive or at least shared EU competences as a necessary condition for advocacy groups to lobby the EU institutions (Klüver 2010: 187). Others only state that advocacy groups that focus on policy areas in which the EU has high competences are more likely to lobby the EU institutions than

9 advocacy groups that deal with policy areas in which the EU has low or no competences (Dür and Mateo 2014). The idea exists that advocacy groups “active in policy areas with low EU competence, therefore, will focus their resources on national or subnational political decisions” (Dür and Mateo 2014: 6).

2.4 The case study

2.4.1 Case study design and case selection The question to answer in this study is: What explains the relative effectiveness of advocacy groups lobbying in the EU institutions for topics where the EU has no official competences? To answer this research question I have made use of a case study design. The aim of using a case study is to “generate an intensive examination of a single case, in relation to which [I] then engage in a theoretical analysis” (Beyers 2012: 71). Case studies can be used for theory generation as well as theory testing. While the above literature argues that advocacy groups that focus on a topic with low EU competences are unlikely to lobby the EU institutions, this study will focus on a case of advocacy groups that deal with a topic where the EU has no official competences (prostitution policy), but where they nevertheless aim to influence the EU institutions. Furthermore, according to Yin (2003) case study designs can be useful when one wants to answer ‘why’ or ‘how’ questions. The study will then on the one hand test whether the existing ideas on which factors impact the level of influence that advocacy groups have on the EU institutions are nevertheless confirmed in this case and will on the other hand generate possible new ideas on other factors that impact the advocacy groups influence. The case itself can be best described as a hypothesis-generating case study (Lijphart 1971) or an instrumental case (Stake 1995). A hypothesis-generating case starts out “with a more or less vague notion of possible hypotheses, and attempt[s] to formulate definite hypotheses to be tested subsequently among a larger number of cases” (Lijphart 1971: 692). Since the aim of this study is to both build on existing findings in relation to advocacy influence in the EU and to possibly formulate new hypotheses here, this fits well within the description of a hypothesis-generating case. An instrumental case furthermore provides insight into an issue or helps to refine a theory. “The case is often looked at in depth, its contexts scrutinized, its ordinary activities detailed, and because it helps the researcher pursue the external interest. The case may or may not be seen as typical of other cases” (Baxter and Jack 2008).

2.4.2 A pan-European approach to prostitution? In February 2014, the EP adopted Mary Honeyball’s ‘Report on sexual exploitation and prostitution and its impact on gender equality’ by 343 votes in favour to 139 against. Adopting this report means that the EP advises all member states to follow the Swedish example on prostitution policy and implement the Nordic model. As the EU has no competences in relation to prostitution policy, the resolution was non-binding. Adopting this resolution means no more than that the EP advises its member states to follow their recommendation. However, even though some people say that the report mainly has as a symbolic function, the effects of this resolution should not be underestimated. Since the Honeyball resolution was voted on in the plenary session this area will form part of the focus on this study. Furthermore, since this Resolution originated in The Committee for Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM Committee), this Committee will also be focused upon. Due to a lack of competences on this topic, the position of the Commission on this topic is not completely clear. Since prostitution policy is not a EU competence, prostitution or sex work is touched upon by the EU institutions through different frames where the EU does have competences: human trafficking and violence against women (shared competences under the heading of ‘the area of freedom security and justice’) and sexual health (supporting competences under the heading of ‘the protection and

10 improvement of human health). In relation to these EU competences the focus will mainly be on the Directorate General Migration and Home Affairs (DG HOME), the Directorate General for Justice and Consumers (DG Justice) and the Directorate General Health and Food Safety (DG SANTE).

2.4.2.1 Terminology: prostitution or sex work Because of the sensitivity of the ‘prostitution debate’, it is important to take a moment to reflect on the different connotations of the concepts ‘prostitution’ and ‘sex work’. Even though both concepts seem to refer to the same phenomenon and are seemingly used interchangeably, whether the one or the other is used in policy or academic documents immediately reflects a certain preference for a legal framework. Since both terms are used in the literature and in policy documents both concepts will be used in this study as well. When I am referring to an abolitionist standpoint the terms ‘prostitution’ and ‘prostitute’ will be used, whereas reference to anti-abolitionist standpoints will make use of the terms ‘sex work’ and ‘sex worker’. Following a definition provided by Joyce Outshoorn, prostitution or sex work is in this study defined as: “the exchange of sex or sexual services for money or other material benefits” (Outshoorn 2004: 3). A prostitute or sex worker in this study refers to a person who provides sex or sexual services or money or other material benefits. These definitions are chosen to provide a definition that is as descriptive as possible.

2.4.2.2 Terminology: different prostitution policies When one talks about advocacy work on prostitution or sex work it is furthermore important to understand the different legal frameworks that are debated. Although different terminology is used throughout the literature, four different types of policies towards prostitution or sex work are generally recognized: prohibition, abolition, legalization and decriminalization. Under prohibitionism, all prostitution is illegal and all people involved are liable to penalties. Prostitution is considered as something immoral. Under abolitionism, prostitution itself is not criminalized, but third parties (such as clients or pimps) are. Under legalization, some forms of sex work are portrayed as work. When a country has enforced this legal framework, sex workers are allowed to earn money in the sex industry under specific rules. Under decriminalization, no legislation dealing with sex work specifically exists. Sex work is perceived as a service industry and is treated as such (Scaramuzzino and Scaramuzzino 2015: 139; Outshoorn 2004: 8; Wagenaar and Altink 2012a: 12). A further distinction can be drawn between prohibition and abolition on the one hand and legalization and decriminalization on the other is that the latter clearly distinguishes between voluntary and forced prostitution whereas the first does not (Soo Chon 2015). However, it must be noted that although this is an often-mentioned distinction, most legal frameworks that fall in the first category, such as the Swedish abolitionist framework, do not officially state anything about this in their laws. This distinction should therefore be understood as one of moral differences between radical and liberal feminists, which will be discussed below.

2.4.2.3. Diverging feminist perspectives: the Sex Wars As the sensitivity of the concepts of prostitution and sex work shows, different groups perceive prostitution and sex work very differently and therefore have very diverging ideas of what the best prostitution or sex work policy entails. Feminists have such strong but diverging interpretations of feminist sexual morality that Ferguson (1984) coined these debates the ‘Feminist Sex Wars’. An employee of the European Women’s Lobby (EWL) stated that she believed there to be no ideological clash in the organization and that there was of lot of consensus. “But when one started to talk about prostitution, there was an explosion! Women were shouting. It was chaos” (Translated from Lafon 2014).

11 When it comes to feminist perceptions of prostitution and sex work, two opposing positions can generally be identified: the radical feminist view and the liberal or libertarian feminist view (Ferguson 1984; Limoncelli 2009). Radical feminists see the ideal sexual relationship as one between “fully consenting, equal partners who are emotionally involved and do not participate in polarized roles” (Ferguson 1984: 108) and describe prostitution as “an exploitation of women by men and argue that certain women are forced to prostitute, making prostitution a tool for men to dominate women” (Soo Chon 2015: 378). Liberal feminists, by contrast, see the ideal sexual relationship as one between “fully consenting, equal partners who negotiate to maximize another’s sexual pleasure and satisfaction by any means they choose” (Ferguson 1984: 109) and portray prostitution as “a kind of sex work which individual women can freely choose” (Soo Chon 2015: 378). Whether someone defines her or himself as a radical or as a liberal feminist functions as a very good predictor for their preferred policy towards prostitution or sex work. Radical feminists prefer abolition, while liberal feminists prefer legalization or decriminalization. Feminists are, however, not the only group of people who engage in these sex wars. Conservative and religious groups often side with the radical feminists in their assessment of prostitution. Furthermore, while the debate goes beyond the left- right divide, nationality is also quite good indicator of one’s position in the debate. For example, Sweden is often mentioned as a country where most people favour the abolitionist model, whereas the Dutch are perceived to be anti-abolitionist.

3. Methods My research question focuses on understanding why advocacy groups lobby the EU on a topic where the EU lacks competences. Qualitative methods tend to be best suited to answer this type of explanatory question. Furthermore, a case study design, like in this study, often favours qualitative methods (Bryman 2012: 68). Moreover, since academic and policy documents tend to provide very little information about tactics and strategies, the intensity of collaboration between advocacy groups and the EU institutions, or how particular policy proposals are understood by the different actors (Beyers et al. 2014: 176), it is very important to combine documentary analysis with methods that are able to answer these questions. For this reason, I used three different data gathering forms or analysis methods in this study. I made use of a qualitative survey, I conducted expert interviews with different experts and I used content analysis on both academic as well as policy documents. Each of these methods will be discussed below.

3.2 The Survey The first method I used was a qualitative survey. Qualitative surveys are generally most appropriate for exploratory studies of small population studies and are aimed at idea generation (Researchplan 2016). I have used this survey format to collect both answers to close-ended questions as well as to collect verbatim statements through open-ended questions. For my survey I approached two different groups of academics that either officially supported or criticized the 2014 EP resolution on Mary Honeyball’s ‘Report on sexual exploitation and prostitution and its impact on gender equality’. The first group that I surveyed consisted of the 75 academics who signed the document ‘Submission in support of Mary Honeyball’s Report on sexual exploitation and prostitution and its impact on gender equality.’ The second group consisted of the 94 academics who signed the International Committee on the Right of Sex Workers in Europe (ICRSE) document entitled ‘A Critique of the “Report on Prostitution and Sexual Exploitation and its Impact on Gender Equality”’. I invited all signers whose email addresses I could retrieve to participate in the survey via a personal email. After two weeks a reminder was sent to

12 everybody containing a similar request to fill out the survey and, as requested by some of the academics, an official ethical clearance from the University of Amsterdam. The aim of the questionnaire was to develop a clearer picture of the way the academics who had been willing to openly voice their support for or against the abolitionist framework on prostitution organized themselves. Questions focused on the academic’s preferred prostitution approach; whether they had previously focused their advocacy activities at the political level; whether they personally had been in contact with the EU institutions; whether they thought the academic community was involved in the debates and if yes, how, and what it meant to be part of this global network of academics. The response rates from both groups differed a lot. Whereas 30% of the academics who signed the Critique from ICRSE in the end filled out the survey, the response rate was only 7% for the academics who signed the Submission for Honeyball’s report. A likely explanation for this is that one of the people in the ‘Nordic Model Information Network’, which is a mailing list containing of all the academics who signed the submission, found an old presentation online in which I presented arguments as to why I personally believe it would not be a good idea to follow the abolitionist framework on prostitution. This person shared her concerns about the ethics of the study with this network. The Ethical Clearance of the University of Amsterdam provided for this study was unable to remove these concerns among many of the people in this network. To compensate for this low response rate, I have also used the personal email conversations with some of these academics that followed from the survey as input for this study.

3.3 Expert interviews Regarding my expert interviews I aimed to speak with people in the EU institutions as well as with people from different advocacy groups. My aim was furthermore to cover both sides of the debate. In the end I was able to interview: representatives from different anti-abolitionist organisations (ICRSE, TAMPEP, La Strada); academics who signed the ICRSE’s critique; and a member of the FEMM committee of the EP. In total I conducted 6 interviews which all took place in the spring of 2016. The aim of the interviews was to gain a better insight in what factors positively or negatively impacted advocacy groups’ level of impact on the EU institutions. They furthermore helped me to visualize the needs of the EP and the EC when it comes to expert input and to understand what the different positions within the EU institutions were and how these positions originated. Similar to the problems encountered in the survey, it proved to be extremely difficult to come into contact with people advocating a pan-European abolitionist approach to prostitution. The most important advocacy group in this respect is the European Women’s Lobby. Despite repeated attempts, I have sadly been unable to receive any response from this organization, which means that my analysis of this organization is based on the views of the other experts. Similarly, my request to interview different people in the Commission was denied, based on the fact that the EC has no competences on the topic of prostitution. Input on the Commission has therefore been obtained through multiple emails from officials in DG SANTE, DG HOME and DG Justice. The responses to the survey as well as the interview transcripts were manually coded with help of the programme ATLAS.ti. These codes formed the basis for the analysis of the survey and interviews.

3.4 Documentary literature: Content analysis Available documentary sources are a good addition to the use of interviews, since these sources can “considerably improve the quality of the interviews and also because these help in coding, cross-referencing, cross-validating and interpreting evidence obtained

13 through interviews” (Beyers et al. 2014: 176). A large part of my thesis is based on these academic and policy documents. I conducted a content analysis of this data with the assistance of related theories from the academic literature and signs of position in the debate from the policy documents.

4. Results In the following section I will outline the results of the data analysis. I will hereby focus on the ways influence is exercised on the EU institutions and what the preferred position of these institutions seems to be. Furthermore, I will present the results regarding the impact of academics and the different advocacy groups.

4.1 The EU institutions It is important to study the EU institutions, as they are not neutral or isolated entities. EU institutions “are composed of agents with varied ideological and national affiliations, and they operate in the international sphere as a unitary actor with a strong resemblance to other international organisations” (Grundell 2015). The EU institutions should be understood as the carriers of ideas or “collective memories” (Schmidt 2008: 318). The programmes that originate from the EC should furthermore be understood as “compromises between national positions and the demands of the specific groups who had input into the policy process” (Mattson 2015: 34). Since the EU has no competences in relation to prostitution or sex work policy, the frames used and underlying position presented by different DGs and EP committees form an important basis to understand the unofficial position of the EU institutions. For these reasons, the documents published within these institutions combined with the frames used will provide a good indication of their preferred prostitution or sex work position as well as of the success of advocacy groups in getting their message across.

4.1.2 Influence on the European Commission The following section will analyse the EC, more specifically: DG HOME, DG Justice and DG SANTE. As stated above, prostitution or sex work policy is a member competence in line with the principle of subsidiarity formulated in the treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam (Outshoorn 2004: 12). However, all three DGs adopt a specific frame that enables them to address the subject. They deal with the topic through the frame of human trafficking, in relation to violence against women and in relation to sexually transmitted infections (STIs).

4.1.2.1 DG HOME

4.1.2.1.1 Frame and Structure In relation to prostitution or sex work, DG HOME is the most outspoken and influential DG. Article 83 (TFEU) confers competence to the EU over sexual exploitation of women and trafficking in human being. Human trafficking is a severe violation of human rights, which is prohibited under Article 5 on the prohibition of slavery and forced labour of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. Article 2 of Directive 2011/36/EU defines exploitation through human trafficking as “the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services.” DG HOME’s approach comprises the above-mentioned Directive and the EU Strategy towards the Eradication of Trafficking in Human Beings 2012-2016, which it defines as a “human rights based victims centered, gender specific and child sensitive” approach (Europa.eu). An important actor in DG HOME is the EU Anti-Trafficking Coordinator. Myria Vassiliadou, former Secretary General of the EWL, who was appointed the first EU Anti- Trafficking Coordinator in December 2010 by Cecilia Malmström, a Commissioner from Sweden whose position lies close to the EWL as well. Vassiliadou’s task is to coordinate

14 the coherence between EU institutions, EU agencies, Member States, third countries and international actors. She reports directly to the Director-General of DG HOME.

4.1.2.2.2 Content analysis The first important document in relation to this topic in DG HOME (then DG Justice and Home Affairs) is the 1996 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament called ‘Trafficking in women for the purpose of sexual exploitation’ (COM (96) 567). The document states the following:

The Communication does not however seek to address the question of women who are not put under duress by a third party to travel to work as prostitutes over borders, nor does it address the questions of black market labour in other sectors in the European Union. (COM (96) 567)

The document emphasizes the distinction between forced prostitution and prostitution of women “who are not put under duress”. This distinction seems to point to an anti-abolitionist stance. This is a very different position from the one presented in the EU Strategy towards the Eradication of Trafficking in Human Beings 2012-2016, which describes DG HOME’s current approach. Language wise, what stands out immediately in this Strategy is the use of the phrase ‘victims of human trafficking for sexual exploitation’. This seems to be a more neutral term than the term ‘prostitute’. However, while the 1996 Communication distinguished between those who were forced and those who were not, the 2012 Strategy solely mentions victims. Furthermore, the Commission’s new position in the sex wars debate is set out clearly in the 2012 Strategy’s first recommendation: to understand and reduce demand:

The exchange of best practices can help reduce demand for all forms of trafficking, including sexual exploitation. It should build on work done in the areas of public awareness campaigns targeting consumers and users of services, corporate social responsibility, codes of conduct, business and human rights and initiatives aimed at eliminating human trafficking from the supply chains of businesses. […] The research will provide material for the Commission’s 2016 report on the legal measures that some Member States have taken to criminalise the use of services of victims of trafficking in human beings (italics added).

Since it is already forbidden to traffic human beings or to sexually exploit people, this latter sentence seems to refer to prostitution policies. Although the Commission cannot take an official position on what it believe to be the best framework for prostitution or sex work, DG HOME seems to present a strong preference for an abolitionist approach.

4.1.2.2.3 Expert input When it comes to gaining expert input on the topic of human trafficking, there are two important networks: the informal EU Network of National Rapporteurs or equivalent mechanisms (NREM) and the EU Civil Society Platform against Trafficking in Human Beings. The NREMs are in charge of carrying out assessments of trends in the trafficking of human beings, of measuring the results of anti-trafficking actions (including the gathering of statistics, in cooperation with civil society) and of reporting. The informal network of NREMs plays an important role in discussing issues relating to the collection of comparable data and assessing trends based on commonly, developed and agreed reporting templates, in line with Articles 19 and 20 of the Directive (Europa.eu). In May 2013 the EU Civil Society Platform against the trafficking of human beings in Member States and selected non-EU countries was launched. Some important members of this platform are the Coalition Against Trafficking in Women (CATW), Equality Now, the EWL, La Strada and PICUM. The former three are the best-known

15 organisations worldwide fighting for the abolition of prostitution. La Strada and PICUM, on the other hand, believe in the decriminalization of sex work. These latter two, however, are much less vocal than CATW, Equality Now and the EWL. Finally, the EU Anti-Trafficking coordinator herself provides expert input. As argued above, Vassiliadou is the former Secretary General of the EWL and, therefore unsurprisingly, has an abolitionist stance towards prostitution.

4.1.2.3 DG Justice

4.1.2.3.1 Frame and Structure DG Justice touches upon prostitution or sex work through the EU priority of combating violence against women. DG Justice addresses this issue in this context since it recognises that women working in prostitution are at heightened risk of violence, and have thus funded some projects on this topic under the Daphne Programme. Under this programme, DG Justice has funded a few transnational projects on supporting women in prostitution who are victims of violence or empowering women in prostitution to prevent violence (personal communication, May 13, 2016). The precise names of these projects are unknown to me.

4.2.2.3.2 Content analysis The DAPHNE program appears to include projects that relate to prostitution and violence against women. However, this program is highly criticized by Mattson for its very biased stance towards prostitution or sex work:

The DAPHNE project is permeated with abolitionist sentiment, not least by generally ignoring men as part of its definition of vulnerability. The project received its name, the website explained: “Because in ancient Greek mythology, DAPHNE was a pure, innocent young woman pursued by the god Apollo who had fallen in love with her. Desperate to fend off Apollo’s sexual advances, DAPHNE called upon her father, the river god Perseus, to help her. As Apollo touched her, the god turned DAPHNE into a laurel bush, DAPHNE in Greek (Mattson 2015: 41).

4.1.2.3.3 Expert input In the words of the office the Secretary of the Gender Equality D2 Unit: “We have funded a few transnational projects on supporting women in prostitution who are victims of violence or empowering women in prostitution to prevent violence, under the Daphne programme. However, this is the extent of our work on the topic, and we have very limited interaction with related organisations or experts” (personal communication, March 17, 2016).

4.1.2.4 DG SANTE

4.1.2.4.1 Frame and Structure Finally, DG SANTE addresses the topic of prostitution or sex work in light of STI prevention. The two main instruments here are the 2009 Commission Communication on combating HIV/AIDS in the EU and neighbouring countries and current Action Plan on HIV/AIDS in the EU and neighbouring countries: 2014-2016.

4.1.2.4.2 Content analysis Interestingly, the 2009 version does not refer to sex workers – not even as an at risk group. The three at-risk groups mentioned here are men having sex with men (MSM), injecting drug users (IDUs), and migrants from a country with a high HIV prevalence and mobile populations. In the 2014 document, however, sex workers are mentioned as an

16 at-risk group: “Besides MSM and IDUs other vulnerable groups at high risk of acquiring HIV infections include migrants and mobile populations, sex workers and prisoners.” Most interesting here is the choice for the term ‘sex worker’ over ‘prostitute’. Also interesting is the 2014 report on sex workers and HIV/AIDS from the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC). Here again the use of the term sex worker stands out. They furthermore argue that laws that criminalize sex workers hinder HIV prevention for sex workers.

Some EU/EEA countries raised concerns about the implications for HIV prevention and outreach of an apparent shift towards greater criminalisation of, and a more repressive environment for, sex work. […] Civil society also raised concerns about the implications for HIV prevention if countries implement the recommendation of the European Parliament to criminalise sex workers' clients.

Based on this observation the document finally advises to: “Consider reviewing or revising laws criminalising sex work or activities related to sex work that also serve to hinder prevention and outreach work” and “Consider monitoring the legal context for sex work and the Influence of this provision and uptake of HIV services by sex workers.”

4.1.2.4.3 Expert input DG SANTE receives expert input from different points: through EU agencies, through collaboration with other global institutions, through formalized civil society input and through input from academia. First of all, the two most notable EU agencies they receive input from are the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) and the ECDC. They furthermore receive input from global institutions such as the World Health Organisation, which provide normative expertise on public health issues. In the area of HIV/AIDS, a group with representatives of EU Member States and neighbouring countries has moreover been established to exchange information and to strengthen cooperation. This so-called EU HIV Think Tank also provides policy advice to the Commission. Furthermore, there is the Civil Society Forum, of which TAMPEP is a member, comprising major European networks and NGOs. This Forum also provides advice on policy formulation and implementation. Finally, they regularly receive information from established medical journals. They are (currently) not in contact with the EWL.

4.1.2.5 Position of the EC: Abolitionist Even though the EU has no competences regarding prostitution or sex work policy, both DG HOME and DG Justice seem to prefer the abolitionist approach, while DG SANTE has more of an anti-abolitionist position. This has both symbolic and practical consequences. More importantly, the strong link that is formed between the abolitionist movement and human trafficking policy means that a certain idea about prostitutes or sex workers is presented. By conflating prostitution or sex work with human trafficking, the people working in the sex industry are inherently presented as victims. This frame makes it quite difficult for anti-abolitionist, or pro sex work, advocacy groups to make themselves heard at the level of the EC, as their message does not fit with this idea of the prostitute as a victim. Even though DG SANTE has an anti-abolitionist position, this impact is nullified by the power of DG HOME and DG Justice.

4.1.3 Influence on the European Parliament

4.1.3.1 Influence in the plenary sessions Even before the EC presented its Council Framework on combating trafficking in human beings in 2001, the EP had already passed resolutions, conducted research, organized

17 seminars and accepted recommendations. The first resolution on prostitution and trafficking in persons was passed in 1989. “Lobbying by feminists in the Council of Europe led to the commissioning of pioneer research into trafficking and a seminar where trafficking and prostitution were separated as issues, enabling recommendations against trafficking and forced prostitution in 1997” (Outshoorn 2004: 12). One of my interviewees argued that prostitution is rarely discussed as a main subject, but almost always in in connection to another subject on the ethical agenda such as abortion and LGBTI issues. In 2014, however, the Parliament clearly did express its opinion on the issue through its Resolution on sexual exploitation and prostitution, on which I will elaborate below.

4.1.3.1.1 The Honeyball resolution: Background to the resolution Mary Honeyball’s 2014 Resolution on sexual exploitation and prostitution and its impact on gender equality was adopted by 343 votes in favour, 139 against and 105 abstentions. Adopting this report meant that the EP advises all member states to follow the Swedish example on prostitution policy and implement the Nordic model. The abolitionist standpoint becomes very clear from the following excerpts from the report:

Prostitution and the sexual exploitation of women and girls are forms of violence and as such are obstacles to equality between women and men. […] Exploitation in the sex industry is both a cause and a consequence of gender inequality perpetuating the idea that women’s and girls’ bodies are for sale. Prostitution is a very obvious and utterly appalling violation of human dignity. […] [I]t could also be considered that making prostitution and procuring normal activities, or legalising them in any way, is to legalise sexual slavery and gender inequality for women.

Although the resolution was adopted by a large majority, it faced quite some criticism as well. First of all, fellow FEMM member Marina Yannakoudakis (UK, ECR) wrote an alternative resolution. In an open letter to Honeyball she writes:

By conflating sex workers and victims of human trafficking you make it difficult to help those who have been forced into the sex trade while failing to create a safe environment for those who choose to work as prostitutes. […] [Y]ou have got it wrong. You’ve been driven by fervour, not the facts and you’ve put feminism before females.

The alternative resolution was rejected by 238 votes in favour, 334 against and 36 abstentions. Next to this alternative resolution, two minority opinions were voiced. The first one from Angelika Niebler Christa Klass and Astrid Lulling (all members of the Group of the European People’s Party (Christian Democrats)(EPP)) argues that: “a distinction needs to be drawn between forced prostitution and legal prostitution, as provided for in Community legislation.” The second opinion voiced by Ulrike Lunacek (Austria, Greens/EFA), Marije Cornelissen (the Netherlands, Greens/EFA), Iñaki Irazabalbeitia (Spain, Greens/EFA), Raul Romeva (Spain, Greens/EFA) and Sophie In’t Veld (the Netherlands, ALDE) argues that:

Policies that aim to make prostitution invisible and that exclude prostitutes/sex workers from public places, add to stigma, social exclusion and vulnerability. All EU Member States should refrain from criminalising and penalising sex workers or rendering sex work illegal, should give them access to social security rights and develop programmes to assist them to leave the profession should they wish to do so.

In the end multiple amendments were accepted that focused on making a distinction between prostitution and forced prostitution. This way, the minority opinions were partly included in the final adopted resolution. Because of this the abolitionist

18 tendencies of the resolution were somewhat reduced, although the overall message clearly remained abolitionist.

Figure 2: Votes on the 2014 Resolution ‘on sexual exploitation and prostitution and its impact on gender equality’ viewed per political groups (Votewatch.eu)

Figure 3: Votes on the 2014 Resolution ‘on sexual exploitation and prostitution and its impact on gender equality’ viewed per member state (Votewatch.eu)

19 4.1.3.1.1 The Honeyball resolution: analysis of votes As stated above, the resolution as a whole was adopted by 343 votes in favour to 139 against. The votes against came mostly from the Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE), the Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance (Greens/EFA) and the Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy Group (EFD), but also from a minority of members from all other groups. A total of 65% of MEPs voted along European political group lines. The votes by political group and by member states are shown in Figure 2 and Figure 3. Here one can see that some politicians voted along with their political groups, while others preferred to vote along national lines. As Figure 2 shows, about two thirds of the MEPs in the Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament (S&D) voted in favour of the resolution. As Honeyball herself belongs to S&D as well, it is interesting to see where the 34 S&D MEPs who voted against this resolution are from. Their country of origin here could explain why they went against the position of their party. Of the total number of 34 MEPs from S&D that voted against the resolution, 16 were from Germany, 3 from Austria, 3 from the Netherlands, 2 from Belgium. Croatia, France, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain and the UK all had one S&D MEP that voted against this resolution.

4.1.3.2.2 Expert input in the FEMM committee The importance of the frames used by the FEMM committee are well explained by the following quote from Rolandsen Agustín, Associate Professor at Aalborg University in Denmark:

In the context of [the FEMM] Committee, women’s interests are continuously being (re)defined by discursive and deliberative processes. Civil society actors are being included into these processes of policy-making through institutional funding and public hearings. Through the inclusion of particular organizations and the selection of experts for hearings, existing meanings are being reproduced and/or challenged. […] [B]attlegrounds have been (re)opened in recent years as dominant discourses are questioned by the inclusion and legitimation of new civil society actors. Both the FEMM Committee, as a feminist stronghold, and the established women’s organizations at the EU level are being challenged. It becomes contested who the gender experts are, and diverse understandings of gender equality and women’s interests are being articulated. (Agustín 2012: 23)

The FEMM committee gathers input by inviting experts to its hearings. These experts are often academics specialized in the topic they want to address or representatives of organisations that deal with the topic in daily life. Interesting here is the relationship between the FEMM Committee and the EWL. Agustín describes how between 2004 and 2009 the EWL seemed to have lost relative importance in the public interest group representation in the FEMM Committee compared to the period 1999 – 2004. The EWL appeared 6 times as experts in the FEMM Committee in the 5th legislature, whereas it only appeared once in the 6th legislature (Agustín 2012: 33) Following this, I have found two instances in the 7th legislature where EWL experts were invited to FEMM hearings. In 2001, both Amandine Bach and Myria Vassiliadou (then still Secretary General of the EWL) were invited. Until now, the EWL has not been invited as speaker yet in the 8th term. Vassiliadou has however been invited, now in her role as EU Anti-Trafficking Coordinator. That the EWL still plays a very large role in the FEMM Committee is described by on of my interviewees, who state:

It is of course the case that when you work with an organization that has easy access to the Parliament you look at what they are doing and think: “I like that”. But you furthermore also know how to behave in the Parliament and you also know how to stand

20 for election and what you need to do to be eligible. So yeah, there is always a great form of cross-pollination. But between the EWL and the FEMM committee this is really extreme (Interview La Strada).

4.1.3.3 Position of the EP: Abolitionist Even clearer than the position of the EC is that the EP presents a position that is officially abolitionist. Even though the EP lacks competences in this respect as well, it has nevertheless officially recommended the member states of the EU to follow an abolitionist model in relation to prostitution policy. On the one hand this effect could be smaller than the effect of the EC, as the EP can be considered as less powerful or influential than the EC. On the other hand its effect could be stronger, as the EP has officially taken a position on this topic, whereas this is impossible for the EC to do this.

4.2 Influence of academics on the EU institutions As argued in the methods section, the conducted survey was meant to gain more insight into the content and structure of the networks of academics and into how these networks relate to each other and the EU institutions. Below I will describe how the debate between an abolitionist and an anti-abolitionist group is organized, how the networks are structured and in what ways these academics relate to advocacy groups on this topic and to the EU institutions.

4.2.1 Preferred approach: abolitionist vs. anti-abolitionist Differently from what I anticipated, the debate does not seem to be one between academics in favour of an abolitionist approach to prostitution and those in favour of decriminalizing sex work. The debate actually seems to be between those in favour and those against the abolitionist framework. In this sense, academics that are in favour of decriminalization, those in favour of legalization, and those that prefer neither or both all form one group. That this group is a combination of all kinds of academics is shown in the following quote from one of the signers of the critique:

I do not have a preference for a particular prostitution policy. A main reason why I signed the protest against the Honeyball report was how it misrepresents realities and challenges in this policy field and how it proposes only one way to approach prostitution as correct (Answers to survey).

This characteristic becomes visible when one analyses the preferred approaches to prostitution of the two groups. The survey shows that the academics who signed the submission to Honeyball’s report all feel very positively about abolition and are very much against prohibition, legalization and decriminalization (apart from one academic who seemed to have changed opinion to an anti-abolitionist standpoint). However, the academics who signed the ICRSE critique do not show a similar consensus. While a large majority prefers decriminalization, there are also academics in this group who believe that legalization is the best approach to prostitution. And while all academics are (very) positive about decriminalization, Figure 4 shows that opinions about legalization within this group are very divided.

21 33.30% 35.00% 29.60% 30.00% 25.00% 20.00% 14.80% 15.00% 11.10% 11.10% 10.00% 5.00% 0.00% 1 2 3 4 5

Figure 4: Answers to the question ‘To what extent are you in favour or against implementing legalization as the pan-European approach to prostitution?’ on a scale from 1 to 5 where 1 means ‘completely in favour’ and 5 means ‘completely against’ by the academics that signed the ICRSE critique to the Honeyball report.

4.2.2 Advocacy and academia For both academics who supported the Honeyball report and those that supported the ICRSE’s critique, this was not the first time they had used some form of advocacy work towards a political entity. All abolitionist academics and over 90% of the anti- abolitionist academics had previously written or signed letters aimed at their local or national governments. A large majority of both groups had also previously written or signed letters aimed at the EU institutions. The topics they addressed at a national or local level varied widely. Some focused at these levels on prostitution policies as well, but others dealt with subjects that ranged from higher education policy to TTIP and gender violence. Most academics had not previously advocated for a pan-European approach to prostitution by the EU institutions, although they had often lobbied their national governments in relation to prostitution or sex work policy. Although many academics had signed letters aimed at the EU institutions, personal contact occurred much less frequently. Of the academics who signed the critique 11% and 3% are in frequent contact with the EP and EC respectively. A little over one-third had once or a few times been in contact with these institutions. One of the participants described the involvement of academics as follows:

There is an active contribution by academics acting as consultants for national governments and EU institutions. Much of their contributions are in the form of research reports, blueprints, and similar documents that, typically, academics are asked to provide. Moreover, many of such academics work with charities, NGOs and similar organizations interested both in addressing EU or national/local policies, and to receive research grants badly needed for continuing to survive in this special market/industry based on people's problems (Answers to survey).

4.2.4 Networks of academics: personal relations and email lists All academics on both sides of the debate (a score of 100%) believe that the academic community is in some way involved in the debate on the best pan-European prostitution policy. Academics are often involved in the debate through the research they are conducting. They furthermore help frame the debate and address their opinions in different contexts.

When it comes to prostitution the distinction between academics, activists and practitioners is very blurred. Most academics who work on prostitution that I know also are involved with local initiatives and NGOs. This means that it is very difficult to

22 establish the role of academics in these debates as they are so closely enmeshed with groups (on all sides of the debate) (Answers to survey).

In line with the above quote, one of my interviewees called herself a ‘feminist activist researcher’. Furthermore, I also asked whether they believed that there is a ‘global network of academics’ (in line with a sentence in the Submission to Honeyball’s Report) advocating in favour of the Nordic model and whether they believed that there is such a network advocating against the Nordic model. Following these questions the participants were asked to describe the network and whether they felt that they were a part of it. I will look at both the network of academics in favour of the Nordic model and the network of academics against this model. First, about half of the academics in both groups believe in the existence of a network of academics advocating in favour of the Nordic model. This was described by academics on both sides of the debate as an informal network that is mainly organized through email lists and through existing connections within the women’s movement, particularly radical feminist informal networks. Academics who supported the ICRSE’s critique called this network of academics a sort of old girls’ network and criticized its members for not inviting sex workers as keynote speakers. One academic who signed the ICRSE critique describes the network as follows:

This network, which is particularly, but not only, developed outside Southern Europe, works as a very influential network, active both within and outside the borders of academia. Main figures are British, Swedish, French and Danish academics, with many contacts in the European Commission and in some central NGOs (or similar organizations) based mostly in Brussels. Leading figures easily receive EU research grants as those provided by FP7, Horizon 2020 and the like. More importantly, leading figures are able to influence the priorities of such research programs, in the course of their development. […] Then, of course, there are publications. Usually, such publications are shaped as reports, printed by an unknown NGOs based in Brussels; but, importantly, they also carry the EU logo on the cover (Answers to survey).

The academic integrity of supporters of the Nordic model was often questioned by both signers of the critique as well as by my interviewees. They were often criticized for basing their findings on a moral position rather than academic research. Weitzer has previously referred to this group as ““extreme” in the sense that it is absolutist, doctrinaire, and unscientific”. (Weitzer 2005: 2) Rubin argued that this literature is filled with “sloppy definitions, unsupported assertions, and outlandish claims” (Rubin 1993: 36). Although the positions expressed in the survey or interviews were not as strong as those of Weitzer and Rubin, similar views were expressed there. A representative of the ICRSE argued for example that: “often the argument then boils down to on the one side the evidence, and on the other side, you know emotional or ideological discourse” (Interview ICRSE). One of the academics who signed the ICRSE critique furthermore states that: “I do not believe in academics who take up an anti- trafficking position. It’s all the same moral tone as what you find by some of those NGOs. Everything that does not fit into the way they view the world is manipulated so that it will fit” (Interview Lorraine Nencel). Ine Vanwesenbeeck, another academic who signed the ICRSE critique, furthermore paraphrases Wagenaar and Altink (2012) when she argues that the abolitionist politics is “notoriously fact resistant” (Interview Ine Vanwesenbeeck). Secondly, there is the network of academics advocating against the Nordic model. Only one of the academics who signed the Honeyball Submission beliefs that this network exists, while about three quarters of the academics that signed the ICRSE critique believe this. Of this latter group, about 80% also believes to be a part of this network. This network seems to be organized in a very similar fashion to the network of

23 academics advocating in favour of the Nordic model: through personal ties and mailing lists. Being a part of this network means that one discusses the topic with other academics. Academics who signed the ICRSE critique furthermore state that they believe their network to be more open to having alternate voices at their events than the abolitionist network.

4.3 Influence of advocacy groups on the EU institutions Four different advocacy groups played an important role in my study: the EWL, the International Committee on the Rights of Sex workers in Europe (ICRSE), the European Network for HIV/STI Prevention and Health Promotion among Migrant Sex workers (TAMPEP) and La Strada International – the European Network Against Trafficking in Human Beings Of these four organisations their background, position towards prostitution or sex work and general level of influence on the EU institutions will be outlined below.

4.3.1 The main advocacy groups

4.3.1.1 The European Women’s Lobby The EWL was founded in 1990 and is the largest European umbrella organization working to promote women’s rights and gender equality in the EU. Four different adopted motions are the basis for the EWL’s position on prostitution. First of all, the 1998 motion “Prostitution and Trafficking” affirmed that prostitution is not a job but a violation of human rights, a form of male violence, and denies a distinction between voluntary and forced prostitution. The 2001 motion on “Sanctioning of the clients of prostitution and strengthening the policies against pimping” stated that the EWL was in favour of the Nordic model. A third motion in 2003 reaffirmed the EWL’s abolitionist position after organisations from new EU member state had joined the EWL. Finally, a fourth motion in 2005 affirmed the ‘zero tolerance’ position towards prostitution and stated that prostitution should not even exist to satisfy people with a handicap (Lafon 2014). The EWL’s position towards sex work policy has become one of its core tenets. The EWL has organized multiple campaigns and actions to create support for their position. It has launched the “Nordic-Baltic Pilot Project”, a regional cooperation against prostitution (ibid). It furthermore has launched the 2011 campaign ‘Together for a Europe free from prostitution’ and was an active supporter of MEP Mary Honeyball’s 2014 report. Quite some of the actions in the EC and EP originated in the EWL (ibid). The foundation of the EWL was encouraged by the EC, which sought “a unitary voice to represent the otherwise fragmented and diverse landscape of the European women’s movement of the 1980s” (Agustín 2012: 26). The organisation was given an exclusive A- budget of Community funds in 1995, which it kept until 2002. “This is important because such funding provides the most stable and safe form of financing, and therefore entails the possibility of long term planning and certain financial stability. More importantly though, such funding is designed to fund EU administrative activities, which means that the EC considers the EWL to be performing such tasks for the EU. Consequently, it is not viewed as any other women’s organisation, but as a fundamental partner of the EU in the production and implementation of EU gender policies, and is granted a de facto financial monopoly” (Grundell 2015). This shows that the EWL is viewed as a fundamental partner in the EU production and implementation of EU gender policies. Only a small number of well-organized groups get preferential access to the EU institutions (Peters 2005). The EWL seems to be one of these.

4.3.1.2 ICRSE The International Committee on the Rights of Sex Workers in Europe (ICRSE) originated from the 2005 European Conference on Sex Work, Human Rights, Labour and Migration. The ICRSE includes 84 organisations 29 countries in Western, Eastern and Central

24 Europe and Central Asia. The core values of the ICRSE were decided upon at the 2005 conference and include that as a member of the ICRSE you oppose the criminalization of sex work, you support the self-organization of sex workers and you respect the self- determination of sex workers. Similar to what is found with the different groups of academics on this issue is that the core value of the ICRSE is anti-abolitionist rather than pro-legalization or pro-decriminalization. The ICRSE elaborates on this point as follows:

The perspective of the ICRSE, so the core values of the European Network is to oppose the criminalization of sex work, which is quite large, you know, in some cases. We don’t advocate specifically for one legal model. So, we just oppose the criminalization of sex work. Because as you know, in the region you can have different models, from you know, full criminalization to legalization, with different kinds of emphasis. So in the network we do not have kind of one position. (Interview ICRSE)

Differently from the EWL, the ICRSE does not receive direct funding from the EU institutions. Whereas the EWL seems to receive a lot of institutional recognition, this is not the case for the ICRSE. For example, when the EWL presented their Declaration at the EP, sex workers were also asked to leave at the request of participants from a trafficking conference that was also taking place at the time. The ICRSE as well as sex workers seem to have been delegitimized as political actors. Whereas the EWL is often consulted by different DGs, the strategic action of the ICRSE seemed to have been foremost reactive and involved little interactions with the EU institutions. The ICRSE is best described as a “challenger from the outside” (Scaramuzzino and Scaramuzzino 2015: 147, 154). Although the ICRSE currently is unable to exercise a large influence at the European level, it does have the long-term goal to be more present and to engage further in advocacy activities if capacities improve.

4.3.1.3 TAMPEP TAMPEP is the European Network for HIV/STI Prevention and Health Promotion among Migrant Sex workers. One of its roles is to organize lobbying and advocacy activities at national, regional and international levels. Included in TAMPEP’s mission is that the organisation wants to promote “a legal and social framework for dealing with prostitution based on the protection of human and civil rights.” A flyer from 2000 furthermore shows that the organization is in favour of respect of the civil rights of prostitutes, the freedom of self-determination of sexual choices and the freedom to sell or buy sex among consenting adults (TAMPEP). TAMPEP used to be financed by the EC. This is no longer the case, since the organization wanted to function completely independent from the Commission in order to not experience pressure to conform to EC wishes. The organization has been financed through the DAPHNE programme. While the organization does have its contacts within the EP, they are rarely approached by MEPs. Similar to the ICRSE situation, connections are mainly based on a pro-active stance of TAMPEP.

4.3.1.4 La Strada International La Strada was launched in 1995 and was officially established in 2004. It currently includes eight member organisations (La Strada International). The organization is financed by the EC on project basis. The latest project where this was the case was the 2014 campaign ‘Used in Europe’, which was co-funded by the Prevention of and Fight Against Crime Programme of the European Union. La Strada’s primary goal is to empower trafficked persons, to improve their position through promoting their universal rights, including the right to choose to emigrate and work abroad and to be protected from violence and abuse. They base themselves on the belief that the right of all human beings should be protected, including the rights of sex workers. A former representative of La Strada describes their position on prostitution policy as follows:

25

What is important for us is that there are no laws that make it difficult for sex workers to carry out their work. What you are saying in principle then is that you are in favour of decriminalization (Interview La Strada).

Similarly to the ICRSE and TAMPEP, La Strada does not have an office in Brussels. To be able to exercise influence at the European level they therefore count on other organisations in their networks, which do have a Brussels based office. As described by the former representative of La Strada: “I never sat ‘in the fire’, but I always made sure that I was close to the people who were.” La Strada has formed coalitions and working relationships with, among others, Amnesty International, Save the Children, PLAN, the Church Commission on Migrants in Europe (CCME) and PICUM. They are also a member of the Human Rights and Democracy Network. Furthermore, La Strada used to be invited more often to share their insights with Joy Ngozi Ezeilo, the high official that could be seen as the predecessor of the current Anti-Trafficking Coordinator and the current Special Rapporteur on trafficking in persons, especially women and children in the OHCHR. However, when the current Anti- Trafficking Coordinator took office La Strada was not invited in the EU Civil Society Platform against the trafficking of human beings (Interview La Strada).

4.3.2 Factors of influence As stated in the theoretical framework influence will be measured in this study on five different dimensions: agenda setting; access to decision-making arenas; achieving favourable policies; monitoring and shaping implementation; and shifting the long-term priorities and resources of political institutions (Andrews and Edwards 2004: 492). First, there is agenda-setting. As the EP did discuss the benefits of the Nordic model in 2014, but did not discuss the benefits of legalization or decriminalization this shows that the abolitionist advocacy groups have been able to decisively influence the agenda setting whereas the anti-abolitionist have not. Secondly, one needs to look at access to decision-making arenas. As described above, the European Women’s Lobby has an office in Brussels while the ICRSE, TAMPEP and La Strada do not. For this reason, the abolitionists do have access to the decision-making arenas whereas this is much more complicated for the anti-abolitionists. Thirdly, one is influential if one can achieve favourable policies. Similar to point one, the EP adopting the Honeyball Resolution shows that the abolitionists achieved their favourable policy. Even though this resolution was non-binding, it does show a larger influence of the abolitionists than the anti-abolitionists. Fourthly, influence can be measured by the extent to which advocacy groups are able to monitor and shape implementation. In relation to this topic, this form of influence is difficult to measure since the EU has no formal competences. Implementation is therefore left to the individual member states. Since this has not been the focus of this study, I am unable to what extent the different lobbying coalitions exercise influence at this level. Finally, it is important to study the extent to which one is able to shift the long- term priorities and resources of political institutions. Again, the abolitionists seem to be on the winning side here. Combatting human trafficking and prostitution constitutes a priority of the EC while combatting the spread of HIV and respecting the rights of sex workers, is much less so. Furthermore, abolitionist advocacy groups seem to be quite able to secure funding, while this seems to be much more difficult for anti-abolitionist advocacy groups. We can therefore conclude that the abolitionist advocacy groups are more influential than the anti-abolitionist advocacy groups, but how should we explain this? The next section will study whether the effect of both internal as well as external factors mentioned in the theoretical framework of this study are confirmed in this case. These

26 factors were financial and personnel resources of advocacy groups; having a physical presence in Brussels and the resonance of the position with the status quo and with the EU frame (internal factors) and the level of institutionalism of the advocacy groups; the lobbying coalitions; complexity and salience of the topic; and the degree of conflict in relation to the topic (external factors). Finally two new explanatory factors are discussed: the riskiness of taking an official position in non-salient issues and the resonance with official EU competences.

4.3.2.1 Internal factors

4.3.2.1.1 Financial resources The EWL and abolitionist groups more generally tend to be quite successful in securing funding for their organisations. This is often related to the frame they are working in as well as the alliances they have created. While the abolitionist are known for their successes here, the anti-abolitionists often argue that they have no money. Among the organisations that I interviewed TAMPEP no longer receives funding from the EC and has people working for them on a voluntary basis. The ICRSE had no paid staff until three years ago and currently is only able to afford some part-time employees. The only anti-abolitionist organization that I spoke with that seems to be able to secure some funding, although only on a project basis, is La Strada, which is possibly attributable to them being an anti-human trafficking organization rather than an organization whose main focus is sex work. Since they have no money, anti-abolitionist organisations furthermore remain fairly small. This finding is in line with the theories presented in the theoretical framework: advocacy groups with little financial resources are less likely (or practically unable) to have an influence on the EU institutions

4.3.2.1.2 Personnel resources and a physical presence in Brussels The theory that personnel resources and a physical presence in Brussels have a positive effect on the level of advocacy groups on the EU institutions is confirmed in this case as well. Having an office in Brussels near the EU institutions indeed allows an organisation to enter into face-to-face contact with officials in the EU institutions. When an organisation has both a Brussels based office and personnel resources focusing on advocating its position in the EU institutions, the organization furthermore gains expertise in the workings of the EU, is able to follow everything that happens in the EU institutions, as well as to be provided with the opportunity of when and how to approach MEPs and officials in the EC. Linked to their lack of financial and personal resources, the anti-abolitionist advocacy groups currently do not have lobbying as their main focus. This is in stark contrast with the EWL, which has both a Brussels based office as well as people on pay role that focus on lobbying for their standpoint.

4.3.2.1.3 Resonance of position with status quo and EU frame The literature suggested that advocacy groups whose position resonates with the status quo of the EU institutions and the frame used in these institutions more generally are more successful in influencing the EU institutions. This study seems to confirm this theory as well. As this study has shown, the status quo position taken up in both the EP and most of the DGs that (indirectly) deal with prostitution or sex work policy shows a preference for the abolitionist approach to prostitution. The abolitionist advocacy groups such as the EWL also seem to have a “higher value and greater legitimacy form the outset” (Rolandsen Agustín 2008: 514) than for example the ICRSE or La Strada. Furthermore, as is shown above, the EU is able to exercise most influence on prostitution or sex work policy through the frame of human trafficking. Here again, we find that this is the frame that the abolitionists adhere to most as well. The relatively unsuccessful anti-abolitionists contrarily try to steer away from the frame of human trafficking as much as possible.

27 4.3.2.2 External factors

4.3.2.2.1 Level of institutionalism: the monopoly of the EWL The theory assumes that advocacy groups that consist of “the resourceful and already organized networks” (Rolandsen Agustín 2008: 515) will me more successful in influencing the EU institutions. This hypothesis is confirmed in this case by the fact that the only resourceful and officially recognized organization by the EU institutions, the EWL, is also the only advocacy group that is able to really influence these institutions. A question of causal nature is here in place. The question remains whether the EWL has influenced the EU institutions in adopting an abolitionist stance, or whether the EWL has grown out of an existing standpoint in these institutions. The origin of the EWL described in for example Ramot (2016) or Lafon (2014) hints to a mutual relationship that leans to the EWL influencing the EU institutions. What is interesting is that this study has furthermore found that one advocacy group creating a monopoly for itself also negatively affects the possible influence of other advocacy groups that do not share the same position as the EWL. The fact that the EWL is funded to this extent by the EC shows that it has a very important role when it comes to lobbying for gender related issues in the EU. As Helferrich and Kolb argue: “EWL is frequently consulted by the Equal Opportunities Unit of DG Employment (formerly DG V) on a regular basis. Informal friendly contacts have led to formal and more important lobbying interactions, strengthening not only the role of the EWL but that of agencies trying to advance equality as well” (Helferrich and Kolb 2001: 148). Even though the unit that is referred to is the current Directorate D of DG Justice, the above quote shows that EWL has strong formal as well as informal connections with the EC. For this reason, it seems to be the case that a large part of the expertise on prostitution in the EU institutions comes from the EWL. Due to the dominant occupation by EWL, it is practically impossible for anti-abolitionist advocacy groups to penetrate the EU. The mere existence of the EWL, combined with the ‘if you’re not with us you’re against us’-message, therefore makes it very difficult for anti-abolitionist organisations to come into contact with the EU institutions.

4.3.2.2.2 Lobbying coalitions Another factor that is stressed by the literature is the effect of lobbying coalitions of advocacy groups on the extent to which they are able to influence the EU institutions. Analysis showed that abolitionists are most likely to work with organisations that associate themselves with the women’s movement, with religious organisations and with organisations whose main focus is to combat human trafficking. Anti-abolitionists on the other hand have formed coalitions with organisations that associate themselves with the LBGT-movement, organisations that fight against the spread of HIV and organisations who fight for the rights of (illegal) migrants. A representative from the ICRSE explains the hierarchical relationship between these alliances:

Well it’s the women’s rights movement. So the same way that the women’s rights movement has more funding than the LGBT movement, which has more funding than the trans movement. So there is like a hierarchy of oppression I guess. And women being more numerous and like a stronger movement have more funding. (Interview ICRSE)

As this hierarchy shows, the more powerful coalitions are in this case more successful in influencing the EU institutions, confirming existing theory. What is however interesting is that “organizations that work directly with prostitutes on a regular basis are invariably suspicious of abolition and supportive of legalization” (Mattson 2015: 172-73). Abolitionists receive a lot of criticism from both NGOs as well as from academia. NGOs that work closely with sex workers that are currently working

28 in the sex industry often claim that abolitionists refuse to listen to the wishes and needs of sex workers. As argued above, anti-abolitionist academics furthermore describe abolitionists as moralistic, radical feminists that refuse to base themselves in evidence. Furthermore, the result of the support of both academics as well as NGOs that work together with sexworkers and the rise of the abolitionist standpoint has caused some larger organisations, such as Amnesty International, to officially take a position in the debate.

I have witnessed a change in perspective from ‘that is an issue we are not talking about’ to ‘it is actually quite difficult to not discuss sex workers when you are dealing with human trafficking’. The reason for this is that human trafficking policy could possibly have severe consequences for sex workers rights, even if it is not meant to. The collateral damage is so huge that, well yeah, at one point you have to take a stand on it. I feel that that is something that has occurred with organisations over the last ten years. (Interview La Strada)

However, these new coalitions seem not to be strong enough to create a counter narrative in the EU institutions against the abolitionists. Nevertheless, as argued by La Strada, it is only a recent phenomenon that new human rights organisations have started to join the coalition of the anti-abolitionists. This may potentially alter the success of anti-abolitionist advocacy groups on influencing the EU institutions in the future.

4.3.2.2.3 Complexity of the problem: The simplicity of the solution of the abolitionists Another assumption made in the literature was that on more complex topics the EU institutions would be more inclined to look for the expert input of advocacy groups. Even though the impact of prostitution policy is quite a complex field, this case showed quite little incentive of the EU institutions in addressing advocacy groups. An explanation for this is that prostitution or sex work policy is not an official EU competence. However, what this study did show was that advocacy groups that were able to simplify the problem and to provide simple answers to the problem were more likely to be listened to by the EU institutions. Here abolitionists are again more successful. Their solution is relatively simple: criminalize clients of prostitution. This causes a decline in the demand for prostitution, which causes a decline in the supply of prostitution, which means that fewer women will become victims of prostitution. This solution gains much appeal since all EU officials are enticed by prospects of fewer victims in the sex industry. The anti-abolitionists’ solution is more complex: both legalization and decriminalization are presented as legal approaches that are only able to succeed if one devotes time and money to relating regulations. Furthermore, their solution focuses on improving working conditions and decreasing stigma of sex workers – a much less popular solution than saving victims of human trafficking.

4.3.2.2.4 Salience It was hypothesized that the EU institutions are more likely to include advocacy groups and academia when a topic is salient for stakeholders or the overall public. However, as argued in the section above as well, the topic of prostitution or sex work policy is naturally not a salient issue since the EU’s lack of official competences here is well known. Furthermore, even if people are concerned about sex work policy it is not the most important topic that they are dealing with, as was underlined by a former representative of La Strada:

So yeah, you indeed had a number of Greens that were angry [about the Honeyball resolution]. But even there, you know, it is not as if they all made a huge issue about it. They thought: we are so low in numbers so we do not really stand a chance and if we still have a chance to succeed at the climate summit in Paris than we prefer to save our kudos

29 for Paris than to use them all up on this topic. While, I mean, they did do it you know. But did they set up a gigantic campaign? No. (Interview La Strada)

Due to the low level of saliency of the topic, the EU institutions possibly did not include the anti-abolitionist advocacy groups to a very large extent. However, this particular factor does not explain why the abolitionist advocacy groups were successful while the anti-abolitionists were not.

4.3.2.2.5 Degree of conflict in relation to the topic The literature referred to in the theoretical framework argues that advocacy groups that deal with topics without competing coalitions find it easier to influence the EU institutions (Klüver et al 2015: 452). Officially, both anti-abolitionists as well as abolitionists dealt with the same topic and therefore with the same degree of conflict in relation to this topic. However, as the EWL, the official organization representing women’s issues in the EU, has taken an abolitionist position, they have partly succeeded in presenting their position as one where there is consensus among women and feminists. Even though the feminist sex wars clearly portray no such consensus, the fact that EWL makes it look this way has enabled them to influence the EU institutions to a larger extent.

4.3.2.3 New explanatory factors Next to the explanations derived from the literature, the data analysis also showed two other explanations for the relative success of some advocacy groups. These two consist firstly of riskiness for EU officials / humanitarian organisations to officially condone one position, while secondly some groups excel in resonating with official EU competences.

4.3.2.3.1 Riskiness of taking an official position in non-salient issues Unmentioned in the literature was the risk of taking up a position in the debate by officials in the EU or EP, affecting level of influence of advocacy groups in EU institutions. In this specific case, taking up the anti-abolitionist position could entail negative effects. People in the EC or EP who advocate for anti-abolitionist standpoints run the risk of being depicted as human traffickers or pimps themselves. For this reason, many supporting organisations as well as officials are unwilling to be in the front line in this debate.

“If you’re not with us, you’re against us.” That really is the message of the EWL and of Equality Now. That is their strategy and that makes others cautious as well. For example, La Strada did write and publish some clear statements on sex workers over the last couple of years. We did not do this before. Everybody knew our position, but we did not publish any official statements about this. (Interview La Strada)

An example where abolitionists called an anti-abolitionist group of organisations (in this case the ICRSE and La Strada) a ‘pimp’ occurred for example on the evening of the vote for the Honeyball resolution. Honeyball sent an email to the other MEPs stating the following:

I am writing to you in the light of correspondence you will have received which includes a press release from an organisation purporting to represent 470 NGOs. At a hearing on the subject organised by the S&D Group last week, Rachel Moran, a survivor of prostitution, made it very clear that these are in fact organisations comprised of pimps etc. I hope that you will take this into account, since it is clear that the information you have received is not what it seems and is incorrect (Facebook).

These actions show that when it is risky for EU officials to officially take a position, this makes it more complicated for advocacy groups lobbying for that position

30 to influence the EU institutions. This is especially the case for topics where the EU has no official competences, as this makes this topic less salient. EU officials are less likely to put themselves at risk for issues that are for them of low salience.

4.3.2.3.2 Resonance with EU competences Literature suggests it is a necessary condition for advocacy groups to focus on a topic where the EU has official competences. If not, they should rather opt to lobby at the domestic or national level. This study has interestingly found that even when advocacy groups focus on a topic where the EU has no competences, the ability to nevertheless attach themselves to topics where the EU has (high) competences greatly affects the level of influence that these advocacy groups have in the EU institutions. As this study has shown, abolitionists frame their message as an issue of gender equality or as one that is closely related to human trafficking. Framing prostitution as a gender equality issue is important, since this implies that all or most women would be in favour of this approach, which implies a frame of general importance. Anti-abolitionists oftentimes remain in the frame of sex workers, and therefore remain outside of the EU competences. “[W]ith regards to their interest, those defended by sex workers’ CSOs are often not considered general. […] Moreover, they clearly do not tally with the interests of European society as expressed in EU policies” (Grundell 2015). Next to the gender equality frame, abolitionists often deploy the powerful frame of human trafficking. Contrarily to prostitution policy, human trafficking is an issue where the EC has shared competences under the heading of the area of freedom, security and justice. The use of this frame enabled the EWL to make the issue of prostitution relevant for the EU (Scaramuzzino and Scaramuzzino 2015: 145). A EU- related frame used by the anti-abolitionists is that of human rights or public health. However, public health is only a supporting competence of the EU, while human trafficking is a shared one. In general one can conclude that advocacy groups that lobby for a topic where the EU has no formal competences are likely to be much more successful in influencing the EU institutions when they can successfully frame their issue as one where the EU has formal consequences than when they refrain from doing this.

5. Conclusion This study aimed to provide an answer to the question:

What explains the relative effectiveness of advocacy groups lobbying in the EU institutions for topics where the EU has no official competences?

To be able to answer this question I have looked at the ways both the EC and the EP deal with the topic of prostitution or sex work and in what ways they receive expert input in relation to this topic. Furthermore, I have studied the networks between academics at both sides of the ‘sex wars’ debate and have depicted a picture of how these academics interact with each other and with the EU institutions. Finally, I have looked in depth at both internal and external factors that contribute to advocacy groups’ level of impact when it comes to influencing the EU institutions and had studies to what extent they confirm existing theories on how advocacy groups best influence the EU institutions. I will briefly summarize these findings; outline some recommendations for advocacy groups that want to have a greater impact on the EU institutions and will finally conclude with recommendations for future research.

31 5.1 Summary of findings First of all, although prostitution policy is a member state competence, analysis of the EC showed that three different DGs nevertheless deal with the topic of prostitution or sex work. DG HOME deals with the topic through the frame of human trafficking, DG Justice through violence against women and DG SANTE deals with sex workers as an at risk group in the prevention of the spread of STIs and HIV. These DGs differed not only in the way they linked prostitution and sex work to their competences, but also in the way they received expert input. Furthermore, although they cannot officially take a position, DG HOME and DG Justice seem to prefer an abolitionist approach, while DG SANTE seems to be anti-abolitionist. This matters, since the preferred position of the EU institutions has quite an effect in what advocacy groups are able to influence these institutions, as has been discussed in 4.3.2. Secondly, the EP dealt more openly with the topic of prostitution and sex work policy. The clearest example of this was the 2014 Honeyball Resolution ‘on sexual exploitation and prostitution and its impact on gender equality’, which was adopted with 343 votes in favour to 139 against. Among other things, the adoption of this resolution in the EP plenary, which was created and adopted in the FEMM committee of the EP, shows that the EP as a whole and more specifically its FEMM Committee share an abolitionist position to prostitution. Both the EC and the EP here seem to share the abolitionist position to prostitution. The Committees of the EP gather expert input in different hearings that they organise themselves. Most experts are academics, but experts from the EWL have been invited to these hearings as well. Regarding academics, the study showed that both networks of academics that advocate in favour of and against the Nordic model exist. Both networks are based on personal relations between academics and communicate through email lists. There is little to no communication between the two sides. Reasons for this are based on a lack of interest in the other side as well as a possible clear dislike of the people in the other network. Most of the academics that signed the submission or critique of the resolution had previously been active in advocating for their preferred prostitution policy at the national or local level and for other, oftentimes unrelated, topics at the European level. These actions were mainly based on writing and signing letters, as most academics had never been in personal contact with people in the EP or EC. Finally, this study outlined both internal and external factors that affect the level of impact of advocacy groups. The internal factors focus on financial and personnel resources of advocacy groups; having a physical presence in Brussels and the resonance of the position with the status quo and with the EU frame. Here all existing theories were confirmed. The level of influence of advocacy groups increased when they had access to funding and had professional lobbyists on payroll; when they had a Brussels- based office and when they worked in the frame of a subject where the EU institutions have competences, preferably human trafficking. The external factors focus on the level of institutionalism of the advocacy groups; the lobbying coalitions; complexity and salience of the topic; and the degree of conflict in relation to the topic. Regarding the first two factors the theory is clearly confirmed: more institutionalised advocacy groups and advocacy groups in stronger lobbying coalitions are indeed more able to influence the EU institutions. The theory on the complexity and saliency of the topic is more difficult to confirm, as the topic was the same for all sides of the debate. However, it seems advocacy groups that are able to come up with simpler solutions and to link their solution to more salient topics are better able to influence the EU institutions. Finally, the literature argues that when there is less conflict surrounding a topic advocacy groups in general are more able to influence the EU institutions. In this case, however, we deal with a case where there is a very high degree of conflict and a very skewed division in the extent to which advocacy groups are able to influence the EU institutions. A possible explanation for this is that

32 the successful advocacy group, the EWL, has been successful in portraying its position as one where there is consensus among women and feminist organisations. In addition, this study yielded two more factors that possibly explain the extent to which advocacy groups are successful in influencing the EU institutions: the riskiness of taking an official position in non-salient issues and the resonance with official EU competences. First of all, this study showed that officials are less likely to officially speak out in favour of one position on a non-salient topic if taking up this position can have negative consequences for them. In this study, taking up the anti-abolitionist position could pose the risk of being framed as a human trafficker by abolitionist advocacy groups. The most important new explanatory factor that this study found is that advocacy groups who dealt with a topic where the EU had no official competences (prostitution or sex work policy in this case) were most successful in influencing the EU institutions if they were able to frame their topic as one where the EU does have official competences. In this case, the abolitionists were successful in reframing their concerns of prostitution policy as concerns in relation to human trafficking and gender equality. The anti-abolitionists however continued to lobby through a sex work policy frame, or sometimes as sex work policy linked to human health, and by doing so were less successful in influencing the EU institutions.

5.2 Recommendations for advocacy groups So what should be the focus of advocacy groups that want to increase their influence in the EU institutions in relation to a topic where the EU has no competences? Whereas the literature argued that advocacy groups in those scenarios in general do not lobby the EU institutions, this study however showed that advocacy groups can (productively) lobby regardless of official competences of the EU. As a contribution, this study shows that one of the bases for success here seems to lie in the frame that one works from. If one wants to influence the EU institutions, one should work in a frame related to one of their competences. In relation to prostitution or sex work policy it seems most useful to work in the frame of human trafficking. Human trafficking, however, seems to centre mainly on a victim-centred approach, which is something anti-abolitionists should keep in mind. Working in these frames may improve chances to secure funding for their activities and research. A further precondition for having an impact at the European level is well known: make sure that you have an office in Brussels and lobbyists on payroll. Necessary for this is of course to secure funding for your organization. When it is impossible to have your own office and people in Brussels, it is advisable to form coalitions and connections with organisations that do have an office and lobbyists in Brussels. This is one of the tactics exercised by La Strada, which seems to have been quite successful. Finally, both the EP as well as the EC stated that what they needed from advocacy groups were facts. It is therefore a good idea to work together with academics to provide the institutions with solid academic evidence.

5.3 Recommendations for future research My recommendations for future research are threefold and focus on both more in depth research into this specific case and more in depth research into advocacy groups lobbying the EU institutions on general. A recommendation for further research that would focus more on this case would be one where one studies more closely the position of DG HOME in relation to prostitution policy and how DG HOME has come to its abolitionist position. This would be important research, as DG HOME seems to be the most influential DG in the EC in relation to this topic. Secondly, still related to this case but focussing on the influence of advocacy groups more general, more research is needed that focuses on the winners in this case: the abolitionist advocacy groups that have successfully influenced the EU institutions in relation to prostitution policy. Interviews conducted with for example the EWL or other important individual players

33 on the abolitionist side could further strengthen (or weaken) the results of this study. Finally, to see if the results found in these study, especially the new factors, will hold for multiple situations where advocacy groups lobby the EU institutions on topics where the EU has no competences, more research is needed on other cases than prostitution or sex work policy. Such a study would similarly be able to strengthen or weaken the results found in this thesis.

6. Discussion and reflection In the following section I want to reflect on some of the problems that I encountered during the research and on some possible complications based on the methods. I will mainly reflect on the general use of interviews as a means to answer my research question, discuss the problems I encountered in trying to collect respondents for my survey and in trying to find interviewees, and come up with some recommendations for other researchers studying sex work or other sensitive subjects.

6.1 Problems with generalizing from interview data First of all, one can problematize the fact that I have used interviews as a form of data input to answer my research question. Issues that are questioned about interviews are for example the reliability and the effect of biased questions (Bryman 2012). Whereas I spend quite some time on the wording of my questions, biased questions are practically inevitable. However, even though these are general characteristics that can be questioned about interviewing in general, I feel that my combining this data with secondary literature makes it less likely that I will run into problems here. Furthermore, since I asked all my interviewees about their own experiences in the recent past, this will also cause fewer problems than if I had asked them about experiences they were less familiar with in the more distant past. Finally, the use of interviews has enabled me to gather data that I would have been unable to gain access to with other methods, since much of my findings are build on personal knowledge and experience. This therefore has made interviewing a very suitable method in my study.

6.2 Problems with gathering respondents for survey and interviews Whereas I expected that gaining the acceptance of the abolitionist activists might be somewhat more complicated than working with the anti-abolitionists, I had not expected it to be this difficult and to run into this much hostility – especially not at the academic level. I was surprised most by the fact that people went to the trouble of notifying their network of my own position in the debate and to ask of their network to reconsider whether or not they would want to partake in my study. Both because of the possible effect of interviewing as a method in general, and of the bias in respondents that were willing to share their insights with me, it is possible that my results contain some sort of bias. I believe that the complications I encountered can be explained by the general difficulty in reaching abolitionists, the fact that I am not a part of any network, the intensity of the debate connected to the impossibility to talk to people on ‘the other side’, and because I am a Dutch student who stands on the anti-abolitionist side of the debate. First of all, as argued above, the networks of the abolitionists run through personal contacts and mailing lists. Since I am neither in those networks, nor know anybody who is, this further complicated securing contacts here. Furthermore, experiencing problems when trying to include face-to-fact contact with abolitionists in one’s research turns out to be a common problem, as the following story shows:

[A] couple of researchers, I think MA students or PhDs were trying to gain a better understanding of the different groups on advocacy and policy in Scotland. And they were

34 having exactly the same response. It was impossible to get in touch with the women’s rights, women’s support network in UK. But it was really easy to talk to people who support decriminalization. (Interview ICRSE)

The intensity and sensitivity of this topic furthermore makes it more difficult to win the trust of abolitionist activists and researchers. Both O’Neill and Mattson acknowledge this intensity in the following two quotes:

I will say that, in my experience, feminists opposed to prostitution, pornography and s/m fight with a passion reserved for the truly self-righteous. It is not only that they know they are right, but they know that the safety of women elsewhere depends on the triumph of their position. Women who disagree are not only enemies but traitors. (O’Neill 2001: 22)

The stakes are especially high given prostitution’s role in ongoing “feminist sex wars” over the meaning of sexuality, between radical feminists who strive to abolish it along with pornography and sadomasochism, and liberal or sex-positive feminists who argue there are no fixed meaning of sexuality. These wars position individuals as either apologists or allies for each side, making neutrality all but impossible. […] Prostitution, in the way it is currently understood, necessarily implicates the personal lives of its experts in ways that expertise on the European Union or theories of the states does not. (Mattson 2015: 183 - 84)

When it comes to personal characteristics, some worked in my favour whereas others made it practically impossible to interact with abolitionists. The fact that I was a female has probably helped me in gaining access, since prostitution is a field in which almost all the experts are women (Mattson 2015: 184). What however was problematic was the fact that I was Dutch and affiliated with the University of Amsterdam, since the Netherlands forms a stereotypical example of legalization of sex work. Neither was it helpful that I am ‘merely’ a student, which provides me with a position that is generally quite low on the hierarchical ladder of academia. The characteristic that really made it impossible for me to talk to academics, advocacy groups or NGOs that are in favour of the Nordic model is the fact that I personally prefer decriminalization or legalization of sex work to abolition. I have not elaborated upon my own position in my requests, since my study had no aim to favour or disfavour any side of the debate, but was only aimed at gaining a better understanding on the workings of advocacy groups on this topic. However, when people found an old online presentation where I argued why I believe we should not follow the Swedish model on prostitution all doors were closed. This was an extremely frustrating experience, described very well by Mattson:

These situations challenged my status as a neutral researcher and required me to reassert a self that was congruent with my interviewees’ political worldviews. […] I did not want to explicitly or implicitly cast aspersions on those who are against buying sex, or have sold it, or on anyone, not because I wanted to have greater access to the field, but because my purpose a researcher was to understand and not to condone or condemn. (Mattson 2015: 187, 191)

6.3 Practical and Theoretical Recommendations I would recommend any other researcher who starts doing prostitution or sex work related research to be extremely transparent in your objectives, to not send out any requests without official ethical clearance and to address possible tensions immediately. It is of great importance to treat every respondent and interviewee with respect. If I could do it over again I would probably explain my personal preferred prostitution policy, just for the sake of transparency. As Mattson argues, “[i]t was naïve of me to confuse neutrally worded questions with a neutral political stance, especially in the

35 middle of a sex war” (Mattson 2015: 190). It, however, remains the question whether an even more transparent approach would have made much of a difference.

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