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SOMALIA CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY AFS: HCMMYNYX AERONAUTICAL INFORMATION MANAGEMENT NOTAM LIST EMAIL: [email protected]

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SOMALIA CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY AFS: HCMMYNYX AERONAUTICAL INFORMATION MANAGEMENT NOTAM LIST EMAIL: Ais@Scaa.Gov.So TEL: +252-1-857-394 SOMALIA CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY AFS: HCMMYNYX AERONAUTICAL INFORMATION MANAGEMENT NOTAM LIST EMAIL: [email protected]. MOGADISHU INTL NOTAM OFFICE SEROES “A” web: www.aip.scaa.gov.so MOGADISHU, SOMALIA THE FOLLOWING NOTAM SERIES “A” WERE STILL VALID ON 15 MAY 2020. NOTAM NOT INCLUDED HAVE EITHER BEEN CANCELLED, TIME EXPIRED OR SUPERSEDED BY AIP SUPPLEMENTS. FIR Subject A0065/17 FROM 1709041230/PERM. FIR IS CLASS G IN RECOGNITION OF THE FACT THAT MOGADISHU FIR IS CLASS G PILOTS TO AIRSPACE, WHERE ONLY FLIGHT INFORMATION SERVICES (FIS) IS MAINTAIN HIGH PROVIDED, PILOTS ARE TO MAINTAIN A HIGH LEVEL OF ALERTNESS LEVEL WHEN TRANSITING THROUGH THE MOGADISHU FIR RVSM AIRSPACE ALERTNESS AND TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION TO ENSURE SAFETY OF FLIGHTS BY MAINTAINING CONTINUOUS LISTENING WATCH ON VHF EMERGENCY FREQUENCY 121.5MHZ AND IFBP FREQUENCY 126.9MHZ AT ALL TIMES. A0088/18 FROM 1809180800/PERM AFTN PRIMARY ALL OPERATORS ARE HEREBY INFORMED THAT THE PRIMARY MEANS MEANS OF OF COMMUNICATION FOR MOGADISHU FIR (HCSM) IS AFTN. SITA COMMUNICATION COMMUNICATIONS WILL ONLY BE USED AS A BACKUP IN THE EVENT OF THE AFTN FAILURE. A0061/19 FROM 1912111244/PERM NO FLAS AT NO FLAS FOR WESTBOUND TRAFFIC AT POSITION ORLID WITHIN HCSM POSITION ORLID FIR. A0041/20 FROM 2005030000/2005172359 EST ALL LOCAL APS ALL AIRPORTS ARE CLSD TO LOCAL PAX FLIGHTS. CARGO FLIGHTS CLSD (FOOD STUFF, MEDICAL SUPPLY, AND SPARE PARTS) EXCEPT FRUITS AND VEGITABLE SARE AUTHORIZED PROVIDED PRIOR PERMIT IS OBTAINED FROM SOMALI CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY. A0023/20 FROM 2003152000/PERM SUSPENSION OF IN ACCORDANCE OF THE SOMALIA FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TRAVELLERS (MINISTERY OF HEALTH) AIMING AT PREVENTING THE INTRODUCTION FROM CERTAIN AND/OR SPREAD OF INFECTIONS BY CORONAVIRUS, ALL AIRLINES ARE COUNTRIES REQUIRED TO ABIDE BY THE FOLLOWING: ALL PASSENGERS ORIGINATING FROM CHINA, IRAN, REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND ITALY AND/OR TRANSITTING ONE OF THE ABOVE- MENTIONED COUNTRIES FOR THE LAST 14 DAYS REGARDLESS OF INTERMIDIATE STOPS ARE NOT ALLOWED TO ENTER SOMALIA. INCASE OF SUSPECTED CORONAVIRUS DURING THE FLIGHT INBOUND TO SOMALIA ALL AIRMEN ARE REQUIRED TO REPORT IMMIDIATELY BY RADIO AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE BEFORE ARRIVAL TO AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL AND COMPLY WITH HEALTH SCREENING OF PASSENGERS ENTERING ALL INTERNATIONAL AIRPORTS IN SOMALIA. A0040/20 FROM 2005032359/200517EST ALL INT’L ALL AIRPORTS WITHIN MOGADISHU FIR ARE CLSD TO ALL INBOUND FLIGHTS CLOSED INTERNATIONAL FLIGHTS DUE TO COVID-19 PREVENTION. THIS WITH RESTRICTION DOES NOT AFFECT THE FOLLOWING FLIGHTS: EXCEPTIONS 1.ACFT IN STATE OF EMERGENCE. 2.CARGO FLTS (FOOD STUFF, MEDICAL SUPPLY,AND SPARE PARTS) NO FRUITS AND VEGETABLES. 3.TECHNICAL LANDING WHERE PAX AND CREW DO NOT DISEMBARK. 4.HUMANTERIAN/MEDICAL FLIGHTS. PERSONS ON BOARD SHAL NOT BE PERMITED TO DISEMBARK WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION.EXCEPT ACFT IN EMERGENCY THE EXEMPTED FLIGHTS ARE TO SEEK PRE-AUTHORIZATION FROM THE SOMALI CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY USING EMAIL [email protected] ENR TRAFFIC IS NORMAL AND AIR OPERATORS ARE ABLE TO FILE INTL AIRPORT AS ALTERNATE AERODROMES.) A0039/20 CHECKLIST FOR MAY 2020 CHECKLIST HCMN A0033/20 FROM 2002050930/2005200300EST CLSD FOR MAINT DISPLACED THR RWY 04 IS 600M. DIST AVBL IS 1300M X26M LEFT SIDE OF RWY O4. HOURS OF SERVICE ARE DURING DAY TIME. A0020/20 FROM 2003151333/PERM UGAS KHALIF BELETUEN AIRPORT HAS BEEN NAMED AS UGAS KHALIF AIRPORT. ABUDWAK A0035/20 FROM 2004131100/20043011EST CLSD FOR MAINT ABUDWAK AD CLSD FOR MAINTENANCE. HCMK A0060/19 FROM 1912111100/PERM. ALL FLTS ORIGINATING FROM ANY POINT WITHIN KENYA FIR DIRECT TO HCMK ARE PROHIBITED. ALL INTERNATIONAL AND LOCAL FLTS FLTs TO HCMK FROM AND TO HCMK MUST ROUTE VIA HCMM DUE TO GOVERNMENT REQUIREMENTS. EXCEPT FLTS BTN HCMK AND DOBLEY. HCMH SUBJECT A0054/17 FROM 1707270830/PERM CONTROLLERS AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS VIEW OF RWY 06 (APPROX. 300M FM THR VIEW RWY 06) IS OBSTRUCTED. PILOTS ARE ADVISED TO EXERCISE CTN OF RWY 06 WHEN OPERATING AT THE AD. HCMM A0042/20 FROM 2005060740/2005312359 EST PARKING AREA PARKING AREA WIP.PILOTS TO EXER CTN WHEN PARKING AND WIP TAXIING. A0038/20 FROM 2004291500/2005292200 EST RWY WIP RWY O5 WIP. FROM THE THR TO 1500M AIRAC AIP SUP: AIRAC AIP SUP 01/20 Construction of Beletuen Airport 21MAY2020/31MAR2021 AIP SUP: AIP SUP 14/17 Unauthorized use of Aviation 23MAR2017/PERM Frequency bands AIP SUP 65/18 Fall back procedure 17SEP2018/PERM AIP SUP 01/19 Strategic Lateral Offset Procedures (SLOPs) AIP SUP 02/19 Closure of Aerodromes 23MAR2017/PERM AIP SUP 03/19 Direct flights from Aden Adde 17TH SEP 2018/PERM. Intl. Airport to Nairobi/JKIA AIP SUP 04/19 Status of Airfields in Somalia. 17TH SEP 2018/PERM. AIP SUP 05/19 In-flight Broadcast Procedure (IFBP) 25TH JAN 2018/PERM AIC INFORCE: 2017: 02, 03 2018: 02 2019: 02 2020: 01,02 Latest AIP AMDT: 03 Latest AIRAC AIP AMDT: 01/20 .
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