Civil Society and the War Against Corruption
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David U. Enweremadu Anti-corruption campaign in Nigeria (1999-2007) The politics of a failed reform IFRA-Nigeria 7 Civil society and the war against corruption DOI: 10.4000/books.ifra.1674 Publisher: IFRA-Nigeria, African Studies Centre Place of publication: Zaria, Leiden Year of publication: 2012 Published on OpenEdition Books: 22 July 2021 Series: WAPOSO Series Electronic EAN: 9791092312539 http://books.openedition.org Electronic reference ENWEREMADU, David U. Civil society and the war against corruption In: Anti-corruption campaign in Nigeria (1999-2007): The politics of a failed reform [online]. Zaria, Leiden: IFRA-Nigeria, 2012 (generated 24 juillet 2021). Available on the Internet: <http://books.openedition.org/ifra/1674>. ISBN: 9791092312539. DOI: https://doi.org/10.4000/books.ifra.1674. 7 Civil society and the war against corruption Introduction From the perspective of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), the war against graft in Nigeria is yet to start. It will begin the day CSOs plan their own programmes, source their own funds, and take the initiative in executing programmes. It will start when CSOs can muster enough strength to compel the President, Vice-President, governors of states and deputy governors of states, to shed their pretence or immunity and declare their assets publicly and subject themselves to the same kind of probe as anyone else. The war will start when civil society forces the same people, as well as all legislators, to make known to Nigerians the sources of their wealth. It will start when CSOs are able to achieve the recall of a single leg- islator or the resignation of a sole minister, commissioner, local government chairman, on the charge of corrupt practices … These are actions within the realm of possibility of CSOs. At present, we are caught in a merry-go-round of workshops, conferences, summits, interac- tive sessions, or ‘hot lines’ and monitoring of what government is doing. CSOs of the NGO type are in danger of merely becoming agents of the state or extensions of state programmes. To become true CSOs, we should develop a national action plan for the fight against corrup- tion. Then we can seize the initiative from government. (Asobie 2005: 16) With the exception of the press and spontaneous movements, previous strug- gles against corruption waged by successive governments in Nigeria had gone on without the active participation of non-state actors and institutions, otherwise known as civil society. On the other hand, the Obasanjo years (1999-2007) were marked by a heightened participation of civil society – local and international NGOs, labour unions, professional, cultural, and religious associations, and even groups emanating from the organized private sector, all of which now partici- pated in the war against corruption in Nigeria (ibid.: 8). How can this rapid trans- formation be explained in a country where the war against corruption had tradi- tionally been conducted and imposed from above? And what were the conse- quences of this increased role of civil society for the anti-corruption campaign pursued by the Obasanjo regime? 139 To begin with the first question, the transformation in the role of civil society was facilitated by at least three factors. The first factor was the logic of democ- ratic transition. That is to say, the passage from an authoritarian regime to de- mocracy offered more possibility for the population to organize and participate more actively in the making and implementation of public policies (Chowdhurry 2004; Lewis 2004: 118). The second factor concerned the impact of globalisa- tion, in terms of the work of international actors and institutions that aggressively pushed for the formation, promotion, and consolidation of CSOs, henceforth re- garded as indispensable partners in the promotion of good governance. The third and perhaps more important factor was the Obasanjo anti-corruption strategy it- self. Contrary to what happened in the past, the anti-corruption strategy initiated by the Obasanjo administration had indirectly encouraged a more active role for civil society in the fight against corruption. A good example was the provisions in the EFCC and ICPC Acts which required the two main anti-corruption agen- cies to mobilise members of the civil society behind the war against corruption and receive petitions on alleged corrupt practices from them. In terms of the contribution of civil society to the war against corruption, the activities of NGOs can offer significant insights. In recent attempts to promote good governance in developing countries, NGOs have tended to be more vocal than other sections of the civil society (Atlani-Duault 2005). During the Oba- sanjo era, the number of these organizations and their diversity grew very rapidly in Nigeria (Pérouse de Montclos 2005). While it is difficult or even impossible to know the exact number of these organizations at any given moment, there was substantial evidence suggesting that they were intervening in virtually every do- main of public life, including the struggle against corruption. Indeed, a good number of them were created specifically to help advance the struggle against corruption. Our review of Nigeria’s press, covering the period between 1999 and 2006, revealed that there were nearly 40 such NGOs. Transparency in Nigeria (TIN), which is the local branch of Transparency International; Exam Ethics Pro- ject (EEP), which specialises in combating fraud and corruption in the educa- tional system; Zero Corruption Coalition (ZCC), a loose coalition of some 50 anti-corruption NGOs; African Network for Environmental and Economic Jus- tice (ANEEJ); Independent Advocacy Group (IAG); and Convention on Business Integrity (CBI), which focuses on the struggle against corruption in the business and private sector – these were about the most dynamic and active among these NGOs. But despite their high visibility, these NGOs shared their anti-corruption role with other actors of the civil society. The list includes the mass media, profes- sional associations, labour unions, employers’ associations, the organized private sector, and ethno-religious movements. Like NGOs, the intervention of these 140 various organs of civil society in public life preceded the Obasanjo administra- tion; however, they developed a deep interest in corruption during the Obasanjo era. A more balanced assessment of the contributions of civil society, therefore, will also require a critical review of the activities of these other civil society ac- tors. In this chapter, we will argue that, overall, CSOs have been of little help in Nigeria’s campaign against corruption because their overall contribution, while showing some improvement from that which obtained in the past, was largely weak and inefficient compared with what was prescribed in the academic litera- ture on development policy. The influence and capacity for action of CSOs was undermined by a lack of independent sources of funding, which eroded their autonomy, and the absence of helpful legislation and practices, such as one granting free access to informa- tion in a state that has elevated official secrecy to more or less a religion (Asobie 2005). Their preoccupation with material issues (Momoh 1996) and inability to go beyond primary group (ethnic, religious, etc.) solidarity (Iredia 2005) further contributed to making them less effective than they could have been. In addition, there was the lack of capacity among the leaders of these organizations, the ri- valry and poor networking between different associations, the hostile attitudes of government, and in many instances the rent-seeking behaviour of those at the helm of affairs in these organizations. All these made it possible for politicians to instrumentalise them for political gains. These challenges were not new. At- tempts to create anti-corruption associations in the past had collapsed owing to the same reasons (Falola 1998). The challenges also did not apply only to NGOs or associations formed to promote the struggle against anti-corruption; almost all actors and organizations which formed part of the civil society were touched in one manner or the other by these weaknesses (Eteng 1997; Aiyede 2003: 9). Be- fore looking at the role played by each of these actors during the Obasanjo era, we will briefly look at the concept of civil society from a normative point of view and its development into a force for good governance. The concept of civil society The definition of the concept of civil society has remained a source of disagree- ment among scholars despite its visibility in the literature of the social science for decades (Harbeson et al. 1994; White 1994; Offerlé 2003). However, in recent times two opposing approaches have emerged in the general literature on civil society. The first approach, regarded as the conventional approach, defines civil society as those formal organizations or associations which seek to advance the general interest in particular domains. These organizations are sometimes known by the appellation ‘civic advocacy groups’. According to this approach, these as- sociations are those that must be “formally organized with specific and limited 141 purposes, participatory internal government, and the autonomy to act beyond the immediate interest of their members … They must also confront the state while upholding its authority. That is, force the state to reform” (Kasfir 1998: 6). Schmitter and Diamond are among the most well-known defenders of this essen- tially normative approach. For