Running Head: Development and Accountability of ’s Anti-Corruption Initiatives

“Development and Accountability of Nigeria’s Anti-Corruption Initiatives.”

Chioma F. Nwogu, ABD Doctoral Candidate [email protected]

Adrian M. Velazquez Vazquez, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Public Administration

1950 Third Street, CBPM 118 Department of Public and Health Administration College of Business and Public Management University of La Verne La Verne, CA 91750 909.448.4107 [email protected]

Preliminary Draft Manuscript Not for Citation without Express Permission from the Authors

Paper prepared for delivery at the International Institute of Administrative Sciences’ 2018 IIAS International Congress Tunis, Tunisia – June 25-29, 2018 Development and Accountability of Nigeria’s Anti-Corruption Initiatives

Introduction

In 2015, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development was drafted during the meetings celebrating the 70th anniversary of the United Nations (United Nations, 2015). As part of adopting a “historic decision on a comprehensive, far-reaching and people-centered set of universal and transformative goals and targets” (United Nations, 2015, p. 3), the many actors who participated in drafting this agenda for the future recognized, amongst other goals, the need to “promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels” (United

Nations, 2015, p. 14). As part of this initiative, the United Nations also articulated, along with other specific objectives to fulfill that goal, the need to:

“- Promote the rule of law at the national and international levels and ensure equal access to justice for all. - By 2030, significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows, strengthen the recovery and return of stolen assets and combat all forms of organized crime. - Substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all their forms. - Develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels. - Ensure public access to information and protect fundamental freedoms, in accordance with national legislation and international agreements. - Strengthen relevant national institutions, including through international cooperation, for building capacity at all levels, in particular in developing countries, to prevent violence and combat terrorism and crime (United Nations, 2015, pp. 25-26)”

As one of the utmost hindrances to human growth and public advancement, corruption requires strong public institutions and strict vigilance over governmental processes, especially in developing nations. Whenever deliberate attempts to usurp authority from legitimate agencies occurs, it is necessary to establish clear paths and strong governmental bodies to prevent such endeavors or ameliorate its negative effects. In most economies, however, the development and production of goods and services has been the major function of the public sector (Honest,

2006). With enormous revenues derived from oil and agricultural resources which ought to cater

1 Development and Accountability of Nigeria’s Anti-Corruption Initiatives to the social demands placed on public institutions, lack of accountability and transparent measures have led to great inefficiencies and ineffectiveness in the course of fulfilling the obligations of these agencies (Sekwat, 2002). Unfortunately, due to challenges encountered because of said lack of accountability, citizens all over the world have been exposed to poor or diminished quality of life, leading to an erosion of trust in public institutions.

With that premise in mind, the objective of this work is to explore various anti-corruption initiatives implemented in Nigeria after the establishment of a legitimate democratic government.

Given the practices of various military regimes in previous decades, anti-corruption measures were needed (Ploch, 2013). Those measures materialized due to increased international scrutiny and mounting domestic pressure to adjust institutional practices and civic life (Ribadu, 2009).

Nigeria's chronic problems related to health and public safety have made them dependent on international aid and, as a result, increased the oversight that international actors place on their governmental practices (Gillies, 2009). Consequently, the country engaged in the development of a new paradigm of governance systems to help combat corruption and increase accountability, both internally and to the exterior. Some of the changes included the creation of specific agencies that targeted money laundering operations, fraud, financing of terrorism, and other economic and financial crimes. The implementation of such initiatives began with the formation of the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offenses Commission (ICPC) in 2000, and continued with the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) in 2004, as well as the creation of other national and international mechanisms to curb corruption. The results, however, have been mixed (CLEEN, 2010).

Using a case study approach, this paper aims to explore the following questions: What are the effects of the diverse anti-corruption initiatives in Nigeria? What is the scope of their

2 Development and Accountability of Nigeria’s Anti-Corruption Initiatives attributions and how do they align with the rule of law? Have these initiatives contributed to increased transparency and accountability of governance systems? If so, how? Currently, public perception of these agencies points out to systemic corruption and continuation of past practices, as well as the use of institutions for personal gain and as political tools (Obuah, 2010).

Therefore, the aim of this paper is to increase our understanding of the diverse anticorruption initiatives undertaken in Nigeria using a theoretical framework related to State Crimes against

Democracy, as discussed by deHaven-Smith (2006, 2010), Witt and deHaven-Smith (2010), as well as Kouzmin, Witt, and Kakabadse (2013).

Nigeria’s Historical Challenges with Democracy

The menace of corruption is endemic in Nigeria despite the numerous attempts by governments to curtail it. The military coup of 1966 in Nigeria was a direct response from the military to bail the country out from the corrupt practices of the First Republic (Ogbeidi,2012).

The overwhelming support from civilians, despite the killings of major politicians, showed that

Nigerians were willing to forego democracy if it meant that the country would be delivered from the clutches of corruption (Ogbeidi,2012). The probing of various agencies by the military government showed that various ministers had siphoned funds meant for public agencies into their respective bank accounts, with some even going to the extent of securing contracts for themselves while in office (Okonkwo, 2007). However, suddenly, General Murtala Mohammed, the military administrator was killed, and some of the public administrators who were imprisoned for their misappropriations were freed, hampering the efforts to rid the country of corruption (Afolabi, 1993).

What would have been another go at cleaning up public service by General Murtala

Mohammed, who took over office as the new military administrator, was a flop as he was

3 Development and Accountability of Nigeria’s Anti-Corruption Initiatives assassinated barely six months after he assumed position as the Commander-in chief of the

Federal Republic of Nigeria (Ogbeidi, 2012). As a result, corruption resurged with the advent of the Second Republic due to the widespread availability of funds from oil revenues, as looting of public funds by elected public officials became, once again, common practice. Several claims were made that over $16 billion in oil revenues were lost between 1979 and 1983 under

President Shehu Shagari (Dash, 1983). According to Ogbeidi (2012) “It became quite common for federal buildings to mysteriously go up in flames, most especially just before the onset of ordered audits of government accounts, making it impossible to discover written evidences of embezzlement and fraud”

A new regime by General Buhari in 1983 violated human rights in its bid to tackle corruption and restore sanity to public life, and thus was overthrown by General Babangida.

Unfortunately, corrupt leaders who were found guilty in Buhari’s regime, were released and even regained possession of their confiscated properties (Maduagwu, as cited in Gboyega, 1995, p.5).

After an 8-year rule, amidst public outcry, Babangida relinquished power to a short lived interim government that was ousted by the late military dictator General Sani Abacha (Ogbeidi, 2012).

Under his rule, full blown corrupt practices became systematic. In a 2009 article by the

International Centre for Asset Recovery, it was estimated that illicit acquisition of public funds by Abacha amounted to over $4 billion. As this brief historical recount of Nigeria’s history points out, the implementation of corrupt practices is a vicious cycle in public life, making necessary the design and adoption of measures to combat corruption at all levels of government.

Nigeria’s Post-Democratic Government Accountability

4 Development and Accountability of Nigeria’s Anti-Corruption Initiatives

During the military era, the country passed various legislations aimed at fighting corruption and financial crimes while attempting to increase accountability. Some of the laws and decrees passed before the beginning of the Fourth Republic in 1999 include:

• Investigation of Assets Decree of 1968, which was aimed at Public Officials and

Other Persons.

• The Corrupt Practices Decree 1975, which probed public officials for crimes

related to abuse of office.

• An extra provision inserted in the Nigerian Constitution of 1979 calling for a code

of conduct for public officials.

• An initiative aimed to promote an ethical revolution in 1985.

• The National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) Act of 1990, which was

the first law to criminalize money laundering in Nigeria.

• The 1995 Advance Fee Fraud Act, which intended to curb the menace of the

“Nigerian fraud letters.”

Despite the plethora of anti-corruption legislations and decrees, economic and financial corruption remained on the rise due to the lack of diligence in the implementation of these measures. Consequently, the international community became agitated by the inadequacy of the

Nigerian government to deal with various forms of crimes (Abayomi, 2012). Consequently, the country was forced to engage in more serious attempts at capacity building to combat corruption and its ensuing consequences. This resulted in the establishment of two major initiatives that aimed to appease domestic and international actors interested in increased transparency and stronger accountability for public officials. The first one was the Independent Corrupt and Other

Related Offenses Commission (ICPC) in 2000, while the second involved creating the Economic

5 Development and Accountability of Nigeria’s Anti-Corruption Initiatives and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) in 2004. Both institutions are briefly discussed and contextualized in the following subsections for the purposes of providing context and setting up the subsequent analysis of their respective mandates and actions.

The Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offenses Commission (ICPC)

After the inception of the Fourth Republic in 1999, following Nigeria’s ranking as the most corrupt country in the world (Transparency International, 2000), the Obasanjo administration enacted the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offenses

Commission (ICPC) Act of 2000 to prevent, prohibit, and punish corrupt practices [ICPC, 2000,

Section 3(3)]. The Commission consists of 12 members and must include a retired police officer, a retired Superior Court judge, a retired senior public official, a legal practitioner, an accountant who has been chartered by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Nigeria, a woman, and a youth above the age of 21 and below 31. The Chairman of the Commission and its respective

Members are appointed by the President, and thereafter confirmed by the Senate. After confirmation, they can only be removed by two-thirds majority of the Senate.

The mandate of the ICPC included certain features that were different from legislation passed prior to 2000. These features included, among others, the ability of the independent counsel to investigate corrupt practices of government officials with constitutional immunity, as well as extending protection to informants (ICPC, 2000, S.61-S.64). Other duties of the

Commission include: Enforcement of the law by investigating and prosecuting criminals for reports of attempts to commit crimes, or for crimes committed; prevention of crimes by examining, reviewing, and enforcing corrections of systems prone to corruption, and procedures of public organizations in order to minimize corruption; and education of the citizenry about crimes with a ultimate purpose of creating awareness in the war against corruption [ICPC 2000,

6 Development and Accountability of Nigeria’s Anti-Corruption Initiatives

S.6 (a)-(f)]. However, implementation of these measures was not enough and required other mechanisms to combat corruption and to increase transparency and strengthened accountability of public officials, which gave way to the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC).

The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC)

The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission Establishment act of 2004 mandates the EFCC to combat financial and economic crimes by investigating, prosecuting, and penalizing individuals who have been found guilty of committing these crimes. The agency is also tasked with enforcing other laws related to economic and financial crimes such as: The Money

Laundering Act of 1995, The Banks and Other Financial Institutions Act of 1991, The Advance

Fee Fraud and other Fraud Related Offenses Act of 1995, and the Failed Banks (Recovery of

Debts) and Financial Malpractices in Banks Act of 1994 (EFCC, 2002). The EFCC also has extensive police powers to prosecute terrorist offenses, which include but are not limited to providing and accepting money from any individual, whether directly or indirectly, for committing or attempting to commit or facilitate terrorist attacks.

However, in the course of carrying out the agency’s objectives, allegations have arised regarding observation and adherence to due process, as well as selection bias regarding the cases and individuals it investigates and prosecutes (Onuigbo & Eme, 2015). Furthermore, despite the numerous anti-corruption laws in modern Nigeria, the repetitive patterns of corruption show that fundamental changes need to be made in the various public institutions. Proclamation of self- indulgent laws does not translate into the implementation of effective measures to curb corruption (Ocheje, 2000). In the agency’s fight against corruption, it has faced a constant struggle balancing between the executive and judicial arms of government, which is why in many occasions, members of the opposition to the ruling party are systematically not awarded a

7 Development and Accountability of Nigeria’s Anti-Corruption Initiatives fair due process for prosecution of their crimes (Waziri, 2011). The question is then raised if such actions constitute State Crimes against Democracy, as theorized by Kouzmin, Witt, and

Kakabadse (2013). The following section introduces this concept and discusses its applicability to the Nigerian case.

State Crimes Against Democracy (SCAD)

According to deHaven- Smith (2010), economic state crimes against democracy are defined as the “concerted actions…by government insiders intended to manipulate democratic processes and undermine popular sovereignty with the potential to subvert political institutions and entire governments. They are high crimes that attack democracy itself” (p. 795). For the purposes of clarification, one of the factors that constitutes SCAD is “an abuse of the coercive power of the state because it violates constitutional and/or criminal statutes” (Kouzmin, Witt &

Kakabadse, 2013, p.23). Certain organizational environments may help foster state crimes against democracy because like-minded individuals may promote criminal behaviors either tacitly or by instructions. Since most governments are usually comprised of people with similar interests, these governors, senators, and other public administrators may be used to accomplish similar goals and objectives which do not favor the citizens.

Economic growth in developing countries is often stalled due to the presence of weak public institutions (Acemoglu et al., 2003). Nigeria as a nation fosters corruption because of the arbitrary nature of the judiciary system, the rapacious law enforcement institutions, an oversimplified civil service, and a destabilized social fabric. The constant bending of the rules and the absence of accountability, when combined, have created a divide and a series of events that sabotage the capacity of the state to regulate and punish individuals guilty of crimes, further promoting despotism.

8 Development and Accountability of Nigeria’s Anti-Corruption Initiatives

Despite the numerous efforts of the government to make progress in the fight against corruption, the weakened system of checks and balances (which would encourage the use of the various anti-corruption initiatives to prevent SCAD) continues to undermine the progress that would otherwise have been achieved. According to de-Haven Smith (2006), the intent for defining SCAD as actions rather than as merely illegal actions is to reveal the extralegal technicalities that public officials who commit crimes against the state can use to evade punishments, while superficially conforming to relevant laws. For example, the immunity clause, which is contained in Section 308 of the Nigerian Constitution, creates an institutional barrier for anti-corruption agencies because governors or presidents accused of crimes are given total immunity from prosecution.

Concomitantly, politicization of these agencies, which are supposed to be independent from the government, can lead to bias in official investigations. Investigations of individuals who are closely connected to the president or the ruling party have been described as an exercise in smoke and mirrors (Eneojo et al., 2014). Often, crimes for which there is smoking-gun evidence of governmental complicity gets ruined by the investigating agency itself, since some of these high profiled crimes are committed by people often referred to as “sacred cows” (The Weekly

Treasure, 2005). There have been numerous conspiracy theories about the use of these anti- corruption commissions by members of the ruling government to suppress and threaten the lives and properties of their political enemies (Eneojo et al., 2014). This behavior happens due to the misuse of intelligence agencies to serve the interest of the political godfathers, while helping megalomaniacs and corrupt individuals rise to political offices (Aluko, 2008; Urim et al., 2013).

The case of security votes, an endowment which is sealed by legislation, is a relevant example of SCAD. This slush fund has allowed state governors and the office of the Presidency

9 Development and Accountability of Nigeria’s Anti-Corruption Initiatives to allocate huge sums of money (often running into billions) for the fight against challenges caused by security issues. Worrisome is that the legislation does not stipulate limits to how much of the budget each of these departments can spend on security votes, rather the various heads of these executive branch secretly allocate the funds. Commenting on this, Dada (2015) writes: “If the receipt and spending of security votes cannot be subjected to public scrutiny and censorship, is it not desirable that the practice should be circumscribed by scrupulous legislative examination in order to promote transparency and accountability?” (p.45)

In his research, Dada (2015) examined the spending of unbudgeted funds for use as security votes, finding that the practice is both antithetical to transparency, and a recipe for disaster due to its lack of accountability measures. The irony of the situation is that despite the vast amount of money collected by these officials, the level of insecurity in the country has only intensified. A 2007 study conducted by the Human Rights Watch noted that “the security vote is one of the opaquest items in any local government budget; and it is also typically one of the largest single allocations. According to a Commission of Inquiry convened in 2006, Khano’s local government chair has received an average of $461,000 annually for his security vote. Tai’s local government chair had a security vote of $300,000 in 2006. Opobo/Nkoro’s local government security vote was $280,000 in 2006. In each of these cases, the security votes exceeded the total capital budget for either health or education (p. 43).”

Although the government would argue that they have a legal mandate that includes these unprecedented actions, some of these special funds have contributed to the rapid economic decline of the country. The free market rhetoric of neoliberalism has created political and economic crises and opportunity disaster capitalism. “From Aceh to Iraq, a ruthless form of

10 Development and Accountability of Nigeria’s Anti-Corruption Initiatives disaster capitalism is reshaping vulnerable societies to its own design, with the so-called democracy builders making million in the process” (Klein, 2005, p. 30).

Data and Methods

Using a secondary data analysis approach, the objective of this paper is to provide an in- depth analysis of Nigeria’s system of fighting corruption in order to make an assessment of the effectiveness of their anticorruption initiatives. Using the tenure of specific officials in charge of the ICPC and the EFCC during the administration of President , the authors aim to increase understanding of the anticorruption initiatives put in place after international pressure required the formation and implementation of both commissions to fight corruption and crime. Specifically, the analysis covers the former governors of Delta, Rivers and Bayelsa states,

James Ibori, , and respectively, all of whom served during the 1999 and 2003 administration of former President Olusegun Obasanjo.

The involvement of the British government in this period constituted a form of international pressure after the realization that despite evidence of corruption perpetrated in both

Nigeria and the by these individuals, the Nigerian government showed a lackadaisical attitude in their prosecution. The data was obtained from the historical and archival records of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), the Human Rights Watch, and Transparency International. Human Rights Watch has published various reports examining the role of the EFCC in mitigating corruption, which chronicle multiple human rights issues in

Nigeria. The reports incorporate interviews with EFCC officials, transcript reports of court judgments and motions on appeals for several cases prosecuted by the EFCC.

The Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) was established in 1999 to fight and curb corruption in both the public and private sector The ICPC

11 Development and Accountability of Nigeria’s Anti-Corruption Initiatives

Act 2000 even allows the commission to prosecute politician with constitutional immunity.

Despite the fact that the ICPC was established before the Economic and Financial Crimes

Commission (EFCC), the commission has performed very low in the fight against corruption.

For example, in 2002, The Revenue Mobilization, Allocation and Fiscal Commission (RMAFC) alleged that N302 billion was missing from the NNPC’s coffers. Although, the National

Assembly ordered that an investigation be conducted, the result of the investigation has remained inconclusive (Tell, 2003).

In 2003, El Rufai, then Minister of the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) alleged that senators Ibrahim Mantu, Deputy Senate Leader, and Zwingina, Deputy Majority Leader, demanded a N54 million bribe from him to facilitate his clearance as minister. The Ethics and

Privileges Committee, conducted an investigation, and subsequently exonerated both senators due to lack of concrete evidence. However, both the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other

Related Offenses (Commission (ICPC) and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission

(EFCC) never carried out their own independent investigations (Transparency International,

2004 as cited in Raimi, Suara, & Fadipe, 2013).

Preliminary Analysis and Results

James Ibori’s Case

This article explores the trial of James Ibori, the ex-Governor of who pleaded guilty to money laundering charges in a UK court and was sentenced to a thirteen -years jail term after he was extradited from Dubai to London. The presiding judge of the trial asserted that the looted funds were more than two hundred million pounds, and used the confiscation of the funds and properties as a medium to serve as a deterrence to other individuals seeking to use the United

Kingdom as a haven for laundered monies.

12 Development and Accountability of Nigeria’s Anti-Corruption Initiatives

His conviction left the Nigerian citizens wondering how he managed to evade justice despite the many attempts by the EFCC to prosecute him; a few people suggested that it was as a result of systemic corruption in the judicial system that led to his acquittal in Nigeria. According to Human Rights Watch report (2011), the Nigerian judicial arm of government remains susceptible to pressures from the executive and legislative arms as well as the business sector and as a result, the due process is interfered with. Dr. Braithwaite (2012), a seasoned lawyer narrated how a young lawyer testified under oaths that a supreme Court judge was offered monetary bribe in the amount of $50million by James Ibori for the charges against him to be thrown out. In his new book “My Watch”, ex-President Obasanjo alleged that he was aware of the $15 million bribe offered by Ibori to the former EFCC chairman Ribadu (Eluemor, 2017).

According to Ribadu’s account of the incidence in his own book, “My Story”,

Before the end of Ibori’s term, we met at one of his friend’s house in . I had

brought several of my colleagues from the EFCC. They witnessed Ibori handing over

to me a bag containing $15m in cash, as a pay-off which I pretended to treat as

restitution for the monies he stole from his state. (p.124)

Nuhu Ribadu’s contradictory statements about the date, number of witnesses, and who exactly collected the bribe from Ibori, and the day the money was deposited to the Central Bank of

Nigeria (CBN) on two different occasions signals the magnitude of coverups and deviousness by the agency to lose the case. Since everyone involved in the bribery scandal contradicted every other person’s claim, and the agency officials could not prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused, James Ibori had attempted to bribe officials of the EFCC. In a 2009 ruling by the Court of Asaba, the presiding Judge ruled that “There is no correlation between the evidence in the proof in respect of this Count and the essential ingredient of the offence

13 Development and Accountability of Nigeria’s Anti-Corruption Initiatives charged (because the section of the EFCC Act applied to the banks and not bribery) that the

Proof of Evidence has failed to disclose any prima facie case against the 1st

Accused/Applicant to justify his being put on trial in respect of this charge. Accordingly, I hereby quash Count 66 of the Further Amended Charges”.

Diepreye Alamieyeseigha

In 2005, Diepreye Alamieyeseigha the former governor of managed to flee the United Kingdom after posting bail on charges of money laundering in the amount of 1 million pounds. Prior to his swearing in as the governor of Bayelsa state in 1999, in his asset declaration form submitted to the Code of Conduct Bureau, he claimed to have five houses, 25 plots of land worth N50 million and N 2.5 million respectively, 4 vehicles worth N10 million, a company with capital of N100,000, and a Diamond bank account with a balance of N5 million

(Premium Times, 2017). However, investigations on suspicions of money laundering by the UK

Court revealed that he had acquired multiple properties, and bank accounts in different parts of the world using various aliases and individuals while serving as a governor to the tune of about

$50 million (Mayah, 2017).

Because of his status as a governor, he enjoyed immunity from prosecution by the EFCC, after his tenure, the agency charged him with embezzlement of public funds, he was convicted, but received a lenient jail term. Upon his release, he became a political godfather to ex-President

Jonathan, who was the current president at that time. He was consequently granted full presidential pardon for his transgressions (Mayah, 2016). In 2012, over £5 million of the looted funds was returned by the British government to Bayelsa state (Premium Times, 2017). At his funeral in 2016, prominent politicians and government officials delivered glowing eulogies about

14 Development and Accountability of Nigeria’s Anti-Corruption Initiatives his “positive developments” and ideals. The Bayelsa state government even renamed the

Banquet Hall of the state’s government house after the late Alamieyeseigha.

Peter Odili’s Case

Peter Odili, a two-term former governor of whose tenure was marred by widespread evidence of embezzlement of state funds and participation in electoral fraud was never charged by the EFCC despite the dossier of exhaustive evidences against him. Although

Ribadu derailed his vice-presidential ambitions, the agency never appealed the decisions of a

Federal High Court to permanently restrain the Commission from further investigation into the case, but rather let it die. The decision Court’s decision to grant Odili a perpetual injunction even after he served his term as a governor makes a mockery of the judicial process.

Preliminary Discussion

A critical look at the record of accomplishment of the Economic and Financial Crimes

Commission (EFCC) shows that despite the agency’s ability to effectively prosecute some high profile political corruption cases, it has nonetheless failed to meet the ethical standards of good governance which is a core objective of public practice. Festus Keyamo, a civil rights lawyer argued that the EFCC’s fight against corruption especially under the leadership of Ribadu was mostly smoke and mirrors.

According to Glasberg and Skidmore (1998), an organization’s legal and regulatory environment can facilitate state crimes against democracy because it fails to enforce restrictions against the criminal behaviors of certain elite members of the society while also creating the conditions necessary for them to occur. For the EFCC to achieve its’ organization’s mission, it must record success in effectively and transparently prosecuting corrupt prominent politicians.

15 Development and Accountability of Nigeria’s Anti-Corruption Initiatives

The agency’s performance has been underwhelming, only been able to generate more headlines than convictions, in its attempt to prosecute the elite members of the society.

The structural composition of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) makes it vulnerable to the demands of the presidency, since the chairman of the agency can be removed at the will of the president; it places a lot of pressure on him to yield to the demands of the president. According to documents published by Wiki Leaks in 2011, Waziri, a former chairperson of the EFCC told the US ambassador that Aondoaka, the then attorney general of

Nigeria removed the case against Ibori from the agency’s purview, and even took further measures by providing a letter to Ibori’s lawyer during his UK trial to state that no charges had been filed against him in Nigeria.

Despite the provisions of the EFCC act to appoint special judges and courts to hear corruption cases, several high-profile cases have been dragged out for more than four years without any hearings or witnesses called at a trial. In 2004, , a sitting governor of

Plateau state was arrested in London on allegations of money laundering, however he fled after posting bail, and continued his with his duties as the governor due to his immunity protection.

However, the UK Court sentenced the governor’s associate to a three-year prison term for laundering public funds found to have been looted by the governor. The Courts also appear to be an obstacle to accountability as most case of notable politicians have been stalled in the courts even before trials have begun (Human Rights Watch, 2011). Though Section 40 of the EFCC Act is supposed to aid in speedier trials for the agency, many judges have refused to adhere to it by arguing that they have the constitutional guarantee to choose matters to decide.

This study aims to present information on some of the practices of the Economic and

Financial Crimes Commission as a tool to propagate State Crimes Against Democracy. These

16 Development and Accountability of Nigeria’s Anti-Corruption Initiatives conducts go beyond mere corruption as a result of the sophisticated measures used to abuse powers of the state by elite members of the political circle. Further research should aim to uncover credible evidence of conspiracy where the workings of the government are less than transparent, so that future policies can be formulated on ways to curb such crimes and deter involvements.

17 Development and Accountability of Nigeria’s Anti-Corruption Initiatives

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