The Persistence of Orientalism and the Positive Portrayal of the Gulen Movement in the New York Times and in the Wall Street Journal Between 1985 and 2016

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THE PERSISTENCE OF ORIENTALISM AND THE POSITIVE PORTRAYAL OF THE GULEN MOVEMENT IN THE NEW YORK TIMES AND IN THE WALL STREET JOURNAL BETWEEN 1985 AND 2016

by Yonca Ipek Cubuk

Bachelor of Arts, Saint Francis College, 2015

A Thesis Submitted to the Graduate Faculty

of the

University of North Dakota

in partial fulfillment of the requirements

for the degree of Master of Arts

Grand Forks, North Dakota

December

2018

PERMISSION

Title The Persistence Of Orientalism And The Positive Portrayal Of The Gulen Movement In The New York Times And In The Wall Street Journal Between 1985 And 2016

Deparment History

Degree Master of Arts

In presenting this thesis in partial fulfillment of the requirements for a graduate degree from the University of North Dakota, I agree that the library of this University shall make it freely available for inspection. I further agree that permission for extensive copying for scholarly purposes may be granted by the professor who supervised my thesis work or in her absence, by the chairperson of the department or the dean of the Graduate School. It is understood that any copying or publication or other use of this thesis or part thereof for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. It is also understood that due recognition shall be given to me and to the University of North Dakota in any scholarly use which may be made of any material in my thesis.

Yonca Ipek Cubuk

December 06, 2018

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS…………………………………………………………….....v

ABSTRACT…………………………………………………………………………..,….vi

INTRODUCTION: ORIENTALISM, THE NEWS MEDIA, AND THE GULEN MOVEMENT…………………………….…………………………………………….….1

CHAPTER I. THE PERSISTENCE OF ORIENTALISM IN THE NEW YORK TIMES AND IN THE WALL STREET JOURNAL BETWEEN 1985 AND 2016………………………………………………………………………………………40

THE POSITIVE PORTRAYAL OF FETHULLAH GULEN AND THE GULEN MOVEMENT IN THE NEW YORK TIMES AND IN THE WALL STREET JOURNAL………………………………………………………………………….67

CHAPTER II: MISREPRESENTATION OF FETHULLAH GULEN AND THE GULEN MOVEMENT BY THE ACADEMIA……...…………………………..…………….….91

CONCLUSION: THE FALSE REPRESENTATION OF THE GULEN MOVEMENT AS A RESULT OF PERSISTENT ORIENTALISM……………………………………...... 118

BIBLIOGRAPHY………………………………………………………………………123

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to express my sincere appreciation to the members of my advisory committee Dr. Caroline Campbell, Dr. William Caraher, Dr. James Mochoruk for their tremendous support. I would also like to thank to my friends and colleagues at the University of North Dakota for their support and guidance.

To Emre, my husband and my best friend.

ABSTRACT

This thesis argues that the positive portrayal of the Gulen (Hizmet) movement in the New York

Times and the Wall Street Journal is a direct result of persistent Orientalism in the American academia and news media. The evidence reveals that most of the articles published in the New

York Times and in the Wall Street Journal Between 1985 and 2016 and the majority of academic works completely ignored the controversial nature of the Gulen movement. This favorable approach portrays Islam as monolithic and indicates the otherness of Muslims by subjecting them to a separate set of standards for “moderation.” This is problematic for two distinct reasons. First, it shows that Orientalism is still persistent well into the year 2016. Furthermore, when referring to Gulen as “moderate and progressive,” the journalists and academics falsely portray all Muslims negatively since this portrayal indicates Gulen’s ideology is moderate in comparison to all interpretations of Islam.

INTRODUCTION: ORIENTALISM, THE NEWS MEDIA, AND THE GULEN MOVEMENT

The negative portrayal of Islam, Muslims and Muslim societies in the news media has been a growing issue since the 1970s. Scholars explained this inaccurate and negative portrayal with the tumultuous political environment of the 1970s. Oil Embargo, the Islamic Revolution in

Iran and the Hostage Crisis were among the main events that turned the American attention to

Islam and eventually to its negative portrayal. The relatively positive atmosphere of the post-

WWII lasted roughly until the end of the Afghan-Soviet War in 1989. While the negative news media attention started to portray Muslims and Islam as one-dimensional and almost always as a threat to the security of the United States, the collaboration between the United States and the

Afghan rebels, mujahedeen, continued to garner positive attention. The negative portrayal gained momentum with the beginning of the 1990s and eventually reached its peak after the September

11 attacks with the “War on Terror” and the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Research has repeatedly shown that Muslims, Islam, and especially Arabs in the media disproportionally represented as violent and uncivilized. Human rights abuses in Muslim majority societies often featured in the news for the last twenty-five years; yet, the recent consistent trend in the Muslim-majority nations is to better the lives of their members. From Saudi Arabia to Morocco, societies of different sects of Islam and minorities started to demand and earn more rights. An examination of the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal’s approach to Islam from 1985 to 2016 demonstrate the persistence of Orientalism. The Orientalist approach employed by both of these newspapers emphasized the otherness of Muslims and strengthen the civilized vs. uncivilized narrative. During the 1980s there was little to no public interest in Muslim-majority societies but the interest grew significantly during the 1990s and reached its peak after the September 11 attacks. Certain issues also garnered the attention of journalists; issues regarding child marriage,

violence against women and the lack of LGBTQ+ rights were the main issues both the New York

Times and the Wall Street Journal persistently reported on; access to healthcare and modern education, however, were the kind of issues that often went overlooked. In addition to specific issues, a specific person's and a movement's actions were often overlooked as well: Fethullah

Gulen and the Gulen (Hizmet) movement.1 Even though the Gulen movement’s ideology contributes negatively to the most urgent issues in the Islamic world and his ideology contradicts the clauses on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, both the American academics and

American journalists insistently portrayed the movement and Fethullah Gulen himself as positively. Both the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal dismissed the Turkish concerns as if they were coming from some radical faction and referred to the critics of Gulen simply as

“seculars,” and/or indicated their support of the Turkish Armed Forces, which is an entity that enacted several coups over the course of modern Turkey’s history, allegedly to protect the secularism principle. The journalists who were somewhat critical of Gulen and the Gulen movement lacked in-depth analysis of Gulen’s ideology and primarily focused on the corruption allegations of Gulen affiliated charter schools, Gulen’s leadership, and/or the Turkish state’s accusation where Gulen was suspected of instructing his followers to infiltrate the state institutions. The critical articles never pointed out his remarks where he encouraged violence against women –even instructed when and how to beat women. Never pointed out his unscientific approach to modern science and especially to the scientific theory of evolution which was especially worth noting since he is known for his STEM-oriented schools and famously claims that religion and science must be complementary to each other rather than being rivals. None of the articles even mentioned Gulen’s deep hatred of the LGBTQ+ individuals and atheists while

1 Hizmet means service in Turkish. 2

so vehemently arguing that he promotes tolerance. I argue that the journalists’ reluctance to point out these issues can be explained by two interrelated factors. First of all, there is an absolute favoritism of Gulen and the Gulen movement in the American academia. American academics completely ignored the characteristics of Gulen’s ideology that would never be accepted in a

Western and Judeo-Christian movement/ideology and portrayed Gulen and his movement as the egalitarian and progressive future of Islam. Secondly, I argue that Orientalism, as defined by

Edward Said in 1979, still dominates Western journalism. While, after 9/11 the journalists’ approach seemed to be changed and became more nuanced towards the Muslims, Muslim societies, and Islam the evidence that is provided in this thesis demonstrates that this change was extremely small in scale. This thesis aims to demonstrate the persistence of Orientalism in the

U.S. news media, specifically in the New York Times and in the Wall Street Journal, and the absolute favoritism of the American academia of Gulen and the Gulen movement caused the false-representation of Gulen and the Gulen movement.

The majority of the previous research on the portrayal of Islam and/or Muslims focused on the negative portrayal of Muslims and Islam in the news media. Unlike the previous research, this thesis examines Fethullah Gulen and the Gulen movement’s portrayal in the news media by asking the question “Why does the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal portray Fethullah

Gulen and the Gulen movement positively?” I argue that in addition to the approaches employed by the journalists, the academia’s approach is equally important in order to accurately portray a foreign group such as the Gulen movement. The Gulen (Hizmet/Service) Movement is a religiopolitical movement that originated in Turkey in the 1960s and became internationally known after it reached financial independence during the late 1980s and early 1990s.2 Despite the

2 Tugrul Keskin, "Market Oriented Post-Islamism in Turkey,” in Secular State and Religious Society: Two Forces in Play in Turkey, ed. B. Turam (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 130. 3

positive attention attracted from politicians, scholars, and journalists the Gulen movement is surrounded by controversy. The movement was alleged to have three to six million followers and own the largest network of charter schools in the United States with more than a hundred and sixty schools.3 The Movement established more than a thousand schools worldwide as of 2015.4

One of the most praised aspects of the movement is their STEM-oriented secular schools.

Gulenists claim that science and Islam can co-exist and that they teach these principles in their schools. Yet, the movement’s schools attracted some criticism due to their allegedly corrupt H-

B1 visa policies that allegedly take place in some schools to bring Gulenist teachers to the U.S. 5

The H-B1 practices of the schools posed an issue for the U.S. labor force since these schools outsourced their teachers from Turkey. Recently, Los Angeles terminated three allegedly

Gulenist charter schools based on fraudulent H-B1 practices.6

Fethullah Gulen and the Gulen movement dealt, and are still, dealing with more serious accusations. In 1999 the Turkish government accused Gulen of posing a threat to the secular

Turkish state. This accusation was made after a leaked footage of Gulen showed him giving

3 Claire Berlinski, "Who Is Fethullah Gulen?," City Journal, Autumn, 2012, accessed March 28, 2017, https://www.city-journal.org/html/who-fethullah-g%C3%BClen-13504.html ; “Largest Charter Network in U.S.: Schools Tied to Turkey,” Washington Post, March 27, 2012, accessed March 31, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/answer-sheet/post/largest-charter-network-in-us-schools-tied-to- turkey/2012/03/23/gIQAoaFzcS_blog.html. 4 Fethullah Gulen, “Fethullah Gulen: Turkey’s Eroding Democracy,” The New York Times, February 3, 2015, accessed September 4, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/04/opinion/fethullah-Gulen-turkeys-eroding- democracy.html . 5 Valerie Strauss, “Turkey Seeks Probes of American Charter Schools It Says Are Linked to Fethullah Gulen,” Washington Post, July 20, 2016, accessed March 27, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/answersheet/wp/2016/07/20/turkey-seeks-probes-of-american-charter- schools-it-says-are-linked-to-fethullah-Gulen/.; “U.S. Charter Schools Tied to Powerful Turkish Imam,” CBS News, May 13, 2012, accessed March 27, 2017, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/us-charter-schools-tied-to- powerful-turkish-imam/. 6 Howard Blume, “L.A. Unified Decides Fate of Six Charter Schools; El Camino Leader Resigns,” Los Angeles Times, October 18, 2016, accessed September 4, 2018, http://www.latimes.com/local/education/la-me-edu- lacharter-renewal-votes-20161017-snap-story.html.

directions to his followers on how to infiltrate the state institutions.7 Since these accusations,

Gulen has been living in self-imposed exile in Pennsylvania.8 Gulen was later acquitted from the charges against him in 2006 during Erdogan’s administration before Erdogan and the Movement have fallen out.9 More recently, the President of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, accused

Fethullah Gulen and the movement for the failed coup attempt of 2016.10 These accusations were publicly denied by Gulen in both cases.11

The Gulen Movement was named after its founder Fethullah Gulen, who was born in

Erzurum in 1938 and employs Sunni religious figure Said Nursi's ideas.12 Gulen's writings, according to his followers, promote the idea that modernity and tradition can co-exist along with

Islam and modern science.13 The Gulen Movement started to flourish when Gulen moved to

Izmir, an Aegean city in Western Turkey during the early 1960s, after teaching at a mosque in

Edirne. During this time, his movement became known as Izmir Community, which later evolved into the Gulen/Hizmet (service) movement during the 1960s and 70s.14 Gulen started to invest in education in Izmir where he emphasized that Islamic values, STEM, and philosophy could co-

7 Ibid, 43.; Zia Weise, “Who Is Fethullah Gulen, the Exiled Cleric Blamed for Coup Attempt in Turkey?,” Telegraph, 18 July 2016, accessed September 4, 2018, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/07/18/who-is- fethullah-Gulen-the-exiled-cleric-blamed-for-coup-attempt. 8 Ibid. 9 “Fethullah Gulen Beraat Etti,” CNN Türk, May 5, 2006, accessed March 31, 2017, http://www.cnnturk.com/2006/turkiye/05/05/fethullah.Gulen.beraat.etti/178267.0/index.html. 10 Peter Beaumont, “Fethullah Gulen: Who Is the Man Turkey’s President Blames for Coup Attempt?,” Guardian, July 16, 2016, accessed September 4, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/16/fethullah-Gulen- who-is-the-man-blamed-by-turkeys-president-for-coup-attempt. 11 Stephanie Saul, “An Exiled Cleric Denies Playing a Leading Role in Coup Attempt,” The New York Times, July 16, 2016, accessed September 4, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/17/us/fethullah-Gulen-turkey-coup- attempt.html.; “Fethullah Gulen: A Life Dedicated to Peace and Humanity - Answers by Fethullah Gulen,” FGulen.com, September 24, 2001, accessed September 4, 2018, https://web.archive.org/web/20070928001044/http://en.fGulen.com/content/view/973/14/. 12 M. Hakan Yavuz and John L Esposito, Turkish Islam and the Secular State: The Gulen Movement (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2003), 19. 13 Ibid, 20. 14 Bulent Aras and Omer Caha, “Fethullah Gulen and His Liberal ‘Turkish Islam’ Movement,” Rubin Center, accessed March 5, 2017, http://www.rubincenter.org/2000/12/aras-and-caha-2000-12-04/.; Keskin, "Market Oriented Post-Islamism in Turkey,” 127.

exist. Gulen explained how science and Islam could co-exist by stating that God works through science:

[…] God manifests His Names through veils, although His absolute Unity demands that we attribute the effects directly to His causes to veil His acts, so that people not ascribe Him the things and events that seem unacceptable to them.15

This quote was further explained by Ahmet T. Kuru in “Search for a Middle Way,” as “[…] one may attribute a death, for example, to a material cause (e.g., an illness), to the Angel of Death, and directly to God, simultaneously and without any contradiction.”16 When Gulen and the movement claimed the co-existent nature of philosophy and Islam, they did not specify the kind of philosophy they referred to. Gulen affiliated education institutions attracted children of economically underprivileged families from rural and more conservative parts of Turkey to create the Golden Generation (Altin Nesil) who would get into the best Turkish universities and hold jobs in the government bureaucracy.17

The Turkish state came to regard Gulen and the Gulen movement as anti-communist and anti-left wing force with the growing concerns of the Soviet expansionism during the early years of the Cold War.18 Gulen was always sympathetic to the anti-communism struggle and played a role in the founding of Turkiye Komunizmle Mucadale Dernekleri (Turkish Association for

Struggle Against Communism).19 The Gulen Movement became the biggest pro-NATO and pro-

American religious group in Turkey.20 When Prime Minister Turgut Ozal came into power in

1983, after the Coup D’état of 1980, Fethullah Gulen worked with Ozal to promote his ideology

15 Yavuz and Esposito, Turkish Islam and the Secular State, 121. 16 Ibid. 17 Keskin, "Market Oriented Post-Islamism in Turkey,” 127-128. 18 Ibid, 22. 19 Lâtif Erdoḡan, Fethullah Gulen Hocaefendi: küçük dünyam (İstanbul: AD Yayıncılık, 1997), 78.; Yavuz and Esposito, Turkish Islam and the Secular State, 22. 20 Yavuz and Esposito, Turkish Islam and the Secular State, 22.

on a broader scale.21 During this time Gulen’s education campaign became nationalized and later internationalized.22 To bolster his new Turkish identity where Ottoman legacy, Islam, modernity, and the free-market economy came together, Gulen worked with Ozal and became close with state institutions.23 The 1980s were also the time where Gulenists established successful businesses, financial institutions, and a media empire.24

As I mentioned above, Gulen’s ideology is essentially hostile to women, non- believers/atheists, LGBTQ+ individuals, and modern science. Gulen’s ideology contributes negatively to the most urgent issues Muslims and Muslim societies suffer continuously because of economic hardship, systematic corruption, misinterpretation of religion and for other various reasons. Gender and sexual orientation-based discrimination are among the most urgent issues the Muslim societies need to overcome. Infidelity, premarital sex, flirting, or any contact with the opposite sex can be the reason for violence against children, LGBTQ+ community, and women under the name of “honor killings.” While honor killings are not limited to the Muslim world, and with the exception of Iran, none of the North African or the Middle Eastern country have

“honor laws” derived from Islam, the numbers of women who were killed as a result of honor- based violence were relatively high in the region of the Middle East.25 Feminist scholar Phyllis

Chesler stated that even if an honor killing was persecuted in a Muslim country the perpetrators usually got relatively lighter sentences in her article “Worldwide Trends in Honor Killings.”26

21 Ibid, 35.; Keskin, "Market Oriented Post-Islamism in Turkey,” 129. 22 Yavuz and Esposito, Turkish Islam and the Secular State, 37-38. 23 Ibid, 35-36. 24 Ibid, 36.

25 “Honour Killings By Region,” Honor Based Violence Awareness Network, accessed February 5, 2018, http://hbv- awareness.com/regions/. 26 Phyllis Chesler, “Worldwide Trends in Honor Killings,” Middle East Quarterly, March 1, 2010, accessed September 4, 2018, http://www.meforum.org/2646/worldwide-trends-in-honor-killings.

According to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights Bangladesh, Great Britain,

Brazil, Ecuador, Egypt, India, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Pakistan, Morocco, Sweden, Turkey, and

Uganda are among the countries where honor killings take place.27 The Express Tribune, one of the major English language newspapers in Pakistan, reported that a man murdered his wife based on a dream he had where she was cheating on him. The same outlet reported another murder of a woman by her husband as a result of a love song dedicated to her through the radio, the husband slit the woman’s throat in the town square.28 Child marriage is also rampant in Muslim majority countries. 32% of Yemeni girls were married before the age of 18; the number was 19% in

Palestine, 17% in Egypt and Iraq.29 A Yemeni child, who was only 8, suffered from internal injuries on her “wedding night” after marrying a 40-year-old man, the Guardian reported in

2013.30 A similar incident took place in 2010 when a 12-year-old child was killed as a result of her injuries as reported by CNN.31 In 2010, Fox News reported that another Yemeni girl, who was 13, died as a result of marital rape; “legislation to ban child brides has been stalled by opposition from religious leaders,” the report continued.32

According to the Pew Research Center, when asked if society should accept homosexuality 94% of Tunisians, 97% of Jordanians, 78% of Turks, and 98% of Nigerians

27 “Impunity for domestic violence, ‘honour killings’ cannot continue – UN official,” UN News, accessed February 5, 2018, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=33971&Cr=violence+against+women&Cr1#.WnggSJP1VA. 28 “Pakistan among Least Tolerant of Homosexuality Globally: Survey,” Express Tribune, June 14, 2013, https://tribune.com.pk/story/563152/pakistan-among-least-tolerant-of-homosexuality-globally-survey/ 29 “Child Marriage in the Middle East and North Africa,” PRB, accessed December 8, 2017, http://www.prb.org/Publications/Articles/2010/menachildmarriage.aspx. 30 Janise Elise, “Yemeni Child Bride, Eight, ‘Dies on Wedding Night,’” Guardian, September 11, 2013, accessed September 4, 2018, http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2013/sep/11/yemen-child-bridedies- wedding. 31 Mohammed Jamjoom, “Yemeni Child Bride Dies of Internal Bleeding,” CNN World, April 9, 2010, accessed February 5, 2018, http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/meast/04/09/yemen.child.bride.death/index.html. 32 “Dead Yemeni Child Bride Tied up, Raped, Says Mom,” Fox News World, April 10, 2010, accessed September 4, 2018, http://www.foxnews.com/world/2010/04/10/dead-yemeni-child-bride-tied-raped-says- mom.html.

answered negatively. In comparison, 88% of Spaniards, 87% of Germans, 74% of Argentinians,

60% of Americans answered “yes.”33 Only 43%, 55%, and 50% of Middle Easterners answered positively when asked if “People can say what they want?” “Media can report the news?” and

“People can use the internet?” Whereas the numbers were as high as 71%, 67% and 69% in the

U.S.34 According to a Tunis-based organization, Arab League Educational Cultural and Scientific

Organisation (ALECSO), 46.5% of women in the region were illiterate.35 When asked if women should decide to wear the hijab Only 30% answered the question positively in Afghanistan, 45% in Jordan, and 30% in Congo.36 The law mandates that women must cover their hair and wear unfitting clothes in Iran and Saudi Arabia. Dr. Salman Hameed, who teaches astronomy and religion at Hampshire College, stated that “In Turkey, one of the more secular Muslim countries, the [acceptance level of evolution] is between 22 and 25%.”37 The acceptance rate of evolution is

40% in the US.38 The percentage of people who identified themselves as “evolutionists” was 68 in Sweden and 65 in Germany.39

Despite these issues and human rights abuses in Muslim societies, American journalists who write for the two biggest news outlets in the United States by circulation, the New York

Times and the Wall Street Journal, promoted a movement that either supports or do nothing to

33 “The Global Divide on Homosexuality,” Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project, June 4, 2013, accessed September, 2018, http://www.pewglobal.org/2013/06/04/the-global-divide-on-homosexuality/. 34 Alex Gray, “Freedom of Speech: Which Country Has the Most?,” World Economic Forum, November 8, 2016, accessed December 8, 2017, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/11/freedom-of-speech-country-comparison/. 35 “Illiteracy Plagues Arab World,” ArabianBusiness.com, January 8, 2008, accessed December 8, 2017, http://www.arabianbusiness.com/illiteracy-plagues-arab-world-193646.html. 36 “Dress Code - Women in Islam and Muslim Realms” LibGuides at Cornell University, accessed December 8, 2017, http://guides.library.cornell.edu/c.php?g=221770&p=2559149. 37 Ewen Callaway, “How to Stop Creationism Gaining a Hold in Islam,” New Scientist, December 11, 2008, accessed December 8, 2017, https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn16258-how-to-stop-creationism-gaining-a-hold-in- islam/. 38 Ibid. 39 Glenn Branch, “Polling Creationism and Evolution around the World,” National Center for Science Education, April 25, 2011, accessed December 8, 2017, https://ncse.com/news/2011/04/polling-creationism-evolution- around-world-006634. 9

eliminate these issues, as the new and moderate face of Islam. Academics and journalists often portrayed the Gulen movement as a moderate movement that promoted modern science education, women’s rights and tolerance even though the Gulen movement’s objectives would contribute to the human rights abuses in the Muslim societies instead of eliminating them as suggested by the academics and the journalists.

The Gulen movement is not unique for attracting an positive interest from the journalists, during the height of the Cold War the United States portrayed other fundamentalist groups or governments as “friends,” or “freedom fighters.” After World War II, Islam was seen as a unifying force against Communism by America and during the Soviet-Afghan war, millions of dollars were poured to the Afghan mujahideen, who later evolved into Taliban.40 The

Orientalist historian Maxime Rodinson stated that "Western Christendom perceived the Muslim world as a menace long before it began to be seen as a real problem.”41 Albert Hourani stated that the Christian Western world perceived Islam as a false religion and believed that "Islam was invented by men whose motives and character deplored and propagated by the sword.”42 The world witnessed the shift of political power from the old world to the new world with the end of

World War II. This was branded and polished with the Cold War Era, which has seen the race between the U.S. and the USSR from space research to developing nuclear arms. During the Cold

War Era (1947 – 1991), intellectual migration to the U.S. became a trend. As a result of all these developments, the Orientalist European view of Islam has found itself a new nest in the U.S.

40 Neamatollah Nojumi. The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan: Mass Mobilization, Civil War, and the Future of the Region (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2009), 119-120. 41 Maxime Rodinson, Europe and the Mystique of Islam (New York, NY: I.B Tauris, 2002), 3. 42 Fawaz A. Gerges, “Islam and Muslims in the Mind of America,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 588, no: 1 (2003): 74, accessed September 4, 2018. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1049855.

universities.43 The mythical, monolithic, and homogenous Islam turned the American policymakers to Islam as an official anti-communist tool. The Eisenhower administration hoped that King Sa’ud ibn Abdul Aziz of Saudi Arabia could be a unifying force among Muslims against the communist threat.44 During the height of the Cold War in the 1950s, America sided with a possible Islamic alliance that would serve their interests rather than increased Arab nationalism.45 With the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, the U.S. became even more involved with the region and with Islam. The Carter administration’s National Security Adviser Zbigniew

Brzezinski hoped to employ Islam as a unifying force against the Soviets as well and unleashed a series of propaganda aimed to the Muslims in the USSR.46 According to Gil Guerrero’s

“Propaganda Broadcasts and Cold War Politics: The Carter Administration’s Outreach to Islam,” the State Department-sponsored scholars “to give an impartial academic assessment that concurred with the goals of the public diplomacy campaign.”47 Guerrero noted that journalist

Robert Dreyfuss explained how the U.S. unleashed radical Islam to further its interests in the region in his book Devil’s Game: How the United States Helped Unleash Fundamentalist

Islam.48

The 1970s was the decade Islam and Muslims became to be perceived as a threat by

Americans. Fawaz Gerges argued that the American perception of the Middle East changed during the 1970s as a result of the powerful emergence of political Islam.49 He listed the 1973

43 Robert M. Morrisson, “Faith Fights Communism: The United States And Islam in Saudi Arabia During Cold War,” (Master’s thesis, University of North Carolina Wilmington, 2009). 44 Ibid. 45 Gerges, “Islam and Muslims in the Mind of America,” 75. 46 Javier Gil Guerrero, “Propaganda Broadcasts and Cold War Politics: The Carter Administration’s Outreach to Islam,” Journal of Cold War Studies 19, no: 1, (2017): 6, accessed September 4, 2018. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1162/JCWS_a_00716. 47 Ibid. 48 Ibid. 49 Gerges, “Islam and Muslims in the Mind of America,” 76.

Arab-Israeli War, Arab Oil Embargo, and the 1978/9 Iranian Revolution along with the hostage crisis as the causes of the shift in perception. As a result of these events, many American officials started to perceive Islam as a threat to “Western interests.”50 Edward Said also argued that the Oil

Embargo and the hostage crisis played major roles in this perception in Covering Islam. Said stated that this half ideological half fictional label was solidified with the coverage of the Iranian

Hostage crisis, where Iran and thus Islam became synonymous with religious radicalism and terrorism.51 Melani McAlister stated that “Islam’ became highlighted as the dominant signifier of the [Middle East], rather than oil wealth, Arabs, or Christian Holy Lands.”52 Gerges also argued that Muammar Qaddafi’s employment of Islam in order to legitimize his rule played a major role in shifting American perception even long before the Iranian revolution.53 According to Gerges, terrorism was another major reason why the American perception of Islam shifted radically. With the ending of the Cold War and starting with the 1990s the terrorist attacks that targeted

Americans contributed to the negative perception of Islam and Muslims even further.54 Richard

Bulliet, a scholar from the Columbia University, stated that the Americans were becoming to identify Muslims with terrorism and started to see Muslims as a part of a culture “that cannot be tolerated or reasoned with.”55

Representations and portrayals of Muslims and Islam changed accordingly. After the

Oklahoma City bombing in 1995, an International Herald Tribune article stated that even though this particular attack was done by an American, most terrorist attacks targeting Americans were

50 Ibid. 51 Edward W. Said, Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World (New York: Vintage Book, March 1997), 77. 52 Melani McAlister, Epic Encounters: Culture, Media, and U.S. Interests in the Middle East since 1945 (California: University of California Press, 2001), 200. 53 Gerges, “Islam and Muslims in the Mind of America,” 76. 54 Ibid, 78. 55 Gerges, “Islam and Muslims in the Mind of America,” 79.

perpetrated by Middle Easterners.56 Gerges stated that this argument was not factual and that there had been more terrorist attacks against the American citizens by non-Muslims in the last ten years.57 Abdulaziz Atiyah Al-Zahrani’s unpublished dissertation “U.S. television and press coverage of Islam and Muslims,” established that most stories in the American media regarding

Muslims were about crises and the general portrayal of Muslims, as a result, were negative.58 The article “Press Treatment of Islam: What Kind of Picture Do the Media Paint?” noted that the

President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt portrayed negatively and contradictorily since he was likened to Hitler and referred to as a “crypto-communist” at the same time.59 Matthew F. Jacobs was in agreement and stated that during the early Cold War, the U.S. policymakers, academics, and journalists often had contradictory understandings of Islam.60 Kashif Z. Sheikh, Vincent

Price, and Hayg Oshagan suggested that both Muammar Gaddafi and Saddam Hussein were portrayed as inhuman and labeled as “mad dogs” in “Press Treatment of Islam: What Kind of

Picture Do the Media Paint .”61 The article also explained the negative attitude against Islam with cultural and linguistic ignorance of the reporters.62 Since the West had similar interests in the

Muslim world, they influenced their reporters “to use preferred frames when reporting on issues in the area. This helps create more favorable public opinion locally and increased political capital for policy initiatives internationally.”63 The authors concluded that “Particular international

56 Ibid. 57 Ibid, 79. 58 Kashif Z. Sheikh, Vincent Price, Hayg Oshagan, “Press Treatment of Islam: What Kind of Picture Do the Media Paint?,” International Communication Gazette 56, (1996): 140. Accessed September 4, 2018. Doi: https://doi.org/10.1177/001654929605600204. 59 Ibid. 60 Matthew F. Jacobs, “The Perils and Promise of Islam: The United States and the Muslim Middle East in the Early Cold War,” Diplomatic History 30, no. 4, (2006,): 709. Accessed September 4, 2018. https://www.jstor.org/stable/24915081. 61 Sheikh, Price, Oshagan, “Press Treatment of Islam: What Kind of Picture Do the Media Paint?,” 140. 62 Ibid. 63 Ibid, 141.

events, depending on whether they are viewed positively or negatively, will determine the tone of news stories about Muslims.”64 Deepa Kumar pointed out the lack of studies on the positive portrayal of Islam in the media, even though Islam was promoted by the United States during the

Cold War.65 Kumar concluded that “When ‘Islamic unity’ was useful in the prosecution of the

Cold War, the news media covered it positively, in contrast to the current period in which a transnational Islamist network is presented as an existential threat.”66 Kumar furthered his argument by stating that when Islam “is in service to US foreign policy objectives was the ‘right kind of Islam.”67

For example, when the U.S. was aiding the mujahideen during the Soviet-Afghan War, the war crimes committed by the mujahedeen were not reported often by the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal. David Binder from the New York Times referred to the mujahedeen as

“anti-communist rebels” in “U.S. Aides Say Afghanistan Army is Crumbling Under Rebel

Pressure.”68 While the article positively portrayed the mujahedeen by referring them as “anti- communists,” it also stated that the tribal insurgency especially got stronger after the Soviet- backed literacy campaign was popular among women, and this caused “Strong antagonism among the tradition-minded, male-oriented Afghans.”69 In contrast, Terence Smiths’s article from the New York times also referred to the mujahedeen as rebels but did not provide any context of

64 Ibid. 65 Deepa Kumar, “The Right Kind of ‘Islam’: The news media representations of US-Saudi relations during the Cold War,” Journalism Studies, 19, no: 3 (2016): 1080. Accessed September 4, 2018. Doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/1461670X.2016.1259012. 66 Ibid. 67 Ibid. 68 David Binder, "U. S. Aides Say Afghanistan Army Is Crumbling Under Rebel Pressure, " New York Times, July 13, 1979, accessed September 5, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/1979/07/13/archives/us-aides-say-afghanistan- army-is-crumbling-under-rebel-pressure.html 69 Ibid.

their insurgency.70 Leslie Gelb also chose to refer to the mujahedeen as “guerillas” or

“insurgency,” without mentioning their Islamic roots.71 Another Gelb article from 1984, while reported the $625 million aid went to the mujahedeen, did not mention the motives of the rebels.72 Richard Halloran reported in 1986 that there was a possibility of Reagan government extending the diplomatic recognition of the mujahedeen, also did not touch upon the radical nature of the group.73 Elaine Sciolino’s article reported that the Bush administration was going to continue to fund Afghan rebels in 1989 and referred to the mujahedeen as “rebels.”74 This positive sentiment changed with the nearing of the end of the war. John F. Burns’ article, that was published in 1989, dealt with one of the guerrilla groups in the seven-member rebel coalition in

Afghanistan. It was reported that after a series of criticism directed to the Islamic Party’s use of weapons, the Bush administration cut the faction from receiving any munitions from America.75

The article identified the head of the group, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, as a Muslim fundamentalist and noted that he described America as an “immoral society,” while “his fighters were receiving a third to a half of all American military aid to the Afghan rebels, valued over the years at hundreds of millions of dollars.” 76 Burns also pointed out that Hekmatyar visited the U.S. once in 1985 but refused to meet President Reagan, in contrast to Sciolino’s article published mere

70 Terence Smith, “Carter Tells Soviet to Pull its Troops out of Afghanistan: He Warns of 'Consequences,” New York Times, December 30, 1979, accessed September 5, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/1979/12/30/archives/carter- tells-soviet-to-pull-its-troops-out-of-afghanistan-he-warns.html. 71 Leslie H. Gelb, “U.S. Said to Increase Arms Aid for Afghan Rebels,” New York Times, May 4, 1983, accessed September 8, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/1983/05/04/world/us-said-to-increase-arms-aid-for-afghan- rebels.html. 72 Ibid. 73 Richard Halloran, "U.S. May Establish Afghan Rebel Ties," New York Times, Jun 18, 1986, accessed September 8, 2018, http://ezproxy.library.und.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest- com.ezproxy.library.und.edu/docview/425915420?accountid=28267. 74 Elaine Sciolino, "U.S. Will Continue Afghan Rebel Aid," New York Times, Feb 16, 1989, accessed September 8, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/1989/02/16/world/us-will-continue-afghan-rebel-aid.html 75 John F. Burns, “U.S. Cuts Off Arms to Afghan Faction,” New York Times, November 19, 1989, accessed September 8, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/1989/11/19/world/us-cuts-off-arms-to-afghan-faction.html. 76 Ibid.

months ago.77 Tim Weiner’s article from 1993 reported that the U.S. would spend $55 million to try to get back more than three hundred Stinger antiaircraft missiles that were once provided to the mujahedeen by the U.S. Weiner’s article mentioned Hekmatyar, like Burn’s article, and noted that he became the prime minister of Afghanistan and that he forged an alliance with Iran.78

As we are going to see the examples below, this attitude that mainly ignored the threat and glossed over the mujahedeen was not much different on the pages of the Wall Street Journal either. In “U.S. Is Cautious in Aiding Afghan Rebels,” published in 1984 the mujahedeen was only referred as Afghan rebels, and the U.S.’ cautious behavior when supporting the mujahedeen was explained by the smaller chance of the mujahedeen stood against the Soviet troops.79 Unlike the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal pointed out the inclination of Afghan rebels, even though they were currently allies, towards “Moslem fundamentalism,” in 1984.80 However, another article from 1984 about financial corruption among the Afghan rebels did not refer to

Islamic radicalism or fundamentalism at all.81 A 1985 article reported that the mujahedeen visited the United Nations, looking for political recognition. The article referred to Gulbuddin

Hekmatyar as “Head of the large Hizbi Islami resistance group and chief spokesman for the delegation,” and quoted him when he said, "The Soviet conduct in Afghanistan makes a mockery

77 Ibid. 78 Tim Weiner, “U.S. Increases Fund To Outbid Terrorists For Afghan Missiles,” New York Times, July 24, 1993, accessed September 8, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/1993/07/24/world/us-increases-fund-to-outbid-terrorists- for-afghan-missiles.html. 79 "U.S. is Cautious in Aiding Afghan Rebels." Wall Street Journal, Apr 09, 1984, accessed September 8, 2018, http://ezproxy.library.und.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest- com.ezproxy.library.und.edu/docview/397861902?accountid=28267 80 Amos Perlmutter. "Containment Strategy for the Islamic Holy War,” Wall Street Journal, Oct 04, 1984, accessed September 8, 2018, http://ezproxy.library.und.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest- com.ezproxy.library.und.edu/docview/397905630?accountid=28267 81 Frederick Kempe. "Corruption Said to Divert U.S. Arms from Afghan Rebels, Leading to Demands that the Aid be More Closely Monitored," Wall Street Journal, Dec 27, 1984, accessed September 8, 2018, http://ezproxy.library.und.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest- com.ezproxy.library.und.edu/docview/397969332?accountid=28267.

of the U.N. charter, the Declaration of Human Rights, international law and the norms of civilized behavior."82 Claudia Rosett’s article published in 1988, referred to the mujahedeen as

“mujahideen” and mentioned a Soviet-backed terrorism campaign in Pakistan was aiming to end

Pakistan’s aid to the mujahedeen. The article did not mention the radical trend inside the mujahedeen or Hekmatyar’s anti-Americanism while pointing out that it was the Carter administration started the aid and the Reagan administration was continuing it.83 Finally, with the shift in the approach by the end of the war in 1989, S. J. Masty referred to the problematic aspects of the mujahedeen, the radicalism of Hekmatyar, and the growing Wahhabi influence inside the state.84 This shows that U.S. interests have had changed as the mujahideen evolved from an ally to a radical political entity. And the rhetoric in both the New York Times and the

Wall Street Journal changed accordingly.

As mentioned by David Binder in the New York Times one of the major reasons behind the insurgency against the elected Afghan government in Afghanistan was the introduced reforms. Peter Marsden explained in The Taliban: war and religion in Afghanistan, that the literacy campaign and women and girls’ education especially angered the rural Afghan population.85 Valentine M. Moghadam also agreed that the ruling party, People’s Democratic

Party of Afghanistan, tried to introduce a series of reforms where women’s emancipation was

82 “Afghans Demand a Right," Wall Street Journal, Nov 01, 1985, accessed September 8, 2018, http://ezproxy.library.und.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest- com.ezproxy.library.und.edu/docview/397976157?accountid=28267. 83 Claudia Rosett. "Zia's Killing Haunts Afghan 'Peace'." Wall Street Journal, Nov 04, 1988, accessed September 8, 2018, http://ezproxy.library.und.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest- com.ezproxy.library.und.edu/docview/398178542?accountid=28267. 84 S.J. Masty, "Asia: Victory in Afghanistan Day Leaves Country Divided," Wall Street Journal, Feb 15, 1989, accessed September 8, 2018, http://ezproxy.library.und.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest- com.ezproxy.library.und.edu/docview/398193019?accountid=28267. 85 Peter Marsden, The Taliban War and Religion in Afghanistan (Cape Town: Spearhead, 2002), 24.

linked to “Modernization, development, and socialism.”86 Moghadam explained that there was a strong male backlash to the introduced reforms especially to the ones that declared women free in choosing their marriage partners and the abolishing of “brideprice,” where the groom’s family was expected to pay a certain sum in order to marry the girl, and the right of women to divorce.87

Marsden stated that “The anger of population found an appropriate outlet in the unifying call for

Jihad.”88 Huma Ahmed-Ghosh stated that while the mujahedeen mobilized as a result of a perceived Soviet threat against Islam and their cultural values, their victory in Afghanistan brought an “unprecedented barbarism” between the years 1992 and 1996 during the Taliban regime. According to Ahmed-Ghosh, bodily harm against women such as amputations, femicide, and rapes were so common that many young women chose to end their lives in order to avoid violence and forced marriages.89 Women’s freedom was severely limited during this time, they were not allowed to be outside other than to buy food, they had to be accompanied by a male relative, their dress code was strictly limited to burqa and no make-up or “fancy shoes,” they were not allowed to go to school or visit male doctors in addition to the widespread practice of forced marriages and rape.90 It would be safe to say that during the 1980s these news outlets disregarded the mujahedeen’s anti-women stance.

The news media’s influence over politics and public opinion is a debated subject. While there is no direct evidence that policymakers are influenced from the news media, coverage of

86 Valentine M. Moghadam, “Nationalist Agendas and Women’s Rights: Conflicts in Afghanistan in the Twentieth Century,” in Feminist Nationalism, ed. Lois A. West (New York: Routledge, 1997), 76. 87 Ibid, 87. 88 Marsden, The Taliban War and Religion in Afghanistan, 24. 89 Huma Ahmed-Ghosh, “A history of women in Afghanistan: Lessons Learnt for the Future or Yesterdays and Tomorrow: Women in Afghanistan,” Journal of International Women’s Studies 4, no: 3 (May, 2003): 7, accessed September 4, 2018, https://vc.bridgew.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1577&conte xt=jiws. 90 Ibid.

certain issues may serve as interpretation and anticipation tools.91 It is also clear that the news media is responsible for creating and/or shaping the public opinion. For example, various research has shown that the news media played a major role in influencing foreign aid allocations; every New York Times story that covered a disaster raised approximately $1.7 million in aid. 92 Perhaps the most famous influence credited to the news media was Judith Miller’s articles published in the New York Times before the Iraq War in 2003. Thomas E. Ricks in Fiasco argued that the breaking newspaper stories in the New York Times further distorted the already fouled intelligence process of the Bush administration before the invasion of Iraq. The Bush administration justified the invasion based on their strong belief of Iraq’s possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Judith Miller, a credible the New York Times journalist, published a series of articles that supported the WMD narrative. “U.S. Says Hussein Intensifies Quest For A-

Bomb Parts,” co-authored with Michael Gordon was published on September 8th and claimed that only a mushroom cloud would be a more credible evidence than what already exists to prove

Saddam Hussein was trying to build an atomic bomb.93 Fiasco quoted an unnamed senior military officer who argued that "The media has far more effect on intelligence analysis than you probably realize."94 Miller traveled to Iraq and followed the search for the WMD conducted by the U.S. military, later she reported that the WMD were destroyed by the Iraqi officials and that experts had “found sources of radioactive material.”95 The New York Times resisted criticism for more than a year until running a review that was somewhat critical of Miller’s reporting.96 Judith

91 Douglas A. Van Belle, “Bureaucratic Responsiveness to the news media: Comparing the Influence of The New York Times and Network Television News Coverage on Us Foreign Aid Allocations,” Political Communication 20, no: 3, (2013): 266, accessed September 4, 2018, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/10584600390218896. 92 Ibid, 264.; Van Belle, “Bureaucratic Responsiveness to the news media,” 264. 93 Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq (New York: Penguin Books, 2007), 55. 94 Ibid, 56. 95 Ibid, 382. 96 Ibid, 383.

Miller’s career, on the other hand, ended at the New York Times after she named her source as

Lewis Libby, Dick Cheney’s chief of staff and national security advisor.97 In a recent study from

2017, Jeffrey Bachman accused the New York Times for purposefully reporting misleading information about the civilian casualties of drone strikes in Yemen and Pakistan ordered by the

Obama administration. 98 In “The New York Times and Washington Post: Misleading the public about US drone strikes,” Bachman also argued that this misleading behavior resulted in a lack of understanding of the consequences of the drone strikes among the Americans and a lack of public opinion.99 Similarly, Robin Stevens argued that newspaper coverage influence news coverage by other media outlets and shape and/or influence public opinion. 100

While the measurable extent of the news media’s influence over policymakers and public opinion is open to debate, it is clear that the news media plays an important role in both of them. This thesis only focuses on the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal since they are the largest news outlets in the United States by circulation. The New York Times is considered by its readers, and by itself, as the paper of record. 101 The phrase “newspaper of record,” means that a newspaper that is considered authoritative and could be used as a historical source based on its established attention to detail and in-depth reporting. The phrase originated after the New York

97 Ibid, 385. 98 J. Bachman, “The New York Times and Washington Post: Misleading the Public about US Drone Strikes,” Journalism Studies 18, no: 4: (2015): 481. Accessed September 4, 2018, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/1461670X.2015.1073118. 99 Ibid. 100 Robin Stevens and Robert C. Hornik, “AIDS in Black and White: The Influence of Newspaper Coverage of HIV/AIDS on HIV/AIDS Testing Among African Americans and White Americans, 1993–2007,” Journal of Health Communication 19, no: 8 (2014): 893–906, doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/10810730.2013.864730. 101 Bachman, “The New York Times and Washington Post: Misleading the Public about US Drone Strikes,” 471.

Times started to continuously publish an index of subjects that the day’s paper included in

1913.102 Former the New York Times executive Max Frankel described his newspaper as:

It is the “house organ” of the smartest, most talented, and most influential Americans at the height of American power. And while its editorial opinions or the views of individual columnists and critics can be despised or dismissed, the paper’s daily package of news cannot. It frames the intellectual and emotional agenda of serious Americans.103

The Wall Street Journal is the second largest newspaper in the U.S. by circulation after the New York Times.104 The Wall Street Journal, while being reputable for its credibility and accuracy also argued to reflect American capitalism and to serve the financial elite by Michal

Soffer and Ari Rimmerman in “Representations of the Americans with Disabilities Act employment-related issues in the Wall Street Journal (1990–2008): a feasibility study.” 105 The

Economist magazine called the Wall Street Journal “The Bible of American conservatism.” 106

After the Wall Street Journal was acquired by Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation, the newspaper became less focused on business and increasingly more focused on foreign affairs and politics. According to the Pew Research Center’s Project for Excellence in Journalism from

2011, the Wall Street Journal became competitive with the New York Times.107 In addition to being the two largest newspapers by circulation, the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal are also significantly distinct from each other being on the different ends of the political spectrum. Matthew Gentzkow and Jesse Shapiro differentiated between the political leanings of

102 Kathleen A Hansen and Shannon E. Martin, Newspapers of Record in a Digital Age: From Hot Type to Hot Link (Westport: Praeger, 1998), 6-7. 103 Maxwell McCombs, Setting the Agenda: Mass Media and Public Opinion, (Malden: Polity Press, 2014), ix-xiii. 104 “Newspapers Fact Sheet.” Pew Research Center’s Journalism Project, June 13, 2018, accessed September 12, 2018, http://www.journalism.org/fact-sheet/newspapers/. 105 Soffer and Rimmerman, “Representations of the Americans with Disabilities Act Employment-Related Issues in the Wall Street Journal (1990-2008)”; Stephen Reese, “The news paradigm and the ideology of objectivity: A socialist at the Wall Street Journal,” Critical Studies in Media Communication 7, no: 4 (1990): 392. 106 Michael W. Wagner and Timothy P. Collins, “Does Ownership Matter?,” Journalism Practice 8, no: 6, (2014): 759, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/17512786.2014.882063. 107 Ibid, 758.; Soffer and Rimmerman, “Representations of the American with Disabilities Act employment-related issues in the Wall Street Journal (1990 – 2008): A feasibility study,” 184.

the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal by employing text categorization in order to determine the political leaning of the newspapers. First, they identified phrases mostly used by conservatives and liberals, such as the use of “death tax” by conservatives and “estate tax” by liberals, and then examined the language of the newspapers to determine their political leanings.108 According to this text categorization, the Wall Street Journal employed more conservative phraseology than the New York Times and vice versa. Pew Research Center’s 2010 survey also demonstrated that the 45% the Wall Street Journal readers identified as conservatives whereas 11% of the New York Times readers identified as conservative.109

The coverage of Islam in the Western media is a well-studied subject around the world.

Elizabeth Pool, from Keele University, United Kingdom, argued that mass media played an important role in the production of knowledge and that British Muslims were negatively portrayed in the British mass media.110 Anna Korteweg from the University of Toronto, Canada, argued that Islam had been portrayed as homogenized and a monolithic entity in Canada and often negatively.111 In addition to the news media, the Western popular culture also stereotyped

Muslim. Jack Shaheen focused on the Muslim Arabs’ portrayal in Hollywood and demonstrated that the Muslim societies and Muslims were portrayed as uncivilized and as religious fanatics.112

Evelyn Alsultany examined the positive portrayal of Muslims in popular culture and argued that

108 Matthew Gentzkow and Jesse M. Shapiro, “What Drives Media Slant? Evidence From U.S. Daily Newspapers,” Econometrica 78, no: 1, (2010): 36, accessed September 5, 2018, https://web.stanford.edu/~gentzkow/research/biasmeas.pdf. 109 Joshua Woods and C. Damien Arthur, "The Threat of Terrorism and the Changing Public Discourse on Immigration after September 11," Sociological Spectrum 34 no: 5 (2014): 426, doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/02732173.2014.937652. 110 Elizabeth Poole, Reporting Islam: Media Representations of British Muslims (London: I.B.Tauris, 2002). 111 Anna C. Korteweg, “The Sharia Debate in Ontario: Gender, Islam, and Representations of Muslim Women’s Agency,” Gender and Society 22 no: 4, (2008): 434, https://www.jstor.org/stable/27821662. 112 Jack G, Shaheen, “Hollywood’s Muslim Arabs,” The Muslim World 90, no: 1-2 (2000): 22–42, doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1478-1913.2000.tb03680.x.

the “seemingly positive representations of Arabs and Muslims have helped to form a new kind of racism,” since they legitimized racist policies and practices. In the post-racial era of the United

States, argued Alsultany, the other was not portrayed as the evil but as the sympathetic victim.113

Coming back to the American news media, the most prominent work that dealt with the

Muslim image in the media was Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How

We See the Rest of the World, which was written in 1981 by Edward Said. Said stated that

Muslims were only featured on the mainstream media as “Oil suppliers or as potential terrorists.”114 Said also pointed out the difference between the approaches employed by the

United States and England and France since the United States did not have a colonialist past like the other two. Islam only started to become relevant to America after World War II. Because of the lack of historical awareness, argued Said, there was no room for a non-ideological look at

Islam or at the Arab-world that went beyond “pro/anti-American.”115 Said stated that almost every American journalist employed a “subliminal consciousness,” that “makes press independence subordinate to what are often only implicit expressions of loyalty and patriotism, of simple national identification.”116 Said furthered this argument by stating that “The American media inevitably collect information on the outside world inside a framework dominated by government policy.”117 According to Said the way the press approached the subject matter directly correlated with the audience’s expectations:

The obliteration of the methodological consciousness is absolutely coterminous with the presence of the market, for news as well as whole clienteles of security-conscious

113 Evelyn Alsultany, Arabs and Muslims in the Media: Race and Representation after 9/11 (New York: New York University Press, 2012), 16. 114 Edward W. Said, Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World, (Vintage Digital, 2008), Kindle Location 1384. 115 Ibid, 1622. 116 Ibid, 1740-1743. 117 Ibid, 1744-1747.

consumers (governments, corporations, foundations): one simply does not ask why one does what one does if there is an appreciative, or at least a potentially receptive, clientele.118

Said also explained how Islam became a commodity in academia in relation to expectations:

Worse yet, the scholar stops thinking in terms of the region and the people about whom studies are being conducted. Islam, if it is “Islam” that is being studied, is not an interlocutor but in a sense a commodity. The overall result is a kind of institutional bad faith. The scholarly honor and integrity of the field are upheld against critical outsiders, scholarly rhetoric is willfully arrogant about denying political partisanship, and scholarly self-congratulation fortifies present practices (principally in popular journalism) indefinitely.119

Said stated that scholars tended to work on Islamic issues only if there was a public interest and this made the scholarship solely focused on American interests. Said stated that little other than

“good,” and “bad Muslim” stories were covered in the media because anything else was considered irrelevant to the United States. 120 Said argued that it was the same for the academic community. Anything outside of extremism, terrorism, and violence were little studied in the academia when it came to Islam because the non-academic interest was scarce.121

While Said’s work could be considered outdated since it was written in 1981, more recent studies also argued that Orientalism was still the prominent approach to Islam in the

American media. Saifuddin Ahmed from Johns Hopkins University and Jorg Matthes from the

University of Vienna argued that there was an anti-Muslim discourse in the Western media and it started with the Iranian Revolution of 1979.122 Islamic studies and journalism scholar Karim H.

Karim stated that after 9/11 Muslims started to occupy the space once occupied by the

118 Ibid, 3180-3186. 119 Ibid, 3180-3186. 120 Ibid, 3192-3195. 121 Ibid, 3195-3199. 122 Saifuddin Ahmed and Jörg Matthes, “Media Representation of Muslims and Islam from 2000 to 2015: A Meta-Analysis,” International Communication Gazette 79 no: 3 (2017) 221, doi: https://doi.org/10.1177/1748048516656305.

communists in American minds.123 Karim also pointed out that the word “Islamic” became a popular label to describe radical terrorists’ actions by the journalists. Islam became a focal point on the news and the many newspapers such as the New York Times, Newsweek, and Time featured headlines that connected Islam to terrorism.124 Indian scholar, Smeeta Mishra, also claimed that the Washington Post portrayed the Saudi women as oppressed and in need of Western rescue.125

This argument that the American media extensively covered the “oppressed Muslim women” for propaganda purposes had also been scrutinized by Lila Abu-Lughod in Do Muslim Women Need

Saving?.126 In addition to Abu-Lughod, author Evelyn Alsultany argued that the oppressed

Muslim women narrative dominated the news after 9/11. Alsultany stated that Muslim women who acted as informants of Muslim daily life often dubbed as “moderate Muslims” by the media, promoted racism and Orientalism while serving as proof of false inclusiveness and multiculturalism. The “good Muslim women” who denounced Islam and embraced Western values became feminist heroes according to Alsultany.127

On a broader scale, Teun A. Van Dijk’s analysis showed that the mainstream news media portrayed the minorities as “a problem or a threat, and are portrayed preferably in association with crime, violence, conflict, unacceptable cultural differences, or other forms of deviance.”128 Saifuddin Ahmed and Jorg Matthes’ meta-analysis of three-hundred and forty-five studies demonstrated that Muslims were “negatively framed” and Islam had been portrayed as a

123 Elizabeth Poole and John E Richardson, Muslims and the news media (London: I.B. Tauris, 2010), 117. 124 Ibid. 125 Smeeta Mishra, “Liberation” vs. “Purity”: Representations of Saudi Women in the American Press and American Women in the Saudi Press,” Howard Journal of Communications 18 no: 3 (2007): 259-276, doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/10646170701490849. 126 Lila Abu-Lughod, Do Muslim Women Need Saving? (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015). 127 Alsultany, Arabs and Muslims in the Media: Race and Representation after 9/11, 11–86. 128 Teun A. van Dijk, Racism and the Press (London and New York: Routledge, 1991), 21.

violent religion.129 Ahmed and Matthes also argued that mass media’s articulation of “dominant social values, ideologies, and developments” lead to minorities’ misrepresentation in the media.

130 Ahmed and Matthes’ analysis demonstrated that after 9/11, the Western news media started to focus on Muslims and Islam and the portrayal was often negative, and similarly, the academic studies mainly focused on the negative aspects and emphasized the link between Islam and migration, war, conflict, and radicalism.131 Mohammad Samiei’s article “Neo-Orientalism? The relationship between the West and Islam in our globalized world” shed light to Ahmed and

Matthes’ analysis by examining the changes in Orientalist dualism and neo-Orientalism.132

Samiei agreed with Ahmed and Matthes on how Islam became more mainstream in the West: after the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, and added that the hostage crisis in Tehran and the

“unresolved Palestinian question” also contributed to the growing interest in Islam.133 Samiei gave the example of portraying Islam as a homogenous enemy, and according to this model

Islamic Jihad, Hamas, Hezbollah, and the al-Qaeda had little difference between them.134

Mubarak Altwaiji stated that 9/11 and the following political changes in the world “Contributed to the re-evolution of the classic Orient.”135 Altwaiji stated that the binary division that labeled

Muslims as “them” was employed with the “War on Terror” and the representations of Muslims often portrayed as terrorists.136

A more recent study from 2013 by Fatemah Poorebrahim and Gholam Reza Zarei

129 Ahmed and Matthes, “Media Representation of Muslims and Islam from 2000 to 2015: A Meta Analysis,” 221. 130 Ibid. 131 Ibid, 235. 132 Samiei, “Neo-Orientalism? The Relationship between the West and Islam in Our Globalised World,” 1145. 133 Ibid, 1148. 134 Ibid, 1149. 135 Mubarak Altwaiji. "Neo-Orientalism and the Neo-Imperialism Thesis: Post-9/11 US and Arab World Relationship." Arab Studies Quarterly 36, no. 4 (2014): 314. 136 Ibid.

followed the consensus and argued that Islam was stereotyped and Muslims were negatively represented in the Western news media.137 Poorebrahim and Zarei employed a linguistic approach to examine the Muslims’ portrayal. Their argument was that the language used in the media did not reflect the reality but it created the reality.138 Poorebrahim and Zarei employed Teun A. Van

Dijk’s argument that “Mental representations are often articulated along ‘US’ versus ‘THEM’ dimensions, in which speakers of one group will generally tend to present themselves or their own group in positive terms, and other groups in negative terms.”139 The authors’ examination of the Western media yielded the following results:

137 Fatemeh Poorebrahim and Gholam Reza Zarei, “How Is Islam Portrayed in Western Media? A Critical Discourse Analysis Perspective,” International Journal of Foreign Language Teaching and Research 1, no: 2, (2013) 1. 138 Ibid, 2. 139 Ibid, 3. 27

Table 1. Orientalist Themes: Total Numbers and Percentages in the Independent, The Herald Tribune, the Times, and the New York Times (NYT).140

Orientalist Theme The Herald The NYT % of Independent Tribune Times total Inferiority 1 0 1 0 4.34 Backwardness 1 2 2 2 15.21 Irrationality 2 3 4 4 28.26 Submissiveness 0 0 0 0 0 Islam as threat 5 4 4 4 36.95 Christians/Jews v. 1 1 3 1 13.4 Muslims Strangeness 0 0 0 0 0 Untrustworthiness 0 0 0 1 2.17 Total No. of Headlines 10 10 14 12

Table 2. Word Collocating with the Terms Islam and Muslims in the Selected Headlines.141 Words collocating The Herald The NYT Total Islam/Muslims Independent Tribune Times Radical 3 4 3 2 12 Corruption 1 0 0 1 2 Fundamentalist/ism 0 0 0 1 1 Terrorist/ism 2 2 3 2 9 Barbarity/Violent 2 0 1 1 4 Extremist/ism, 0 0 1 1 2 Fanaticism/ism Kill/War 1 0 1 1 3 Threat/Fear 2 0 3 0 5 Dead/Death 0 1 0 2 3 Veil 1 1 1 0 3 Total 12 6 13 11 44

As demonstrated by Poorebrahim and Zarei’s data, Islam had been portrayed as the other, that was often violent and backward in comparison to the Western culture. Poorebrahim and Zarei’s findings demonstrated that Said’s arguments were still valid even after more than thirty years.

140 Ibid, 11. 141 Ibid, 1.

In order to make sense of the news media portrayal of Islam and Muslims and the favoritism of the Gulen movement as a progressive reform movement, it is practical to define the historical progress of approaches to Islam and Muslims. It would be fair to say that while some nuanced approaches were also employed in the news media towards Islam and Muslims when the

Gulen movement’s portrayal examined it becomes evident that both Orientalism and neo-

Orientalism were employed consistently by the journalists. In this section, I will define and explain Orientalism, neo, and self-Orientalism before demonstrating how all three were employed in the approaches of the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal toward Islam and Muslims.

In 1978, Edward Said published one of his most famous works that is still considered one of the essential texts of post-colonial studies, Orientalism. Said was the first person to formulate an analysis of “the relationship between Orientalist constructions of the Orient and Western imperial domination of that Orient.”142 After Said’s work garnered attention, and to some degree criticism, two other concepts were defined by scholars in the coming years: neo-Orientalism, which is quite similar to Orientalism, and self-Orientalism, which usually goes hand in hand with neo-

Orientalism.

Edward Said’s main argument in Orientalism dealt with the production of knowledge.

Said argued that the process of producing knowledge about the Orient was not objective or accurate; it was simply a result of the Western view of the Orient. Said defined Orientalism as “a style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction,” between the East and the West.143 In most simple terms, the lens the West sees the geographic area labeled as the

142 Salim Kerboua, “From Orientalism to neo-Orientalism: Early and contemporary constructions of Islam and the Muslim world,” Intellectual Discourse 24, no: 1, (2016): 11, http://journals.iium.edu.my/intdiscourse/index.php/islam/article/view/681/553. 143 Edward W. Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), 2.

Orient was called Orientalism by Said.144 Edward Said stated in Orientalism that “Anyone who teaches, writes about, or researches the Orient— and this applies whether the person is an anthropologist, sociologist, historian, or philologist— either in its specific or its general aspects, is an Orientalist, and what he or she does is Orientalism.”145 Said argued that there was no

“Orient” that was misrepresented by the Westerners, and stated that "the Orient" itself was a constituted entity, and that “the notion that there were geographical spaces with indigenous, radically "different" in-habitants who could be defined on the basis of some religion, culture, or racial essence proper to that geographical space was equally a highly debatable idea.”146 In

Orientalism, Said stated that the group of ideas about the “Orient” had no realness to them. In short, he argued that there was no real “Orient.”147 In relation to this argument, he claimed that

Orientalism did not accurately represent the Orient [since it was impossible because the Orient was a constructed reality by the Occident] but it was still “valuable as a sign of European-

Atlantic power over the Orient.”148 Said also stressed the constant status of the Occident in relation to Orient in Orientalism.149 Said believed that the inferiority attributed to the Orient by the Occident also served to construct the Occident’s superiority.150 Said stated that knowledge was produced, and according to this, the Occident represented the civilization while the Orient represented the uncivilized; the Occident was the main geographical area while the Orient was

144 Kerboua, “From Orientalism to neo-Orientalism: Early and contemporary constructions of Islam and the Muslim world,” 11. 145 Said, Orientalism, 2. 146 Ibid, 322. 147 Ibid, 5. 148 Ibid, 5. 149 Ibid, 7. 150 Mitra Mirzayee, Shamsoddin Royanian, Ensieh Shabanirad, “September 11 and the Outbreak of Neo-Orientalism in John Updike’s Terrorist,” World Scientific News 86, no: 3, (2017): 227, http://www.worldscientificnews.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/WSN-863-2017-226-241-1.pdf .

the surroundings; the Occident could modernize the Orient and could civilize it.151 Burc Aka and

Ensar Nisanci argued that the Occident defined the Orient as the surrounding other and as the opposite of reason and virtues by putting itself in the center as the civilization.152 Fred Halliday defined “Orientalism” as an approach to the Arab world “on some broad premises,” such as language, Islam, and the lack of historical change.153 First of them is the language of the region, specifically Arabic.154 Halliday argued that once an individual learned Arabic, he or she almost immediately qualified to be an expert of the Arab world and even seen as someone who c understand the “Arab mind.”155 The second premise, according to Halliday, was religion. Islam was seen as an “independent variable, an explanatory factor.”156 Halliday pointed out that issues explained in Encyclopedia of Islam as “The lack of entrepreneurial class, the frailty of democracy, the hostility to Israel, the insecurity of boundaries, the apparent rejection of modernization, the irrationality, cruelty, even terrorism characteristic of Middle East politics are related to atemporal ‘Islam’ or, failing that, ‘the Arab Mind.”157 Finally, the third premise,

Halliday explained, was the lack of change. “[…] The difficulty or impossibility to change, particularly when if this is seen to be in a direction more like the liberal, secular and in broad terms rational democracies of the West.”158

While Said referred to the late eighteenth century as the starting point of Orientalism, the origins of Orientalism can be traced back to the 14th Century when the Church Council of Vienna

151 Halit Burc Akal and Ensar Nisancı, “Neo-Oryantalizm ve Orta Dogu’yu Anlamak,” Yalova Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi 5, no: 9, (2018): 14, http://yusbed.yalova.edu.tr/article/view/5000164972. 152 Ibid, 14. 153 Fred Halliday, “‘Orientalism’ and Its Critics,” British Journal of Middle Eastern 29, no: 2, (1993): 152, doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/13530199308705577. 154 Ibid. 155 Ibid. 156 Ibid. 157 Ibid, 152. 158 Ibid.

ordered university chairs to work collectively to “promote an understanding of oriental trade, inter-religious rivalries and military conflict.”159 As Said pointed out, the first detailed studies of the Orient were not published until the 18th and 19th centuries.160According to Bryan S. Turner, a theology scholar at Birmingham University, the knowledge of Orient was a direct result of

European expansion towards the East.161 While the “Orient” is a geographical term that constitutes the area from the East Mediterranean to Southeast Asia, “Islam,” Turner argued,

“played a peculiarly significant part in the formation of Western attitudes to the East.”162 Turner argued that Orientalizing the Orient reduced it to a series of oversimplifications in order to make it easily comprehensible for the Western audience. This trend had been criticized recently on the same pages of the Wall Street Journal by Misha Euceph. In 2017, Euceph wrote about a prominent stereotype Muslim women faced, head coverings became their sole identity, a sole symbol of all Muslim women regardless of their stance on the headscarf. 163 A Muslim woman from Queens, New York who wore a headscarf made out of the American flag had recently become the face of all Muslim women, especially during the protests against the Trump administration.164 Euceph argued that since there was not a homogenous consensus over the headscarf’s place in Islam by Muslims and Islamic scholars, it was stereotyping to portray all

Muslim women in a single way. “People who do not personally know Muslims now associate the religion with an article of clothing that is not universally representative,” Euceph remarked in

159 Bryan S Turner, Orientalism, Postmodernism and Globalism (Taylor & Francis, 2016), 37. 160 Ibid. 161 Ibid. 162 Ibid, 38. 163 Misha Euceph, “How Progressives Tokenize the Hijab,” Wall Street Journal, February 3, 2017, accessed September 6, 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-progressives-tokenize-the-hijab-1486081260. 164 Christina Cauterucci and Jamelle Bouie, “A Q-and-A With the Muslim Woman Whose Face Has Become a Symbol of Trump Resistance,” Slate, January 25, 2017, accessed September, 2018, http://www.slate.com/blogs/xx_factor/2017/01/25/a_q_a_with_the_muslim_woman_whose_face_has_become_a _symbol_of_trump_resistance.html.

“How Progressives Tokenize Hijab.”165

Edward Said’s Orientalism attracted its fair share of criticism in addition to great praise.

Most of the critics of Said’s work revolved around his vagueness when defining the Orient and his approach to the Occident. Said mainly focused on the British and French view of the Orient and left the rest of the Western world out. He was accused of committing “Orientalism in reverse” since he was also overgeneralizing the West based on two former empires.166 Bernard

Lewis, who is considered a traditional neo-Orientalist, also pointed out that Said reduced the

Orient to the Middle East and only examined the British and French imperialism along with Fred

Halliday who also accused Said of representing the West as homogenous.167 Fred Halliday focused on another aspect and pointed out the racism employed against the Orient was evident in

“about all subject peoples,” and the hostility towards Arabs or Muslims were not unique.168 Aijaz

Ahmad argued that Said could not deliver an answer to the question of whether Orientalism misrepresented the Orient or that it was impossible to authentically represent the Orient.169 Said stated that the main issue was “Whether indeed there can be a true representation of anything, or whether any and all representations, because they are representations, are embedded first in the language and then in the culture, institutions, and political ambience of the representer.”170 Which

Bruce Robbins responded, “If everything is a representation, then representation is not a scandal.

Or if all representation is a scandal, then no particular representation is particularly

165 Euceph, “How Progressives Tokenize the Hijab.” 166 Hande Tekdemir, “Critical Approaches to Edward Said’s Orientalism,” Uludağ University Faculty of Arts and Sciences Journal of Social Sciences 18, no: 32, (2017): 146, http://dergipark.gov.tr/download/article-file/299265 167 Ibid.; Kerboua, “From Orientalism to neo-Orientalism: Early and contemporary constructions of Islam and the Muslim world,” 12. 168 Ibid, 148. 169 Ibid, 149. 170 Said, Orientalism, 277.

scandalous”171 Overall, none of the critiques of Said argued that Orientalism was not employed when defining and explaining the region of the Orient, their criticism mainly dealt with Said’s definition of the Occident and with the uniqueness of the Orientalism. None of Said’s critiques discredited his claims.

The Orientalist question whether Islam and the West were compatible had been asked repeatedly especially since the 1990s. Bernard Lewis, in his article “The Roots of Muslim Rage”, argued that between the Muslims and the West there was “nothing less than a clash of civilizations.”172 Samuel Huntington also developed his own argument supporting the idea of the clash of civilizations. Ernest Renan said that in order to be understood “Islam […] should be reduced to tent and tribe,” Huntington argued that “Islam has bloody borders,” and famously

Bernard Lewis penned an article entitled “The Roots of Muslim Rage,” that argued all Muslims were prone to violence.173 Different interpretations of Islam, cultures, beliefs, and practices in addition to secular movements were all ignored in Orientalism.174 Meanwhile, experts such as

Fred Halliday and John L. Esposito were actively trying to debunk the myths surrounding Islam and Muslims.175 Deepa Kumar, in 2010, argued that Islam became the “civilizational antithesis of the ‘West.”176 Matthew F. Jacobs argued that Islam was interpreted as “monolithic, totalitarian and inherently confrontational” in the early years of the Cold War.177 Salim Kerboua, on the other

171 Mitra , Shamsoddin , Ensieh, “September 11 and the Outbreak of Neo-Orientalism in John Updike’s Terrorist,” 227. 172 Matthew F. Jacobs, “The Perils and Promise of Islam: The United States and the Muslim Middle East in the Early Cold War,” Diplomatic History 30, no. 4, (2006,): 707, https://www.jstor.org/stable/24915081 173 Kerboua, “From Orientalism to neo-Orientalism: Early and contemporary constructions of Islam and the Muslim world,” Intellectual Discourse, 11. 174 Ibid. 175 Jacobs, “The Perils and Promise of Islam: The United States and the Muslim Middle East in the Early Cold War,” 707. 176 Kumar, “The Right Kind of ‘Islam’: The news media representations of US-Saudi relations during the Cold War,” 1079. 177 Jacobs, “The Perils and Promise of Islam: The United States and the Muslim Middle East in the Early Cold War,” 739.

hand, argued that the original views behind Orientalism resurfaced as intensified after 9/11.

According to Kerboua, both Bernard Lewis and Samuel Huntington played major roles in constructing neo-Orientalism where Muslims were perceived as violent in addition to being backward and inferior in comparison to the Westerners.178 Neo-Orientalism was defined similarly to its predecessor by Ali Behdad and Juliet Williams, “monolithic, totalizing, reliant on a binary logic, and based on an assumption of moral and cultural superiority over the Oriental other.”179

Behdad and Williams pointed out a significant difference between Orientalism and neo-

Orientalism, while Orientalists tended to be white and European males, neo-Orientalists were

“rather Middle Eastern women and men who use their native subjectivity and new-found agency in the West to render otherwise biased accounts of the region seemly more authoritative and objective.”180 According to Behdad and Williams “A journalistic pretense of direct access to truth and the real dominates the current form, as neo-Orientalists deploy superficial empirical observations about Muslim societies and cultures to make great generalizations about them.”181

Avadhesh Kumar Singh defined neo-Orientalism as the “discourse about (sic) Orient by the people of the Orient located in the West or shuttling between the two.”182 Mubarak Altwaiji pointed out that Dag Tuastad employed the term neo-Orientalism when criticizing the American

“neo-colonial and neo-liberal agenda in the Middle East.”183 When George W. Bush described the “War on Terror” as a crusade and when the First Lady, Laura Bush, pointed out that the same

178 Kerboua, “From Orientalism to neo-Orientalism: Early and contemporary constructions of Islam and the Muslim world,” 11. 179 Ali Behdad and Juliet A. Williams, “Neo-Orientalism,” in Globalizing American Studies, ed. Brian T. Edwards and Gaonkar Dilip Parameshwar (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010), 284. 180 Ibid. 181 Ibid. 182 Shanta Nair-Venugopal, The Gaze of the West and Framings of the East, ed. Shanta Nair Venugopal (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2012), 236. 183 Altwaiji. "Neo-Orientalism and the Neo-Imperialism Thesis: Post-9/11 US and Arab World Relationship," 316.

war was also “A fight for the rights and dignity of women” the neo-Orientalist approach was employed.184

The main difference between Orientalism and neo-Orientalism is the difference of the definition of the Orient. While both of them put the Occident in the center and define the Orient over the Occident, in Orientalism the Occident is a geographical concept as in the “East of the

West.” In neo-Orientalism, the Orient is defined over identities such as Muslim, the Middle East, or Islam.185 Neo-Orientalism emphasized that the Orient’s backwardness stems from their culture rather the lack of modernization, which is another major difference between Orientalism and neo-

Orientalism. Bernard Lewis, Samuel Huntington, and Robert Kaplan all argued that the backwardness of the Muslim world was a direct result of the Islamic culture and the Muslim mentality that was essentially prone to violence.186 Yahya Sadowski argued that neo-Orientalists, unlike the Orientalists, attributed the backwardness of the Middle East to the tribal Islamic mentality that did not accept modern political organizations.187 Another major significant characteristic of neo-Orientalism is that it popularizes factually wrong notions about the

Orient.188 Neo-Orientalism employs the Orient’s own people to define the Orient. This is sometimes called self-Orientalism, which was defined as “in a Western value system one’s self- explaining/representing by corrupting the representation of one’s own culture.”189 Unlike

Orientalism, where the West is the actor and the East is the acted on, in self-Orientalism, it is the

Westernized Eastern acting upon the East. In both of these approaches, the Orient is always the

184 Ibid. 185 Akal and Nisanci, “Neo-Oryantalizm ve Orta Dogu’yu Anlamak,” 15. 186 Ibid. 187 Ibid. 188 Ibid, 16. 189 Ibid.

object.190 Historically, self-Orientalism first mentioned by Antonio Chuffat Latour in 1927 referring to the representation of Chinese in “Apunte Histórico de los Chinos en Cuba”191 Unlike

Said’s argument that Orientalism was between the East and the West, self-Orientalism is solely

Eastern. The Orient’s elites who employ Western values upon themselves inevitably self-Orient their own selves/cultures.192 Both Orientalism and neo-Orientalism essentialized the otherness of

Islam, and what is now called “new barbarism” by Dag Tuastad was a direct result of these two

Orientalisms. “New Barbarism,” according to Tuastad, was the way of representing Arabs and

Muslims in the Western media as if violence originated from their respective cultures while omitting political and economic reasons of violence.193 It simply refers to the identification of

Muslims with violence; it is important for the neo-Orientalist view to emphasize this relation between Muslims and violence in order to stress the cultural divide between the West and the

Orient.194 Overall, it would be fair to say that both Orientalism and neo-Orientalism employed an approach to the Occident that portrayed its culture, religion and its people as backward, monolithic, uncivilized, and violent. In addition to this portrayal, Islam often cited as the source of these negative characteristics of the Orient.

The positive portrayal of the Gulen movement in the New York Times and in the Wall

Street Journal by portraying it as an apolitical and secular modernizing force for Islam, which will be examined in detail in Chapter II, stemmed from Orientalism and neo-Orientalism. This favoritism of the Gulen movement might have hindered the public opinion and foreign policies

190 Bünyamin Bezci and Yusuf Çiftci, “Self Oryantalizm: İçimizdeki Modernite Ve/Veya İçselleştirdiğimiz Modernleşme,” Akademik İncelemeler Dergisi 7, no: 1 (2012): 141, http://www.acarindex.com/dosyalar/makale/acarindex-1423868481.pdf. 191 Ibid, 143. 192 Ibid, 160. 193 Samiei, “Neo-Orientalism? The Relationship between the West and Islam in Our Globalised World,” 1149. 194 Akal and Nisanci, “Neo-Oryantalizm ve Orta Dogu’yu Anlamak,” 16.

employed by the United States. Unlike its favorable portrayal, the Gulen movement is essentially a highly political movement, where Gulen ties religion to national identity and civilization. It aims to impose a sexist ideology that conforms traditional gender roles and imprisons women to the domestic sphere in addition to strengthening the existing prejudices against the already vulnerable LGBTQ+ communities in Muslim societies. Gulen movement has been imposing outdated and factually wrong scientific knowledge to the public to further strengthen the religious identity. In order to understand the positive portrayal of the Gulen movement of the New York

Times and the Wall Street Journal, it would be best to demonstrate the portrayal of Islam and

Islam-related news in both of these newspapers. As I mentioned above, the portrayal of Islam and

Muslim-majority societies had not changed drastically overtime from openly Orientalist, while there were cultural relativist/multiculturalist and nuanced approaches to Muslims and Islam the majority of the articles in the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal still employed the characteristics of Orientalism and neo-Orientalism.

While Islam and Muslim-majority societies were not paid much attention by these newspapers during the 1980s, this changed with the new decade of 1990. As a result, the public was subjected to more information about Islam and naturally more criticism of the problems that were common in Muslim-majority societies. The trend, as demonstrated by the examined articles in the following chapter, was that both of the largest newspapers in the United States by circulation growingly became more critical of issues in Muslim-majority societies. The evidence also suggests that this critical approach had not been applied to Fethullah Gulen and the Gulen movement. The evidence demonstrates that regardless of the approach employed by the newspaper, the Gulen movement, as a religiopolitical movement with an ideology that often contradicts the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, gained a certain favoritism and avoided being criticized by the journalists of the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal. The

movement had been praised for providing a modern Islam that was compatible with the West and the Western values in contrary to the evidence that demonstrates the nationalistic and the fundamentalist nature of the movement. In order to paint a clear picture of how Islam, Muslim societies, and problems that were common in Muslim- societies were portrayed and criticized in the New York Times and in the Wall Street Journal, I examined sixty articles that were published between the years of 1985 and 2016.

CHAPTER I: THE PERSISTENCE OF ORIENTALISM IN THE NEW YORK TIMES

AND IN THE WALL STREET JOURNAL BETWEEN 1985 AND 2016

My examination of the articles that dealt with Muslims and problems often attributed to

Muslim societies demonstrates that a very prominent Orientalist approach progressively left its place to a relatively more nuanced approach that still fits the definition of Orientalism and/or neo-

Orientalism in the case of the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal. Since 1985, both of the newspapers increasingly provided platforms to journalists from a variety of backgrounds to employ their own point of views on matters of Muslim societies and Muslims. Especially the

New York Times’ journalist pool grew significantly more diverse after 9/11. However, journalists with diverse backgrounds did not always mean more balanced or accurate representations of

Islam and Muslims. As stated above, one of the main characteristics of neo-Orientalism is providing non-factual information about the Orient, and self-Orientalism where a member of the

Orient accept the cultural superiority of the West and misrepresent his or her own culture accordingly.195 In the next two sections, I will examine Muslims’ portrayal in the New York

Times and the Wall Street Journal to demonstrate that the essentially Orientalist approach persisted. The evidence also shows that these newspapers had never been reluctant to criticize or point out the problems in Muslim societies while mostly sparing the Gulen movement.

This section thematically examines the articles published in the New York Times that dealt with Islam, Muslims, Muslim minority and Muslim majority societies, starting with Judith

Miller’s article “Court Ruling on Wives Divides Egypt,” from 1985 until 2016 to demonstrate the

Orientalist and neo-Orientalist approaches that had been continuously employed by the New York

Times and the lack of criticism of the Gulen movement. While the journalists became more

195 Bezci and Çiftci, “Self Oryantalizm: İçimizdeki Modernite Ve/Veya İçselleştirdiğimiz Modernleşme.” 40

diversified in time and the tones of articles had changed from a more Western-centric to a less polarizing one, the criticism towards the practices often identified with Muslim-majority societies such as lack of women’s and LGBTQ+ rights actually became more prominent since 1985. For instance, during the 1980s Islam was almost always related to the conflict in the New York Times yet some social issues that took place in some Muslim-majority societies attracted attention as well. When I searched the New York Times database for words “Islam” and “terrorism” it yielded

1,205 results for the years between 1985 and 2000 and 3,653 results for the years between 2001 and 2017. For example, in 1986, the Iranian Islamic regime was harshly criticized by the New

York Times. An editorial used the word “barbarous” describing the alleged persecution of the

Bahai minority by the regime. 196 The emphasis was on the “uncivilized vs. civilized” narrative. It is clear that the portrayal had gotten varied over the decades and while Islamic extremism is still a topic that gets published often, social lives of both the Muslim minority in the United States and the Muslim-majority societies became frequent topics as well. In Do Muslim Women Need

Saving, Lila Abu-Lughod argued that the Western news media portrayed Muslim women in need of Western help.197 Abu-Lughod examined the portrayal of Muslim women before and during the invasion of Afghanistan by the United States and argued that the portrayal of Muslim women was used to justify the Iraq War in 2003. When I examined thirty-four articles from the New York

Times that dealt with women’s rights issues in Muslim societies such as child marriage, polygyny, and mandatory dress codes it became evident that until as recent as 2016 the

196 "The Crimes of Iran." New York Times, Nov 25, 1985, http://ezproxy.library.und.edu/login?url=https://search- proquest-com.ezproxy.library.und.edu/docview/425685773?accountid=28267.

197 Abu-Lughod, Do Muslim Women Need Saving?

journalists employed problematic approaches that fit the definition of Orientalism and/or neo-

Orientalism.

The first article I examined was Judith Miller’s piece from 1985. This article dealt with the then-new court ruling that made it easier for Egyptian men to practice polygyny and the reaction it caused among the liberal circles.198 Miller argued that the Egyptians who were afraid to be labeled as anti-Islamists claimed that the Quran granted women more rights than Western societies.199 Miller’s article tied the issues with gender equality in Egypt directly to the Quran and as a result, she cited Islam as the cause for the gender inequality in the Egyptian society without exploring any other possible reasons. Miller’s approach is the typical Orientalist approach, where

Islam is seen as a cause for uncivilized behavior and the reason for this backward practice.

Miller’s approach strengthens the “us vs. them” thesis by minimizing the social and historical causes and scapegoating Islam for all kinds of unequal treatment of women in society.

Child marriage in Muslim-majority societies was a prominent theme in the 1980s for the

New York Times. An article from 1987 focused on the widespread practice of child marriage in

Nigeria, and two articles written by Barbara Crossette focused on the practice of child marriage in Pakistan and India.200 All three of these articles pointed out the negative consequences of early marriages that were often forced upon the young girls by their families. Crossette pointed out the

Islamic influence over formerly Hindu Rajasthan, India, indicating that the child brides were a

198 Judith Miller, “Court Ruling on Wives Divides Egypt,” New York Times, June 10, 1985, accessed September 6, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/1985/06/10/world/court-ruling-on-wives-devides-egypt.html. 199 Ibid. 200 James Brookes, “A Nigerian Shame: The Agony of the Child Bride,” New York Times, July 17, 1987, accessed September 6, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/1987/07/17/world/kano-journal-a-nigerian-shame-the-agony-of- the-child-bride.html.; Barbara Crossette, “India’s Bleakest Corner Is Where All Hope Ends,” New York Times, September 11, 1989, accessed September 6, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/1989/09/11/world/india-s-bleakest- corner-is-where-all-hope-ends.html.; Barbara Crossette, “In Pakistan, Women Seek Basic Rights,” New York Times, March 26, 1989, accessed September 6, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/1989/03/26/world/in-pakistan- women-seek-basic-rights.html.

consequence of Islam. James Brookes also stressed that the child bride he was writing about was a Muslim and that Nigeria was a Muslim-majority country.201 According to the datum provided by the non-governmental organization Girls Not Brides: The Global Partnership to End Child

Marriage, predominantly Christian Central African Republic was following the predominantly

Muslim Niger in child marriages.202 According to the same datum, Brazil, Mexico, the U.S.,

Ukraine, Thailand, Bhutan, and Vietnam were the other countries where child marriages took place frequently. As suggested by this evidence, portraying Islam as the cause for the issue of child marriage is both oversimplifying vastly diverse Muslim societies and enforce the “civilized vs. uncivilized” narrative. In twenty-five states in America, there is no minimum age for marriage, yet all three of these articles framed the issue as an Islamic problem rather than a world-wide and cross-cultural one.203

Henry Kamm’s article from 1988 about the women’s future in Afghanistan after the

Soviet-Afghan war aimed to paint an optimistic picture for the Afghan women. For his article,

Kamm interviewed Masooma Esmatee Wardak, who was the president of the Women’s Council of Afghanistan. Wardak emphasized the worries of Afghan women regarding the possibility of fundamentalists gaining control and eliminating the women’s rights. When Kamm quoted

Wardak’s optimistic outlook for the future he also pointed out her year-long education in

National College of Education in Evanston, Illinois, where she learned most of her English skills according to Kamm.204 By pointing out Wardak’s education in the U.S., Kamm indicated her

201 James Brookes, “A Nigerian Shame: The Agony of the Child Bride,” New York Times, July 17, 1987, accessed September 6, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/1987/07/17/world/kano-journal-a-nigerian-shame-the-agony-of- the-child-bride.html. 202 “Child Marriage Around the World,” Girls Not Brides, accessed September 6, 2018. https://www.girlsnotbrides.org/where-does-it-happen/ 203 Ibid. 204 Henry Kamm, “Afghan Peace Could Herald War of Sexes,” New York Times, December 12, 1988, accessed September 6, 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/1988/12/12/world/afghan-peace-could-herald-war-of-sexes.html

Westernized status. Another article from 1989 written by Barbara Crossette recounted women’s struggle for greater rights in Pakistan and pointed out the inferior status of women to men. The article especially highlighted an activist woman’s plea for legal help to a woman whose husband did not permit her to get a mastectomy even though she had breast cancer.205 While there is no way to fact check this claim, the journalist’s decision to include it to her article contributed to the

“oppressed Muslim woman in need” narrative. Crossette also stated that gender inequality in

Pakistan derived from economic disadvantages, tribal societies, and from Islam.206 Judith Miller’s article from 1992 reported the growingly oppressive practices in Muslim countries. Miller told the story of an Algerian businesswoman whose child cousin refused to kiss her goodnight since he was told by a teacher that it was haram to kiss women.207 In this article, Miller quoted Gilles

Kepel, an Orientalist French expert on Islamic extremism:

What we're seeing is the re-Islamization of the entire region, the alteration of basic patterns of life. Europe is not immune. In my neighborhood in Paris, I used to see one veiled woman a week. Now I see five a day.208

Miller pointed out the oppression of women by the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria, and other abuses of women’s rights in Sudan, and Egypt.209 Miller also quoted Ali E. Hillal Dessouki, an

Egyptian political scientist, who argued that Arabs cannot be democratic since they understood it as the ruling of the majority without any concern over minority rights.210 Miller’s article employed neo-Orientalist approach and Dessouki’s comments could be considered self-

Orientalism, where the Oriental accepted the Western superiority and misrepresented her/his own.

205 Crossette, “In Pakistan, Women Seek Basic Rights.” 206 Ibid. 207 Illicit based on religious grounds. 208 Judith Miller, “The Islamic Wave,” New York Times, May 31, 1992, accessed September 6, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/1992/05/31/magazine/the-islamic-wave.html. 209 Ibid. 210 Ibid. 44

Barbara Crossette pointed out the exclusion of women from public life in Afghanistan under the Taliban rule where women were forced to quit their jobs at the United Nations. The article also pointed out the problems with the girls’ education under the Taliban rule. Crossette identified the Taliban as “conservative Islamic councils” in the first line of her article instead of pointing out the radical nature of the organization.211 This overgeneralization falsely indicated that all conservative Muslims support extremely sexist acts and ideas of Taliban that still targets women to this day. A news article from 1995, “Islamic Dress Code Deaths,” reported the murder of three women in Turkey. A mother and daughter were slain in the Black Sea region of Turkey by their family members allegedly for “dressing revealingly.”212 This brief article labeled the motives of the murderers as the “Islamic dress code,” while there is no consensus on the supposed “Islamic dress code.”213 Oversimplifying a much-debated subject in a sentence fits the definition of the Orientalism as well. Marlise Simon’s article from 1998 focused on the women’s rights abuses in Morocco where polygyny was legal and honor-based violence was prevalent according to the article. Women’s status was criticized throughout the article and Simon stated that “[Polygyny and honor-based violence] are common -- and not just in Morocco, which likes to see itself as one of the more cultured and humane lands among Arab nations.”214 Simon’s

211 Barbara Crossette, “Women Being Forced From U.N. Workplaces in Afghanistan,” New York Times, November 8, 1995, accessed September 6, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/1995/11/08/world/women-being-forced-from- un-workplaces-in-afghanistan.html. 212 “Islamic Dress Code Deaths,” New York Times, August 3, 1995, accessed September 6, 2018, http://www.nytimes.com/1995/08/03/world/islamic-dress-code-deaths.html. 213 “How people in Muslim countries prefer women to dress in public,” Pew Research Center, January 8, 2014, accessed September 6, 2018, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/01/08/what-is-appropriate-attire-for- women-in-muslim-countries/.; “An Islamic Perspective on Women’s Dress,” Muslim Women’s League, December 1997, accessed September 6, 2018, http://www.mwlusa.org/topics/dress/hijab.html.; Susan J Rasmussen, “Re-casting the veil: Situated meanings of covering,” Culture & Psychology 19, no: 2 (2013): 237 – 258, doi: https://doi.org/10.1177/1354067X13478989.; Leila Ahmed, Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots of a Modern Debate (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt32bg61. 214 Marlise Simons, “Cry of Muslim Women for Equal Rights Is Rising,” New York Times, March 9, 1998, accessed September 6, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/1998/03/09/world/cry-of-muslim-women-for-equal-rights-is- rising.html.

approach indicated that Morocco was one of the civilized nations in the Arab world and yet still could not achieve a Western level civilization while also indicating that other Arab nations were less cultured and less humane. Elaine Sciolino wrote in 2000 on the strict Iranian dress code and examined the allowed dress colors for young female pupils in schools. According to this article, girls who were younger than nine did not have to comply with the dress code in public but must so in state-run schools. The article featured an image of a group of female children wearing chadors where the subtitle read: “In Tehran, 9-year-olds celebrate their duties as young Islamic girls.”215 Sciolino’s approach indicates her Orientalism since she specifically referred to chador as “Islamic dress.” Again, there is no consensus on the “Islamic dress code” among Muslims and scholars, in the case of Sciolino’s article it was the Iranian government who enforced this dress code.

In 2001, Susan Sachs wrote about women’s status in Muslim majority societies that echoed the reports from the previous decade. Sachs’ article, entitled “Islam preaches equality, yet in most Muslim countries a woman’s place is determined by a man’s will. It’s the law,” failed to recognize that gender inequality was not, and still is not, a direct cause of Islam nor it was unique to Muslim societies.216 “For Many Turks, Head Scarf's Return Aids Religion and Democracy” published in 2008, written by Sabrina Tavernise and Sebnem Arsu. The article opened with a question whether or not lifting the ban on headscarf was eroding secularism in Turkey and then continued “But in Turkey, looks are often deceiving. A majority of Turks see the measure — submitted Tuesday to Parliament, where it is expected to pass — as good for both religion and

215 Elaine Sciolino, “The World: Iranian Dress Code; Here and There, a Burst of Color Is Now Islamic,” New York Times, July 23, 2000, accessed September 6, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2000/07/23/weekinreview/the- world-iranian-dress-code-here-and-there-a-burst-of-color-is-now-islamic.html. 216 Susan Sachs, “Where Muslim Traditions Meet Modernity,” New York Times, December 19, 2001, accessed December 6, 2017, https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/learning/teachers/featured_articles/20011219wednesday.html.

democracy.”217 Tavernise and Arsu provided data from a survey where the majority of the sampled Turks considered themselves as “very/extremely religious.” Tavernise and Arsu used this data to demonstrate that the majority supported the lift of the headscarf ban. Yet, one can be extremely religious and not favor the headscarf or vice versa. The portrayal of a debatable topic as “good for religion” fits the definition of Orientalism, and neo-Orientalism since Sebnem Arsu is Turkish. The journalists overgeneralized the Turks who favored the lift of the headscarf ban and the Muslims who identified as religious and in Arsu’s case misrepresented the reality without any solid evidence. In an article written on a 9-year-old Yemeni child bride who sought divorce in 2008, journalist Robert F. Worth stressed the role of conservative Islam in child marriages both in Yemen and Afghanistan.218 As I mentioned above, child marriages cannot be considered unique to Muslim societies, and Islam could not be considered the cause for them since there are many Muslim societies that do not practice child marriage.

A 2016 op-ed “How Islam Can Fight the Patriarchy” by Riada Asimovic Akyol credited

Islamist women of Turkey for the withdrawal of a bill known as the “child rape bill,” that was aimed to retrospectively pardon any statutory rapist of a female victim if the perpetrator agreed to marry the victim.219 Asimovic Akyol stated that the bill was withdrawn because of the outrage it caused among the Islamist women.220 Asimovic Akyol’s claim about the reason for the withdrawal of the bill portrayed the protesters’ position as “progressive.” Yet, the bill was only

217 Sabrina Tavernise, “For Many Turks, Head Scarf’s Return Aids Religion and Democracy,” New York Times, January 30, 2008, accessed September 6, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/30/world/europe/30turkey.html. 218 Robert F. Worth, “Tiny Voices Defy Child Marriage in Yemen,” New York Times, June 29, 2008, accessed September 6, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/29/world/middleeast/29marriage.html. 219 “Turkey Withdraws Child Rape Bill after Street Protests,” BBC News, November 22, 2016, accessed September 6, 2018, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-38061785. 220 Riada Asimovic Akyol, “How Islam Can Fight the Patriarchy,” New York Times, December 11, 2016, accessed September 6, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/11/opinion/how-islam-can-fight-the-patriarchy.html.

proposed and the Turkish Civil Law states that no one could marry, under no circumstances, before the age of sixteen, and the normal minimum marriage age is seventeen.221 Since the protesters were supporting the law should be preserved as it was, it would be impossible to talk about a progressive position. Asimovic Akyol stated that using “Islamic arguments” may be helpful to stop child marriages justified based on Islam around the world. Asimovic Akyol’s opinion piece indicated that child marriages were a problem unique to Muslim societies. Hence this article could be considered Orientalist and even self-Orientalist for misrepresenting the position of the law-makers and the protestors while overgeneralizing the protestors’ identity as

“Islamic.” Diaa Hadid, an observant Muslim journalist, recounted her own experience in “At the

Hajj, Facing Islam's Inconsistent Embrace of Women” that was published in 2016. While she did not mention the spiritual side of her journey, her article focused on the second-class status of women in Saudi Arabia that all Muslim women had to endure if they wanted to practice pilgrimage to the Muslim holy land Mecca.222 Hadid’s article stood out from the majority of articles that are examined here since she provided her own experiences in a non-secular country.

Hadid’s article was a great example of self-Orientalism; she attributed the Saudi Arabian dress code to Islam by stating that “[She] was at once frustrated by Islam’s nitpicky strictures on women’s dress.”223

Hostility toward the LGBTQ+ communities in the Muslim and Muslim-majority societies and communities also attracted some attention by the New York Times. Since Fethullah

Gulen and the Gulen movement are both hostile to the LGBTQ+ community it was striking to

221 “124 No’lu madde,” Turk Medeni Kanunu, accessed September 8, 2018, http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/1.5.4721.pdf. 222 Diaa Hadid, “At the Hajj, Facing Islam’s Inconsistent Embrace of Women.” New York Times, September 15, 2016, accessed September 6, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/16/world/middleeast/hajj-mecca-saudi- arabia.html. 223 Ibid. 48

find articles that emphasized “Islam’s hostility” towards the LGBTQ+ communities while none of the New York Times articles pointed out Gulen’s homophobia. Susan Sachs penned an article in 1999 and explained the spiritual and personal struggles of young Muslim gay men in the

United States. The young gay activists pointed out that it was impossible for them to convince a

Muslim community leader, imam or a political leader to speak at their events while Sachs stressed the fact that homosexuality was illegal in most of the Muslim-majority countries. While this is correct, there are also Muslim-majority countries such as Jordan and Turkey where homosexuality is legal, and discrimination based on sexual orientation is outlawed.224 Sachs’ approach could be considered Orientalist since she overgeneralized Muslims for being hostile to the LGBTQ+ communities and cited Islam as the reason for this hatred. Robert F. Worth wrote about the challenges the Muslim LGBTQ+ individuals faced in 2002. Worth pointed out that in most Islamic societies homosexuality was a crime “punishable in some cases by death.”225

Worth’s report was accurate, yet it also pointed out that Al-Fatiha, a Muslim LGBTQ+ group founded by gay Muslims, and an unnamed imam from a liberal New York City Mosque did not consider homosexuality as a sin. This proves that hostility against the LGBTQ+ community cannot be considered a direct result of religion. Worth’s approach fits the definition of

Orientalism since he portrayed Islam as a monolithic religion as his article suggested that the hostility towards the LGBTQ+ community was also monolithic. A Neil MacFarquhar article

“Gay Muslims Find Freedom, of a Sort, in the U.S.” quoted a gay Muslim man:

They're afraid of the rest of the community here,'' said Ayman, a stocky 31- year-old from Jordan, who won asylum in the United States last year on the

224 Neil MacFarquhar, “Egypt Tries 52 Men Suspected of Being Gay,” New York Times, Late Edition (East Coast); New York, N.Y., July 19, 2001, accessed September 6, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2001/07/19/world/egypt- tries-52-men-suspected-of-being-gay.html. 225 Robert F. Worth, “Gay Muslims Face a Growing Challenge Reconciling Their Two Identities,” New York Times, January 13, 2002, accessed September 6, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/13/nyregion/gay-muslims- face-a-growing-challenge-reconciling-their-two-identities.html.

basis of his sexuality. ''It's such a big wrong in the Koran that it is impossible to be accepted.226

Again, since this article portrayed Islam as the sole reason for the hostility against the LGBTQ+ communities it committed Orientalism and even self-Orientalism. As other articles that were published in the New York Times reported, there were and still are Muslim LGBTQ+ organizations. It would simply be committing Orientalism to overgeneralize almost two-billion people from different cultures with different point of views.

Similar to the LGBTQ+ issues, creationism was another current issue the New York

Times paid attention in the recent years that is a non-issue when it comes to the Gulen movement.

While the Gulen movement claims that they support modern scientific education in their schools,

Fethullah Gulen wrote materials aimed to discredit the theory of evolution and he repeatedly stated that he did not believe in evolution. In 2007, Cornelia Dean wrote about Harun Yahya and his controversial self-published book Atlas of Creation in the New York Times. Dean interviewed a group of scholars who received the book in the mail unsolicited and the article concluded that

Yahya’s book mostly consisted of unscientific claims.227 Kenneth Chang reported that creationism was common among Muslims and it was a worrisome trend since it indicated a slow scientific progress in these communities or nations in “Creationism, Minus a Young Earth,

Emerges in the Islamic World” written in 2009.228 Both Dean’s and Chang’s articles demonstrated the double standards applied to the Gulen movement.

226 Neil MacFarquhar, “Gay Muslims Find Freedom, of a Sort, in the U.S.” New York TimesNovember 7, 2007, accessed September 6, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/07/us/07gaymuslim.html?mtrref=www.google.com&gwh=C58B5C407FF786B4 B6D29AD015C6A0D2&gwt=pay. 227 Cornelia Dean, “Islamic Creationist and a Book Sent Round the World,” New York Times, July 17, 2007, accessed September 6, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/17/science/17book.html. 228 Kenneth Chang, “Creationism, Minus a Young Earth, Emerges in the Islamic World,” New York Times, November 3, 2009, accessed September 6, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/03/science/03islam.html. 50

It would be unfair to leave out the examples of articles where the journalists approached their subject matters without employing the characteristics of Orientalism. The sample of articles here also demonstrated that even though the New York Times employed non-Orientalist approaches to the issues of Muslims and Muslim-majority societies, they also did not publish articles that pointed out the same issues with the Gulen movement and Fethullah Gulen. Seth

Mydans’ article from 1996, stated that the Malaysian women’s rights activists attributed the inequality of women to men rather than Islam while the article recognized the secondary status of women in Malaysia.229 Fethullah Gulen and the Gulen movement’s support of gender inequality was, on the contrary, misrepresented in the New York Times.230 None of the articles that were published in the New York Times referenced to Fethullah Gulen’s article where he instructed his followers on the particulars of physically assaulting their wives.231 Neil

MacFarquhar’s article from 2001 about an Egyptian trial, where fifty-two men were tried for suspicion of homosexual activity, pointed out that while homosexuality was not illegal in Egypt the justice system was corrupt enough to try people based on charges that did not exist in the law.232 MacFarquhar’s article was nuanced but when the reports on Gulen are considered this article unfairly targeted the Egyptian individuals who did not condone homosexuality, especially since Gulen holds similar beliefs to quoted Egyptians in this article. As stated by

229 Seth Mydans, “Blame Men, Not Allah, Islamic Feminists Say,” New York Times, October 10, 1996, accessed September 6, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/1996/10/10/world/blame-men-not-allah-islamic-feminists- say.html. 230 Tim Arango, “After a Break, Turkey's Prime Minister Again Courts Controversy,” New York Times, November 8, 2013, accessed September 6, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/08/world/europe/turkey-coed- dormitories-.html. 231 Fethullah Gulen, “Peygamber Efendimizin Kadınları Dövme Tavsiyesi Nasıl Değerlendirmelidir?,” Fethullah Gulen Web Sitesi, July 12, 2007, accessed September 6, 2018, https://fGulen.com/tr/fethullah-Gulenin- butun-eserleri/iman/fethullah-Gulen-asrin-getirdigi-tereddutler/582-fethullah-Gulen-peygamber-efendimizin- kadinlari-dovme-tavsiyesi-nasil-degerlendirmelidir. 232 Neil MacFarquhar, “Egypt Tries 52 Men Suspected of Being Gay,” New York Times, July 19, 2001. accessed September 6, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2001/07/19/world/egypt-tries-52-men-suspected-of-being-gay.html

Tore Fougner “[Gulen] argues that ‘feminized men’ and ‘masculinized women’ are the devil’s work.”233 Somini Sengupta’s article on the Pope Francis’ African visit in 2015 stressed that he did not mention the issue of child marriage, condom use, violence against the LGBTQ+ community, or the high maternal death rate that were prevalent in Africa during his visit to a mosque which was the final destination of his trip.234 This article is significant because it showed the issues worth criticizing by the New York Times but when it comes to the Gulen movement none of these issues were even mentioned.

Other articles that were published in the New York Times between 1985 and 2016 and did not employ the Orientalist approach were “Respecting Muslim Patients’ Needs” from 2010, reported about practicing Muslims who refused the services of medical doctors from opposite genders.235 “Muslim Boys at a Swiss School Must Shake Teachers’ Hands, Even Female Ones” from 2016 where both sides’ point of views reported objectively.236 Mujib Mashal’s 2016 article recounted the short life of Zahra, an Afghan minor who endured abuse in her marriage and eventually was set on fire while pregnant to her first child. When Zahra’s father claimed that it was acceptable to marry young children because it was conducted by the prophet Mohammad,

Mashal explained the difference between tradition and religion rather than citing Islam as the cause for child marriages.237

233 Tore Fougner, “Fethullah Gulen’s understanding of women’s rights in Islam: a critical reappraisal,” Turkish Studies 18, no: 2 (2017) 251-277, doi: 10.1080/14683849.2016.1245582. 234 Somini Sengupta, “Pope Francis Ends African Trip With Visit to a Mosque,” New York Times, November 30, 2015, Accessed September 6, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/01/world/africa/pope-francis-ends- african-trip-with-visit-to-a-mosque.html. 235 Roni Caryn Rabin, “Respecting Muslim Patients’ Needs,” New York Times, November 1, 2010, accessed September 6, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/01/health/01patients.html. 236 Dan Bilefsky, “Muslim Boys at a Swiss School Must Shake Teachers’ Hands, Even Female Ones,” New York Times, May 26, 2016, accessed December 6, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/27/world/europe/switzerland-school-migrants-shake-hands.html. 237 Mujib Mashal, “Child Marriage at Issue as an Afghan Bride Dies,” New York Times, Late Edition, July 19, 2016, accessed September 6, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/19/world/asia/afghanistan-zahra-child- marriage.html.; 52

As demonstrated by the examination of the thirty-four articles above, different journalists with different backgrounds and expertise wrote about problems in Muslim societies in the New York Times over a period of thirty-two years. While it is evident that there were articles that did not employ Orientalism when dealing with Muslims, Muslim societies, and Islam, the majority of the articles that were published in the New York Times could be considered

Orientalist or neo-Orientalist. One of the most common characteristics of Orientalism that was prominent in these articles were the overgeneralization of Muslims and the portrayal of Islam as a monolithic source of negative things. In addition, the perceived resistance to change of Muslim societies were also emphasized by the journalists. It is especially important to emphasize that many practices that had drawn the attention of the New York Times journalists were completely ignored when done or encouraged by the Gulen movement of by Gulen himself. Child marriage, women’s and LGBTQ+ rights, violence against women, inter-religious tolerance, and access to modern education were the main topics that were ignored by the New York Times when it came to the Gulen movement.

When the Wall Street Journal articles that dealt with Islam, Muslims, Muslim minority and Muslim majority societies, starting with Karen Elliot House’s article “The West Will Remain

Hostage” from 1985, thematically examined, they demonstrate that the Orientalist and neo-

Orientalist approaches had been continuously employed by the Wall Street Journal and the lack of criticism of the Gulen movement. Similar to the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal ignored the issues of child marriage, women’s and LGBTQ+ rights, violence against women, inter-religious tolerance, and access to modern education when it came to the Gulen movement.

The Wall Street Journal featured a news piece entitled “The West Will Remain Hostage” written by Karen Elliot House, the foreign editor in 1985, only six days after the hijack of TWA Flight

847. When Hezbollah and Islamic Jihad militants hijacked TWA Flight 847 to seek the release of

more than five hundred Muslims from Israeli custody.238 The passengers were physically harmed, killed, and terrorized during the incident by the militants.239 Elliot House explained:

And it's this basic, almost primitive, fact of political life -- rulers constantly worrying about their own physical survival -- that largely explains why the Middle East is likely to remain paralyzed. In the Mideast, terrorists don't simply hold hostages, terrorism holds the region and its rulers hostage.

Elliot House also quoted the neo-Orientalist scholar Bernard Lewis, she mentioned the lack of

“free exchange of opinion,” in the Arab countries, she predicted that the Middle East would

“remain a slaughterhouse for America and her friends for years to come,” and argued that

America was a hostage to radical Islam as it was five years ago when America was taken hostage by “the ayatollah's Islamic zealots.”240 Elliot House also explained the pre-radical Islam Middle

East by stating that “[…] The modern Mideast was a turbulent and violent part of the world before what is now called radical Islam reared its head.”241 Elliot House, by arguing that the

Middle East and the Arab states were prone to violence by nature clearly employed Orientalism by not examining the reasons behind Islamic terrorism.

Similar to the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal also published articles that dealt with issues other than violence. Metin Demirsar and Brent Bowers wrote in 1985 that most women who were holding high ranks in the Turkish business world thought feminism was irrelevant and that they were opposed to gender equality. It was noted that this negative sentiment

238 William E. Smith, “Terror Aboard Flight 847,” TIME, June 24, 2001, accessed September 6, 2018, http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,142099,00.html. 239 Ibid. 240 Karen Elliott House, “The West Will Remain Hostage,” Wall Street Journal, June 20, 1985, accessed September 6, 2018, http://ezproxy.library.und.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest- com.ezproxy.library.und.edu/docview/397921841?accountid=28267 241 Ibid.

of businesswomen was shared by their male colleagues as well.242 Demirsar and Bowers explained how gender was limiting Turkish women by stating that “Modern Turkey seems prepared to let [women] pursue their ambitions, so long as they follow the ancient sexual rules off the job.”243 This article, while pointing out differing views, could still be considered

Orientalist. The authors overgeneralized the male business people’s opinion by asking only two people of their opinions, and only six women; in contrast providing only one different point of view from a sociologist, Mubeccel Kiray.244 In the article, the devoutly religious past of Turkey was emphasized as well. Barbara Rosewicz reported in 1987 that Al Azhar, the oldest and the most prestigious Islamic institution according to Rosewicz, “[…] explain ways in which moderate, mostly pro-Western governments use Islam today,” in “Prestigious Al Azhar Is a Force for Moderation.”245 In addition to this claim, Rosewicz pointed out the not-so-Western practices of Al Azhar, such as its barefoot students and the grand sheik's belief of women who dyed their hair "are doomed to hell and a bad destiny."246 Rosewicz referred to the institution as the “hotbed of moderate Islam,” and emphasized that the institution “hasn't changed much in 1,000 years.”247

Rosewicz’s approach fits the characteristics of Orientalism since she emphasized the resistance to change of the institution and non-Western characteristics to strengthen the “us vs. them” narrative. Mary Williams Walsh’s article on the abstinence of women from the public sphere in

242 Brent Bowers and Metin Demirsar, “Women Managers and Turkey’s Sexist Society,” Wall Street Journal, May 15, 1985, accessed September 6, 2018, http://ezproxy.library.und.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest- com.ezproxy.library.und.edu/docview/397912784?accountid=28267. 243 Ibid. 244 Ibid. 245 Barbara Rosewicz, “Prestigious Al Azhar Is a Force for Moderation,” Wall Street Journal, August 10, 1987, accessed September 6, 2018, http://ezproxy.library.und.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest- com.ezproxy.library.und.edu/docview/398023416?accountid=28267 246 Ibid. 247 Ibid.

Pakistan was supported with reports on violence against woman in the country.248 While Willams

Walsh noted that tradition also played a role in the widespread gender inequality and the violence against women, she also referred to Pakistan as the “land of arranged marriages” and cited the

“Islamization” policies of the former president Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq as a reason behind gender inequality.249 Williams Walsh’s overgeneralization of Pakistan as the “land of arranged marriages” and her claim that Islamization was the cause of systematic violence against women indicates her Orientalist approach. Another article from 1988 reported the growing number of in vitro fertilization clinics in Egypt and attributed the rapidly growing numbers to the complicated and often controversial place of adoption in Islam.250 In this article, Islam was cited as the sole reason for the growing number of in vitro fertilization clinics, and the general hostility towards adoption. Geraldine Brooks reported that the state-sanctioned oppression of women in Saudi

Arabia in 1989 by stating that “Islam rules here.”251 Brooks quoted Don Kerr from London

Institute for Strategic Studies when explaining the lack of Westernization of the country “When it came to things that are really important, they operate on the same basis they have always done.”252 Brooks demonstrated the slow change in the Saudi Arabian society as the following:

But lest outsiders think nothing changes in Saudi Arabia, Mrs. al-Ammari, who is a member of a 10-woman consortium running a computer-training business, tells a story:

248 Mary Williams Walsh, “At the Mercy of Men: Pakistan Women Look To Bhutto to Improve A Harsh Existence – -- Little Seen, With Few Rights, They Face Perils Including Wrath of Male Kinfolk --- Attacked for Going Outdoors,” Wall Street Journal, May 3, 1989, accessed September 6, 2018, http://ezproxy.library.und.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest- com.ezproxy.library.und.edu/docview/398085301?accountid=28267. 249 Ibid. 250 “Test-Tube Baby Clinics Appear in Egypt Due to Religious Curbs on Adopted Child,” Wall Street Journal, July 12, 1988, accessed September 12, 2018, accessed September 10, 2018, http://ezproxy.library.und.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest- com.ezproxy.library.und.edu/docview/398068414?accountid=28267 251 Geraldine Brooks, “Riddle of Riyadh: Islamic Law Thrives Amid Modernity --- Women Learn Car Mechanics But Not How to Drive; They Still Defend System,” Wall Street Journal, November 9, 1989, essed September 10, 2018, http://ezproxy.library.und.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest- com.ezproxy.library.und.edu/docview/398125575?accountid=28267. 252 Ibid.

Just a generation ago, her mother was kidnapped and sold to a man who became her husband. At the age of eight, it was her second wedding. She had already been married once by family arrangement.253

It is evident that Brooks’ article pointed Islam out as the source of women’s oppression in Saudi

Arabia while the oppressive measures were enacted by the state. At the same time the article emphasized the Orient’s resistance to change by pointing out Mrs. al-Ammari’s mother’s marriage that happened when she was a child, a practice that would be considered unacceptable in a Western culture, while strengthening the “us vs. them” narrative.

Peter Waldman’s report “Man Eyes Woman, She Smiles Back; This Is a Good Date? ---

Kuwait Is Bribing Its Youth To Marry and Have Babies; But Singles Don't Buy In” examined the dating culture in Kuwait right after the Iraqi occupation in 1990.254 Waldman’s article focused on gender inequality in Kuwait, legal polygyny and interfamily sexual relations where cousins were encouraged to marry each other by their family members. Waldman stated that Kuwait was torn between the West and Islam and argued that the Kuwaiti national identity was underdeveloped

“The Iraqi invasion awakened Kuwait to what it meant to be Kuwaiti: not much, except lots of money.”255 The Orientalist approach was evident in Waldman’s article, he oversimplified the

Kuwaiti identity, emphasizing the “us vs. them” narrative by stating that the country is torn between the Quran and the West. Finally, Waldman concluded his piece with a North Carolinian woman’s words. Denise, who married a Kuwaiti man ten years earlier, was quoted saying "Some

Kuwaitis who bring home wives from abroad turn into super-Arab demons. […] One guy won't

253 Ibid. 254 Peter Waldman, “Man Eyes Woman, She Smiles Back; This Is a Good Date? --- Kuwait Is Bribing Its Youth To Marry and Have Babies; But Singles Don’t Buy In,” Wall Street Journal, June 5, 1992, accessed September 6, 2018, http://ezproxy.library.und.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest- com.ezproxy.library.und.edu/docview/398331389?accountid=28267. 255 Ibid.

even let his wife talk about wearing pants, but then he goes around in shorts." The article continued:

Denise and her husband have an unspoken pact. She keeps her American friends, especially the soldiers, away from her sisters-in-law. And he keeps his relatives away from their three daughters. "I don't want any of those cousins eying them -- no way!" Denise says. "My little girls are going to grow up to be doctors."256

The article contributed to the “violent Arab male” narrative with these previous quotations.

Tony Horwitz reported in 1991 that “Western-style democracy is unthinkable” in Saudi

Arabia and explained that “Adulterers are stoned to death and murderers beheaded at a place known to foreigners as "Chop Square” in Saudi Arabia.”257 According to Horwitz’s article, the previous year a criminal’s dead body was left on view for the public after he was decapitated.258

Horwitz’s article emphasized the difference between the “Occident” and the “Orient” by stating how a “Western-style” democracy was impossible because of certain punishment practices. In

1999 Steve Liesman reported the driving ban for women in Saudi Arabia. Liesman’s article concluded with a Saudi woman’s remarks where she listed the dress code and the driving ban as the two hardest things about living in Saudi Arabia.259 “Change comes slowly in a nation where modernism and traditionalism have always been in conflict. This is, after all, the world's center of

Islam […]” Liesman stated, indicating this Muslim nation’s resistance to change.260

256 Ibid. 257 Tony Horwitz, “Thought Police: With Gulf War Over, Saudi Fundamentalists Reassert Themselves --- Islamic Enforcers Try to Purge Kingdom of Western Evil; Public Beheadings Return --- The Royal Family’s Dilemma,” Wall Street Journal, May 2, 1991, accessed September 6, 2018, http://ezproxy.library.und.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest- com.ezproxy.library.und.edu/docview/398196357?accountid=28267 258 Ibid. 259 Steve Liesman, “Driven to Distraction, Saudi Women May Soon Take the Wheel --- Ban Keeps Them Chauffeured, But Slower Economy Adds To Pressure for a Shift,” Wall Street Journal, March 1, 1999, accessed September 6, 2018, http://ezproxy.library.und.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest- com.ezproxy.library.und.edu/docview/398816573?accountid=28267. 260 Ibid.

Michael M. Phillip’s article “Muslim Nations, Vatican Oppose U.N. Declaration on

AIDS,” from 2001, dealt with the disagreement between “Canada, Australia, the EU and many

Latin American countries” and Vatican and Muslim countries over identifying risky groups which were vulnerable to AIDS. “[…] and particularly whether to include men who have sex with men, people who have multiple sex partners, sex workers, and their clients, injecting drug users and their sexual partners" explained Phillip.261 Phillip referred to Iran, Egypt, and Syria as “Middle

Eastern nations” and “Muslim nations,” while leaving out the other eighteen Middle Eastern nations and, forty-six countries that are Muslim majority countries. Phillip clearly employed

Orientalism in this article since he overgeneralized the Muslim majority nations and simply referred to three specific countries as “Muslim nations,” and the “Middle Eastern nations.” It is worth stressing that Fethullah Gulen, who also stated that HIV and AIDS were diseases that least affected Muslims because “The noble values and morality of the Islamic way of life have protected Muslims against such a disaster […]” was never criticized for his point of view by the

Wall Street Journal.262

In “What Muslim Women Want,” written by Geneive Abdo and Dalia Mogahed from the Center for Muslim Studies at the Gallup Organization, claimed that majority of Muslim women from twenty-two predominantly Muslim countries wanted their country’s laws to be based on the Sharia law according to Gallup surveys in 2006.263 Abdo and Mogahed argued that

261 Michael M. Phillips, “Muslim Nations, Vatican Oppose U.N. Declaration on AIDS,” Wall Street Journal, June 21 2001, accessed September 6, 2018, http://ezproxy.library.und.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest- com.ezproxy.library.und.edu/docview/398914837?accountid=28267. 262 Fethullah Gulen, “Is It Right When People Link HIV to "The Beast of the Earth" (Dabbat al ard), One of the Signs of the Last Day?,” Fethullah Gulen Web Sitesi, November 28, 2005, accessed on September 6, 2018 https://fGulen.com/en/fethullah-Gulens-works/faith/questions-and-answers/25479-is-it-right-when-people-link- hiv-to-qthe-beast-of-the-earthq-dabbat-al-ard-one-of-the-signs-of-the-last-day. 263 Geneive Abdo and Dalia Mogahed, “What Muslim Women Want,” Wall Street Journal, December 13, 2006, accessed on September 6, http://ezproxy.library.und.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest- com.ezproxy.library.und.edu/docview/399049320?accountid=28267.

“embracing Islam” was “expressed by wearing the hijab,” dismissed Turkish women’s views by stating that “In nearly every country surveyed, aside from officially secular Turkey, a majority of women say Islamic law should either be the primary source of legislation or a source.” Abdo and

Mogahed’s article employed an Orientalist approach because the Muslim women were overgeneralized along with the definition of Muslim, the authors indicated that embracing Islam was only possible by wearing the hijab.264

Unlike the New York Times, in the Wall Street Journal, the lines between women’s rights and Muslims’ violent tendencies were blurred at times. For example, Peter Waldman noted in 1994 that under the Iranian civil law, women were not equal to men especially when it came to divorce.265 Waldman stated that “The religiously privileged -- in this case, males -- make out like bandits.” While Waldman stated that Islam was not the problem, the article repeatedly referred to the Sharia Law as the sole cause of gender inequality in Iran.266 Waldman’s article repeatedly stated that even violence against women was not seen as a legitimate reason for divorce; while the articles on the Gulen movement looked the other way on the same issue. Fethullah Gulen stated that while the divorce was allowed in Islam, it is one of the worst acts a person could commit that was not considered a sin.267 Another article published on the official website of

Gulen, fGulen.com, explained that when Gulen stated that women who did not have kids would have been allowed to divorce their husbands if their husband was committing violent acts against

264 Ibid. 265 Peter Waldman, “Divorce Iranian Style: In Court, Islamic Law Honors the Husband,” Wall Street Journal, November 8, 1994, accessed on September 6, http://ezproxy.library.und.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest- com.ezproxy.library.und.edu/docview/398542009?accountid=28267. 266 Ibid. 267 Fethullah Gulen, “Boşanma,” Fethullah Gulen Web Sitesi, May 18, 2006, https://fGulen.com/tr/fethullah- Gulenin-butun-eserleri/185-olcu-veya-Yoldaki-isiklar/866-Fethullah-Gulen-Bosanma.

them but he did not mean a simple slap on the face.268 The author of this article, Ahmet Kurucan, explained that, while it was not condoned, husband’s slapping of his wife cannot be considered a legitimate reason for divorce since it was a common and understandable occurrence in the heat of arguments.269 Daniel Pearl wrote about the oppression on the social life in Iran and the young people who were actively trying to flee to the United States as a result of the strict governmental control over their social lives in 1996.270 Pearl cited the Islamic regime of Iran for the social oppression of Iranians, while not acknowledging that the Iranian regime had a peculiar way of interpreting Islam. Naomi Schaefer Riley wrote in 2006 that “Polygamy today is most popular in cultures that are relatively backward and impoverished,” and cited Malaysia, Uganda, and Turkey as examples of these cultures where polygyny was practiced. Schaefer Riley stated that Bernard

Accoyer, a French politician, cited the widely common practice of polygyny among the Muslim minority in French as one of the main reasons for the then-recent riots in Paris. Schaefer Riley agreed with this argument by pointing out the outcomes of systematic polygyny: families living in poverty and young men with not much to do while recognizing that Accoyer was denounced for racism.271 Schaefer Riley’s article was openly Orientalist, she referred to two Muslim- majority and one African country as “backward,” while she referred to the same practice in the

Netherlands as the “social habits of the Dutch.”272 Matt Bradley’s article from 2013 was on

268 Ahmet Kurucan, “Aile İçi Şiddet Üzerine Zarûri Açıklamalar,” fGulen.com, accessed September 6, 2019, https://fGulen.com/tr/turk-basininda-fethullah-Gulen/fethullah-Gulen-hakkinda-kose-yazilari/2008-kose- yazilari/16338-Ahmet-Kurucan-Zaman-Aile-Ici-Siddet-Uzerine-Zaruri-Aciklamalar-1 269 Ibid. 270 Daniel Pearl, “Tehran Wanderlust: Hot Item in Iran Now Is Visa to Visit U.S., Once the `Great Satan’ --- Young Population Embraces Coke and Janet Jackson; Islam Leaders Fight Back --- To Study, Perchance to Stay,” Wall Street Journal, October 11, 1996, accessed September 6, 2018, http://ezproxy.library.und.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest- com.ezproxy.library.und.edu/docview/398578250?accountid=28267. 271 Naomi Schaefer Riley, “Harem, Scare ’Em: Worrying About Polygamy,” Wall Street Journal, January 6, 2006, accessed September 6, 2018, http://ezproxy.library.und.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest- com.ezproxy.library.und.edu/docview/399049175?accountid=28267. 272 Ibid.

Khaled Abdullah, an Egyptian tele-preacher who supported marital rape, who was also against

LGBTQ+ rights and atheists. Bradley wrote:

The Salafi TV preachers advocate restrictive views on women, railing against female protesters and even advising audiences of what they see as the Islamically correct way for a husband to beat his wife.273

Bradley’s article did not employ an Orientalist approach, he did not overgeneralize all Egyptians but rather pointed out an alarming new trend. However, this article demonstrates the positive portrayal of Gulen since Gulen is also openly advising on how to beat women. Bradley’s article referred to Abdullah as a Salafi, which he explained is “an austere practice of Islam that seeks to imitate the lifestyle, and even dress, of the Prophet Muhammad and early Muslims” while Gulen has been referred as a moderate by the Wall Street Journal.274

Similar to the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal also reported on LGBTQ+ rights in Muslim societies. Sara Schonhardt penned “Indonesia's Gays Face a Backlash After

Advancing” in 2016 examined the human rights abuses against the homosexual men in Indonesia and pointed out that “Homosexuality is not illegal similar to many Arab countries but the

LGBTQ+ individuals still face harassment and human rights abuses.”275 This is another nuanced article where the author did not employ the Orientalist approach, but it demonstrates the positive portrayal of Fethullah Gulen and the Gulen movement since both known for their hostility against the LGBTQ+ communities, yet, this side of the Gulen movement had never been acknowledged

273 Matt Bradley, "Islamists Rely on TV Sheiks to Woo the Masses in Egypt," Wall Street Journal, May 09, 2013, accessed September 12, 2018, http://ezproxy.library.und.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest- com.ezproxy.library.und.edu/docview/1349537846?accountid=28267. 274 Ibid. 275 Sara Schonhardt, “Indonesia's Gays Face a Backlash After Advancing,” Wall Street Journal, March 29, 2016, accessed September 12, 2018, http://ezproxy.library.und.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest- com.ezproxy.library.und.edu/docview/1776257391?accountid=28267.

by the Wall Street Journal.276 “Terror in Orlando: A Punitive Line on Homosexuality,” written by

Karen Leigh and Asa Fitch, harshly criticized the majority of Muslims’ stance towards homosexuality around the world.277 The article argued that even the most liberal Arab nations were hostile to the LGBTQ+ communities, and at least in ten Muslim majority countries homosexuality was punishable by death.278 Leigh and Fitch did not mention the non-Muslim majority countries that had hostile laws against the LGBTQ+ communities such as Russia and

Lithuania and countries that recently criminalized same-sex relations between women such as

Zambia and Tanzania.279 Leigh and Fitch’s approach fits the definition of Orientalism since they overgeneralized Muslims as hostile to LGBTQ+ communities, treated Islam as a monolithic entity that was the cause of this hostility, and emphasized the civilized vs. uncivilized narrative by pointing out the hostility against the LGBTQ+ communities in Arab states.

Radical Islam was another prominent subject that was reported by the Wall Street

Journal. Thomas Kamm’s article from 1995 examined the branches of moderate and radical

Islam in France.280 While Kamm’s article was balanced in portraying differing opinions on Islam and Muslims it also failed to acknowledge the secular Muslims living in France. The article

276 Tore Fougner, “Fethullah Gulen’s understanding of women’s rights in Islam: a critical reappraisal, Turkish Studies,” Turkish Studies 18, no:2 (2017): 251 – 277. 277 Leigh Karen and Asa Fitch, “Terror in Orlando: A Punitive Line on Homosexuality --- Many Muslim nations have harshly antigay laws, forcing people to live under the radar,” Wall Street Journal, 14 June 2016, accessed September 6, 2018, http://ezproxy.library.und.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest- com.ezproxy.library.und.edu/docview/1796118106?accountid=28267. 278 Ibid. 279 Siobhan Fenton, “LGBT relationships are illegal in 74 countries, research finds,” Independent, May 17, 2016, accessed September 12, 2018, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/gay-lesbian-bisexual-relationships- illegal-in-74-countries-a7033666.html.; Siobhan Fenton, “Number of countries criminalising sex between lesbian and bisexual women increasing , human rights lawyers warn,” May 14, 2016, accessed September 12, 2018, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/number-of-countries-criminalising-sex-between-lesbian-and- bisexual-women-growing-human-rights-a7029301.html. 280 Thomas Kamm, “Clash of Cultures: Rise of Islam in France Rattles the Populace And Stirs a Backlash --- Europeans Fear Militancy But Young Muslims Say They Are Misunderstood --- A Headscarf Battle in Poitiers,” Wall Street Journal, January 5, 1995, accessed September 3, 2018, http://ezproxy.library.und.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest- com.ezproxy.library.und.edu/docview/398568708?accountid=28267

deducted diverse interpretations of Islam into “radical” or “moderate.” Overgeneralization of

French Muslims indicated Kamm’s Orientalist approach. M. Zuhdi Jasser, an American-Muslim military man, penned the article “The Islamist Threat Inside Our Military” that was published in

2011 pointed out “the ideological struggle between Americanism and Islamism.”281 Jasser’s self-

Orientalist approach was evident in his article, he portrayed Islam as a monolithic religion and argued that one cannot be loyal to the United States, a secular country, and to “The Ummah

(Muslim nation.)”282

Faisal Shahzad, the confessed Times Square bomber, stated to the judge at his arraignment, "We Muslims are one community. We are not divided." He proclaimed that he was a "mujahid" or a "Muslim soldier." Nidal Hasan similarly called himself a "Soldier of Allah." This self-identification is central to the Islamist threat.

While Jasser emphasized that there were many secular Muslim leaders and many Muslim servicemen and women who were serving in the military honorably, the article indicated that there were only two branches of Islam: the one aligns with the West and the one that is the enemy of it.283 Salam Al-Marayati and Maher Hathout voiced their opinion on the question if Islam needed to reform in “Let Islamic Reform Start in America” published in 2014.284 Al-Marayati and Hathout’s article opened with Bernard Lewis’s claim of a possibility of the Westernized

Muslims helping the Middle East on issues regarding minority rights and secularization.

“American Muslims have the freedom and the intellectual capacity to create positive change for

Islamic reform,” argued Al-Marayati and Hathout in their evidently neo-Orientalist article.285

This article overgeneralized non-American Muslims portrayed them as an uncivilized group that

281 M. Zuhdi Jasser, “The Islamist Threat Inside Our Military,” Wall Street Journal, August 18, 2011, accessed September 12, 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424053111904006104576500593598420746. 282 Ibid. 283 Ibid. 284 Salam Al-Marayati and Maher Hathout, “Let Islamic Reform Start in America,” Wall Street Journal, October 30, 2014, accessed September 12, 2018, http://www.wsj.com/articles/salam-al-marayati-and-maher-hathout-let- islamic-reform-start-in-america-1414713552. 285 Ibid. 64

needed to be civilized by the Westernized American Muslims and represented Islam as monolithic.

Andrew Higgins’ 2009 article on Adnan Oktar, a famous creationist and an eccentric TV personality, drawn attention to the growing tendency to accept creationism among the educated

Turkish youth. Higgins quoted Aykut Kence, a scholar from the Biology department of the

Middle Eastern Technical University, “If people can't accept Darwin, they can't accept science.

They can't think," stated Kence.286 Higgins stated that Oktar had relations with the Vatican and that creationism was mostly a Christian idea which was imported to Turkey.287 The same issue had been previously examined in the Wall Street Journal by Daniel Golden in 2002, and it was evident that the newspaper had no reservations in criticizing the creationist movement.288 These two articles demonstrate the positive portrayal of Gulen since not a single article in the Wall

Street Journal, out of one hundred and seventy-three, pointed out the fact that Gulen is a creationist.

Again, similar to the New York Times, not all articles in the Wall Street Journal employed

Orientalism when dealing with Muslims. In 2000, Geraldine Brooks wrote about the lack of women’s sports in Muslim-majority nations such as Iran and Bahrain and how athletes were struggling to flourish under very strict rules against women’s participation in sports.289 “In many

286 Andrew Higgins, “An Islamic Creationist Stirs A New Kind of Darwinian Struggle --- Mr. Oktar Has Plenty of Fans in Turkey, But Biologists Beg to Differ,” Wall Street Journal, March 17, 2009, accessed September 3, 2018, http://ezproxy.library.und.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest- com.ezproxy.library.und.edu/docview/399133041?accountid=28267. 287 Ibid. 288 Daniel Golden, “Strange Bedfellows: Western Scholars Play Key Role in Touting `Science' of the Quran --- Some Say They Were Duped To Support Islamic Idea Embraced by bin Laden --- A Prophecy of Space Travel?,” Wall Street Journal, January 23, 2002, accessed September 3, 2018, http://ezproxy.library.und.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest- com.ezproxy.library.und.edu/docview/398871011?accountid=28267. 289 Geraldine Brooks, “Summer Olympics 2000: Muslim Women’s Veiled Optimism --- Bahraini Team Makes Olympic History but, Oh, the Slog,” Wall Street Journal, September 25, 2000, accessed September 3, 2018,

conservative Muslim Gulf countries, women's sports don't exist,” stated Brooks, “[Bahrain] has been quicker to accept wider women's roles than its neighbors,” explained further.290 Brooks’ article clearly stated that every Muslim country was different when it came to allowing women to play sports and did not cite Islam as the cause of the inequality in sports. Said Summer and Ellen

Knickmeyer wrote in 2012 that the Saudi King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz al Saud appointed a moderate cleric as the head of the country’s moral police. The newly appointed Sheik Abdulatif al-Sheikh supported greater rights to women and vehemently opposed child marriage according to the report.291 Summer and Knickmeyer repeatedly pointed out that the Saudi reformers were hoping that Sheik Abdulatif al-Sheikh would enforce a different interpretation of the Islamic

Law, indicating that there were Islamic Laws and not a single interpretation.

A close examination of the sixty articles above from the New York Times and the Wall

Street Journal demonstrates that neither of these newspapers was completely free of Orientalism when it comes to Muslims, Muslim societies, and Islam between 1985 and 2016. While it is also evident that there were a couple of articles published by the New York Times and the Wall Street

Journal that were nuanced and did not employ Orientalism, the majority of the articles still fit the definition of Orientalism and/or neo-Orientalism. Since this section demonstrated the journalists’ approach to Islam and Muslims in the New York Times and in the Wall Street Journal, the next section will examine the portrayal of the Gulen movement to demonstrate that the movement had been positively portrayed by the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal. The following chapter will examine and demonstrate why this portrayal is problematic.

http://ezproxy.library.und.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest- com.ezproxy.library.und.edu/docview/398911896?accountid=28267 290 Ibid. 291 Summer Said and Ellen Knickmeyer, “World News: Reformist Cleric Named To Enforce Saudi Morals,” Wall Street Journal, January 14, 2012, accessed September 2, 2018, http://ezproxy.library.und.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest- com.ezproxy.library.und.edu/docview/916138267?accountid=28267. 66

THE POSITIVE PORTRAYAL OF FETHULLAH GULEN AND THE GULEN

MOVEMENT IN THE NEW YORK TIMES AND IN THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

For this section, I examined Fethullah Gulen and his movement’s portrayal between the years 1998 and 2016 in the New York Times and in the Wall Street Journal. Before 1998, there were not any accounts either on Gulen or on the movement. The articles on the Gulen movement were only critical or investigative of Gulen and his movement when the reported issue was about

Gulen affiliated charter schools. Almost none of the articles were critical or even investigative of

Gulen’s ideology. The articles that dealt with the rivalry between the once prime minister, and the current president of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Fethullah Gulen and the Gulen movement also failed to examine or accurately represent the ideology of the Gulen movement.

And finally, articles that directly focused on the Gulen movement and Fethullah Gulen, in addition to lacking criticism and proper investigation of Gulen and the movement, usually referred to the people who opposed Gulen as radical seculars. I identified five articles that pointed out the questionable nature of the movement and Fethullah Gulen but the majority of the articles that dealt directly with Gulen falsely portrayed the movement as a moderate religious movement. The following section will thematically examine the articles, starting with the charter schools issue, I will then examine Gulen’s portrayal in articles that focused on the feud between

Erdogan and Gulen, and finally, the last part will demonstrate the articles that focused solely on

Gulen that misrepresented and falsely portrayed the movement as moderate without mentioning the alarming characteristics of the movement and Gulen’s ideology. It is also worth noting that there is no exact definition of “moderate Muslim” and the meaning has been debated.292 A

292 Safraz Manzoor, “Can we drop the term ‘moderate Muslim’? It’s meaningless,” The Guardian, March 16, 2015, accessed September 6, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/mar/16/moderate-muslim- devout-liberal-religion.; Shireen Younus, “I Am Not a Moderate Muslim,” The Harvard Crimson, February 10,

scholar from the University of Leiden, Alex P. Schmidt, used Julia Tallmeister’s definition of moderation in his article “Moderate Muslims and Islamist Terrorism: Between Denial and

Resistance:”293

Islamist movements that attempt to achieve their goals through bottom-up, non-violent methods, and are able to both accept democratic values and tolerate perspectives other than their own. In the same sense, ideological moderation is defined as the gradual transformation of a movement’s core values and beliefs from rigid and fixed, to flexible and tolerant.

Zeyno Baran’s definition also stressed toleration as one of the main characteristics of moderation:

“Moderate and secular Muslims, who embrace the compatibility of Islam and democracy and the individual freedoms we all cherish in the West […]”294 Based on these two definitions of moderate Muslim, it would be safe to say that the definition would include internalized tolerance, flexibility, and the non-violent outlook. Based on this definition, classifying Gulen and the Gulen movement as “moderate” is not accurate. While Gulen and the Gulen movement vehemently support non-violence to non-Muslims and male Muslims, they cannot be considered tolerant, since some of Gulen’s writings were essentially homophobic, or cannot be considered completely non-violent since Gulen supports violence against women. An examination of the problematic elements of Gulen and the movement’s ideology will be discussed in detail in the following chapter. At the end of this section, I will briefly examine the more neutral and critical articles and explain why they could be considered critical.

Fethullah Gulen and the Gulen movement started to appear in the New York Times during the 2000s. Gulen’s name first mentioned by the New York Times in “World Briefing”

2017, accessed September 6, 2018, https://www.thecrimson.com/article/2017/2/10/younus-i-am-not-a-moderate- muslim/. 293 Alex Schmid, “Moderate Muslims and Islamist Terrorism: Between Denial and Resistance,” ICCT, August 2017, accessed September 6, 2018. https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/ICCT-Schmid-Moderate-Muslims-and- Islamist-Terrorism-Aug-2017-1.pdf. 294 Zeyno Baran, The Other Muslims: Moderate and Secular (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 1. 68

section in 1999, where Gulen was referred as a “leader of a secretive sect.” Before the rivalry between Gulen and Erdogan, Gulen mostly garnered the attention of the New York Times for the movement affiliated schools and the controversies surrounding them. In 2006, Samantha M.

Shapiro stated that Gulen was a “part of a new trend of religious leaders who want a conservative religion that can function in harmony with a globalized world” in the New York Times Magazine where she referred to Gulen as “Sufi master.295 Sabrina Tavernise’s article, contributed by

Sebnem Arsu, was published in March 2008 described Fethullah Gulen as someone who

“combines Sufi religious philosophy with modern science, offering a blend of Islamic tradition and secular modernism in hundreds of schools that his followers have built.”296 The emphasis on alleged secularism of Gulen schools persisted throughout the years. In May 2008, Tavernise described the Gulen movement and affiliated schools as a moderate alternative to radical Islam that was becoming prominent in Pakistan. Tavernise stated that Gulen movement’s view of Islam was “moderate and flexible, comfortably coexisting with the West while remaining distinct from it,” and that the movement was “like Muslim Peace Corps volunteers, they promote this approach in schools, which are now established in more than 80 countries, Muslim and Christian.”297

Gulen’s ideology claimed to be STEM friendly by Tavernise, Gulen’s approach to science and religion was explained as "without science, religion turns to radicalism, and without religion,

295 Samantha M. Shapiro, “Ministering To the Upwardly Mobile Muslim,” New York Times Magazine, April 30, 2006, accessed September 6, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/30/magazine/ministering-to- theupwardlymobilemuslim.html?mtrref=www.google.com&gwh=19A0934672DE9229DF7FC9C0641B7E0D&g wt=pay. 296 Sabrina Tavernise, “Iraqi Leader Tries to Mend Relationship With Turkey,” New York Times, March 8, 2008, accessed September 6, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/08/world/middleeast/08turkey.html?mtrref=undefined&gwh=BA21BB34CA7 8BBE2F6A9A16B6391CAF3&gwt=pay. 297 Sabrina Tavernise, “Turkish Schools Offer Pakistan a Gentler Vision of Islam,” New York Times, May 4, 2008, accessed September 6, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/04/world/asia/04islam.html?mtrref=www.google.com&gwh=72731BBEB1F AAF3999C928D3BAA03D&gwt=pay.

science is blind and brings the world to danger" by one of Gulen’s followers.298 The article argued that Said Nursi’s followers, the theologian whom Gulen was influenced of, “were seeking ways to coexist with [science].”299 While the next chapter discusses these claims in detail, it is worth noting that Gulen is a creationist and frequently denied the scientific consensus. Adama

Diop, a scholar from the Dakar University in Senegal, wrote on Gulen’s approach to science and evolution in an article that can still be found on Fethullah Gulen’s official website.300 Diop said that “F. Gulen was aiming to change society through Education. The system he advocates gives priority to the teaching of SCIENCES, Science being considered as a tool for understanding the miracles of the Quran,” when he was explaining how Gulen affiliated schools helped to change the education system in Sub-Saharan Africa.301 Another evidence of Gulen’s anti-evolution stance could be also found on his official website. Taken from one of his books, Questions and

Answers About Islam Vol. I, Gulen argued that the theory of evolution was not factual.302

Stephanie Saul’s article, published in 2011, examined the controversy surrounding the charter schools in Texas, allegedly owned by the Gulen movement.303 Saul stated that Gulen “Preaches the need to embrace modernity in a peace-loving, ecumenical version of Islam. At the center of his philosophy is the concept of “hizmet” — public service.”304 While Saul pointed out the

298 Ibid. 299 Ibid. 300 Adama Diop, “Fethullah Gulen’s idea on the relationship between science and religion,” Fethullah Gulen Web Sitesi, accessed September 10, 2018. https://fGulen.com/en/home/1346-fGulen-com-english/conference- papers/Gulen-conference-in-indonesia/27029-adama-diop-fetullah-Gulens-idea-on-the-relationship-between- science-and-religion 301 Ibid. 302 Fethullah Gulen, “What is the reason for the persistence of darwinism in the general culture of the masses though many of darwins hypotheses have been challenged and even disproved?” Fethullah Gulen Web Sites, accessed September 10, 2018.; Fethullah Gulen, Questions & Answers about Islam (New Jersey: Tughra Books, 2012). 303 Stephanie Saul, “Charter Schools Tied to Turkey Grow in Texas,” New York Times, June 6, 2011, accessed September 6, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/07/education/07charter.html?mtrref=www.google.com&gwh=B841DD2D3D DDDD8F2D8929C97B1B932D&gwt=pay. 304 Ibid.

controversy regarding the charter schools and dealt extensively with the allegedly corrupt visa practices and corruption in awarding contracts, she did not criticize or point out the problematic aspects of the movement itself.305 David Lepeska’s article that dealt with a Gulen affiliated

Islamic college in Chicago, the American Islamic College, referred to the Gulen movement as a

“secretive movement.”306 The article reported that the Gulen (Hizmet) movement promoted

“public service and education and oversees research institutes, universities, media outlets and one of Turkey's largest banks.”307 According to Lepeska, the school officials argued that the school aligned with Gulen’s religious ideology, which claimed to be “a more moderate form of

Islam.”308 While Lepeska emphasized the allegedly corrupt visa practices employed by Gulen affiliated schools, he did not mention any of the ideological allegations against Gulen and the

Gulen movement.309 Stephanie Saul’s article “Audits for 3 Georgia Schools Tied to Turkish

Movement” is another example of the lack of criticism of Gulen’s ideology.310 The article pointed out the dubious visa practices of the Gulen schools in the U.S. but also emphasized that while the schools were “inspired by Mr. Gulen and teach Turkish language and culture,” stated Saul, “they did not teach religion.”311 Tim Arango’s article of Gulen “Raids and Graft Inquiry in Turkey Are

Seen by Some as Muslim Cleric's Plot” referred to him as a “Charismatic preacher who leads one of the most influential Islamic movements in the world and commands an empire of secular

305 Ibid. 306 David Lepeska, “Return of Islamic College Raises New Questions,” New York Times, May 29, 2011, accessed September 6, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/29/us/29cncislamu.html?mtrref=www.google.com&gwh=B783C918BDE766 BCD757367E9DBC4706&gwt=pay. 307 Ibid. 308 Ibid. 309 Ibid. 310 Stephanie Saul, “Audits for 3 Georgia Schools Tied to Turkish Movement,” New York Times, June 6, 2012, accessed September 6, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/06/us/audits-for-3-georgia-charter-schools-tied- to-gulen-movement.html. 311 Ibid.

schools […]”312 It is evident that the New York Times journalists were emphasizing the secular nature of these schools while also pointing out the bureaucratic controversy surrounding them.

Aside from news regarding the Gulen-affiliated charter schools, Gulen was featured in the New York Times for the polarizing rivalry between Erdogan and his movement. The commonality shared by these articles is that they referred to Gulen as a “preacher,” or a “leader,” but failed to explain the movement’s ideology other than a couple of generic sentences that stated

Gulen owned a media empire and had been living in the U.S. on a self-exile since 1999. Tim

Arango and Sebnem Arsu wrote “Growing Corruption Inquiry Hits Close to Turkish Leader” in

2013, where they argued that Fethullah Gulen and Erdogan “combined forces in a battle with the country's secular military elite, sending them back to the barracks in recent years and establishing

Turkey as a successful example of a moderate, democratic Islamic government.”313 Fethullah

Gulen was portrayed as pro-Israel and the article indicated that the power struggle between

Erdogan and Gulen was due to their disagreements on Turkish foreign policy.314 A Gulen affiliate, Huseyin Gulerce, explained that the followers of the Gulen movement were complaining about the growingly authoritarian Erdogan regime and the abandonment of the “pursuit of membership in the European Union.”315 Another article by Arango and Arsu claimed that the

Erdogan-Gulen collaboration “aimed to rid Turkish politics of the influence of the military, which carried out three coups in the 20th century and protected the secular elite while oppressing

312 Tim Arango, “Raids and Graft Inquiry in Turkey Are Seen by Some as Muslim Cleric's Plot,” New York Times, December 19, 2013, accessed September 6, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/19/world/europe/turkey- graft-inquiry-political-rivalry.html. 313 Tim Arango, Sebnem Arsu and Ceylan Yeginsu, “Growing Corruption Inquiry Hits Close to Turkish Leader,” New York Times, December 20, 2013, accessed September 6, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/20/world/europe/growing-corruption-inquiry-hits-close-to-turkish leader.html?mtrref=www.google.com&gwh=DE4EEE090606126FBFB7832E3922DF9F&gwt=pay. 314 Ibid. 315 Ibid.

the pious classes.”316 The article barely mentioned why Gulen had to leave Turkey in 1999 by stating that “[Gulen left Turkey] for exile in America after he was accused of trying to establish an Islamic state.”317 The authors avoided mentioning why the accusations were made in the first place –as a result of a leaked footage where Gulen was instructing his followers to infiltrate the state institutions.318 In contrast, an article written by Dan Bilefsky and Sebnem Arsu, in 2012, reported the so-called politically motivated charges against journalists under the name of

“Sledgehammer” by the Turkish government. This article briefly touched upon the alleged role of the Gulen movement in the alleged “political purge” by stating that according to analysts the

Gulen movement’s members “have infiltrated the highest levels of the country’s police and judiciary.”319 While an article written by Ceylan Yeginsu only two years later, in 2014, pointed out Gulen’s affiliation with the Sledgehammer case and the extensive use of dubious evidence,

Bilefsky and Arsu’s article mainly dealt with Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s growingly oppressive government.320 Two other articles written by Ceylan Yeginsu, one in 2014, the other in 2015, referred to Gulen as an “influential Muslim cleric” and solely dealt with mutual allegations between Erdogan and Gulen’s followers without providing any information regarding Gulen’s

316 Tim Arango and Sebnem Arsu, “Graft Inquiry Intensifies Turkish Political Rivalry,” New York Times, December 18, 2013, accessed September 6, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/18/world/europe/graft-inquiry- intensifies-turkish-political- rivalry.html?mtrref=www.google.com&gwh=8BEAED0649287D81DEF4D192D44BF18C&gwt=pay. 317 Ibid. 318 “Siyaset Meydanı (1999) 1. Bölüm (Necip Hablemitoğlu, Türkan Saylan),” YouTube, accessed September 14, 2018. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c4csYhE2T08.; “Siyaset Meydanı (1999) 2. Bölüm (Necip Hablemitoğlu, Türkan Saylan),” YouTube, accessed September 14, 2018. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Yn0xQ2gYc5A. 319 Dan Bilefsky and Sebnen Arsu, “Charges Against Journalists Dim the Democratic Glow in Turkey,” New York Times, January 5, 2012, accessed September 6, 2018, http://ezproxy.library.und.edu/login?url=https://search- proquest-com.ezproxy.library.und.edu/docview/913659189?accountid=28267 320 Ceylan Yeginsu, “Turkish Officers Convicted in 2012 Coup Case Are Released,” New York Times, June 19, 2014, accessed September 6, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/20/world/europe/turkish-court-orders-release-of- officers-convicted-of-plotting-coup.html.

ideology.321 In Tim Arango’s account, Gulen was portrayed as the owner of an empire of secular schools.322 The article quoted Jenny White, a scholar at the Stockholm University Institute for

Turkish Studies. “The goal,” White said, “is to create a "golden generation of young people who are educated in science, but have Muslim ethics.”323 Another expert who was quoted in the article was James F. Jeffrey, former U.S. ambassador to Turkey, claimed that the Gulen movement was a “cultlike” movement while arguing that it would have been near impossible for Gulenists to infiltrate the armed forces.324 The article did not feature any Turkish scholars’ opinion. Sebnem

Arsu and Brian Knowlton wrote in their 2014 article that Gulen “Promotes a moderate, pro-

Western brand of Sunni Islam that appeals to many well-educated and professional Turks, once made common cause against the country's staunchly secular military and political leadership.”325

Arsu and Knowlton did not explain why they preferred to refer Gulen’s ideology as “moderate” and “pro-Western.” An editorial from 2014 also referred to Gulen as a promoter of “a moderate, pro-Western brand of Sunni Islam that appeals to many well-educated and professional Turks.”326

In 2015, Katie Rogers referred to Gulen as a critic of Erdogan in her article “Turkey Frees Two

321 Ceylan Yeginsu, “Turkey Issues Arrest Warrant for a Rival of Its President,” New York Times, December 20, 2014, accessed September 6, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/20/world/europe/turkey-issues-arrest- warrant-for-a-rival-of-its-president.html.; Ceylan Yeginsu, “Police Officers in Turkey Held in Wiretaps of Officials,” New York Times, February 26, 2015, accessed September 6, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/26/world/europe/turkish-police-accused-of-wiretapping-recep-tayyip-erdogan- in-feud-with-fethullah-Gulen.html. 322 Tim Arango, “Raids and Graft Inquiry in Turkey Are Seen by Some as Muslim Cleric's Plot.” 323 Ibid. 324 Tim Arango and Ben Hubbard, “Turkey Pursues Cleric Living in U.S., Blamed as Coup Mastermind,” New York Times, July 19, 2016, accessed September 6, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/20/world/europe/fethullah-Gulen-erdogan-extradition.html. 325 Sebnem Arsu and Brian Knowlton, “Turks to Seek Extradition of Preacher Living in U.S.,”New York Times, April 30, 2014, accessed September 6, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/30/world/middleeast/turkish-leader- seeks-extradition-of-muslim-preacher-in-us.html. 326 “Let Mr. Erdogan Fight His Own Battles,” New York Times, May 3, 2014, accessed September 6, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/03/opinion/let-mr-erdogan-fight-his-own-battles.html.

Journalists, but a Colleague Is Still Held.”327 Stephanie Saul’s article regarding the attempted coup accusations targeting Gulen, from 2016, mainly focused on the Gulen’s accusations of

Erdogan and comparing the current Turkish government to Nazi Germany.328 Saul’s account lacked any sort of criticism of the Gulen movement and she defined the movement as:

At the core of his movement, promoted as a peace-loving form of Islam, is the concept of Hizmet, which his followers describe as a type of public service.329

Some other articles that dealt with the power struggle between Erdogan and Gulen that did not include any examination of Gulen’s ideology and simply refer to him as a “spiritual leader,” “cleric,” “imam,” or a “preacher” are the following: “Purge of Police Said to Be Move by Turkey to Disrupt Graft Inquiry;” “In Push Against Muslim Cleric, Turkey Detains Police

Officers and Journalists;” “Turks Are Glued to a Sensational Drama, This One Political;”

“Turkish Officers Convicted in 2012 Coup Case Are Released; In Scandal,” “Turkey's Leaders

May Be Losing Their Tight Grip on The news media;” “Not on Ballot, Turkey's Premier Still

Gets Push From Party in Local Elections;” “A Debate Becomes a Brawl as Turkey's Parliament

Votes to Rein In Courts;” “Turkey: Cleric's Passport Is Revoked; In Blow to Turkish President;”

“Court Halts Closing of Schools;” “Turkey's Wrong Turn; “Sharp Denials After Arrest of

Journalists in Turkey;” “Prosecutor Overseeing Turkish Graft Inquiry Is Removed From Case;”

“Premier Tries to Keep Power, as President;” “Obama Meets Erdogan in an Effort to Patch Up

Differences With Turkey;” “Number of Imprisoned Journalists Hits Record, Advocacy Group

Says;” “A Complicated Alliance With Turkey;” “Turkey Purges Thousands and Blocks

327 Katie Rogers, “Turkey Frees Two Journalists, but a Colleague Is Still Held,” New York Times, September 4, 2015, accessed September 6, 2018, http://ezproxy.library.und.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest- com.ezproxy.library.und.edu/docview/1709343978?accountid=28267. 328 Stephanie Saul, “An Exiled Cleric Denies Playing a Leading Role in Coup Attempt.” 329 Ibid.

Wikipedia;” “Angela Merkel, Meeting With Erdogan in Turkey, Emphasizes Free Speech;” “40

Sentenced to Life for Plot to Assassinate Turkey's President.”330

330 Dan Bilefsky and Sebnem Arsu, “Purge of Police Said to Be Move by Turkey to Disrupt Graft Inquiry,” New York Times, January 8, 2014, accessed September 6, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/08/world/europe/turkey-corruption-inquiry.html.; Şebnem Arsu, “In Push Against Muslim Cleric, Turkey Detains Police Officers and Journalists,” New York Times, December 15 2014, accessed September 6, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/15/world/europe/turkish-police-officers-and- media-workers-are-detained-in-roundup.html.; Tim Arango, “Turks Are Glued to a Sensational Drama, This One Political,” New York TimesFebruary 26, 2014, accessed September 6, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/26/world/europe/turks-are-glued-to-a-sensational-drama-this-one- political.html.; Ceylan Yeginsu, “Turkish Officers Convicted in 2012 Coup Case Are Released,” New York Times, June 19, 2014, accessed September 6, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/20/world/europe/turkish- court-orders-release-of-officers-convicted-of-plotting-coup.html.; Tim Arango, “In Scandal, Turkey's Leaders May Be Losing Their Tight Grip on The news media,” New York Times, January 12, 2014, accessed September 6, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/12/world/europe/in-scandal-turkeys-leaders-may-be-losing-their-tight- grip-on-news-media.html ; Tim Arango and Sebnem Arsu, “Not on Ballot, Turkey's Premier Still Gets Push From Party in Local Elections,” New York Times, March 31, 2014, accessed September 6, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/31/world/europe/not-on-ballot-turkeys-premier-still-gets-push-from-party-in- local-elections.html.; Tim Arango and Sebnem Arsu, “A Debate Becomes a Brawl as Turkey's Parliament Votes to Rein In Courts,” New York Times, February 16, 2014, accessed September 6, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/16/world/europe/a-brawl-and-then-a-vote-to-rein-in-turkish-courts.html. ; Ceylan Yeginsu, “Turkey: Cleric's Passport Is Revoked,” New York Times, February 3, 2015, accessed September 6, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/04/world/europe/turkey-revokes-passport-of-cleric-in-exile-in- pennsylvania.html.; Ceylan Yeginsu, “In Blow to Erdogan, Turkish Court Halts Closing of Schools Tied to His Rival,” New York Times, July 15 2015, accessed September 12, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/15/world/europe/in-blow-to-erdogan-turkish-court-halts-closing-of-schools- tied-to-his-rival.html.; “Turkey's Wrong Turn,”, New York Times, January 28, 2014, accessed September 6, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/28/opinion/turkeys-wrong-turn.html ; Ceylan Yeginsu, “Sharp Denials After Arrest of Journalists in Turkey,” New York Times, September 2, 2015, accessed September 12, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/02/world/europe/turkey-arrests-3-vice-news-journalists-on-terrorism- charges.html.; Tim Arango, “Prosecutor Overseeing Turkish Graft Inquiry Is Removed From Case,” New York Times, December 27, 2013, accessed September 6, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/28/world/europe/turkey-corruption-scandal.html.; Tim Arango and Sebnem Arsu, “Turkey’s Premier Tries to Keep Power, as President,” New York Times, August 9, 2014, accessed September 6, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/09/world/europe/premier-tries-to-keep-power-as- president.html.; Mark Landler, “Obama Meets Erdogan in an Effort to Patch Up Differences With Turkey,” New York Times, September 5, 2016, accessed September 12, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/05/world/asia/obama-erdogan-turkey-coup-syria.html. ; “A Complicated Alliance With Turkey,” New York Times, August 26, 2016, accessed September 6, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/26/opinion/a-complicated-alliance-with-turkey.html.; Patrick Kingsley, “Turkey Purges Thousands and Blocks Wikipedia,” New York Times, May 1, 2017, accessed September 12, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/30/world/europe/turkey-purge-wikipedia-tv-dating-shows.html.; “Angela Merkel, Meeting With Erdogan in Turkey, Emphasizes Free Speech,” New York Times, February 3, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/02/world/europe/angela-merkel-recep-tayyip-erdogan-germany-turkey- kpp.html ; Carlotta Gall, “Turkey Sentences 40 to Life in Coup Attempt Against Erdogan,” New York Times, October 5, 2017, accessed September 12, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/04/world/europe/turkey- erdogan-coup-marmaris-trial.html.; Carlotta Gall.

The articles that focused solely on Gulen or the Gulen movement were a rarity in the

New York Times in comparison to charter schools and the rivalry between Gulen and Erdogan.

However, the earliest article on Gulen, published in 2000, “Turkish Court Voids Warrant for

Islamic Leader” referred to Gulen as a “prominent Islamic leader” and pointed out his connections with “senior politicians and religious leaders” was an article solely on Gulen and his movement.331 The article also stated how Gulen explained his motives, “[He] only wanted Turkey to be more tolerant of ethnic and religious diversity.”332 “Turkey Assails a Revered Islamic

Moderate” written in 2000 by Douglas Frantz referred to the Gulen movement as a “prospering

Islamic community,” stated that Gulen “promoted a moderate brand of Islam.” 333 This article also argued that a possibility of an extradition request for Gulen from the Turkish authorities unsettled the liberals who were not associated with the Gulen movement; an argument that indicated the liberal nature of the movement. Frantz also reported that Gulen argued that he was seeking a more tolerant government which “treated ethnic and ideological differences as a cultural mosaic, not a reason for discrimination.”334 Frantz also praised Gulen’s schools by stating that they were expensive private schools with religious curriculum approved by the state.335 Neither of these articles did provide the points of views of the people who were critical of the movement and only mentioned them as “the secular hard-liners” or the “secular elite.” By ignoring the diversity among the critics of Gulen the authors overgeneralized his critics labeling them as “extreme seculars.” In 2009, the New York Times referred to Taraf, a pro-Gulenist

331 “Turkish Court Voids Warrant for Islamic Leader,” New York Times, August 29, 2000, accessed September 6, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2000/08/29/world/turkish-court-voids-warrant-for-islamic-leader.html. 332 Ibid. 333 Douglas Frantz, “Turkey Assails a Revered Islamic Moderate,” New York Times, August 25, 2018, accessed September 6, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2000/08/25/world/turkey-assails-a-revered-islamic-moderate.html. 334 Ibid. 335 Ibid.

newspaper that was often criticized for its fabrication of evidence during the Sledgehammer case that resulted in a purge of the seculars in the Turkish Armed Forces, as a “liberal newspaper.”336

Tavernise’s 2010 article “Army Ebbs, And Power Realigns In Turkey,” mentioned the possibility of Gulen’s involvement in the alleged effort of the government’s campaign to silence the opposition. Tavernise referred to Gulen as a “preacher” and the Gulen movement as an “Islamic network.” Tavernise did not point out the questionable evidence provided by Taraf and the anti- secularism allegations about Gulen and the Gulen movement. Rock Gladstone’s account on

Gulen from 2016 stated that Gulen “is the overseer of a religious movement that runs schools, charities and other enterprises in a number of countries, but that the Turkish government considers a terrorist organization.”337 In 2016, Fethullah Gulen himself referred to his movement as moderate in an article he authored in the New York Times.338

At a time when Western democracies are searching for moderate Muslim voices, I and my friends in the Hizmet movement have taken a clear stance against extremist violence, from the Sept. 11 attacks by Al Qaeda to brutal executions by the Islamic State to the kidnappings by Boko Haram.339

In 2016, an article written by Tim Arango, Ceylan Yeginsu, and Safak Timur explained that “[Gulen] has been embraced in the past by the West for espousing a vision of moderate Islam

336 “Leaders Meet Amid Tensions Over Report Of Turkish Plot,” New York Times, June 17, 2009, accessed September 6, 2018, http://ezproxy.library.und.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest- com.ezproxy.library.und.edu/docview/434110644?accountid=28267.; Dani Rodrik, “Ergenekon and Sledgehammer: Building or Undermining the Rule of Law?,” Turkish Policy Quarterly 10, no: 1 (2011), https://www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi_turkey_tpq_vol10_no1_Dani%20Rodrik.pdf. 337 Rick Gladstone, “Turkish Cleric, Accused in Coup Plot, Calls Crackdown 'Dark Pages' in History,” New York Times, September 15, 2016, accessed September 6, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/16/world/middleeast/turkey-fethullah-Gulen-coup.html. 338 Fethullah Gulen, “I Believe in Democracy for Turkey,” New York Times, July 26, 2016, accessed September 6, 2018, http://ezproxy.library.und.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest- com.ezproxy.library.und.edu/docview/1806556497?accountid=28267 339 Ibid.

and interfaith dialogue.”340 Again in 2016, the New York Times claimed that Gulen “Has promoted a more liberal stream of Islam […]”341

While the vast majority of the articles published in the New York Times did not properly and factually portray Gulen and the Gulen movement there were a couple of articles that stood apart from the majority. An article written by Dan Bilefsky and Sebnem Arsu explained the controversies surrounding the movement in 2012.342 Mustafa Akyol’s account from 2016 pointed out the hierarchical structure of the movement and the cultish characteristics.343

Fethullah Gulen and the Gulen movement mostly garnered the attention of the Wall Street

Journal because of the rivalry between Gulen and Erdogan. The charter school issue was virtually uncovered by the Wall Street Journal which was one of the most covered topics regarding the Gulen movement in the New York Times. The number of articles written on Gulen and the movement before the Gulen vs. Erdogan rivalry was also limited. Regardless of the topics and the quantity of the articles, the evidence demonstrates the positive portrayal of Gulen and the

Gulen movement in the Wall Street Journal. Based on the evidence, it would be fair to argue that the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal employed a similarly positive outlook to Gulen and the Gulen movement.

340 Tim Arango, Ceylan Yeginsu and Safak Timur, “Turks See Purge as Witch Hunt of ‘Medieval’ Darkness,” New York Times, September 17, 2016, accessed September 6, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/17/world/europe/turkey-erdogan-gulen-purge.html 341 “Tumult in Turkey: The Key Players,” New York Times, July 16, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/16/world/europe/tumult-in-turkey-what-we-know-and-what-we-dont- know.html. 342 Dan Bilefsky and Sebnem Arsu, “Turkey Feels Sway of Reclusive Cleric in the U.S.,” New York Times, April 25, 2012, accessed September 6, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/25/world/middleeast/turkey-feels-sway- of-fethullah-Gulen-a-reclusive- cleric.html?mtrref=www.google.com&gwh=5181D8AC5832D9267682A85538CD199F&gwt=pay. 343 Mustafa Akyol, “Who Was Behind the Coup Attempt in Turkey?,” New York Times, Jul 22, 2016, accessed September 6, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/22/opinion/who-was-behind-the-coup-attempt-in- turkey.html.

The first report that focused solely on Fethullah Gulen in the Wall Street Journal dates back to 1998. Hugh Pope’s portrayal of Gulen pointed out that even though the Turkish government was worried about Gulen infiltrating the state he was accepted by the Pope Jean Paul

II, which was “A rare honor for a Turkish Muslim.”344 Pope also stated that Gulen was one of

Turkey’s most respected Muslim leaders.345 Pope’s article implied that Gulen was legitimized since he was accepted by a Christian religious leader.346 Claire Berlinski stated in 2010 that there were conspiracy theories against the Gulen movement while pointing out the Gulenists’ theories were also impossible to prove.347 Berlinski did not provide any evidence for the fears surrounding the Gulen movement, even though what the Gulen movement openly advocating was against many Turkish laws, such as encouraging violence against women.348 In 2010, Joe Lauria also praised Gulen:

Mr. Gulen preaches nonviolence, dialogue between Western and Muslim worlds, and an educational tradition that combines study of science and Islam. His newspaper columns, weekly Internet sermons and other messages have been collected into more than 60 books.349

Lauria’s article did not provide the names of the books, nor it mentioned any of Gulen’s writings that cannot be considered “moderate.” The same year Andrew Mango described Fethullah Gulen

344 Hugh Pope, “Turkish Islamists Face New Crackdown --- Army’s Hard Line Threatens Economic Reforms, EU Entry,” Wall Street Journal, March 30, 1998, accessed September 8, 2018, http://ezproxy.library.und.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest- com.ezproxy.library.und.edu/docview/398756721?accountid=28267. 345 Ibid. 346 Ibid. 347 Claire Berlinski, "A Nation of Conspiracies --- Coup Plots and Growing Extremism; Why the West can't Ignore Turkey's Paranoia," Wall Street Journal, March 13, 2010, accessed September 12, 2018, http://ezproxy.library.und.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest- com.ezproxy.library.und.edu/docview/399104329?accountid=28267. 348 “Turk Medeni Kanunu,” Turkiye Buyuk Millet Meclisi, accessed May 14, 2017, https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/kanunlar/k4721.html. 349 Joe Lauria, “Confrontation at sea: Reclusive imam, influential in turkey, criticizes flotilla aid effort,” Wall Street Journal, accessed September 8, 2018, http://ezproxy.library.und.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest- com.ezproxy.library.und.edu/docview/357062585?accountid=28267.

as a preacher who wanted to “engage with the modern world.”350 Asli Aydintasbas stated that

Nedim Sener, a journalist, got arrested recently because he “Exposed the influence of Fethullah

Gulen -- an Islamic preacher living in the United States -- on Turkish security forces.”351 While

Aydintasbas’ article focused on the allegedly politically motivated arrests of journalists, it did not mention Gulen for the second time in this article.

The power struggle between Erdogan and Gulen attracted some serious interest from the

Wall Street Journal. Emre Peker, in his 2013 article, referred to Gulen as “a reclusive, influential

Muslim cleric,” and explained the movement as “the moderate Islamic movement is estimated to have at least a million followers including AKP lawmakers, prosecutors and police in Turkey.”352

Another article by Peker, published a couple of days after the previous article, stated that

“[Erdogan’s] supporters seem to have fallen out with a faction loyal to a former ally, Fethullah

Gulen, whose millions of followers helped elect Mr. Erdogan three times.”353 A few more articles written around this time by Peker credited Gulen for Erdogan’s success and referred to Gulen as

“Erdogan’s rival” but did not examine the nature of the movement.354 Soner Cagaptay stated that

350 Andrew Mango, “Ottoman Past Shadows Turkish Present --- Ankara's turn against the U.S. on some crucial issues reflects centuries of power plays,” Wall Street Journal, June 26, 2010, accessed September 8, 2018, http://ezproxy.library.und.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest- com.ezproxy.library.und.edu/docview/520743092?accountid=28267. 351 Asli Aydintasbas, “Turkey's press crackdown continues,” Wall Street Journal, accessed September 12, 2018, http://ezproxy.library.und.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest- com.ezproxy.library.und.edu/docview/856389659?accountid=28267. 352 Emre Peker and Joe Parkinson, “World news: Erdogan party under strain,” Wall Street Journal, November 29, 2013, accessed September 12, 2018, http://ezproxy.library.und.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest- com.ezproxy.library.und.edu/docview/1462355780?accountid=28267. 353 Emre Peker, "Turkish Leader Pressed to Quit --- Prime Minister Shuffles Cabinet Amid Graft Probe," Wall Street Journal, December 26, 2013, accessed September 12, 2018, http://ezproxy.library.und.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest com.ezproxy.library.und.edu/docview/1470750328?accountid=28267. 354 Joe Parkinson and Emre Peker, "Raids Highlight Split in Turkey's Ruling Party." Wall Street Journal, December 18, 2013, accessed September 8, 2018, http://ezproxy.library.und.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest- com.ezproxy.library.und.edu/docview/1468832929?accountid=28267; Emre Peker and Joe Parkinson, "Turkey Economy Hit by Infighting," Wall Street Journal, December 21, 2013, accessed September 8, 2018, http://ezproxy.library.und.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest- com.ezproxy.library.und.edu/docview/1469987516?accountid=28267.; Emre Peker, "Turkish Leader Slams

the Gulen movement promoted “conservative yet relatively modern” message in 2013 in an article he co-wrote with Jim Jeffrey.355 In 2014, Joe Parkinson and Ayla Albayrak portrayed

Gulen as a charismatic cleric who “preaches a message of tolerance to his millions of followers from his self-imposed exile.”356 Parkinson and Albayrak also argued that Gulen “gained a broad following for his moderate sermons in the 1960s and '70s.”357 Parkinson and Albayrak ignored the fact that Gulen was tried for his remarks during sermons and his sermons were not considered moderate by the secular Turkish law.358 Another Parkinson article referred to Gulen simply as a

“Turkish imam,” along with Emre Peker’s more recent article co-authored with Ayla Albayrak from 2014, where Gulen was referred as a “U.S.-based cleric,” did not mention any of the controversies surrounding the movement or Gulen.359 Some other articles where the authors

Probe as Western Plot --- Thousands Protest Government as Prime Minister Blames International 'Interest-Rate Lobby' for a Corruption Investigation," Wall Street Journal, December 23, 2013, accessed, September 8, 2018, http://ezproxy.library.und.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest- com.ezproxy.library.und.edu/docview/1470365271?accountid=28267.; Emre Peker, "Prosecutor Removed from Turkey Graft Case --- Chief Dismisses Subordinate Who Complained Investigation was being Blocked, Pressure Mounts on Prime Minister," Wall Street Journal, December 27, 2013, accessed September, 8, 2018, http://ezproxy.library.und.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest- com.ezproxy.library.und.edu/docview/1470864612?accountid=28267.; Emre Peker, " Erdogan's Grip on Turkey is Tested --- Graft Probe, Approaching Election Expose Rifts in Fractious Coalition, Reviving Memories of Country's Turbulent Past," Wall Street Journal, December 28, 2013, accessed September 8, 2018, http://ezproxy.library.und.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest- com.ezproxy.library.und.edu/docview/1471021254?accountid=28267.; Emre Peker, “Turkey asks to arrest Erdogan rival in U.S,”. Wall Street Journal, December 20, 2014, accessed September 8, 2018, http://ezproxy.library.und.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest- com.ezproxy.library.und.edu/docview/1639330152?accountid=28267. 355 Soner Cagaptay and Jim Jeffrey, “The Islamist Feud Behind Turkey’s Turmoil,” Wall Street Journal, December 30, 2013, accessed September 6, 2018, http://ezproxy.library.und.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest- com.ezproxy.library.und.edu/docview/1471329342?accountid=28267. 356 Joe Parkinson and Ayla Albayrak, “Rare Comments: From His Refuge in the Poconos, A Reclusive Imam Roils Turkey,” Wall Street Journal, January 21, 2014, accessed September 6, 2018, http://ezproxy.library.und.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest- com.ezproxy.library.und.edu/docview/1490633872?accountid=28267. 357 Ibid. 358 Erdoḡan, Fethullah Gulen Hocaefendi: küçük dünyam, 92-93. 359 Joe Parkinson, “Turkey to Ask U.S. for Cleric's Extradition," Wall Street Journal, April 30, 2014, accessed September 12, 2018, http://ezproxy.library.und.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest- com.ezproxy.library.und.edu/docview/1519810018?accountid=28267.; Emre Peker and Ayla Albayrak, "Turkey Detains 27 Tied to President's Rival --- Crackdown on Supporters of U.S.-Based Cleric Gulen is seen as Bid to Tighten Grip on Power Ahead of Elections in June," Wall Street Journal, December 15, 2014, accessed September 12, 2018, http://ezproxy.library.und.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest- com.ezproxy.library.und.edu/docview/1636094726?accountid=28267. 82

referred to Gulen as “cleric,” “imam,” “preacher,” or simply as “former ally of Erdogan” and did not examine the nature of the movement and Gulen’s ideology are the following: “Struggle in

Turkey Tarnishes Lender,” “Soccer Club Chief Sees Plot Behind His Conviction,” “World News:

Turf Fight Escalates Amid Turkish Cases,” “World News: Social-Network Sites Under Fire in

Turkey,” “World News: Turkish Court Tries Alleged Coup Plotters --- Move Against President's

Opponents Puts Dozens of Soccer Fans on Trial,” “World News: Turkish Scandal Ripples in

U.S.,” “Net Loss: Turkey Builds New Model For Web Censorship,” “Global Finance: Turkey

Takes Over Bank, As Political Fight Heats Up,” “World News: Turkish Court Acquits Officers in

Coup Plot --- Reversal of convictions seen to help president's effort to fix damaged ties with armed forces,” “World News: Government Seizes Bank Caught Up In Politics,” “World News:

Two TV Stations Seized in Istanbul,” “A Christian Pastor in Turkey's Prisons,” “World News:

Turkey Sentences Officers for Coup,” “World News: U.N. Orders Turkey To Release Judge,”

“World News: NBA Star Dodges a Turkish Crackdown --- 'It's Crazy,' Thunder's Kanter says of effort to round up foes of President Erdogan,” and “Erdogan's American Enemies List” where the author Sohrab Ahmari pointed out that Bernard Lewis was accurately predicted the future of

Turkey as a country that accepted a “Some form of Islamist rule.”360

360 Emre Peker and Yeliz Candemir, Struggle in Turkey Tarnishes Lender." Wall Street Journal, November 19, 2014, accessed September 12, 2018, http://ezproxy.library.und.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest- com.ezproxy.library.und.edu/docview/1625806359?accountid=28267.; Emre Peker, "Soccer Club Chief Sees Plot Behind His Conviction," Wall Street Journal, January 21, 2014, accessed September 12, 2018, http://ezproxy.library.und.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest- com.ezproxy.library.und.edu/docview/1490635417?accountid=28267.; Emre Peker and Joe Parkinson, "Turf Fight Escalates Amid Turkish Cases," Wall Street Journal, January 9, 2014, accessed September 12, 2018, http://ezproxy.library.und.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest- com.ezproxy.library.und.edu/docview/1475371846?accountid=28267.; Joe Parkinson, "Social-Network Sites Under Fire in Turkey," Wall Street Journal, March 8, 2014, accessed September 12, 2018, http://ezproxy.library.und.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest- com.ezproxy.library.und.edu/docview/1504891194?accountid=28267.; Joe Parkinson and Emre Peker, "Turkish Court Tries Alleged Coup Plotters --- Move Against President's Opponents Puts Dozens of Soccer Fans on Trial," Wall Street Journal, December 17, 2014, accessed September 12, 2018, http://ezproxy.library.und.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest-

The Wall Street Journal also provided a medium for Gulen to publish his own article in

2015. “Muslims Must Combat the Extremist Cancer” written by Gulen, was published on

September 4th, right before the anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, argued that every Muslim should promote human rights:

[…] Muslims must publicly promote human rights -- dignity, life and liberty. These are the most basic of Islamic values and no individual, nor any political or religious leader, has the authority to snatch them away. Living the essence of our faith means respecting diversity -- cultural, social, religious and political. God identifies learning from one

com.ezproxy.library.und.edu/docview/1636584905?accountid=28267.; Lisa Fleisher and Joe Parkinson, "Turkish Scandal Ripples in U.S," Wall Street Journal, March 1, 2014, accessed September 12, 2018, http://ezproxy.library.und.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest- com.ezproxy.library.und.edu/docview/1503222377?accountid=28267.; Joe Parkinson, Sam Schechner, and Emre Peker, "Turkey Builds New Model for Web Censorship," Wall Street Journal, May 2, 2014, accessed September 12, 2018, http://ezproxy.library.und.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest- com.ezproxy.library.und.edu/docview/1520281248?accountid=28267.; Emre Peker, "Turkey Takes Over Bank, as Political Fight Heats Up," Wall Street Journal, February 5, 2015, accessed September 12, 2018, http://ezproxy.library.und.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest- com.ezproxy.library.und.edu/docview/1651287928?accountid=28267.; Emre Peker, "Turkish Court Acquits Officers in Coup Plot --- Reversal of Convictions seen to Help President's Effort to Fix Damaged Ties with Armed Forces," Wall Street Journal, April 1, 2015, accessed September 12, 2018, http://ezproxy.library.und.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest- com.ezproxy.library.und.edu/docview/1667874893?accountid=28267.; Emre Peker, "Government Seizes Bank Caught Up in Politics," Wall Street Journal, June 1, 2014, accessed September 12, 2018, http://ezproxy.library.und.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest- com.ezproxy.library.und.edu/docview/1684364440?accountid=28267.; Emre Peker, "Two TV Stations Seized in Istanbul," Wall Street Journal, October 29, 2015, accessed September 12, 2018, http://ezproxy.library.und.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest- com.ezproxy.library.und.edu/docview/1727830517?accountid=28267.; Sohrab Ahmari, "A Christian Pastor in Turkey's Prisons," Wall Street Journal, January 3, 2017, accessed September 12, 2018, http://ezproxy.library.und.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest- com.ezproxy.library.und.edu/docview/1854727472?accountid=28267.; Emre Peker, "Turkey Sentences Officers for Coup," Wall Street Journal, January 6, 2017, accessed September 12, 2018, http://ezproxy.library.und.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest- com.ezproxy.library.und.edu/docview/1855676252?accountid=28267.; Margaret Coker, “U.N. Orders Turkey to Release Judge," Wall Street Journal, February 1, 2017, accessed September 12, 2018, http://ezproxy.library.und.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest- com.ezproxy.library.und.edu/docview/1863133883?accountid=28267.; Margaret Coker, "NBA Star Dodges a Turkish Crackdown --- 'it's Crazy,' Thunder's Kanter Says of Effort to Round Up Foes of President Erdogan," Wall Street Journal, June 1, 2017, accessed September 12, 2018, http://ezproxy.library.und.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest- com.ezproxy.library.und.edu/docview/1904048475?accountid=28267.; Sohrab Ahmari, "Erdogan's American Enemies List," Wall Street Journal, April 24, 2017, accessed September 12, 2018, http://ezproxy.library.und.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest- com.ezproxy.library.und.edu/docview/1890962792?accountid=28267.

another as the primary goal of diversity (Quran 49:13). Respecting each human being as a creation of God (17:70) is respecting God.361

Gulen argued that Muslim societies must provide modern education to their members and that was what the “Hizmet” movement had been doing with more than a thousand schools around the world. He also emphasized the importance of women’s equality in society and pointed out that

Muhammad’s wife Aisha was a well-educated teacher and a community leader.362 Regardless of what Gulen argued on the pages of the Wall Street Journal, the evidence demonstrates that this was a false self-representation. The next chapter will examine and demonstrate why Gulen’s claims regarding human rights, respecting diversity, and respecting every human along with women’s equality and modern education would be discredited by his own writings.

The rivalry between Erdogan and Gulen got escalated after the failed coup attempt in

2016 where Erdogan blamed Gulen for masterminding the coup. The charter school controversy regarding the movement also garnered interest from the Wall Street Journal for the first time in

2016. While the earliest article published in 2014 which recognized Gulen’s ties with the U.S. charter schools, it was not until 2016 the controversies were recognized.363 Dan Frosch’s article,

“U.S. News: Turkey Ties Dissident to U.S. Schools,” was the first article in the Wall Street

Journal that pointed out the Gulen movement owned charter schools and focused on the complaint filed by the lawyers of the Turkish government against the schools. This article reported the claims of the Turkish government rather than examining the actual controversies

361 Fethullah Gulen, “Muslims Must Combat the Extremist Cancer,” Wall Street Journal, August 28, 2015, accessed September 8, 2018, http://ezproxy.library.und.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest- com.ezproxy.library.und.edu/docview/1707745860?accountid=28267. 362 Ibid. 363 Joe Parkinson and Ayla Albayrak, “Rare Comments: From His Refuge in the Poconos, A Reclusive Imam Roils Turkey,” Wall Street Journal, January 21, 2014, accessed September 8, 2018, http://ezproxy.library.und.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest- com.ezproxy.library.und.edu/docview/1490633872?accountid=28267

surrounding the schools like the New York Times.364 Beckie Strum’s article was also similar to

Frosch’s article and only dealt with the allegations of the Turkish government.365 Douglas Belkin and Tawnell D. Hobbs’ article “World News: Texas Probes Gulen Tie to Schools” also only reported the allegations of the Turkish government.366 Saeed Shah explained the Gulen movement’s schools in Pakistan by stating that “Its 26 fee-based schools educate some 10,000 children and have a reputation for quality education and moderate religious views.”367 In August

2016, Barrett Devlin and Adam Entous became the first Wall Street Journal authors who pointed out the “Long-running Federal Bureau of Investigation probe into whether financial crimes were committed at U.S. schools linked to Mr. Gulen.”368 Thomas Grove argued that Gulen’s ideology aligned with moderate Islam in 2016 by stating that “[Gulen] started a series of schools aimed at giving poorer Turkish students a quality education at an affordable price, albeit laden with his version of moderate Islam.”369 Douglas Belkin, Jeanne Ianthe Dugan, and Beckie Strum portrayed Gulen as a moderate in their 2016 article. “Mr. Gulen, who preaches a moderate brand of Islam,” claimed the authors “is known for his powerful sermons on peace, tolerance and

364 Dan Frosch, "U.S. News: Turkey Ties Dissident to U.S. Schools," Wall Street Journal, May 25, 2016, accessed September 12, 2018, http://ezproxy.library.und.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest- com.ezproxy.library.und.edu/docview/1790877468?accountid=28267. 365 Beckie Strum, "Ties seen to U.S. Schools," Wall Street Journal, July 20, 2016, accessed September 12, 2018, http://ezproxy.library.und.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest- com.ezproxy.library.und.edu/docview/1805441847?accountid=28267. 366 Douglas Belkin and Tawnell D. Hobbs, "Texas Probes Gulen Tie to Schools," Wall Street Journal, July 30, 2016, accessed September 12, 2018, http://ezproxy.library.und.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest- com.ezproxy.library.und.edu/docview/1808023116?accountid=28267. 367 Saeed Shah, "Pressure on Cleric Mounts," Wall Street Journal, August 2, 2016, accessed September 12, 2018, http://ezproxy.library.und.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest- com.ezproxy.library.und.edu/docview/1807981564?accountid=28267. 368 Barrett Devlin and Adam Entous, “U.S. Not Persuaded on Imam Extradition," Wall Street Journal, August 5, 2016, accessed September 12, 2018, http://ezproxy.library.und.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest- com.ezproxy.library.und.edu/docview/1809029407?accountid=28267. 369 Thomas Grove, "Turkish Dragnet Snares Educators --- Suspensions, Firings of People Linked to Imam After Failed Coup show Sector is seen as Threat," Wall Street Journal, July 22, 2016, accessed September 12, 2018, http://ezproxy.library.und.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest- com.ezproxy.library.und.edu/docview/1806007954?accountid=28267.

harmony, spread via books and video.”370 Another article by the same authors, also published in

2016, explained Gulen’s success by stating that “Mr. Gulen rose to prominence in Turkey in the

1980s with his moderate Islamic teachings combining religion, democracy and science.”371 The same year, Margaret Cooker referred to Gulen as a “moderate religious leader” in her article

“World News: Turkey Premier Urges U.S. Help.”372

Similar to the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal only published a handful of articles that could be considered critical of Fethullah Gulen or the Gulen movement until 2016.

For example, a Turkish scholar, Soner Cagaptay’s article in 2010 entitled “Turkey’s Republic of

Fear” referred to the Gulen movement as “ultra-conservative Fethullah Gulen Movement.”373 Jay

Solomon also approached the movement with some suspicion in his 2016 article where he stated that “Mr. Gulen, in the past, hasn't made secret his hope that his supporters, who promote Turkish nationalism and Islamic values, would gradually dominate the ranks of the country's bureaucracy.”374

The articles above demonstrate the positive portrayal of the Gulen movement and

Fethullah Gulen by the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal. While the New York Times was outspoken about the alleged corruption in Gulen affiliated schools, the Wall Street Journal

370 Douglas Belkin, Ianthe Jeanne Dugan and Beckie Strum, "Erdogan Targets His Foe in U.S.," Wall Street Journal, July 23, 2016, accessed September 12, 2018, http://ezproxy.library.und.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest- com.ezproxy.library.und.edu/docview/1806204182?accountid=28267. 371 Ianthe Jeanne Dugan and Douglas Belkin, “Erdogan War on Cleric Hits U.S. Classrooms --- Turkey Hired Lawyers to Challenge Schools It Says Are Tied to Fethullah Gulen,” Wall Street Journal, September 23, 2016, http://ezproxy.library.und.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest- com.ezproxy.library.und.edu/docview/1822328110?accountid=28267. 372 Coker, “World News: NBA Star Dodges a Turkish Crackdown --- ‘It’s Crazy,’ Thunder’s Kanter Says of Effort to Round up Foes of President Erdogan.” 373 Soner Cagaptay, "Turkey's Republic of Fear," Wall Street Journal, Mar 05, 2010, accessed September 6, 2018. http://ezproxy.library.und.edu/login?url=https://search- proquestcom.ezproxy.library.und.edu/docview/399096516?accountid=28267 374 Jay Solomon, "U.S. Holds Split View of Erdogan Rival --- Washington Assesses Cleric Fethullah Gulen, Whom Turkey has Blamed for Coup," Wall Street Journal, July 19, 2016, accessed September 12, 2018, http://ezproxy.library.und.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest- com.ezproxy.library.und.edu/docview/1805203729?accountid=28267. 87

chose to mostly ignore to report on the charter schools issue. The articles that did not criticize

Gulen or the Gulen movement referred to Gulen mostly as an “imam,” “preacher,” or a “cleric,” without pointing out the controversies surround Gulen and his movement in their home country.

These articles also dismissed the Turkish concerns as if they were coming from some radical faction and referred to the critics of Gulen as “seculars,” “secular hard-liners,” or indicated their support of military while pointing out the military enacted coups in order to protect the secular identity of the country. The handful of critical articles also did not point out the problems with

Gulen’s ideology, never pointed out his support of violence against women, his hostility towards the LGBTQ+ communities, his disregard of modern science, and his lack of tolerance towards atheists. The reluctance of journalists to point out these characteristics of Gulen’s ideology could be explained by many reasons but I argue that there are two main reasons behind this false- portrayal: 1) the absolute favoritism of Gulen and the Gulen movement by the American academia and 2) the still persistent Orientalism in the New York Times and in the Wall Street

Journal. Since Orientalism sees the Orient as hesitant to change, monolithic, and perceives it and its peoples as backward and uncivilized, arguing for Gulen and the Gulen movement’s progressiveness indicate the overgeneralized backwardness of the Muslims in the Western eyes.

When extremely conservative schools of Islam, such as Wahhabism, considered the ideology of

Gulen can be easily seen as moderate or even progressive. After all, Gulen advocates a relative betterment of women’s status and absolute lack of violence to non-Muslims.375 In Wahhabism, on the other hand, the use of violence for jihad is sometimes justified and the exclusion of

375 For example, Gulen argued that “that the veiling of women was a detail in Islam, and that ‘no one should suppress the progress of women through the clothes they wear."375 Gulen also stated that he supported modern education, and advocated that any problem may be solved with tolerance and dialogue. Although most of these claims were contradicted by his own writings.; Aras and Caha, “Fethullah Gulen and His Liberal ‘Turkish Islam’ Movement.”

women from social and economic activity is widespread.376 When compared to Wahhabism, the

Gulen movement is progressive and moderate, however, arguing that the Gulen movement is progressive and moderate without comparing it to a stricter ideology reveals the assumption of monolithic Islam. Modern Turkey, founded in 1923 by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, allowed women to go to schools along with male pupils in 1924, banned polygyny and allowed divorce for women with the new Turkish Civil Law in 1926. Finally, in 1934 the Turkish women gained full suffrage.377 The first modern Turkish constitution from 1924 stated that every Turk was equal in front of the law and stated that it was mandatory for both genders to have the primary education.378 The new constitution of 1961 expanded the equality claim and stated that every citizen of Turkey was equal in front of the law regardless of their race, gender, and religion.379

The same constitution also declared women and children as the ones to be protected by the state.380 In 1998, domestic violence was officially outlawed by the Turkish state.381 In short, it is evident that while Gulen’s ideology could be considered moderate for another Muslim majority country, it cannot be considered moderate or progressive in the case of Turkey, Gulen’s home country. Since Gulen advocated domestic violence and violence against women, it would be fair to say that his teachings are regressive for the Muslim majority Republic of Turkey. Therefore, I argue that portraying Gulen as a moderate and progressive cleric and the Gulen movement as a moderate and progressive movement are Orientalist because it clearly indicates the monolithic

376 Christopher M. Blanchard, “The Islamic Traditions of Wahhabism and Salafiyya,” CRS Report for Congress, last modified January 17, 2007, accessed September 12, 2018, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a463789.pdf.; Hamid Algar, Wahhabism: A Critical Essay (Oneonta, NY: Islamic Publications International, 2002). 377 Belkis Konan, “Turk Kadininin Siyasi Haklari Kazanma Sureci / The Process Where Turkish Women Earned Political Rights,” AUHFD 60 no:1 (2011): 167, 168, accessed September 12, 2018, http://dergiler.ankara.edu.tr/dergiler/38/1584/17173.pdf. 378 Ali Kuyaksil, “Türk Anayasalarında Kadın Hakları ve Gelişimi,” Mustafa Kemal Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi 6, no: 11 (2009): 343, http://dergipark.gov.tr/download/article-file/183154. 379 Ibid, 345. 380 Ibid. 381 “Ailenin Korunmasına Dair Kanun,” T.C. Resmi Gazete, Sayi: 23233, accessed September 12, 2018, http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/arsiv/23233.pdf. 89

perception of Islam, overgeneralizing of Muslims into a single stereotype where women are disfranchised and often victimized by patriarchy, and also the perception of Muslim’s reluctance to change since many Muslims and Muslim societies have already progressed beyond Gulen’s ideology. The next chapter will explain the American academia’s approach and portrayal of

Gulen and the Gulen movement and demonstrate why both the New York Times and the Wall

Street Journal journalists were wrong to portray Gulen and the Gulen movement as moderate and progressive along with American academics.

CHAPTER II: MISREPRESENTATION OF FETHULLAH GULEN AND THE GULEN

MOVEMENT BY THE ACADEMIA

This chapter negates the US scholars’ and journalists’ portrayal of Fethullah Gulen and the Gulen movement and argues that the Gulen movement is essentially highly political, where

Gulen ties religion to national identity and civilization, aims to impose a sexist ideology that conforms traditional gender roles and imprisons women to domestic sphere in addition to imposing outdated and factually wrong scientific knowledge to the public to further strengthen the religious identity. Gulen’s objective was defined as Turkifying Islam, and Islamizing the

Turkish national identity; re-establishing the Ottoman idea of linking religion and state together where the rulers follow Islamic rules in their private lives to strengthen the state and protect the society.382

The Gulen movement has attracted almost only positive reactions both by the news media and by American academics. Neither Fethullah Gulen, the Gulen movement, or a person who identifies as a Gulenist were criticized for supporting actions or ideas that directly contradict the clauses of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Except for Soner Cagaptay’s article that was published in the New York Times in 2010, neither the New York Times or the Wall Street

Journal mentioned Gulen’s ideology that would inevitably cause human rights abuses in the countries or societies where it is employed. The most obvious reason behind this lack of criticism is the academics’ absolute favoritism of the Gulen movement even though there is contradictory evidence, easily available, to debunk their arguments. Journalists, who often consult academics’ ideas to comprehend foreign entities, such as the Gulen movement, end up being reluctant to point out or be completely unaware of the problems associated with these entities. A journalist

382 Aras and Caha, “Fethullah Gulen and His Liberal ‘Turkish Islam’ Movement,” 32.

would be completely comfortable calling Gulen “a moderate cleric” or portray him as someone who supports gender equality because, except for few exceptions, that was exactly what the academic works were saying about Gulen. Journalists’ hesitancy to challenge the established academic consensus is understandable since journalists do not always possess the same comprehension of the field or the region as the expert academics.

Fethullah Gulen and the Gulen movement portrayed themselves as religious in private life but a politically secular movement that can exist within the democratic and secular state of

Turkey. Their portrayal included being an apolitical entity that promotes gender equality, modern scientific knowledge that can co-exist with Islam, and inter-religious dialogue. Their approach to women’s rights, emphasis on modern education, where they teach Islam and science are supplementary to each other, and their work towards interreligious dialogue and promotion of toleration attracted much attention in the Western academic world.

One of the earliest scholarly works regarding the Gulen movement was a series of works published under the name Turkish Islam and the Secular State: The Gulen Movement in

2003, edited by Hakan M. Yavuz, a political scientist at the University of Utah, and John L.

Esposito. Yavuz is a prominent scholar, who produced a considerable amount of work on the movement, recently started to criticize the movement and its political and anti-secular nature according to his interview with the daily newspaper Hurriyet.383 In Turkish Islam and the Secular

State: The Gulen Movement secularism in Turkey was defined as “an intellectual and political project in Turkey has a long history of differentiating marginalizing and excluding large sectors

383 Cinar Oskay, "Prof Dr. Hakan Yavuz: 'Cemaatçiler savaşı kaybetmiş Naziler gibi! Hoca’ya karşı isyan var,'" Hurriyet, Istanbul, Turkey, August 21, 2016, accessed April 6, 2017, http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/prof-dr-hakan- yavuz-cemaatciler-savasi-kaybetmis-naziler-gibi-hocaya-karsi-isyan-var-40203038.

of Turkish society.”384 The authors accused the Young Turks and Mustafa Kemal Ataturk for depending on science and technology for economic development and trying to shape the society based on positivist philosophy.385 The book consisted of twelve works that dealt directly with

Gulen and his ideology and the overall theme was the progressive nature of the movement.

Despite the contradictory evidence given by authors regarding gender inequality and political nature of the movement Turkish Islam and the Secular State: The Gulen Movement portrayed the

Gulen movement as a reformed future for Islam.

The perception of the Gulen movement mostly positive in the US –aside from the alleged corrupt visa practices– despite some critical views of the movement in Turkey and around

Europe. Martin Riexinger, from the Aarhus University in Denmark, criticized the movement for replacing the Kemalist “suppression” of the religious life in modern Turkey with American fundamentalism.386 The director of the Turkish Media Project at the Middle East Media

Research Institute, Rachel Sharon-Krespin, was highly critical of the movement’s self-portrayal as a progressive and apolitical movement and pointed out the political objectives employed by the Gulen movement.387 Sharon-Krespin stated that “It appears Gulen is not fighting for more individual freedoms but to free Islam from the confines of the mosque and the private domain of individuals and to bring it to the public arena, to govern every aspect of life in the country.”388

Criticism originated in Turkey targeted the movement’s claimed that the movement did not support gender equality and women’s rights.389

384 Yavuz and Esposito, Turkish Islam and the Secular State: The Gulen Movement, xiv. 385 Ibid, xxi. 386 Hans Henrik Hjermitslev, Stefaan Blancke, Ronald L. Numbers, and Peter Kjærgaard, “Turkey” in Creationism in Europe (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014), 180 -98. 387 Rachel Sharon-Krespin, “Fethullah Gulen’s Grand Ambition,” Middle East Quarterly, January 1, 2009, accessed September 6, 2018, http://www.meforum.org/2045/fethullah-Gulens-grand-ambition. 388 Ibid. 389 Tore Fougner, “Fethullah Gulen’s Understanding of Women’s Rights in Islam: A Critical Reappraisal.”

Wilson Center scholar Bulent Aras praised the Movement’s approach to women’s rights and gender equality. Aras classified Gulen’s views of women as progressive because Gulen’s arguments decreased the importance of the veil.390 According to Gulen women can hold high positions when they work outside of their homes and no one should be judged based on how they dressed.391 Dr. Sophia Pandya, who holds a Ph.D. in Religious Studies, recognized that the movement's events in the U.S. becoming less gender segregated and that there was some progression; male followers who live in the U.S. became more accustomed to the American culture and as a result, started to help their wives at home.392 Pandya stated that accusing the movement of patriarchy would eliminate the role taken by women in the movement.393

Bernadette Andrea was another scholar who praised Fethullah Gulen’s views of women and stated that he was a “champion of women’s rights.”394 Aras, Pandya, and Andrea all seem to agree that Gulen was a feminist based on his argument of the non-essential nature of the veil/headscarf and his views on working women, who, according to Gulen, can hold high positions.

Hakan M. Yavuz also agreed that Fethullah Gulen himself was progressive regarding gender roles and women’s rights, based on his views on the veil and working women, but his views were facing resistance within the movement since the members held more conservative views.395 Mark Webb agreed with Yavuz regarding the resistance and argued that even though

390 Bulent Aras, “Turkish Islam’s Moderate Face,” Middle East Quarterly, September 1, 1998, Accessed September 6, 2018, http://www.meforum.org/404/turkish-islams-moderate-face. 391 Ibid. 392 Sophia Pandya and Nancy Elizabeth Gallagher, The Gulen Hizmet Movement and Its Transnational Activities: Case Studies of Altruistic Activism in Contemporary Islam (Florida: Brown Walker Press, 2012), 11. 393 Ibid, 10. 394 Robert A. Hunt and Yuksel A. Aslandogan, Muslim Citizens of the Globalized World: Contributions of the Gulen Movement (New Jersey: Tughra Books, 2007), 172. 395 Yavuz and Esposito, Turkish Islam and the Secular State, 29.

Gulen never voiced any opinions for gender segregation, the Gulen schools segregate students and teachers [both Muslim and non-Muslim] based on gender.396 Maria Curtis attributed this

“slow progression” towards gender equality to the fact that many Gulenists came from traditional

Turkish families.397

Fethullah Gulen and the Movement’s views on LGBTQ+ rights had not attracted much attention by the scholars, mainly due to the fact that neither Gulen nor the movement had been outspoken about this issue. However, Webb stated that it was impossible for a committed member to be openly gay, and claimed that the lack of voiced opinion by Gulen on the LGBTQ+ rights was a vulnerability for the movement.398 While most of the movement’s supporters in the

West were theologically and socially liberal, Turkish Gulenists tended to be conservatives. He argued that this rift along with women’s rights issues may hurt the interreligious dialogue the movement was trying to achieve.399

The Gulen movement had also been praised by scholars for promoting Turkish language and culture, promoting a message of peace and tolerance, and providing teachers who were positive role models to pupils while offering high-quality STEM-oriented education. Fuller explained the movement’s emphasis on peace and tolerance with their rationalism: “[The Gulen movement] is rationalist in its views and places great emphasis on tolerance toward all other religious (and even non-religious) views within a pluralist society that express the multi-faceted panoply of God’s creation.”400

396 Christopher L. Miller, The Gulen Hizmet Movement: Circumspect Activism in Faith-Based Reform (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013), 18. 397 Ibid. 398 Ibid, 162. 399 Ibid. 400 Graham E. Fuller, The Future of Political Islam. (New York: Palgrave, 2003), 129.

Elisabeth Ozdalga stated that Gulen schools did not teach Islam but “They introduce ethics through the exemplary conduct of their teachers.” According to Ozdalga, helping students to “internalize qualities of self-discipline, self-sacrifice, and tolerance” are among the duties of the teachers.401 Hakan M. Yavuz investigated Gulen’s use of educational networks to spread

Islamic values. He stated that Gulen “Schools seek to consolidate conservative Islamic and

Turkish values.” The footnote explained this sentence further, “Women can be either teachers or secretaries in these schools, and there are no women teachers in boys’ schools. Moreover, students are taught to respect authority.”402 Yavuz stated that the movement emphasizes the idea that modern science was compatible with Islam and that being a good citizen is related to being pious.403

Graham E. Fuller, who was a political analyst specializing in Islamic extremism who served as the former chairman of the National Intelligence Council in the Central Intelligence

Agency, stated that the Gulen movement believed that science and Islam could co-exist, and that modern education and knowledge serve “to reveal God's presence and grand purpose in the universe the movement strives to create a higher level of moral consciousness in society thus leading over time to more enlightened governance.”404 The Movement’s strong emphasis on offering “good quality secular education” was explained by the movement’s perception of education which was seen as a way to get closer to God, by Fuller.405 Unlike Yavuz, Fuller did not recognize the issues with gender segregation in Gulen schools and considered them as secular institutions. Fuller, similarly to Yavuz, portrayed the movement as an apolitical and progressive

401 Hakan and Esposito, Turkish Islam and the Secular State, xxx. 402 Ibid, 40. 403 Ibid, 8. 404 Hakan and Esposito, Turkish Islam and the Secular State, 8. 405 Fuller, The Future of Political Islam, 128.

movement that emphasized education in his book The Future of Political Islam published in

2003.406 Fuller also mentioned the movement’s tolerant attitude toward other religions and to the non-religious.407 Fuller’s view was also shared by Bulent Aras. Aras argued that the movement was against Political Islam and had no political interests.408 Sociologist Helen Rose Fuchs

Ebaugh agreed with Fuller on the Gulen movement’s moderate nature and its dedication to interfaith dialogue and educating the youth.409

The scholars explained the criticism of Gulen and the Movement in Turkey with the authoritarian nature of the secular Turkish regime. In Turkish Islam and the Secular State the authoritarian regime was criticized by Esposito: “[…] as the Mustafa Kemal saying went

‘Science is the truest guide in life.’ So, the Kemalist laicism is not about the separation of politics and religion, but rather about restructuring society in accordance with positivist philosophy. In practice, this restructuring means preventing religious influence in the spheres of education, economics, family, dress code, and politics.”410

The perception of the movement as a progressive future for Islam was explained by

Bulent Aras in “Turkish Islam’s Moderate Face:”

[Gulen] looks at the Islamic regulations bearing directly on government (such as taxation and warfare) in light of contemporary realities. This leads him to the conclusion […] that the democratic form of government is the best choice […] [Gulen says that] "no one can suppress the progress of women through the clothes they have to wear." Furthermore, he says, "women can become administrators," contradicting the views of most Islamic intellectuals. Gulen emphasizes worldly education and favors integration with the modern world. Gulen wishes to merge Islam into the international political system and the economy; he supports Turkey's bid for membership to the European Union […].411

406 Ibid. 407 Ibid. 408 Aras, “Turkish Islam’s Moderate Face.” 409 Helen Rose Fuchs Ebaugh, The Gulen Movement: A Sociological Analysis of a Civic Movement Rooted in Moderate Islam, (Dordrecht; London: Springer, 2010.) 410 Yavuz and Esposito, Turkish Islam and the Secular State, xxi. 411 Aras, “Turkish Islam’s Moderate Face.”

As it could be understood from the quotation above, Gulen was praised for his non-extremist interpretation (ijtihad) of Islam, where he offered relative freedom to women and a space for functioning market economy along with a democratic state that aligned with Islamic ideals while advocating for non-violence and tolerance.412 Gulen emphasized that religion was a matter of private life and should not be politicized. Graham E. Fuller interpreted the progressiveness of the movement as:

[The Gulen] movement […] dedicates the bulk of the movement’s energies to an educational effort, including the founding of schools and study circles to propagate a modernist approach to Islam based on broad moral teachings that are nearly universalist in character. The focus on study reflects the movement’s belief that education and knowledge in all fields, including science and technology, can never contradict religion but only serve to reveal God’s presence and grand purpose in the universe. […] [Gulenists] describe even the law of gravity, for example, as one of the elements of Shari’a. […]The movement does not engage in political activity, has no party, and believes that any legal government must be accorded respect.413

International Affairs and Islamic Studies scholar John L. Esposito is a known supporter of the movement along with Fuller. John L. Esposito specifically stated that the Gulen movement was a progressive movement.414 Esposito’s positive perception of the movement could be explained by the relatively moderate nature of the ideology promoted by the Gulen movement.

Esposito stated that “Gulen emphasizes the centrality of freedom of thought and expression [and] is open to other cultures.415 […] Gulen supports the full separation of religion and the state and that he opposes religious parties.”416 Esposito also claimed that it was established that Gulen affiliated schools and universities taught modern sciences along with “a reformist understanding

412 “The Gulen Movement: Gender and Practice,” Rumi Forum, accessed May 14, 2017, https://rumiforum.org/the- guelen-movement-gender-and-practice/.; Gulen, “Fethullah Gulen: Turkey’s Eroding Democracy.” 413 Fuller, Graham E. The Future of Political Islam, 128. 414 Esposito, John L. “Prof. John L. Esposito’s Keynote at the Gulen Movement Conference, Chicago,” Filmed [November 2010]. YouTube video, 26:51. Posted [Oct 2, 2013]. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4qvb0PixVH0. 415 Ibid. 416 Ibid.

of religion.”417 Esposito concluded his speech with a statement where he recognized Gulen as a reformist.418

Hakan M. Yavuz, who held similar beliefs to Esposito about the movement, claimed that the Turkish secularism should be considered top-down modernization project and explained the bottom up-modernity as the following:

With those two different conceptions of modernity, you have also two different conceptions of secularism in Turkey. One is the top-down modernization-project conception of secularism: it is very much a laïcisme in the French sense. This approach means that there is no room at all for religion in the public sphere, resulting in the cleansing of religion from the public domain. Science becomes the guide, while religion is something negative: something to get rid of. The second form of modernity – i.e. bottom-up modernity – allows room for religion in the public sphere. Its conception of secularism is in line with the Anglo-Saxon notion of this concept. Religion is seen as a source of morality and ethics. It also does not see religion and politics as being necessarily in conflict. However, it does not want religion to become a tool of politics, because if something then goes wrong in politics, people will blame religion.419

Yavuz argued that Fethullah Gulen and the Gulen movement supported the latter, the bottom-up modernity. Supporters of Gulen agreed that Gulen favored a form of Islam that could easily function with a free market economy and a democratic state.

Academics in the U.S. portrayed the Gulen movement as an apolitical movement that was secular in nature. Academics pointed out that Fethullah Gulen was a religious leader and the movement was based on Islamic principles but they had no interest in influencing the political sphere or reverse the secular achievements of the Turkish Republic. Their ideology allowed them to co-exist with a secular government while staying away from politics. For instance, Graham E.

Fuller penned a recent article that was published in the Huffington Post after the latest coup-

417 Ibid. 418 Ibid. 419 “The Gulen Movement: A Modern Expression of Turkish Islam,” Religioscope, July 21, 2004, accessed September 7, 2018, http://english.religion.info/2004/07/21/the-Gulen-movement-a-modern-expression-of-turkish- islam-interview-with-hakan-yavuz/. 99

attempt in Turkey during the summer of 2016. Fuller explained the difference between Erdogan and Gulen by emphasizing the apolitical nature of the movement.

But there are important differences between the two groups. Erdogan runs a political party while Gulen operates a civil movement called Hizmet (“Service”). Erdogan comes out of a more traditional Sunni Turkish Islamist movement; Gulen comes out of an apolitical, more Sufi, mystical and social tradition. Gulen is interested in slow and deep social change, including secular higher education; Erdogan as a party leader is first and foremost interested in preserving his party’s power, operating in a populist manner, trying to raise the general welfare.420

In 1999 Siyaset Meydani, a popular political talk show broadcasted a leaked footage of Gulen speaking to his followers. In this footage, Gulen was seen as instructing how to infiltrate the state institutions to his followers and emphasizing how important it was to comply with the law and lay low until they infiltrated the law enforcement and the judicial system.

Gulen’s involvement in politics was not denied by many, Hakan M. Yavuz openly mentioned his involvement with the new post-Coup Turkish identity known as the Turkish-

Islamic Synthesis that originated after the Coup of 1980. Yavuz stated that Gulen worked with

Turgut Ozal during this time.421 In Toward an Islamic Enlightenment:

The Gülen Movement, written in 2013, Yavuz aimed to demonstrate the statist nature of the Gulen movement. Yavuz stated that the movement emphasized the modern science was compatible with Islam and “That individuals must be pious in order to be good citizens.”422

There were, however, conflicted perceptions of Gulen’s political involvement. He had been vocal about the much-debated presidential system. In 1997, Gulen stated that the

420 Graham E. Fuller, “The Gulen Movement Is Not a Cult – It’s One of the Most Encouraging Faces of Islam Today,” Huffington Post, last modified December 6, 2017, accessed September 7, 2018, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/graham-e-fuller/Gulen-movement-not-cult_b_11116858.html. 421 Yavuz and Esposito, Turkish Islam and the Secular State, 35-36. 422 Hakan M. Yavuz. Toward an Islamic Enlightenment: The Gülen Movement (Oxford: Oxford, University Press, 2013), 8.

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groundwork should be laid out for the presidential system and that the people should be gradually prepared for the system change.423 When questioned about Gulen’s involvement in politics,

Gulenists explained the situation by stating that it was Gulen’s natural right as a Turkish citizen to voice his opinions on political matters. In addition to his natural right, his supporters added that Gulen aimed to construct a common morality regarding public places as a modern religious person.424

Gulen’s political objectives explained as the following in a pro-Gulen article,

“[Gulen] hopes to reestablish the link between religion and state that existed in the Ottoman era, thereby reversing one of the most clear-cut features of the state established by Atatürk.”425 Fuller also explained the controversy surrounding the movement in Turkey with Kemalist paranoia:

While such a movement should be viewed as an ideal model of modern Islam, enlightened Muslim thinking, and a non-confrontational approach to politics and the state, it is in fact the source of much controversy inside the Kemalist state that fear its long range potential to bring back Islam into the hearts of Turkish citizenry in ways that might affect the state-controlled secularism of the state.426

In Kucuk Dunyam, a book published in 1995 that essentially was a long interview with

Gulen conducted by one of his followers, Gulen recounted events that indicated his politically active stance. “Hizmet (Gulen movement) participants have never formed a political party nor have they pursued political ambitions,” explained Fethullah Gulen in an Op-Ed he wrote for the

423 Cınar Livane Ozel, “Fethullah Gulen 1997’de Başkanlık Sistemine Sıcak Baktığını Söyledi Iddiası,” Teyit.org, March 3, 2017, accessed September 7, 2018, https://teyit.org/fethullah-Gulen-1997de-baskanlik-sistemine-sicak- baktigini-soyledi-iddiasi/. 424 “Fethullah Gulen, Bir Din Adamı Olmasına Rağmen Neden Bu Kadar Siyasetle İlgileniyor?,” Fethullah Gulen Web Sitesi, accessed April 12, 2017, https://www.fGulen.com/tr/fethullah-Gulenin-butun-eserleri/terbiye-ve- cihad/263-fGulen-com-turkce/hayati/fethullah-Gulen-ve-hareket-hakkinda/49714-fethullah-Gulen-bir-din-adami- olmasina-ragmen-neden-bu-kadar-siyasetle-ilgileniyor. 425 Aras, “Turkish Islam’s Moderate Face.” 426 Fuller, The Future of Political Islam, 128.

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New York Times contrary to the evidence that himself provided only twenty years ago.427 In

Kucuk Dunyam, Gulen said that he never accepted the coup of 1960; even though he was distant to political parties he favored the Democrat Party because of their relatively softer approach to

Islamic services.428 In the same interview, he recounted a memory where he wanted to establish a foundation against Communism in Erzurum but did not have the chance to do so.429 Gulen later played an imported role in the state-sanctioned anti-Communism movement.430 Gulen recounted another memory where he planned to talk about Deccal (Al-Masih ad-Dajjal, simply the anti-

Christ) at the mosque on the last day of Ramadan, and he claimed that the mosque turned into a

“meeting” place; the word “miting,” literally meeting, in Turkish is only used for political gatherings.431

Fethullah Gulen and the Gulen movement had also been portrayed as progressive in women’s rights by the American academia. Gulen’s relatively relaxed stance on headscarf [he states that it was not mandatory to wear the headscarf, a pious woman could uncover her hair if the circumstances arise, referring to the headscarf ban in public institutions such as schools and universities that was in place before the Justice and Development Party lifted the ban in 2007 for universities, and completely in 2013] was simply enough for many of the academics to believe that Gulen and Gulenists deeply cared for the inclusion of women in public life and their equality to men.432 The Gulen Movement’s perception as a progressive movement was prominent among

Western politicians in addition to scholars. The former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright was

427 Gulen, “Fethullah Gulen: Turkey’s Eroding Democracy.” 428 Erdogan, Fethullah Gulen Hocaefendi: küçük dünyam, 55. 429 Ibid, 78.; Turk Dil Kurumu, s.v. “Miting,”, accessed May 13, 2017. 430 Yavuz and Esposito, Turkish Islam and the Secular State, 22. 431 Erdogan, Fethullah Gulen Hocaefendi: küçük dünyam, 78. 432 “Türkiye’de başörtüsü yasağı: Nasıl başladı, nasıl çözüldü?,” Aljazeera Turk, accessed September 7, 2018, http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/dosya/turkiyede-basortusu-yasagi-nasil-basladi-nasil-cozuldu.

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a keynote speaker at Gulen Institute Luncheon Forums in 2008, where Kofi Annan was also a speaker only two years after Albright.433 Albright stated that the world lacked a direction and needed a pathfinder. This role cannot be filled by “radicals, aggressive nationalists, autocrats, apostles of the holy war” but it may be filled by someone who shared Gulen Institute's values; which were "commitment to international dialogue and understanding of cultural diversity, support for human justice and the love of peace."434 Annan, in his 2010 speech, promoted Gulen as a champion of 21st Century values such as “freedom, equality, solidarity, tolerance, respect for nature and the environment, and the shared responsibility for humankind.”435 A recent article published on FoxNews.com, written by the Gulenist Rumi

Foundation’s president, argued that Erdogan’s so-called witch-hunt in Turkey targeted the Gulenists because they were moderate Islamists and defined the movement as:

The witch-hunt has targeted the coeducational, non-denominational schools, stressing math and science, which serve diverse populations across the world and in the US. In this battle between the strongman and the scholar, Americans should recognize Mr. Gulen as an advocate of human rights, religious freedom and world peace.436

An article published on GulenMovement.us, written by Sait M. Yavuz, explained

Gulen’s approach to gender equality by stating that he did not support “the ‘western champions of women’s rights,” and continued “in [Gulen’s] words ‘most champions of women’s rights and freedom only excite women with physical pleasure and then stab her spirit.’ Gulen thinks that for

433 Hon. Madeleine Albright, “Gulen Institute Luncheon Forums - Hon. Madeleine Albright, Part 2/6,” YouTube, accessed February 19, 2017, https://www.youtube.com/.; Kofi Annan, “Luncheon Forums,” Gulen Institute, March 12, 2010, accessed September 7, 2018, http://www.Guleninstitute.org/programs/luncheon-forums/195- luncheon-forum-kofi-annan/. 434 Hon. Madeleine Albright, “Luncheon Forums.” 435 Kofi Annan, “Gulen Institute Luncheon Forums - Kofi Annan - United Nations Secretary-General - Part 3/3.” 436 Emre Celik, “Erdogan’s vendetta against moderate Muslims threatens Turkey’s Role in War on Terror,” FoxNews.com, March 31, 2016, accessed September 7,2018, http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2016/03/31/erdogans-vendetta-against-moderatemuslims-threatens- turkeys-role-in-war-on-terror.html.

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the sake of so-called freedom, women were used as objects of pleasure, means of entertainment, and materials for advertisement, which reduced ‘freedom’ to sexual liberty.”437 Yavuz explained how Gulen saw equality among genders:

Gulen thinks that there is no obstacle in front of women in having equal rights and responsibilities with men; however, women and men have been physically and emotionally different so that gender roles have had to suit these differences […] Men have been physically stronger and apt to bearing hardship, while women are more compassionate, delicate and self-sacrificing. Therefore, the responsibility of motherhood is given to women, so that they naturally become the first nurturers, educators, and trainers of the new generation. This makes women the first teachers of the humanity, which is a unique position bestowed upon them by God.438

As it was clear in Yavuz’s article, Gulen had a traditionally conservative view of gender roles.

While he explicitly stated that women could work for wages outside of their homes, however, the main duty of a woman was to serve; first to God and then to her family since the primary role of the woman is motherhood in Gulen’s eyes.

Gulen was usually considered moderate because of his views of the Islamic headscarf.

He argued that covering the hair was not a religious necessity for women and the education should be chosen over wearing the hijab. This was essential for the movement to gain more followers during the years where the headscarf and hijab were banned in public spaces in Turkey

(such as schools, universities, military institutions etc.)439

Aside from his relatively moderate views on the headscarf, Gulen’s actions and speeches have proven that he was promoting a sexist and a dangerous ideology, which threatens not only the

437 M. Sait Yavuz, “Women in Islam: Fethullah Gulen’s Perspective,” Gulen Movement, May 25, 2013, accessed September 7, 2018. http://www.Gulenmovement.us/women-in-islam-fethullah-Gulens-perspective.html. 438 Ibid. 439 “Women’s Rights in Islam,” Fethullah Gulen’s Official Web Site, accessed February 11, 2017, http://fGulen.com/en/home/1329-fGulen-com-english/press/mehmet-gundems-interview-in-milliyet-daily/25338- womens-rights-in-islam.; “Women’s Rights?,” Fethullah Gulen’s Official Web Site, accessed February 11, 2017, http://fGulen.com/en/home/1363-fGulen-com-english/Gulens-works/questions-and-answers/24922-womens- rights.

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hopes for gender equality but also the established women’s and LGBTQ+ rights. An article, that did not appear on the same website’s English language version, entitled

“Peygamber Efendimizin Kadınları Dövme Tavsiyesi Nasıl Değerlendirmelidir?” written by

Gulen, advised men on how to beat their wives properly.440 In this article Gulen strongly defended men’s right to beat their wives by stating that after everything else failed to subdue a rebellious wife, “Who in their right mind would object the beating [as the last resort?]441 Any form of violence and domestic violence are illegal under the Turkish law and there is a specific law that aimed to protect women and children – or any person – who are victims and/or under the threat of domestic violence or stalking.442 Gulen, by publishing this article clearly encourages men to beat their wives, therefore to break the Turkish law.

A conference, organized by the Journalists and Writers Foundation in 2010 on family – an organization closely associated ties with Fethullah Gulen since he is the honorary president – hosted Allen C. Carlson as the keynote speaker. Carlson was the emeritus president of the

Howard Center for Family, Religion & Society, a tax-exempt institution that works against women’s and LGBTQ+ rights.443 According to Carlson contraception and sexual intercourse, other than for reproduction, were great dangers for the future of the society.444 Carlson’s speech from another conference, given under the same title, defined the traditional family as the

440 Fethullah Gulen, “Peygamber Efendimizin Kadınları Dövme Tavsiyesi Nasıl Değerlendirmelidir?,” Fethullah Gulen Web Sitesi, July 12, 2007, accessed September 6, 2018, https://fGulen.com/tr/fethullah-Gulenin- butun-eserleri/iman/fethullah-Gulen-asrin-getirdigi-tereddutler/582fethullah-Gulen-peygamber-efendimizin- kadinlari-dovme-tavsiyesi-nasil-degerlendirmelidir 441 Ibid. 442 “Turk Ceza Kanunu, Madde 86,” Turkiye Buyuk Millet Meclisi, accessed April 12, 2017, https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/kanunlar/k5237.html.; “Ailenin Korunmasi ve Kadina Karsi Siddetin Onlenmesine Dair Kanun,” TBMM, accessed April 12, 2017, https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/kanunlar/k6284.html. 443 “World Congress of Families Believes the Natural Family Is the Fundamental Unit of Society,” World Congress, accessed March 5, 2017, http://worldcongress.org/work.php. 444 Allan Carlson, interview by E.J. Hutchinson, “An Interview with Allan Carlson.” The Calvinist International, May 29, 2013, accessed September 7, 2018, https://calvinistinternational.com/2013/05/29/carlson-interview/

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marriage of man and woman, and argued that only the societies with traditional families could have prosperity. Carlson relied heavily on the Bible to prove his points.445 Overall, there is a clear inconsistency between Carlson’s views and the Gulen movement’s perceived “progressiveness.”

However, since the same conference declared homosexuality as a disease that needed to be fought against and also classified homosexuality along with incest and urged religious marriages to be recognized [punishable with jail time according to the Turkish law when not accompanied with legal marriage] while arguing that measures should be taken to discourage abortion,

Carlson’s and Gulenists’ views clearly align.446

A Gulen affiliated internet source on Islam, the Way to Truth, claimed that “God’s

Messenger” advised marrying childbearing women and preferring virginity. The source stated that a virgin woman was more likely to be pleased by a man and less likely to be devious and deceiving. The source noted that both parties should be virgins while indicating that women were prone to being devious and deceiving.447 The source stated that “a girl” [the word girl describes a virgin woman, regardless of her age] had a right to choose her spouse and her father or guardian cannot ignore her wishes.448 What was being said here was that women were under the guardianship of someone rather than being independent individuals. This was made clearer under

445 "Conference Schedule," JWF Family Conference 2010 – Program, accessed May 15, 2017, https://jwffamilyconference.org/download/2010/documents/JWF-Family-Conference-2010-Program.pdf.; Allan C. Carlson, “The Natural Family in an Unnatural World,” Australian Family Association, accessed February 11, 2017, https://www.family.org.au/105-publications/afa-journal/afa-journal-vol-30-no-1-2009/141-the-natural- family-in-anunnatural-world. 446 Fethullah Gulen, “JWF’s Honorary President Fethullah Gulen’s Founding Speech,” The Journalists and Writers Foundation, accessed April 12, 2017, https://jwf.org/jwfs-honorary-president-fethullah-Gulens-founding- speech/.; “Eşcinsellik Hastalığına Karşı Önlem Alınsın!,” t24.com.tr, November 21, 2010, accessed April 12, 2017, http://t24.com.tr/haber/escinsellik-hastaligina-karsi-onlem-alinsin/113694. 447 This website is openly affiliated with the Gulenist Fountain Magazine.; Yavuz and Esposito, Turkish Islam and the Secular State, 36. “Understanding Islamic Religion.” Accessed April 12, 2017. http://www.thewaytotruth.org/.; “Marriage and Family Life.” Accessed April 12, 2017. http://www.thewaytotruth.org/pillars/family.html#Preferred. 448 Ibid.

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the section of Nikah, which means a marriage contract, where the source stated the following is required for Nikah to be valid:

The presence of the woman’s guardian or representative (waliy). The waliy is a Muslim man charged with marrying a woman entrusted to his care to a man who will be good for her.449

The section Women to Whom Marriage is Prohibited was directed towards men, hence the indicated that men could choose their spouses but women could not.450 The same source argued that Muslim men cannot marry any woman who practices idolatry and could only marry a previously married woman if her husband died or divorced her. Again, the indication was that a woman could not control her own life and could simply be “divorced.”451 The source directly talked to women on one certain occasion where it forbid them from marrying any non-Muslim men, even if they were “People of the Book” [referring to Christians and Jews] while Muslim men were told that there was no limitation on marrying women from the same category.452

The source touched upon the gender equality issues as well, and stated that the men and women were created equal but are not the same:

This distinction between equality and sameness is vital. Equality is desirable, just, and fair; but sameness is not. People are created as equals, and not as identical to each other, and so there is no basis to consider a woman to be inferior to a man. There is no reason to assume that she is less important than he just because her rights are not identical to his. Had her status been identical with his, she would have been no more than a duplicate of him, which she is not. The fact that Islam gives her equal – but not identical – rights shows that it takes her into due consideration, acknowledges her, and recognizes her independent personality. […] However, we should acknowledge that a woman’s heart is the most compassionate, loving and generous of all hearts. This is why the Qur’an stresses men’s inclination toward and attachment to women, rather than the other way. In fact, it states that the most beautiful blessing in Paradise for a man will be a pure woman. […] God has not created all people exactly the same in all respects; rather, He has given each superiority in some respect to others, as required by social life, the division of labor, and

449 Ibid. 450 Ibid. 451 Ibid. 452 Ibid. 107

the choice of occupation. Although it is not true to the same degree for all men and women, as He has created men superior to women in some respects, He also has given women superiority over men in others. For example, God has given men greater physical strength, endowed them with a greater capacity for management, and has charged them with the family’s financial upkeep. This is why He has made men the head of the family. However, this does not mean that men have absolute authority over the family, for this authority must be exercised according to the Prophetic principle: The master of a people is he who serves them. In addition, responsibility is proportionate to authority and authority is proportionate to responsibility.453

When it came to polygyny the source stated that it was uncommon in Muslim societies but defended the practice with Billy Graham’s views:

No one is unaware of the part mistresses play in Western society. In this respect Islam is a fundamentally honest religion, and permits a Muslim to marry a second wife if he must, but strictly forbids all clandestine amatory associations in order to safeguard the moral probity of the community.454

Also, the unequal inheritance in Islamic law was explained by the women’s lesser earning capacity and since the husband took care of the wife, the source argued that men should inherit more.455 While this source may not reflect Gulen’s own views, the close association indicated that Gulen and Gulenists were not bothered by the content.

Fethullah Gulen himself had written about how to raise female children in 1962. Since the article could be found on Gulen’s official website without any edits it is fair to assume that

Gulen’s view on this matter had not changed since 1962. Gulen stated that if women would adopt men-like characteristics and men adopt women-like ones it would cause degeneration in the society. Girls should be raised lady-like and encouraged to perform lady-like duties like sewing.

Gulen strongly emphasized that girls should not wear boys’ clothing. He stated that just like when men try to act and look like women, it was equally unsympathetic and ugly when women

453 Ibid. 454 Ibid. 455 Ibid. 108

adopt men-like traits. He warned parents that if they let this happen the child will become

“Something in between men and women, a third gender,” and women or men acting like the opposite gender were cursed.456 The Gulenist hostility to LGBTQ+ individuals was apparent in this article.

Gulen’s views on HIV, a disease that is known for destroying many LGBTQ+ communities, are controversial as well. As a leader who promoted “Freedom, equality, solidarity, tolerance, respect for nature and the environment, and the shared responsibility for humankind,” in Kofi Annan's’ words, Gulen stated that he was ashamed to talk about HIV and that Muslims were the least impacted community of the HIV crises because of their way of life. Even though, he argued, there were campaigns for Muslims to renounce that way of life in an article entitled

“Is It Right When People Link HIV to “The Beast of the Earth” (Dabbat al-ard), One of the Signs of the Last Day?” In this article, Gulen argued that HIV and AIDS were just two of the impurities the “modern lifestyle” brought.457

Gulen explained in Kucuk Dunyam that when the judge asked him about his previous remarks regarding women during a trial, he explained that he sometimes preached to women and he stopped shaving a while before these sermons and always appeared with a beard before women. Gulen said that he warned women to look in front of them rather than looking at his face when he was preaching and classified his behavior as something that was in favor of religion despite the court tried to use it against him.458 Another issue the Turkish court took with Gulen,

456 Fethullan Gulen, “Kız Çocuklarıyla Alâkalı Küçük Bir Mütalaa,” Fethullah Gulen Web Sitesi, accessed April 12, 2017, https://www.fGulen.com/tr/fethullah-Gulenin-butun-eserleri/terbiye-ve-cihad/fethullah-Gulen-ve- gencligin-problemleri/1343-Fethullah-Gulen-Sizinti-Haziran-1982-Sayi-41-Kiz-Cocuklariyla-Alakali-Kucuk-Bir- Mutalaa. 457 “Is It Right When People Link HIV to ‘The Beast of the Earth’ (Dabbat Al Ard), One of the Signs of the Last Day?,” Fethullah Gulen’s Official Web Site, accessed April 12, 2017. https://www.fGulen.com/en/fethullah- Gulens-works/faith/questions-and-answers/25479-is-it-right-when-people-link-hiv-to-qthe-beast-of-the-earthq- dabbat-al-ard-one-of-the-signs-of-the-last-day. 458 Erdoḡan, Fethullah Gulen Hocaefendi: küçük dünyam, 92-93. 109

according to Gulen himself, was his words on the contemporary youth. He warned the congregation of young people for almost making love on mosque windows and drinking next to mosque walls. Gulen explained that he was asked if he said: “If these people would not be schooled based on Islamic ideals they would drink wine from their fathers’ skulls.” He accepted the quote and stated that he did not see anything wrong with these statements and asked the reader if there was anything wrong with them.459

Gulen repeatedly mentioned supernatural occurrences throughout the book; he seemed to be under the impression that a greater being was communicating with him through his dreams.460 He recounted that in order to buy flooring for a new Imam Hatip [Islamic equivalent of a seminary] that was under construction he had to talk to a woman, even though he did not want to. He stated that even if it was hard for him to talk to a woman he compromised on his principles for a greater good; strangely they did not buy anything from that woman, he added.461

Gulen also explained that he only thought about getting married when he had too much dirty laundry.462 Furthermore, Gulen mentioned of two women at a local organization in Erzurum. He defined them by their lack of headscarves but added that these women perceived themselves as covered relative to how other women dressed since they at least wore long skirts.463 He stated that when his father came to visit him during his military service, he could not find a “clean” hotel for his father to stay. This was because every hotel accepted women as guests. He explained that this situation was against his understanding of decency. He further explained that he spoke in

459 Ibid, 93. 460 Ibid, 115, 142, 144, 174. 461 Ibid, 111. 462 Ibid, 63. 463 Ibid, 77.

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favor of vandalism against these hotels and that one time he asked that the government controlled the law enforcement and if they did not intervene with this “immorality” then who would?464

Gulen’s view of women does not fit his perception as a progressive Islamic scholar who supports women’s rights and modern education or to his perceived tolerant approach to different cultures and religions. His rhetorical question regarding the hotels that accepted women as customers indicated a clear political objective. Yet, Sophia Pandya in the introduction she has written for The Gulen Hizmet Movement and Its Transnational Activities: Case Studies of

Altruistic Activism in Contemporary Islam, stated that accusing the movement of being patriarchal would eliminate the role taken by women in the movement.465 Gulen was being portrayed as a progressive religious leader while there was clear encouragement to not to question or criticize the blatant sexism of the movement.

When compared to extreme Islamic movements, such as Wahhabism, Gulen’s interpretation of Islam employs a rather progressive outlook. However, since Gulen’s ideology originated in an essentially secular country it would not be logical to compare Gulen’s views to some of the more extreme interpretations of Islam originated in different nations. Gender-specific violence and discrimination based on gender, two ideas that are encouraged by Gulen were crimes according to the Turkish Civil Law that was in effect from 1926 to 2001 and still are according to the current Civil Law.466

Gulen was also praised for claiming that Islam and modern science must and should co- exist. Graham Fuller explained that during the research period of his book, The Future of

Political Islam, he “found Hizmet to be remarkably moderate, tolerant, non-violent, open to

464 Erdoḡan, Fethullah Gulen Hocaefendi: küçük dünyam. 80. 465 Pandya and Gallagher, The Gulen Hizmet Movement and Its Transnational Activities, 10. 466 “Turk Medeni Kanunu,” Turkiye Buyuk Millet Meclisi, accessed May 14, 2017, https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/kanunlar/k4721.html. 111

dialogue, a social rather than political movement, and a strong proponent of education as the means to empower Muslims in a globalizing future. […] I still believe that Hizmet as a movement represents one of the most encouraging faces of contemporary Islam in the world.”467Again, in Kucuk Dunyam, Gulen explained how enraged he was when he heard about the possibility of the Quran published in Turkish with the Turkish alphabet. He stated that he perceived this event as a move against Islam.468 A relatively radical reaction by a person who claimed to favor modern education and encourage knowledge since a translated Quran meant easier access to it for the majority of the Turkish people who did not speak Arabic. When asked if he had any doubts about his beliefs Gulen recounted an event he had experienced when he was younger. During this time Gulen was reading a Turkish author’s novel [neither the author nor the novel’s name was given] where the author mentioned Darwinism [the theory of evolution] and the possibility of evolution influenced Gulen temporarily. Gulen explained that he “recovered” from this episode of doubtful anxiety where Satan was trying to impose these thoughts onto

Gulen with the help of God.469 He also stated that if he had any power he would have had written about the inconsistencies in the theory of evolution. He stated that there should be serious works that explained and provided evidence for the creation. Anything that refutes creationism should not be tolerated, Gulen said; if there was a single person who stopped praying because of the influence of evolution that would be the worst trouble that he could imagine.470

To avoid anti-religious influences, Gulen supports “proper brainwashing.”471 He said that the questioning of religion should not exist in the first place and that people should be

467 Graham E. Fuller, “The Gulen Movement Is Not a Cult – It’s One of the Most Encouraging Faces of Islam Today.” 468 Erdoḡan, Fethullah Gulen Hocaefendi küçük dünyam 55. 469 Ibid, 66. 470 Ibid, 67. 471 Ibid, 68.

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conditioned not to question. Belief, he said, was not conditioning, but conditioning should come after belief was established. Individuals must not let think of any of these beliefs that were against the religion and that every individual should be conditioned to think like this.472

Fethullah Gulen strongly emphasizes creationism. “Kur’ân-ı Kerim’de ve Hadis- i Şeriflerde Yaratılış” is an article written by Gulen, aimed to prove that creation was based on the Quran.473 Another source where Gulen’s hostility to modern science was apparent was an introduction written by him for a biology textbook entitled “Towards Alternative Biology.” The authors of the book vehemently argued against evolution.474 Gulen also answered a question regarding the first human beings in the Americas and explained how the first peoples got to the

Americas, after mistakenly stating that the evolutionary argument claimed that people have had evolved in the Americas.475

Gulen even wrote a book called the Creationism Reality and Evolution, where he tried to prove that creation was, in fact, factual while evolution was still a theory.476 In an interview conducted with Gulen for the daily newspaper Milliyet, Gulen stated that the military general

Kenan Evren, who enacted the Coup of 1980 and held responsible for a series of executions of political prisoners, would eventually go to heaven despite his “sins” because he made religion classes mandatory for all school children. 477 These religion classes were not comprehensive

472 Ibid. 473 Fethullah Gulen, “Kur’ân-I Kerim’de ve Hadis-I Şeriflerde Yaratılış,” Fethullah Gulen Web Sitesi, accessed February 11, 2017, http://fGulen.com/tr/fethullah-Gulenin-butun-eserleri/iman/fethullah-Gulen-yaratilis-gercegi- ve-evrim/11783Fethullah-Gulen-Kuran-i-Kerimde-ve-Hadis-i-Seriflerde-Yaratilis. 474 Fethullah Gulen, “Alternatif Biyolojiye Doğru,” Fethullah Gulen Web Sitesi, July 1995, accessed September 7, 2018, https://fGulen.com/tr/fethullah-Gulenin-butun-eserleri/196-Takdim-Yazilari/1087-Fethullah-Gulen- Alternatif-Biyolojiye-Dogru-Temmuz-1995-Alternatif-Biyolojiye-Dogru. 475 Fethullah Gulen, “İnsanların Amerika’ya Geçmesi Nasıl Olmuştur?,” Fethullah Gulen Web Sitesi, July 11, 2007, accessed September 12, 2018, https://fGulen.com/tr/fethullah-Gulenin-butun-eserleri/iman/fethullah-Gulen-asrin- getirdigi-tereddutler/534-fethullah-Gulen-insanlarin-amerikaya-gecmesi-nasil-olmustur. 476 Fethullah Gulen, Yaratılış Gerçeği ve Evrim (İstanbul: Nil Yayınları, 2004). 477 Mehmet Gündem, "Fethullah Gulen'le 11 Gün - Zorunlu din dersi Evren'in sevabı," Milliyet, Istanbul, Turkey, January 31, 2005, accessed December 11,

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survey classes but they were designed to teach solely Sunni Islam to students and aimed to shape them to be obedient to the state.478

Gulen’s promotion of evolution was not limited to his own writings. Sizinti was a magazine owned by the Gulen movement until it got shut down by the Turkish government following the coup attempt in 2016. The former vice-president of the

Institute for Creation Research, Duane Gish’s article on creationism and evolution was published in Sizinti. Gish was a Young Earth creationist and had been to Turkey for more than one occasion to attend conferences on creationism. Gish, in this article, defended the need for teaching creationism because evolution was an outdated theory.479

Gulen is a strong supporter of Abrahamic religions. He argued that any nation that did not have a belief was condemned to disappear.480 Religion was essential for a person’s well- being, and even if the non-believer person was well educated there could be no possible way for this person to be beneficial [to the society].481 Gulen argued that being a non-believer brought many unfortunate symptoms such as bad luck.482 Gulen argued that non-believers would work to fulfill their endless desires, would go to hell before they die and eventually they would die alone.483 According to Gulen non-believers lost their interest in compassion and mercy. At this point in the article, Gulen quoted an uncited source that claimed that “no mercy” should be

2016, https://web.archive.org/web/20160314022907/http://www.milliyet.com.tr/content/fethullah/html/fet09.html . 478 Yonca I. Çubuk, "Implementation of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis after the 1980 Turkish Coup D'etat," (Saint Francis College, 2014. Print), 36. 479 Duane T. Gish, “Eğitimde Yaratılış ve Evrim,” Sızıntı Dergisi, June 18, 2011, accessed September 7, 2018, https://web.archive.org/web/20110618051105/http://www.sizinti.com.tr/konular/ayrinti/egitimde-yaratilis-ve- evrim.html. 480 Fethullah Gulen, “İnanç,” Fethullah Gulen Web Sitesi, October 1981, accessed September 7, 2018, https://www.fGulen.com/tr/fethullah-Gulenin-butun-eserleri/terbiye-ve-cihad/fethullah-Gulen-ve-gencligin- problemleri/1336-Fethullah-Gulen-Sizinti-Kasim-1981-Sayi-34-Inanc. 481 Ibid. 482 Ibid. 483 Ibid.

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shown to non-believers who were experiencing the drunkenness of denial, just like “no mercy” should be shown to people who were engaging in vandalism when they were drunk on wine.484

Then he added that even if they were shown mercy, they would not accept it because their hearts would be closed.485 “No mercy” in this context can be interpreted as having violent connotations but it can also mean to ignore these individuals when trying to convert people to Islam. Gulen claimed that non-believers would be able to perform any kind of evil act and that it would be impossible to persuade them to believe in religion.486 Gulen argued that non-believers were harmful to the public order.487

Gulen has had been recently accused of comparing atheists to terrorists for the following quote stating that "Those who kill a person will suffer the same fate as unbeliever."488 Gulen later retracted this statement and provided an explanation regarding the context.489 Gulen argued that atheism spreads because “Education is misused, young people are neglected, and schools actually defend and foster it.”490 According to Gulen God’s existence manifests itself in nature, and he added that “Planets and stars move within an interrelated complexity of drifts and orbits that are infinitely more precise than anything we could ever design or make. If what we make is accepted as evidence of intelligent design, why is the far more vast and complicated universe considered an exception to this rule?”491 Gulen blamed French existentialists and Western European

484 Ibid. 485 Ibid. 486 Ibid. 487 Ibid. 488 Fethullah Gulen, “Teröre Girmiş İnsan Müslüman Kalamaz,” Fethullah Gulen Web Sitesi, January 18, 2014, accessed September 7, 2018, https://web.archive.org/web/20140118073332/http://tr.fGulen.com/content/view/12069/15. 489 Sefa Kaplan, “Ateist Terörist Değildir.” Hürriyet, Istanbul, Turkey, April 21, 2004, accessed September 7, 2018, http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ateist-terorist-degildir-219352. 490 Fethullah Gulen, “Why Is Atheism So Widespread?,” Fethullah Gulen Web Sitesi, April 11, 2013, https://web.archive.org/web/20130411233520/http://en.fGulen.com/questions-and-answers/612-why-is-atheism- so-widespread. 491 Ibid.

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influence that valued individual freedom more than religious education and “less careful” scientists for the spread of atheism. Scientists were blamed for offering only theories than scientific truths and that public opinion tended to value these scientists rather than “more valuable ones.”492

For example, many textbooks and encyclopedias continue to present humanity's evolution from apes to human beings as fact instead of theory. In reality, a growing number of scientists, most particularly evolutionists, argue that Darwin's theory of evolution is not a truly scientific theory at all. Many critics of the highest intellectual caliber admit that we still have no idea of how this "evolution" took place. While there is a great deal of divergent opinion among the experts about probable causes and the actual process, the general public and less-informed scientists continue to believe in it.493

Gulen clearly stated that they (he uses the word we) should target the atheists whose beliefs were not firmly established and must teach them the truth.494

Gulen thinks that it was humanity’s most important duty to “enlighten others with knowledge of the true religion and the duties that accompany it.”495 Gulen stated that everyone, regardless of their age and status, must tell other people “What he is supposed to tell.”496 Gulen advised to approach the subject by giving gifts, or helping them first, and become their friends before inviting them to faith. He advised that the person must be careful and considerate to not to scare the possible convert away from them and Islam. This was only possible by knowing possible convert’s “level of faith, knowledge and culture.”497 Gulen heavily emphasized the earning trust and friendship of possible convert to a degree where their friendship “weigh heavier

492 Ibid. 493 Ibid. 494 Ibid. 495 Ibid. 496 Ibid. 497 Ibid.

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than that of his other friends.”498 Gulen warned his followers to be careful during the time where many “Obstinate people have come to soften their attitudes to Islamic matters and even begun to consider them as feasible. Therefore, at such a time, it is incumbent upon us to develop, employ and evaluate new methods and approaches, provided that we do not depart from the essence and spirit of the truth.”499

The evidence, that is easily accessible through a simple internet search, demonstrates that Gulen and the Gulen movement are in fact not moderate nor progressive. Gulen supports creationism over scientific consensus while arguing that he supports modern scientific education and that science and Islam must co-exist. As we see from his own writings, Gulen supports science only when it conforms to the Quran. Similar this his scientific views, Gulen is extremely anti-women and anti-LGBTQ+, to a point where not only he supports violence against women but he also sees women as sub-humans who are to be disciplined by men. In addition, Gulen is not tolerant in the sense that he tolerates other beliefs and lifestyles, he is just tolerant enough not to violently subdue the things he claimed to tolerate. Gulen sees non-Muslims as possible converts and instructs his followers how to successfully deceive these targeted people into conversion. It is, therefore, quite clear that the American academics were actually employing

Orientalism when portraying Gulen as moderate and/or progressive. The academics, who favored

Gulen absolutely set lower standards for a Muslim movement because they believed that Gulen’s ideology was progressive for all Muslims. Naturally, this sentiment carried on to create a public opinion in America since the New York Times and the Wall Street Journalists also employed the same approach, possibly in order to not to challenge the academia.

498 Ibid. 499 Ibid. 117

CONCLUSION: THE FALSE REPRESENTATION OF THE GULEN MOVEMENT AS A RESULT OF PERSISTENT ORIENTALISM

As this thesis demonstrates, despite the efforts to adopt a more neutral and balanced approach to cultures and societies that are not Western, the Orientalist approach persisted both in the academia and in journalism. Orientalism evolved to neo-Orientalism and even disguised itself as self-Orientalism.500 The otherness of Muslims and Muslim societies have had been emphasized by the news media in the United States. For this thesis, I examined the approaches of the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal to see if they employed differing approaches to

Muslims and Islam. In order to have a clear demonstration, I chose the time-frame between 1985 and 2016. The date 1985 was significant because it was a time where the Cold War was still relevant to the United States yet the growing radical Islam also started to pose a significant threat.

Starting my research on Orientalism in the news media from 1985 also allowed me to examine the evolution of the approaches, or the lack of it, with rather significant events. The most important of these events was the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center in New York

City in 2001. Al-Qaeda, a radical Islamic terrorist organization, was behind this atrocity that cost more than two-thousand lives and eventually led the United States into a war in Afghanistan in

2001. During this time, the media portrayal of women especially became important for the

Americans, portraying Afghan women as in need of Western rescue grew prominence according

500 Cultural relativism, for example, originated in the 20th century as a reaction to cultural evolutionism, a theory that assumed all human progress is linear, and cultures progressed from “primitive” to “modern.” Franz Boas is considered one of the first scholars to challenge the concept of linear progress by stating that the criteria which measures success is obscured by biases and added “general theory of evaluation of human activities, as taught by anthropological research, teaches us a higher tolerance than the one which we now profess.” Boas’ students Ruth Benedict and Melville Herskovitz echoed Boas’ ideas. As Herskovitz described in Cultural Relativism: Perspectives in Cultural Pluralism “Evaluations are relative to the cultural background out of which they arise.” Michael Singer points out that cultural relativism developed as a reaction to Western cultural superiority. Alison Dundes Renteln, “Relativism and the Search for Human Rights,” American Anthropologist 90, no. 1 (1988): 57.; Franz Boas, The Mind of Primitive Man (London: Forgotten Books, 2015), 225.; Ruth Benedict, Patterns of Culture (Boston; New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2005). Dundes Renteln, “Relativism and the Search for Human Rights,”: 57. 118

to experts. In addition to the war in Afghanistan, the Iraq War of 2003 was also sometimes justified on the grounds of liberating Muslim women from their Muslim male captors. The original research question for this thesis was “Why does the media portray the Gulen movement positively?” but as I broaden my scale and focused on the portrayal of Muslims and Islam in the media, and specifically in the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal the distorted view and the otherness of Muslims became apparent.

The reason why I decided to focus on the New York Times and Wall Street Journal was to be able to see if there were any differences between the two newspapers that are known to represent and serve to differing ends of the political spectrum. The New York Times, the newspaper of record, one of the most trusted newspapers in the world, usually identified as a liberal-leaning newspaper. The majority of its readers also identify as liberals rather than conservatives. While the Wall Street Journal is the opposite, being almost equally large by circulation and trusted source of news usually classified as a conservative-leaning medium.

Because of this clear difference between the newspapers, it was surprising to discover that both of them employed an almost identical approach to Muslims, Muslim societies, and Islam. The existing research on the portrayal of Muslims and Islam in the news media supported these findings. Especially since the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and with the rise of Taliban, the portrayal of Muslims and Islam became synonymous with the other, uncivilized, barbarous, dangerous, and irrational; and in the case of Muslim women in need of Western help. Edward

Said’s definition of Orientalism consisted mainly four different characteristics; the otherness of

Muslims and Islam, the homogeneousness of Islam, Islam and Muslim’s resistance to change, and the overgeneralization of the Orient as a whole. The news articles I examined for this thesis, except for a handful of nuanced and neutral articles, employed all four of these characteristics.

In addition to examining the portrayal of Muslims and Islam, and the approach

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employed by the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal, I examined the same newspapers’ portrayal of the Gulen movement in order to have a clear understanding of their approach to

Gulen and the Gulen movement. After the examination of the New York Times and the Wall

Street Journal for articles related to the Gulen movement, the evidence revealed that only the

New York Times reported extensively on the corruption allegations regarding Gulen affiliated charter schools in the United States. The evidence also demonstrated that both of these newspapers positively portrayed the Gulen movement and Fethullah Gulen himself. While it is important to note that both newspapers published critical articles of the movement and Gulen, most of the articles were completely ignored the controversies surround Gulen and the movement. It was also revealed after examining the articles that, even the journalists who employed critical approaches to the Gulen movement avoided providing an in-depth criticism of

Gulen’s ideology. As demonstrated in the second chapter of this thesis, the Gulen movement is a highly political, non-secular movement that supports gender inequality and theories that are considered unscientific by the consensus. While most journalists in both of these sources referred to Gulen simply as a cleric, or an imam, their articles lacked any proper information regarding

Gulen’s ideology. The sympathetic articles defined Gulen’s ideology as “moderate” and even argued that Gulenists and Gulen believe tolerance and the compatibility of science and religion.

While Gulen’s ideology could be considered moderate for some Muslims, not all Muslims would consider Gulen progressive or moderate. The Turkish critics of Gulen, usually consisted of people from the Turkish Armed Forces according to these articles, were dismissed as “seculars,” and their concerns were oversimplified as radical views. While some of the articles pointed out that Gulen was tried for trying to establish an Islamic state and provided the leaked footage of

Gulen where he was instructing his followers to infiltrate the state institutions, these articles never provided any information on Gulen’s ideas that would be considered radical by the Turkish

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state such as advising violence against women. I argued that the positive portrayal of Gulen that disregarded his non-moderate and non-progressive ideology stemmed from the Orientalist approach. The journalists’ approach was essentially Orientalist since almost all of them argued that Gulen was moderate while not defining what moderate was, and moderate in relation to what or who. In short, Orientalism was persistent in the New York Times and in the Wall Street Journal and because of this the Gulen movement and Fethullah Gulen have had been portrayed inaccurately.

Another reason for journalists to portray Gulen and the Gulen movement in a certain way was the perception of Gulen by the academia. While Gulen has had been criticized by some

European and Turkish scholars, there was an absolute favoritism of Gulen in the American academia. The latest section of my thesis demonstrates why Gulen cannot be considered moderate or progressive. While both Gulen and Gulenists misrepresented their ideology by giving false statements about their beliefs, I argue that since almost all the information I accessed when I was writing this thesis was available online and could be reached with a simple Google search, it was also Orientalism that led the scholars to think that Gulen was moderate. As I mentioned above, some of Gulen’s beliefs could be considered moderate and even progressive in comparison to some more conservative and/or radical interpretations of Islam. It is, however, impossible to classify Gulen moderate or progressive in general since there are more moderate and progressive Muslims than Gulen. Not all Muslims condone violence against women, hate atheists, and the LGBTQ+ communities while believing that the theory of evolution is an imperialistic tool of the West. In fact, in Turkey, where the Gulen movement originated, evolution has been a part of national education curricula until very recently, while discrimination based on religion has been outlawed since the 1920s. Violence against women is an issue the

Turkish society has been dealing, for example, domestic violence has been specifically outlawed

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since 1998.

The answer to my original question “Why does the media portray the Gulen movement positively?” is that because of their Orientalist approach, the journalists overgeneralize all

Muslims as less moderate and less progressive than Fethullah Gulen’s ideology and falsely portray him as the bright future of Islam. This approach is problematic for two distinct reasons.

First of all, it shows that Orientalism is still persistent well into the year 2016. And second of all, while referring to Gulen as moderate and progressive these journalists falsely represent all

Muslims in a negative light. All the issues that Gulen’s ideology has, violence, hatred of women and the LGBTQ+, scientific backwardness are already associated with Islam as a result of Islam’s

Orientalist portrayal. Presenting Gulen as moderate for saying that violent Jihad should not be waged diminishes the value of actual moderate and progressive Muslims. This portrayal of Gulen also indicates that even the moderate Muslims condones violence against woman and is hateful towards certain groups. Which is simply not accurate. Portraying Gulen’s ideology as positive, these journalists and academics, contributed to the stereotypes of Muslims, Islam and further strengthen the prejudices against Muslims in the Western world.

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