RUSSIAN ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 102, 26 September 2011 17

Analysis

Russian in an Election Year: Still in Crisis By David White, Birmingham Abstract ’s liberal opposition is in tatters. Right Cause is reeling from the ejection of its oligarch leader . Despite the return of Grigory Yavlinsky, lacks the resources to contest the election effec- tively. Finally, the Justice Ministry refused to register the People’s Freedom Party, led by and his colleagues. With no real opposition, Russia will continue to suffer under an authoritarian model of politics.

Requiem for a Movement founded less than a year ago, was denied registration Following elections to the Russian in by the Justice Ministry. December 2003, , then Deputy Chief Each of these parties can be seen as occupying dis- of Staff of the President’s Executive Office and architect tinct positions on the “opposition continuum”. At one of ’s successful campaign, claimed that the end we find the quasi or semi-opposition, those par- defeat of the liberal parties, Yabloko and the Union of ties or individuals outside the ruling elite who aim to Right Forces (SPS), marked the end of an era. “The his- join government but not necessarily with the intention toric mission of the liberal parties in Russia” declared of enacting major policy changes and who do not seek Surkov was over. Similarly, most post-election analy- to be overly critical of the regime for fear of exclusion ses suggested that the two parties would, to paraphrase or in the hope of preferable treatment. At the opposite Trotsky, be confined to the dustbin of post-Soviet his- end are situated what the celebrated political scientist, tory. Once the electoral dust had settled, a further obit- Otto Kirchheimer, referred to as the “principal” oppo- uary for Russia’s liberals came from a more unexpected sition, political actors seeking power precisely because source, the former sponsor of the main liberal parties. they want to change the way the political system oper- In March 2004, awaiting trial on charges of tax evasion ates. During Putin’s first term, parties tended to move and fraud, former Yukos CEO, , along the continuum with a degree of fluidity. However, published “The Crisis of ”, a with- since 2004 Russia’s party system has stabilised and it is ering critique of Yabloko and SPS in which he accused possible to categorise parties in relation to their oppo- the liberals of misleading the people about the economic sition credentials (see Table 1). reforms of the 1990s and ignoring those who had suf- fered hardship as a result of such reforms. As a result, The Kremlin-Loyal Opposition: Right liberalism in Russia has been thoroughly discredited. Cause Subsequently, the decline of the liberal parties con- Created in 2008 as a merger between two insignifi- tinued apace. In 2008, facing massive debts to the state cant pro-Kremlin liberal parties (Civil Force and the for unpaid electoral broadcast fees, the Kremlin per- Democratic Party of Russia) together with the remnants suaded SPS to disband (in return for writing off its debts) of the disbanded , Right Cause and to merge into a new “Kremlin-friendly” liberal party, remained in the margins of Russian politics until the Right Cause. Yabloko meanwhile continues to plough its spring of 2011 when the billionaire oligarch, Mikhail lonely social-liberal furrow, barely registering on opinion Prokhorov, took control of the party. President Med- polls. The replacement of Grigory Yavlinsky with Sergei vedev openly expressed his support for the rejuvenated Mitrokhin as party chairman did nothing to halt the party, leading to speculation that Right Cause may party’s decline. Rejecting electoral politics altogether, become a vehicle for the president. Prokhorov was quick disaffected members of Yabloko and SPS joined the Sol- to position the party, announcing that, it would become idarity movement, an organisation focusing primarily an alternative to United Russia but was not in opposition. on street protests and blogging activities. The word “opposition”, associated with “fringe groups Ahead of December’s parliamentary elections it that have lost the sense of reality” was to be expunged seems highly unlikely that liberal parties are capa- from the party’s vocabulary, stated Prokhorov. Initially ble of resurgence. Opinion polls suggest that no party there was little to suggest that Right Cause would be of a liberal-democratic hue will be returned to the anything other than a Kremlin-friendly “pseudo-opposi- State Duma. Two registered parties, Yabloko and Right tion” party, a supposition reinforced by Prokhorov’s reg- Cause, have campaigning mountains to climb if they ular meetings with the president and Medvedev’s warm are to reach the notoriously high electoral threshold words of support. Moreover, during the summer of 2011 of seven per cent, whilst the People’s Freedom Party, the party’s opinion poll ratings improved to the point RUSSIAN ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 102, 26 September 2011 18

that by September it was no longer inconceivable that Mitrokhin’s leadership, Yabloko continues to be critical the party might be capable of reaching the seven per- of government policies but is wary of attacking the pres- cent cut-off in the elections. A high profile election cam- ident or prime minister outright. In return the party is paign was expected after it was revealed that Prokhorov allowed access to limited funding, sufficient to main- was prepared to spend up to $100 million of his own tain its headquarters but not to fight effective wealth on electioneering. electoral campaigns. Yabloko now operates less like a However, by the end of the summer there were signs national political party and more like a social organisa- that Prokhorov was beginning to take a more indepen- tion concentrating on local issues such as campaigning dent line. The party’s manifesto, published at the end against unpopular development projects. of August, stated that authoritarian rule had returned Former party chairman, Grigory Yavlinsky, has been to Russia and the country was becoming a “farce and seen in the past as both Yabloko’s greatest asset and lia- a parody of the ”, stifled by bureaucracy. bility. He has been criticised for turning down the offer Prokhorov also claimed that United Russia’s political of governmental posts and refusing to cooperate with monopoly was unhealthy and proposed a 226-seat limit parties representing the economic liberal strand such for any one party in the State Duma. Although Medve- as the Union of Right Forces. Nevertheless, he remains dev promised to look at Prokhorov’s “exotic plan”, the a nationally well-known political figure. Recognising proposal drew the wrath of Vladislav Surkov, now First the need for a leader with a higher profile, the party has Deputy Head of the presidential administration, who agreed that Yavlinsky will head the Yabloko party list in dismissed the idea out of hand as undemocratic. As December. Such a move will not result in any divisions long as Right Cause occupied the “right-liberal” niche within the party. Mitrokhin has always made it plain it was safe from the machinations of the Kremlin. By that although he was party chairman, Yabloko’s leader turning his fire on the , Prokhorov was would always be Yavlinsky. taking a major risk. The party faces a gargantuan task to achieve the It was still a shock however when, on 15th Septem- required seven percent of the votes. Since losing its par- ber, Prokhorov was ousted as leader at the party’s con- liamentary representation in 2003 Yabloko has rarely gress. Prokhorov was quick to claim this was a Kremlin- polled more than a single percent in opinion surveys. engineered coup, the architect of which was likely to be Nevertheless, with the implosion of Right Cause and the “grey cardinal”, Surkov. Prokhorov urged his sup- the refusal of the Justice Ministry to register the Party of porters to leave the party, now no more than a “Kremlin People’s Freedom (detailed below), it has been presented puppet party”. Without Prokhorov’s charismatic leader- with an opportunity. Whether Yabloko has either the ship and, more importantly, without his vast wealth it is operational capacity or the necessary financial support to unlikely that Right Cause will be able to fight an effec- take full advantage of this opportunity is another matter. tive campaign unless it is allowed access to the regime’s “administrative resources”. At the time of writing the full The Non-Systemic, Principal Opposition: reasons for Prokhorov’s ouster were unclear and, given The People’s Freedom Party (PARNAS) the murky nature of Russian politics they are likely to The People’s Freedom Party, known in Russia by its acro- remain so. However, it seemed as though Prokhorov was nym, PARNAS, was founded in December 2010 by Boris paying the price, just as previously the Rodina (Moth- Nemtsov of the Solidarity movement and the leaders of erland) party and Sergei Mironov’s A Just Russia had, three other existing political movements: Mikhail Kasy- of straying too far from the Kremlin’s notion of “con- anov of the Russian People’s Democratic Union; Vlad- structive opposition”. imir Ryzhkov of the Republican Party of Russia; and Vladimir Milov of Democratic Choice. Like Nemtsov, The Kremlin--Sanctioned, Semi-Opposition: the three leaders, although clearly aligned to the dem- Yabloko ocratic opposition, have experience of working in, or Ever present on the party political scene since the first close to, government. elections to the State Duma in 1993 and perennial oppo- The failure of parties within the broad liberal-dem- sitionists during both the Yeltsin and Putin presiden- ocratic movement to form effective electoral coalitions cies, it is tempting to see Yabloko as the archetype Rus- or create a single united party has been a persistent phe- sian “principal” opposition party. However, since losing nomenon of post-Soviet Russian politics. Speculation Khodorkovsky’s funding in 2003 and having failed to over the possible creation of a unified liberal bloc was reach the threshold for parliamentary representation rife in the run-up to the 2003 parliamentary elections in two consecutive Duma elections, the party’s rela- and the failure to form an effective electoral coalition tionship with the Kremlin is ambiguous. Under Sergei was identified by some as being at the root of the subse- RUSSIAN ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 102, 26 September 2011 19

quent elimination of liberal parties from the State Duma tle over six months and which had received very lit- for the first time. The creation of PARNAS therefore, tle publicity. and the Solidarity movement which helped to spawn Following the Justice Ministry’s decision, divisions it, can be seen as a major achievement for Russia’s lib- emerged over what choice of strategy to follow. Some erals, bringing together representatives of the hitherto argued for a campaign of street protest to highlight previously fractious liberal strands. Social liberals such the failings of an electoral system which prevented the as former leader of the Yabloko youth movement, Ilya opposition from participating, many from this camp Yashin, are content for the time being to co-exist along- also support a campaign aimed at persuading voters to side economic liberals such as Boris Nemtsov and Vlad- spoil their ballot papers. Others, such as Vladimir Milov imir Milov. and the political and social activist and serial blogger, Few in the new party believed that it would be (not a member of either Solidarity or allowed to register for the parliamentary elections. More- PARNAS) have called for a campaign against United over, many Solidarity activists viewed any attempt to Russia. Rather than spoil their ballot papers (the sus- do so (involving the accumulation of 45,000 members picion being that such papers are more than likely to in half of Russia’s regions, the minimum requirement find their way into United Russia’s pot) voters should for registration) as being a drain on valuable resources. vote for any party other than the “party of thieves and Nevertheless the party went ahead with the project in swindlers” (Navalny’s depiction of United Russia and the fairly certain knowledge that registration would be now a term used regularly amongst opposition activists). denied. In an interview with the author, stated: Electoral Prospects “When we don’t take part in elections our opponents With Right Cause seemingly torn asunder, Yabloko say ‘why do you criticise when you didn’t even try to take unlikely to be able to mount an effective challenge and part in this election’. So we will do everything to regis- PARNAS prevented from standing, the prospects of ter the party and I am sure they will refuse us and after seeing any liberal opposition of whatever hue in the this we will have the moral right to criticise the system.” next State Duma remain bleak. Whilst the liberal par- As expected, in June 2011 the Justice Ministry ties have in the past made strategic errors (the failure of refused to register PARNAS, citing alleged discrepancies Yabloko and the Union of Right Forces to cooperate in with the party’s statutes and the membership list submit- any meaningful sense in 2003 being a prime example) ted. The ministry also claimed to have received commu- it is the nature of the political system under the Putin- nications from former members who had given up their Medvedev tandem rather than the actions of the par- membership after the list was compiled (although no ties which explains this state of affairs. The Russian such former members were identified). A second alleged political system can best be described, to use Andreas violation related to the party rules, which, the minis- Schedler’s term as “electoral authoritarian”, a model try claimed, did not include a provision for the man- associated with the Peruvian political system during datory rotation of party leaders. The party refuted the the years of Fujimori’s presidency when political oppo- charges, pointing out that possible discrepancies related sition was severely restricted. An electoral authoritar- to only 79 members out of a total of 46,000 (one thou- ian regime “plays the game of multiparty elections” but sand more than required for registration by the Law on ensures that effective opposition is shackled, essentially Political Parties). Moreover, lawyers for the party insisted making elections instruments of authoritarian rule. As that the charter did have a mechanism for the rotation the renowned political scientist, Robert Dahl, reminds of party leaders. Most analysts believed PARNAS had us, the presence of organised opposition is as central to been subject to far greater scrutiny by the Justice Min- the overall concept of liberal democracy as is the exis- istry than was strictly necessary. tence of free and fair elections. The glaring lack of organ- At the time of the Justice Ministry’s ruling, PARNAS ised opposition, liberal or otherwise, in the elections to was achieving opinion poll ratings of around three per- the State Duma in December suggests that Russia will cent – hardly spectacular but actually quite promising remain wedded to the electoral authoritarian model for for an unregistered party that had only existed for lit- the foreseeable future.

About the Author David White is a Lecturer in Politics at the University of Birmingham. He is the author of The Russian Democratic Party Yabloko: Opposition in a Managed Democracy (Ashgate Press, 2006) and a number of articles on party politics and the role of opposition in Russia.