Cyberwarfare in the C-Suite

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Cyberwarfare in the C-Suite CYBERCRIME FACTS AND STATISTICS STEVE MORGAN, EDITOR-IN-CHIEF AT CYBERCRIME MAGAZINE 2021 REPORT: CYBERWARFARE IN THE C-SUITE JAN. 21, 2021 PUBLISHED BY CYBERSECURITY VENTURES | SPONSORED BY INTRUSION, INC. | OFFICIALCYBERCRIME.COM S Cyberwarfare In The C-Suite is authored by E V Steve Morgan, Editor-in-Chief at I T Cybercrime Magazine, and published by U C Cybersecurity Ventures, the world’s leading E X researcher and Page ONE for the global E cyber economy, and a trusted source for E T I cybersecurity facts, figures, and statistics. U S - We provide cyber economic market data, insights, and C ground-breaking predictions to a global audience of CIOs R and IT executives, CSOs and CISOs, information security O F practitioners, cybersecurity company founders and CEOs, S venture capitalists, corporate investors, business and C I finance executives, HR professionals, and government T cyber defense leaders. S I T Cybercrime Magazine publishes our annual and quarterly A T reports covering global cybercrime, cyberwarfare, hacks S and data breaches, cybersecurity market forecasts and D spending predictions, publicly traded cybersecurity N companies and stock performance, M&A and VC funding A activity, cyber defense employment, and more. S T C Steve Morgan A Founder of Cybersecurity Ventures F Editor-In-Chief at Cybercrime Magazine E [email protected] M I Twitter.com/CybersecuritySF R Linkedin.com/in/CybersecuritySF C R E B Y C S Cyberwarfare In The C-Suite is sponsored E V I by INTRUSION, Inc., a cybersecurity T U innovator who has reframed the problem of C failed network security to successfully E X address the depth and breadth of cyber E E attacks experienced every 3 seconds in the T I United States alone. U S - C We believe your company network should be a safe place. R Free from ransomware, theft of trade secrets, harvesting O of corporate knowledge, insider threats, IoT extraction of F data, and many other forms of cyberwarfare and S cybercrime. C I T S We leverage decades of experience and dynamic I T technology to offer your organization the best possible A defense. We are passionate about winning the war on T cybercrime. That's why we offer important insights and S updates in the form of regular Threat Updates. D N A INTRUSION Shield™ is the newest Internet protection S solution for all businesses: small, medium and large T enterprises. INTRUSION Shield’s primary role is to identify C A and block all dangerous and harmful traffic. Shield does this F using a unique, patented process flow technology which E analyzes all network traffic - incoming and outgoing - to M I keep your business safe. R C For more information, visit intrusion.com. R E B Y C S If it were measured as a country, then E V cybercrime — which is predicted to I T inflict damages totaling $6 trillion USD U C globally in 2021 — would be the world’s E X third-largest economy after the U.S. and E China. E T I U Cybersecurity Ventures expects global cybercrime S - costs to grow by 15 percent per year over the next five C years, reaching $10.5 trillion USD annually by 2025, up R from $3 trillion USD in 2015. This represents the O greatest transfer of economic wealth in history, risks the F incentives for innovation and investment, is S C exponentially larger than the damage inflicted from I T natural disasters in a year, and will be more profitable S I than the global trade of all major illegal drugs combined. T A The damage cost estimation is based on historical T S cybercrime figures including recent year-over-year D growth, a dramatic increase in hostile nation-state N sponsored and organized crime gang hacking activities, A and a cyberattack surface which will be an order of S magnitude greater in 2025 than it is today. T C A Cybercrime costs include damage and destruction of F data, stolen money, lost productivity, theft of intellectual E property, theft of personal and financial data, M I embezzlement, fraud, post-attack disruption to the R normal course of business, forensic investigation, C R restoration and deletion of hacked data and systems, E and reputational harm. B Y 1 C S CYBERCRIME HITS HOME E V I T The United States, the world’s largest U C economy with a nominal GDP of nearly E X $21.5 trillion, constitutes one-fourth of the E world economy, according to data from E T I Nasdaq. U S - Cybercrime has hit the U.S. so hard that in 2018 a C supervisory special agent with the FBI who investigates R cyber intrusions told The Wall Street Journal that every O F American citizen should expect that all of their data S (personally identifiable information) has been stolen and C I is on the dark web — a part of the deep web — which is T intentionally hidden and used to conceal and promote S I heinous activities. Some estimates put the size of the T deep web (which is not indexed or accessible by search A T engines) at as much as 5,000 times larger than the S surface web, and growing at a rate that defies D quantification. N A The dark web is also where cybercriminals buy and sell S T malware, exploit kits, and cyberattack services, which C they use to strike victims — including businesses, A governments, utilities, and essential service providers on F E U.S. soil. M I A cyberattack could potentially disable the economy of a R C city, state or our entire country. R E B Y 2 C In his 2016 New York Times bestseller — Lights Out: A S E Cyberattack, A Nation Unprepared, Surviving the V I Aftermath — Ted Koppel reveals that a major T cyberattack on America’s power grid is not only possible U but likely, that it would be devastating, and that the U.S. C E is shockingly unprepared. X E Billionaire businessman and philanthropist Warren E Buffet calls cybercrime the number one problem with T I mankind, and cyberattacks a bigger threat to humanity U S than nuclear weapons. - C A bullseye is squarely on our nation’s businesses. R O F “Cybercriminals know they can hold businesses — and S our economy — hostage through breaches, ransomware, C I denial of service attacks and more. This is cyberwarfare, T S and we need to shift our mindset around cybersecurity I in order to protect against it,” says Jack B. Blount, T A president and CEO at INTRUSION, Inc. T S Organized cybercrime entities are joining forces, and D their likelihood of detection and prosecution is N A estimated to be as low as 0.05 percent in the U.S., S according to the World Economic Forum’s 2020 Global T Risk Report. C A F “Every American organization — in the public and private E sector — has been or will be hacked, is infected with M malware, and is a target of hostile nation-state cyber I R intruders,” adds Blount, formerly the CIO at the United C States Department of Agriculture (USDA). R E B Y 3 C S RANSOMWARE E V I T Ransomware — a malware that infects U C computers (and mobile devices) and E X restricts their access to files, often E threatening permanent data destruction E T I unless a ransom is paid — has reached U epidemic proportions globally and is the S - C “go-to method of attack” for R cybercriminals. O F S A 2017 report from Cybersecurity Ventures predicted C I ransomware damages would cost the world $5 billion in T 2017, up from $325 million in 2015 — a 15X increase in S I just two years. The damages for 2018 were estimated at T $8 billion, and for 2019 the figure rose to $11.5 billion. A T S The latest forecast is for global ransomware damage D costs to reach $20 billion by 2021 — which is 57X more N than it was in 2015. We predict there will be a A ransomware attack on businesses every 11 seconds in S T 2021, up from every 40 seconds in 2016. C A The FBI is particularly concerned with ransomware F E hitting healthcare providers, hospitals, 911 and first M responders. These types of cyberattacks can impact the I physical safety of American citizens, and this is the R C forefront of what Herb Stapleton, FBI cyber division R section chief, and his team are focused on. E B Y 4 C Late last year, ransomware claimed its first life. German S E authorities reported a ransomware attack caused the V I failure of IT systems at a major hospital in Duesseldorf, T and a woman who needed urgent admission died after U she had to be taken to another city for treatment. C E X E E T I U S - C R O F S C I T S I T A T S D N Ransomware, now the fastest growing and one of the A S most damaging types of cybercrime, will ultimately T convince senior executives to take the cyber threat C more seriously, according to Mark Montgomery, A F executive director at the U.S. Cyberspace Solarium E Commission (CSC) — but he hopes it doesn’t come to M that I R C PODCAST: Mark Montgomery, Executive Director at CSC and Jack R Blount, President & CEO at INTRUSION. [ LISTEN ] E B Y 5 C S CYBER ATTACK SURFACE E V I T The modern definition of the word “hack” U C was coined at MIT in April 1955.
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