A Simple Model of Copyright Levies: Implications for
Harmonization
Jin-Hyuk Kim
Abstract
This paper analyzes optimal copyright levies in a representative consumer model
and derives welfare implications for harmonization of levy rates. When the policymak-
ers place enough weight on the interests of collecting societies, harmonization could
lead to a reduction in social welfare. When countries are asymmetric, the country
with a larger proportion of foreign consumption and more ine¢ cient tax system loses
more from harmonization. A calibration exercise using European data shows that har-
monization would increase aggregate welfare. In some countries, both consumers and
policymakers are better o¤; however, in others, policymakers are worse o¤ although
consumers would gain from harmonization. (JEL F42, O34, O52)
Keywords: copyright levies; international harmonization
Department of Economics, University of Colorado at Boulder. E-mail: [email protected].
1 1 Introduction
A copyright levy, also called as a private copying levy, is a special tax that is charged on
various copying equipment and blank media that consumers use to produce copies for private
use and for non-commercial purposes. The levy systems were introduced in many European
countries under the EU Directive on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and
related rights in the information society (2001/29/EC).1 However, there is no European- wide levy system, but each Member States sets di¤erent levy rates to the same recording equipment and media. In all instances, the levies are set and administered by copyright collecting societies acting on behalf of rights holders.2 This process has often prompted heated national debates over the appropriate level of levies.
On the other hand, national variation in the size of levies distorts the single market, and the European Commission has attempted to harmonize copyright levies. The initiative launched by Charlie McCreevy, the Internal Markets Commissioner for the EU, in 2006 to harmonize levies was, however, aborted after political pressure from France. Press reports say that McCreevy was forced to back down by Commission President, who was indirectly pressured by French collecting societies and by the French government allegedly because income from the levies is used to …nance cultural events and projects (Mallinder 2008; Nie- mann 2010). Since then, the variation in levies remains considerable. For instance, in 2010
1 The Directive, in particular Article 5.2(b), allows Member States to introduce a variety of private copying exceptions and to provide for fair compensation for rightholders for the use made of their protected works. 22 out of the 27 Member States have implemented the exception accompanied by a levy system. In Ireland and the UK, private copying exceptions other than the time-shifting of broadcasts are not authorised, whereas in Malta, Greece, and Luxembourg, private copying exceptions were legislated into a law but no levy system has been introduced or enforced. 2 For instance, rightholders in foreign countries receive their dues via their local collecting society under the series of bilateral reciprocal agreements that each collecting society has with its sister societies in other countries.
2 the levy on a CD varies from e0.35 in France to e0.03 in Switzerland.
Collecting societies seem to wield in‡uence by lobbying at the national and supranational level. Levy rates have been increasing, and legislations to cut levies have been deterred.
Levies are often considered as a source of revenue for collecting societies as well as for rightholders. In particular, collective societies, before distributing the collected levies to domestic or foreign rightholders, often deduct a part of the collections to fund a variety of social and cultural programs for national artists from music festivals to pension funds.
The proportion of deductions are set by the national laws, which vary across countries.
That is, cultural funds are a matter of national policy with little cross-border e¤ects, so the deductions are set by each country’spolicymaker even if the levy were harmonized.
This paper builds a simple model to capture some of the salient features of copyright levy system. Based on the premise of the Directive that private copying causes economic harm to the rightholders, the model assumes that the levies can substitute in for the lower income that would result under private copying. Following Johnson (1985), the focus is on the long run, and I assume that the supply of creative goods would depend positively on the amount of creator’sremuneration. In addition, the e¢ ciency loss associated with commodity taxation is captured with an increasing function of levy rate, and the national policymakers are assumed to maximize the weighted sum of a representative consumer’s utility and the size of cultural funds re‡ecting the collecting societies’in‡uence on them.
The basic …ndings are intuitive. The levy rate chosen by the policymaker is always positive because of the market failure. Deduction for cultural funds is provided only when the policymaker places a su¢ ciently large weight on the interests of collecting societies.
At the interior solution, the levy rate increases with the collecting society’s in‡uence and
3 decreases with the marginal cost of taxation. An increase in consumer’s marginal utility reduces the size of cultural funds, but the levy rate remains the same. This basic model is then extended to a two-country setting to investigate the e¤ects of harmonization of levy rates across countries, where the two countries are linked through leakages and injections of levy collections that are distributed to foreign rightholders after deductions.
As is well known in the literature on macroeconomic policy coordination, harmoniza- tion of levies would internalize the spillovers across countries. This can be seen clearly in a symmetric country case, where the harmonized levy would be higher relative to the non- cooperative level. However, under the in‡uence of collecting societies, this means that the levy is even higher, so that both countries could be made worse o¤ after harmonization.
When countries are asymmetric, the country with a larger share of foreign consumption and more ine¢ ciency from commodity taxation would see its levy increase due to harmoniza- tion, and thus would be made worse o¤. Therefore, in the real world, where countries are heterogeneous, the aggregate welfare e¤ects could be ambiguous.
To assess how well the model explains the real world and what predictions it yields regarding the harmonization e¤orts, I calibrate the above model using available data on how the levies were distributed to domestic and foreign rights holders, respectively, and for the social and cultural purposes in ten European countries. The estimated policymaker’s weight on the size of cultural funds is three times larger than the weight on a representative consumer, from which each countries’ine¢ ciency parameter is backed out. The harmonized levy rate is calculated by maximizing the aggregate utility of the policymakers using both equal weight as well as the actual number of votes in the European Council. Given this, the size of cultural funds are determined by each policymaker.
4 This exercise reveals that while the harmonization increases the aggregate social welfare, which is de…ned as the sum of each country’sconsumer welfare including any e¢ ciency loss but excluding the policymaker’s weight on cultural funds, there is a considerable variation across countries. For instance, Germany and Spain gain the most from the harmonization and their policymakers are also made better o¤ with harmonized levies. However, in some countries, like France and Austria, the policymakers are made worse o¤ and thus may oppose to harmonization initiatives despite that their consumer welfare would increase moderately.
Another …nding is that a fewer number of policymakers would be made worse o¤ by the harmonization if the countries’voting rights were equally distributed.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brie‡y discusses the rele- vant literature. Section 3 lays out the basic model and characterizes the equilibrium. Section
4 extends the model to a two-country setting and analyzes the implications of harmoniza- tion both for symmetric and asymmetric countries. Section 5 calibrates the model using data from ten European countries and calculates the welfare consequences of counterfactual, harmonized levies. Section 6 concludes.
2 Literature Review
Economists have taken an interest in the copying and copyright issues with the advances of copying technologies. The two most thoroughly investigated issues appear to be the short- run pricing e¤ect and the optimal level of copyright protection.3 Recently, researchers have
3 See, for example, Novos and Waldman (1984) and Liebowitz (1985). The literature has developed well beyond these seminal papers, which I do not attempt to survey here. See Peitz and Waelbroeck (2006) and Towse et al. (2008) for recent surveys.
5 begun to examine the issue of hardware taxation or copyright levies. For instance, Chen and Png (2003) show that it is socially optimal to charge a levy on copying media rather than to impose a …ne on infringing users. In Gayer and Shy (2003), the optimal levy rate is positive when piracy endangers the existence of creative industry which has a high …xed cost. Kinokuni (2005) adds that the optimal levy rate could be positive because if the levy is too low, then creators may adopt copy-protection technology.
The strength of this short-run framework is its micro-foundation of pro…t-maximizing behavior for a given copyrighted good, whereas long-run analysis that addresses the supply response has been generally lacking in these models. An important exception is Johnson
(1985), who captures the supply response in the long run with a simple reduced form equation that is an increasing function of the pro…t.4 He then performs social welfare calculation based on his model and …nds that the optimal levy can be a large fraction (68 percent) of the market price of the originals because the long-run bene…t exceeds the short-run cost. This paper contributes to the long-run assessment of the copyright levy system that takes into account the in‡uence of collecting societies on the policymakers.5
This paper is also related to the literature on international policy coordination. The traditional approach is to model interacting governments as optimizing agents who choose policy instruments. Not surprisingly, the basic …nding is that, in models of international spillovers, coordination can lead to an e¢ ciency gain. In some instances, however, policy
4 Another strand of literature examines the supply response to changes in copyright terms, where recent empirical evidence suggests that the current copyright term may be excessive (see, e.g., Boldrin and Levine 2009; Png and Wang 2009). 5 Huang and Png (2010) empirically …nd some evidence that levies are in‡uenced by both content produc- ers’slobbying and the median consumer’spreference. More speci…cally, the odds of having a levy system are higher in countries where consumers’ethical costs are lower, which is consistent with lobbying equilibrium. However, when interacted with a measure of democracy, the odds are lower with lower ethical costs, which is an evidence that levies are also in‡uenced by consumers’preferences.
6 coordination can be counterproductive.6 In investigating incentives to harmonize intellectual property protection through international treaties, Scotchmer (2004) shows that harmoniza- tion can improve upon tendencies to underprovide unilateral protection due to out‡ow of pro…ts, but it is not an e¢ cient solution when unilateral protection is su¢ cient for incentives or public sponsorship is the most e¢ cient way to fund R&D.
This paper shows another channel through which policy coordination may reduce welfare.
That is, when the policymaker maximizes his own objective function that weighs more heav- ily on lobbying group than social welfare, coordination which internalizes foreign spillovers could move government policy in the direction of reducing social welfare. When countries are asymmetric and policies are strategic substitutes, Casella (1992) shows that not all cooper- ative equilibria will dominate noncooperative solution, in particular, from the point of view of smaller or weaker countries. This general intuition holds in this paper, too. Moreover, calibration results seem consistent with Casella’s argument that the weaker countries need more than proportional weight in common policy-making.
3 The Model
Consider a society, which is populated by a unit measure of identical consumers who have quasi-linear preferences on consumption of copyrighted goods and a numeraire. I assume that due to an easy access to copying technology and the prohibitive cost of monitoring
6 A well-known case is that when policymakers face time-inconsistency problems, coordination eliminates competition between policymakers, who then become more opportunistic ex post and adopt a policy that reduces the representative citizen’swelfare (Rogo¤ 1985).
7 private copying, the measure of consumers who purchase the originals is zero in equilibrium.7
That is, market failure occurs and no copyrighted goods will be supplied without e¤ective
copyright protection because of its public good nature. Thus, the government has to tax the
sale of copying equipment and/or blank media as a second-best solution. The government
also determines how much to deduct from the levy collections for cultural funds.
These funds are spent on hosting various cultural and social events as well as supporting
welfare programs for authors and artists. I assume that the number of authors and artists
is …nite, hence measure zero, so that the spent on cultural funds do not contribute to the
social welfare, which in this model is the same as consumer welfare. This is a simplifying
assumption, but on the other hand, the use of such deductions has not been well understood
due to the closed nature of the collecting society’s businesses. Moreover, recently, some
collecting societies have been charged with fraudulently siphoning o¤ funds destined for
artists. Let and denote the size of the levy and cultural deductions per consumer.
After deduction, levy proceeds are distributed to the rightholders as private copying
remuneration, which stimulates the long-run supply. I assume a simple linear production
technology, l = , where l is the supply of creative goods.8 Assume that the consumer’s utility function u(l) satis…es the Inada conditions. The levies also create the usual deadweight loss associated with commodity taxation, which is captured by a continuous convex function