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In the United States District Court
Case 1:13-cv-06802-WHP Document 567 Filed 05/02/16 Page 1 of 17 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK THE DIAL CORPORATION, et al., Civil Action No. 13-cv-06802-WHP Individually and on behalf of Similarly Situated Companies, Plaintiffs, v. NEWS CORPORATION, et al., Defendants. DECLARATION OF STEVEN F. BENZ IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF SETTLEMENT Case 1:13-cv-06802-WHP Document 567 Filed 05/02/16 Page 2 of 17 I, Steven F. Benz, declare as follows: 1. I submit this declaration in support of preliminary approval of the settlement reached on behalf of the certified Class and Defendants News Corporation, News America, Inc., News America Marketing In-Store Services L.L.C., and News America Marketing FSI L.L.C. (collectively, “Defendants”). 2. I am a partner with the law firm of Kellogg, Huber, Hansen, Todd, Evans & Figel, P.L.L.C. (“Kellogg Huber”), which is Co-Lead Counsel for the Class of plaintiffs certified by the Court on June 18, 2015. I am a member of good standing of the District of Columbia, Iowa, Maryland and Minnesota bars, and am admitted to practice before this Court pro hac vice. I have personal knowledge of the matters set forth in this declaration. I became involved in this case at its inception in 2011 and am closely familiar with all aspects of this case since that time. 3. Both Kellogg Huber and I personally have significant experience with antitrust litigation and class actions, including settlements thereof. Copies of my firm’s resume and my personal profile are annexed to this declaration as Exhibit A. -
Regulating Local Variations in Federal Sentencing
BIBAS LOCAL VARIATIONS IN FEDERAL SENTENCING 58 STAN. L. REV. 137 10/28/2005 1:29:23 PM REGULATING LOCAL VARIATIONS IN FEDERAL SENTENCING Stephanos Bibas* INTRODUCTION................................................................................................ 137 I. TYPES, COSTS, AND SOURCES OF LOCAL VARIATION.................................. 139 A. Justified and Unjustified Types of Local Variation............................. 139 B. Sources of Local Variation.................................................................. 141 II. A CASE STUDY OF UNJUSTIFIED VARIATION: FAST-TRACK PROGRAMS.... 145 III. A MIXED BAG: SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE DEPARTURES ........................ 148 A. How Substantial Assistance Works in Practice................................... 148 B. How To Achieve the Right Blend of Uniformity .................................. 151 CONCLUSION ................................................................................................... 154 INTRODUCTION While federalism justifies variations among state laws, federal criminal law is supposed to be a uniform national response to crimes of national import. On paper, a single set of federal criminal statutes and Federal Sentencing Guidelines applies uniformly throughout the United States. But in practice, federal criminal charges and sentences vary greatly from state to state and from district to district. For example, some districts regularly prosecute low-level drug offenders. Others set high drug-quantity thresholds for charging and refer less significant cases -
Neuroscience and Sentencing
Fordham Law Review Volume 85 Issue 2 Article 7 2016 Neuroscience and Sentencing Nancy Gertner Harvard Law School Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons, and the Law and Psychology Commons Recommended Citation Nancy Gertner, Neuroscience and Sentencing, 85 Fordham L. Rev. 533 (2016). Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol85/iss2/7 This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact [email protected]. NEUROSCIENCE AND SENTENCING Nancy Gertner* INTRODUCTION This symposium comes at a propitious time for me. I am reviewing the sentences I was obliged to give to hundreds of men—mostly African American men—over the course of a seventeen-year federal judicial career.1 As I have written elsewhere, I believe that 80 percent of the sentences that I imposed were unfair, unjust, and disproportionate.2 Everything that I thought was important—that neuroscientists, for example, have found to be salient in affecting behavior—was irrelevant to the analysis I was supposed to conduct. My goal—for which this symposium plays an important part—is to reevaluate those sentences now under a more rational and humane system, this time at least informed by the insights of science. The question is how to do that: How can neuroscience contribute to the enterprise and what are the pitfalls? This Article represents a few of my preliminary conclusions, but my retrospective analysis is not complete. -
Mattos Chassidus on the Massei ~ Mattos Chassidus on the Parsha +
LIGHTS OF OUR RIGHTEOUS TZADDIKIM בעזרת ה ' יתבר A Tzaddik, or righteous person , makes everyone else appear righteous before Hashem by advocating for them and finding their merits. Kedushas Levi, Parshas Noach (Bereishis 7:1) MATTOS ~ MASSEI _ CHASSIDUS ON THE PARSHA + Dvar Torah – Mattos Keep Your Word The Torah states (30:3), “If a man takes a vow or swears an oath to G -d to establish a prohibition upon himself, he shall not violate his word; he shall fulfill whatever comes out of his mouth.” In relation to this passuk , the Midrash quotes from Tehillim (144:4), “Our days are like a fleeting shadow.” What is the connection? This can be explained, says Rav Levi Yitzchok, according to a Gemara ( Nedarim 10b), which states, “It is forbidden to say, ‘ Lashem korban , for G-d − an offering.’ Instead a person must say, ‘ Korban Lashem , an offering for G -d.’ Why? Because he may die before he says the word korban , and then he will have said the holy Name in vain.” In this light, we can understand the Midrash. The Torah states that a person makes “a vow to G-d.” This i s the exact language that must be used, mentioning the vow first. Why? Because “our days are like a fleeting shadow,” and there is always the possibility that he may die before he finishes his vow and he will have uttered the Name in vain. n Story The wood chopper had come to Ryczywohl from the nearby village in which he lived, hoping to find some kind of employment. -
17-15016 Date Filed: 03/27/2020 Page: 1 of 104
Case: 17-15016 Date Filed: 03/27/2020 Page: 1 of 104 [PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________ No. 17-15016 ________________________ D.C. Docket No. 5:14-mc-00002-MTT MARION E. PITCH, The Personal Representative of the Estate of Anthony S. Pitch, Plaintiff – Appellee, LAURA WEXLER, Intervenor, versus UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant – Appellant. ________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia ________________________ (March 27, 2020) Case: 17-15016 Date Filed: 03/27/2020 Page: 2 of 104 Before ED CARNES, Chief Judge, WILSON, WILLIAM PRYOR, MARTIN, JORDAN, ROSENBAUM, JILL PRYOR, NEWSOM, BRANCH, GRANT, TJOFLAT, and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.* TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge: The grand jury, as an institution, has long been understood as a “constitutional fixture in its own right,” operating independently of any branch of the federal government. United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 47, 112 S. Ct. 1735, 1742 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted). That independence allows the grand jury to serve as a buffer between the government and the people with respect to the enforcement of the criminal law. But the ability of the grand jury to serve this purpose depends upon maintaining the secrecy of its proceedings. The long-established policy of upholding the secrecy of the grand jury helps to protect the innocent accused from facing unfounded charges, encourages full and frank testimony on the part of witnesses, and prevents interference with the grand jury’s deliberations. See Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Nw., 441 U.S. -
History of the U.S. Attorneys
Bicentennial Celebration of the United States Attorneys 1789 - 1989 "The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor– indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one." QUOTED FROM STATEMENT OF MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND, BERGER V. UNITED STATES, 295 U. S. 88 (1935) Note: The information in this document was compiled from historical records maintained by the Offices of the United States Attorneys and by the Department of Justice. Every effort has been made to prepare accurate information. In some instances, this document mentions officials without the “United States Attorney” title, who nevertheless served under federal appointment to enforce the laws of the United States in federal territories prior to statehood and the creation of a federal judicial district. INTRODUCTION In this, the Bicentennial Year of the United States Constitution, the people of America find cause to celebrate the principles formulated at the inception of the nation Alexis de Tocqueville called, “The Great Experiment.” The experiment has worked, and the survival of the Constitution is proof of that. -
Members by Circuit (As of January 3, 2017)
Federal Judges Association - Members by Circuit (as of January 3, 2017) 1st Circuit United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Bruce M. Selya Jeffrey R. Howard Kermit Victor Lipez Ojetta Rogeriee Thompson Sandra L. Lynch United States District Court District of Maine D. Brock Hornby George Z. Singal John A. Woodcock, Jr. Jon David LeVy Nancy Torresen United States District Court District of Massachusetts Allison Dale Burroughs Denise Jefferson Casper Douglas P. Woodlock F. Dennis Saylor George A. O'Toole, Jr. Indira Talwani Leo T. Sorokin Mark G. Mastroianni Mark L. Wolf Michael A. Ponsor Patti B. Saris Richard G. Stearns Timothy S. Hillman William G. Young United States District Court District of New Hampshire Joseph A. DiClerico, Jr. Joseph N. LaPlante Landya B. McCafferty Paul J. Barbadoro SteVen J. McAuliffe United States District Court District of Puerto Rico Daniel R. Dominguez Francisco Augusto Besosa Gustavo A. Gelpi, Jr. Jay A. Garcia-Gregory Juan M. Perez-Gimenez Pedro A. Delgado Hernandez United States District Court District of Rhode Island Ernest C. Torres John J. McConnell, Jr. Mary M. Lisi William E. Smith 2nd Circuit United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Barrington D. Parker, Jr. Christopher F. Droney Dennis Jacobs Denny Chin Gerard E. Lynch Guido Calabresi John Walker, Jr. Jon O. Newman Jose A. Cabranes Peter W. Hall Pierre N. LeVal Raymond J. Lohier, Jr. Reena Raggi Robert A. Katzmann Robert D. Sack United States District Court District of Connecticut Alan H. NeVas, Sr. Alfred V. Covello Alvin W. Thompson Dominic J. Squatrito Ellen B. -
March 12, 2013
REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES March 12, 2013 The Judicial Conference of the United States convened in Washington, D.C., on March 12, 2013, pursuant to the call of the Chief Justice of the United States issued under 28 U.S.C. § 331. The Chief Justice presided, and the following members of the Conference were present: First Circuit: Chief Judge Sandra L. Lynch Judge Paul J. Barbadoro, District of New Hampshire Second Circuit: Chief Judge Dennis Jacobs Chief Judge Carol Bagley Amon, Eastern District of New York Third Circuit: Chief Judge Theodore A. McKee Judge Joel A. Pisano,1 District of New Jersey Fourth Circuit: Chief Judge William B. Traxler, Jr. Chief Judge Deborah K. Chasanow, District of Maryland 1Designated by the Chief Justice as a substitute for Chief Judge Gary L. Lancaster, Western District of Pennsylvania, who was unable to attend. Judicial Conference of the United States March 12, 2013 Fifth Circuit: Chief Judge Carl E. Stewart Chief Judge Sarah S. Vance, Eastern District of Louisiana Sixth Circuit: Chief Judge Alice M. Batchelder Chief Judge Thomas A. Varlan, Eastern District of Tennessee Seventh Circuit: Chief Judge Frank H. Easterbrook Judge Ruben Castillo, Northern District of Illinois Eighth Circuit: Chief Judge William Jay Riley Judge Rodney W. Sippel, Eastern District of Missouri Ninth Circuit: Chief Judge Alex Kozinski Judge Robert S. Lasnik, Western District of Washington Tenth Circuit: Chief Judge Mary Beck Briscoe Judge Dee V. Benson, District of Utah Eleventh Circuit: Chief Judge Joel F. Dubina Judge W. Louis Sands, Middle District of Georgia 2 Judicial Conference of the United States March 12, 2013 District of Columbia Circuit: Chief Judge Merrick B. -
Choosing the Next Supreme Court Justice: an Empirical Ranking of Judicial Performance†
Choosing the Next Supreme Court Justice: † An Empirical Ranking of Judicial Performance Stephen Choi* ** Mitu Gulati † © 2004 Stephen Choi and Mitu Gulati. * Roger J. Traynor Professor, U.C. Berkeley Law School (Boalt Hall). ** Professor of Law, Georgetown University. Kindly e-mail comments to [email protected] and [email protected]. Erin Dengan, Édeanna Johnson-Chebbi, Margaret Rodgers, Rishi Sharma, Jennifer Dukart, and Alice Kuo provided research assistance. Kimberly Brickell deserves special thanks for her work. Aspects of this draft benefited from discussions with Alex Aleinikoff, Scott Baker, Lee Epstein, Tracey George, Prea Gulati, Vicki Jackson, Mike Klarman, Kim Krawiec, Kaleb Michaud, Un Kyung Park, Greg Mitchell, Jim Rossi, Ed Kitch, Paul Mahoney, Jim Ryan, Paul Stefan, George Triantis, Mark Seidenfeld, and Eric Talley. For comments on the draft itself, we are grateful to Michael Bailey, Suzette Baker, Bill Bratton, James Brudney, Steve Bundy, Brannon Denning, Phil Frickey, Michael Gerhardt, Steve Goldberg, Pauline Kim, Bill Marshall, Don Langevoort, Judith Resnik, Keith Sharfman, Steve Salop, Michael Seidman, Michael Solimine, Gerry Spann, Mark Tushnet, David Vladeck, Robin West, Arnold Zellner, Kathy Zeiler, Todd Zywicki and participants at workshops at Berkeley, Georgetown, Virginia, FSU, and UNC - Chapel Hill. Given the unusually large number of people who have e-mailed us with comments on this project, it is likely that there are some who we have inadvertently failed to thank. Our sincerest apologies to them. Disclosure: Funding for this project was provided entirely by our respective law schools. One of us was a law clerk to two of the judges in the sample: Samuel Alito of the Third Circuit and Sandra Lynch of the First Circuit. -
Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL RULES November 2, 2020 AGENDA Meeting of the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules November 2, 2020 1. Opening Business A. Chair’s Remarks and Administrative Announcements (Oral Report) B. ACTION: Review and Approval of Minutes • Draft Minutes of the May 5, 2020 Meeting of the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules .......................................................23 C. Report of the Rules Committee Staff • Report on the June 2020 Meeting of the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure • Draft Minutes of the June 23, 2020 Meeting of the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure ...............49 • Report on the September 2020 Session of the Judicial Conference of the United States • September 2020 Report of the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure to the Judicial Conference of the United States (appendices omitted) ............................79 • Rules and Projects Pending Before Congress, the Supreme Court, the Judicial Conference, and the Rules Committees • Chart Tracking Proposed Rules Amendments ...............103 • Legislative Update • Legislation That Directly or Effectively Amends the Federal Rules (116th Congress) ...............................109 2. Draft New Rule 62 (Rules Emergency) A. Reporters’ Memorandum (October 14, 2020) ............................................121 B. Supporting Materials • Draft New Rule 62 and Committee Note .....................................141 • Chart Comparing Draft New Rule 62 with the CARES Act .......153 • Memorandum from Kevin Crenny, Rules -
Neuroscience and Sentencing
NEUROSCIENCE AND SENTENCING Nancy Gertner* INTRODUCTION This symposium comes at a propitious time for me. I am reviewing the sentences I was obliged to give to hundreds of men—mostly African American men—over the course of a seventeen-year federal judicial career.1 As I have written elsewhere, I believe that 80 percent of the sentences that I imposed were unfair, unjust, and disproportionate.2 Everything that I thought was important—that neuroscientists, for example, have found to be salient in affecting behavior—was irrelevant to the analysis I was supposed to conduct. My goal—for which this symposium plays an important part—is to reevaluate those sentences now under a more rational and humane system, this time at least informed by the insights of science. The question is how to do that: How can neuroscience contribute to the enterprise and what are the pitfalls? This Article represents a few of my preliminary conclusions, but my retrospective analysis is not complete. I approach the issue of neuroscience and sentencing from three vantage points. First, I look at the sentencer’s brain. I ask who the sentencing decision maker is and what cognitive and other pressures the sentencer experiences.3 The insights of neuroscience will be a nullity if they are filtered through a system—like the one I labored under—that makes them irrelevant, ignored, and even trivialized. Likewise, science will be irrelevant if decades of a mandatory sentencing system has affected the cognitive lens through which judges today see the sentencing task, as I believe it has. Nearly thirty years of sentencing by a flawed formula—of avoiding the exercise of meaningful discretion; of major changes in the division of labor on * Senior Lecturer on Law, Harvard Law School; Judge (Ret.), U.S. -
September(27+29,(2013( Hon
Jus4ces(and( Judges( Women&Transforming&Our& Communi1es&and&the&World& September(27+29,(2013( Hon. Ruth I. Abrams Class of 1956 “… it was clear one judge didn’t want me in the courtroom [even though I was the Assistant DA in Middlesex County]. He said I could not be in the courtroom without a hat and white gloves. The white hat and gloves were an excuse. Do you know how dirty the old Middlesex County courthouse was?” Honorable Ruth I. Abrams (Ret.) Justice, First Female Justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Harvard Law School Class of 1956 Radcliffe College (A.B., 1953) Hon. Cynthia G. Aaron '84 Hon. Sharon V. Burrell '82 Hon. Mary Grace Diehl '77 Hon. Justice Arden '70 Hon. Zoe A. Bush '79 Hon. Raya S. Dreben '54 Hon. Christine M. Arguello '80 Hon. V. Buthelezi-Khampepe '82 Hon. Fernande R. V. Duffly '78 Hon. Deborah A. Batts '72 Hon. Diane O. Campbell '76 Hon. Antoinette L. Dupont '54 Hon. Carol Berkman '67 Hon. Yvonne E. Campos '88 Hon. Jacquelyn P. Eckert '94 Hon. Marie-France Bich '80 Hon. Susan L. Carney '77 Hon. Maryanne E. Elliott '90 Hon. Cathy Bissoon '93 Hon. Denise Jefferson Casper '94 Hon. Christine C. Ewell '86 Hon. Catherine C. Blake '75 Hon. Shelley C. Chapman '81 Hon. Gail Ruderman Feuer '84 Hon. Karen J. Brandt '79 Hon. Dorothy Chin-Brandt '75 Hon. Dale S. Fischer '80 Hon. F. S. Brenneman '53 Hon. Cynthia J. Cohen '75 Hon. Fern Fisher '78 Hon. Eileen M. Brewer '87 Hon. Laura A. Cordero '88 Hon.