Our River Crossing, Offensive, Deliberate Assault, River Crossing
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vE?5cv ligb 1 L lK t lIn CSI BATTLEBOOK I.S. ,(TTLFFr 6E 0'. R F.IER C~ O 6!I t bS'~ ES n Ltute O~TO ELECTE f COMBAT I STUDIES INSTITUTE - 84-C;(: 326,2 jkpprOVFt) FOR PUBLIC RElEASE: Disa1UTO~86 :3 2O;03O **e CST BATTLEE-:rJK 16-B O'JR RIVER CROSSINE3 Combat Studies Institute * Fort Leavenworth, Kansas EL TS I ,',-. -c, m. S~DaMAR 2 ELEASE: A ... FOR pUI3-C DisTaiBUTION UNLIMITED. SCURITY CLASE:FICA71CN OF THIS PAGE (147on Date Entered) REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FCR~f 1 RPCR NUbER2.GOVT ACCESSION No. 3. RECIPIENT*S CATALOG NUMBER .1 E (and Subttl) S. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED Jur River Crossing, Offensive, Deliberate Assaultiersintdn ppr N~E SPERFORMING ORG.REOTNMR ~ QR8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(e) rl'JIMcCord 4.1 hmed, D,)ickinson, 1i' yr I'Ea -A Estrada, tHiller, DHuia JMartin, T Poole RRichter, J Sabia, J Saltness, D Speck, 0 Wilian 9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS * 10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT. TASK Combat Studies Institute, USACGSC AREA &WORK UNIT NUMBERS K ATZL-SWI, Ft. Leavenworth, KS 66027 11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS 12. REPORT DATE Combat Studies Institute, USACGSC .23 May 1984 KATZL-SWI, Ft, Leavenworth, KS 66027 13. NUMBER OF PAGES 14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME 6 ADDRESS(I1 different from Controllng Office) IS. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report) Unclassified:2 I3a. DECL ASSI FICATION/ DOWNGRADING I% SCHEDULE 16. Di ST RIBUTI ON ST AT EMEN T (of this.Report) APPROV7ED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE: DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstfract entered In Block 20, If different from Report) IS. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES A battlebook prepared by students of the US A!%y Command ,and General Staff Colljege under the supervision of Combat Sttidies Institute as part of the I' Battle Analysis Program. *. 19 KEY w-_p:S (Ccnjtrnue an re~erse side if necoeivy and Identify by block number) History, Case Studies, Military Operations, Tactical Analysis, Battles, Military Tactics, Tactical Warfare, Antitank Warfare, Armor, Artillery, Infantry, Tanks (Combat Vehicles). Free Terms: Battle Analysis, World War II, Assault, River Crossing. rRiver Crossing, Offensive, Deliberate r41ArC1 (-ccaas *a revere aide if necwwoea and Identify by block ntmber) Action around the Our River bridgehead in February 1945 by the 6th Armored Division was an effort to divert Germans from an attack by the US XII Corps. Nevertheless, this action provided a basis for penetrating the West Wall. As a foolow up to the Allied march across France, the pace was slowed as units neare( Germany. The lessons of-the tombined Arms team in securing and exploiting a K heavily defended bridgehead are clearly demonstrated. IFOR" 147 EDITINo or IaNO S IS OBSOLETE 'C3SFTE SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS~ PAGE (WDo!* Entered) K.' lITLE PAGE OUR RIVER CROSSING OFFENSIVE, DELIbERATE ASSAULT, RIVER CROSSING Accession For US 6TH ARMORED DIVISION NTIS GRA&I vs DTIC TAB GERM4AN 167TH VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION Justnfincedon By FEBRUARY 1945 Distribution/ Availability Codes vail and/or Dist Special - PREPARED BY: STAFF GROUP B, SECTION 16 I STAFF GROUP LEADER-MAO JAhES NCCORD . MEMBERS. CPT hOHAMED AHMED M4AJ JULIAN MARTIN ' . MAJ DON DICKINSON HAJ THOMAS POOLE hAO HERBERT DYER MAO ROBERT RICHTER MAJ JANES EGAN MAO JACK SABIA MAO ARTHUR ESTRADA MAO JERRY SALTNESS MAO FRANK HILLER kAJ DANIEL SPECK MAO DANIEL HOULIHAN MAJO0.0. WILLIAMS Submitted to the Combat Studies Institute, U. S Army Command and General Staft College, in partial fulfillment of the requirements tor subcourse P651, Battle Analysis. FORT LEAVENWORTH MAY 1984 _. *s_ r-7-~ -7 -j 77 V rr7 T T 7 ABSTRACT COMMON REFEkENCE: OUR RIVER CROSSING TYPE OPERATIONS: Offensive, Deliberate Assault, River Crossing OPPOSING FORCES: U.S. bth Armored Division GERMAN 167th Volksgrenadier Division SYNOPSIS: Action around the Our River briagehead in February 1945 by the 6th Armored Division was an effort to divert Germans from an attack by the U.S. XII Corps. Never- theless, this action provided a basis for penetrating the West Wall. As a follow up to the All led match ' across France, the pace slowed as units neared Germany. The lessons of the Combined Arms team in securing and exploiting a heavily defended bridgehead are clearly demonstrated. .- ° * -.. :.-.,* - :. .. - . .. **'**q** TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION PART TITLE PAGE --- INTRODUCTION TO THE BATTLE 1 A SYNOPSIS OF THE BATTLE 1 B SOURCE MATERIALS 4 II THE STRATEGIC SETTING 8 A GENERAL BACKGROUND 8 B ALLIED CAMPAIGNS IN EUROPE 10 C THE EIFFEL CAMPAIGN 12 D HISTORY OF THE 6TH - ARMORED DIVISION 15 E VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISIONS 20 III THE TACTICAL SITUATION AND FIGHT 24 A MAJOR PHASES OF THE BATTLE 24 B THE KEY EVENTS 36 C THE OUTCOME OF THE BATTLE 39 IV SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ACTION 45 A IMMEDIATE 45 B LONG-TERM 47 C MILITARY LESSONS LEARNED 50 ii -oK F'% p % ........................ ...... SECTION I INTRODUCTION TO THE BATTLE PART A SYNOPSIS OF THE BATTLE This is an analysis of the deliberate river crossing conducted by an armored division in the European theater of operations during World War II. The crossing of the OUR River by the United States 6th Armored Division during the period 5-8 February 1945 provides the student of military history and combat operations with a classic case of an opposed deliberate river crossing operation. This battle clearly demonstrates the lessons to be learned in employing a Combined Arms team in securing and exploiting a heavily defended bridgehead. At the conclusion of the ARDENNES Campaign the Allies had defeated a strong German counteroffensive by 26 January 1945. Allied forces were arrayed against the Germans along a north-south line west of the OUR River along the German border. These Allied forces were poised to resume the offensive into the German heartland. This offensive was designed to be the final overwhelming strike which would cause the complete collapse and surrender of Nazi Germany. The 6th U.S. Armored Division, belonging to III Corps, Third U.S. Army, 12th Army Group, was deployed on a 12 mile front along a high ridge between the CLERF and OUR RiverS from LIELER to UBER " "%-. * ,7 EISENBACH on 27 January 1945. This ridge was nicknamed "skyline drive". The Division conducted aggressive patrolling between its positions and the OUR River to prevent enemy infiltration and prepared plans to cross the river and continue the attack to the northeast. The Corps mission at this time was to continue the attack to clear enemy from the west bank of the OUR, to maintain an aggressive defense, and to prepare to attack to the east on Army order. (3:204) On 4 February 1945, Corps extended the 6th Armored Division sector one mile to the north in order to realign units because of the shift of VIII Corps northward in preparation for its assault across the OUR and against the SIEGFRIED LINE or WEST WALL. The VIII Corps offensive was to be Third Army's main effort. On 5 February, 6th Armored Division received orders from III Corps to plan for and conduct a reconnaissance in force across the OUR River during the night of 6-7 February. The Division was to establish a bridgehead on the east bank of the OUR River and maintain the bridgehead in order to facilitate future operations to the east. It appeared that the SIEGFREID LINE was inadequately manned on the Corps front. Corps further believed that the bulk of F enemy strategic reserves east of the OUR had been withdrawn. .-, (4:36) Four crossing sites over the OUR had been chosen by reconnaissance parties. Division chose Reserve Command to 2 . establish the bridgehead because it was most familiar with the terrain. Reserve Command planned to make the crossing with two infantry battalions and establish a bridgehead on the high ground north of DAHNEN. Due to a thaw, the OUR River was swollen to several times its normal width and was flowing at the rate of 15 miles per hour. A relatively minor stream had become a major .. obstacle. In a well planned and executed operation blessed with a certain amount of luck, crossings at two sites were successfully accomplished by reinforced rifle companies. These crossings were accomplished above and below the KALBORN-DAHNEN road. In spite L of the rising river, which increased in width by fifteen feet during the ensuing 24 hours, three foot bridges, two pontoon bridges, and a suspension bridge were established. (4:36) Despite the fact that the suspension bridge was destroyed by enemy mortar fire shortly after its erection, a bridgehead two miles wide and one mile deep was firmly established by 8 February. This specific operation deserves study because it shows how a _ major and difficult obstacle can be successfully negotiated. The 6th Armored Division accomplished its mission of an opposed night river crossing. Elements contributing to this outcome were U~iF 3 -. "t * detailed planning, the prudent task organization using the proper mix of combat arms, combat support and combat service support - assets, and effective operation security. There are many lessons for today's soldier to learn about river crossing operations by I [. Combined Arms teams through the study of this battle. This is * the significance of this operation and the purpose for which this * paper is written. PART B SOURCE MATERIALS General knowledge concerning operations in the European theater were obtained principally from the following sources: THE LAST OFFENSIVE by Charles B. MacDonald, EISENHOWER'S LIEUTENANTS by Russell F. Weigley, HISTORY OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR by B. H. Liddell Hart, and THE WEST POINT ATLAS OF AMERICAN WARS edited by . BG Vincent J. Esposito. These are all academic works by noted historians.