Strategic Communications and the Decline of the US Soft Power
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XIII Strategic Communications and the Decline of US Soft Power Gene E. Bigler· Abstract our strategic communications practices tend to build on one another in con Ftributing to the widely noted and contin uing decline in US soft power. First is the problem of inattention to audiences. By neglecting them as we prosecute the war on terrorism, the war of ideas seems to swell more with critics and combatants than allies. Second, recent approaches to strategic communications tend to em phasize process and consistency in uniting messages, but the role of the national executive in achieving convergence may be more crucial. That is, sending identical or even reinforcing messages may not be as important as making sure that the mes sages are consistent with audience expectations about US policy. Third, Depart ment of State (DoS) financing for public diplomacy has increased only incrementally, if that, while the Department of Defense (000 ) weight in the total flo w of strategic communications, as in foreign policy generally, seems to have es calated along with its b udget. The continuing deterioration of opinion suggests that the mix of communications is not working, and it certainly contradicts expert advice on the resources needed for public diplomacy. Finally, the growing concern about the militarization of US foreign policy may reflect the rejection of the "military as messenger" for the United States, even if " Visiting Professor-Practitioner oflnternational Relations, University of the Pacific, Stockton, California. Strategic Com munications and the Decline of US Soft Power civilians actually make the policy. The US afftrmation of the preemptive use of force puts the military at the forefront of US strategic policy, just as the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq have overwhelmed and tended to color the perception about the rest of our policy. Thus, the increasingly dominant role and resource endow ment of DoD in strategic communications might actually worsen the impact on US soft power. While general flaws in US policy and deficiencies in the work of DoS may also contribute to the deterioration of America's international image, recent experience suggests that DoD dominance of strategic communications, and of for eign policy in general, may be increasingly responsible fo r the deterioration of US international standing. Opinions of the United States and American Soft Power Co ntinue to Decline Together Notwithstanding the global outpouring of sympathy for the United States follow ing the September 11, 200 1, terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, many observers noted a downturn in public support for the United States during 2002 that reflected widespread deterioration in opinions of the United States. The Pew Research Center for People and the Press reported in De cember 2002 that images of the United States had become increasingly tarnished in the publics of NATO allies, former East European nations, developing nations and especially Muslim nations and on a variety of dimensions.] That report went on to detail how pluralities had become critical of American unilateralism, but this did not extend to rejection, except in Muslim nations, of the approach the United States was taking to the war on terrorism. On the other hand, the report was prescient in recognizing that a potential war with Iraq might "further fuel anti-American sentiment." As the Pew Center expected, important policy actions, such as the invasion of Iraq, apparently caused a further deterioration in opinions of the United States. At titudes, even among allied nations, toward the US approach to the war on terrorism also turned sharply negative, and despite some break in the trend during 2005, the overall slide in global opinion of the United States continued to worsen and spread.2 Of course, this is a heavily nuanced phenomenon, and lots of other variables and the particular circumstances of each nation are important. This is also characteristic of the factors which are closely related to soft power, a nation's ability to attract and persuade others. Opinions are really a snapshot of people's orientations at a specific moment in time. Professor Joseph S. Nye, Jr., and a number of others have shown that soft power is also highly situational.3 While acknowledging the influence of other factors that 218 Gene E. Bigler contribute to anti-Americanism and the decline in soft power, Nye's perspective concurs with the observation of Australian foreign policy commentator Paul Kelly that: [TJhe lesson of Iraq is that the US's soft power is in decline. Bush wen t to war having failed to win a broader military coalition or UN authorization. This had two consequences: a rise in anti-American sentiment. lifting terrorist recruitment; and a higher cost to the US for the war and reconstruction effort.4 Besides the loss of soft power to influence the situation in Iraq, the growing anti Americanism and deterioration in opinions of the United States will influence our soft power in other contests as well. For instance, recent research on human rights shows that majorities in such allied nations as Great Britain and Germany no lon ger see the United States as an effective advocate of human rights.s Without enter ing into details, it is not surprising to hear corridor concerns and read blogger speculation about declining US soft power as a contributor to such differing for eign policy problems as cooperation in managing nuclear confrontations with Iran and North Korea, the improvement of multinational peacekeeping and humani tarian operations in Darfur, or even the advancement of America's trade agenda. This forum is not the place for a full exegesis of the way in which public diplo macy, strategic communications and propaganda are intertwined in wielding soft power. The broad tendencies ofinterest here and the degree of consensus about the interconnectivity among them was manifest in the use of a common frame of refer ence for our conference discussions provided in a timely article by Linda Robin son.6 In that article, Robinson describes a visit Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld made to the Army War College in March 2003 in which he lumped all these concepts into a broad "war of ideas" in which he believes America is doing a very poor job: "If I were grading,l would say we probably deserve a D or 0 plus as a country as to how well we're doing in the battle of ideas that's taking place in the world today.... " 7 Not surprisingly, Secretary Rumsfe1d has followed up his expression of con cern with some specific actions to study and improve the strategic communica tions morass in which America has been entrapped for several years. In this re gard, his reaction has been concrete and definitely action oriented because of his executive authority, but the realizations that prompted his action are not dissimi lar to the concerns that motivated the production of over thirty studies and rec ommendations within the US government over the last few years to address the problem of public diplomacy. Nor indeed has DoD been alone in trying to deal with the issue. In fact, prior to the recent actions in DoD, much of the effort had 219 Strategic Com munications and the Decline of US Soft Power been concentrated at DoS through the appointment of high proftle individuals to take charge of the public diplomacy effort. Prominent advertising executive Charlotte Beers was appointed under secretary for public diplomacy and public affairs in December 2002. She was followed by former State Department spokes person Margaret Tutwiler, and then after a two-and-a-half-year vacancy, the presi dent called on his campaign and White House communications adviser Karen Hughes to take the job and launch yet another refonn effort in the fall of 2005. In 2006, Secretary Rumsfeld proposed some important new initiatives, many of which will only get under way as this volume is being published. Despite the good intentions of aU those involved (and in which the author was also personally en gaged until July 2005), the hypothesis that informs this analysis is that the new stra tegic communications effort in DoD may, as we have seen to a certain degree with the increasing efforts and new leadership at DoS, actually be prelude to further worsening of the US image and a greater loss of soft power. It may even be possible that the increasing effort in strategic communications at DoD will actually aggra vateand further spread and deepen America's soft power problem. As suggested by the Pew study in 2002,S the fundamental problem is one of policy. This analysis takes that idea a step further by demonstrating that a fundamental part of the pol icy problem centers on the increasing visibility and ubiquity of the military in America's global communications. Indeed, this may be increasingly at the root of America's loss of soft power as we shall see later.9 Audience May Be as Crucial as the Message As mentioned previously, policy is the crucial issue for the deterioration in opin ions ofAmerica and American soft power. 10 Yet strategic communications plays an important role, and despite the increasing overall effort put forth by the United States, a good deal of the effort may even be counterproductive. One of the key problems is simply an inattention to audiences or attention to the wrong audi ences, especially at the highest levels of government. Implicitly, the US Executive Branch and Congress appear to have decided that they don't care about the opin ion of most of the English-speaking world and traditional American allies in West ern Europe. Congress has pushed for, and the Executive has complied with, the drastic reductions of public diplomacy spending, cut back or transferred out per sonnel, and curtailed the broadcasting of the Voice of America to countries that have been traditional friends and allies.